PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY

Paul A. TurnerUniversity of Arizona

I hesitate, as a Linguistic and Culturalanthropologist, to criticize Physical anthropologistsabout their treatment of evolution. After all, they arethe experts and much better qualified than I to dealwith this topic But they just might be willing to listento what I have to say because of the recentconfrontations between them and creationists,especially so when the battles have been won bycreationists in Arkansas and Louisiana (Richardson1981:82).

I feel the need to say something sinceconfrontations between anthropologists andimportant segments of the tax-paying populationcan be damaging to our discipline. Perhaps somesuch confrontations are unavoidable when crucialissues are involved. In those instances, we wouldhave to let the chips fall where they may while beingloyal to our convictions.

I do not believe that this is the case, though, withthe presentations of the theory of evolution byPhysical anthropologists. In fact, I will argue thatthese presentations provoke unnecessary confron-tations with conservatives just because they are notin the broad tradition of anthropology. That is, theyare not characterized by cultural relativism,participant-observation, nor holism. The essentialhumanistic element of anthropology is missing andwhat is left is a form of scientism that is unaccept-able to most people.

I will illustrate what I mean by examining threerepresentative introductory textbooks in Physicalanthropology: Human Biology and Behavior byWeiss and Mann; Human Evolution by Birdsell;and, Physical Anthropology by Lasker. A fourth anddifferent type of book will also be used, Nature,Culture and Human History by Greenwood andStini, because of its special relevance to the issuesraised in this paper, hereafter referred to as thesynthetic text. In addition to these sources, I willrefer to recent communications in the Anthropo-logy Newsletter dealing with the controversy be-tween creationists and evolutionists. By way ofconclusion, some suggestions will be offered as tohow to deal with the controversy in general as wellas the specific shortcomings in these books in theirtreatment of human evolution.

Cultural relativism is a concept that is not easy to

define, but, taken in a weak sense, mostanthropologists would probably agree that itinvolves a sensitivity and respect for the beliefs ofothers. This is the sense emphasized in my paperand as such is probably acceptable to all humanists.Taken in a stronger sense, the concept implies thatthere are no absolute standards that can beappealed to in evaluating beliefs, be they Westernor non-Western, scientific or non-scientific.Cultural relativism in this sense is not acceptable toall humanists (Grindal 1976:6).

All four books fail on both counts with these twoaspects of cultural relativism in mind. Only one ofthe authors presents a non-scientific version ofhuman evolution to accompany the lengthyscientific account (Birdsell 1972:6). This one-paragraph version deals with the origin of theworld and is composed of common elementsfound in many such accounts, including the bookof Genesis. Unfortunately, not even this briefversion is presented with sensitivity and respect forthe beliefs of others as indicated by the use of suchterms as "legends" and "myths" to refer to thesources synthesized. Anyone from a conservativereligious background who considers the Bible tobe inspired by God, such as an Orthodox Jew or anEvangelical Christian, would be offended by areference to the Old Testament account as ahuman invention.

Birdsell's inclusion of the creation account in hisbook is commendable but his reason for doing so isnot clear. His introductory sentence implies thatthe creation account is not as valid as the scientificone because that sentence deals with peoplepushing back the boundaries of their ignorancethrough scientific observation (1972:6). Heconcludes the account by giving one reason whypeople find such versions appealing: just as aperson's life has a beginning and an end, so doesthe world.

Birdsell's explanation for the popularity ofcreation accounts may be correct as far as it goes.His explanation, though, does not do justice to theenduring importance of non-scientific versions ofhuman origins. These versions have not beenreplaced by the evolutionary account but continueto be believed by large segments of the world's

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population, including conservative Christians,Jews, and Moslems. These accounts must be meet-ing important human needs not dealt with in thetheory of evolution. As such, they deserve a re-spectful and sensitive treatment by anthropologists.

The omission of any non-scientific version ofhuman evolution by the other three authorsimplies that such an account does not belong in aPhysical anthropology textbook. The author whoincluded the composite ncn-scientific accountasserts as much when he says, ". . . this book ismaterialistically oriented in an explicit way . . ."(Birdsell 1972:xiii). However, he does not explainwhy his book is so oriented nor how ananthropologist committed to cultural relativismwould have any basis for making such a decision.Apparently only the authors of the synthetic textare even aware that anthropologists are notpracticing cultural relativism if they consider thescientific version of evolution better than non-scientific ones:

Other cultures. . . do not think in evolutionary termsat all. Unless we want to assert that we have a special andsuperior knowledge of reality compared with othercultures, we must admit that evolution is simply one wayof categorizing experience and of constructing our ownWestern cultural reality (Greenwood and Stini 1977:418).

Yet, even though they recognize that there areequally valid non-scientific accounts, none areincludedin their book. It may be that their book isonly intended for students sharing the sameWestern cultural reality and this justifies omittingany non-Western versions. That justification,though, breaks down for students from sub-cultures of our own culture that do not shareequally in the same Western cultural reality—American Indians, Mexican Americans, Blacks, andothers.

Wef)dve an account of a member of one of thesesub-cultures, an American Indian, questioning SolTax on this issue:

A few years ago I was invited to a liberal arts collegecelebrating an American Indian day. I shared a platformwith an Indian educator before a large audience ofstudents and faculty. I had spoken about policy andabout White-Indian relations, rather than aboutanthropology. But during a lull in the question period heturned and asked me to justify the Bering Straits originstory that we tell and that runs counter to tribal tradi-tions. My response included the fact that man's closestprimate relatives are native only to the Old World. Thisinvolved our theory of evolution, which he soon madeclear was not accepted by Indian people, who have theirown creation myths. My only recourse was to pleadpluralism in reverse, saying in effect that evolution is oneof the things anthropologists believe and that I was stuckwith it: an anthropologist saying before a collegeaudience that biological evolution is an alternative myth!

Since I spend time with Indian friends all or most of

whom are very serious in their feelings in the matter, theproblem stays with me. Although of course I believe thatbiological evolution is a more probable explanation ofthe distribution of species than that each AmericanIndian tribe was specially created according to its ownmythology, I find it difficult to persist in this view, sincethe Indian's explanation is for him 100% true! If I had towrite a textbook now, I would discuss the Asian origin ofAmerican Indians in the context of the conflict as I amdescribing it. For isn't what I have said the pluralisticanthropological truth? (Tax 1977:230)

The conflicting claim of scientific and non-scientific accounts of reality are not easy ones foran anthropologist to answer. Physical anthropolo-gists, because of their orientation to science, arenot evidently aware of the significance of thisconflict. They have identified themselves with thescientific viewpoint and have not taken seriouslythe beliefs of non-scientists. That kind otinsensitivity to the beliefs of others may be acharacteristic of scientists but it is not acceptable toanthropologists who believe in cultural relativity.

Now it may be that cultural relativity is no longera viable position for anthropology. If Physicalanthropologists could provide an acceptablealternative they would be making an importantcontribution to social science for culturalrelativism has come under increasing attack in theliterature (Hymes 1969, Weaver 1973). But to makethat kind of a contribution, they will have tograpple with some difficult intellectual problemsrather than ignoring the validity of the beliefs ofnon-scientists. Until Physical anthropologists areable to offer a carefully thought-out alternative tocultural relativism, their presentations need to becharacterized by sensitivity and respect for thebeliefs of others to be in the broad tradition ofanthropology.

Physical anthropologists are also not beingsensitive about the beliefs of others when theymake polarizing statements such as the following:

Some still prefer to call it the theory of evolution,claiming that the theory is not really proven and is still nomore than an idea. We have more than enough evidenceto demonstrate that evolution is a fact (Weiss and Mann1975:11).

In his own time the major contribution of Charles Darwinwas the demonstration of the great fact of organic evolu-tion . . . (Birdsell 1972:29,30).

There is no longer any doubt among scientists about thefact of evolution as the central process of nature (Lasker1976:12).

Calling a theory a fact is a misleading andconfusing use of words. It is misleading becauseany theory is partial, tentative, and incomplete(Barbour 1966:289) and always subject to disproof.Calling a theory a fact is confusing because theories

12 ANTHROPOLOGY AND HUMANISM QUARTERLY

are usually thought of as providing a conceptualframework for facts. Theories and facts, althoughinterrelated, are customarily thought of as separateconcepts—one does not become the other. If, onthe other hand, these authors are only claimingthat there is evidence to support the theory ofevolution, then their statements should be ex-pressed in more qualified terms.

The reaction of some anthropologists to theattacks of creationists is to fight back with the samepolarizing terms that provoked the conflict:

With Arkansas and Louisiana under their belts, thecreationists will be looking for new state legislators tobedazzle with their magical facts and newspeak. If I havelearned anything from all this, it is that we need to attack,not apologize . . . We must communicate the fact ofevolution along with the theories we use to interpret thatfactual process (Richardson 1981:22).

It seems to me that anthropologists and others in thebiological sciences are negligent in not challenging theuse of the words "theory of evolution." Anyone whoknows anything about evolution recognizes that is is afact, not a theory (Cruber 1981:21).

Calling this particular theory a fact encouragesconfrontations because of two quite differentinterpretations of the term evolution. As atechnical theory of limited application, evolution,according to the Modern Synthesis version, dealswith changes in populations over time. Few peoplewould disagree that evidence exists to support thistheory and its application to microevolution.Creationists that I have talked to are willing toadmit that changes have taken place withinspecies. What they are not willing to accept is thatevolution is responsible for the origin ofcompletely different species. Nor are scientistsagreed that the Modern Synthesis theory canexplain macroevolution, or changes above thespecies level, for the necessary documentation ismissing from the fossil record (Lewin 1980:883).Anyone who implies that the theory of evolutionapplies equally well to micro-and macroevolutionis overstating his case, pure and simple.

The term, evolution, can also refer to an all-encompassing anti-religious philosophy thatidentifies Evolution (with a capital letter) as the realforce in the universe (MacKay 1974:52). Manypeople find this usage objectionable in a scientificcontext because it is questionable if any data existto support or contradict this viewpoint. To switchfrom statements about evolution to Evolutionarypronouncements without warning is a tactic thatought to be avoided by anthropologists.

An example of such pronouncements can befound in the synthetic text:

. evolution is not a process that has a prior direction

. There is no guiding hand . . . The earth was notmade for us . . . (Greenwood and Stini 1977:480).

These pronouncements are particularly out ofplace in a book that attempts to present a scientific-humanistic synthesis of humans and theirdevelopment. They are not humanistic statementsbut expressions of the scientific world view, orscientism. Nor are they scientific statementsbecause no data can either prove or disprove them.They are non-scientific statements in a scientificcontext.

It is this mixing of two kinds of statements,scientific and non-scientific, in a supposedlyscientific treatment that can be particularlyoffensive to laypeople and intellectuals alike. Non-scientific statements are presented as if they werescientific statements backed with the full prestigeof the theory of evolution (MacKay 1974:52). Theiranti-religious bias should make them even lessacceptable for anyone committed to culturalrelativism.

Participant observation is another basiccharacteristic of an anthropological approach andit involves an identification of the subject with theobject of study. This concept has been customarilythought of as a field technique for culturalanthropologists but it also applies to the otherthree divisions of anthropology whenever sensitivefield work is conducted in them. Linguisticanthropologists, for example, are participant-observers when they function as analyst-learners ofunwritten languages. Archeologists are partici-pant-observers when they do ethnoarcheology onthe material remains of contemporary cultures.Physical anthropologists are participant-observerswhen they live, interact, and empathize with theprimate order they study. Thus, anthropology has atradition of using participant-observation as a basicapproach in gathering data in each of its foursubdivisions.

There is another sense, though, in which all actsparticipant-observation, but this viewpoint hasonly begun to be stressed in the Western world. Formost of our Western tradition of thinking, therehas been emphasis^on a sharp distinction betweensubject and object, and the opposition of thesubjective and objective elements of knowledge.This emphasis has led to the attempt to purge outthe subjective from the scientific method andworld view (Wojciechowski 1975:288). But themore we have found out about what is involved inthe acts of knowing, the less likely does it appearthat we will be able to eliminate the subjectiveelement in our observations.

Neurological studies indicate that informationabout the world is already highly processed by usby the time it reaches the depths of our minds(Stent 1975:1055)—there are no raw data. Acts ofknowing involve still another subjective element,

VOL 7, NO. 1 MARCH 1982 13

the emotional contribution of us as knowers(Polanyi 1958:312), without which there would beno knowledge. Thus, there can be no simpledichotomy between observers and the observed.Instead, we are dealing with relationships andinteractions between the knowers and the known(Barbour 1966:178). In the special case of humanevolution, the known are also the knowers. We areinsiders studying ourselves.

The morJern image of the scientist as actor, asparticipant-observer rather than a detachedobserver, is approximating the viewpointtraditionally held by anthropologists. They haverealized that many of the most important questionsabout people cannot be asked, let alone answered,strictly from an outside observer's point of view(MacKay 1974:36). They know that the outsider'sviewpoint needs to be supplemented with that ofan insider for a proper understanding of people.None of the introductory textbooks, though,presents an insider's viewpoint in the study ofhuman evolution. They do not emphasize thathuman beings are self-conscious participants in theevolutionary process. As such, they are uniquelyqualified to provide an insider's viewpoint ofevolution to supplement the outsider's viewpointprovided by scientists. Here the anthropologist cantake the stance of myth-teller (Richardson 1975)and make sense out of what has happened to us. Asmyth-teller, he has the opportunity to givemeaning to our existence, nobility to ourendeavors, and significance to our accompish-ments.

An insider's viewpoint of evolution wouldinclude a description of what people believe abouttheir ultimate origins, their development, theirpresent state of existence, and their future destiny,drawing upon the seminal work of Teilhard deChardin (1959) and others. Such a descriptionwould probably also include a serious study ofcreation accounts, which, no matter how differentthey may be in content, are completely contrastivewith the outsider's or scientist's viewpoint of theorigin of life and its subsequent development. Theinsider's viewpoint would also include theaudacious claim that people have souls, somethingthat has no place in the materialistically orientedviewpoint of scientists.

An insider's viewpoint would stress that peoplemust live with intentionality and purpose in orderto survive under normal conditions (Frankl1969:48) and even more so under extremes ofdeprivation experienced in prison camps (Frankl1959:76). But, people as purposeful organisms are,according to the scientific perspective, the result ofnon-purposeful processes of evolution—aseeming contradiction (Monod 1971:21,22). Theimplications of that contradiction are profound but

appear to be of little concern to scientists ingeneral.

In fact, the two viewpoints, that of an insider andan outsider, differ so dramatically that it may beextremely difficult to reconcile the two. As difficultas the task may be, the anthropologist needs toincorporate both viewpoints in a presentation.Using only one viewpoint, that characterized bydetachment, is not in the broad tradition ofanthropology.

Anthropology has customarily emphasized aholistic approach to its subject matter. The authorsof the textbooks probably think their treatmentsare holistic in presenting human evolution from ascientific perspective. They all fail, though, in thatnone of them, not even the synthetic text,emphasizes both a humanistic and scientificviewpoint of evolution. Since only the scientificaccount is presented,the implication isthat humanevolution can be adequately dealt with usingnothing but the scientific approach. This "nothing-but" assumption can then be interpreted as anautomatic debunking by the authors of any non-scientific account of human evolution (Frankl1959:131; MacKay 1974:72). Here again, it wouldseem that anthropologists sensitive to the beliefs ofothers would want to avoid giving such animpression.

Oneway to avoid the "nbthing-but" assumptionis for the authors to point out the limitations of thescientific approach when applied to the evolutionof people. Mention could be made about howscience, as one of the most sure forms ofknowledge available, is also one of the mostrestricted. It is limited by our senses, our centralnervous system, our personal and culturalcategories, our language, and most of all, by its ownrules (Ornstein 1972:41).

Eliminated by its rules are considerations oftranscendent purposes, powers, and causes. Inscience there is little place for teleologicalconsiderations and no concern with ultimatemeaning (Cauthen 1969:19). The rules of sciencedo not allow it to deal to any extent with intuition,self-awareness, values, morals, and love.

Love is perhaps the most powerful force inhuman life, going beyond the mutual helpfulnessthat holds a society together. Natural selection mayhelp to explain the development of altruisticbehavior but not the practice of self-sacrificinglove that has negative survival value (Sinnott1966:183).

Thus, values, love, and much of what is thoughtof as characteristically human is handledinadequately, if at all, by the scientific approach.The inadequacy of this treatment is to be expectedof any one approach to the study of such a complexphenomenon as human evolution. Using only one

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approach to such a complicated subject matter andclaiming that it is entirely adequate, while otherapproaches are unnecessary or even wrong, can beconsidered a reductionistic treatment.

An adequate treatment of this complexphenomenon requires a holistic approach,humanistic as well as scientific. The humanistic partwould emphasize that in evolutionary theory it isthe intellectual and behavioral differencesbetween humans and animals we have to explain.The scientific part would continue to emphasizethe biological similarities between us and animals.

Both parts, scientific and humanistic, would bepresent in the same textbook but clearly separated.The scientific component would describe thedetails and processes of evolution, the howelement. The humanistic presentation would dealwith the significance and meaning of humanorigins and development as understood by theparticipants in the process, the why element.

My article has stressed that Physicalanthropologists are more than just scientists, theyare humanists as well. Their description of humanevolution should differ significantly from that ofsomeone who writes only from the viewpoint of ascientist. It seems to me that this combination ofscience and humanism is anthropology's reason forbeing, its most important contribution to ourunderstanding of people.

I f ind it ironic that biology, withoutanthropology's commitment to humanism, isexploring an area of particular concern tohumanists: the evolution of human behavior.Barkow (1978:99) makes the claim that if Physicalanthropologists had been using a holistic approachto their study of human evolution, includingbehavior as well as morphology, we would nothave had to wait for biologists to inventsociobiology.

I find it even more ironic that anthropologistshave been successfully characterized as narrow-minded dogmatists by creationists in Louisiana(Richardson 1981:28). Anthropologists have been socharacterized because of their unwillingness toteach creation-science along with evolution-science. Granted, creation-science is a cleverlinguistic bit of hocus-pocus on the part ofcreationists, but their accusation has some validity.A treatment of human evolution, written only fromthe scientific perspective is not "balanced," notholistic, and not anthropological.

If such a scientific treatment of human evolutionis good biology, then the biologists should be theones to do battle with the creationists. Let thebiologists antagonize the publ ic whi leanthropologists stay above the fray, in typical laidback fashion. As myth-tellers we understand whatbothers the creationists when only the scientific

perspective of human evolution is presented. Weagree that such a narrow perspective bothers us,too, for we are humanists as well as scientists. Ourtask is to combine the two perspectives into anaccount that does justice to human evolution.

We have a choice to make in writing textbooksfor the public school system. We can writescientific-humanistic accounts on our own,choosing the material we want presented, or, wecan continue to write only scientific accounts. Ifour choice is the latter, then state legislators willprobably continue to force the inclusion of non-scientific material that is not of our own choosing.

Since legal coercion is not a factor in writingtextbooks on the college level, anthropologistsmay do nothing to change their presentations ofhuman evolution for college students. The moreperceptive ones among us, though, will recognizethat legal action on the state level isasymptomof aserious problem, not just involving a radical few,but a wide spectrum of the public. Theseanthropologists will try to u nderstand the concernsof the opposition and see what can be done to de-fuse the situation.

To sum up, we can be conciliatory towardcreationists without betraying our ideals. We are introuble precisely because we have failed toemphasize the basic characteristics of anthropo-logy in dealing with human evolution. Physicalanthropology needs to be anthropology, not just toavoid conflicts with the public, but to be true toitself.

NOTES

•An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 77thAnnual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association,November 15,1978. That version benefited from the commentsof Joseph Birdsell, William Merrifield, William Stini, JaneUnderwood, Mark Weiss, and Stephen Zegura.

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FIELD POETRY

Toni FloresHorbart and William Smith College

To begin with, it ought to be admitted that onecan't define poetry except by defining it in thedoing. It has something to do with sensuality andthe mind. That is, poetry has to do with the transfer,or perhaps the transformation of physical sensa-tions, and our delight in them, directly to the mind,without the mediation of abstraction or "ideas."This is vague enough, and without empirical justifi-cation, but it explains something of what I will try todemonstrate in the following pages.

Marking TimeWhile the world waits for me to awakento its soft flesh and the odor of itsthighs,while birthings lie secret, their dark heartsbeatingand birds wait nervously in the wingsI mark time in the lined pages of exercisebooks

squeezing out poems like the painful littlerocksof a woman with constipation.Wait for me. I am keeping my shoes on.I am setting the table. I am laying out potsand wooden spoons and woven berrybaskets,and my fingers keep loose with sewing andwashingready for the hour and the momentwhen the beech tree lifts its leaves to myface,pulls me to its flank and, mouth to mouth,shares with me warm sap, almond milk,and the round smell of peaches.

One thing I learned for myself is that writing proseis not a matter of simply waiting for inspiration. Itrequires work, maybe daily work. It requires thatthe channels be kept open, that the observer-

16 ANTHROPOLOGY AND HUMANISM QUARTERLY