physical security (1979) - fm 19-30

8/11/2019 Physical Security (1979) - FM 19-30

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Field Manual

No. 19-30

*FM 19-30

HeadquartersDepartment of the Army

Washington, D.C. 1 March 1979

*This publication supersedes FM 19-30, 3 November 1971, including all changes.

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You, the user of this manual, are the most important element in keeping this

publication current and viable. You are encouraged to submit any comments or

recommendations pertinent to this field manual. Comments should be keyed to

the specific page and line of the text in which you feel an improverment is

needed. You should provide reasons for each comment made to insure complete

understanding and evaluation Make your comments on DA Form 2028

(Recommended Changes to Publications) and forward to the Commandant,

USAMPS/TC, ATTN: ATZN-TDP-C, Fort McClellan, AL 36205. Every comment

will be considered.

The word he in this publication is intended to include both the

masculine and feminine genders and exception to this will be noted.

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FM 19-30

1 MARCH 1979

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

BERNARD W. ROGERS

General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

J. C. PENNINGTON

Major General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11A,Requirements for Physical Security (Qty rqr block no. 142).

Additional copies can be requisitioned from the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center,

2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1994 - 153-846


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Chapter 1

Th e c o m m a n d e r m u s t i n s u r e t h a tappropriate physical securi ty measures

are taken to minimize the loss of sup-

plies, equipment, and materiel through

threa ts , nat ural or huma n. He normally

exercises this charge through the provost

ma rsha l a nd/or physical security officer.

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Formulating Section I

1-1 System Design

You should formulate and imple-ment your basic physical security designfrom a total system approach. It should beorganized in depth and contain mutuallysupporting elements a nd be coordinat ed toprevent gap or overlap in responsibilities andperformance.

a. Total system approach is based on:

(1) Thoughtful and continuing analysis ofexisting protective measures.

(2) Determination of the possibility ofinterference with the operational capabili-ties of the insta llation or fa cility from a nyor all sources.

(3) Careful evaluation of the measuresnecessary an d pract icable that mainta insecurity at a desired level.

(4)Tailored to the needs and local condi-tions of each installation or activity.

b. Mutually supporting elements in -clude:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Physical perimeter barrier(s).

Clear zones.

Protective lighting.

Entry control facilities.

Detection, including the use of sensors

and assessment systems.

(6) Warning systems.

(7) P erimeter defensive positions, if a p-propriate.

Note: Selection and use of meansbeyond minimum requirements:

Established by command directives. Coordination and cooperation be-tween physical security officers andfacilities engineers is a necessity. Wherever threat indicates need forincreased security.

1-2 Design Considerationsa. Available resources must be used

in the most efficient manner to achieveadequate protection for an entire installation.

b. Emphasis goes to the operationalrequirements of the insta l la t ion indetermining the type and extent of physicalprotection. The physical security ma na gershould consider the following pertinentfactors in the indicated sequence.

(1) Mission assignment importance ofthe installation or unit to the mission of theArmy.

(2) The area to be protected, including thenature and arrangement of the act ivity ;classification of information, data, activi-ties; the number of personnel involved;monetary an d/or str at egic value of ma te-riel located therein; or other importantfeatures inherent to the problem, such asexis t ing threats , either na tura l or huma n.

(3) Criticality and vulnerability of

information, materiel and personnel.

(4) Integration of operating, mainte-nance, and other requirements.

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(5) Environment, such as political andeconomical aspects, legal considerations,terrain, weather, climate, etc.

(6) Feasibility, effectiveness, and desira-bility of various possible methods ofproviding adequate protection.

(7) Costs of materiel and equipment to be

installed as well as availability of f inds toprovide at least minimum protection for allcritical areas and activities This mini-mum may be less than the desirable degreeof physical protection; therefore, the pro-

gram must be f lexible so that refinementscan be added as additional resourcesbecome available.

(8) Possible changes in operation,such as expansion, relocation and re-trenchment. Coordination must be main-tained with appropriate staff offices so

tha t cha nges may be projected a s far inadvance as possible, and necessary supple-ment a l personnel a nd/or funds ca n berequested.

c. Changes in mission and activities ofan instal lat ion or act ivi ty may also requireadjustments in security. Physical securityplanning and programing must be acontinuing process if security managersare to provide the best protection possible.

d. All security measures should beemployed so that they complement andsupplement each other. Lack of integration ofsecurity measures may result in a wa ste ofmoney, equipment, and manpower. But moreimportant, the security of an installation may

be placed in jeopardy. By the considerationsoutlined, a sound physical security programshould evolve.

e. The formulating procedure is sound

whether it is applied to changes on existinginstallation or the construction of a newfacili ty.

1-3 AssessmentOf Security Posture

The degree of protection desired onany installation is predicated upon an analy-sis of tw o factors-critica lity a nd vulnera bil-i ty .

a. Resource Criticality

(1) Determination

(a) Importance to the national defensestructure.

(b) Effect of its partial or complete loss.

(2) Evaluation

(a) Installation. High criticality-greateffect on national defense structure.

(b) Comma nd/a ctivity. High critica l-i t y p a r t i a l o r c o m p l e t e l o s s immediate and serious impact to per-form its mission for a considerableperiod of time.

b. Resource Vulnerability

(1) Determination

(a) Susceptibility to threats that resultin da ma ge, loss, destr uction or disrup-

t ion.(b) Type Of installation or activityinvolved, industrial or other processes

performed, physical layout and con-struction.

(2) Evaluation

(a) High vulnerabilityone or morethreats easily causing sufficient loss,damage, or destruction to affect themission of the whole installation or itssubordina te comm a nds/a ctivities.(b) Decreased vulnerabilityexisting

threats not l ikely to cause interferencewith the mission.

(c) It should be noted that cost of

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protective measur es in terms of equipment and manpower may not a l low foroptimum security for the entire installa-

tion. Also, determination of securitypriority based on criticality and vulnera-bility is essential to proper allocation ofresources.

c. Security in depth (guards, physicalbarriers, and syst ems) is a lw ays the goal ofthose individuals responsible for the security

of an installation or activity. No object is sowell protected that it cannot be stolen,damaged, destroyed, or compromised. There-fore, access must be made so difficult that an

intruder will be deterred from committing a

criminal act or will be detected and appre-hended before he can successfully completethe criminal act. Accumulated delay timefor the intruder must be built into asystem for protection in depth. Thisprotection results from the security in-depthring (see figure 1).

d. Physical security is only part of theoverall defense plan of an installation. It doesnot include dispersion of facilities, continuityof operations, civil defense structures, con-struction specifications, or plans formulatedto cope with natural or human threats thathappen. The formulating process must allowfor the integration of all these measures.

Figure 1Security in-depth ring.

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Security Threats Section II

Security threats are acts or conditions thatmay result in the compromise of information;loss of life; damage, loss, or destruction of

property; or disruption of the mission of theinstallation or facility. Before the physicalsecurity manager can develop an effectivesecurity program, he must determine thepossibility of interference with the opera-tional capabilities of the installation orfacility from any and all sources. Recognition

of all risks is mandatory if he is to makerecommendations for physical security mea-sures to control or eliminate them. The sever-

it y of security threats depends on such varia-bles as the type of installation or facilityinvolved, mission or processes performed,physical la yout, a nd const ruction. The geo-

graphical location, the enemy situation, andthe existing state of law and order are mostimportant fac tors .

1-4 Definition

a. Security threats are acts or condi-tions, which include human threats, that may

result in:(1) Disruption of the installation or facil-i t y .

(2)t y .

(3)

(4)

Damage, loss or destruction of proper-

Personal injury or loss of life.

Compromise of defense information.

b. Threa t s everity depends on s uch var i-ables as:

(1) Type of installation or facility.(2) Mission or processes performed.

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

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Physical layout and construction.

Geographical location.

Stability of the situation.

Exis ting s ta te of law and order.

Protection measures in effect.

Categories

Security threats are classif ied aseither natural or human.

a. Natural Threats

(1) Usually the consequence of naturalphenomena.

(2) Normally not preventable by physicalsecurity measures.

(3) May greatly affect security operationsin one or more of these ways.

(a) Require an increase in protectivemeasures.

(b) May reduce the effectiveness of

existing security measures by suchoccurrences as:

Collapsed perimeter fences. Inoperable protective lighting. Damaged patrol vehicles. Poor visibility.

Examples of natural threats are:

Floods flooding of the installation withresulting property damage, destruction ofperimeter barriers and short circuiting ofintrusion detection systems. Heavy rains or

snowfalls , even though they do not result infloods, may cause some of the same damages.

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Storms high winds or rain causing nui-sance alarms and short circuiting in IDS, and

limiting visibility of security personnel.

Earthquakes causing n uisance alarms,possible fires from broken gas mains, build-ings weakening and falling down.

Winds disrupting power lines, setting off

nuisance alarms, causing safety hazardswith flying debris.

Snow and Ice blocking patrol roads,increasing response time to alarms, andfreezing of locks and alarm mechanisms.

Fires da ma ge/dest ruct ion of perimeterbarriers or buildings.

Fog causing reduced visibility for securityforces and increased response time to alarms

and may require additional security person-nel.

b. Human Threats

These threat s a re the result of a st at e ofmind, a t t i tude, weakness , or character tra i ton the part of one or more persons. Theyinclude acts of commission or omissionovert and covertwhich could disrupt ordestroy the operation or mission of aninstallation or facility.

Examples of human threats are:

Pilferage (appendix A). Sabotage (appendix B ). Espionage (appendix C). Bombing (appendix D).Pilferage in Consumer Outlets (appendixA).

Attacks on Key Persons (chapter 14).

Carelessness and accidents in perfor-mance of official duties. Disaffection and disloyalty of employees.

Safety hazards from equipment malfunc-t ion. Human Intelligence Threat (HUMINT).

1-6 Risk Analysis

This process is invaluable to thesecurity manager in establishing priorities ofprotection of assets. Basically, it consists of

a. Identifying items and functions interms of:

(1) Total replacement

(2) Temporary replacement

(3) Unrecoverable costs

(4) Allied and related costs.

b. Conducting a haza rds a nd vulnerabil itystudy of personnel, facilities, items, andfunctions.

c. Conducting a probability of occurrenceassessment through indicators, such as:

(1) Documented records

(2) Insurance claims or adjustments

(3) Weather, etc.

d. Establishing a range of losses based onexperience involving specific items (mini-mum to maximum in terms of dollar value),and assessing the losses over a 3-5 yearperiod.

e. Correlating the degree of loss experi-

enced with the ranges of losses or functions.

f. Comparing the low against high ele-ments of ranges for all items and functions;then averaging weight against risk value interms of criticality (Defense Industrial Secu-rity Institute, DSA).

1-7 Evaluation of Risks

The actual degree of risk involveddepends on two factors:

Probability of adverse effects occurring as

a direct result of the threat(s).

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Extent to which the installation or activity All determinable threats.will be affected by the threat(s). Continuing activity beginning in peace-

time and expanding to meet the particulari-

Security threats significantly impact on a t ies of forma l hostilit ies.

physica l security program by requiring the Coordinat ion a nd integrat ion w ith otherincorporation of the following considera- protective programs, such as crime preven-tions: t ion and safety .

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Chapter 2

Planning, Programing, and

Budgeting

o insure that the security responsi-bility of an installation or activity receivesmaximum emphasis, the security ma na germust be totally aware and involved in thein st a lla t ion pla nn in g, programing, andbudgeting process. This involvement in-

cludes preparation of manpower reports andappropriate submissions.

T

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Planning Section I

Planning for the security defense of anins ta l la t ion must remain consta nt , pra ctical ,flexible to the mission and certainly respon-sive to the needs of the commander. Onlythrough a dequate planning can we providean effective counter response to securitythreats-as outlined in chapter 1.

2-1 Planning Basis

a. Implementat ion of Department

of the Army (DA) policy, AR 190-13, and thosesupplemental directives by installation andhigher commanders is imperative to having asound security, program.

b. The following must be considered whenplanning security measures for an installa-

t ion:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

2-2

Mission.

Vulnerability.

Impact on operations.

Budget l imitations.

Personnel and equipment limitations.

Objectives

To be effective, planning must in-volve a phased approach, be flexible inincorporating changes, and have clearlydefined courses of actions. It must be con-cerned with realistic protection in depth andbe based on:

a. Relative s tandards .b. Personnel, materiel and equipment

available.

c. Probability of the most serious incident.d. Implementation in the interest of conti-

nuity of all security operations.

2-3 Pre-operational Phase(Estimate)

a. Sound prior estimates of thesecurity operational situation will reap big

dividends when planning is ongoing. As am in im um , t he pr eop er a t i ona l es t i m a t eshould be concerned

(1) Security AnalEstimate (SAVE)

with the la tes t

ysis and Vulnerability

(2) Security Vulnerability Assessment(SVA)

(3) Operational Security (OPSEC).

b.The estima te must involve determina -tion of all available resources and acts as the

basis for developing a sound security plan.

c. The estimate should entail maximumuse of existing organizational structures,supervisors, materiel and equipment, andavailable technical skills .

(1) Identification of unknown factors andl imi ta t ions .

(2) Identification of the necessary aug-mentation of personnel and equipment tosupport the operational phase.

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2-4 Operational Phase

Planning for the operational phasemust be all inclusive. It involves trainingprograms concerning duties and responsibili-ties prior to, during, and after the operationalphase. As a minimum, this phase shouldcover:

a. Employment of assigned a nd a t ta chedpersonnel.

b. Serviceable equipment.

2-5 Awareness Phase

To insure that the operational phase

is sound an d tha t th e plan is w orkable andpractical, all personnel must be aware of theirduties and responsibilities. Contents of theplan must dictate requirements and coursesof action to include the interface of securitypersonnel.

Extracts of the plan must be provided to keypersonnel and supervisors to insure areas ofresponsibility are executed. Also, supervisorsmust brief their personnel on appropriateduties and responsibilities, and monitor their

actions to insure a successful plan exists.

2 - 6 Development

Developing a sound security planmust involve an int egrated a pproach as t owh o, wha t , w hen, where and how. Specifi-cally, the development should be in accor-dance with appendix F of this manual .

2-7 Evaluation

a. This is a n importa nt element ofany plan to insure the plans overall appropri-

at eness a nd w orkabili ty . Sound evalua t ion

procedures will identify plan deficiencies and

allow for necessary corrections and adjust-ments .

b. Evaluat ion of the plan will actuallyacquaint personnel with their duties andresponsibilities a s w ell as th e mecha nics of

the plan.

c. The methods of evaluation should in-clude:

(1) Testing techniques in which all por-tions of the plan are exercised individually

and collectively.

(2) Testing conditions which are as closeas possible to real world conditions and

which s imulat e securi ty t hreats as appro-pria te .

(3) Quality contr ol through selecting eval-uators who can provide a complete critiqueof the workability and appropriateness ofthe plan. Evaluators should be instructedto place special emphasis on personnelactions, both individually and collectivelyas a team, when weaknesses in trainingare evident. The evaluator should makenote. An essential element of the evalua-t ion is the feedback by evaulators. This

feedback acts as a procedure for revisinga nd modifying th e plan. Revision sh ouldbe immediate and all personnel must bemade aware of the changes .

(4) Eva luat ion Frequency:

(a) The plan must be evaluated atirregular intervals based on publisheddirectives and as deemed necessary by .the responsible commander.(b) Mechanics involving developmentof a security plan shou ld consider the

processes outlined in figure 2 a ndincorporat e the data set forth in appen-dix F.

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Figure 2Process steps in effective planning.

Programing and Budgeting Section II

As the Army continues to mature in terms for advanced security equipment, more and

of complexity and sophistication of weapons better trained security personnel, both civil-

and equipment, the management of Army ian and military. Therefore, the securityresources becomes an increasing responsibil- manager must be knowledgeable in resourceity. Inherent to this responsibility is the need management .

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I t is essential , in the management ofinstallation security measures and require-ments , that the security manager knows theworking relationships and necessary require-

ments involving budget formulation andexecution of the following:

Command Budget and Manpower Guid-a nce (B MG).

Program Budget Advisory Committee(PBAC).

Command Operat ing Budget Est imate(COBE).

Major Activity Directors (MAD). Budget Requests . Manpower Procedures. J ustification for Additional Security P er-sonnel and Equipment.

2-8 Budget and ManpowerGuidance (BMG)

a. Budget and manpower guidanceis generated a t Headquarters , DA, to insurethat Army responsibilities spelled out in theFYDP are passed down to major commandsand agencies.

b. Through this guidance DA spells out foreach major command and agency preciselywhat wil l be required and what l imita t ions

a re to be imposed. Ba sed on t his guida nce,major commands and agencies update their5-year programs and generate budget esti-mates for the budget year. The document each

command or agency develops is its budgetand manpower guidance (BMG).

b. This document provides higher head-quarters approval for use of all assignedresources for a specific period. The documentis an extract from the Army portion of theFYDP of those resources that have beencontemplated for allocation and containsgoals and workloads that such resources aredesigned to support.

2-10 Concepts

a. Ma jor comma nd/a gency 5-yea rprograms, written in terms of appropriations,

budget programs, and elements of expense,are detailed statements of the plannedapplication of the resources (based on DAguidance) to accomplish assigned missions,goals, an d w orkloads of the comman d for 5years .

b. DAs budget and manpower guidancefor ma jor comma nds a nd a gencies does notconst i tu te authori ty to obl iga te f inds .Rather, it is guidance to which recipientsrespond with their budget est imates and,finally their command operating budgetestimates (COBE). This guidance documentfrom Headquarters, DA, is formally updatedthree times a year.

c. Each successive headquarters trans-lates the guidance it receives from above into

expanded guidance for its subordinate com-mands. This action carries guidance fromHeadquarters, DA, down to the operat inglevels where, in response, the COBE is gener-

a t ed .

2-11 Command OperatinBudget Estimate (COBE)

2-9a.The comma nd operat ing budget

BMG Objectives estimate (COBE) is the field commandersestimate of resource requirements for the

a. The BMG is the bas is for plan- approaching f isca l yea r and an es t ima te ofning, programing and budgeting for all the following fiscal year based on advancedassigned missions, objectives and workloads. budget plans. Headquarters, DA, will advise

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field commands of their approved operatingbudgets through four interrelated actions.

(1) J une updat e of program an d budgetguidance.

(2) DA issuance of the resources guidance.

(3) Issua nce of approved opera ting bud-

get .(4) Command operating budget markup.

b. Missions are assigned and resources are

allocated to the installation commander in

the command operating program of higher

headquarters. The allocation is expressed in

terms of the Army m an agement st ructure,

AR 37-100 (basic fiscal code), and AR 37-100-XX (FY fiscal code). Within this broad frame-

work the installation commander develops amore detailed description of activities to beperformed during the year. When approved,the C OB E becomes th e plan of action for ex-ecutors of the program.

c. The COBE is a command, agency or

installation plan of action for a specific fiscal

year covering the activities for which it was

responsible.

Installation Management

2-12 Purpose of COBE

a. To record in one place the activi-ties to be conducted for a given year and theresources for th eir support . These a re t heactivities necessary to achieve objectivesassigned by higher authority based onguidan ce extra cted from t he Army portion ofthe FYDP.

(1) Identify that portion of the budget tobe accomplished by each subordinate ele-ment in terms of objectives, policies, priori-

ties, and resources available.

(2) Establish a basis against which ac-complishments and resource utilizationcan be measured.

b. Each command, agency, and installa-tion in the Army establishment prepares anannual COBE covering operations for which

it receives funds. These COBEs are preparedin sufficient detail to identify

(1) What has to be done.

(2) When it must be done.

(3) What resources are available.

c. The COBE is prepared by each com-mand and developed in response to programa nd budget guidan ce received from h igherheadquar ters .

Section Ill

We have alrea dy noted tha t th e resource much higher portion of the DOD budget w ill

management system requires installa t ion be reflected annually in Army installation

commanders to identify the costs of their budgets .

military personnel. In the future, therefore, a

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2-13 Budget Formulation

At the inst alla tion level, you w ill beconcerned wit h a budget cycle divided int otwo phasesformulation and execution.

a. The budget cycle for operation andmaintenance, Army, appropriation whichfinances most of the day-to-day operatingcosts of the Army, actually starts 18 monthsah ead of the t ar get budget year (B Y). Mostinstallations do not become formally in-volved in the actual budget until 6 to 8 monthsbefore th e beginning of the t ar get B Y. As soon

as the annual Army budget estimate has been

fina lized [follow ing joint DO D /Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB) hearings on

the Army budget estimate], DA revises itsguidance by sending to all of its majorcommands revised budget and manpowerguidance (B MG) in J anua ry (about 6 months

before the target BY). Based on this revisedguidance, each subordinate command makesnecessary changes in its local plans andprograms.

b. On receipt of the guidance document atthe installation in Octobersix months prior

to the BYit is sent to the Directorate ofResource Management (DRM), who is theprimary staff officer charged with financialmanagement responsibility. After briefingthe insta l la t ion commander and adding thecommanders desires, the DRM breaks down

the guidance into terms and segments thatare meaningful at the installation level. Hethen distributes guidance with a minimum ofdelay to the major activity directors (MADs).

c.The DRM develops a time-phased sched-ule of actions necessary for completion of theinstallation budget. This is similar to asuspense-date calendar.

prepares the draf t insta l la t ion BMG.

e. To facilitate and coordinate preparationof progra m/budgets, t he st a ff forms a pro-gram budget advisory committee (PBAC) toserve as atop management advisory group to

the commander. The Chief of Staff is nor-mally chairman. Other members are theprincipal staff officers responsible for the

functional areas of personnel, operations,an d logist ics, and other r epresenta t ives asdesired by the commander.

f. The committee considers all aspects ofthe internal management of the command.

g. Each member insures that his area ofstaff responsibility is accorded full considera-

tion by the committee.

h. The use of financial data (that is,expressions of resource requirements indollar terms) permits comparison of totalinput, using a common unit of measure.

i. The goals a nd r equirements of individ-ual a reas a re coordina ted an d molded intooverall goals and requirements for the com-mand.

j. Recommendations of the PBAC repre-sent the consensus of the top managementofficials of the command.

k. The comptroller presents the draft BMGto the PBAC along with any unresolveddifferences that could not be settled by staffcoordination.

2-14 PBAC Functions

a. In terpre t a t ion o f BMG f romhigher authority and integration of the localcommanders guidance.

b. Development of a plan for preparationd.Aided by his staff , the DRM establishes of a proposed progra m/budget t ha t w ill

objectives and resource limitations, using effectively and efficiently accomplish thelocal historical data and experience. He then commands mission.

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Figure 3-Installation budget cycle.

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c. Application of judgment and experienceto specific program areas.

d.Achievement of reasonable balance andcoordination between proposed missions,activities, and resources assigned to subordi-

nate commands and agencies.

e. Presentation of a staff-coordinated pro-posed command operating budget estimate(COBE) to the commander.

f.Review of t he r eport s of progra m/budgetexecution and preparation of recommendedrevisions to th e opera tin g progra m/budgetbased on the results of operations.

g. Principal members of the PBAC areassisted by their subordinates who functionas a junior or working PBAC. Representationin this junior group is expanded to include at

least one representative of each categorywithin each functional area. For example, theDPCA represents the provost marshal (secu-rit y officer). The progr a m/bud get officer fr om

the comptrollers office also participates as aworking member. Much of the detailed workfor the senior PBAC is done by the juniorPBAC prior to the senior PBACs beingconvened. The junior PBAC works up de-tailed alternative courses of action for consid-eration of the senior PBAC.

h. Action agencies receiving the BMG are

the major activity directors (MADs). They arealso frequently called program directors.Specific determinations of what is a majoractivity and of the designation of the MADdepend on t he insta lla t ion a nd its mission.However, primary staff officers are normallydesignated MADs for activities falling intheir a reas of primary sta ff responsibili ty .Major activities usually follow the break-down of the Army management s tructure.

2-15 Major Activity Directors

For example, the director of indus-trial operations (DIO), is responsible for thecentral supply and maintenance program.

Also, the Guard and Reserve forces programwould belong to the director of plans andtraining. Physical security equipment (pro-vost marshals office) belongs to the directorof personnel and community act iv i t ies(DPCA).

a. At the installation level, organization

more clearly reflects the functional manage-ment requirements, but does not clearly ad-dress the program as a whole. The installa-t ions have subdivided their programs byfunctional area responsibilities. The namecoined for the subdivisions is key accounts.

b. One rule that must be followed in thissubdivision is that the data collected for theaccounts must be identifiable to insure thatwhen this data is combined with dataconcerning other key elements in the pro-gram , it does not lose its identity with the

major programs that i t supports .

c. Guidance is analyzed by the majoract ivity directors and passed down to theactivity chiefs who report to them. Theact ivity chiefs analyze their guidance andpass appropriate guidance down to subactiv-ity chiefs who report to them. For example,the DPCA is the MAD for G-641. Under himthere are normally activity chiefs and subac-tivity chiefs (physical security managers).

d.When the guidance finally gets down to

th e activity/subactivity chief, it is t ra nslat edinto budget requirements. This is the turna-around point. Detailed budget segments areprepared by subactivity chiefs; reviewed, and

consolidated by activity chiefs; again re-viewed and consolidated by major activitychiefs; until the draft insta lla t ion COB E isconsolidated by the DRM. Requirements arejustified by use of performance factors (PF)listed for budget codes in the Army manage-ment structure.

e. The ba sic progra m/budget documen tprepared at the installa t ion is the act ivitybudget schedule, reflecting, within cost guid-

ance, dollar requirements for resources by

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Figure 4-Typical organization for programing and budgeting O

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type (element of expense), manpower by man-years and type, and work output in terms ofPF. Data is projected for each quarter of thefiscal year. The same three types of data areprovided for unfinanced requirements; thatis, the workload considered essential formission accomplishment and its associated

resource requirements that cannot be per-

formed within the cost guidance received. Theactivity budget schedule establishes a stan-dard cost per unit of output, composed of la-bor, supply equipment, and other costs at the

programed level of output.

f. The activity budget schedule is normallysupported by schedules of temporary dutytravel, supply requirements, contracts, andunfinanced requirements and a narrat ivestatement by the act ivity manager. Whenautomatic reimbursements are expected to beearned by the activity, a list of sources and

anticipated amounts is also prepared.

g. Activity budget schedules are reviewedby functional category managers . Part icularattention is paid to the balance of unfinancedrequirements of activities having similarpriorities. When balance has been achievedamong activities of the same functionalcategory, functional category managers,act ing now a s th e working P B AC, proposeadjustments in activity cost ceilings toachieve balance installation wide among allfunctional categories and activities.

h. The PBAC will review and make neces-sary modifications to the draft COBE beforesubmitt ing it to the commander with itsrecommendations. Those items that theinstallation feels are necessary for the accom-plishment of its mission, but cannot affordwithin the dollar guidance received fromhigher headquarters, are included in theCOBE as unfinanced requirements. Unfi-nanced requirements are listed in order ofpriori ty with justi f ication and impact s ta te-

ments supporting the installations requestfor additional funds.

i. The installation COBE is a plan of

action for a specific fiscal year and has athreefold purpose:

Record activities to be conducted and

resources needed for t he inst a llat ions sup-

port . Identify action to be accomplished by each

subordinate element. Establish basis to measure accomplish-

ment and resource consumption.

j. Of special interest in the COBE is sectionI , Commanders Narrative Analysis . In thissection, the commander is provided theopportunity to defend his views on the

adequacy or inadequacy of his COBE whichhas been developed in response to guidancereceived from parent headquarters.

k. After review and approval, the COBE issubmitted to the major command which

reviews a ll COBE s submitted to determineconsistency w ith guidance, ma gnitude, andtype of resources requested and also theurgency of unfinanced requirements.

l. Major comma nd COB Es a re reviewed,adjusted, and consolidated a t Headquarters ,DA, and form the basis of the Armys annualapportionment request, which is submittedthrough DOD to OMB.

2-16 Budget Execution

a. The insta llat ion budget execu-tion phase begins 1 October with receipt of theapproved operating budget (AOB) or markedup COBE indicat ing the act ion taken inresponse to the DA-approved COBE. Themarkup of the installa t ion COBE at thispoint reflects all changes to the installations

COB E result ing from budget reviews at a lllevels of DOD, OMB, and Congress. As such,it represents the approved installation plan ofexecution for the BY.

b. An a pproved budget esta blishes a nnua llimit a tions a nd/or objectives to include th eamount of expense or obligations that maybe

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incurred for a specific program (or otherclassification) for the BY.

c. The installation marked up COBE andthe AOB for the first quarter of the fiscal year

are sent to the DRM for action. The DRMreviews and analyzes these documents,

determines adjustments required, and in-forms major activity directors concerned ofpertinent adjustments.

d.Through the coordinat ed efforts of theDRM and the working PBA, the insta l la t ionprogram is updated. The DRM sends theoriginal of the AOB to the finance andaccounting office. Authority to obligate theGovernment comes to the installation in theform of a Funds Authorization Document(FAD). This authority is provided on a

quarterly basis .

e. If the magnitude of chan ges wa rra nts,the PBAC meets to review the revisedinstallation program for balance in re-sources, levels and workloads. When satisfied

with the plan of operation, the PBAC recom-mends that the plan be approved by theinstallation commander. The commandereither approves the recommended program ordirects that changes be made. After finalapproval, the program is returned to the

insta llation DR M. The DRM finalizes, pub-lishes, and distributes the approved installa-tion operating program which serves as theoverall plan of operations for the fiscal year.

f.The budget execution review (BER) is themidyear review report and provides the basis

for funding adjustments by higher headquar-ters during the latter half of the current fiscal

year. In preparing the BER, program andactivity directors should carefully review allresource requirements to insure that esti-mates are accurate, and that the unfinancedrequirements are completely justified toinsure that no mission-essential activities arehampered by the lack of resources.

2-17 First-half-year Data

a. Actual data (experience) on ex-penses incurred and performance (workload)accomplished for the first 3 months (that is 1October through 31 December).

b. Cumulative projected data for the first 6months that include the first 3 months ofactual data plus 3 months (1 October through

31 March) of projections of the expense to beincurred and the performance (workload) tobe accomplished.

c. Cumulative projected data for the entiref iscal year. The last half estimated data areincluded in the cumulative projections orexpenses to be incurred and performance tobe accomplished for the entire fiscal year.

d. Segments of the BER are submittedsimilar to sections of the COBE; they arereviewed, analyzed, and consolidated bya ctivity chiefs and t he ma jor a ctivity direc-tors, and finally, the draft instal lation COBEis composed of five sections.

e.Section I, Commanders Narrative An-alysis, is the one in which the installationcommander informs higher headquarters ofmajor problems involved in performingassigned missions, programs, and workloadswithin existing resources. It is the highlightfeature of the BER on which all reviews arefinally focused for decision a nd a ction. It isdeve loped under the management-by-exception concept a nd oriented t o facilitat ebudget execution, management, review, andanalysis processes at each succeeding level ofcommand. See section IV, chapter 2, AR 1-1,for a more detailed explanation of the Armybudgeting system.

J -SI IDS issue is based on request ma de tothe Nat iona l Inventory Control Point(NICP). Other equipment may be obtained,

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as a resul t o f an an nual unprogrammed and un- mander on installation vulnerability, equip

financed request, by providing the necessary ment criticality, and need. This will also

justification for input to the command op- assist the commander in preparing section I

erating budget estimate (COBE). of the comma nders na rra tive an a lysis.

d. Coordinate with necessary installationprimary staff elements and solicit docu-mented support.2-18 Security Equipment

Procurement Procedure e. P repar e the insta lla t ion budget formsa. Security manager conducts an and a security equipment decrement list to be

inspection to determine the need. submitted to the comptroller. (The decrementlist is a priority list for items to be removed

b. Determine requirement authority from the program if resource guidance is(DO D/DA let ter , AR, dir ective, et c.). reduced. As such, the document list goes from

lowest priority to highest priority in t erms of

c. B rief provost ma rsha l/inst a llat ion com- the critical needs of the installation.)

Sample Budget Request

Budget requests provide for police services,ma intena nce of order, tra ffic control, crim-inal investigations, correctional facility, andphysical security services, equipment,and inspections. The physical security man-ager must review the design of Military Con-

struction Army (MCA) projects and providerecommendations.

The cost estimate must be submitted withthe appropriate transmit ta l document, ac-cording to local policy. DA Pamphlet 140-series explains this subject in great detail.

Section IV

The samples included in the next 15 pages are

physical security oriented (6 pages for COBEand 9 for SPE funding).

If the DPCA receives cuts in its request, the

budget request may be returned to the

installation in initial FY 80 budget guidancebecause of cuts in the DPCA request. If, forinstance, the security managers request for aradio network was not funded, he mustsubmit a second request for special equip-ment finding to the installation DRM.

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Sample COBE 1 of 6 pages).

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COBE summary 2 of 6 pages).

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COBE summary continued 3 of 6 p

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Sample COBE continued 4 of 6 pages)-Travel and transp

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Sample COBE continued 5 of 6 pages)-Contrac

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Sample COBE continued 6 of 6 pages)-Supplies and m

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Sample SPE funding request (1 of 9 pages).

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Sample SPE funding request continued (2 of 9 pages).

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Sample SPE request continued (3 of 9 pages)Enclosure 7.

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Sample SPE request (4 of 9 pages)Enclosure 2.

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Sample SPE request (6 of 9 pages)Enclosure 3 continued.

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Manpower Procedures Section V

Review and revision of tables of organiza-tion and equipment (TOEs) is accomplishedon a recurring basis, coinciding with HQDAplanning requirements and the Army imple-mentation of the Five-Year Defense Program

(FYDP) as discussed earlier.

The TOE Documentation Program is con-trolled by the TOE program letter andschedule. This letter specifies the TOE to bedeveloped or revised during the fiscal year,

an d is published in J uly and updat ed inJ anua ry. Security man agers ar e not involvedin the revision and development of TOEs.This a ction depends on t he TOE proponentagency within the TRADOC school system. Itis based upon and in concert with, DAapproved doctrine and concepts, etc. (See AR310-31.)

2-19 Security ManagersInterface

a. Security managers, a t varioustimes, must be involved with revision ofmodification tables of organization andequipment (MTOEs) and tables of distribu-tion and allowances (TDAs)-mainly thelatter. This involvement usually requires aninterface with the supporting force develop-ment officer or the next higher headquartersoperation section (S3) to prepare documentsin accordance with the Army AuthorizationDocuments System (TAADS) which is asystem used for:

Developing organizational structuresRequirements Personnel authorizations and equipment.

b. The final product of this system is aunits authorization documents (MTOE/TDA), which provide for subsequent person-nel and equipment transactions. The MTOEprovides the commander with the means tomodify or adjust the DA approved TOE tomeet specific operational requirements. TheTDA, on the other hand, establishes its ownorganizational structure to meet the needs of

each specified unit. A flow chart showing theprocessingof a TAADS aut horizat ion docu-

ment is at figure 5. Authorizations to supportthis document are as follows:

MTOE TD A

Augmenta t ion TDA Mobilizat ion TDA.

c. TDA security units organized to supportthe Armys peacetime posture may not besufficient in terms of personnel strengt h a ndequipment. The requirements column of the

TDA must be based on requirements recog-nized in an approved manpower survey.Adjustments by the survey authority maybemade when changes in mission, function, orworkload occur between manpower surveys.Requirements for a n ew TDA unit must bebased on the mission, projected workload,and applicable staffing guides.

d.The ma npower a uth oriza tions columnof the TDA must be based on allocations ofresources, and n ormally w ill be equa l to orless than the manpower reflected in the

requirements column. When authorizationsare less than requirements, reduced capabili-t ies must be reflected in the appropriate

paragraphs of section I of the TDA.

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* Security manager involvement

Figure 5Flow chart for TAADS data.

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e. Grades of DA civilian personnel posi-tions in the TDA must be established byapplication of civil service and DA civilianpersonnel policies, regulations, and proce-dures .

f. Organizational structures of TDA unitsmust adhere to applicable DA regulationsgoverning organization of specific units; or inth e absence of such regulat ions, th ey mustadhere as closely to the appropriate DAstaffing guide as local conditions permit.

g. Military and civilian manpower utiliza-tion policies in AR 570-4 must be followedwhen organizing and staffing TDA units toperform security missions.

2-20 Manpower Management

The objective is to achieve optimumuse of manpower in accomplishing thesecurity mission.

a. The security manager must realize thatthe tw o primary constra ints on ma npowerare :

(1) Man-years generated during a fiscalyear.

(2) Strength a t the end of a f iscal year.

b. The tota l s trength of an activi ty a t anygiven time in the year is important because itis the basis for computing man-years.

c. As security st rength s cha nge during af iscal year, adjustments must be made to:

(1) Total man-years and, if appropriate,

(2) End-year strengths.

Manpower planning and allocation docu-ments, as discussed previously, are as an-

nounced in Chapter IV of the Program andBudget Guidance (PBG) provided to majoractivity directors (MADs).

2-21

t a in the

Establishing ManpowerRequirements

-

a. The security manager must ob-following documents to prepare his

requirement:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

TOE manpower authorization criteria

DA staffing criteria

DA staffing guides

Manpower surveys

Various work measurements

The physical security plan.

b. The civilian personnel officer will ac-tively participate in TDA development in-volving civilian security positions. Civilian

position structures in the TDA will be inaccordance with regulations of:

(1) The office of management and budget

(2) Civil Service Commission (CSC)

(3) HQDA.

2-22 Grade and PositionChange

a. To change security grade levelor position at the local level, unless instructedotherwise, must be done IAW the following:

(1) Civilian Personnel Regulation 501.

(2) J ob reengineering.

(3) Civil Service Commission Research &Development Engineering Grade Evalua-tion Guide.

(4) Civil service classification guidance.

b. Grade levels and position structure ofpositions in grade GS-15 and below, and inwage board pay categories may be submitted

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as proponent-approved, unless HQDA in-structs otherwise.

c. Evaluation of civilian personnel officerpositions are subject to the provisions ofCivilian Personnel Regulation (CPR) 501.

d. Applica tion of job eva lua t ion decisions

of the CS or HQDA is mandatory. Action onsuch mandatory decisions must be taken inaccordance with civilian personnel regula-tions and instructions, even though applica-tion results in grade levels that exceed thecurrent approved TDA.

e. Prior approval requirements. The secu-r i ty manager must realize that successiveechelons of command are not authorized toestablish prior approval requirements be-yond the provisions of CPR 501, unlessdetermined to be necessary to improve

position management and the civilian posi-tion structure. The HQDA policy of decentral-izing authority for civilian personnel man-agement and for position classification to thelowest practicable level must. be observedboth in principle and in practice.

f. Civilian grades listed in DA-approvedTDA. Civilian grades listed in DA-approvedTDAs are not authorized until finalized bythe security elements supporting civilianpersonnel office in accordance with the above

paragraphs. DA review normally wil l be

accomplished on a post audit basis. Com-ments addressing civilian positions in ap-

proved TDAs, if any, will be furnishedseparate ly by DAPE-CPP.

2-23 Proponent-InitiatedChanges

a. The organization structure ofsecurity units and activities may be changedat the init iative of commanders. Changesma y be necessary to respond t o cha nges inmission or to realine resources and organiza-

tional elements for greater security missionefficiency.

b. Proponent-initiated changes must com-ply with organizational policies, as set forthin chapter 2, AR 310-49.

c. Cha nges in the organiza tion and ma n-ning of units and activities must conform tothe manpower management policies in AR310-49, and to information on position catego-

ries, classif ications, and grading.

d.Requests for additional security person-nel spaces required because of increasedworkload or similar factors must be made inaccordance with AR 570-4.

2-24 J ustification

For Personnel Changes

a. J ustif ica tion is an expla na tion ofthe si tuation and circumstances which re-quire personnel changes to cope with thesecurity mission.

(1) Your justification is the major basis onw hich the Army st a ff forms its judgmentregarding the request.

(2) Explanations must be sufficientlyclear, well-organized, concise, and com-plete to al low an analyst who is unfamiliar

with the unit and local conditions tounderstand the rationale for the proposedaction.

b. Organizat ion charts and diagrams helpto clarify the reasons for a justificationproposal.

c. A citation of Army directives, previouslyobtained approval of actions, and approvedmanpower survey reports frequently areadequa te justi f ication.

d.Section VI shows conditions that influ-ence personnel spaces and the actions re-

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quired bychanges.

e. Whenments a re

proponents to justify specific

new security organizational ele-formed, an explanation of the

mission or functions of the newly formedorganization and an estimat ed workload wil loften suffice to justify positions, grades, andMOSs of members.

(1) J ob descriptions provided must be fullyexplained to assist in the justification.

(2) To further substantiate the require-ment for a position, the grade and MOS or

civilian series code, workload data, and anindication why the work is performed,must be included in the justification.

f. Guidance for prepara t ion and submission of justification for security personnelchanges in TAADS is reflected in AR 310-49.

2-25 J ustification for SecurityPersonnel and Equipment

a. The security manager must docu-ment necessary justification in accordancewith:

(1) AR 570-2

(2) AR 611-1

(3) AR 611-101

(4) AR 310-34

(5) AR 310-49

(6) AR 750-43.

b. As a security manager, you realize thatTDA units rely primarily on manpower toestablish manpower requirements. There-fore, between surveys, manpower surveyforms must be used and documented to assistin developing changes in requirementscaused by changes in the activitys securitymission a nd/or w orkloa ds.

c. To increase the personnel strength levelof the local security office in an effort to

supplement the TDA, you will be required tojustify the increase IAW DA Pamphlet 570-4,The Ma npower P rocedures H a ndbook. Act-ing as a check and balance to strength levels,

manpower surveys by specialized teams areconducted on a programed basis; therefore, as

a security representative of the commander,the burden of proof that additional manpower

is needed to accomplish the security missionrests with assessment of individual capabili-ties and documentation of normal workloads.

d. In accomplishing this documentation,there are several survey documents thatpresent data about the operat ion of thesecurity office in terms of:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Organization

Manpower utilization

Workloads

Estimat ed ma npower requirements inrelation to existing guides.

e. The security manager, when preparingfor manpower surveys, must take a two-prong

approach(1) strong justification must bedocumented to prevent loss of existingmanpower, and (2) strong detailed justifica-tion must be documented to obtain additional

manpower spaces. Survey documentationinvolves the following forms:

(1) DA Form 140-1 (Remarks)

(2) DA Form 140-2 (Schedule A - Man-power Inventory)

(3) DA Form 140-3 (Schedule T-Identifica-tion of Manpower)

(4) DA Form 140-4 (Schedule X - Man-power and Workload Data)

(5) DA Form 140-5 (Schedule A - Man-power Inventory Continuation Sheet).

f. Initial entries on the forms must be madeby the security manager, and the applicable

portions must be completed during the on-sitevis i t by the manpower teams.

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Chapter 3

Education

A ny security program or syst emdesigned to combat the security t hrea t sdiscussed in chapter 1, appendixes A, B , C ,and D will prove ineffective unless it issupported by an effective security education

program. Security personnel cannot effec-tively accomplish their mission without theactive interest and support of everyone on the

installation. Such interest and support can besecured only through an effective securityeducation program.

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3-1 Program Considerations

a. It is obvious from a review ofthe security threats as presented, that asecurity education program must approachs e c u r i t y f r o m a t o t a l p a c k a g e ,comprehensive-360-degree viewpoint. It mustbe concerned not only with physical security

measures designed to prevent such purelycriminal acts as pilferage; but just as impor-tant, with counterintelligence measures de-signed to provide security of classified intelli-gence information and materials. The closerelat ionship of the tw o types of security ismade evident from a review of the Coun-terintelligence Survey Checklist in FM 30-17,Counterintelligence Operations. The rela-tionship and importance of physical securityto all other security is also well documented inDA P a m 380-1. Both of these documents a rehighly recommended reading for the physical

securi ty ma nager.

b. I t is also essential that the securityeducation program include all pertinentaspects of the crime prevention program (ARs190-31, 190-33, 195-10, and FM 19-20). Manyaspects of this program have a direct per-sonal a pplica tion to all insta llat ion person-nel.

c. The individual and collective concern ofevery soldier and Department of the Army(DA) civilian is involved in protection efforts.Security education must be designed tosupplement mission accomplishment and beconsidered essential to the successful imple-mentation of a physical security program.

d. Your educational program should en-courage prompt repor t ing o f secur i tybreaches and at tempt to:

Reduce security infractions and violations.Act as a communications feedback for

improved protective measures. Reduce vulnerabilities.

Inst ill security consciousness, w hich w illsolicit potential-threat information.

e. The essentia l int errelationship of bothtypes of security, plus the need for closecoordination between Military Police andArmy Counterintelligence personnel in theformulation and operation of a securityeduca tion program w ere considered in pre-

paring this chapter.

3-2 Program Formulation

To insure integration of securityeducation, your plan must be developed at theinstallation level, which will require actionsby the major commands. Based upon vulnera-bil i ty and cri t ical i ty, s tatist ical data ofincidents and criminal information formula-tion must complement both crime preventionand military intelligence educational efforts.

3-3 Program Objectives

a. The objectives of a security edu-cation program are to acquaint all personnelwith the reasons for security measures and toinsure their cooperation. The assumption byinstallation personnel (military and civilian)that they are not concerned with securityunless they work with classified matter or in arestricted area must be overcome. It must beimpressed upon them and be continuallyreitera ted t ha t a locked ga te or file cabinetdoes not constitute an end in itself, but ismerely an element in the overall securityplan.

b. A continuous program should be pre-sented to selected audiences (primarily super-visors and other key personnel) on timely andapplicable topics to develop and foster a highdegree of securit y consciousn ess.

3-4 Educational Requirements

Security consciousness is not an

inherent state of mindit must be acquired.Many people are naive and tr ust ing , and a re

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inclined to accept things at face value,Desirable as these characteristics are, theyare not conducive to vigilance or securityconsciousness. Structural and mechanicalaids to security are valueless without theactive support of all personnel. All installa-t ion personnel must be ma de aw a re of theconstant threat of breaches of security and of

their individual responsibilities to detect andthwart such threats . A continuous andforceful education program provides theconstant awareness that successful securi tydemands.

3-5 Personal Presentations

Very effective at commanders call.Requires formal instruction at the unit and

activity level.Technical advice may be presented by the

provost ma rsha l or security ma na ger.Security content is presented in accordance

wit h the 190-series Army regulat ions.

3-6 Graphic Media Aids

Posters are effective since theymay be large in size, brief and to the point,and impact th eir message at a glance. Posters

should be displayed in locations where thema jorit y of people pass a nd/or congrega te.

Placards used where attention is neces-sary and people are expected to loiter andha ve time to read, such as bulletin boa rds,telephone booths, vending machines andrecreation areas.

Leaflets are economical and are usuallypocket size for easy carrying. Distribution ofleaflets is determined by the commander oractivity chief .

3-7 Indoctrination

AR 380-5 requires the commander to

establish security indoctrination and educa-

t ion programs within his command andinsure the following:

a. Each individual is indoctr inated andkept proficient in the particular securityprocedures which apply to him in the per-formance of his duties.

b. All personnel are aware of their securityresponsibilities.

c. All newly assigned personnel must begiven security indoctrinations. The readingof printed security regulations is not suffi-cient to insure complete understanding.Indoctrination should consist of a generalorienta tion on t he need for and da ngers tosecurity, and the individuals responsibilityin preventing infractions. It should include adiscussion of those hazards common to allpersonnel, with emphasis on the dangers of

loose talk and operational carelessness. Itshould define general security m easur es ineffect , such as the pass system, privatevehicle control, and package inspection. Thesecurity indoctrination is an introduction tothe subject as applied to the particularinstallation. Further instruction should beapplicable to the individuals duty assign-m e n t .

d. Furth er orienta tion, on a n init ial a ndannual basis, is prescribed by AR 381-12,Subversion and Espionage Directed Against

the US Army and Deliberate Security Viola-t ions.

e. AR 360-81, The Command InformationProgram, discusses news media that can beused in security educat ion progra ms, includ-ing those prescribed by AR 381-12.

3-8 Crime Prevention

All security education programsshould include materials on the crime preven-

tion programs (AR 190-31, AR 195-10, FM 19-10, and FM 19-20) which are designed to

reduce crime. This is done by eliminating or

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neutralizing factors that cause individuals to

commit criminal acts and that remove or

minimize opportunities for committing sucha cts .

FM 19-20 provides detailed guidance onconducting a crime prevention program.Such a program includes both the conduct ofcrime prevention surveys for the purposes

mentioned in above paragraph, and aneducation program to emphasize security

consciousness on the part of all personnel,and to educate them in the importance ofsecuring and protecting both military andpersonal property.

A security educa tion program , t herefore,provides an excellent means of disseminatingcrime prevention information, and of encour-aging the active participation of all personnel

in observing and reporting security deficien-cies, violations, or hazards of any nature.

3-9 Program of Instruction

a. The security manager is responsi-ble for planning an effective program ofinstruction. Profitable use of the limited time

normally available for such instructiondemands the techniques of a competentinstructor. The security manager should givethe more important portions of the instruc-

tion. Other competent instructors may beused for less importa nt phases or for phaseswhich concern their areas of responsibility,training, and experience.

b. FM 30-17 provides an excellent discus-sion of the planning and implementation of a

security education program. While the pro-gram outlined is directed primarily to intelli-gence security, a review will indicate many

points at which physical security and crimeprevention education can be integrated.

c.Each of the offices listed here can assistin the formulation of the program by contrib-

uting materials from its own areas of re-sponsibility, knowledge, and interest. Eachcan also assist by presenting security brief-ings within those areas.

Staff judge advocateChaplainSpecial services officerSafety director

Information officerPost surgeon

CID representativeCharacter guidance council representativeMajor organizational command represent-a t ives

Local police and allied agencies

d. The program should be based on anevaluation of the total security posture of theinstallation. I t should begin with an explana-tion of the program, its aims and objectives

the WHY.

e. It should then develop the necessarytools to reach those aims and objectivesthe

WHAT.

f. It should proceed to delineate methods ofeducation by which the program will beconducted-through individual and groupconferences, meetings, speeches, use of news

media, posters, placards, leaflets, etc.theHOW.

g. Each program must provide for initial

and refresher training. It will also provide fordebriefing of appropriate personnel upontheir reassignment, retirement, departure onleave, and at other appropriate times.

h. The program must, above all , stress theabsolute requirement for the support of everyindividual, regardless of any security clear-ance he mayor may not have, and regardlessof his work assignment.

i. As a minimum, each program shouldinclude materials on any recent incidents of

security deficiency or violation, and anyar eas of laxity or trends t ha t h ave become

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apparent in the security posture of the instal-la t ion.

3-10 Scheduling and Testing

Frequent short periods of instructionare more effective than less frequent longperiods. The ideas contained in four well-planned weekly 15-minute classes are morereadily absorbed than those contained in a 1-hour lecture once a month-regardless of howwell the latter is planned and delivered.Instruction that infringes on the free time of

the audience is seldom well received. Shortperiods of instruction to selected groups areeasier to schedule without disrupting theoperation.

In a ny form of instr uction, testing servesthe dual purpose of keeping the audience alertand indicating the eff iciency of the presenta-tion and the total program. Tests do not

necessarily involve written answers. In fact,skits and hypothetical si tuations tend toenliven the instruction. Audience participa-tion in giving consequences or solutions tosituations presented will accomplish thesame results.

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Chapter 4

erimeter barriers, intrusion detec-tion devices and protective lighting providephysical security safeguards; however, theya lone a re not enough. A positive personnel

movement control system must be estab-lished and maintained to preclude unauthor-ized entry, and to facilitate authorized entryat personnel control points. Access lists,personal recognition, security identification

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cards and badges, badge exchange proce- ing efficient operations. Properly organized

dures, and personnel escorts contribute to the and administered, a personnel and move-effectiveness of movement control systems.

The best control is provided when systemsment control system provides a means not

only of positively identifying those who haveincorporate all these elements. Simple, under-sta nda ble, and w orka ble identi fica tion a nd the r ight a nd need to enter or leave a n a rea,

movement control procedures should be used but also of detecting unauthorized personnel

to achieve security objectives without imped- who at tempt to gain entry.

Identification of Personnel Section I

4-1 Purpose of Movement (6) Using identification codes.Control and Identification

(7) Using duress codes

a. P revent introduction of ha rmfuldevices, materiel, or components. 4-2 Employee Screening

b. Prevent misappropriation, pilferage, orcompromise of materiel or recorded informa-t ion by means of:

PackageMater ie l Property Movement Control.

c. This prevent ion is accompl ishedthrough:

(1) Init ial ly determining who has a validrequirement to be in a n a rea.

(2) Limiting access to those persons whohave that valid requirement .

(3) Establishing procedures for positiveidentification of persons within, and ofpersons authorized access into, areas.

(4) Issuing special identification cards or

badges to personnel authorized access intorestricted areas.

(5) Using access lists.

a. Screening job applicants andemployees to eliminate potential espionageand sabotage agents and other security risksis important in peacetime and is extremelyimportant in t ime of a national defenseemergency. For such screening to be mosteffective, it should be incorporated into

standard personnel policies for peacetime aswell as for times of emergency.

b. Personnel Security Survey Ques-tionnaire. The use of a personnel securityquestionnaire is essential in the investigationof both applicants and employees. Thesecurity questionnaire should be screened forcompleteness and, in the case of applicants,obvious undesirables eliminated from furtherconsideration. A careful investigation shouldbe conducted to assure that the applicants or

employees character, associations, and suit-ability for employment are satisfactory.

c. Sources of Data. The fol lowing

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sources may be helpful in securing employ-ment investigative data :

(1) State and local police, to includenational and local police in overseas areas.

(2) Former employers.

(3) References (including those not fur-nished by applicant or employee. These are

known as throw-offs, an d th eir na mes areobtained during interviews of referencesfurnished by applicants or employees).

(4) Public records.

(5) Credit agencies.

(6) Schools (all levels).

(7) Others as appropriate. (These mayinclude the FBI, the US Army CriminalRecords Repository, etc.). In requestinginvest igat ive data from a ny of the abovesources, enough information should befurnished to properly identify the appli-cant or employee and avoid error inidentity.

4-3 Identification System

a. An identification (ID) systemshould be established at each installation orfacility to provide a means of identifying allmilitary personnel, civilian employees, andvisitors. The syst em should provide for t heuse of security identifica tion cards or badges

to aid in control and movement of personnelinto, within, and out of specified areas oractivities.

b. The standard identification media, DDForm 2A (Military) or DA Form 1602 (Civil-ian Employee), may be prescribed for person-nel by installation or facility commanders asvalid identif icat ion for a ccess to areas tha tare basical ly administrative in nature, con-tain no security interest , and are not in therestricted area category.

c.Personnel requiring access to restrictedareas should be issued a security identifica-tion card or badge as prescribed in AR 606-5.

The identification card or badge should bedesigned as simply as possible and stillprovide for adequate control of the movementof personnel.

d.P rovisions for identification by car d orbadge control a t an installa t ion or facil i tyshould be included as part of the physical

security plan.

4-4 Use of Identification Media

a. Designation of the various areaswhere media are required.

b. Description of the various types in useplus a uthorizat ions an d limitat ions placedupon the holder.

c.Required presentation at times of enter-ing and leaving each area, including nonop-

erational hours.

d.Details , of where, when, and how worn,displayed, or carried.

e. Procedures to be followed in case of lossor damage.

f. Disposition on termination of employ-ment or as a result of invest igat ions andpersonnel actions.

g. Prerequisites for reissue.

4-5 Types of Systems

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4-6 Card and Badge System

a.A security ident ifica tion car d orbadge system should be established to admitand control the movement of all personsadmitted to restricted areas employing 30 ormore persons per shift . However, the com-mander may at his discret ion authorize a

card or badge system in restricted areaswhere less than 30 persons per shift areemployed.

b. Of the several identif icat ion systemsused in access control, three of the mostcommonly used are the single card orbadge system, the card or badge ex-change system, and the multiple card orbadge system. These ID syst ems ma y beused either for cards carried on the person orfor cards or badges worn on outer clothing.

c. A system may be established (in anappropriate situation) for issuance of identifi-cation cards or badges at the main entranceto an installation. Such a system can be usedfor visitors and similar personnel.

4-7 Single Card or Badge

a.With this system, permission toenter specific areas is shown by let ters,nu m e r a l s , o r co l o r s . I t h a s a m a j o rlimitation-loose control. The opportunity foralteration or duplication is high.

b. This sy stem gives compa ra tively loosecontrol and is not recommended for securityareas. Permission to enter does not always gowith the need to know, and the fact that IDcards and badges frequently remain in the

bearers possession during off duty or off posthours gives the opportunity for alteration orduplication.

4-8 Card or Badge Exchange

a. In t his system, tw o items conta inidentical photographs but different back-ground colors, or one item has an overprint.One is presented at the entrance to a specificar ea a nd excha nged for th e other, w hich iscarried or worn while in that area. Individual

possession upon issuance is only in t he a rea,t o decrease the possibility of forgery oralteration.

b. This method provides extra security byhaving both photographs identical . In thistype of system, the second badge or card iskept in the security area and never leaves thea r e a .

4-9 Multiple Card or Badge

a. Instead of having specific mark-ings on the ID card or badge denoting permis-sion to enter various restricted areas, the mul-t iple card or badge system makes an ex-cha nge at the entra nce to each security a reawithin the installa t ion. Exchange cards orbadges are kept a t ea ch a rea for only t hose in-dividuals who have the appropriate card orbadge. By virtue of the localized and con-trolled exchange requirements, th is is th emost secure and effective system.

b. Card and badge data are identical andmust be so to allow comparisons.

4-10 Card and BadgeSpecifications

a. Security ID cards and badgesshould be of a type of design and construction

which will make them, for a ll pract icalpurposes, tamperproof, and which will meetthe requirements of AR 606-5.

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control is exercised by the supplier. Thisis especially important when engravingor special paper is concerned.

b. Security ID card and badge insertsshould be prenumbered to avoid any possibil-ity of reissuing any number. Acquisition,storage, and control of card and badgecomponents and all engraved plates must beaccomplisher as prescribed in AR 606-5.

c. Issuance and Accountability:

(1) Identif ication card or badge issuance,accuntabi l i ty , and control should beaccomplished at a central office, preferablythe office of the provost marshal orphysical security office, so a minimum oftime me elapses between change in the statusof a card or badge and noti f ication of thesecurity forces.

(2) A duplicate of each issued card orbadge and a f i le on each hearer should bekept including, in addit ion to the dataentered on t he card or ba dge, the bearers

residential address and telephone number.(3) Why such strict control?

(a) Because any ID card or badge maybe altered or reproduced by a personha ving the t ime and sufficient skill inprinting. engraving and photocopying,the makeup, issuance, and accountabil-ity of cards and badges must be fullycontrolled.(b) Because control commences with themanufacturer or supplier.(c) When inserts or complete cards or

badges are secured commerically, verifi-cation should be made that adequate

4-11 E nforcement Measures

The most vulnerable link in anyidentification system is its enforcement.Perfunctory performance of duty by thesecurity forces in comparing the bearer withthe card or badge may weaken or destroy theeffects of the most elaborate system. Positiveenforcement measures should be prescribedto insure effective operation of the personneland identification system. These shouldinclude, but not be limited to the following:

a. Security personnel designated forduty at entrance control points should bechosen for their alertness, quick perception,tact, and good judgment.

b. Formalized, s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e sfor conducting assemblies, posting, and relief

of personnel, and frequent inspection ofpersonnel on post at irregular times areeffective means to preclude posting of unqual-ified personnel and perfunctory performanceof duty.

c. A uniform method of handling orwearing security ID cards or badgesshould be prescribed. If carried on the person,the car d must be removed from t he wa llet orother container and handed to security

personnel. A badge should be worn in acon spicuous position to expedite inspectionand recognition from a distance.

d. Entrances and exits of restrictedareas should be arranged so that arriving anddepart ing personnel a rc forced t o pa ss in asingle file in front of securit y personnel. Insome insta nces, the use of turnst iles ma y beadvisable to a ssist in ma inta ining positivecontrol of entrance and exit.

e. Artificial lighting at the control

points should be arranged so that it i l lumi-nates the arriving and departing personnel

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and should be of sufficient intensity to enablesecurity personn el to compa re an d identifythe bearer with the ID card or badge.

f. Enforcement of access control sys-tems rests primarily on the installa t ionsecurity forces. However, it is essential thatthey have the full cooperation of the employ-ees, w ho should be educat ed a nd encoura gedto a ssume this security responsibili ty . E m-ployees should be instructed to consider eachunidentified or improperly identified individ-ual as a trespasser. In restricted areas whereaccess is limited to particular zones, employ-ees should report movement of individuals tounauthorized zones.

g. Identification card and badge racksor containers used at control points for anexchange system should be positioned so they

are accessible only to guard personnel.

h. A responsible custodian should beappointed by competent authority to accom-plish control procedures required by AR 606-5for issue, turn in, recovery, or expira tion ofsecurity ID cards and badages, The degree ofcompromise tolerable in the identificationsystem is in direct proportion to the degree ofsecurity required or indicated. The followingcontrol procedures are recommended forpreserving the integrity of a card and badgesystem:

(1) Maintenance of an accurate writ tenrecord or log listing, by serial number, allcards an d badges, showing t hose on ha nd,to whom issued, and disposition (lost,mutilated, or destroyed).

(2) Authentication of records and logs bythe custodian.

(3) Periodic inventory of records by acommissioned officer.

(4) Prompt invalidation of lost cards andbadges.

(5) Conspicuous posting a t s ecurity con-

trol points of current lists of lost orinvalidated cards and badges.

(6) Establishment of controls within restricted areas to enable security personnelon duty to determine promptly and accu-ra tely the number of persons within t hea r ea a t a ny t im e.

(7) Establishment of a two-man rule whenrequired.

(8) Establishment of procedures to controlmovement of visitors to security areas. Avisitor control record should be maintaineda nd loca ted w here positive controls can beexercised.

4-12 Visitor Identification

And Controla. Physica l securi ty precaut ion

aga inst pilferage, espiona ge, and sa bota gerequires screening, identification, and con-trol of visitors. Visitors are generally in thefollowing categories:

(1) Persons with whom every instal la t ionor facility must have dealings in connec-

tion w ith the conduct of its business, suchas representatives of suppliers, customers,licensers or licensee, insurance inspectorsor adjusters, government inspectors (na-

t ional, state, and local), service industryrepresentat ives , contractors, employees,etc.

(2) Individuals or groups who desire tovisit an installa t ion or facil i ty for apurpose not essential to, or necessarily infurtherance of, the operations of theinstallation or facility concerned. Suchvisits may be desired, for example, bybusiness, educational, technical, or scien-t i f ic organizat ions and individuals orgroups desiring to further their particular

interests.(3) Individuals or groups specificallysponsored by government agency organi-

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zations such as foreign nationals visitingunder technical cooperation programs andsimilar visits by U S n at ionals. Requestsfor visits by foreign nationals should beprocessed in accordance with AR 380-25.

(4) Individuals and groups who the gov-ernment generally encourages but does notspecifically sponsor, because of the contri-

bution they ma ke to economic and techni-cal progress or to defense production in theU nited St a tes a nd/or in friendly na tions.

(5) Guided tour visits to selected portionsof installations in the interest of publicrelations.

(6) Further information concerning re-quirements and procedures for visits willbe foun d in AR 381-130 a nd AR 550-50.

b. Arrangements for identification and

control of visitors may include the following:

(1) Positive methods of establishing theauthority for admission of visitors, as wellas any limitations relative to access.

(2) Positive ID of visitors by means ofpersonal recognition, visitor permit, orother identifying credentials. The em-ployee, supervisor or officer in chargeshould be contacted to ascertain thevalidity of the visit .

(3) Availability and use of visitor registra-

tion forms and records that will provide arecord of identity of the visitor, time andduration of his visit , and other pertinentcontrol data.

(4) Availability and use of visitor ID cardsor badges. Such identification mediashould be numbered serially and indicatethe following:

(a) Bearers name.(b) Area or areas to which access isauthorized.(c) Escort requirements, if any.

(d) Time limit for which issued.(e) Signature (or facsimile).(f) Photograph, if desired and available.

(5) Procedures which will insure support-ing persona l identification in a ddition tocheck of visitor cards or badges at re-stricted area entrances.

(6) Procedures for escorting visitors hav-ing limitations relative to access throughareas where an uncontrolled visitor, eventhough conspicuously identified, could

acquire information for which he is notauthorized. Foreign na t iona l v is i torsshould be escorted at a ll times.

(7) Controls which will recover visitor IDcards or badges on expiration, or when nolonger required.

(8) Twenty-four hour advance approvalwhen possible. Where appropriate, theinstallation should prepare an agenda forthe visit and designate an escort officer.

4-13 Sign/CountersignAnd Codeword

This additional measure to verify

identity is primarily used in tactical maneu-vers and during Army Training and Evalua-tion P rogr a ms (ARTE P ). The sign /count er-sign or codeword procedure should be checkedand tested to insure immediate change if.

compromised.

4-14 Duress Code

This is a simple word or phrase used

during normal conversation. I t alerts othersecurity personnel that an authorized personhas been forced to vouch for an unauthorizedindividual. A viable duress code requires

preplanning to insure appropriate response.And it is changed frequently to minimizecompromise.

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Methods of Control Section II

Equipment And/Or Manpower

This syst em a ssists in the contr ol of entryand departure of personnel to and from theseareas