physical change in plato’s timaeus

Brian David Prince

Physical Change in Platorsquos Timaeus

Abstract In this paper I ask how Timaeus explains change within the triangle-based part of his cosmos Two common views are that change among physicalitems is somehow caused or enabled by either the forms or the demiurge Iargue for a competing view on which the physical items are capable of bring-ing about change by themselves prior to the intervention of the demiurge andprior to their being turned into imitations of the forms I outline three problemsfor the view that physical things depend on the forms for their causal powersand show how the view I propose solves each I then add further arguments formy view based on (a) statements by Timaeus that seem to favor my view di-rectly (b) implications of Timaeusrsquo positions that favor the view and (c) Ti-maeusrsquo explanatory practice in the second half of his speech

Keywords Plato Timaeus causation change forms

Brian David Prince University of Oxford ndash Faculty of Philosophy Radcliffe HumanitiesWoodstock Road Oxford Oxon OX2 6GG United Kingdom E-Mail brianprince498gmailcom

In this paper I ask how Timaeus explains change within the triangle-based partof his cosmos1 This question amounts to asking whether and how physicalthings interact with the forms to produce change in the physical part of thecosmos One answer would be that just as physical things imitate the propertiesthat the forms instantiate or are they also imitate changes happening amongthe forms This is obviously a non-starter given Timaeusrsquo view that the realm offorms is unchanging there are no changes among the forms to be imitated2 Itseems clear that physical things must instead change the forms that they imi-tate the question is how this kind of change takes place and in particular whatcauses it

Scholars have sometimes thought that the forms although unchangingthemselves are nevertheless the source of the trianglesrsquo ability to produce

1 I will refer to the triangle-based part of the cosmos as the physical world or the materialworld I wish to take no position here however on the question whether Timaeusrsquo world in-cludes matter per se2 For example τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ εἶδος ἔχον and generally 51e6ndash52a4 Translations from Platoare from Cooper 1997 Greek text is from Burnet 1902

DOI 101515apeiron-2012-0037 apeiron 2014 47(2) 211ndash229

Brought to you by | Washington University in St LouisAuthenticated | 1282526766

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change One might spell out the details of this kind of view as follows Theforms do not change but the realm of forms includes relations among theforms the relations are unchanging just as the forms are These relations existtimelessly (in the same sense of this word in which the forms themselves exist)but they provide instructions for the physical things participating in them Soto take a simple example from the Phaedo there is a relation of necessary en-tailment from the form of fire to the form of heat As a result of this relationphysical things imitating the form of fire also follow this lsquoinstructionrsquo to imitatethe form of heat as well Such relations must be very complex of course if theyare to account for all the physical changes in our cosmos This view then seesthe forms and their mutual relations as playing a role similar to laws of natureboth lsquotellrsquo physical items how to behave in whatever circumstances they findthemselves

Steven Strange seems to hold a view of this type

The causality of the Forms discussed in Phaedo 99bndash105bhellipis I think very close to whatPlato in the Timaeus calls Necessity Both the Phaedo and the Timaeus versions of thissort of causality involve the consequences for the world of Becoming of the fact that theworld of Forms has a certain structure that is that certain Forms import certain Formsand exclude others Forms have causal implications as Vlastos puts it hellipThe Reason ofthe Timaeus employs the very same sorts of causal implications in constituting the cos-mos and it is these very same causal implications that hinder the cosmos from being aperfect likeness of its model3

In Strangersquos view it is the forms that import and exclude one another that isforms are responsible for bringing about changes in the physical world

A second view also contrary to the one I argue for here is that the trianglesrely on soul to set them in motion Cornford may hold this view ldquoThey [theprimary bodies] are things that can set other things in motion but they requireto be set in motion themselvesrdquo4

3 Strange 1985 410 Cherniss 1954 also argues that the triangles rely on the forms to producechange4 I say he may hold this view because at various places he seems to imply both that theprimary bodies rely on souls for the motions they transmit to one another and also that thesame bodies can produce these motions by themselves This distinction must not have beenbefore his mind as he wrote See for example Cornford 1997 197 and 223ndash4 Johansen alsoholds a version of this view with the difference that he thinks the primary bodies had ldquonointernal properties of their ownrdquo and hence also no motions prior to their being formed intoelements by the demiurge (2004 96ndash7)Sedleyrsquos view is harder to classify He writes ldquoThere is then no reason to suspect that PlatorsquosDemiurge in any way fell short of achieving the best possible disposition of matter let alonethat matter itself was so resistant to persuasion as itself to limit his success That is not to say

212 Brian David Prince



I shall shortly formulate and defend a competing hypothesis on which thephysical things themselves and their properties determine when and howchange takes place But before introducing this alternative view I shall introdu-ce three difficulties produced by the forms view afterward I shall argue that thepowers view can explain each of these as well as several other passages fromthe text

1 Against the forms view

11 Order in the pre-cosmos

Timaeus claims that there was becoming prior to the demiurgersquos creative inter-vention showing that physical items do not depend on the forms for their mereability to change5 Since there was becoming prior to the act of creation ex hypo-thesi it was occurring without the intervention of either the demiurge or theforms6 But the changes occurring did not have chance results Had the resultscome about at random or by chance we would expect the four kinds to have beenmore or less evenly mixed with one another Instead the four kinds were already(more or less) separated members of each kind tending to be located with whatwas similar7 The receptacle itself cannot be responsible for these results as it is

that the world is perfect in every detailhelliprdquo (2007 120 emphasis added) If weight is given to thewords I have emphasized then there may be no disagreement between Sedleyrsquos view andmine I would agree that the demiurge achieves the best possible but not necessarily the bestimaginable disposition of matter Nor do I think we should characterize matter as resistant tothe demiurge even if he is unable to make it do all that he might wish5 hellipὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι τρία τριχῇ καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι (52d3ndash4)6 The demiurge uses forms and numbers (εἴδεσι τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς 53b5) to transform the physi-cal things he finds in the pre-cosmos For another reading of εἴδεσι in this passage also com-patible with what I say here see Mohr 2005b 114ndash6 Johansen denies that there is any order orbecoming in the pre-cosmos calling even the likenesses among pre-cosmic entities ldquosomethingof a retrojection from the condition of the cosmosrdquo (2004 96) But this view does not accountwell for Timaeusrsquo claims that the four kinds ldquoinitially possessed certain traces of what they arenowrdquo and that they ldquocame to occupy different regions of space even before the universe wasset in orderrdquo (53andashb) Timaeus could have asserted instead that the four kinds did not reallyexist or that they were nothing like their present forms or again that one cannot say anythingabout where they were located before the creation any of these statements would have com-ported better with Johansenrsquos view than what he actually does say (Cf Johansen 2004 94)7 ldquoThat is how at that time the four kinds were being shaken by the receiver which was itselfagitating like a shaking machine separating the kinds most unlike each other furthest apartand pushing those most like each other closest together into the same region This of course

Physical Change in Platorsquos Timaeus 213



entirely passive8 The forms view then faces a challenge in explaining how theminimal order in the pre-cosmos was produced this order was not produced byrelations among the forms nor by the demiurge nor was it the result of chanceCausality seems necessary to account for the minimal order in the pre-cosmosbut the forms hypothesis seems unable to account for causal production

12 The act of creation

The forms-based view also has trouble explaining precisely what the demiurgedid in creating the cosmos Consider Strangersquos suggestion that the workings ofnecessity ldquocan be referred to the mutual entailments and exclusions of formsrdquoStrangersquos proposal faces a dilemma either the demiurge must have changed thefacts about which relations there are among the forms or there must alwayshave been more than one set of these relations among the forms so that thedemiurge could make it the case that physical items stopped imitating one setof relations and began imitating a different such set Neither horn of the dilem-ma is attractive Since the forms are changeless relations among them shouldalso be changeless had the demiurge changed the facts about which relationsexist he would have changed the forms themselves Or equivalently he wouldhave changed being This is not possible on Timaeusrsquo view Nor is it believablethat there should be more than one set of relations among the forms after all ifthere are two such sets why not more than two And for those who think thatthe form of the good is equivalent to the set of all these relations among theforms this claim would entail that there is more than one form of the goodThese answers raise many more questions than they settle In short the formsview has trouble explaining what the demiurge does in creating the cosmos ifcausal relations are copies of relations among the forms imagining any sort ofchange in these relations is implausible

Another possible view escapes the dilemma I have just outlined in the follo-wing way Prior to the creation it says physical items did not imitate the formsat all after the creation physical items have come to imitate the (only) relationsthat obtain among the forms9 This view avoids the implication that relations

explains how these different kinds came to occupy different regions of space even before theuniverse was set in order and constituted from themrdquo 53a2ndash78 ἀνόρατον εἶδος τι καὶ ἄμορφονhellip (51a7)9 It may be helpful to include an example of this view which Johansen develops forcefullyHe illustrates his view of the post-creation situation with the choice of the gods as they createdthe human skull either a thick protective bony structure which would have conferred longer




among the forms must change or must be plural but a different dilemma con-fronts it Prior to the creation physical items did not imitate anything Eitherthey had no causal powers at all then (since causal powers can be had only byimitating the forms) or if they did possess causal powers they must have hadthese in their own right The former option that they had no causal powers atall is on its face (at least) inconsistent with Timaeusrsquo attribution to the pre-cos-mos of a patterned arrangement The latter option is the view I defend here

13 The naming puzzle

Shortly after Timaeus makes his second beginning at explaining the cosmos(47endash48b) he describes a problem about how to name the four kinds or ele-ments (49bndash50a) The problem (as I shall read it here) is how to refer properlyto the physical elements10 The problem Timaeus sees with the usual way ofnaming the elements is that each one is potentially something other than whatit happens to be at the time it is named

Now then since none of these appears ever to remain the same which one of them canone categorically assert without embarrassment to be some particular thing this oneand not something else One canrsquot (49c7ndashd3)11

life but limited intelligence or a thinner more vulnerable skull allowing greater intelligencebut shortening life Johansen writes ldquoThe godsrsquo selection here ranges over sets of charactersThe character in each set necessarily implies the other characters in the set and necessarilyexcludes the characters in other sets The craftsmen can choose which set they want but theycannot choose which characters compose each setrdquo (2004 101) This sounds very like Strangersquossuggestion that necessity reflects relations among forms except that Johansen denies that therewas anything answering to lsquonecessityrsquo in the pre-cosmos Johansen does not say in this pas-sage why the characters in each set are found together There are three plausible answers tothis First perhaps the demiurge wanted them together ndash but in that case one wonders why hedid not put them together so that even better results would be obtainable Second the associa-tions might be determined by relations among the forms ndash but in this case one has the problemof explaining the apparently causal relations in the pre-cosmos Third the associations withinsets might be determined by the natures of the physical items themselves10 In describing the problem this way I follow what Zeyl calls the traditional reading of thepassage (2000 lvindashlxi) An alternative reading was discovered by Cherniss and has since beenchampioned by several authors On the alternative reading the problem is not how to referproperly to physical phenomena but which phenomena we should call by the names lsquofirersquolsquowaterrsquo etc Here I assume the traditional reading adherents of the alternative reading maytherefore find this section less persuasive Broadie 2012 187 also follows the traditional reading11 οὕτω δὴ τούτων οὐδέποτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἑκάστων φανταζομένων ποῖον αὐτῶν ὡς ὂν ὁτιοῦντοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παγίως διισχυριζόμενος οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖταί τις ἑαυτόν οὐκ ἔστινhellip




That is the fact that a corpuscle of fire say is potentially air or water somehowdisqualifies it from being called lsquofirersquo tout court Now it is not clear why Timaeusfinds it better to call this fire-corpuscle lsquowhat is suchrsquo or lsquowhat is fieryrsquo ratherthan just lsquofirersquo But this preference is itself clearly motivated by the potential fortransformation of one element into another12 His solution is that one shouldcall each element lsquowhat is suchrsquo rather than lsquothisrsquo or lsquothatrsquo for example lsquowhat isfieryrsquo rather than simply lsquofirersquo

Now on the forms view a particle of fire (a tetrahedron) depends on theform of fire both for the fact that it is now an instance of fire and for its abilityto become air or water at some later time For the causal connections betweenphysical things of course are all encoded as relations among the forms thereare no direct causal relations among physical things themselves The potentialfor elements to transform is explained by a form lsquotellingrsquo a physical particlewhat to do But on this picture Timaeus should not object to calling particles offire lsquofirersquo for it is precisely their imitation of the form of fire that renders themable to transform into air or water That is while one might give various expla-nations for why Timaeus prefers calling the elements lsquowhat is suchrsquo rather thanby their substantive names (lsquofirersquo lsquoearthrsquo etc) it will be difficult for any of the-se explanations to make sense of the reason he gives for raising the problem inthe first place namely the potential for transformation For on the forms vieweach element gets its potential to transform from the same place that it gets itsconventional and (according to Timaeus) mistaken name that is from a formBy contrast I will argue below that the powers view can provide a relativelyintuitive explanation of this problem

These three difficulties should ideally be resolved by a more satisfactoryview about causality and necessity in the Timaeus In what follows I propose analternative account of these aspects of Timaeusrsquo metaphysics able to solve the-se problems as well as others

Cf Mohr ldquoThe problemhellipis that all phenomenal types seem to be interchangeable so that allphenomena are equally well called by any and all names of types of phenomenardquo (2005a 84)See also Cornford 1997 178ndash81 whom I follow in diagnosing the problem Timaeus is pointingto but who thinks its solution is to distinguish substances from qualities12 Timaeus speaks as if this problem applies to all four elements in spite of the fact that onhis own theory earth is not able to change into the other elements Perhaps the problem ap-plies to earth in virtue of each variety of earth being transformable into other varieties of earthIn this case though it is hard to see why Timaeus should object to its being called lsquoearthrsquo




2 The powers view

The view I shall defend here is that physical items already possess causalpowers of their own both prior to and after the creation of the cosmos Thusthey do not rely on the forms to lsquotellrsquo them which effects to produce Insteadtheir own causal powers are sufficient for bringing about results Of course theforms continue to play important roles in relation to the physical part of thecosmos13 I will not discuss in detail these other jobs that the forms do I onlywish to note that I am not denying the forms any role toward physical thingsWhat my view denies is that the forms are the source of or otherwise responsi-ble for the causal efficacy of physical things14

I begin by showing how the powers view handles the three problems raisedjust above I then discuss several other passages which support the powers viewor illustrate its presence in the background of Timaeusrsquo account These otherpoints come in three varieties first I point out passages in which Timaeusrsquo choi-ce of words points directly to the powerful natures of physical things next Ishow how certain of his claims about other features of his cosmos imply thatphysical items have causal powers and finally I demonstrate how his practiceof providing explanations of natural phenomena is best explained by thepowers view


The problem again is that the pre-cosmos exhibits a certain degree of orderingand this implies that something is producing causal effects but nothing seemsable to account for this The powers view gives causal powers to the physicalitems themselves powers which are therefore already present in the pre-cos-mos There is no need to look outside the receptacle for something that would

13 In particular Timaeus describes physical things as imitations of the forms (μιμήματα) at50c5 and he argues that the forms play a key role in legitimizing our use of words to describethings at 49b7ndash50a414 One might object to this claim as follows On my view physical items are imitations of theforms and because they have the particular forms and proportions that they have they havecertain causal powers rather than those they possessed prior to the creation Surely their causalpowers are the way they are because these things imitate the forms that they do This is truebut my view does not deny this Rather my view is that having causal powers tout court is aproperty of the physical items both before and after the creation Put another way if per im-possibile the forms were to cease to exist physical things would continue to have some kindof causal powers in spite of the fact that they could no longer count as imitations of the forms




enable causality for it is there already The physical items have properties of asort sufficient for them to bring about effects on other physical things15 Thesepowers allow them to produce the (more or less) regular ordering of kinds foundin the pre-cosmos and also account for Timaeus saying that the four kindsldquopossessed certain traces of what they are nowrdquo16 We thus have a simple argu-ment for attributing causal powers to the pre-cosmic physical items somethingin the pre-cosmos was producing regular results this something was neither thedemiurge nor the forms nor the receptacle therefore it must have been thepre-cosmic contents of the receptacle that is physical things themselves17 Onthe powers view then when the demiurge creates the cosmos he modifies thecausal efficacy of physical things but does not create it


The problem is to say just what the demiurge does to create the universe Nowon the powers view the causal powers of physical things are not derived fromor tied to any other metaphysical entities Therefore there is no obstacle to say-ing that the demiurge must have taken the causal powers already present andmodified them to make them into (imperfect) imitations of the forms What thedemiurge does Timaeus tells us in creating the cosmos is to use ldquoforms and

15 I mean that the causal powers of the physical items are collectively sufficient to bring abouteffects That is these powers might have been triggered by stimulus properties or events (suchas are usually thought necessary for powers to produce their effects) The stimuli would be thecausal powers of other physical items The crucial distinction is that the powers were not inneed of anything contributed by the forms or the demiurgeThe argument in this section does not depend on which way we read the creation carried outby the demiurge If the story is taken literally then there is one situation before creation andanother afterward My exposition assumes that creation is to be read this way But for thosewho prefer to read the creation story as metaphor not reflecting temporal progression myargument can be given the same kind of reading On this approach the lsquopre-cosmosrsquo is just thestate of the cosmos as it would have been in the absence of the demiurgersquos intervention Simi-larly the problem becomes that of saying what would have accounted for the minimal orderingof the pre-cosmos and the solution says that the physical items that would have existed wouldhave had their own causal powers16 ἴχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὑτῶν ἄτταhellip (53b2)17 Cf Johansen ldquohellipcosmologyhellipdoes not aim to raise questions about being as such rather itaims to understand coming into beingrdquo (2008 465) Mohr may imply agreement with my viewhere when he writes ldquohellipthe phenomena [in the pre-cosmos] move spontaneously as they sortthemselves according to kindrdquo (2005c 131)




numbersrdquo to give physical things ldquoproportion and measurerdquo18 Note that addingor using ldquoforms and numbersrdquo does not imply adding causal efficacy

On this picture the physical items prior to the demiurgersquos intervention hadcertain powers but these powers were not in any way planned or arranged toproduce good results Put differently the powers that there were might havecome about at random19 The demiurge intervened by changing the causalpowers of the physical items bringing them more into line with the realm of theforms and therefore with what is best As a result they now come much closerto achieving good results On this view what the demiurge and the forms addto the physical items is not the ability to produce change but the ability to pro-duce ordered that is to say good changes In the pre-cosmos there were noforms no numbers and no proportion by which the changes taking place werearranged (and of course no one to do the arranging) the demiurge added the-se things and the result was the cosmos20


The problem here was that according to Timaeus we should not call fire by thesubstantival name taken from the form of fire the reason this is illegitimate hassomething to do with the ability of fire to transform into air or water The

18 εἴδεσί τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς 53b5 πάντα ταῦτrsquo εἶχεν ἀλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως 53a819 Having powers whose identity has come about at random is compatible with those powersproducing determinate results just as tossing a fair coin is compatible with it landing on onedeterminate sideSee Mohr 2005b for elaboration of a view compatible with mine regarding the physical natureof the basic triangles and what the demiurge did in the act of creation My understanding oflsquonecessityrsquo follows Cornford 1997 16620 Broadiersquos remarks may support my view when she speculates on the purposes of Timaeusrsquodistinction between the two kinds of cause as he discusses vision (46e7ndash47c4) She imaginesthat when Plato says that the purpose of vision is to allow us to see the workings of reason inthe heavens one motive he may have for this claim is to reject a popular thought according towhich the elements themselves have a sort of primitive intelligence and hence might bethought to have given rise to our bodies naturally without the intervention of any cosmic in-telligence Broadie points out that making the purpose of vision something so lofty as the revo-lutions in the heavens might be intended to promote the thought that that purpose could neverhave been aimed at by the primitive alleged intelligence found in material nature (2012 178ndash80) If her speculation is on target it supports my contention that the physical particles havecausal efficacy for while Timaeus makes a point of denying that physical things have intelli-gence he accepts that they are causes He only insists that is that their causation lacks intelli-gence or purpose




powers view begins by suggesting that Timaeusrsquo point may be that we cannotcall a corpuscle of fire lsquofirersquo because the name does not correspond to what itis21 This claim makes sense if Timaeus thinks that what a fire corpuscle is inclu-des what it can become and this is just what he emphasizes in describing theproblem In other words what each physical element essentially is includes itspotential for change and this is what makes it inapt to call it by whatever formit merely happens to have at a single moment

Being powerful means that each element stands in need of nothing furtherto be able to change into other elements22 So a corpuscle of fire is its potentialto become air or water in addition to the potential it is currently manifestingto be fire In other words a corpuscle of any of these elements includes thepower to be fiery the power to be airy and the power to be watery23 From ametaphysical point of view each power is on an equal footing with the othersOn this conception it is easy to see one reason Timaeus may have for objectingto using one of these names in preference to the others ndash the choice of any onename is arbitrary and picks out at best an arbitrary part of what the element isthat is what its own powers allow it to become So the reason that lsquofirersquo is aninappropriate name for a bit of fire is that as Timaeus thinks this implies thatbeing fire is a stable property that it will keep But in fact being fire is just one ofits powers And importantly this power is no more important to what this thingreally is than its other powers which allow it to become air or water24

We can now pass on to some further considerations favoring the powersview As I said above I divide these into three groups

ndash In sect24 I point out passages in which Timaeusrsquo lexical choice says more orless directly that the physical things bring about effects themselves

ndash In sect25 I show that Timaeus makes certain claims that also imply thepowers view and

ndash In sect26 I argue based on Timaeusrsquo explanatory practices25

21 I mean lsquoisrsquo here not in the sense Timaeus uses to designate his realm of being but in thesense of accurately referring to whatever nature fiery stuff has This is a sense of lsquoisrsquo Timaeuswould endorse22 See note 15 for clarification of ldquostanding in need of nothing furtherrdquo23 More precisely the basic triangles are what have equally the powers to be fiery airy andwatery The particles of the element derive their powers from those of the basic triangles24 Perhaps more precisely we could say that it is in virtue of the same power(s) that thisparticle is now fire and is also now able to become air or water25 These divisions are of course arbitrary but I hope they are nevertheless helpful




24 Lexical choices favoring the powers view

Timaeus once refers to the things in the receptacle as lsquopowersrsquo (δυνάμεων52e2)26 Now Plato gives Socrates two short speeches about powers at Republic477c1ndashd5 there Socrates says ldquoPowers are a class of the things that are thatenable us ndash or anything else for that matter ndash to do whatever we are capable ofdoingrdquo (477c1ndash2) So Timaeusrsquo choice of words suggests that physical things eit-her are or have powers that is that they either are or have properties enablingthemselves to do whatever they can do If this is their nature they do not needany contribution from the forms for their ability to bring about results Of cour-se Socrates is not Plato and Plato is not Timaeus so we cannot draw this infe-rence without qualification But Timaeus is happy to call the physical thingslsquopowersrsquo so thus far at least his word choice favors the powers view

Timaeus also speaks of ldquothe things that have come about by necessityrdquo (τὰδιrsquo ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενα 47e4ndash5 emphasis added) and he says that people mis-take these for lsquoreal causesrsquo precisely because they

hellipmake things cold or hot compact or disperse them and produce all sorts of similareffects27

Both phrases ndash τὰ διrsquo ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενα and ἀπεργαζόμενα ndash imply that physi-cal things are themselves responsible for bringing about physical changes Ti-maeus uses the same verb ἀπεργάσασθαι with the demiurge as subject at37c8ndashd1 This verb emphasizes completion and causal production ldquofinish offcompleterdquo and ldquocause producerdquo are LSJrsquos suggested translations28 At least insome sense what the demiurge does then is also something that physicalitems do What they have in common is their ability to bring about resultsmdashnotequally good results of course but results nonetheless29

At 56d Timaeus is describing what happens when particles of earth arebroken up by fire Since earth cannot be transformed into any other element its

26 Mohr 2005c 125 adds arguments for reading δυνάμεων as I do here ie as powers in thesame sense as we find in Republic V Cornford takes Timaeus to mean by δυνάμεων just ldquosensi-ble qualitiesrdquo or ldquopropertiesrdquo although the fact that he later translates δυνάμεως as ldquoactivepropertiesrdquo (emphasis added) shows that he is not thinking of the distinction I am discussinghere between powers and properties that are not powerful (1937 159 162 167)27 ψύχοντα καὶ θερμαίνοντα πηγνύντα τε καὶ διαχέοντα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζόμενα (46d2ndash3 emphasis added) For comparison of this passage with the Phaedo see Johansen 2004 103 ff28 Liddell 1996 sv ἀπεργάζομαι29 See below for discussion of the distinctions between reason and necessity and betweenprimary and secondary causes Here I only want to point out that Timaeusrsquo word choice attri-butes causal abilities to the physical items




constituent triangles can do nothing else but re-form into particles of earth Ashe explains this he says that the triangles themselves fit themselves togetheragain to produce cubes (that is particles of earth)

When earth encounters fire and is broken up by firersquos sharpness it will drift abouthellipuntilits parts meet again somewhere refit themselves together (πάλιν συναρμοσθέντα αὐτὰαὑτοῖς) and become earth again (56d4ndash5)

One might suppose that the forms are somehow involved in the fitting-togetherbut Timaeus makes no mention of this Rather his syntax suggests that the ba-sic triangles are themselves the causal agents of their own assembly the pro-nouns αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς emphasize that the activity is reflexive and thus that thetriangles are causally responsible for the effect

So much for the evidence from Timaeusrsquo statements themselves Of coursenothing rules out building other interpretations of these passages But I think itmust be conceded that the powers view is at least one natural way of readingthem I turn next to passages with logical implications favoring the powersview

25 Implications favoring the powers view

Timaeus makes a distinction between reason and necessity or between primaryand secondary causes30 But in neither case does he use the distinction to denycausal efficacy to physical things

Timaeus introduces these distinctions in this passage at the end of his dis-cussion of optics The passage is worth quoting at length in order to see howTimaeus returns more than once to the same basis for making the distinctionThat basis is the possession or lack of intelligence and therefore the ability toplan and arrange things for the best set against what we might call lsquomechani-calrsquo cause and effect in the sense that its effects will only be chance ones Andproducing chance effects guarantees that they will lack order beauty and pur-pose in Timaeusrsquo view

Now all of the above are among the auxiliary causes (συναιτίων) employed in the serviceof the godhellipBut because they make things hot or cold compact or disperse them andproduce all sorts of similar effects most people regard them not as auxiliary causes butas the actual causes of all things (οὐ συναίτια ἀλλὰ αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων) Things likethese however are totally incapable of possessing any reason or understanding about

30 I shall assume that these are the same distinction at least at the relatively coarse-grainedlevel at which I will examine them For a much finer-grained discussion see Johansen 2004




anything (λόγον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ νοῦν εἰς οὐδεν δυνατὰ ἔχειν ἐστίν)hellipSo anyone who is alover of understanding and knowledge must of necessity pursue as primary causes thosethat belong to intelligent nature (τὰς τῆς ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίας πρώτας) and as sec-ondary all those belonging to things that are moved by others and that set still others inmotion by necessity We too surely must do likewise we must describe both types ofcauses distinguishing those which possess understanding and thus fashion what isbeautiful and good from those which when deserted by intelligence produce (ἐξεργά-ζονται) only haphazard and disorderly effects every time (46c7ndashe6)

What we do not find here or in the other passages where Timaeus returns tothis distinction is any claim that one kind of cause is a lsquorealrsquo cause while theother is only specious that is a cause that fails to produce any effects of itsown31 The distinction may be drawn based on the contrast between order anddisorder or intelligence and chance or planning and blind mechanism But allthese distinctions presuppose that both kinds of cause are real causes in thesense that they both produce effects32 If the secondary causes produced no ef-fects of their own there would be no point in reason persuading them nor anypoint in philosophers investigating them33

Turning to another passage the powerful view of physical items is also bet-ter able to explain why Timaeus describes the receptacle as lsquoshakenrsquo by its owncontents This passage is especially puzzling as Timaeus seems to describe thereceptacle both as shaking its contents and as shaken by them

[The receptacle] sways irregularly in every direction as it is shaken by those things andbeing set in motion it in turn shakes them34

We may take the order of presentation in this statement as reflecting a causalsequence first the powers within the receptacle shake it and as a result thereceptacle somehow also transmits this shaking back to the physical items it

31 Timaeus brings back this distinction on the same basis at 47endash48b and at 68endash69a32 Broadie agrees that the auxiliary causes are nevertheless real causes (2012 176) But shemay disagree when she comes to comment on the four elementsrsquo tendency to separate intotheir own regions within the cosmos She writes ldquoIf the regional movements are simply basicattributes of the four elements then the latter are self-sufficient as regards these movementsFor Plato it would follow that they are not inanimaterdquo (2012 229 and n114) I take it that lsquoself-sufficientrsquo as Broadie uses it is equivalent to lsquopowersrsquo But I fail to see why being a powershould entail having a soul for Plato Timaeus seems to allow explicitly the possibility of some-thing producing effects but without intelligence and therefore possibly without a soul Broadierefers to 46d4ndashe2 but this passage says merely that soul is required for intelligence not forbeing a power33 For reason persuading necessity cf τῷ πείθειν (48a2)34 hellipἀλλrsquo ἀνωμάλως πάντῃ ταλαντουμένην σείεσθαι μὲν ὑπrsquo ἐκείνων αὐτήν κινουμένην δrsquo αὖπάλιν ἐκεῖνα σείειν 52e3ndash5 Mohr argues that the shaking is not to be taken literally (2005c126ndash32)




contains The most straightforward solution to this problem is that the physicalitems are powers in their own right they thus need nothing outside the recepta-cle to produce changes35

26 Timaeusrsquo explanatory practice

Timaeus introduces the necessary kind of cause at 47e and much of the remai-ning part of his speech consists of examples of this kind of explanation Hegives a wealth of examples in which physical properties or behaviors at onelevel are traced to the properties or behaviors of their smaller (and still physical)constituents He claims for example that the four elements get their propertiesfrom the triangles making up the individual solids of each element (55dndash56b)Everything physical then is ultimately built up from two kinds of right triangleWhatever is true of the triangles is inherited by all larger physical items sincethey all consist of these triangles Within the physical world then the basictriangles pass their properties on to other larger items but do not inherit pro-perties from any other physical item

By contrast Timaeus gives no explanation for the basic trianglesrsquo proper-ties He confirms that these are the ultimate explanantia when he says ldquoPrinci-ples yet more ultimate than these [sc two kinds of triangle] are known only tothe god and to any man he may hold dearrdquo36 That is explanations stop withthese two triangles once one arrives at these triangles in a chain of explanati-ons their properties are the last step37

35 Cf ldquoIn fact the ultimate source of movement turns out to be the Receptaclersquos contentsrdquo(Broadie 2012 227) ldquoThe contents move and only then in reaction to their motion does the win-nowing-basket movehelliprdquo (Mohr 2005c 127)36 τὰς δrsquo ἔτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἄνωθεν θεὸς οἶδεν καὶ ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἂν ἐκείνῳ φίλος ᾖ (53d6ndash7)37 Timaeus includes an epistemological hedge in the quotation saying that a god and per-haps a few human beings may know of principles more ultimate than the triangles But I wishto discuss only the views that Timaeus sets out explicitly and is committed to himself So evenif Plato is alluding to other principles here they are not part of Timaeusrsquo ontology For discus-sion of other principles Plato may be alluding to here see Cornford 1937 212ndash13There are moreover two senses in which the basic triangles may be lsquoultimatersquo First theymight be the smallest physical items Second each basic triangle may consist of yet smallercongruent triangles (Zeyl 2000 lxviiindashlxix explains how the basic scalene triangles can be ar-ranged to form equilateral triangles of different sizes and also how the basic scalene trianglecould be composed of smaller congruent triangles ad infinitum) In the second case explana-tory appeals to smaller and smaller triangles could go on ad infinitum but the basic triangleswould still be ultimate in the sense that all explanations would be repetitions of the first Thuson either reading of their lsquoultimacyrsquo these basic triangles remain ultimate




The uniquely privileged position of the basic triangles in Timaeusrsquo explana-tions suggests what he says explicitly when discussing the distinction betweendivine and necessary causes That is that physical items ndash all built from thebasic triangles ndash have causal capacities independent of the forms If the trian-gles were indebted to the forms for their causal abilities we might expect Tima-eus to indicate this at some point Instead in each case he gives an explanationdescending to lower physical levels

In the following passage Timaeus gives a general account of motion and rest

Now as for motion and resthellipthere will be no motion in a state of uniformity For it isdifficult or rather impossible for something to be moved without something to set it inmotion or something to set a thing in motion without something to be moved by itWhen either is absent there is no motion but [when they are present] it is quite impos-sible for them to be uniform And so let us always presume that rest is found in a stateof uniformity and to attribute motion to nonuniformity (57d7ndash58a1)

The key terms are the expressions τὸ κινῆσον (lsquosomething that will cause motionrsquoor lsquoa moverrsquo) and τὸ κινησόμενον (lsquosomething that will be movedrsquo or lsquosomethingmovedrsquo)

It would be easy to think that Timaeus is drawing a merely nominal distincti-on but this cannot be the case For he cannot be saying that motion requiresthat some entity be called lsquoa moverrsquo since he will use this claim to explain realcases of motion He must mean that being a mover and being moved designatereal properties independently of their being named or conceived by anyone

We can see this claim more clearly by looking also at its use in a nearbypassage Timaeus explains how some elements can be transformed into othersat 56dndash57c In explaining the intertransformations of elements we see thatwhich element instigates the transformation and which gets transformed va-ries depending on the case In one case water is broken up by fire (56d6) whilein another fire is broken up by water (56e2ndash5) When water surrounds a smallquantity of fire so that the fire is broken up and turned into more water thewater must be playing the role of mover while fire is being moved Converselywhen fire surrounds a small amount of water so that the water is broken upand becomes fire fire is the mover and water is moved

Further being the mover or the moved must be properties belonging to thebasic triangles rather than to the Platonic solids made from those triangles Forduring a process of being broken up the triangles that had constituted a tetra-hedron (fire) are separated and exist independently for some time before theyre-form into some other element Yet during the time they are separated theymust retain the property of being things-that-are-moved If they did not thenone of the conditions for motion would be missing from the situation and therewould be no further motion




Timaeusrsquo practice shows that he is attributing these properties being a mo-ver or being something moved to the basic triangles themselves These proper-ties may be the ones responsible for the necessary kind of causality if so wehave a window onto Timaeusrsquo most basic thinking about physical causality Forit is these two properties occurring in pairs that constitute the nonuniformitynecessary for motion and this kind of motion largely perhaps completely con-stitutes the necessary kind of cause

Timaeus gives a sophisticated explanation for the melting and freezing ofice the details of which reinforce his commitment to physical explanations in-dependent of the forms38 Timaeus goes on to claim that there are several obser-vable varieties of each element (58c ff) For example the explanation for thedifferent types of water is that some kinds of water have fire mixed in with them(58dndash59c) Fire introduces non-uniformity (ὁμαλότητα ἀποβάλλει 58e3) andthis makes the mixture mobile and hence liquid By contrast water lacking fireis solid The same principles explain the mobility of liquid water and the solidi-ty of ice and other non-liquid types the non-uniformity of the fire-water mixturemakes it mobile while without fire water is packed together and becomes hardbecause of its uniformity

He continues

The other type of water composed of large and uniform kinds is rather more immobileand heavy compacted as it is by its uniformity But when fire penetrates it and beginsto break it up it loses its uniformity and once that is lost it is more susceptible tomotion When it has become quite mobile it is spread out upon the ground under pres-sure from the air surrounding it (58d8ndashe6)

One might think that the inequality Timaeus is appealing to here consists ofhaving two different elements present in the same mixture But this is mistakenas we see from his claim that liquid water has water parts that are unequal andsmall

Because the former possesses water parts that are not only unequal but also small itturns out to be mobile both in itself and when acted upon by something else This isdue to its nonuniformity and the configuration of its shape39

38 To reiterate this is not to say that he thinks explanations using the demiurge and the formsunimportant Rather Timaeus is just following his own advice in these sections that we lookfor the necessary causes ldquofor the sake of the divinerdquo (69a2) Necessary causes can be investi-gated independently of the divine (although that would be a mistake in Timaeusrsquo view) disco-vering divine causes depends on our finding some necessary causes first39 τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑγρὸν διὰ τὸ μετέχον εἶναι τῶν γενῶν τῶν ὕδατος ὅσα σμικρά ἀνίσων ὄντωνκινητικὸν αὐτὸ τε καθrsquo αὑτὸ καὶ ὑπrsquo ἄλλου διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλότητα καὶ τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ἰδέανγέγονεν (58d5ndash8)




So the inequality lies only in the water corpuscles and this must mean thereare icosahedra of different sizes in it40 The fire that Timaeus mentions is thereto break up large water corpuscles into smaller ones thus creating inequalityamong the water-parts and causing the ice to melt This is why Timaeus descri-bes fire as ldquothe agent of nonuniformityrdquo meaning that fire is responsible forbringing about the nonuniformity41 Fire creates but does not constitute thenon-uniformity

If the fire particles leave the liquid water a reversal occurs ending in there-freezing of the water into ice In this causal story fire leaves the liquid waterdisplacing some of the surrounding air42 The air near the water then exertspressure on the liquid water causing it to compact and fill the spaces left bythe fire particles The compacting action must also cause some of the water par-ticles to re-form into larger particles so that uniformity is re-established Whenthe water is uniform again it is no longer mobile so it becomes ice

The fire thus acts as a catalyst for melting so long as it is present the watertends to be made of differently-sized particles and thus to be mobile and toflow43 Nevertheless fire is not one of the things constituting the nonuniformityfound in cases of liquid water His physical resources for explaining phenomenandash the triangles and the four solids they form ndash enable him to construct surpri-singly sophisticated accounts of physical properties

In fact in these passages it is the forms that seem to lack causal efficacythey play no role in initiating changes or in explaining why changes happen ina certain way If one is looking for changes that are explained by the forms thedemiurgersquos decisions and actions are the best candidate these are indeed gui-ded by his perception of how the forms are arranged But they of course be-long to the other kind of cause

40 Perhaps Timaeus adds that they are small to account for the ability of water to run throughvery small spaces41 τοῦ τῆς ἀνωμαλότητος δημιουργοῦhellip (59a5)42 This detail also reveals that Timaeus cannot be referring to the form of fire as he gives theseexplanations43 This feature of the theory could be intended to account for the fact that for example intro-ducing air or earth into a mass of ice does not cause it to melt had the non-uniformity in thiscase consisted merely of the copresence of two different elements the theory would have pre-dicted that ice could also be melted by mixing it with earth or air Timaeus could also be think-ing more generally of the fact that heating many substances renders them more liquid andlikely to flow




3 Conclusions

I have argued that the physical things in the receptacle even in the pre-cosmicchaos are able to bring about changes in other physical things on their ownTimaeusrsquo necessity is thus a realm of causality independent of the forms andthe demiurge that is independent of reason One result of adopting this view isto add weight and drama to Timaeusrsquo story of the demiurge finding things inchaos and then arranging them to produce better results The physical part ofthe world on the view I propose is not actively resisting the demiurge but itdoes have its own ability to produce changes and these changes will never tendtoward what is best in the absence of outside intervention Physical thingsthen are not merely imitations shadows or reflections of the forms nor is thedemiurge free to create them in just any form he might conceive In much thesame way human craftsmen must start with some material which is not hostileto their intentions but does have its own pre-existing causal abilities Intelli-gent intervention can often achieve results that seem remarkable to the non-ex-pert observer but such success does not imply that the task was carried outeasily The view I have defended then assigns a higher degree of accomplish-ment to the demiurge than its competitors do

A second implication of my argument concerns how we understand the re-lation between being and becoming the world of forms and the physical worldIf physical items are or have causal powers of their own they are able to pro-duce results independently of whether or not the forms are involved We mightchoose to regard this picture as diminishing the importance of the forms astaking away something they were thought to possess and re-assigning it to thephysical world instead I think this view would be mistaken We might insteadregard this picture as emphasizing that the forms and the physical world aretwo different kinds at the most basic level of Timaeusrsquo metaphysics Assigningfunctions or abilities to each kind is therefore not a zero-sum game at leastsome of the time their abilities lie along different dimensions from one anotherA better conclusion to draw then is that in the Timaeus producing physicalchange is not one of the functions of the forms This function belongs to physi-cal items in virtue of their causal powers44

44 This paper was written as part of the ongoing project Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontolo-gies directed by Anna Marmodoro and supported by the European Research Council I amgrateful to Anna Marmodoro Irini Viltanioti Kelli Rudolph Scott Berman Simone Seminaraand Adina Covaci-Prince for comments on earlier drafts




Bibliography

Broadie S 2012 Nature and Divinity in Platorsquos Timaeus Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPress

Burnet J ed 1902 Platonis Opera Oxford Oxford University PressCherniss H 1954 lsquoThe Sources of Evil According to Platorsquo Proceedings of the American Phi-

losophical Society 98 23ndash30Cooper J M ed 1997 Plato Complete Works Indianapolis HackettCornford F M 1937 Platorsquos Cosmology London RoutledgeJohansen T K 2004 Platorsquos Natural Philosophy A Study of the Timaeus-Critas Cambridge

Cambridge University PressJohansen T K 2008 lsquoThe Timaeus on the Principles of Cosmologyrsquo In The Oxford Handbook

of Plato Oxford Oxford University Press 463ndash483Liddell H G H S Jones R Scott and R McKenzie 1996 Greek-English Lexicon Oxford

Clarendon PressMohr R D 2005a lsquoImage Flux and Space in the Timaeusrsquo In God and Forms in Plato Las

Vegas Parmenides 83ndash99Mohr R D 2005b lsquoRemarks on the Stereometric Nature and Status of the Primary Bodies in

the Timaeusrsquo In God and Forms in Plato Las Vegas Parmenides 111ndash120Mohr R D 2005c lsquoThe Mechanism of Flux in the Timaeusrsquo In God and Forms in Plato Las

Vegas Parmenides 121ndash145Sedley D 2007 Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity Berkeley University of California

PressStrange S K 1985 lsquoThe Double Explanation in the Timaeusrsquo In Plato 1 Oxford Oxford Uni-

versity Press 397ndash415Zeyl D J trans 2000 Timaeus Indianapolis Hackett




change One might spell out the details of this kind of view as follows Theforms do not change but the realm of forms includes relations among theforms the relations are unchanging just as the forms are These relations existtimelessly (in the same sense of this word in which the forms themselves exist)but they provide instructions for the physical things participating in them Soto take a simple example from the Phaedo there is a relation of necessary en-tailment from the form of fire to the form of heat As a result of this relationphysical things imitating the form of fire also follow this lsquoinstructionrsquo to imitatethe form of heat as well Such relations must be very complex of course if theyare to account for all the physical changes in our cosmos This view then seesthe forms and their mutual relations as playing a role similar to laws of natureboth lsquotellrsquo physical items how to behave in whatever circumstances they findthemselves

Steven Strange seems to hold a view of this type

The causality of the Forms discussed in Phaedo 99bndash105bhellipis I think very close to whatPlato in the Timaeus calls Necessity Both the Phaedo and the Timaeus versions of thissort of causality involve the consequences for the world of Becoming of the fact that theworld of Forms has a certain structure that is that certain Forms import certain Formsand exclude others Forms have causal implications as Vlastos puts it hellipThe Reason ofthe Timaeus employs the very same sorts of causal implications in constituting the cos-mos and it is these very same causal implications that hinder the cosmos from being aperfect likeness of its model3

In Strangersquos view it is the forms that import and exclude one another that isforms are responsible for bringing about changes in the physical world

A second view also contrary to the one I argue for here is that the trianglesrely on soul to set them in motion Cornford may hold this view ldquoThey [theprimary bodies] are things that can set other things in motion but they requireto be set in motion themselvesrdquo4

3 Strange 1985 410 Cherniss 1954 also argues that the triangles rely on the forms to producechange4 I say he may hold this view because at various places he seems to imply both that theprimary bodies rely on souls for the motions they transmit to one another and also that thesame bodies can produce these motions by themselves This distinction must not have beenbefore his mind as he wrote See for example Cornford 1997 197 and 223ndash4 Johansen alsoholds a version of this view with the difference that he thinks the primary bodies had ldquonointernal properties of their ownrdquo and hence also no motions prior to their being formed intoelements by the demiurge (2004 96ndash7)Sedleyrsquos view is harder to classify He writes ldquoThere is then no reason to suspect that PlatorsquosDemiurge in any way fell short of achieving the best possible disposition of matter let alonethat matter itself was so resistant to persuasion as itself to limit his success That is not to say



































2 The powers view





















































































He continues
















3 Conclusions







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2 The powers view





















































































He continues
















3 Conclusions







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He continues
















3 Conclusions







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3 Conclusions







Bibliography















Bibliography















physical change in plato’s timaeus

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