pigeon poop on the pump handle: a critique of the report of the un mission to investigate the use...

7/27/2019 Pigeon Poop on the Pump Handle: A Critique of the Report of the UN Mission to Investigate the Use of Sarin in Da

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[email protected]

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Pigeon Poop on the Pump Handle:

A Critique of the Report of the UN Mission to Investigate the Use of Sarin in Damascus

Denis R. OBrien, PhD/Esq.1

October 11, 2013


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In particular, the environmental, chemical, and medical samples we have collected provide

clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent Sarinwere used in Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus.

Sellstrom Report, pg. 5


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A. Introduction1. Objectives and organization of the present paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

a. The Aug21.2013 Ghouta attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4b. The UN Missions response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3. Brief statement of findings and conclusions of the Sellstrom Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6a. The nature of the evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6b. The facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

c. Sellstroms primary conclusion and the evidentiary triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

B. Surface-to-surface rockets1. Limitations with the physical/environmental evidence generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

a. The Sellstrom Report was co-produced by the insurgents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7b. Cherry-picked facts tacitly point to Assad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2. Rocket evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10a. Significance of determining that surface-to-surface rockets were used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10b. Inventory of the rocket evidence in the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11c. Interpretation of the rocket evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13d. Rocket trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

C. Sarin1. Limitations with the collection/analysis of the sarin evidence generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

a. The Missions real goal: find sarin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15b. Concealing Methods and Identity of Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15c. Total lack of quantitative data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2. Connecting the rockets/impact sites to sarin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17a. Moadamiyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17b. Ein Tarma and Zamalka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3. Conclusions regarding sarin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

D. Used

1. Problems with the clinical/biological evidence generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19a. Insurgent-selected subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19b. Failure to identify subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19c. Failure fully to report the results indicates, at best, a lack of objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2. The evidence that sarin was used, vel non . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21a. Fatalities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21b. Symptoms as of when? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21c. Symptom signatures constellation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22d. The biological and analytical limits of assessing sarin exposure after 9 days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

E Plenary ConclusionsThe evidence derived from environmental, chemical, and medical samples as reported by the Sellstrom

Report constitutes neither clear nor convincing proof that any surface-to-surface rocket containing thenerve agent sarin was involved in the alleged CW attack against Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah, or Zamalkain the Ghouta area of Damascus on Aug21.2013. Although limited evidence has been found that maybe consistent with the release of sarin in one or more of those communities, because of the likelihoodthat some or all of the evidence made available to the Mission was tainted by parties to the conflict, novalid conclusions can be drawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24


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A. Introduction1. Objectives and organization of the present paper

I have before me a document titled UN Mission toInvestigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in

the Syrian Arab Republic Report on Allegations of the Use

of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on

21 August 2013. I refer to this document as the

Sellstrom Report or simply the Report. It can beobtained in .pdf format online. 2

The Report comprises 5 pages of analysis and 33pages of appendices, which appendices include severalphotographs, graphs and tables. Attached to the Reportis a two page cover document titled Note by theSecretary-General, which is not signed, dated, orotherwise identified as to its source or author. Alsoattached to the document is a one-page transmittalletter dated Sep13.2013 and signed Professor AkeSellstrom (Head of Mission), Mr. Scot Cairns (Head ofand signing for the OPCW Component), Dr. Maurizio3

Barbeschi (Head of and signing for the WHO4

Component). I refer to these gentlemen as theauthors.

The objective of the present paper is very narrow: tounderstand the findings of the Sellstrom Report and toverify its primary conclusion, which is quoted on page 2,above. This paper does not represent an attempt tounderstand what happened at Ghouta. Rather, it is anattempt to understand what the Sellstrom Report sayshappened at Ghouta, and for that reason I restrictmyself as much as possible to what is within the four

corners of the Report.This is, necessarily, a lengthy analysis of a complexevent and investigation. The reader may want to take itsection by section. By that I mean look at each sectionas a separate analysis; contemplate the points andcriticisms I raise; review the Report, the videos, onlinedocuments, and other materials provided; andobjectively critique my critique. And then move to thenext section. But why bother at all? I am asking myselfthat question as well as asking you.

While the fervor for a retaliatory attack on Syria inresponse to the Ghouta incident has dropped

dramatically as a result of diplomatic efforts of Russia,the US, and Syria, there is still the unfinished businessof determining what happened, determining who isresponsible, and punishing the guilty parties. If thecivilized world does not apprehend, adjudicate, andpunish those who commit the most heinous of crimes,then these atrocities will proliferate and be rewarded.

But we must get it right, and it is in the spirit of gettingit right that this critique is offered.In my opinion, the Sellstrom Report does not get it

right, and its conclusions are not adequately supportedby the facts presented by the Report, not by a long shot.The Report is so confusing, contradictory, andincomplete with respect to the presentation of data,facts, and other information that no valid conclusionabout anything that happened at Ghouta onAug21.2013 can be fairly drawn. Furthermore, giventhe role of the insurgents in co-producing the Reportand providing the evidence, and given that the areas of

interest and the evidence were completely unsecured for6-9 days between the attack and being investigated, theevidence is too suspect to be of much value indetermining what happened. In short, the Sellstrom5

Report comes across more as a PR effort for theinsurgents trying to bring down Assad than as a fact-finding mission of the UN.

The conclusion I have come to after spending weekswading through the Report and trying to understand itscontents is that if the objective of the Mission was, asSellstrom asserts, to ascertain the facts related to the

allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Ghouta,then the Sellstrom Report is about as helpful as pigeonpoop on the pump handle. The present paper explainswhy I have reluctantly come to that conclusion.

2. Backgrounda. The Aug21.2013 Ghouta attack

In the early hours of Aug21.2013 YouTubechannels of Syrian insurgents started filling up withvideos of alleged chemical weapons atrocities that thevideos claimed had taken place and were taking place

in the Ghouta region of Damascus. Babies, children,women, and men by the scores were shown dead and

http://logophere.com/Syria/Syria%20Docs/Secretary_Gen2

eral_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 3

an international organization independent of the UNthat administers the Chemical Weapons Convention

World Health Organization an agency of the UN.4

I repeatedly refer to this 6-9 day delay. Given that the5

attack was at about 2am on Aug21, and given that the

samples were taken during the afternoons of Aug26,Aug28 and Aug29. the samples were collected morethan 5.5, 7.5, and 8.5 days later, rounded up to 6, 8, and

9.
http://logophere.com/Syria/Syria%20Docs/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdfhttp://logophere.com/Syria/Syria%20Docs/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf


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dying, but without visible bodily trauma, wounds, orblood. It appeared that these poor souls were victims ofa CW attack.

These gruesome videos were produced anduploaded by various insurgent groups trying to bringdown Assad one can tell who produced them by thelogos that proudly appear in each vid, usually in theupper left corner. Google translations of the Arabic

titles and text attached to many of the videos claim thatAssad was responsible. It is clear that the intent ofthose producing the videos was obviously to enrage theworld against Assad, and thats pretty much what theydid.

My initial impression was that these videos werevery suspicious. For one thing the vids were uploadedwithin a couple hours of the attack, and yet many ofthem were able to definitively identify the CW agentbeing used as sarin, an organophosphorus agent that isalso referred to as GB. For instance, one video (Vid#001 ), which was provided to Congress by Obamas6

people, is titled Infected and martyrs as a result of thebombing of sarin on Zamalka Bdoma crimes Assad21-08-2013." Another video provided to Congress (Vid#003 ) carries the title: Always: dozens of martyrs as7

a result of the bombing of al-Assad chemical sarin onZamalka. (These are Google translations of the Arabictitles given on the vids.)

I have a PhD in pharmacology, and, to be honest, itdoesnt come in handy all that often. But it did thistime. For the life of me, as a pharmacologist, I couldnot understand how anyone could look at those vids

flooding out of Syria on Aug21 and conclude that thevictims had been gassed with sarin. Even if oneaccepted that there was a CW attack, the agent thatwas used could have been any of a dozen or twentydifferent possible agents. Without the perpetratorsthemselves telling you what agent they used, there wasno way to know it was sarin without some pretty seriouschemical analyses. How could these insurgents be socertain within a couple of hours of the attack that theagent was sarin unless they had been told by thoseresponsible, where those responsible is a PCeuphemism for the colon-scum who killed those kids?

Think about it. The only people who could haveknown at 6 am GMT what agent was used 3 hoursearlier were the actual colon-scum using the agent.And given that the people making the videos knew itwas sarin, then logic tells us that the people responsiblefor the attack and the people making the videos wereeither the same colon-scum or so closely associated as tobe co-conspirators, which is to say co-colon-scum.

You can see where Im going with this line ofthought: the hypothesis that the people who werepublishing the videos and alerting the world to a sarinattack were the same people responsible for the attack.Thinking back to 8 grade, you may recall how the guyth

in class who was the first one to point at others aroundhim was inevitably the one who farted. Same principle;its universal.

And so, before the sun rose on NYC on Aug21, theMSM all around the world were screaming SARIN!!!and whatever happened in Ghouta was internationallychristened as THE sarin attack. Within hours rumor

had become reality without first passing through thedifficult but time-consuming process of fact-checking.And without one iota of skepticism. Mostdisappointing and dangerous of all were USG peoplelike Obama, Hagel, Kerry, McCain, Graham. Doingtheir best to avoid appearing capable of contemplativeanalysis of this tragic and potentially dangerousinternational crisis, they immediately began braying forSyrian blood, using the polite but deadly euphemism ofa limited retaliatory attack. This was, after all . . .sarin.

b. The UN Missions response

Even as all of the drama was unfolding in Ghouta,virtually just around the corner a tiny group of the mosthighly trained people in the whole world forinvestigating CW attacks was rising, showering, andheading for breakfast. A UN Mission comprising CWinvestigators from the UN, WHO, and OPCW wasalready in Damascus, having been sent there toinvestigate prior allegations of CW use.

If you are gullible enough, you may think that it was

a complete coincidence that the UN Mission was inDamascus when the Ghouta attack occurred just a fewkilometers from their hotel. But think about it: on themorning of Aug21 insurgents (who magically knew theattack was by sarin) were making videos andbroadcasting the sarin allegation to the world; and thesame insurgents knew the UN Mission was in Damascusand where they were staying, which turns out to be ashort crow-flight from where the attacks happened; and

Video numbers in this paper refer to a6 table of related

videos I have been compiling. Links to the videos andshort descriptions can be found in that table.http://logophere.com/Syria/Table%20of%20Vids.htm

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTSVC-FrQzw&list7

=PLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX&index

=3
https://www.youtube.com/verify_controversy?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3DkqQAWiOPO-M%26list%3DPLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX%26index%3D1https://www.youtube.com/verify_controversy?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3DkqQAWiOPO-M%26list%3DPLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX%26index%3D1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTSVC-FrQzw&list=PLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX&index=3https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTSVC-FrQzw&list=PLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX&index=3http://logophere.com/Syria/Table%20of%20Vids.htmhttp://logophere.com/Syria/Table%20of%20Vids.htmhttp://logophere.com/Syria/Table%20of%20Vids.htmhttp://logophere.com/Syria/Table%20of%20Vids.htmhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTSVC-FrQzw&list=PLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX&index=3https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTSVC-FrQzw&list=PLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX&index=3https://www.youtube.com/verify_controversy?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3DkqQAWiOPO-M%26list%3DPLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX%26index%3D1https://www.youtube.com/verify_controversy?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3DkqQAWiOPO-M%26list%3DPLO_vQ_Y4lJ5B1lD1kCN-PRDm9A7aLeSkX%26index%3D1


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the same insurgents also knew that Obama hadthreatened to thump Assad if Assad was ever caughtusing CW. If you are dim enough to see only merecoincidence in this remarkable set of circumstances,then you are not likely going to be able to work yourway through this paper. You might as well stop hereand save yourself the frustration.

It took them almost six days to whip into action but

the UN Mission eventually diverted from theirscheduled investigation in the northern part of Syria inorder to investigate whatever happened in Ghouta.Although the MSM blamed the delay on Assad, thatwas, apparently, not the case. According to a video of adaily press briefing by UN spokesman, Farhan Haq, onAug27.2013, the UN did not make a formal request tothe Syrian government to investigate the Ghoutaallegations until Angela Kane arrived in Damascus onAug24. In the mean time the evidence was8

deteriorating.The diversion of the UN Mission to Ghouta meant

two things: 1) the Mission would not investigate theprior alleged CW attacks, for which Russia had alreadypublished evidence implicating the insurgents, and 2)the Mission would focus its attention on CW attacksthat occurred in areas controlled exclusively by theinsurgents, meaning the insurgents controlled bothaccess and evidence. This whole thing could not haveworked out better for the insurgents politically andmilitarily if it had been planned.9

And so, instead of investigating the allegations ofprior CW attacks for which there was already strong

evidence of the insurgents guilt, the Mission wasdiverted to Ghouta where for 7.5 hours over three daysthey collected evidence of an attack that the world wassure was a sarin attack and that Obama was alreadyaccusing Assad of. The Mission collected physicalevidence provided by the insurgents, they took blood,urine, and hair samples from subjects provided by theinsurgents, they then went back to Geneva or whereverthey came from and analyzed what they had. Threeweeks later, on Sep13.2013, the leaders of the Mission,Ake Sellstrom, Scott Cairns, and Maurizio Barbeschi,presented the Sellstrom Report to the UN . . . and to an

angry, waiting world.Before turning to my critique of the Sellstrom

Report which is going to get extremely pointed Iwant to make it clear that whatever criticisms I expresshere are criticisms of executive decisions made inplanning the Mission and decisions made in reporting ofresults decisions like what evidence to collect andwhat evidence to ignore, what data to report and whatdata to conceal, and, of course, the conclusions. I haveimmense admiration for all of those individuals who

were willing to wade into this volatile and, possibly,toxic environment to collect the evidence. Nothingherein is intended to detract from the worldsappreciation for their efforts and admiration of theircourage.

3. Brief statement of findings and conclusions of the

Sellstrom Reporta. The nature of the evidence

The evidence developed by the Mission relative tothe Ghouta attack is reported in various tables, graphs,

and textual format, as discussed further below. It fallsinto the following six categories: Visual inspection of physical objects and places

such as rocket components, impact sites, livingareas, and personal property found in living areas.

Chemical analysis of 30 samples taken from physicalobjects and places, said chemical analysis apparentlylimited to the detection of sarin, its precursors,metabolites/break-down products, and otherinteresting chemicals.

Physical examinations and/or pertinent medical

histories of 36 purported survivors.

10

Chemical analysis of 34 blood samples, 15 urinesamples, and 4 hair samples obtained from theaforementioned purported survivors, said chemicalanalysis apparently limited to attempts to detect orascertain sarin exposure.

Review of medical records of 8 alleged victims. Eye-witness statements from the aforementioned

purported survivors and 9 health-care providers.

b. The facts

Page 5 of the Sellstrom Report sets out explicit facts

http://webtv.un.org/watch/daily-press-briefing-sg-travel-t8

o-the-netherlands-syria-iran-palestine-darfur-afghanistan

-sg-appointment-major-general-imam-edy-mulyono-indonesia-force-commander-of-the-minurso/2632263081001

Let me say that again for effect: if it had been planned.9

The and/or is used here because, as discussed below, the10

Sellstrom Report does not reveal whether the clinical

information is based on the subjects self-reporting ofsymptoms occurring at the time of the attack or on theinvestigators reporting of symptoms 6-9 days later at the

time of examination.
http://webtv.un.org/watch/daily-press-briefing-sg-travel-to-the-netherlands-syria-iran-palestine-darfur-afghanistan-sg-appointment-major-general-imam-edy-mulyono-indonesia-force-commander-of-the-minurso/2632263081001http://webtv.un.org/watch/daily-press-briefing-sg-travel-to-the-netherlands-syria-iran-palestine-darfur-afghanistan-sg-appointment-major-general-imam-edy-mulyono-indonesia-force-commander-of-the-minurso/2632263081001


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derived from the foregoing types of evidence. The11

facts are: The Mission found impacted and exploded surface-

to-surface rockets. The rockets were capable of carrying a chemical

payload. The rockets contained sarin. The area where patients were affected was close

to the rocket impact sites.12

The environment of the aforementioned area wascontaminated by sarin.

More than 50 interviews given by survivors andhealth care workers corroborated medical andscientific results. 13

A number of patients/survivors were clearlydiagnosed as intoxicated by an organophosphoruscompound. 14

Blood and urine samples from the same patientswere found positive for Sarin and Sarinsignatures. 15

c. Sellstroms primary conclusion and the evidentiary

triadThe primary conclusion that Sellstrom asserts as

being supported by the foregoing facts is quoted at page2, above. It is broken down into its components asfollows: Surface-to-surface rockets containing . . . sarin, were . . . used in . . .

Moadamiyah, . . .

Ein Tarma . . . and, Zamalka.

This conclusion suggests an evidentiary triad that isuseful in assessing the validity of the conclusion. For inorder for the conclusion to be valid the Report mustpresent for each of the three listed communities: 1) asurface-to-surface rocket; 2) a victim; 3) a location

(impact site) and all three must be linked to eachother and to sarin. I see it as a triad forming the base ofan evidentiary pyramid with sarin at the apex. But atthe end of the day the Report must provide us with atleast three such sarin-connected triads one each forMoadamiyah, Ein Tarma, and Zamalka otherwiseSellstoroms conclusion is false, or at least notsupported.

B. Surface-to-surface rockets

The primary physical evidence that the Sellstrom

Report discloses relates to rockets and theircomponents, which is the first element of theevidentiary triad. Finding rockets and rocket fragmentsin these areas should not represent a problem. After all,Assad has been shelling these areas for well over a year.And so the only difficulty here is finding rocketcomponents that test positive for the only CW theMission was apparently looking for: sarin.

1. Limitations with the physical/environmental

evidenceThis first sub-section of B. is a discussion of thephysical/environmental evidence generally. It will behelpful to get these general observations out of the waybefore focusing on rockets specifically in sub-section 2.

a. The Sellstrom Report was co-produced by the

insurgents.The areas of Damascus that the Mission

investigated Moadamiyah, Ein Tarma, and Zamalka are controlled by insurgent groups trying to take down

Assad. No one disputes that. It was therefore necessaryfor the Mission to obtain an agreement from both theSyrian Arab Army (SAA) and the insurgents for atemporary cease-fire so the UN teams could get in thereand get their evidence. The agreed cease-fire was for 20hours divided over 4 days, although for some reason theMission actually investigated only 7.5 hours over 3 days(and later complained about how little time they had tocomplete the mission). (Sellstrom Report, pg. 3)

Page numbers of the Sellstrom Report given in this paper11

refer to actual Report page numbers. To convert from a

.pdf page number to an actual page number, subtract 3.

The singular area is used in the Report although 512

impact sites in at least two communities miles apart aredisclosed.

This doesnt say that more than 50 survivor/health care13

workers gave interviews, only that there were more than

50 interviews. It is clear from the Report that some

survivors were interviewed more than once and for morethan one purpose.

The fudged term a number is used in the Report instead14

of providing a precise number. Also, amazingly, Sellstromdoesnt assert as an enumerated fact that thepatients/survivors were intoxicated by sarin, specifically.

Hopelessly ambiguous. Presumably same patients refers15

to the blood and urine samples, and not to the patients

referred to previously.


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There is no statement in the Report that the siteswere chosen by the Mission without prior notice to theinsurgents, which is what would have happened in thebest of circumstances. Instead, the Report describeshow the planning of the entire investigation was a jointeffort between the Mission and the insurgents, eventhough for all Sellstrom knew the same insurgents hewas partnering with were responsible for killing the

women, children and babies the world was seeing in thevideos.But a partnership it was. The subjects that were

examined were provided by the insurgents. The placesthat were visited were predetermined by the insurgents,and a local insurgent leader provided security for eacharea to be visited and was placed in control of theMission. (e.g. Sellstrom, pg. 10) We can see fromvideos taken of the Mission on the ground that theMission teams were constantly and closely surroundedby armed insurgents.

There are a number of videos out there showing the

Mission teams in action and showing how closely theinsurgents controlled the Mission. One example is a PRinterview with Deputy Head of the Mission Scott Carinsproduced by OPCW. (Vid #019 ) There are16

numerous video clips included in the OPCW vidshowing UN personnel absolutely surrounded byinsurgents. Heres a screen grab of one of those clips.

Fig 1. Screen shot from Video #019 at 02:22

There are a couple of ancillary points that arisewhen viewing this screen shot and the entire OPCWvideo. One issue is how incredibly well equipped theinsurgents are. New uniforms. New ammo belts. Lotsof personal firearms, most of which are American M16s,

an indication of where the insurgents are getting theirsupport.

The other issue that arises is harder to see in thescreen shot, but in the upper left-hand corner there is atiny white statement: Video by local resident. And ifyou peer hard enough, just under that statement you

can see a blur where the original videos logo has beenpixellated into oblivion. This is true of most of the clipsspliced into the OPCW vid: they have all been sanitizedof these logos.

The logos that were erased identify the insurgentgroups that took the video clips used by OPCW. Byclaiming the videos were taken by local residents andby blurring the logos that identify the insurgent groups

that actually took the videos, the OPCW comes acrossas removing evidence indicating that the localresidents were actually members of insurgent groupsthat were present during the investigations, and thatthose insurgents later shared their videos with theOPCW for its PR effort. But the larger point here is thefact that the insurgents controlled what the Missionwould see.

Fig. 2, for instance, is another screen shot from theOPCW vid. (Vid #019.) It is from a clip showing awhat looks like a munitions casing being examined by aUN Mission guy bearing the number C10. 17

Fig 2. Screen shot fromVideo #019 at 01:08

What is interesting about the shell or munition ishow pristine it is barely a scratch on it, and there areno indications of impact on the concrete around it. Itlooks almost like an artillery casing. The ends of theshell, where one might expect the most impact damage,are in perfect condition. What is going on here?

Well, my working hypothesis, had I come on thismunition, would be that someone dropped it there. Ifit later turned out to be contaminated with sarin, Iwould hypothesize that whoever dropped it had accessto sarin. Given that the insurgents controlled thisentire area before the Mission showed up, and given

that we know the insurgents have access to sarin, thishypothesis seems entirely reasonable.

Sellstrom acknowledges the potential for theevidence being tainted in two brief passages, page 18

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXxnzcYWRy0&feat16

ure=youtu.be

This may be the same munitions casing described and17

diagramed at pages 18-19 of the Report, but it is notpossible to make that statement definitely from what we

are told in the Report.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXxnzcYWRy0&feature=youtu.behttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXxnzcYWRy0&feature=youtu.be


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and page 22. But he offers no insight as to his decisionthat in spite of the evidence being very possibly verylikely tainted it was alright to use it to drawconclusions that could produce extremely unfortunateand unintended consequences.

Here is the dilemma: there are two leading suspectsfor this crime and one of them controls all of theevidence.

The two competing hypotheses regarding theAug21 attack are that it was perpetrated by 1) AssadsSAA against the insurgents, or 2) by the insurgents as afalse flag operation to draw the US into the conflictagainst Assad. Obama and various members of theUSG, including members of Congress, have assumedhypothesis #1 and have accused Assad publicly of beingguilty of the Aug21 attack, which, according to theUSG, justifies a retaliatory attack on Assad and alsojustifies, according to pro-Israeli hawks like McCain andGraham, removing Assad from power. We now knowhow close to a military attack Obama was: he gave

Israel a 48 hour advance warning that it was coming.18

While the Mission was not tasked with determiningwho was responsible, it almost goes without saying thatthe evidence the Mission collected would ultimately beapplied to resolving the question of guilt, and theanswer to that question will likely determine whetherthe USG attacks or otherwise punishes Assad. But theinsurgents had complete and unfettered access to all ofthese places, pieces of evidence, and witnesses foralmost a week before the Missions investigation started.

If the insurgents were the ghouls who gassed

hundreds of women and children and Sellstrom didnot know whether or not that is the case then theinsurgents would certainly go to any extent necessary torig the evidence so that it points to Assad. But in orderfor this investigation to take place, it had to be co-produced by those who have, for all Sellstrom knows,blood on their hands. The ethical ramifications of thisinescapable dilemma are enormous, but are ignored bythe Report.

If this was an investigation of a murder case inwhich there are two suspects and ultimately it is itwould be as if only one of the suspects controlled all of

the evidence and all of the witnesses. Any evidenceobtained under such conditions would likely be deemedinadmissible in court, or if it was admitted, it would beignored by any fair-minded jury. Which begs thequestion: What was the point of the Mission if they

could not exclude the very real possibility that the onlyevidence they had access to was tainted? It is almost asif the entire UN Mission turns out to be a PR exercisefor the insrugents, and I think that needs to bother us.

b. Cherry-picked facts tacitly point to Assad

Over and over again Sellstrom reminds us that the

objective of the Mission was not to allocate blame butto collect facts. And yet, there are a couple points inthe Report at which the authors bias against Assadtacitly seeps through, leaving the reader with ageneralized impression that this attack really wasAssads dirty business.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergy Ryabkovmakes this point in his Sep18.2013 interview on RT.See Vid #020. For instance, as Ryabkov points out, if19

Sellstrom was really trying to produce an objectivereport why did he ignore the evidence given to him bythe Syrian government? I mean, Sellstrom was certainly

happy enough to let the insurgents contribute. Onewould think that out of a sense of basic fairness, if notobjectivity, Sellstrom would also consider Assadsinformation and evidence. But there is no indication inthe Report that anything Assads people had to say wasconsidered.

Another instance of cherry picking whatinformation is presented is at page 4 of the Reportwhere there is a short section titled Weatherconditions in Damascus on 21 August. Weatherconditions?? Well, if you consider the statement that

the air temperature was dropping between 2:00 am and5:00 am to be a statement of the weather conditions,maybe so. Thats the only condition Sellstrom choosesto disclose, and, with all due respect, that observationturns out to be technically correct but technicallyirrelevant.

For instance, Sellstrom does not tell us what theactual air temperature was, which is highly relevant tothe rate of decomposition and volatilization of manyCW agents. Humidity and precipitation are alsoimportant factors, and they were also not revealed. Noris there any mention of wind speed or direction, which

is obviously extremely relevant to the extent, rate, anddirection of movement of a gaseous or volatile CW.

No, all that Sellstrom wants us to know about theweather in Damascus that night is that the airtemperature was dropping. In this same weather-section, instead of telling us pertinent information

Times of Israel18 , Oct05.2013, Raphael Ahrenhttp://www.timesofisrael.com/us-was-so-sure-it-was-striki

ng-syria-it-made-warning-calls-to-israels-leaders/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZ69OKp3-4819
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZ69OKp3-48http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-was-so-sure-it-was-striking-syria-it-made-warning-calls-to-israels-leaders/http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-was-so-sure-it-was-striking-syria-it-made-warning-calls-to-israels-leaders/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZ69OKp3-48


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about the weather, Sellstrom tells us that dropping airtemperatures means the air will be sinking and that thisfavors CW use because falling air maximizes thepotential impact of CW as the heavy gas can stay closeto the ground and penetrate into lower levels ofbuildings and constructions where many people wereseeking shelter.

Seeking shelter?? From what, the elements? There

was no rain, or snow, or sleet. It was a clear, pleasantnight in Damascus on Aug21, and these people weresound asleep when the attack began, according to thestory-line developed in the Report. The temperaturehad almost stabilized by 2 am. It dropped just 2E C.between 2 am and 5 am. Contrary to Sellstoms20

theory, this two degree drop had no affect whatsoeveron the dispersion of sarin or any other gas, given thatthe predominant weather feature was a moderate wind,gusting to 7-8 mph from the west. This wind wouldhave obviated the sinking and pooling of any toxic gasenvisioned by Sellstrom.

Furthermore, Sellstroms speculation that adownward air current which didnt exist because ofthe wind would maximize the potential impact of CWby keeping the gas near the ground makes little sensewhen one sees the videos of these areas. All of thesebuildings are high-rises. We have no evidence and noreason to conclude that the victims were seekingshelter in lower levels of buildings and constructions.For all we know they were sound asleep 10 to 100 feetoff the ground well above any CW that would besinking according to Sellstroms theory and painfully

limited meteorological analysis.This rather bizarre weather section is most revealingnot in what it tells us about the weather but what it tellsus about Sellstroms bias. Ostensibly, they went in thereinvestigating allegations that there was a CW attack.And yet Sellstrom takes what should have been a simplestatement of the weather conditions, strips out all of therelevant weather information, and substitutes hisspeculation about why the CW attack tool place in thewee hours, thus tacitly turning an alleged CW attackinto an actual one.

2. Rocket evidencea. Significance of determining that surface-to-surface

rockets were used.

Information gathered about the deliverysystems used was essential for theinvestigation. (Sellstrom Report, pg 4)

The first point to be made here is that the Reportsauthors clearly presupposed that there were deliverysystems rockets. Why? We know very well that sarincan be used effectively just by using the tip of an

umbrella to punch a hole in a baggie full of it, as wasdone in the 1995 Tokyo subway attack. You dont needrockets to kill people with this stuff.

And it is significant that Sellstrom has included thedetail that the attack was carried out by surface-to-surface rockets in his primary conclusion. If theevidence takes you there, then thats where you have togo. But if the evidence doesnt connect sarin to therockets, then theres an ethical problem in concludingthat rockets were used.

The problem is that there is a tacit, unspokenassumption that if sarin gas was delivered by surface-to-

surface rockets, then this must be an SAA attack.Approaching this from the other direction: If theReport had concluded that the sarin had been deployedby baggies or some means other than rockets ormunitions, then there would be a strong presumptionthat the SAA was not responsible.

It is by connecting the sarin to the rockets thatAssad is implicated, at least in the eyes of the hawks inthe USG. After all, it is not difficult to manufacturesarin; the 1994 and 1995 sarin attacks in Japan makethat clear. But handling and packaging sarin so that it

can be delivered by a rocket weaponizing it requiresa whole different level of expertise. And, of course, thewhole world knows Assad has weaponized sarin and hasstockpiled rockets full of it in order to defend Syriaagainst Israel.

So while the Mission was not tasked with pointingany fingers, when it makes statements or comes toconclusions that sarin was delivered by rocket, there is atacit pointing of a finger at Assad. Obama strutted outthis same reasoning: we know Assad was responsiblebecause only Assad had the capabilities. Bycapabilities Obama was referring to the rockets and

weaponizing technology not making sarin because itis known that various of these insurgent groups has thecapability to make sarin or to obtain it from Iraq andTurkey. 21

Weather report20

http://www.worldweatheronline.com/damascus-weather/d

imashq/sy.aspx?day=21

RT21 'Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra in Syria may have significantamounts of sarin' Sep17.2013

http://rt.com/op-edge/syria-rebels-have-sarin-980/
http://www.worldweatheronline.com/damascus-weather/dimashq/sy.aspx?day=21http://rt.com/op-edge/syria-rebels-have-sarin-980/http://rt.com/op-edge/syria-rebels-have-sarin-980/http://www.worldweatheronline.com/damascus-weather/dimashq/sy.aspx?day=21


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b. Inventory of the rocket evidence in the Report

At page 4 of the Report Sellstrom says that severalsurface to surface rockets capable of deliveringsignificant chemical payloads were identified andrecorded at the investigated sites. The use of the wordseveral does not exactly inspire confidence that we aregetting the most precise information. If these rockets

were examined, photographed, and the data recorded,why not say precisely how many rockets there were?Again, on page 5 of the Report we are told that

surface-to-surface rockets were found to contain sarin,but we are kept in the dark as to how many. This istypical of the hide-the-ball game Sellstrom playsthroughout the Report with hard numbers. He prefersto let us try and dig the numerical information out ofthe Report ourselves, and its not an easy task,particularly when the information turns out not to bethere at all.

The following table attempts to make sense of all of

the disclosures regarding rockets and the impact sites.The table is organized as follows: In the left column, rockets are designated with an

R number, impact sites with an I number. The

number itself is the page of the Report on which therocket or impact site is first disclosed.

The second column summarizes the Reportsphysical description of each rocket and impact sitementioned.

The third column summarizes information aboutwhere the rocket/impact sites were found, andattempts to connect the rockets/impact sites to the

data tables. The fourth column attempts to summarize theReports assertions connecting rockets/impact sitesto sarin.One of the difficulties in this exercise is that

Sellstrom uses multiple terms rocket, rocket motor,warhead, munition and it is sometimes not clearwhether he is talking about one object, differentcomponents of a single object, or entirely differentobjects. He may not know himself, which may be whyhe declines to go on the record as to how many rocketsthey examined. At any rate, all such devices or

components are listed here as separate rockets unlessit is absolutely clear they are components of the sameobject.

Table 1.

Rocket/Impact site Location, notes, and relation to

Tables 6 and 7.1

Evidence of sarin

R-18 Intact rocket motor coincidentto an impact site.

Warhead apparently not found.[They refer to rocket motorand munition. Is a motor amunition?]

L.~63.0 cm. W ~14.0 cm. engine had 10 jet nozzles in a

circle. Photos and diagrams provided

Moadamiyah

Trajectory determined as comingfrom east [Is this the sitedesignated Impact Site #1?Cant tell.]

Debris found in adjacent aptbldg. but no intact identifiablemunitions fragments werelocated.

This rocket is not mentioned inthe tables and is not described asrelated to any sarin sample ortest.

I-18 Impact site associated w/ R-18 Backyard terrace of an apt. bldg. No indication of blast/explosives,

according to report.


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Tables 6 and 7.1

Evidence of sarin

-12-

R-19a Munition unguided rocket 6 stabilizer fins Motor: L ~134 cm; Dia ~12 cm Central tube of warhead: L

~70cm; Dia ~12cm

Vol of warhead: 56 liters Warhead did not function

prior to impacting roof. [?] Photos and diagrams provided

Zamalka/Ein Tarma

Arrived from NW [Is this thesite designated Impact Site #4 atEin Tarma? Cant tell.]

Not at all clear what theyretalking about. How does arocket found on a roof come torest in a room below? If its inthe room below, its no longer onthe roof.

This rocket is the only oneassociated with a roof. SampleSN 18, Table 7.1, is the onlyrocket sample associated with aroof.

Samples SN 14-17, 19, & 20 ofTable 7.1 refer to the only non-rocket samples taken from a roof,which may be this impact site,although this is not statedanywhere.

The Report does not resolvethese ambiguities.

I-19a Impact site associated w/ R-19a Alleged munition impact. ?? Roof of 5-story bldg. Penetrated cinder block wall

then a re-bar containing wall(concrete?), came to rest inroom below.

R-19b [Not separately described. Sametype munition as R-19a.]

Zamalka/Ein Tarma This rocket is not mentioned inthe tables and is not described asrelated to any sarin sample ortest.I-19b Impact site associated w/ R-19b

Open field near I-19a

R-23a Munition Matches M14 artillery rocket Warhead not observed it was

either original or improvised. [Isthere a third possibility?]

Moadamiyah

It is not possible to determinewhether this is the same rocketas R/I-18, above. Report doesnot say.

This rocket is not identified inthe tables and is not described asrelated to any sarin sample ortest.

I-23a Labeled Impact Site #1" byReport

Associated w/ R-23a Shallow crater in ground Azimuth = 215 degrees

I-23b Labeled Impact Site #2" byReport

65 meters from I-23a Azimuth = 214

Moadamiyah

No rocket associated w/ this site

No rocket and no sarinassociated with this site.

R-23c 330 mm artillery rocket Ein Tarma

It is not possible to determinewhether this is the same rocket

and impact site as R/I-19a,above. Report does not say.

This rocket is not identified inthe tables and is not described asrelated to any sarin sample ortest.

I-23c Labeled Impact Site #4" byReport Associated w/ R-23b Earthy, relatively soft ground Azimuth = 105


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Tables 6 and 7.1

Evidence of sarin

-13-

I-22a These sites inferred fromcomment on pg 22 that 5 impactsites were investigated.Presumably they would beImpact Sites #3 and #5

No information given on thesesites other than that a trajectorycould not be obtained.

No rocket and no sarinassociated with these sites.

I-22b

R-31 Table 7.1: SN 21, 22, 24- 26 These items refer to one or more rockets, ordinance, munitions etc. that are notidentified to any impact site, location, or rocket described in the text.

c. Interpretation of the rocket evidenceIt is evident from the comments entered into Table

1 that, essentially, it is not possible to interpret theReport with respect to what rocket was found where.

Sellstrom says they only investigated five impactsites. He uses the labels Impact site number 1,Impact site number 2, and Impact site number 4.This suggests that he actually has an inventory of fivesites, that he has numbered them all, and somewherethere is a site #3 and a site #5. What Sellstrom doesnot specifically state is how many rockets were found. Itcould be five, it could be 50.

One would think that the authors of the Reportwould go to great lengths to clearly label every one ofthe impact sites, provide some way to pinpoint itsprecise location with coordinates or street addresses,label every one of the rockets, and identify which rocketwas associated with which site. But none of thisinformation appears in the Report. None of the reasonsI can think of for concealing this basic information are

particularly complimentary of the authors. As indicatedin Table 1 and discussed in the next section, as a resultof this massive, easily avoidable ambiguity, it is notpossible to identify a single rocket/impact site dyad asbeing contaminated with sarin, much less as beingproximate to any victim.

d. Rocket trajectoriesAt pages 22-23 of the Report, Sellstrom presents a

subsection titled Considerations on the likely trajectoryof the rockets. This has gotten a lot of attentiononline and in the MSM. We are told that of the five

impact sites investigated by the Mission only two ofthose could be used to deduce rocket trajectories, orazimuths. We are told that the two impact sites thatyielded azimuths were Impact Site #1 in Moadamiyahand Impact Site #4 in Ein Tarma. But then Sellstromimmediately contradicts himself by asserting that therewas a third impact site from which an azimuth wasobtained Impact Site #2, which was 65 meters awayfrom Impact Site #1. The azimuths calculated by

Sellstrom are 215E, 214E, and 105E for Impact Sites 1,2, and 4, respectively. There is no informationwhatsoever as to impact sites #3 and #5 not just notrajectory information, no information, period. None.

I am not at all clear on what the point was ofreporting these azimuths without reporting thelocations of the impact sites as well. It is not useful tosay the impact sites are in Moadamiyah or Ein Tarmabecause Moadamiyah and Ein Tarma are each milesacross. In the absence of coordinates or otherinformation providing the location of the impact sites,any attempt to use just these azimuths to pinpoint theSAA as the source of the rockets, as has been attemptedby Josh Lyons ofHuman Rights Watch and C.J.22

Chivers for the NYT is a pitifully futile, if not23

disingenuous, exercise.Even if was possible to use Sellstroms trajectories to

pinpoint the origin of the rockets and it isnt therockets those trajectories are calculated for have notbeen connected to sarin, as Table 1, above, illustrates.

Furthermore, we know that the SAA has beenpounding this area for over a year, and so the idea thatone can use a rocket impact site provided by theinsurgents to calculate an azimuth that implicates theSAA (or anyone) in a sarin attack is laughable.Without a competent description of the impact sites,including their coordinates and evidence connectingthem to sarin, Sellstroms trajectories are totallymeaningless with respect to the alleged use of sarin inGhouta.

Chivers NYT article is particularly odious in thisrespect. Chivers avers that the NYT trajectory analysis

from the Sellstrom report suggested that gas-filledrockets, which sailed over central Damascus and landed

http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping22

-sarin-flight-path

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/middleeast/un23

-data-on-gas-attack-points-to-assads-top-forces.html?ref

=world&_r=2&pagewanted=all&
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping-sarin-flight-pathhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/middleeast/un-data-on-gas-attack-points-to-assads-top-forces.html?ref=world&_r=2&pagewanted=all&http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/middleeast/un-data-on-gas-attack-points-to-assads-top-forces.html?ref=world&_r=2&pagewanted=all&http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping-sarin-flight-path


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in civilian neighborhoods, originated from the directionof the Republican Guard 104th Brigade, whichoccupies a large base on the mountains western side.What bunk. There is nothing in the Sellstrom Reportthat indicates any of the rockets or impact sites forwhich azimuths were reported were contaminated withsarin. Gas-filled rockets, indeed. The only thing filledwith gas is the NYT.

I hate to keep reiterating the point but I feel I haveto because the people writing the MSM articles haveclearly not seen it. It is essential that one keep in mindthat the insurgents chose what sites and what munitionsthe UN Mission would see. And they had many days toplan. If they had wanted to there is nothing that wouldhave kept them from digging a hole and sticking arocket motor in it pointing directly at the PresidentialPalace so that gullible writers at HRW and NYT couldconclude that Assad himself launched the rocket.Consequently, all bets are off as to the validity,authenticity, and relevance of this evidence.

For instance, look at Fig. 3 and Fig 4, below. Igrabbed Fig. 3 from the OPCW video of the UNMission I have alluded to repeatedly; i.e., Vid # 019. It

Fig. 3 Screen shot from Video #019 at 02:00.

Fig. 4 Blow-up of area circled in Fig. 3

shows a couple UN guys standing in an open spot,bagging a piece of evidence. Look closely and in thebackground you can see one of these rockets stickingout of the rubble. Its really hard to spot, but the blow-up Fig 4 shows it more clearly. This may well be one ofthe impact sites used by Sellstrom to calculate anazimuth, but we dont know that, even though theChiver NYT article includes another shot of this rocket,

tacitly suggesting that it is relevant to the trajectoryissue.But my point is that in the 6 days between the

Ghouta event and the first inspection, any fool with asmall shovel and half a wit could have dug a hole andjammed that rocket down into it. Do we now use thedirection that rocket is leaning to put this atrocity atthe feet of Assad? Not if we have a modicum ofskepticism, common sense, or sense of justice.

C. Sarin

Sarin is, of course, is the name of this game.Virtually the only name. Even if sarin could not beconnected to any subject or any rocket, merely findingsarin on a window sill would be sufficient to convince aflock of war hawks that Assad was the perpetrator.Assad is, after all, a sarin kind of guy. The world knowshe has stockpiles of it and he flaunts that to someextent. He has to if it is to serve its purpose as adeterrent to Israels nukes.

But we are not concerned in the present paper withthe wider game and reasons to go after Assad; we are

concerned just with what Sellstrom has concluded, andhe has concluded that sarin delivered by surface-to-surface rockets was used. We come to the usedcomponent of Sellstroms conclusion in the nextsection. Here we focus on the broad issues bothpolitical and analytical associated with sarin, and onthe nexus, vel non, of sarin and the rockets. As far asthe important question of what rocket from wheretested positive for sarin, Table 1, above, provides asummary. The short answer is: who knows? You surecant tell from the Report which rockets were the onesSellstrom claims carried sarin.

1. Limitations with the collection/analysis of the sarin

evidence generallyThe Sellstrom Report is not, and is not intended to

be, a scientific report of a caliber that would be acceptedby a scientific journal believe me, no reputable journalwould accept a mess like this for publication. Nor is theReport meant to be expert forensic evidence that would


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hold up in a court of law. It wouldnt no reputablecourt would allow this sort of confusing, inconclusivework to be admitted in evidence. I get that. Iunderstand that this UN report is meant for publicconsumption and should not be bogged down withtechnical and legal minutiae of the sort that would berequired for publication in a scientific journal oradmission in a court of law.

On the other hand, the validity of Sellstromsconclusions depends upon the validity of the clinicaland analytical data reported, and in order to assess thevalidity of those data one has to know at least the basicsof how they were produced. It is insufficient or worse dishonest to obfuscate methodologies, to scramblesamples, to cherry pick data, and then throw out abunch of conclusions with a Heres what we found!Were the UN; trust us. In other words, the Reportmust disclose a certain minimal amount of informationin order to allow an objective assessment of not justwhat was found but the process by which essential

conclusions were reached.

a. The Missions real goal: find sarin.

And so we turn to the critical issue of whether sarinwas found, and if so where or in whom. By now we havegiven up the hope that Sellstrom would present a properevidentiary triad in which a victim, an impact site, and arocket are all connected to each other and to sarin. Weare forced to reduce our expectations of the Report justto the question of whether any sarin was found at all.

According to Sellstrom, [t]he purpose of thisMission is to ascertain the facts related to theallegations of use of chemical weapons and to gatherrelevant data and undertake necessary analysis for thispurpose . . . (Sellstrom Report, pg. 1) That is theostensible purpose the PR purpose. But contrary totheir terms of reference, the Mission did not undertakethis mission to ascertain the facts. The actual purposewas much more precise: It was to find sarin. Full stop.And thats exactly what they did. In spite of dozens ofCW agents that could have been used in Ghouta, theUN chose to focus on just sarin. In other words, this

was not an objective, open-minded investigation. It wasan investigation co-produced by the UN Mission andthe insurgents to find sarin. As noted above, theinsurgents were screaming SARIN!! from the momentthe first video hit YouTube. They knew what theywanted the UN Mission to find, and the Missionobliged.

This allegation is supported by the fact thatSellstrom makes no statement whatsoever as to what

CW agents the Mission was looking for or what CWagents they tested for other than sarin. Nor do theyexplain why their focus was on sarin. Recall that irrespective of the entire world screaming SARIN! until the Ghouta samples were analyzed, there was not ashred of evidence that sarin had been used. In fact, asone trained in neuropharmacology, it was clear to mefrom the symptoms I saw in the videos authenticated

by US intelligence agencies and provided to Congressthat sarin had, in fact, not been used at least not onthe subjects in those videos. I return to this pointbelow. Because Sellstrom could not have had priorknowledge that sarin had been used, his team shouldhave been looking for every plausible agent: yes, ofcourse, sarin and other organophosphates such as VX.But also phospgene, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide,mustard gas, dimethylheptylpyran, CN, carbonmonoxide, etc.

As a corollary to this line of skepticism, it isindicative of the Missions real goal that the Sellstrom

Report is silent as to what CW agents were not found.Negative evidence has its place, too, and can be just asprobative as positive evidence. Remember the dog thatdidnt bark in that Sherlock Holmes story? But there isnot a word in the entire Sellstrom Report excludingother potential agents.

A competent report would have said: We lookedfor W, X, Y, and Z and the only thing we found was Y.But Sellstrom says, in effect, We looked just for sarinand, wouldnt ya know it, thats what we found. thusleaving loose-thinking readers with preconceptions to

infer that sarin was the only agent involved when, infact, Sellstrom tells us nothing about what else was orwasnt there. Because Assad is well known to produceand store sarin, the implication of Sellstroms clippedconclusion is that Assad was responsible.

Given the limited goal of finding sarin, the UNobviously decided that partnering with the insurgentswas 1) necessary; 2) morally and ethically acceptable;and, 3) not objectionable with respect to the insurgentslimiting the scope of the investigation by restricting it to20 hours over four days.

b. Concealing Methods and Identity of Laboratories

The concealment of pertinent information that weknow Sellstrom obviously has is a big problem in theReport. These are editorial decisions made for apurpose.

The most obvious example of the very generalproblem of concealing pertinent information is that theSellstrom Report makes no effort whatsoever to state


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for the record what technology or technologies wereused to analyze any samples. We are given a pretty goodidea of how the physical samples were packaged, sealed,and protected. But there is not a word regarding howany of the samples were actually analyzed. Was ionexchange used? High pressure liquid chromatography?Some combination of gas chromatography and massspectrometry? Retired DEA sniffer dogs? I do not see a

single word explaining what analytical techniques wereused.We do not even know whether the different labs

that were employed used the same techniques. In fact,we are not even told what labs did the analyses. Thelabs are identified in much the same way the subjectsand samples are: by number only. You have to have amoderately sharp eye to see even a hint of descriptionabout the labs. In a wee footnote to Table 7.1 found onpage 34 there is the clause used by the OPCWlaboratory. But the footnote itself says laboratory singular while referring to Laboratory 1" and

Laboratory 2".Are labs #1 and #2 really just a single lab, as the

footnote indicates? What about labs #3 and #4? Arethese labs owned by OPCW or are they independentlabs under contract to OPCW or the UN? Are theylocated in a country, like Israel or the US, that has areal interest in the outcome of the Report? Is theresome reason to maintain the privacy of the labs that aretaking public money to analyze samples collected withpublic money to produce data that will be reported tothe public?

Below I discuss the serious problem of inter-labinconsistencies. One possible explanation for theseinconsistencies is that the labs used different analyticaltechniques. But because we are not given even the mostbasic information as to the identity of these labs or whatmethods are used by each lab, we cannot begin tosuggest reasons for these inconsistencies. And becausewe are not given even a hint of what methods wereused, a conclusion that the methods used to analyze thesamples were valid is no more warranted than askeptics conclusion that the methods were not valid.We just dont know. Hence, the frustration.

I can see no legitimate reason for concealing theanalytical methods used or the identity of the labs. Thiswould be like a cop busting you for speeding and thenrefusing to tell the judge how he clocked your speed think how frustratedyou would be. What legitimatereason could there be for concealing this information?

c. Total lack of quantitative data

Im having a real problem with this SellstromReport, as you can tell by now. But as one trained inthe medical sciences at lab benchs where generatingdata real data, as in numbers is everything, whatpains me most of all is the way Sellstrom has chosen notto reveal a single quantity of either sarin or any markerfor sarin in any sample. He has not provided a singlequantity ofanything! By quantity I mean how much of

the stuff was present. This is incredibly importantinformation and its concealment gives me an acute caseof heartburn, particularly with respect to the biologicalsamples.

And the reason Ive got my knickers in a twist overthis is that if we had data telling us what the levels ofsarin or its metabolites were at the time the sampleswere taken 6-9 days after the attack we could usethose levels to estimate of how much sarin the subjectswere initially exposed to. For instance, following thesarin attacks in Japan in 1994 and 1995, Tsuchihashi etal. were able to measure sarin metabolites in the urine24

of victims and estimate what the actual peak dose ofsarin was. This would be incredibly helpful informationin the present case. For one thing, the symptomsreported in the Sellstrom Report are totally wacko, asdiscussed below. If we knew what the peak levels ofsarin was in the various survivors, maybe it would helpmake sense of the inexplicable array of symptoms. Idont think so, but maybe.

Also, if Sellstrom determined the levels of sarin inthe subjects blood and urine and the levels of pre-cursors of sarin, such as DIMP, one could use that25

information to deduce the ratios of pre-cursor to sarinthat the subjects were exposed to. This informationwould then help determine who produced the sarinbecause a crude synthesis of sarin such as the insurgentswould likely employ leaves a relatively highconcentration of pre-cursors, while a sophisticatedsynthesis such as Assad would employ produces acleaner sarin. And because some of the pre-cursorsproduce the symptoms reported that sarin does notproduce, the wacko constellation of symptoms reportedby Sellstrom might be easier to understand if we knewhow much of what chemicals were initially present.

The actual quantities of chemicals can also behelpful in evaluating the validity of the methods used.Every detection method has what is called a level ofdetection. The LOD is the minimum amount of thetarget chemical that the method can reliably detect. At

J.Anal.Tox 22:383(1998)24

Diisopropyl methylphosphonate25


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low concentrations of sarin and its metabolites close tothe LOD of whatever method is being employed concentrations one would expect after 6-9 days thereliability of the method comes more and more intoquestion.

In summary, a competent report would have clearlyset out for each lab and each type of sample 1) whatchemical or chemicals were being analyzed as markers

for sarin; 2) the method that was used in each case; 3)the LOD for that method, and 4) the actual amountmeasured. Having this information at hand, one wouldbe a lot less skeptical about whether or not the propermeasurements were done. Unless these labs were usingsome crude method that just determines the presence orabsence of a chemical, the actual amount of thechemicals in the blood and urine can be and shouldhave been determined and reported. Why werentthese values provided?

2. Connecting the rockets/impact sites to sarinIn Table 1, above, I have attempted to line up the

various rockets and impact sites discussed by Sellstromwith the sarin results. Rockets, rocket debris, and otherphysical samples that tested positive to sarin must beconnected to impact sites if the conclusion of theReport is to be accepted. But the Report is not evensufficiently organized to meet this simple objective.

The results of testing the 30 physical samples aregiven in Sellstroms Table 7.1 (Sellstrom Report, pp 27-34). Five of the 30 descriptions of samples refers to a

rocket. And not a single one of any of the 30 samples isexplicitly identified to any of the three communities,much less any impact site. The only way the reader canattempt to wade through this thicket is that each of thesamples in Table 7.1 has a sampling date, and we aretold the Mission was in Moadamiyah on Aug26 and inEin Tarma/Zamalka on Aug 28 and Aug 29. Becausethe sampling date of Samples 1-13 of Table 7.1 isAug26, one can deduce that those samples came fromMoadamiyah. Of course, Sellstrom doesnt actually saythat, but it seems a reasonable guess, and reasonableguesses are all we have.

However, with the remaining 17 samples we donteven have a reasonable guess as to which came from EinTarma and which came from Zamalka because all weare told is that the Mission was in those two places onAug 28 and 29, but we are not told which place on

which date. This is an extremely important fail. The26

reader should not have to be guessing which samples areassociated with which community or which impact site this should be clearly set forth in the Report.

a. Moadamiyah

As I say, going by the sampling date, one can make

a good guess that samples 1-13 of Sellstroms Table 7.1were most likely collected at Moadamiyah, which is theonly community that can be identified to anyenvironmental samples. So what about Moadamiyah?Sellstrom has concluded that surface-to-surface rocketscarrying sarin were used in Moadamiyah. Is thatconclusion borne out, or not?

It is not. For looking at Table 7.1 you will not finda single one of the 13 samples from Moadamiyahdescribed as being from a rocket or any component of arocket. Either the Mission did not take any swipes fromthese rocket parts and impact sites found in

Moadamiyah or else they took them and decided toconceal the results.

How can that be?? We know that there are at leasttwo impact sites in Moadamiyah: labeled #1 and #2 bySellstrom. And Sellstrom goes into great detail withphotos describing an M14-style rocket found inMoadamiyah. (Sellstrom Report, pp18-19 & 23). Whyin the world would the Mission have examined theMoadamiyah rocket and taken photos of it but noswipes to analyze for sarin? Surely they must havetaken these samples they were in Moadamiyah for two

hours! (Sellstrom Report, pg. 6) And if they did takesamples of the Moadamiyah rockets, why does Sellstromnot report the results?

In view of this editorial silence and in view of thefact that there are no rocket samples of any kind fromMoadamiyah, it beggars belief that Sellstrom canconclude that surface-to-surface rockets delivered sarinto Moadamiyah. Beggars belief.

To make matters worse, inconsistencies betweenthe labs obviate even the limited assertion thatsignatures of sarin were found in any sample fromMoadamiyah. Of the 13 samples we have guessed came

from Moadamiyah, the only ones for which there iscomplete agreement are the samples that are negativefor everything. Furthermore, neither lab #1 nor lab #2

Much of the information in Table 7.1 is also provided in26

the tables of Appendix 6 (pp 24-26). However, as Mr.Gleb Bazov has kindly pointed out to me, the samples arenumbered differently in Appendix 6 than they are in

Table 7.1, which only adds to the confusion.


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found sarin in any of these 13 samples. But lab #2found degradation or by-product chemicals in 6 of the13 samples, while lab #1 found such chemicals in onlytwo samples. Im talkin just the 13 samples that areprobably from Moadamiyah. If you look at all 30 of theenvironmental samples, there is complete agreementbetween lab #1 and #2 on only two of them: samples24 and 28. (Sellstrom, Table 7.1)

It is helpful to look at these inter-labinconsistencies as a function of what chemical isreported. In detecting DIMP the two labs agreed 80%of the time. But in detecting sarin, the labs agreed onlyabout 50% of the time, and in detecting IPMPA there27

was a meager 25% agreement. And when we put italtogether, you get complete inter-lab agreement foronly 2 samples out of 30, or 7%. Keep in mind we arenot talking about quantitative agreement how muchwas there. We are talking the far easier task of justdetermining whether or not a chemical was present.

I dont believe this sort of inter-lab inconsistency

would be acceptable in a court of law. If one lab findsDIMP or sarin in a sample and the other lab findsnothing, then one cannot fairly conclude that DIMP orsarin is present. By analogy, if one laboratory finds adefendants DNA at a crime scene, and a secondlaboratory finds no DNA, the defendant walks. Unlessyou explain the discrepancy, 50% isnt good enough fora conviction. Lets hope its not good enough to start awar.

b. Ein Tarma and ZamalkaEin Tarma is the only community other thanMoadamiyah that is in any way mentioned in theReport with respect to a rocket. Ein Tarma makes acameo appearance on page 22 where Sellstromidentifies Impact site number 4" as Ein Tarma. That isthe only unambiguous connection of Ein Tarma to anyevidence. And there is no way at all to identify anyrocket or impact site to Zamalka, which is a hugeblunder because, as noted below, the only subjects thatare identified to any location are identified to Zamalka.

Let me be more specific about this gripe. In the

second table of Appendix 6 (Sellstrom Report, pp. 25-26), Sellstrom refers to multiple samples taken from oneor more rockets, which is good. But that table is titledZamalka/Ein Tarma, and does not distinguish samplesthat came from Zamalka from those that came from Ein

Tarma, so were out of luck there.Table 7.1, which reports the analysis results, does

not refer to any location. Not Moadamiyah. Not EinTarma. Not Zamalka. None. Zip. Nada. Zilch. Evenif, as noted above, one may feel somewhat confident inassigning samples SN 1-13 of Table 7.1 to Moadamiyahon the basis of sampling dates, there is still no way toassign the remaining samples to either Ein Tarma or

Zamalka or Impact Site #4.Again, I must complain in the clearest terms: thisfailure to identify every single sample to its place oforigin, which should have been given as coordinates, isa total cock-up it is unacceptably shoddy science. Thepeople of Syria and particularly the victims and theirfamilies deserve better.

3. Conclusions regarding sarin

The Report goes to great lengths to describe tworockets. However, given the history of hostilities in

these areas for over 2 years no one should be shocked atfinding rocket parts scattered around, and so thepresence of rockets or rocket partsper se is meaninglessin the context of the alleged sarin attack. And giventhe 6-9 days that passed between the alleged CW attackand the time the UN Mission showed up, rockets androcket-parts could have been freely planted anywherethe insurgents decided the UN Mission would beallowed to go. If the insurgents are the perpetrators ofthe attack, then it is a dead certainty that evidence wasplanted, tampered with, or otherwise tainted.

More problematical is the fact that the Report doesnot tie a single rocket or rocket part to sarin. Onesuspects that Sellstrom has data that could do that, but,for whatever reason, he decided to construct the reportin such a way as to conceal that information. Forinstance, rocket impact sites are not identified bycoordinates and rocket samples/swipes are not clearlynumbered and identified to those unidentified impactsites.

Furthermore, because no rocket impact locationsare disclosed, and because no rockets are connected tosarin, individuals or organizations, like Human Rights

Watch and the NYT, who are trying to use Sellstromstrajectories to triangulate the position from which therockets were fired are contributing absolutely nothingexcept gratuitous confusion.

In other words, what weve got here is pigeon poopon the pump handle.

Isopropylmethylphosphonic acid. This is a break-down27

product of sarin considered to be the most specific

indicator of sarin.


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D. Used

In the last section I concluded that the Report failsto tie sarin to any surface-to-surface rocket, and so thesurface-to-surface rockets assertion of Sellstromsconclusion is, basically, off the table. Our analysis istherefore greatly reduced to determining whetherSellstrom makes a case for any type of sarin attack in

those three communities, irrespective of whetherrockets were involved.This section is titled Used because that is the

word Sellstrom employs in his conclusion. Sellstromadroitly takes that four-letter word and turns it into asemantic weapon of mass obfuscation. For his (nowamended) primary conclusion is that sarin was used inMoadamiyah, Ein Tarma, and Zamalka.

This is pretty slippery stuff, for Sellstrom does notexplicitly conclude that any person was poisoned,injured, or killed by the sarin. He does not evenconclude that sarin itself was used he says the

rockets were used. However, in his list of facts,Sellstrom does assert that 1) [a] number ofpatients/survivors were clearly diagnosed as intoxicatedby an organophosphorus compound, and 2) [b]loodand urine samples from the same patients were foundpositive for Sarin and Sarin signatures. Thus, withoutever saying so explicitly, Sellstrom leads the MSM andthe hawks to interpret the Report as saying that sarinwas used to injure and kill civilians in Ein Tarma,Moadamiyah, and Zamalka.

Because of this semantic hide-the-ball tactic, I am

forced to join the MSM and hawks and make the sameobvious and necessary presumptions in order analyzethe Report. I presume that by the clause used in EinTarma, Moadamiyah and Zamalka what Sellstrommeans is sarin caused death or serious injury to peopleof Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah and Zamalka. Any otherinterpretation of used would have the effect of turningthe entire UN Mission into an exercise in futility, if nota macabre comedy. If nobody was hurt, why was theMission there?

Consequently, this Section D analyzes Sellstromsevidence tying sarin to human casualties in Ein Tarma,

Zamalka, and Moadamiyah. The evidence set forth bythe Report is of two types: 1) symptoms that survivorsreported or displayed, and 2) other evidence of sarinexposure.

1. Problems with the clinical/biological evidence

generallyAs with Sellstroms sarin analysis of physical

objects, any objective reader of the Report will have anumber of unavoidable general objections to the waythe biological data are reported. It is, in fact, notpossible to determine whether critical evidence is totallylacking or whether it is there but improperly andinadequately described.

a. Insurgent-selected subjectsAs noted above, the insurgents co-produced theSellstrom Report by controlling what locations andwhat physical evidence the Mission would have accessto. The other major way the insurgents co-producedthe Sellstrom was by selecting the victims that theMission would examine and interview. This is the wayit worked: The Mission requested that insurgentphysicians make available 80 subjects that fit someundisclosed profile or criteria established by theMission. We are not informed of what those criteriawere precisely and we are not provided a copy or

translation of the questionnaire used. We are only toldthe selection process was designed to primarily identifysurvivors who had severe clinical presentations,(Sellstrom Report, pg 4), and (contradictorily), toidentify individuals who either demonstrated moderateto severe symptoms and signs or were able to provide aclear and detailed history of the event. (SellstromReport, pg. 11)

From this initial pool of 80 subjects chosen by theinsurgents, the Mission team selected 36 who wereexamined and interviewed. This appears to be some

sort of a technique to randomize who would beexamined, but Sellstrom does not indicate how the final36 subjects were chosen or who chose them. It reallymakes little difference because regardless what processand criteria were used to select the sub-population of36, those 36 were still initially chosen by the insurgents.Had the insurgents supplied, say, 800 subjects who metthe criteria, and had the Mission randomly chosen 36from that large pool, then there might have been somestatistical point to the exercise.

b. Failure to identify subjectsWhat then are we told about these subjects with

respect to, say, where they were when they were exposedto sarin, their ages, their gender, & etc.?

Oddly, with the exception of seven subjects who aredescribed as living in Zamalka, we dont know a thingabout any of them except the number they wereassigned and what symptoms they reported. Thereforeonly those seven subjects we are told were living in


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Zamalka can possibly be used to support Sellstromsconclusion, and even then only in so far as Zamalka.The other 29 subjects are pretty much irrelevant as faras tying sarin to any of the three communities.

The problem is that with the exception of theseseven from Zamalka, the Report tells us only where thesubjects were assessed, not where they were from. Weare told that 44% of the subjects were assessed at

Moadamiyah, but they may have all been from Allepofor all we are told. Simply saying where a subject wasassessed is irrelevant as far as tying that subject to animpact site, a rocket, or any physical objects that testedpositive for sarin.

In fact, it is a pretty good guess that some of the 80subjects were insurgents themselves and possibly responsible for preparing or delivering the CW thatkilled the kids in the videos. And the reason I say thatis that if you look at the OPCW vid (Video #019) andother vids of these areas, they are all completely bombedout. Everythingis completely bombed out. All of the

windows are busted and half of the buildings arewrecked. It looks worse than the Bronx. Worse thanDetroit. In other words, the place looks like a war zone,which is what it is. After all, Assad has been bombingthat area for over a year. As pointed out by MotherAgnes Mariam el-Salib, mother superior of St. JamesMonastery in Qara, Syria, because of a year of constantbombing, the place was a ghost town well before Aug21.Only the insurgents themselves and a few of their familymembers were left. So where did 3600 victims and28

1400 fatalities claimed by Obama come from? More

importantly for the present analysis, where didSellstroms 36 subjects come from? We dont know,other than that the insurgents provided them.

As I noted above, the Report does give a bit moreinformation about seven of the subjects. (SellstromReport, pp 36-38) Four of them are males between theages of 17 and 49 living in Zamalka, which sounds a lotlike insurgents to me. What other males of that ageremain in the area? Two are females, one 34 and one38, also living in Zamalka, as was one boy, aged 8.Since we know nothing about the other 29 subjects orwhere they are from, these seven subjects are very

important to the Report because they are the only onesthat could be relied on to help support Sellstroms theconclusions.

c. Failure fully to report the results indicates, at best, a

lack of objectivityWith respect to the physical evidence I remarked

above that it was suspicious that the Mission appears tohave looked for nothing other than organophosphates,and, more particularly, sarin. This is true for thebiological samples as well. There is no indication here

that any other chemical or class of chemicals wassought. But one might ask: As long as the Missionfound sarin, what difference does it make if there wereother agents present?

One answer is that while finding sarin would pointto Assad because the world knows he has stockpiled it,finding VX, or phosgene, or carbon monoxide, or manyother agents that are easier to produce and more readilyavailable would point to the insurgents. If the Missionanalyzed its samples in a way that would detect onlysarin, then it can be assumed Sellstrom et al. had Assadin their sights.

But not only does the Sellstrom Report not disclosewhat chemicals were being sought, when it comes to thebiological samples, the Report does not even disclosewhat chemicals were found. Here is what we get: Page 5 under the heading Information concerning

bio-medical samples refers to positive blood andurine specimens, without saying what positivemeans.

Table 2 (Sellstrom Report, pg. 15) summarizes thebiological results, but all we get is Positive andNegative.

Table 7.2 (Sellstrom Report, pg. 35)reports theactual results of all 36 subjects, but, again, all we getis Pos and Neg.

The facts set forth on page 5 of the report say thatblood and urine samples were found positive forSarin and Sarin signatures. Now, thats what werelooking for! A statement of what they found! Andyet the Report does not identify a single blood orurine sample that tested positive for sarin and doesnot reveal what chemicals were used as Sarinsignatures.

Text on page 15 fudges the foregoing assertion of

page 5. Page 15 says the blood samples testedpositive for Sarin exposure. OK . . .tested29

positive for sarin exposure. What, precisely, does

ISTEAMS Report28 on chemical attack on East Ghouta,Sep11.2013, pg. 9.http://logophere.com/Syria/Syria%20Docs/Mother%20Ag

nes%20-%20ISTEAMS%20rpt%20Sep2013.pdf

The blood samples that were exposed to sarin?29

Presumably, what is intended is that the blood samplestested positive for the existence of some chemical, thepresence of which indicates that the person from whom

the blood was drawn was exposed to sarin.
http://logophere.com/Syria/Syria%20Docs/Mother%20Agnes%20-%20ISTEAMS%20rpt%20Sep2013.pdfhttp://logophere.com/Syria/Syria%20Docs/Mother%20Agnes%20-%20ISTEAMS%20rpt%20Sep2013.pdf


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that mean? Again, what chemical or chemicals didSellstrom find that indicates sarin exposure?Sellstrom elects to conceal that information.

This refusal to reveal what exactly was beingdetected or measured in the blood/urine samples ishighly problematic for a number of reasons, the first ofwhich is that it doesnt pass the smell test.

The second relates to the huge inter-labdiscrepancies. Note in Table 7.1 (Sellstrom Report, pp27-33) that the results of the environmental samples which do indicate what chemicals were detected showproblematic, qualitative inter-lab inconsistencies. Onthe other hand, the results of the biological samples which give no in

pigeon poop on the pump handle: a critique of the report of the un mission to investigate the use...

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