phronesis volume 19 issue 1 1974 [doi 10.2307%2f4181923] gary young -- socrates and obedience

Socrates and ObedienceAuthor(s): Gary YoungSource: Phronesis, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1974), pp. 1-29Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181923 .Accessed: 22/08/2013 21:18

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Socrates and Obedience GARY YOUNG

I. The problem

Students of Plato have long puzzled over what seems to be a contradiction in the views expressed by Socrates in Apology and Crito.

In Apology, Socrates asserts: (I) I shall not give up philosophy, even if the city commands me to

doso. (Ap.29d)1 But in Crito, Socrates asserts or implies: (II) Every citizen (including myself) should obey every command

of the city. (Cr. 50 a-53 a)2 From these two claims, it follows fairly straightforwardly3 that Socrates will give up philosophy and will not give up philosophy, if the city commands him to give up philosophy.

This contradiction4 has called forth two responses from commen- tators:

This reading rests upon the crucial phrase neia%,ut 8l sLaXXov 'rjci , 4 l..... Oi) n O)vesLOt 9?0,oaoqP&v 29 d 3-5, which makes it clear (i) that Socrates is envisioning a conflict between what the city says and what the god says, for otherwise he would not have to obey one rather than (aLFtXXov... i3...) the other; (ii) that therefore Socrates must be supposing the city to have told him to do something that requires him to disobey the god, and this, as the context makes clear, is to cease doing philosophy - it is not, as 29 c 5-dl might otherwise suggest, either to cease philosophy or to submit to death; (iii) that Socrates will obey or be persuaded by the god, hence will not be persuaded by (will disobey) the city - note the emphatic double negative. Of course the city never actually commands Socrates to give up philosophy. 2 For evidence of this claim in Crito, see note 18. 3 The derivation requires two further assumptions: Roughly, that Socrates will do what he says in (I) he will do, and that Socrates will do what he should do. ' It is not strictly speaking a contradiction, for it has the form 'If P, then Q and not-Q.' But since it is possible that P, it follows that it is also possible that Q and not-Q, and this follows whether or not the city ever actually commands Socrates to give up philosophy. So Socrates seems at least committed to the position that it is possible that both Q and not-Q, even though he may never be confronted with the problem of both giving up and not giving up philosophy, both at the same time. Even if Socrates is not guilty of believing a contradiction, he surely seems to hold that an inconsistent proposition (Q and not-Q) is consistent, which is bad enough. To simplify matters, I shall talk throughout this paper as though we were dealing with a contradiction.

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(1) The contradiction between (I) and (II) is merely verbal or apparent; that is, Socrates is not really contradicting himself in asserting (I) and (HI), because he has in mind a qualification of either (I) or (II) [usually (II) is picked for this role], which has the effect of limiting the applicability of (I) to one set of cases, and the applicability of (II) to a wholly different set of cases, so that (I) and (II) could never both apply to the same situation.5

(2) The contradiction between (I) and (II) is not merely apparent; it is ineluctable. No reconciliation between (I) and (II) is possible, and Socrates holds contradictory views.6

But neither (1) nor (2) is satisfactory. (1) is unsatisfactory because none of the distinctions purported to resolve the contradiction between (I) and (II) can be found in either of the dialogues, at least in such a way as to indicate that Socrates would use them to resolve the contradiction.7 All the variants of view (1) thus far suggested, to my knowledge, impose upon Socrates a position he did not hold, so far as our evidence shows. Unfortunately, to reject (1) seems to be to embrace (2), and (2) has decidedly unpleasant consequences. For (2) ascribes to Plato - or at least to Socrates - an inconsistency so obvious and bothersome that it is hard to believe that Plato and/or Socrates could have overlooked it, or, if they did not overlook it, could have left it standing.

Now (1) and (2) agree on one crucial assumption: That the two dialogues are meant to be literal expressions of the views of Plato and/or Socrates. Both views restrict themselves to considering what Socrates says in the dialogues - his very words - and both views assume that when Socrates says something in either dialogue, he (or Plato) means it, i.e. he (or Plato) believes that it is true - with the exception of a few obvious jokes and ironies, such as his statement, at the start of Apology, that his accusers spoke so persuasively that they almost persuaded him. In other words, both (1) and (2) agree in taking (I) and (II) to be assertions that Socrates regards as true;

5 Thus A. D. Woozley, 'Socrates on Disobeying the Law,' in Gregory Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 299-318, esp. 306-308. 6 Thus Howard Zinn, in Disobedience and Democracy (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 28: 'We forget that Plato was not a democrat, and that Socrates violates in the Crito that spirit he showed in the Apology, at his trial.' 7 See note 19 for an illustration of this difficulty as it arises in Woozley's account.

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view (1) then attempts to find meanings for (I) and (II) such that the two propositions are not inconsistent, and view (2) denies that this can be done.

Both (1) and (2), by proceeding in this way, ignore the dramatic setting of the dialogues. They focus on Socrates' very words, and ignore the fact that Socrates addresses those words to two different audiences with two presumably different purposes in mind. This consideration opens up the possibility that Socrates does not believe both (I) and (II), that his uttering of (I) and/or (II) is to be explained at least in part in terms of the audiences and purposes he has in the two dialogues, and not merely in terms of a desire or intention to speak what he believes to whomever he is addressing.8 In order to S There is a fourth approach to our problem, besides (1), (2), and the one pro- posed here, but I think it too should be rejected. On this interpretation, which Grote seems to have held, (I) and (II) are regarded (correctly) as inconsistent; but instead of letting the inconsistency stand as an implicit indictment of Socrates and/or Plato, as does position (2), or explaining the inconsistency as a function of Socrates' different audiences and purposes in the two dialogues, as does my interpretation, this fourth approach explains the inconsistency as the result of Plato's different purposes in writing the dialogues. According to Grote, Crito "appears intended by Plato - as far as I can pretend to guess-at his purpose - to set forth the personal character and dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which they present in the Apology. In defending himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its institutions ... In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts, Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they justified by some of his public remarks... Xenophon in his Memorabilia recognises this impression as prevalent among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton" (Plato [London, 1875], I, 300-302).

It is not clear whether Grote would go so far as to say that the question of whether Socrates believed (I) and (II) is irrelevant, on the ground that the Socrates of Apology is a different character than the Socrates of Crito, so that there is no one Socrates of whom the question could be asked. If Grote would go that far - and I think this would be the most consistent development of his position - then he has an interpretation of the two dialogues that is a competitor to (1), (2), and my own. These three interpretations all assume that there is sufficient dramatic or historical continuity between the Socrates of the Apology and the Socrates of the Crito that this question is intelligible.

If Grote too assumed this, however, he would have to take a stand on the question of whether Socrates believed (I) and (II), which means, since he thinks (I) and (II) are inconsistent, that he has to take a stand on whether

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show that this is the case - that, as I wish to argue, Socrates does not believe (II) - we cannot, of course, depend merely upon the possibility that he would speak differently to different audiences and with different purposes. We must explain in detail what it is about Socrates' audiences and purposes in the two dialogues that might reasonably lead him to misrepresent his beliefs in one dialogue or the other. The following is an attempt to analyze the dramatic and argumenta- tive structure of Crito in such a way as to explain this.

II. Crito and the many To test our interpretation, we must arrive at some reasonable opinion about Socrates' audience and purpose(s) in Crito: in other words, we must find out who Crito is (or, what I shall take to be the same, who Socrates thinks Crito is), and what Socrates is trying to do in speaking with Crito as he does. I shall ignore evidence concerning Crito to be found outside Crito and Apology.

Just before the middle of the dialogue, Socrates states the question he and Crito are to answer: Is it dikaion (48 b) for Socrates to try to get away without the permission of the Athenians? Socrates, but not Crito, thinks it is not, and the rest of the dialogue is devoted to his presentation of arguments purporting to establish this opinion.

How did this question arise? Earlier in the dialogue Crito had

my interpretation or (2) is correct. In this case, his interpretation (that the inconsistency is a result of Plato's purposes in writing the dialogues) is not a competitor, but complementary, to either (2) or my position.

But whether or not Grote makes this assumption, his account of Plato's purpose in writing Crito is unacceptable. Only the speeches of "the laws" support Grote's claim that the purpose of Crito is that Socrates "be brought back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and exculpated from the charge of incivism" (Grote, p. 303). Grote recognizes that the first half of the dialogue is at odds with this account: "It is thus that the dialogue Kriton embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct elements - constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality" (Grote, p. 304). But what Grote calls "Sokratic individuality" (and astonishingly enough identifies as the Protagorean doctrine of homo mensura, p. 305), is just the familiar contrast that Socrates draws between himself and the many, to the detriment of the many. Grote says that Plato wrote Crito to exculpate Socrates from the charge of incivism, and thus Plato must have addressed the dialogue to those most likely to make such a charge, namely the many. What Grote fails to explain is why Plato should then make Socrates begin the dialogue with an all-out attack upon the opinions of the many. (Cf. Paul Friedlander, Plato [New York, 1964], II, 172.)

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bombarded Socrates with a series of considerations designed to show that Socrates should flee (44 b-46 a). In those arguments Crito appeals twice to what is dikaion: At 44 e-45 a he says that Socrates should not worry about the punishment Crito might receive if caught helping Socrates to flee - that all they should be concerned with is that Crito do what is dikaion. And at 45 c, Crito says that it isn't dikaion for Socrates to betray himself, i.e. to do exactly what his enemies want. But Crito never explains why it is dikaion for Socrates to flee, or for Crito to help him flee. The closest he comes to explaining this is in his disturbing suggestion that what one's enemies want one to do is the opposite of to dikaion: we are reminded of the view of dikaion advanced by Polemarchus in Republic I. When Socrates later states the basic question in terms of what is dikaion, he is ap- pealing to a concept for which Crito has some liking, but concerning which Crito is clearly confused, at least from a Socratic viewpoint.

This confusion is expressed more clearly in several of Crito's other statements. At 44 b-c he points out that if Socrates doesn't flee, people will think that Crito wouldn't take the trouble to save Socrates. To this, Socrates replies that what the many (hoi polloi) think is irrelevant; we should heed only what the most reasonable people (epieikestatoi) think. Crito rejoins that the many can do the greatest of evils to one, if one has a bad reputation with them. But Socrates objects that the many cannot make a person wise or foolish - that is, they can do neither the greatest good nor the greatest evil. One might think that Socrates, in saying this, had made his point clearly enough. But later (45 d-46 a) Crito appeals to courage (the only virtue he mentions other than to dikaion) to prove that Socrates should flee - arguing not that only a coward wouldn't try to escape, but rather that people wiU think Socrates a coward if he doesn't try to escape, and think Crito a coward if he fails to help Socrates.9

At 48 c, Socrates brushes aside these arguments, as well as several others advanced by Crito (that Crito has enough money, 45 a-b, and that Socrates is abandoning his children, 45 c-d), as arguments of the many. Rather than consider these arguments, Socrates says, we should consider only whether or not it is dikaion to flee (cf. Ap. 29 d-e).

What does this tell us about Crito? According to Socrates, most if not all of the considerations Crito has advanced are considerations typical 9 It is odd that people wouldn't think Socrates more of a coward for fleeing death, but Crito's instinct on this matter strikes me as right.

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of the many. Central among the considerations persuasive to the many are those concerning reputation, i.e. concerning what the many think of one. Thus Crito is concerned not with courage, but with the reputation of courage; he wants others to regard him and Socrates as brave. There is, furthermore, a suggestion that Crito identifies the virtues he wishes others to ascribe to him - the virtues themselves as opposed to the reputation or appearance of having the virtues - with the opposite of what his enemies wish for him. Here again we find Crito's thought stated in terms of the opinions of others. He wishes others to have a certain opinion of him, and the opinion he wishes them to have of him is a function of still other opinions others have. Finally, and perhaps the cornerstone of these attitudes of the many (cf. Glaucon's decription of the social contract, Republic II), is the fear of what the many can do to a person of whom they have a bad opinion: they can do the very worst thing, viz. put one to death.

Crito is one of the many. The dialogue Crito makes this clear. For this reason, there is an abyss between Crito's opinions and those of Socrates, as Socrates hints at one point in the dialogue. There, speaking of the Socratic principle that one ought never to do wrong to anyone, Socrates says:

Take care, Cnrto, lest in agreeing to this you agree contrary to your opinion. For I know that only a few think and will think this. Those who think this and those 1who don't have no common counsel, but must think little of each other, seeing each other's opinions. (49 d, my emphasis)

Despite the evidence the context of this passage might seem to give to the contrary assertion (I shall discuss this in the next section), it is clear that Crito is not one of the few, but one of the many, and that therefore he will not be able to understand, or at least to understand properly and fully, the Socratic principles. Insofar as such principles are decisive for Socrates' decision not to flee Athens, Crito will be unable to understand the reasons for that decision. And if Socrates wishes to persuade Crito that it is not dikaion for Socrates to flee Athens, he will not be able to rely upon Socratic principles as a means of persuasion: the Socratic principles, at least by themselves, will leave Crito unmoved.

III. Crito and Socrates The question Crito and Socrates are to discuss is whether it is dikaion

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for Socrates to flee - where to dikaion is not tied to the opinions or deeds of the many. To get the question posed in this way, Socrates has had to struggle with Crito. Crito has repeatedly raised the question of what the many will say and think and do (44 b-c, 44 d, 45 c, 45 d-46 a, and 48 b, where Socrates baits Crito). Nonetheless, Crito finally agrees with Socrates concerning the question to be discussed, agrees that the views of the many are not relevant to Socrates' decision. This seems to be evidence that Crito is not merely or even one of the many, that he is something more or other than one of the many.

Crito is Socrates' fnrend. He is of the same age and deme as Socrates (Ap. 33 d-e), and he and Socrates have often discussed in the past such matters as they discuss in Crito (46 b-47 a, 48 b, 49 a-b). Often in the past Crito has heard, and agreed to, the Socratic principles that Socrates will once more invoke in Crito: even the incredible para- dox that wrongdoing is bad for the wrongdoer (49 d). How could Crito be one of the many?

But notice that, so far as Crito's participation in the discussion is concerned, Crito falls into three parts:

1) 43 a46 a: Crito presents to Socrates a series of arguments he hopes will persuade Socrates to flee Athens to avoid his death; So- crates characterizes these as arguments of the many and rejects them.

2) 46 b49 e: Crito is reminded by Socrates of certain things that he and Socrates had in many earlier discussions agreed upon, but which Crito has forgotten, at least in 43 a-46 a; these reminders contradict the views of the many.

3) 50 a-end: Crito makes but five speeches, each a single short sentence in length, for, as Crito says (50 a), he doesn't understand what Socrates is talking about; Crito's place as the interrogated is taken by Socrates, who introduces the fictional "laws" to interrogate himself.

From this brief review of the dialogue, we can see that insofar as Crito takes an active part in initiating the discussion (43 a46 a), he takes the position of the many. But he is capable of being reminded of certain Socratic principles that are at odds with the views of the many (46 b49 e), even though he cannot apply those principles himself (and hence drops out from 50 a to the end). To show that Crito is not one of the many, we must show that he grasps the Socratic principles held only by the few. But all the evidence points to the conclusion that Crito's grasp of those principles is tenuous. He can be

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reminded of them, and can be led to assent to them, at least by Socrates, after some discussion. But Crito has not made those principles his own: he does not act upon them, or even remember them, when faced with the crisis of Socrates' death-sentence; he cannot apply them by himself. No doubt Crito has been touched and to an extent changed by his friendship with Socrates; but the change falls far short of a conversion to Socratic principles, or even of an active understanding of those pnnciples. Crito is not merely one of the many, he is also a friend of Socrates; but nonetheless Crito is one of the many.

In 43a46a the Socratic principles are driven from Crito's mind by his sorrow over Socrates' approaching death. Unlike Socrates, who at the start of the dialogue is just waking from sound sleep, Crito is sleepless and sorrowful (43b); Socrates is interested in discussing his curious dream, but Crito cannot hear what the dream has to say and immediately plunges into his exhortation to Socrates. Later Socrates appeals to Crito, with irony Crito seems to miss, saying: "You, in human probability, are not going to die tomorrow, and therefore your judgment will not be distorted by present circumstance" (46 e-47 a). But of course it is Crito, not Socrates, who is beside himself over Socrates' imminent death; he has forgotten, if he ever knew, that "it is not living which we should consider most important, but living well" (48 b). In precisely the sort of situation to which Socratic principles apply most strikingly, Crito has forgotten them completely.

Nevertheless Socrates and Crito are friends, perhaps as close as two people could be, given the huge gap between their opinions. There seems to be no reason to doubt Socrates' sincerity when he says (48 e) that he wants to act with Crito's approval.

IV. Why Socrates speaks with Crito as he does

Crito and Socrates are friends. Crito will grieve Socrates' death deeply, and Socrates is concerned to ease Crito's sorrow as much as possible. Yet Crito is one of the many. As such, he will not be moved by the considerations that are decisive for Socrates. For Socrates to reconcile Crito to his (Socrates') death, Socrates must therefore use arguments different from those he himself regards as decisive. What Socrates says in Crito therefore cannot be taken, without further argument, to be a statement of his own or Plato's own beliefs.

It is possible, indeed likely, that Crito could be fully reconciled to Socrates' death only on Socratic principles, i.e. only by accepting the

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view that "it is not living which we should consider most important, but living well," where 'living well' is given Socratic content (44 d, 48 b). Therefore Socrates will presumably present Crito with as close an approximation to the Socratic position as will succeed in easing Crito's sorrow, for that will most ease his sorrow.

We have now reached a position from which we can profitably return to our initial problem, the inconsistency between Apology and Crito. The foregoing considerations show, I believe, that to prove that Socrates regards (II) as true, it is not enough to point to the fact that he asserts (II) in his talk with Crito. This is not enough, because Socrates' intent in talking with Crito is not to explain to Crito why he (Socrates) is not going to flee, but to move Crito to accept Socrates' decision not to flee. And to do this, Socrates will have to use at least some arguments that he himself does not find compelling. To show that Socrates regards (II) as true, therefore, we would have to show that (II) is not one of the considerations aimed merely at persuading Crito, not one of the considerations directed to the many. Later (in Section XII) I shall argue that (II) is introduced by Socrates for no other reason than to persuade Crito.

One might object that on the one hand we have said that Socrates invokes Socratic principles to persuade Crito, yet we have also said that Crito, one of the many, does not understand those principles sufficiently to be persuaded by them. On this reading of the dialogue, it seems, Socrates' attempt to persuade Crito should be an ill-conceived failure. But though Socrates does invoke the Socratic principles in Crito, those principles play much less of a role in the arguments of Crito than a reading of 49 a-e might lead one to suspect. I shall attempt to show this below by an analysis of the arguments given by the laws. The Socratic principles are less important as premisses in the arguments of the laws than as touchstones for the quality of Crito's soul.

Now let us turn to the second half of Crito, where we expect to find an attempt to answer the question of whether it is dikaion for Socrates to flee.

V. The two principles concerning to dikaion (49 a-e) The question, Crito agrees with Socrates, is whether it is dikaion for Socrates to try to escape from prison and Athens without the permission of the Athenians (48 b-d). Socrates immediately asks Crito to consider the archi (principle or beginning) of the inquiry, and lays down a pair of propositions to which Crito gives quick assent.

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The first of these preliminary propositions is presented in two forms. The first version is:

(a) One must not do wrong (adikein) even when wronged. (49 a-c). This is derived from the prior assertion that one must in no way do wrong, which in turn is derived from the assertion that to do wrong is in every way bad and shameful for the wrongdoer (cf. 47 d-48 a). (Socrates apparently assumes that one must in no way do that which is in every way bad and shameful to oneself - hardly a controversial assumption.) A second version of this proposition is derived from (a) by substituting 'doing harm' (xocxW 7tOLe-V or xoxoupy?-v) for 'doing wrong' (adikein) (and similarly 'harmed' for 'wronged'); Socrates says there is no difference between doing wrong and doing harm. Thus we have:

(a') One must not do harm, even when harmed oneself. (49 c) The second proposition, presented very briefly, is:

(b) A person ought to do what he/she has agreed to do, if what he/ she has agreed to do is dikaion. (49 e)

The expression translated 'if what he/she has agreed to do is dikaion' - viz. 'dikaia onta' - could mean either "if it is permitted by justice" or "if it is required by justice." Presumably it means the former, however; if it meant the latter, there would be no need for the agreement: One should do what is required, whether one has agreed to do it or not.10 This reading is sufficient for the purposes to which the principle is later put, moreover. Indeed, throughout most of Crito, "permissible" seems to catch the sense of 'dikaion' best.

Socrates presents both these propositions as principles of the inquiry (Iq axkicoq 'vv &pxiv 48 e; &pX608c e'wi3,t5v 49 d; ex 'TOu(ov &*pzL 49e). But as starting-points they suffer from two flaws. They are put for- ward dogmatically, with little pretense at proof. The claim upon which (a) and (a') rest, that wrongdoing is bad for the wrongdoer, cries out for proof, as the most superficial reader of Republic wil have learned; and the discussion at 47 d-48 a is woefully inadequate. According to Socrates, (a) and (a'), though perhaps not (b), are taken over from old discussions between Crito and himself, without any new examination.

10 Cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato (London, 1929), p. 171, note 1; also Paul Shorey, "Notes on Plato, Crito 49 e-50 a," Classical Journal, vol. II (1906), p. 80. I would deny the last assertion Taylor makes here, that "we see in the sequel that the tacit 'compact' by which Socrates is pledged to the v6[LOL or xoLv6v of Athens involves nothing but what is strictly licitum." See the last paragraph of Section X.

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Perhaps we should charitably regard them as hypotheses, in something like the sense(s) of the middle dialogues.

Second, although the 'adikein' of (a) and the 'dikaia onta' of (b) appear to make these principles relevant to the question of whether it would be dikaion for Socrates to escape, this appearance is misleading. For in posing the question as he has - whether it is dikaion for him to escape - Socrates has explicitly supposed (and Crito with him) that if it turns out not to be dikaion for Socrates to escape, then Socrates should not try to escape (see 48 c-d). Thus the question that they must resolve is whether it is dikaion for Socrates to escape, not whether Socrates and Crito should do what is dikaion. But principles (a), (a') and (b) tell us nothing about what counts as dikaion, and therefore seem to be of no help in answering the question Socrates has posed.

(b) seems the most promising of the three, in this respect, for one might suppose that it says it is dikaion to keep one's promises, and contrary to to dikaion to break them. But it says no such thing: It only says that promises are to be kept (7roLiov), if they are promises to do something dikaion, i.e. permissible. So far we have no hint why it is not dikaion for Socrates to flee.

VI. Crito and the laws of Athens ( 49e- 50a) Socrates now asks the obvious question, "What bearing do these principles have upon the question of whether I should run away?"

Observe in the light of these whether, if we go away from here without persuading the city, we are doing harm (kakds poioumen), and doing it to those to whom we least ought to do it, or not; and whether we are standing by the things we agreed to do, things which are dikaia. (49 e-50 a)

Upon hearing this, Crito drops out of the conversation. He pleads that he doesn't understand these questions and therefore cannot answer them. Socrates thereupon introduces the laws of Athens (oL v4pLt xocl T6 xmov6v rr 7t46Xew 50 a), and after that point Crito has but four one-sentence speeches in the remaining five Stephanus pages. Crito's difficulty is obvious enough: He has no idea to what harm and what agreement Socrates could be referring. The laws are ideally suited to explain this to Crito, for it is the laws which, Socrates seems to think, will be harmed by his flight, and it is the laws with whom he seems to think he made an agreement which he will break if he flees.

The laws enter the dialogue at the point at which Crito becomes

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silent. But they do not take his place. Rather, Socrates takes Crito's place and opinions, and the laws take Socrates' place. Instead of Socrates questioning Crito, now the iaws question Socrates. But of course this is a misleading way to describe what goes on: in fact, Socrates, playing the laws, questions Socrates, pretending he is about to flee Athens.

The entry of the laws has at least a double effect upon Crito. First, Crito, never a strong dialectician, is no longer pitted against Socrates in the discussion; he is taken off the hook. Socrates, not Crito, will defend Crito's opinion, insofar as it gets a defense at all (in fact, it gets very little defense, for Socrates merely sets himself up as a target for the laws' arguments, and never seriously attempts to respond to those arguments). Second, the laws and the city are presumably more awesome in Crito's eyes, endowed with a more impersonal and a higher authority, than Socrates. That the laws object to Crito's proposal will seem to him a much weightier reason to give it up, than that Socrates disagrees with it.

For both these reasons, Socrates' introduction of the laws is a clever move. But we might suspect still a third motive at work. "The laws" are Socrates' creatures; they say what he makes them say. This is true even though it is easy while reading the dialogue to imagine that one is really listening to the laws of Athens talk. Why doesn't Socrates say in his own person what he makes "the laws" say? Perhaps merely because of the effect "the laws" have upon Crito. But perhaps he puts these speeches into the mouths of the laws also because Socrates himself does not hold all the opinions they express. In any event, it would seem to require some evidence to show that what Socrates imagines the laws to say is what Socrates himself believes. (One might suppose that Socrates' speech at 54 d (in his own person) provides the needed evidence; I shall consider it in Section XII).

VII. The arguments of the laws

The laws present four distinct arguments to show Socrates that he should not carry out his supposed intention to flee Athens. That is, Socrates presents Crito with four distinct arguments against Crito's proposal that Socrates flee Athens: (A) By running away Socrates intends to destroy the city and its

laws (50 a-c). (B) Socrates stands to the city and laws as slave to master and as

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child to parent, and therefore he must submit to them (50 c-51 c). (C) Socrates has made an agreement with the laws, an agreement

whose terms require that Socrates stay to meet his death (51 c- 53 a).

(D) Socrates' flight will have bad effects upon his friends, himself, and his children (53 a-54 b).

At or near the end of each of these arguments but the first, Crito agrees, in response to a question from Socrates, that the laws have established their point. However, when the laws have presented their first argument, Socrates suggests that one might rebut them by pointing out that "the city wronged me and did not judge the case rightly"; Crito seizes upon this objection.

From the way the dialogue has developed to this point, we might expect that these arguments will all turn upon (a), (a') and (b). (D) is wholly independent of (a), (a') and (b). (A) relies upon (a'), (B) upon (a), and (C) upon (b). But in none of these arguments are (a), (a') or (b) stated explicitly. "The laws" seem interested in playing down these principles, and turning Crito's attention elsewhere. Let us now turn to these arguments, to see what indications, if any, we can find of Socrates' intent in giving them.

VIII. Argument (A): Destruction o/ the city (50 a-c) The laws say:

Are you not intending, by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire city, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that that city can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are disregarded and undermined by private persons? (50 a-b)

Filling in several more or less obvious unstated steps, the argument seems to proceed as follows: 1. If the decisions made by the courts of a city are disobeyed,

then the city and its laws will be destroyed. 2. If Socrates runs away, he will disobey the decision made by the

courts of Athens that he should die. 3. From 1 and 2: If Socrates runs away, he will be destroying

Athens and its laws, so far as he is able (t4 a&6 ,uepos). (a'). One must not do harm, even when harmed oneself.

4. To destroy something is to harm it. 5. From 3, (a'), and 4: Socrates must not run away.

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Only 1 and 3 are stated in the text. On this analysis, the conclusion follows from 1, 2, (a'), and 4. Step 2 is unobjectionable. Thus any criticism of the argument must turn on the question of its validity and on the question of whether 1, (a'), and 4 are acceptable.11

(A) is the only argument of the laws to which Socrates and Crito object in any way. The objection, suggested by Socrates and quickly accepted by Crito, is that "The city wronged (+&xet) me and did not judge the case rightly (6pXio) (50 b-c). (Crito at this point utters one of the two oaths he makes in the dialogue, Tauta ne Dia, 50 c, cf. 43 b.) But what does this objection mean? To what step in the argument is it directed?

The objection can be taken in either of two ways, against either (a') or 1. Taken as an objection to (a'), it says: Because the city wronged or harmed Socrates, Socrates has the right to return harm to the city. Taken as an objection to 1, it says: Because the city wronged or harmed Socrates, his failure to follow the command o/ the city will not tend to destroy the city. The text favors neither interpretation; the objection is dropped as soon as it is made, and Socrates moves on to argument (B). If Socrates were to accept this objection (it is unclear whether or not he does), he would have to regard it as an objection to step 1; his commitment to (a') is too strong for him to reject it. But we might suspect that Crito seizes on it so eagerly because he regards it as an objection to (a'); we recall that Crito's acceptance of (a') is shaky.

If we take the objection to be directed against (a'), we encounter a problem that runs throughout the last half of Crito: understanding what (or who) "the laws" are. Later in the dialogue, Socrates has 11 I pointed out earlier that (a') gives no content to the notion of to dikaion, and therefore is no help in determining whether it is dikaion for Socrates to flee, which is the question we wish to answer. In argument (A), content is given to the notion of dikaion by step 4. (Compare step 3 of argument (B), and 7 in (C).) For (a') is just another way to say (a) One must not do wrong (adikein), even when wronged; and similarly, then, it would seem that 4 is equivalent to 4'. To destroy something is to do wrong (adikein), from which we get 4". To destroy something is not dikaion. From 3 and 4" it follows that it is not dikaion for Socrates to flee, which with (a) gives 5. But step 4 is unargued; we are not given any reason to suppose that destruction is never dikaion, and such a claim seems absurd on the face of it. Do we - and does Socrates - wish to accept: 4"'. From 4": To destroy something bad to make something good is not dikaion.

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the laws say to him that "you will go away wronged (i&xqkiuvo4), if you do go away, not by us, but by men" (54 b-c). If this is correct, then in running away Socrates would not fall afoul of (a') by doing harm to those who harmed him (i.e. retaliating), but merely by doing harm: He has been harmed by the citizens, and he intends to harm the laws and the city, which are not the same as the citizens. And then the objection that "the city wronged or harmed Socrates" is either false (if by 'city' we do not mean the citizens of Athens) or irrelevant to the claim that one should not retaliate (if by 'city' we mean the citizens of Athens).

But are the city and laws different from the citizens? More precisely, are the laws and the city sufficiently different from the citizens that the fact that the citizens, using valid legal procedures, wronged Socrates, does not entail that the city and laws wronged Socrates? And is it true that the city and laws are not harming Socrates? At 51a, the laws suggest that they are attempting to destroy Socrates, because they think it dikaion (which here should perhaps be understood as "required"); and (A)4 tells us that this is to harm Socrates, which by (a') is something one should not do. At 54 c, the laws say that if Socrates runs away, he will return wrong for wrong and harm for harm (&vt8LxTJaOC LC xocl &vTLxxxoupy '), which implies that either the laws have wronged and harmed Socrates (and he is retaliating against them), or that in fleeing Socrates will wrong and harm the citizens, who have wronged and harmed him (and hence that he may not be harming or wronging the laws). Finally, notice that although the question posed by Socrates was whether it is dikaion for him to flee "without the permission of the Athenians" (48 c, 48 e), the question is changed at 49 e-50 a to whether they are harming anyone or breaking any agreements if Socrates flees without permission of the city (polis), and the arguments of the laws from that point on refer only to the city and laws, not to the Athenian citizens. Either there is no difference between the two, or else Socrates' original question is never answered by the laws. None of these indications is decisive, of course; yet the evidence in the dialogue is far from showing that the laws are not harming Socrates, and there is even some question as to the difference between the citizens, i.e. the many, and the laws and city.

To return to the objection to argument (A), if we take it to be directed against step 1, it has the point that 1 should be reread as follows: 1'. If the right decisions made by the courts of a city are disobeyed,

then the city and its laws will be destroyed; but if the wrong

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decisions are disobeyed, the city and its laws won't be destroyed. Then, to reach 3, we must change 2 to: 2'. If Socrates runs away, he will disobey a right decision made by

the court of Athens, viz. the decision that he should die. In this form the argument can be stopped by the objection that the court's decision was wrong. But if 1 is true, it will be irrelevant that the court's decision was wrong.12

IX. Argument (B): Citizen as child and slave (50 c-51 c) The argument is roughly this: 1. The laws gave birth to Socrates, nurtured him and educated

him. 2. From 1: Socrates is the offspring (Zxyovo~) and born slave (goUo~)

of the city and its laws. 3. What is dikaion for the father (inoc p) or master is not the same

as (iE taou etvcL) what is dikaion for a child or slave. 4. From 2 and 3: What is dikaion for the laws and city is not the

same as what is dikaion for Socrates. 5. From 4: If the laws and Socrates' fatherland (7rocrpEq, playing

on 7ccr'p) undertake to destroy Socrates, thinking it dikaion, it is not dikaion for Socrates to retaliate (0v6nroteZv) by trying to destroy the laws and his fatherland.

6. If Socrates runs away, he will be destroying the laws and his fatherland, so far as he is able.

7. From 5 and 6: It is not dikaion for Socrates to run away. (a) One must not do wrong (adikein), even when wronged. 8. From 7 and (a): Socrates must not run away.

1I Is 1 true? I think not. As Howard Zinn says, in a recent discussion of civil disobedience: "A common argument is that disobedience even of bad laws is wrong because that fosters a general disrespect for all laws, including good ones, which we need. But this is like arguing that children should be made to eat rotten fruit along with the good, lest they get the idea all fruit should be thrown away. Isn't it likely that someone forced to eat the rotten fruit may because of that develop a distaste for all fruit?" (Zinn, p. 13). This is not the only weak point in the argument, even if we accept (a'). Surely the inference from 3, (a'), and 4 is dubious: To destroy something so far as one is able may not be to harm that thing, if one's powers are negligible, compared to the powers of the thing.

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All the steps are explicitly stated except for 6, 7, (a) and 8, which are needed to finish the argument.'3

For our purposes, two points should be made. First, (B)3 is unargued in the dialogue. As stated, it leaves open the question of precisely what dikaia are referred to. Do the laws (i.e. Socrates) mean that the slave-child(-citizen) has no rights? Or do they mean only that we cannot in/er from the fact that the master-parent (-city) has a certain right, that the slave-child (-citizen) also has it? On the latter interpretation, 3 would not help the argument, for it could not be used to determine whether the case of Socrates is one of those in which Socrates lacks a right the city has. But step 5 makes it clear that the laws have no doubt that in the present case the city has a right Socrates lacks, and they derive 5 from (inter alia) 3. Thus it seems we must interpret 3 in the first way, i.e. so that it means: 3'. Children and slaves have no rights vis a vis their parents or

masters. or in terms of dikaion: 3". Nothing is dikaion for children or slaves vis 'a vis their parents

or masters that is not permitted them by their parents or masters. That this is the correct interpretation of 3 is further suggested by the extreme nature of Socrates' case: if it is not dikaion for Socrates to try to avoid death from the city, then it is unlikely that anything else Socrates might wish to do vis it vis a city without its permission would be dikaion. Death is the greatest evil the city can do to a person, although it may not be the greatest evil a person can suffer. From 3' or 3" it follows that: 4". Nothing is dikaion for Socrates vis i vis the city that is not

permitted him by the city.

1 Notice that step 6, which in argument (B) is unstated and unargued, is the same as step 3 in argument (A), which is explicitly stated and derived from (A)1 and (A)2. Now if Crito's objection to argument (A) had really been against (A)1, upon which (A)3 = (B)6 rests, Crito should also object to (B)6. (For if Crito accepts (B)6= (A)3, then the objection to (A)1 is irrelevant: The laws need only begin argument (A) with step 3, which Crito ex hypothesi accepts, and forget about step (A)1.) But Crito says nothing against (B)6. Either he doesn't realize that argument (B) assumes something to which he had earlier objected (viz. (B)6 = (A)3), or else his objection was not to (A)1, but to (a'). In any event, there is no doubt that Crito is persuaded by argument (B), as he himself indicates at 51 c. Neither he nor Socrates offers the least objection to this second argument of the laws, although Socrates refrains from endorsing the argument.

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What is dikaion for Socrates the citizen is what the city says. What the many are in Crito's arguments, the city is in the arguments

of the laws. For Crito, the standard of to dikaion is what people like him call dikaion; for the laws, the standard of to dikaion is what the laws say is dikaion. Neither the many nor the city can do the greatest good or the greatest harm to one, and yet Socrates has warned us to be alert for that, and nothing less (44 d, 48 b, 49 b). If to dikaion is concerned with the greatest good, as Socrates claims (48 b), it is hard to see how the city or laws could provide a standard for to dikaion, any more than the many could.

The second point to be made concerning argument (B) is this. In (B) Socrates is analogized to or identified as a child or slave; yet elsewhere in the dialogue children and slaves are spoken of as contemptible. Children are frightened by goblins, just as the many might try to frighten Socrates with death (46 c). If all the conclusions reached earlier by Socrates and Crito are now to be overturned, the two men are no better than children (49 b). If Socrates flees, the laws say, he will be doing what the meanest slave (doulos phaulotatos) would do (52 d). And if he flees to a place like Thessaly, they say, Socrates will have to live as an inferior and slave to everyone (53 e). These passages all exemplify the argument: If you do such-and-such, you will be like a child or slave; but since you cannot wish to be like a child or slave, you should not do such-and-such. But the implication of argument (B) is that it is not so bad to be a child or slave (or like them) that Socrates should rebel against that status: he should accept it, with its limitations. This tension, if not outright inconsistency, might make us wonder if (B) is meant to be as acceptable as we might at first suppose it is.

X. Argument (C): Socrates' agreement with the laws (51 c-53 a) This agreement is mentioned at the very start of the preceding section (50 c). There the laws ask Socrates, "Was that the agreement between you and us, or was it that you would stand by whatever judgments the city might make?" But this suggestion is not developed until 51 c-53 a. The argument seems to be this: 1. Whoever among the Athenians remains in Athens, seeing how

the laws pass judgments and govern the city in other respects, has by his/her deed (gpyco) already agreed to do whatever the

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laws command him/her to do, if he/she fails to persuade them that they are wrong (i.e. in commanding it).14

2. Socrates has remained in Athens even though he has seen how the laws pass judgments and govern the city in other respects.

3. From 1 and 2: Socrates has agreed, by his deeds, to do whatever the laws command him to do, if he fails to persuade them that they are wrong.

4. The laws have commanded Socrates not to flee, but to drink the hemlock.

5. From 3 and 4: If Socrates does what he has agreed to do, then, if he fails to persuade the laws that their command [that he drink the hemlock] is wrong, he will drink the hemlock and not flee.

(b) A person ought to do what he or she has agreed to do, if what he or she has agreed to do is dikaion.

6. From 5 and (b): If what Socrates has agreed to do is dikaion, then, if he fails to persuade the laws that their command is wrong, he ought to drink the hemlock and not flee.

7. What Socrates has agreed to do [viz. whatever the laws command him, if he fails to persuade them they are wrong] is dikaion.

8. From 6 and 7: If Socrates fails to persuade the laws that their command [that he drink the hemlock] is wrong, then he ought to drink the hemlock and not flee.

9. Socrates failed to persuade the laws that their command is wrong.

10. From 8 and 9: Socrates ought not to flee.

14 The laws describe what Socrates has agreed to do in several ways. i) & aV 0>elq xexeu,cev 7oLttaeLv -raO'a 51 e 4;

ii) 0&itv 7eCE&WeaL 51 e 6; iii) ~ 7reMcmv ?.Lm; X 7roLeCv 52 a 2-3; iv) xmx&' 0Cuas WoX-reeaOox 52 c 2, d 2-3, d 5. At 51 e-52 a the laws say that the opportunity to try to persuade them is built into the agreement. They make the same point in the course of argument (B) (51 b-c): if Socrates cannot persuade his fatherland that its command is wrong, he must obey it. This statement, with the reference to the agreement Socrates made with the laws at 50 c, in the middle of argument (B), and the reference to the laws as parents at 51 e, in the middle of argument (C), make it difficult to disentangle the two arguments. These three passages may indicate that "the laws" did not regard the arguments as essentially different, which they are not in one respect: both arguments try to establish the existence of the same asym- metrical relation between city and citizen. But the arguments do differ in the ways they go about establishing this. I discuss this later in the text.

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(b), 6, 7, 8, and 9 are never stated explicitly by the laws, but all are needed to finish the argument that the laws set in motion with steps 1 through 5.

The laws give most of their attention to steps 1 and 2, and Crito, at least, is persuaded by their efforts, for at 52 d he agrees that the laws speak the truth when they assert step 3. Socrates says only "&XXo

I' o,ioXoyca~Liv;" - "What else can we do but agree?" (Disagree?) Step 1 gains whatever plausibility it has from the conditions that

the laws say or imply must be satisfied before the citizen can truly be said to have agreed, by his deeds, to obey the laws. At least five such conditions are suggested in Crito, the last of which I have in- corporated into the terms of the agreement as stated in 1:

(i) The citizen must not be led into the agreement by compulsion (Ov&yxn) or fraud (&nrocrje) (52 e).

(ii) The citizen must not be forced to make up his mind in a short time (52e).

(iii) The citizen must have an alternative to making the agreement, i.e. he must be able to go away, with his belongings, to an Athenian colony or foreign place (51 d).

(iv) The city and laws must have given him good and also essential things; that is, they must have given birth to him, nurtured him, and educated him (51 c). (Note that here this provides the citizen with a reason for making an agreement with the laws, while in argument (B), as step 1, it was the basis for the claim that the citizen is of/spring and slave of the laws. To both, contrast Rep. 520 a 9-b 4.)

(v) The citizen must have the opportunity to try to persuade the laws they are wrong (p.n xax?do 51 e 7; cf. to dikaion 51 c 1); they do not roughly order him to do what they command (51 e-52 a). Fulfillment of the first three conditions is necessary for there to be

an agreement.15 The laws place most emphasis on (iii), pointing out at length (52 b-53 a) that Socrates had preferred to stay in Athens above all other cities. (iv) and (v) seem to be not conditions for the existence of an agreement (we can imagine agreements without them), but rather reasons that the citizen might have for wishing to make the agreement. Note, however, that (iv) and (v) do not guarantee, as part of the agreement, that the laws will continue to provide good or essential things to the citizen, or that the laws will do to the citizen only what is dikaion. All that the laws promise is that they will, for a time,

15 Taylor makes this point with respect to (i) and (ii), p. 172 note.

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listen to the arguments of the citizen, if the citizen wishes to argue that the laws have commanded him to do something wrong.

This might seem to soften the agreement, but of course there is no guarantee that the city will be persuaded by good arguments and unpersuaded by bad; in fact there may be good reason to suppose the opposite. In Socrates' case, the chance to try to persuade the laws presumably was his trial; it is the trial that shows the truth of step 9. At his trial, Socrates addressed the citizens; if by 'city' we mean the citizens of Athens, then Socrates had a chance to persuade the city (one day, cf. Ap. 19 a), and he failed. Recalling that in Crito the laws distinguish themselves from the citizens, we might ask: When did Socrates have a chance to persuade these laws? The answer seems to be that he never had such a chance; indeed, it is impossible even to imagine what such a chance would be like. To make intelligible the notion of Socrates persuading the laws or city, we must identify the city or laws with the citizens. And then we must note that Socra- tes had no hope that he could persuade the citizens: the time alot- ted was too short; and the citizens were the many, and could not understand what Socrates was doing (see, e.g., Ap. 37 e-38 b).

The agreement of which the laws speak institutes an asymmetric relation between them and Socrates which is nearly indistinguishable from that of slavery. The only feature that distinguishes this relation from slavery is the element of persuasion embodied in (v) and built into step 1, and this feature hardly guarantees that the rights of the citizen will be protected. Indeed, the agreement amounts to a giving up of all rights, except the dubious (and in Socrates' case, not accidentally, futile) right to try to persuade the city it is wrong. It is not unfair to say that the agreement is to enter voluntary servitude.

Arguments (B) and (C) are alike in that the laws claim in both that Socrates is their slave (though in (C) they don't use the word for slave). The difference is that in (B) Socrates is born the city's slave, while in (C) he agrees to become its slave. But how can a born slave agree to become a slave? Such an "agreement" could only be a joke. The "agreement" of a born slave to be a slave fails to satisfy condition (iii) for the existence of the agreement: the born slave has no alternative to being a slave."' (Note that this point does not essentially depend upon my characterization of the agreement as one to (volun- 16 After writing this I discovered that the same point is made by Rex Martin, in "Socrates on Disobedience to the Law," Review of Metaphysics, XXIV (1970), page 36.

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tary) servitude. It is impossible to conceive of the slave of (B) making the agreement of (C), whether or not that agreement is properly described as one to servitude.) This shows that Socrates cannot consistently give both arguments (B) and (C) - both of which are supposed to apply to himself - and it is hard to see how Plato could have overlooked this fact. The contradiction between being a slave in (B) and being free in (C) is just as glaring as that between propositions (I) and (II). Should we not consider this to be further evidence that the arguments of the laws are not meant to express Plato's or Socrates' beliefs?

Notice the implication this analysis has for step 7. What Socrates has agreed to do is become the slave of the city; 7 therefore claims it is dikaion for Socrates to become a slave to the city. (Contrast Euthy- demus 282 a-b).

XI. Argument (D): The effects of Socrates' flight (53 a- 54b) Finally the laws present three considerations that turn upon the effects of Socrates' flight from Athens. There are no explicit appeals to to dikaion anywhere in this section (though the word 'dikaiosune' is used twice, 53 c 7, 54 a 1). Each of these considerations refers back to some argument earlier advanced by Crito. (1) At 44 e-45 a, Crito had urged Socrates not to be concerned over the fate his friends might meet if he fled; at 53 a-b, the laws remind Socrates that if he flees, his friends will be banished or lose their property. (2) At 45 b-c, Crito had taken issue with Socrates' remark in court - in Crito's words, that "he would not know what to do with himself" (cf. AP. 37 c-d) - and reminded Socrates that Crito's friends in Thessaly would welcome and protect Sociates. At 53 b-e, the laws argue that if So- crates goes to well-governed cities like Thebes or Megara, he will go as an enemy, while if he goes to Thessaly or some other disorderly city, he will have to live as an inferior and a slave. (3) Finally, at 45 c-d, Crito had charged Socrates with abandoniing his children by dying; but at 54 a-b the laws point out that Socrates' children would be no better off in Athens without Socrates, or with Socrates in Thessaly (or Thebes, presumably), than if Socrates were dead, and that even if Socrates were dead, his friends would care for the children.

These three arguments are of unequal weight; the most important is clearly (2). Not only do the laws spend more time on (2) than on

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the others; Socrates himself, at 48 c, had ascribed such concern for money and children to "those who lightly put men to death, and, if they could, would bring them to life again, without a thought: the many." In saying this, Socrates had seemed to rule out any further consideration of (1) and (3); we might wonder why they are taken up again near the end of the dialogue. But first let us look more closely at (2).

Crito believes that Socrates, at his trial, had said that he would not know what to do with himself if he left Athens. What Socrates really said was this:

Shall I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you would accept that. I must indeed be possessed by a great love of life if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.

Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without talking?" Now this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will not believe me; and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less. These things are as I say, gentlemen, but to persuade you is not easy. (37 c-38 a)L7

In this passage Socrates gives two reasons for asserting (I): first, the god has commanded Socrates to engage in philosophy (cf. 23 b, 28 a-29 e, 30 e, 33 c), and, as he says earlier, "to do wrong and to 17 Here (with one change) and subsequently I use H. N. Fowler's translations of the Apology and Crito in the Loeb Classical Library.

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disobey my superior, whether god or man, is wicked and dishonorable" (29 b). Second, life without philosophy is not worth living. It is not surprising that Crito understands neither of these points, for he is like the gentlemen to whom Socrates says "to persuade you is not easy."

Although in Apology Socrates stresses obedience to the god as his reason for asserting (I), this argument is dropped entirely in Crito, where the god is mentioned only at the end, 54 e. But the subsidiary argument of Apology, that life without philosophy is not worth living, is repeated - by the laws! - in section (2) of argument (D):

Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilized men? And if you do this will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on - what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men? ... Or will you keep away from these places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly? ... And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet? What will become of our conversations about justice and virtue? (53 c-54 a)

The point here is the same as in Apology: wherever he goes, Socrates will be unable to converse, to examine himself and others about virtue (though the laws add that virtue is no more important than the laws). The laws clearly imply that if he cannot converse elsewhere - cannot engage in philosophy elsewhere - he has no reason to flee Athens, even to avoid his death. Life without philosophy is not worth living. Crito's understanding of this is that "if Socrates went away he would not know what to do with himself" (45 b), and his cure is feasting in Thessaly.

XII. The contradiction between Apology and Crito In both Apology and Crito, Socrates states a doctrine of obedience. In Apology he says "to disobey my superior, whether god or man, is wicked and dishonorable," and places obedience to god above obedience to humans. In Crito he makes the laws argue that Socrates should do whatever they command.'8 In Apology one doctrine of obedience

18 The laws never assert this or (II) baldly. But both follow from the premisses in each of (A) - (C), and it is reasonable to regard these three arguments as

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is used to support (I), while in Crito another doctrine of obedience is used to support (II). And in both Apology and Crito a second argument is given - that life without philosophy is not worth living - which in Apology (38 a) is explicitly used to support (I), but which in Crito is used to support not (I) but rather the proposition that Socrates should not flee Athens.

What conclusions can we draw from all this? Let us label our propositions: (I) I shall not give up philosophy, even if the city commands me to

do so. (II) Every citizen (including myself) should obey every command of

the city. (III) Life without philosophy is not worth living. (IV) The god has commanded me to engage in philosophy, and I

should obey the god. (V) I should not flee Athens. In the two dialogues, we have the following arguments:

Apology Crito (i) (III) therefore (I). (iii) (III) therefore (V). (Cf. (D), part (2).) (ii) (IV) therefore (I). (iv) (II) therefore (V). (Cf. (A), (B), (C).) (III) and (IV) are not persuasive to the many (Ap. 37 c-38 a). Thus Socrates' arguments in Apology fail to persuade his jury. Yet had he used any other arguments - arguments that would appeal to the many - he would have compromised himself and his ability to philos- ophize in Athens. He had no choice but to speak the truth (Ap. 17 b 4-6). Now argument (iii) will be no more persuasive to Crito than were (i) and (ii) to the jury. Because Socrates wishes to reconcile Crito to his (Socrates') death in Crito, Socrates will use not (iii) - or rather not

each establishing that citizens generally must obey laws and lawful commands generally, and then particularizing this to Socrates and the command that he die. In other words, we can regard each of the three arguments as proving (II), and then from (II) showing that Socrates should not flee. In (A), 1 and (a') and 4 together are supposed to imply that (IIA) one must obey the decisions made by the courts of the city; in (B), 1 and 3 (read as 3") and (a) together are supposed to imply that (II B) one to whom the laws gave birth, etc., must not do what is not permitted by the laws; and in (C), 1 and (b) and 7 together are supposed to imply that (IIC) whoever among the Athenians remains in Athens, etc., ought to do whatever the laws command, if he/she cannot persuade the laws that their command is wrong. (IIA) - (IIC) are all variants of (II); none of them allow the exception asserted in (I).

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merely (iii) - but also arguments that are capable of moving the many. This is why he uses (iv), i.e. uses arguments (A), (B), and (C), and also why he has the laws reintroduce in sections (1) and (3) of argument (D) considerations that he had earlier rejected as typical of the many. This interpretation has the merit of clearing Socrates of the charge of inconsistency between (I) and (II) - the problem with which we began - because we can now say that Socrates does not believe (II), that he uses (II) to reconcile Crito to his death.'9 This is not the whole story about (II), however; I shall suggest below that Socrates believes something like (II). 19 Position (1), which claims to provide a resolution of this inconsistency, has not yet been worked out successfully, to my knowledge. Consider the most recent defence of (1), by A. D. Woozley, in "Socrates on Disobeying the Law." (See note 5). Woozley argues that there is no inconsistency between (I) and (II), because (II) has built into it a "permitted exception," viz. "attempting to convince the state that it is wrong in the law or command" that it has given one. And Woozley regards this permitted exception to (II) as identical with engaging in philosophy, so that when in (I) Socrates says he will never give up philosophy even if the city commands him to do so, he is only saying in a slightly different way what (II) says when it (implicitly) allows people to try to persuade the city that its laws or commands are wrong. (Vlastos, p. 307).

Woozley's argument clearly turns upon (a) the identification of philosophy with the attempt to convince the state that some law or command is wrong, and (b) the supposition that in Crito the laws guarantee to the citizen the right to try to persuade them that they have given an unjust command. It is hard to know how to respond to (a), it is so surprising. But consider how few of the Pla- tonic dialogues would contain "philosophy" if philosophy were to be defined as Woozley suggests, and recall the various dialogues in which Socrates opposes philosophy to persuasion (rhetoric) (Woozley himself refers to the rejection of rhetoric in Gorgias, at Vlastos, p. 302). As to (b), it is clear that argument (C), and likely that (B) (see 51 b 3-4, b 9-c 1), give Socrates the alternatives of either obeying or (successfully) persuading the laws they are wrong. But this is surely not true of argument (A). Woozley at one point suggests that (A) also admits this option of persuasion, on the ground that if one disobeys the laws by attempting to persuade them they are wrong, such disobedience would not "do violence and injury to the law" (Vlastos, p. 307). But it is not obvious that such disobedience would have no harmful effect on the law - it depends on what form the attempt at persuasion takes, on what the laws are, and on what the citizens are like.

Woozley's account is not the only one that suffers from an erroneous notion of what Socratic philosophy is; indeed, this seems to be a major pitfall for those attracted to position (1). For instance, Alexander Meiklejohn, in his account of the relation between Crito and Apology, identifies the freedom to engage in philosophy with the freedom of opinion (Political Freedom [New York, 1965], pp. 21-24).

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There are several further reasons for accepting this account, besides the two just mentioned (viz., that it removes the inconsistency from Socrates' beliefs, and that it is suggested by who Crito is and Socrates' remarks about (III) and (IV)). First, there is the glaring inconsistency we noted between arguments (B) and (C). If we hold that Socrates himself (or Plato) gives credence to both these arguments, we must ascribe to him an inconsistency as serious as that between (I) and (II).

Second, we noticed in discussing arguments (A) and (B) that So- crates' appeal to the laws and city as a standard of to dikaion seems little better than Crito's appeal to the many. The city seems to be little more than a way to unify the many citizens, to produce (at least for the time being) a unity from the manifold opinions held by the many. In no way can the city avoid the shortcomings of the opinions of the many, unless the many do not make the laws.20 The city cannot by itself be a standard for to dikaion.

Third, the laws nowhere in their arguments explicitly make use of principles (a), (a'), or (b). Analysis shows that those principles play a role in the arguments, but it is a minor role, well hidden, and a number of other surprising and unargued propositions are given more prom- inence. Does Socrates have the laws hide these principles from Crito's attention? This would be surprising, in light of the fact that Cnrto dropped out of the conversation because he couldn't see how those principles applied to Socrates' question. We would hope or expect that Socrates would help Crito by stressing the role the principles play in the arguments of the laws; instead Socrates seems to have decided that the principles were not useful for persuading Crito, that Crito would not understand them no matter how much Socrates stressed them.

This leaves unanswered the question of why Socrates has the laws give arguments that even implicitly rely upon those principles. Isn't this because he thinks those principles should be used in answering the question of whether he should flee? The shortcoming of the arguments of the laws is that they make the city and its laws a measure of to dikaion, not that they implicitly rely upon Socratic principles. The corrective we must apply to those arguments is to find a better standard for to dikaion, not to throw out Socrates' principles.

What might this better standard be? At 47 e-48 a, Socrates says 20 This leads directly to Republic 473 c-d and 499 b-c, as well as Seventh Letter 327 a-b.

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that life is not worth living when that part is injured which is injured by to adikon and improved by to dikaion. And to live well is to be well (or at least getting better) in this part, for to live well is to live kalos and dikaios (48 b). But in Crito we also find the suggestion that what makes life worth living is conversation about dikaiosune and the other virtues (53 c-e, cf. Ap. 38 a), i.e. that philosophy makes life worth living. The implication is that philosophy improves that part of the soul that is improved by to dikaion, that philosophy is the cause of living dikaios. Thus, although philosophy or the philosopher may not be the standard of to dikaion, it seems to follow that only the philosopher is in a position to perceive that standard. The many cannot perceive or be that standard (Ap. 37 e-38 b, Cr. 49 d), nor can the city so long as it is controlled by. the many (which here includes the oligarchic party). Since arguments (A) - (C) teach that the city and its laws are the standard of to dikaion, or at least that they always con- form to that standard, those arguments must be unacceptable to Socrates.21

Socrates nowhere explicitly assents to the arguments of the laws. The closest he comes is at the end of the dialogue, 54 d, where he says:

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this [viz. what the laws have said] is what I seem to hear, as the corybants seem to hear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes within me and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assured that, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words, you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can ac- complish anything, speak.

Doubtless one's first impression of this passage is that it expresses Socrates' agreement with what he has made the laws say (see also Phaedo 98 e 5-99 a 4). But even supposing this impression correct, S2 One might ask where Socrates thinks arguments (A) - (C) go wrong, if, as I say, he himself doesn't accept them. Is there any evidence to show which premisses or inferences he would point to as the sources of the arguments' inadequacy? I think there is no such evidence in the arguments themselves, and this perhaps counts against my interpretation. Nonetheless we can indicate in a question-begging way which premisses he would rejct, by referring to note 18 and supposing that he will reject at least one of any set of propositions that leads to (II), though he will hold to (a), (a') and (b). This gives the result that in (A) he would reject steps 1 and/or 4; in (B), steps 1 and/or 3 (read as 3"); and in (C), steps 1 and/or 7. (Of course he could also avoid (II) by challenging the inferences in these arguments; see note 12).

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does the passage imply or require that Socrates agree with all of what the laws have said? Couldn't Socrates make the above statement (and the Phaedo statement) merely on the basis of agreement with the conclusion the laws have advanced, that Socrates should not flee, and agreement with argument (D)? The assertion that Crito will speak in vain against what the laws have said (i.e. against what So- crates has said) can be taken ironically, to mean that Crito, arguing from the perspective of the many, could not conceivably persuade Socrates to flee, because Socrates is unmoved by the concerns of the many.

The only command of the city that Socrates is prepared to disobey, it seems, is the command to give up philosophy. In all other respects - even unto the laws' command that he die - he is an obedient citizen; those of us who advocate disobedience on other matters cannot claim Socrates as our authority or precursor.22 The position Socrates makes the laws present in Crito - that Socrates should never disobey the city - is therefore in a sense close to, though inconsistent with, Socrates' true position. When Socrates makes the laws say what he thinks will persuade Crito, Socrates does not distort his position except in one respect: concerning philosophy, a matter of the highest im- portance, but one which Crito will not understand anyway.

University of Wisconsin - Madison

22 Here lurk two problems that could explode our discussion: First, when Socrates refused to fetch Leon of Salamis for the Thirty, did he violate a lawful command? Xenophon, among others, argues that the command the Thirty gave Socrates was unlawful( Memorabilia IV iv 3). But we might suspect his motive for claiming this, because he is trying to prove that Socrates identified to dikaion and to nomimon, the just and the lawful. The problem is to specify when a command is lawful, and when what purports to be a law is a law, i.e. is to be obeyed. And although we have seen that if Socrates thought something were a law or lawful command, he would obey it (with the exception indicated in (I)), we have not seen what criteria he would use to characterize a law. Second, why is Socrates prepared to disobey precisely this one command, and no others? If the polis does not grasp the standard of justice, might it not give other unjust but lawful commands, besides the command to give up philosophy? Would Socrates obey such commands? I shall not discuss either of these problems.

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Article Contentsp. 1p. 2p. 3p. 4p. 5p. 6p. 7p. 8p. 9p. 10p. 11p. 12p. 13p. 14p. 15p. 16p. 17p. 18p. 19p. 20p. 21p. 22p. 23p. 24p. 25p. 26p. 27p. 28p. 29

Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1974), pp. 1-94Front MatterSocrates and Obedience [pp. 1-29], , and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of Forms [pp. 30-58]Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character and the Possibility of Character Change [pp. 59-65]A Note on Aristotle's Absolute Ruler [pp. 66-69]Aristotle on Rational Action [pp. 70-80]The Motif in "Parmenides": B 1.24 [pp. 81-94]Back Matter

phronesis volume 19 issue 1 1974 [doi 10.2307%2f4181923] gary young -- socrates and obedience

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