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PHMSASafetyRegulationsforGasTransmissionandGatheringPipelinesDocketnumberPHMSA-2011-0023 TomBender*Nehalem,Oregon*27June2016SUMMARY:Existingsafetyregulationsandtheirinterpretationandmodificationtotallyignorethemagnitudesofpotentialhazardsandimpactsonfacilitiesandthepublicexistingwiththescaleoftoday'sLNGfacilitiesandtankers,theglobalclimateofterrorismpotential,andhistoryofactualaccidents.Undertheseconditions,noapprovalforLNGtransport/import-exportfacilitiesshouldoccuruntiltheabovenotedinadequacieshavebeenresolved.1.THETRUEMAGNITUDESOFPOTENTIALHAZARDSHAVEBEENIGNORED:

• "Determinationof"ExclusionZone"requirementsforLNGfacilitieshaveshrunkenfroma"designaccident"(release)beingthecatastrophicreleaseoftheentirecontentsofthelargeststoragevesselonthesiteto"holesinselectedtransferlines".ThesetotallyignoretheimmensemagnitudeofpotentialenergyreleasepossiblewithLNGfacilities,waterandpipelinetransport."(Havens&Venart,2015)

• Today'slargestLNGtankershaveacapacityof70,000,000gallonsofLNG,withtheenergyequivalentof120to160Hiroshimabombs.Evenifonly1%ofthatcapacityignitedexplosively,itwouldhavegreaterimpactthantheHiroshimaatomicbomb.(Bender,2014)

• ThisdoesnottakeintoaccountLNGinstoragetanks,pipelines,andotherpetroleumproductsinvolvedinliquefactionofLNGfortransport.

• "OneoftheU.S.government'sresponsibleresponsestothemultipleterroristattackson911includedpreventingascheduledLNGshipfromenteringtheEverett,MA,terminal,holdingitoffshoreforseveraldaysbeforedirectingittoproceedtoElbaIsland,GAtounload.ThiswasduetoconcernsthatLNGfacilitiesinhighlypopulatedareasmightbeconsideredattractivetargetsforterroristattack.Thispotentialstillexists,butistotallyignoredbyallsafetyregulationsandagencies."(Havens&Venart,2015)

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(Bender,2014)

2.PUBLICSAFETYEXCLUSIONZONESARENOTBASEDONREALITIESOFHAZARDS:

• "FERCusesThermal&VaporExclusionZones,forpublicsafety,whicharebasedonasinglespillfromthelargesttransferlinefortenminutes.

• "AccordingtoDr.JamesFay,professoremeritusatMITandanexpertinLNGsafety,"Forallcrediblespills,includingterroristattacksonthestoragetankandLNGtanker,thedangerzoneforhumansextendsalmostfourmilesfromtheterminalsite."Thisdoesnotincludecascadingandexplosiveevents.

• "Themethodsusedtodeterminevapor-cloudexclusionzones,particularlytheuseof“mitigation”methodssuchasgas-imperviousconcretefencestopreventadvanceofvaporcloudsbeyondtheapplicant’spropertylines,couldincreasethepotentialforserious,evencatastrophic,vaporcloudexplosions.TheJCETerminalDEISappearstoignoreinternationalexperiencesofcatastrophicunconfinedvaporcloudexplosions(UVCE),atleastfourofwhichoccurredinthelastdecade,destroyingthefacilitiesinvolvedasaresultofcascadingevents.

• "TheJCEDEISfocusesprincipallyonargumentsdirectedtomeetingthe“letter”ofthefederalregulationsgoverningasingleindexofpublicsafety-mathematicalmodeledexclusionzones(safeseparationdistances)intendedtokeepthepublicoutofharm’sway.ButthisDEISrelies,forpredictionofexclusionzonedistances,ontheuseofmathematicalmodelswhichhavenotbeensubjectedtoadequate(openforpublic

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inspection)validationrequirementseitherbycomparisonwithexperimentaldataorindependentscientificpeerreview."Furthermore,thecalculationsoftheexclusiondistancesforvapordispersionandvapor-cloud-explosionhazardsdonotprovideanyevidenceofapplicabilityinnearcalmconditionscoupledwithrelianceonimpermeable(concrete)vaporfencesdesignedtoretardvaporcloudtravel."Untilthereisproducedbytheapplicantmeaningfulevidenceoftheaccuracyandapplicability-for-purposeofthesemodelingtechniques,andthatinformationismadeavailableforpublicevaluationandoversight,itmustbeconsideredthatthepotentialhazardsofstorage,handling,andshippingofsuchmassivequantitiesofenergyasareinvolvedinthisprojectcouldhavebeenseriouslyunderestimated.

• "Withthesehazard-worseningconditionsandthepresenceofdenselypackedprocessingequipmentandthevaporfenceswhichbecomeenvelopedinthecloud,onecouldhardlydesignthereleasestobettermaximizethepotentialforcatastrophicexplosionhazard."(Havens&Venart,2015)

• "AnalysisofaccidentsindicatesthatvaporcloudexplosionsareMORElikelywhenthequantityinthecloudisMOREthan10,000pounds."(edited)(Havens&Venart,2015)(70,000,000gallonsratherexceedsthisamount.)

• "Ahighenergyignitionsource(suchasafuel-airbomb)alsocontributestotheprobabilityofoccurrenceofavaporcloudexplosion.

• "Therehavebeenalargenumberofdevastatinghydrocarbonexplosions,particularlyBLEVEs,since1994.Finally,wenotethatthedesignspillsconsideredintheJCEDEISexceedthe10,000poundfiguresuggestedbyEPAasdemarcatingthesizebelowwhichUVCEsare“improbable”(seeemphasisaddedtextintheEPAreportquotedabove)byatleastafactorof10,andinthecaseofLNGspills,byafactorofperhaps300.(catastrophicreleasefargreater)

• "TheLNGspillsarehuge,andthevaporcloudsformedhavelineardimensionsofhundredsofmeters,withacorrespondingpotentialforexcessiveflameacceleration.

• "Secondaryexplosionsthatcouldboosttheexplosionprocessescannotbediscounted."(Havens&Venart,2015)

3.PIPELINETRANSPORTOFLNGISMOREHAZARDOUSTHANACKNOWLEDGED:

• PipelinessupplyingmanyproposedLNGfacilitieswouldpassthroughlandslide-sensitivegeology.Earthquakespresentanotherpotentialforseverepipelinefailures.Oregon,forexample,whereatleastfourterminalshavebeenproposed,isoverduefor3000-yearsubductionearthquake,withR9.5lateralmovement.Terrorismpotentialsexist.

• Since2000,therehavebeenover400pipelineaccidentsintheU.S.(Wiki)From1986to2013,therehavebeen8,000incidents(300/year)with$7billiondamage,spillingthreemilliongallonsofpetroleumproductsperyear.(CenterforBiologicalDiversity)Naturalgasisoneofthemoreexplosivematerialstransportedviapipelines.

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4.WATERTRANSPORTOFLNGHASUNACKNOWLEDGEDHAZARDS:

• WatertransportofLNGpresentsanothersignificantlyignoredhazard.TheColumbiaRiverBarisoneoftheworstintheworld,and"delaycosts"wouldpromptbarcrossingsbyLNGtankersinhazardousconditions.

• Locationofterminalsinpopulatedlocations,suchasBoston,causesLNGtransporttankerstobesignificantterroristtargets.

5.REGULATIONSHAVEBEENBASEDONTHEORETICAL,MATHEMATICALSTUDIES,NOTREALTESTSOREXPERIENCEFROMREALACCIDENTS.ACTUALEXPERIENCEWITHACCIDENTSINDICATESSIGNIFICANTLYGREATERHAZARDSTHAN"REGULATORYTHEORY":

• "DOT'sPipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafetyAdministration(PHMSA)hostedanin-depthdiscussionofwhatwentwrongduringaMarch2014explosionatanLNGfacilityinPlymouth,Wash.,thatledtofiveinjuriesand$72millioninpropertydamage.

• "DuringacongressionalhearinginApril2015,Rep.JackieSpeier,aDemocratfromSan

Francisco,pointedtothelethalanddestructivenaturalgaspipelineaccidentinSanBruno,Calif.

• "Latelastyear,(2015)aleakingAlisoCanyonundergroundgasstoragefacilityoutside

LosAngeles,operatedbySouthernCaliforniaGasCo.,promptedhandwringingthatregulatorswereunderprepared.

• "Naturalgasanditsliquidformareflammableandexplosiveinconfinedspaces,but

researcherssayit'snotpronetoexplodingwhenreleasedinlarge,openareas.That'snotthecaseforotherheavyhydrocarbonssuchaspropaneandethane,storageof

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whichoccursatlargeLNGexportfacilities.

• "TheconcernamongresearchersandregulatorsgrapplingwithhowtoregulateLNGsafetyisthepotentiallydeadlymixofliquidfuelsatanLNGsite.

• "ArecentpresentationbyGrahamAtkinson,aprincipalscientistintheMajorHazardsUnitoftheHealthandSafetyLabinBuxton,England,focusedonwhathappenswhenheavyhydrocarbonsexplode:industrialaccidentslinkedtoliquefiedpetroleumgas(LPG),LNG,gasolineandotherpetrochemicals:

"Researcherslookedat24vaporcloudexplosionsbutfocusedtheirattentiononfourmajorindustrialaccidentsatgasolinestoragesitesinBuncefield,England,in2005;Jaipur,India,in2009;SanJuan,PuertoRico,in2009;andatanLPGstoragesiteatVenezuela'sAmuayrefineryin2012.Thoseincidentstookplacewithinthelastdecadeandwereexplosionsofso-calledunconfinedvaporcloudsthatledtoaseriesofcascadingeventsthatultimatelydestroyedthefacilities."Atkinsonsaidanaccidentcanhappenundertwoconditions.Oneisasmallleakthat,afteraslittleas15minuteswithnowind,cancauseamassiveexplosionthatresemblesabombblastwithnoepicenter.Devastationisspreadevenlyacrosstherangeofthevaporcloud."Theotheraccidentscenarioisalargeleakonawindyday,whenclouddispersionfromthewindcannotkeepupwiththevolumeofgasreleased.That,too,createsacloudsizedexplosionzone."(Mandel,2016)(ThispotentialobviouslyexistswithcatastrophicreleaseofLNGfromatanker.)"Theresearchersalsolookedatcasesinwhichflashfiresturnedintoexplosions,findingthatinsomecasesaconfinedspaceoracongestedintersectionofpipingturnedafireintoablast."Inallbutoneoftheincidentsreviewed,whenaverylargecloudwasformed,therewasasevereexplosion,"Atkinsonsaid.Inlowwindconditions,vaporcloudsthataccumulatedfromsmall,sustainedleakscausedblastdamageandfatalitiesnearlyhalfamileormorefromthesource.AndifalargecloudofgasolineorLPGaccumulates,a"severeexplosion"islikely,Atkinsonsaid."(Mandel,2016)

• "Inallfourcasesthesecloudswereignited(presumablyaccidentally)andtheexplosionsresultedincascadingeventsleadingtocatastrophicdamagestothefacilities(refineries/tank-farms)andinjury/and/ordeathsinthepublicsector.Thefollowingfactsareamatterofrecordforallfour:

o Theeventsoccurredinverylowwind(nearcalmorcalm)weatherconditions.o Themaximumlinearextentsoftheflammablecloudswereatleast250meters,

rangingtoatleast650metersatAmuay.o UCVEsoccurredineverycasethatregisteredabove2.0ontheRichterScale.o Theinitiatingexplosionsresultedincascadingeventsleadingtototallossofthe

facilities."(Havens&Venart,2015)

• BasedonenergyfacilitysecuritystudieswedidinOregonGov.TomMcCall'sofficeduringthe1974OilCrisis,werealizedthathighlycomplextechnologicalculturesarehighlyvulnerabletounanticipatedaccidentsorintentionalharm.Consequently,I

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predicted9/11fifteenyearsinadvance,andstepsneededtoprevent.LNGtransportandfacilitiesareequallyhighlyvulnerableandimpactfultargets.(Bender,1986)

6.POTENTIALFORCATASTROPHICUNCONFINEDVAPORCLOUDEXPLOSIONS(UVCES):

• Terroristfuel-airbombingoftankerscreatespowerfulshockwaves,potentiallyimpactingstoragetanks,incoming/outgoingpipelines,andotherfacilities.Accidentalaircraftcrashesmayhavepotentialforsimilarcascadingevents.

• "WebelievetheJCEDEISfailstoprovideforprotectionofthepublicfromcrediblefireandexplosionhazards.TheconversionoftheJordanCovefacilityforexport,includingprovisionofgastreatmenttechnologyutilizingmixedhydrocarbonrefrigerantsforliquefactionandremovalofheavyhydrocarbonsfromthenaturalgasfeedtotheplant,presentshazardstotheprojectmoreserious(onaunitweightbasis)thanwithLNG."Webelievetheseadditionalhazardshavebeendiscountedwithoutsufficientscientificjustificationinspiteofmultipleinternationalreportsduringthelastdecadeofcatastrophicaccidentsinvolvingunconfined(hydrocarbon)vaporcloudexplosions.Itisclearthattheincreasedhazardsduetothepresenceofsignificantamountsofheavier-than-methanehydrocarbons,forwhichthereisconsiderablymoreextensiveresearchandaccidentexperiencethanforLNG-ONLYprojects,andwhichare“game-changing”inimportance,havebeenseriouslyunder-estimatedinthisDEIS."WebelievethehazardsattendingLNGexportfacilitiescouldhavethepotentialtorise,asaresultofcascadingevents,tocatastrophiclevelsthatcouldcausethenear-totalandpossiblytotallossofthefacility,includinganyLNGshipberthedthere.Suchaneventcouldpresentserioushazardstothepublicwellbeyondthefacilityboundaries."Wealsobelievethereremainssignificantpotentialforcascadingfireandexplosioneventsattending“LNGonly”storageandhandlingthathavenotbeensufficientlyaddressed,particularlyregardingtheworst-possiblecaseeventsthatshouldbeconsideredontheshoresidestoragetanksandmarineside(shiprelated),eitherbyaccidentorterroristactivity."(Havens&Venart,2015)

• Recentaccidentexperiencedemonstratesthatconditionsarebestforlargevaporcloudstoformifthereisamechanismforrapidevaporationofthespilledliquidandiftherearenearcalmconditionswhichpreventrapiddispersion.Suchobviouslyisthecasewithfuel-airbombterroristactionswhichhavecarefullybeenignored.

• "ThedesignspillsconsideredfortheJordanCoveExportTerminalfitbothcriteria;the

conditionsconsideredarelow-wind,nearcalm,andthematerialsarehighlyvolatile;mostvolatileintheorderofdecreasingcarboncontent:methane,ethylene,propane,andpentane."ThesimplefactisthatwhilethevaporcloudsconsideredinthisDEISarepreventedbyphysicalbarriers(vaporfences)fromposingavaporcloudhazardextendingmuchbeyondthepropertyline,theholdupofverylargequantitiesofflammablehydrocarbonsbythevaporfencescausesthegasestoaccumulate,withspreadinglargelydrivenbygravityspreading,soastocompletelyfilltheaffectedareastodepthsofafewmeters,withlargeportionsofthosegascloudshavingconcentrationsbetween

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theflammablelimits."SecondaryimpactsofsuchexplosionswouldcauserapidevaporationofLNGandpotentiallargevaporcloudexplosions."(Havens&Venart,2015)

7.NOSAFETYREGULATIONSAREADEQUATEWHENREAL-LIFEHISTORYSHOWSTHEMIGNOREDBYPUBLICAGENCIES,OR"TWEAKED"TOFALSIFYREALRISKS:

• Inreviews/approvalsoffourproposedLNGterminalsinOregon,notasinglestateorfederalagencyacknowledgedANYpotentialterrorismtargetissues,orsafetyissuesfromlocatingterminalfacilitiesacrossfromrunwaysofpublicairportsinlocationswith100mphwindsand100"ofrain.

• "FERCfinalizedJordanCove'sEISinSept'15,makingNOMENTIONofHavensandVenart'scommentsofexportrisksfarexceedingimportrisks,ofignoredcascadinghazards."(Mandel,2016)

• "Initially,"designaccident"(release)wastakenasthecatastrophicreleaseoftheentirecontentsofthelargeststoragevesselonthesite."Itlaterwaschangedtothe“guillotine”severanceofthelargesttransferlineinthefacility,withthereleasedurationassumedtobetenminutes,orashortertimeiftheapplicantcoulddemonstratetheabilitytolimitthespillduration(suchasbyincorporationofemergencyshutdownprocedures)."Therefollowedtheadoptionofaprovisionbywhichanalternativereleaserateandtotalamount(termedan“accidentalleakagerate(ACR)spill”canbesubmittedbytheapplicantforapproval.SuchACRspillsaretypicallyspillsfromsmallerlines(suchasbranchorinstrumentlines)ratherthanthelargestlinescarryingthehazardousmaterial."Theregulationprovisionsnowallowconsiderationofevensmallerreleasesfrom“holes”intheselectedlines."Inouropinionthesedevelopmentscanonlybeunderstoodasresultingfrompressuresontheapplicantstoseekapprovalofsmallerandsmallerrequiredexclusiondistancedeterminations.ButtherequirementsplacedontheapplicanttodemonstratetheprobabilityorlackthereofofthedifferentkindsofreleasesassumedfordesignationasanACRarenotsufficientlyquantified–theprocessappearstobelargelya“good-faith”decisionreachedjointlybytheapplicantandtheDOT/FERCstaffs.Inourjudgmentthisisnotgoodscienceorengineering;itisindicativeofregulationthatfacilitatesfacilityapproval–potentiallyattheexpenseofpublicsafety."(Havens&Venart,2015)

8.EVENGREATERHAZARDSEXISTWITHLNGTHATOVERRIDEANYPOTENTIALREGULATORYAPPROVALPARAMETERS:

• ItismyperceptionthatroutinetransferofLNGisnotsupportableunderANYsafetyregulations:

o GlobalwarmingimpactsofANYextendinguseoffossilfuels,suchasnewLNGfacilities,willcreateinundation,stormdamage,andotherimpactsfarexceedinganybenefits.

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o TheprocessesinvolvedwithLNGofpumping,liquefaction,transportbyship

halfwayaroundtheworld,re-evaporation,conversiontoelectricity,anditstransportconsume75%to80%oftheenergyinthefuel.Suchwasteofanirreplaceableresourceisunacceptable.Useinareaofproduction,withoutliquefaction,isfarlesswasteful.

o Theoreticalanalysiswithoutany"real"testingisunsupportableasbasisforregulationswiththemagnitudeofpotentialhazardsinvolved.

o Cascadinghazardeventsofthemagnitudesinvolvedcannotbepredicted.CONCLUSIONS:NoapprovalforLNGtransport/import-exportfacilitiesshouldoccuruntiltheabovenotedinadequacieshavebeenresolved.

*"AssessingExplosionHazardsOfLargeHydrocarbonCloudsFormedInCalmConditions:AreWeDoingItWrong?"JerryHavens,DepartmentofChemicalEngineering,UniversityofArkansas,USA.55thUKELGMeetingon“DispersionandConsequencesofLNGReleases”April26,2016-HSELaboratory,BuxtonDerbyshire.*"UnitedStatesLNGTerminalSafe-SitingPolicyIsFaulty"JordanCoveExportTerminalDraftEnvironmentalImpactStatementDocketNo.CP13-483JerryHavensandJamesVenart,January14,2015.*"NaturalGas:ExplosiveLNGIssuesGrabPHMSA'sAttention",JennyMandel,E&Ereporter,EnergyWire:Tuesday,June7,2016.*"StatementInOppositionToApprovaloftheJordanCoveLNGTerminalProposal",TomBender,11December2014.*"TheEndofNuclearWar",TomBender.December,1986.