pilotage march 2011-2

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PilotageA selection of articles previouslypublished by Gard AS


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Ports and places of refuge in South Africa 5

Increased risks of grounding in Barranquilla, Colombia 7

Communication in pilotage passage planning 8

Harbour towage and pilotage 9

Damage to fixed objects when manoeuvring in confined waters 11

Pilot error survey 13

What happens to the pilot after a casualty? 13

Is the pilot a part of the bridge team? 14

Navigation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea 16

Pilot on board! 17

Pilot on the bridge - Role, Authority and Responsibility 19

Who is to blame? 23

Contents


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Disclaimer

The information contained in this publication is compiled from material previously published by Gard AS and isprovided for general information purposes only. Whilst we have taken every care to ensure the accuracy and qualityof the information provided at the time of original publication, Gard AS can accept no responsibility in respect of anyloss or damage of any kind whatsoever which may arise from reliance on information contained in this publicationregardless of whether such information originates from Gard AS, its shareholders, correspondents or othercontributors.


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Ports and places ofrefuge in South AfricaBy Alan Reid and Mike Heads,

P&I Associates (Pty) Ltd, Durban, South Africa

Gard News 201,February/April 2011

The subject of ports and places ofrefuge around the world has steadily

become a topic of much debate amongvarious interest groups, especially afterthe breaking of the PRESTIGE off thecoast of Spain.

No doubt when the PRESTIGE accidentoccurred there were several issues atstake regarding what should be donewith the vessel and what steps shouldbe taken by the various authorities.After the incident some experts arguedthat if the vessel had been taken intoa port or place of refuge the resultantoil spill could have been controlled.This is not the first time that such a

debate has occurred, since the issue ishighly sensitive. The PRESTIGE case,however, does illustrate the need for asensible approach when dealing withships in difficulty. In the case of the MSCNAPOLI, a decision had to be takenon what to do with the vessel after shedeveloped a crack, and it was decidedthat a beached landing would be thebest solution in order to limit andcontrol the damage to the environment.

It is against this background that SouthAfrica has looked at its contingencyplans in order to deal with ships indifficulty and what it should do if facedwith any of the above scenarios.

South Africa is surrounded by 2,798

km of coastline that splits the Atlanticand Pacific Oceans. At certain times of

the year this length of coastline can beone of the most dangerous stretchesof coastline in the world, especiallywhen one takes the weather, currentsand rugged rocks into account. It is forthese very reasons, that it is importantto have a plan in place and to be awareof the options available to the country inorder to deal with potential ecologicalcatastrophes should one ever arise.The coastline is littered with wrecksstretching back hundreds of years and,therefore, the next maritime casualtycould be imminent.

A sensible and commercialapproachTo deal with the scenario of a ship indifficulty, the South African governmenthas passed legislation and approvedthe appointment of the South AfricanMaritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) toconsider their options, together withother local marine experts, on theprocedures to follow should a vessel runinto trouble.

South Africa has adopted a verysensible and commercial approach tothe issue of ships in difficulty and the

need to have ports and places of refugeavailable for a vessel in case of anemergency. There are places of refugeavailable in South Africa for deep draft

vessels, together with certain ports,provided certain requirements can bemet.

There are three possible places ofrefuge on the South African coast:1. St Helena Bay - a deep water bay butexposed to the wind from the northwest2. False Bay - very good area that offersmuch protection3. Algoa Bay - good shelter only from

the west

In addition, there are eight commercialports in South Africa: Saldanha Bay,Cape Town, Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth,Coega, East London, Durban andRichards Bay.

Anchoring a vessel at will is illegalA shipowner or master can not simplyanchor a vessel along the South Africancoastline at their own will. Variouspieces of legislation have been passedto prevent this:- The Marine Traffic Act, Act 2 of 1981;

- South African Maritime SafetyAuthority Act, Act 5 of 1998;- Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security)Regulations 2004, which incorporateRegulation X 1-2/9 of SOLAS (ISPS);- Marine Pollution (Control and CivilLiability) Act, Act 6 of 1981;- Wreck and Salvage Act, Act 94 of 1996;- Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951(as amended);- National Ports Authority Act, Act 12 of2005.

The Marine Traffic Act deals with avessel entering and departing from

international waters and states thatthere are regulations regarding theimmobilising, laying up, stopping oranchoring outside harbours or fishingharbours. It is an offence under the Actfor any vessel to lay up on the SouthAfrican coastline without the necessarypermission. Permission to lay up a vesselmust be given by the relevant ministerthrough SAMSA, who may demand, interalia, that various conditions be met. Forexample, SAMSA may demand that a tugbe made fast to the vessel at all timesthroughout the duration of the lay-up.The tug would therefore be able to movethe vessel in case of an emergency. If sheis made fast, then there is little delay inmoving or relocating the vessel shouldthe need arise.

Nautical chart of Valsbaai (False Bay).


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SAMSAs roleSAMSA also has the power to demandthat the master or owner of the shippost security to the satisfaction ofSAMSA in an amount determined bySAMSA for the recovery of any costsincurred by SAMSA in enforcing anycondition applicable to the immobilising

or laying up of the ship, or in theexercise of its powers under the Act.

SAMSA have the authority to prevent avessel coming towards the coast to seekrefuge and this authority stretches toall bays and anchorage areas. Althoughthe ports are operated by the TransnetNational Ports Authority (TNPA), theywill often turn to SAMSA for advice andassistance. Before a vessel can seekrefuge at a place or port in South Africa,SAMSA must first give their authority,and if it is a port, then TNPA will alsohave to be consulted and give their

approval. SAMSA will always considerthe safety of life as being paramountand the Maritime Rescue Co-ordinationCentre in Cape Town co-ordinates allrescue activities with the harbour masterat the nearest port. The next priorityis the environment. Once the abovefactors have been taken into account,one would then give consideration tothe safety of property.

South Africa has always had an excellentapproach to the subject of vesselsseeking a port or place of refuge andSAMSA should be commended for

their role in such matters. SAMSAhave a difficult function to fulfil andit has always been our advocacy thatshipowners looking to utilise SouthAfrican waters as a place of refuge

should act with utmost good faithwhen dealing with SAMSA. A failureto disclose a particular fact may leadto a vessel being barred from gainingrefuge.

Where a vessels structure has beencompromised, SAMSA will want to

inspect the vessel and assess theproblem before granting permission forthe vessel to get close to the coast.Once permission has been granted, itmay be subject to certain conditions, forexample:- The vessel may be requested toproduce a valid hull and machineryinsurance certificate.- The vessel may be requested toproduce a valid P&I insurance certificateof entry.- All fuel bunkers and black oil (includingcontents of engine sumps) may have to

be removed from the vessel.- The vessel must be attended to by anadequately powerful salvage tug thathas to be made fast.- A salvage contractor must beappointed by owners (the contractorshould be an International SalvageUnion member).- An operational plan must be preparedand approved by SAMSA- A suitable guarantee might berequested.

The request for valid insurancecertificates is a new development and

an essential one. If vessels want to makeuse of our coast, then owners mustunderstand that South Africa needsto protect itself from having to incurand bear the costs of removing vessels

which may eventually be abandoned bythe owners. Having suitable insurancein place provides a level of protectionshould an unfortunate event or risk ariseduring the period of refuge.

Both SAMSA and TNPA recognise andaccept Club letters of undertaking from

IG clubs. The wording of this letter hasbeen agreed upon with the clubs andis only a slight variation of the standardIMO wording for ports of refuge. Thevariation is that it incorporates SouthAfrican law.

ResourcesSouth Africa is fortunate to have variousresources available on its coastline toassist vessels in difficulty or which mayhave to lay up. South Africa was the firstcountry to recognise the need to have atug solely for the above purpose, whichresulted in the rest of the world also

introducing emergency towing vessels(ETV).

Two salvage companies have officesin Cape Town with fully equippedwarehouses. Resources are available toprovide, inter alia, fenders and transferhoses.

Co-operation is paramountSouth Africa, as a coastal state, doesrecognise the need for vessels to seekrefuge and in general will assist in thisprocess. However, it is imperative thatthe requirements of the authorities are

met and that the owners, the ship andtheir respective insurers co-operate atall times.


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Increased risks ofgrounding in Barranquilla,

Colombia

Figure 1- Magdalena River & Rio Caucareaches the sea in Barranquilla

to the current and turning at the wrongtime. In addition to the groundings,the excess water flow has also led toother incidents such as collisions due tomiscalculating the speed and strengthof the current.

With the increasing volume of water,the silting up of the river bed andof the mouth of the river has alsoincreased, causing changes in the

pattern of silt deposits, creating shoalsand reductions of depth where therepreviously were none. The changes inthe river bed also have a bearing onthe speed and direction of the current.The current in the navigational channelhas increased due to the Bernoulliprinciple2. This has changed thehydrodynamics of the River.

The authorities have expressedconcerned and have increasedthe frequency of bathymetries andsoundings of the river bed. They havealso started to provide information

more regularly (bi- or tr i- monthly,rather than once a month). In addition,a permanent dredge is now stationedat Bocas de Ceniza to cope with thechanging circumstances.

RecommendationsDue to the unusual conditionsin Barranquilla, Gard stronglyrecommends Masters to be awareof the risks involved and take theabove into consideration whenplanning the arrival or departure.

Vessels entering the port shouldrequest their agents to provide the

most up to date bathymetric chartsand recommendations from the localauthorities prior to entering port. Whenpossible, vessels should enter the portduring daytime.

When possible the pilot should boardthe vessel three or more miles outsidethe river mouth. This will allow the pilotmore time to get a better feel of thehandling of the ship, should there bean emergency situation. Masters shouldwork closely with the pilots in thediscussion and planning of the enteringmanoeuvre. The pilot station should becontacted well in advance to obtain anupdate on the conditions in order toget accurate data for the onboard risk

BackgroundGard and other P&I clubs have recentlyexperienced several serious casualtiesin the port of Barranquilla. The portof Barranquilla is located on the westbank of the Rio Magdalena (MagdalenaRiver) some 10 miles upriver from themouth, known as Bocas de Ceniza, inthe Caribbean Sea. The port receivessome 300 vessels monthly. The purposeof this circular is to inform about the

situation in Barranquilla and to helpmembers and clients to assess theincreased risk when entering or leavingthis port.

The unusual situation inBarranquillaThe 2010 rainy season in Colombia,with unusually large volumes of rainfalling for considerable periods of timehas been the worst in 40 years. Therainiest months of the year are usuallyApril and October, but in 2010 due tothe La Nia1 phenomenon, the laterainy season started in late August

and is now running into December.Colombian climate experts estimatethat the rains will continue well into2011, probably until March, causing thelate rainy season of 2010 to merge withthe early rainy season of 2011. At thetime of writing, this years rains have sofar left more than 130 people dead andclose to two million affected.

There are currently unusually largevolumes of water in the rivers, andspecial directional dams at Bocasde Ceniza have been constructedto accelerate the flow of the river to

maintain and improve depth and thusthe draught for the shipping channel.This has created unprecedentedconditions and increased the risksinvolved in navigating in the port ofBarranquilla.

Increased risk when navigating in theport of BarranquillaThe severe conditions described havecaused difficulties for even the mostexperienced pilots in Barranquillaand some of the incidents, includingthree serious groundings in October/November may be due in part tomisjudgement of the river conditions bythe pilots and masters. Examples of thiscould be presenting too much hull

Loss Prevention CircularNo. 15-10

assessment. The Master and the pilotshould plan together to reduce thevessels side exposure to the current toavoid losing rudder control of the ship.

The circular has been drafted andedited by Gards local correspondent inColombia Marventura Services Ltda.

1 La Nia is a coupled ocean-atmospherephenomenon that is the counterpart of ElNio as part of the broader El Nio-Southern

Oscillation climate pattern.2 If the volume increases and the area todischarge remains the same, the same volumeis delivered but at a higher speed.


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Communication inpilotage passage

planning

Gard News 200, November 2010/January 2011

Good communication between masterand pilot continues to be paramount.The article Master/pilot exchangeof information, published in GardNews issue No. 154, focused on theimportance of good communicationbetween master and pilot, a problemwhich was also highlighted in thearticles Pilot on board! in Gard Newsissue No. 181 and Is the pilot a part ofthe bridge team? in Gard News issueNo. 185. In the following article GardNews revisits the topic once again.1

Ideally the pilot, the master and theofficer of the watch (OOW) shoulddiscuss and agree on the intendedpassage plan in pilotage watersprior to commencing the passage.Unfortunately, this is often not donein accordance with bridge teammanagement principles. For themaster and the ships crew to be ableto supervise the pilots performance,

or even question the pilots actions,they all have to be aware of the pilotsintentions.

Pilots prevent far more accidents thanthey cause. Nevertheless, when a pilotboards a vessel there may be pressureon both the pilot and the bridgeteam in terms of time. As a result, thepassage plans of the pilot and theon-board bridge team may not beconsistent with each other. There maybe a lack of communication betweenthe bridge team and the pilot regardingthe intended passage, which may

significantly reduce the safety of theoperation.

Recent findings in incidentsinvestigated by Gard involving pilotsshowed that common elements werepresent in most of these cases:

(1) information had not been shared bythe master and the pilot,(2) there had been insufficient time forthe ships crew to familiarise themselveswith the pilots intended passage plan,(3) the pilot boarding ground wasfrequently closer to the harbour

entrance compared with the chartedboarding ground.

ECDISIn many areas pilots use their ownelectronic chart systems, displaying thepassage on a laptop or similar devicethat they bring with them on boardand connect to the vessels AIS pilotplug. Use of such aids to navigation,if combined with reduced planningand bad communication betweenbridge team and pilot, further reducesthe ability of the OOW to monitorthe pilots intentions regarding thevessels track, changes of course andto question any decisions made by thepilot.

Nowadays most vessels are equippedwith ECDIS or ECS as aids to navigationand support to conventional paperchart navigation.2When the passage isproperly represented in these electronicsystems, it is possible to enable anumber of automatic alarms, which addto the safety of navigation. However, for

these safety barriers to be effective, thepassage plan must be properly agreedbetween vessel and pilot.

In some areas pilots send passage plansor passage planning information for aparticular port to vessels in advance.This proactive communication enablesthe vessels bridge team to prepareand enter the expected passage in theon-board systems prior to the arrivalof the pilot, including activating thesafety settings on the vessels ECDIS/ECS. When the pilot arrives on board,the bridge team is already aware of his

main intentions and should be ableto quickly discuss and agree on thepassage plan, including any possibledeviations from the original plan.However, this should not replace theall-important master-pilot exchange ofinformation.

Given the technology available today,the transmission of intended passageplanning information in advanceof the vessels arrival by the pilot,pilotage authority or other responsiblebody through a simple e-mail wouldsignificantly add to safe navigation and

would assist the pilot in becoming amore integral part of the bridge team.

This becomes even more importantwith the impending implementation offull ECDIS regulation. And why not alsouse emails to send the waypoint detailsin advance?

Advance information leaves onlyminor technicalities to be discussed orconfirmed at the time of pilot boardingand ensures that the bridge teams fullattention can be immediately directedtowards navigation.

This is probably the way forward:communication of the pilots intendedpassage plan in advance of the actualoperation, which would facilitate inputof the plan in the ships anti-groundingmonitor system, the ECDIS. This wouldalso allow the bridge team to familiarisethemselves with the intended passageplan and be in a better position tomonitor the pilots actions.

Footnotes1 See also the article Harbour towage andpilotage, elsewhere in this issue of Gard News.2 See article ECDIS - Charting the future ofnavigation elsewhere in this issue of GardNews.


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Harbour towage andpilotageBy Yves Beeckman, Marine Superintendent, URS, Antwerp.

Gard News 200, November 2010/January 2011

It is generally assumed that tugoperations are routine for ships crewsand that mooring parties will handlethem efficiently and swiftly. As a result,master-pilot exchanges do not usuallyaddress this issue. However, in orderto ensure effective harbour towageoperations, it is essential that therelevant information is exchangedbetween the master and the pilotbeforehand, so that the mooringparties can be called to their stationsin time, fully briefed on the details ofthe operation. Daily experience in aharbour towage department showsthat, unfortunately, the number ofless-skilled mooring parties is on theincrease. This lack of skill may resultin delays in securing a tug, puttingtime pressure on the crew and therebyincreasing the risk of personal injuryor of the vessel sailing in unsafeconditions, for instance in dense traffic,before the tug is ready.

Exchange information beforehandThe tug information can be exchangedduring the voyage under the pilotsadvice, as opposed to being exchangedat the time of pilot boarding, whenthere are other navigational prioritiesto be addressed. At the start of thetowing operation the parties should allbe at their mooring stations in goodtime and have the heaving lines readyat the correct/required position. Themaster should discuss the ETA at therendezvous point and ensure that hemusters the crew on time, allowing for

the distances to the mooring stations tobe covered in time, without the need torun. If the operation is to take place atnight, the crew should have ample timeto wake up and prepare for the periodout there, possibly in adverse weatherconditions.

Information required to be passedfrom pilot to masterDue to the different types and sizes oftugs, there are many different types ofharbour towage manoeuvres, so themaster should find out the followingdetails from the pilot in order to pass

them on to his crew:- ships lines or tug line- type of tow wire (steel, synthetic, size,indication of their size)- method of getting the tow wire on

board or the ships lines to the tug.(most commonly for tugs lines: thinheaving line from the vessel to pickup a larger size messenger ropefrom the tug, which can be led to thewarping drum of a winch in order toheave on board the tow wire. Whenusing ships ropes, the other option isto lower a ships rope or send it overwith a heaving line. Most tugs will,however, not take a lowered line whenunderway), only when departing fromthe berth- position for passing over the heavingline (throw from the ships shoulder,which fairlead the heaving line shouldbe taken through)- maximum speed for securing the tug,so the bridge team can monitor- bollard pull of the tug(s)- VHF channels to be used for workingwith the tugs

Information required to be passed

from master to pilotThe master should provide thefollowing information to the pilot:- SWL of the mooring / towingequipment- Which fairleads are suitable forsecuring the tugs. If they are off centreand only one tug is to be used, thismust be specifically brought to theattention of the pilot.- Pushing point strength, if known. Ifno pushing points are indicated on thehull, but the ship has a reinforced beltall around, it is important to convey thisfact to the tug master.

What the crew should knowThe officer in charge must ensurethat the mooring party knows whichbollard(s) will be used for the tug(s),how the messenger line will be ledtowards the warping drum and how thetow wire will be stopped off in orderto allow the strain to be taken off themessenger line and the soft eye to beput over the bollard. They should alsobe aware of the releasing procedure.

In order to avoid disruption, if therehas been a crew change, the new crew

should familiarise themselves with themooring equipment before taking theirstations for the first time.

Regular meetings should be held

to remind the crew of the risks ofhandling tow wires and to discuss theprocedures.

During the operationThe commands used by the officerin charge should be clear and wellunderstood by the deckhands; standardterminology may be developed, subjectto the ships working language.

The crew should wear leather workinggloves or gloves made from equivalentmaterials when handling a tow wire,never cotton gloves. Very loose workclothing should also be avoided.Overalls should be tight, especiallyaround the wrists and ankles.

Many serious personal injury incidentsin mooring areas involve parting lines.It is therefore important to note thata snapback zone exists when amooring line is under tension. Crews

should take that into account duringoperations and it may be a good ideato indicate these areas permanently onthe deck. As soon as the tug is secured,all crew stand back from the snapbackzones. Crew members should also bewarned to beware of hands and fingers:sudden jerks in the tow wire whiletaking the line on board or releasing thetug can easily lead to personal injury.

The officer in charge must always bein visual contact with the tug duringsecuring up, so he can exchange handsignals with the tug crew, which is

usually better than trying to handle awalkie-talkie VHF in windy conditions.There are ships in which the bulwarksare so high that the tug crew can notsee anybody on the (forecastle) deckof the vessel, or anything that goes onthere. In such conditions, it is absolutelyessential to have one person in aspecific location for signalling visuallyto the tug. The crew should alwayssignal to the tug when the tow wire issecured and the tug can safely startapplying power. Status of the towwire should also be confirmed to themaster (secured, in the water, propeller

cleared).

Only a suitably weighted heavingline should be used. Monkeys fistsshould not have additional weight,


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but a heaving line should not bethrown without a monkeys fist. Thelatter may be blown away and maybe impossible to get across to thetug. The crew should have a secondheaving line ready to throw in case thefirst one should end up in the water.The ships crew should always warn the

tug crew before sending the heavingline across. The crew should neveruse a thick messenger line to throw tothe tug, instead of a normal heavingline: the weight of the line comingdown may injure the tug crew; it is alsomore difficult to tie two messengerlines together (a rope messengerline will typically be a three strandpolypropylene rope of 24mm diameter).

A tow wire should never be grabbedfrom below, but always from above.1Ifthe wire has to be released quickly inan emergency, it is always easier to just

release your grip on the wire and letgravity do the work than to pull yourfingers away from underneath the wire.

The messenger line must never bedisconnected from the tow wire. Asan alternative, after securing thewire over the bitt, the shackle can bedisconnected from the soft eye of thetow wire and reconnected immediately,over the wire behind the soft eye, asa running shackle. This provides ameans to give sufficient power to thetow wire to create enough slack so thatthe soft eye can be lifted easily from the

bollard. If this is not done, the shackleconnecting the messenger line to thetow wire should not be allowed tobecome jammed between the bollardand the tow wire. This would cause a

sharp bend in the tow wire under load,which might cause it to snap. The towwire should never be stopped by simplyputting it on deck and standing on it;the wire is too heavy and you may bethrown off your feet or dragged along.

Very serious injuries will result in mostcases. The crew should also beware of

snaking messenger lines when theyare released and run out. They couldseriously hurt someone upon impact.

Normally, the bow tug will have noproblems when the tow wire is releasedin one go; the tug will be moving awayfrom the vessel and there will be littlerisk of the tow wire ending up in thetugs propellers. However, the crewshould always try to obtain confirmationfrom the tug of how they want thisdone. The stern tow wire must alwaysbe released in a controlled way (slackedaway by means of the messenger line,

in co-ordination with the tug crew).When you let it go in one motion, itwill most probably end up in the tugspropellers.

Tug emergency let goproceduresTugs working on a towing winch have alet go system. The ships crew doesnot have to do anything to disconnectthe wire; that will be done by the tugmaster. He will set his winch drum freeand let the wire run out, until it breaksfrom its securing bolt on the winchdrum, while he manoeuvres his tug to

safety.

However, this leaves the ships crew witha problem: the vessel will be trailingup to 140m of steel wire, which has to

be recovered from the water beforethe tug can make a new approach(to secure up with its spare towingwire). When making speed throughthe water, this will be a difficult job forthe mooring party, because once themessenger line is entirely on boardor on the warping drum, it will bemuch more difficult, probably evenimpossible, to wind the remainingtowing wire in on the warping drum. Inthis case, a stopper must be used, anda (second) messenger line tied to thetowing wire further down the line, andthen winding the wire on board canbe resumed. This process may have tobe repeated a considerable numberof times. It will probably be necessary,if conditions allow, for the vessel toreduce speed. This is a dangerousoperation and great care must be takenwhen carrying it out.

Footnotes1 Towing wires typically have thefollowing dimensions: for 45 ton bollardpull: 42mm diameter; for 65 ton bollardpull: 48mm diameter; for 80 ton bollardpull: 54mm diameter.


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Damage to fixed objectswhen manoeuvring in

confined waters

Gard has recently seen a noticeableincrease in cases involving significantcontact damage to fixed objects byvessels manoeuvring in confinedwaters, mostly within port. Fixed objectsinclude berths, docks, locks and shore

side equipment such as cranes. Thecontact damage has resulted in somevery large claims for the repair and/orloss of use of such objects. Outlinedbelow are five of the most commonfactors, in Gards experience in casesinvolving contact damage to fixedobjects in confined waters.1 Theseincidents also risk harming people andthe environment (e.g. pollution frombreached oil tanks), and the ship itselfis often left with expensive repairs andloss of trading time.

1. Prevailing and forecast

conditions not properly assessedThe cumulative effect of wind, sea,current and tidal conditions on the shipmay not have been fully appreciated.As a result of the above factors the

vessel can experience difficulties inmanoeuvring in a controlled fashionand within safe parameters. Insufficientallowance has been made for the forcesacting on the ship. These can easily turnout to be greater than expected and

beyond the capabilities of the ship and,due to the unforeseen effects of theprevailing and/or forecast conditions,insufficient tugs would have beenemployed to handle the vessel. Thereare instances where manoeuvrings inconfined waters should be deferreduntil conditions have improved. Thisalso includes cases of reduced visibility.

2. Unfamiliarity with the shipsmanoeuvrabilityA pilot will know the local waters best,however, the master is more familiarwith his vessels manoeuvrability. Due

to the rotation of crew, familiarity withthe ships own manoeuvring systemscan be lacking, and, as technologyand computerisation is becomingever more prevalent, training may be

Loss Prevention CircularNo. 6-09

needed to ensure that crew membersare familiar with the vessels systems.2It is important to include informationas to the vessels manoeuvrability inthe master/pilot information exchangebefore the commencement of the

pilotage.3 The effect of changes inthe vessels draft, trim and windagecharacteristics must also be taken intoconsideration when discussing thevessels manoeuvrability.

3. No agreed manoeuvring planJust how the vessel will manoeuvrewhen in close proximity to fixed objectsis often not planned and/or agreedin advance within the bridge teamand/or with the pilot.4 This not onlyconcerns the location that the vesselis proceeding to/from, but also otherfixed objects which the vessel will

pass within critical close proximity.Often, insufficient time is invested inadvance to consider how the vesselcan be expected to behave, given itsmanoeuvring characteristics and the


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prevailing conditions. The closest pointsof approach are often not calculated asare critical bearings, transits and rangesto assist in determining the limits of thesafe manoeuvring parameters.

4. Poorly executed manoeuvreEven the best ship handlers

occasionally get it wrong, although itis perhaps surprising how very wrongin some cases. Excessive speed is acommon factor as is pilot error andthe bridge team can be reluctant tointervene when the pilot is clearlymaking mistakes.

5 Communication with tugs, terminalsand mooring crews leading tomisunderstandings has also beena contributory factor. Even where amanoeuvring plan is agreed, prevailingcircumstances can require the plan tobe changed and there may be little

time to react to new situations. Inparticular, changes in wind conditionsand the movements of other vesselsoften create problems. In a numberof cases it appears that aborting themanoeuvre to try again has not beenconsidered or has been left too late.

1 See also Bumps and scrapes can be costly! from Gard News 183.2 Some shipowners have sought to standardise equipment across vessels in their fleet and to always assign senior officers to the same class of vessel.3 See Master/pilot exchange of information from Gard News 154.4 See Guidance to Masters 2.13.4 Navigation in confined waters Bridge Resource Management.5 See also Loss Prevention Circular no. 04-00: Pilot on the bridge - Role, authority and responsibility.

5. Loss of manoeuvring capabilityThe loss of engines, propulsion,steerage, or thrusters is, perhapssurprisingly, a less common factorthan those mentioned above. Thereare instances where such a loss hasoccurred immediately before/aftermanoeuvring systems have been, or

are due to be, repaired or overhauled.Unfortunately, during these periods ofincreased risk, additional precautionsappear not to have been taken.Pre-sailing and pre-arrival checks onmanoeuvring systems are important,especially after a long ocean passageor stationary period. Less obviousfactors involve squat and/or interaction.Although a loss of manoeuvringcapability will inevitably make contactavoidance more difficult, exercisesand drills can be used to test back-upsystems, including use of the shipsanchors. Having something in reserve

is important, but being able to putthat reserve to effective use is equallyimportant.

RecommendationIt is better to abort the manoeuvreand make a second attempt than to

fail on the first. During drills, exercisesand tests of equipment prior to arrival,the Master should ensure that thecrew is able to respond at any timeto an emergency situation relatedto manoeuvring. Tasks should beproperly defined and assigned toqualified personnel, and the Master

should ensure that the companyprocedures are fully understood byeverybody involved. Effective andclear communication is important.The Master should closely monitor themanoeuvres and should not hesitate tocomment, give advice, or even abortan approach if he is uncomfortable withthe situation.


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Pilot error survey

floating objects was USD 400,000. Thereport recommends better training orbriefing of bridge team managementto operate with the pilot on board,especially in relation to passageplanning.

Collisions involving pilot erroraccounted for 24 per cent of claims bynumber and 24 per cent by cost. Onaverage there were 14 collision cases

per year involving pilot error and theaverage cost of each case was USD800,000. The report recommendsbridge teams to keep a proper look-outand not to forget that their eyes are stil lthe most sophisticated aid to do so.

Groundings, pollution and generalaverage/salvage cases involving piloterror each accounted for about threeper cent of the incidents by number.There were on average two incidentsin each of these categories every year.Groundings accounted for 35 per centof all incidents by cost. The average

cost of each grounding involving piloterror was USD 7.85 million and of

International Group of P&I Clubsreports on pilot error-relatedclaimsThe Pilotage Sub-committee of theInternational Group of P&I Clubs (IG)has published a report on claims overUSD 100,000 involving pilot error.Information pooled by IG Clubs relatingto 260 such claims has been included inthe study, which covers the period from20th February 1999 to 20th February

2004.

Important observationsThe average number of incidents peryear involving pilot error was 52. Thefrequency did not increase from yearto year. The average cost of each claimover the five year period was USD850,000. The average cost did notincrease from year to year either.

Claims for damage to fixed and floatingobjects (FFO) involving pilot erroraccounted for 65 per cent of claims bynumber (37 claims per policy year) and

33 per cent by cost. The average costof each claim for damage to fixed and

What happens to thepilot after a casualty?A glimpse at pilot error from a differentperspective.

When a vessel with a pilot on boardis involved in an accident, the usualpractice is that the pilot leaves thevessel as soon as possible, oftenbeing replaced by a new pilot. Hence,examination or questioning is avoided.The pilot is the shipowners servant,and faults or errors made by thepilot are generally covered by theshipowners insurance policies. Only inmajor casualties can one expect thatthe pilot will be forced to give evidence

and to be cross-examined. In thesecases, the normal procedure is for thepilot to demand a written letter ofindemnity from the shipowner prior toany hearing.

One should therefore believe thatpilots involved in casualties do notget any reproach as a consequence oftheir faults. However, some (or perhapsmost) pilots associations have theirown internal investigations following acasualty, although very seldom is onemade aware of sanctions imposed.In a particular recent collision case,Gard received a copy of the relevantpilots associations investigation,which proved that some pilots in factare properly sanctioned. In the casein question, the pilots associationsinvestigation concluded that the pilot

was responsible for: wrong understanding of the distancebetween his vessel and the mooredvessel with which it eventually collided; his approach was too fast;

the timing of turning was wrong; other waiting vessels made him over-hasty in his operations.

Due to the above, the pilot wassuspended from business for 21 days.He was degraded to a lower rank forthree months, including a salary cutof USD 1,000 per month for the sameperiod. In addition, he was forced totake navigational simulator training athis own expense.

Notwithstanding, the damage to thevessels had to be covered by the

shipowners insurers.

each pollution incident involving piloterror the average cost was USD 1.8million. The report recommends bettertraining or briefing of the bridge teammanagement to operate with the piloton board, with emphasis on the master/pilot exchange of information.

Groundings are the most expensivepilot error claims. They are more thanfour times as expensive as pollution

claims and almost 20 times moreexpensive than FFO claims.

The IG is currently maintaining adatabase of pilot error incidents from21st February 2004 to the present andthereafter.

The complete report can bedownloaded from the IG website atwww.igpandi.orgunder News andInformation.

Gard News 186,May/July 2007

Gard News 186,May/July 2007


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Is the pilot a part of thebridge team?By Captain Erik Blom Master of the M/V BLACK WATCH,

Fred. Olsen Cruise Lines

environmental and other factors forsetting different watch conditions, butas a minimum on ships with crews ofmore than 6-7, the bridge team (BT)consists of the master, the officer onwatch (OOW) and a sailor as helmsmanand lookout. With several shippingcompanies, especially within the cruiseand oil industry, additional crew joinsthe BT.

The BTs responsibility is to ensurea well-functioning Bridge ResourceManagement (BRM). Some of the mainobjectives of BRM are: To assist the ship master in managingthe vessels bridge team for eachvoyage so that personnel are rested,trained and prepared to handle anysituation. To help the ship master recogniseworkload demands and other riskfactors that may affect decisions insetting watch conditions. To ensure bridge team members

are trained and aware of theirresponsibilities.

Hopefully the answer to the abovequestion is yes, but this comes at aprice.

I have been a Captain for the last 20years, starting in the Royal NorwegianNavy, later becoming a pilot on theNorwegian coast, until I decided tochange trade and became a cruisevessel captain. Over the years I have

worked on and managed a lot ofbridges, some well-functioning and theodd ones not working at all.

Most readers will certainly know thepurpose of a well-functioning bridgeteam. Hopefully gone are the dayswhen the Captain with a capital C took all the decisions without discussingwith anyone, and not listening to advicefrom others. On bigger ships the masternow has a team around him on board tosupport him in his decisions: the bridgeteam.

Bridge team and its responsibilitiesThere are many combinations of

1 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers, 1978.


To help bridge team membersinteract with and support the masterand/or the pilot.

Pilots responsibilitiesThe pilot is on board to assist innavigation and manoeuvring. Theexchange of information betweenmaster and pilot does not shift theresponsibility for the safety of the vessel

from one to the other.

FatigueChapter VIII (Fitness for duty) of theSTCW Convention1sets limits onthe hours of work and minimum restrequirements for watchkeepers.

A pilots work environment (irregularand lengthy working hours, workingat night, unpredictable duty rosters,and travelling to and from their jobs)can significantly contribute to fatigue.Moving a large vessel in confinedwaters is a high-risk task and the pilot

assigned to that task has a responsibilityto the state, the port authority and theships master.

Pilots are managers of high-risk


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situations that require intenseconcentration and skill levels so that anydecrease in performance can potentiallylead to a catastrophe. A pilot errorcaused by fatigue can endanger theship, crew, port and the environment.

Only national rules apply to pilots

and they are not subject to the sameregulations as the ship-board crew. Ihave met pilots who have been on therun for more than 36 hours without adecent nap, and I can assure you itdoes not bring back happy memories.

CommunicationCommunication can not be overrated.It is the most vital part of bridge teammanagement. Communication withpilots and their organisation startsalready during passage planning.Some countries have pages and pageswith information within our planning

material, and the information oftenends with the statement failing toreport might cause x hours delay.If the master/ship has not been to theport before the stress level within theBT begins to rise.

The next crucial point of contact iswhen the OOW uses the VHF to reportto Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) or pilotstation. Most stations are very friendlyand helpful, but others do not reply atall when ships try to comply with thecompulsory rules to report the requirednumber of hours before arrival. The

OOW has been informed via passageplan that he must get in touch with thepilot station by a specific time otherwisethe ship might be delayed. If there isno reply he will continue with repeatedcalls on all possible means, dive backinto the publications to double checkthe passage plan information and takethe focus away from his main duty tonavigate. This in turn again increasesthe stress level.

Then the pilot boat is approaching.Being a former Norwegian pilot myselfI know how important it is to have

optimum conditions for the pilot boatwhen the pilot is boarding. It can lookvery calm down there from the bridgewing, but being in the pilot boat is adifferent story. Very often the pilot boatmaster has a specific heading he wantsus to steer. Coming into the UK is apleasure: they are always very politeusing phrases such as Please, Sir andCaptain. Others merely observe theformalities and make you feel ill-at-ease. This is not a good start as you arewaiting for a person from that particularpilot boat to come up on the bridgeexpecting him/her to be a part of the

bridge team.

Eventually the pilot is on the bridge.How the master and the pilot meet and

greet each other is the key to how therest of the passage will be. The pilot has(maybe) done this passage hundredsof times and the master not havingbeen here before has made his ownassumptions on how the approachshould be handled.

I have experienced pilots embarkingat the breakwater, not giving us timeto meet and greet at all, forcing memore or less to disregard the pilot asthere is no time to discuss or exchangeinformation. This is very often the casein Mediterranean ports where you onlyhave a breakwater and a berth or two.The pilots are just there as an advancedlinesman showing us where to berth.This is a very unsatisfactory situation asthe pilot is not integrated with the BTand sometimes just creates clutter tothe organisation.

In general the pilots are on the bridgein due time in order to allow for athorough handover/informationexchange. In this case the masterhas a vital role in making the pilotfeel welcome, and the pilot needs toremember how it was coming into anew (complicated) port for the firsttime.

A lot of information has to beexchanged between the pilot and themaster in a relatively short time, whenthe master normally has the conn andthe ship is moving in confined waters

(to have the conn is to have soleresponsibility to control, or direct byorder, the movements of a ship, i.e., togive proper steering and engine ordersfor the safe navigation of the ship).

Typically the following information isto be exchanged between the pilotand master during the approach:ship details; originating authority;manoeuvring details; propeller details;main engine details and equipmentdefects; berth and tug details; localweather and sea conditions; details ofpassage plan, including navigational

hazards, abort points and emergencyplans; local regulations, including VTSreporting, maximum allowable draft,etc.; ships agent; year built; IMOnumber; cargo type (IMO codes ifdangerous cargo); last port; etc.

At this stage it is very important that thechemistry between the pilot and themaster is good. Otherwise it might leadto dangerous situations.

The next step is transition of theconn from the master to the pilot. Ihave met pilots coming on the bridge

and, without acknowledging anyone,giving the helmsman orders based onthe ships heading when he left thepilot boat, not realising we were on

the correct heading for the approach.After the exchange of informationsummarised above I always clearlyinform my bridge team with the phrasePilot has the conn and in turn myOOW and helmsman acknowledge theinformation: the closed loop.

The closed loop is a communicationprotocol where information is given,repeated by the receiver and normallyconfirmed by the issuer. This is the onlyway one can be sure an order is beingfollowed and is a vital part of the bridgeteam management. Having observedthis from all sides, it is obvious tome that you can minimise the riskof misunderstanding if the closedloop is working. In a Canadian studywhere 200 accidents were related tohuman error, 84 (42 per cent) involvedmisunderstanding between pilot andmaster and some could probably have

been avoided if the closed loopprotocol had been used.

LanguageI have recently returned from a voyageto the French part of Canada. In the StLawrence River ships the same size asmine always have two pilots on boardtaking one hour watches. As in manyother countries, a new generation ofpilots is being trained and in additionto the two pilots we had apprenticeson board. It was too easy for them tofall back on speaking French betweenthemselves instead of speaking English

and in turn creating two bridgeteams, which should be avoided.

Sometimes it is not possible to avoidtwo teams due to communicationdifficulties, either on the crew or on thepilots side. Based on my experience,most pilots speak more than goodenough English, but as a pilot conninga ship heading for Mongstad oilterminal I have experienced that myhelm orders had to be translated intothree different languages before theywere executed by the helmsman. In thatsituation it was difficult to establish a

closed loop.

The pilot is a vital part of thebridge teamProvided a few essential premises aretaken care of, the pilot is a very vitalpart of the bridge team.

In my opinion, fatigue, languagebarriers, lack of chemistry, an open loopand, last but not least, cell phone callsfrom the pilots family are threats toships safety.

Welcome on board, Mr Pilot. Coffee

or tea?


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Navigation through theentrances to the Baltic

Sea

This circular is based on a recent letterreceived from The Danish Maritimeauthorities highlighting the increasednumber of navigational accidentsin Danish waters, and Gards ownexperience with similar accidents in thesame area.

As members and clients are aware,IMO resolution MSC.138 (76) providesrecommendations on navigationthrough the entrances to the Baltic

Sea, namely the Great Belt (Route T)and The Sound. The recommendationsinclude the use of pilots for certaintypes of ships in high traffic densitywaters. The purpose of IMO resolutionMSC 138(76) was to provide thoseresponsible for the operation ofships with recommendations on safenavigation through the entrances ofthe Baltic Sea with the objectives toensure safety, prevent human injury orloss of life, and to avoid damage to theenvironment, in particular the marineenvironment, and to ships and theircargoes.

In a letter to the International Groupof P&I Clubs, the Danish MaritimeAuthority has drawn the shipping

industrys attention to IMO resolutionMSC.138 (76) and indicating that anumber of ships are disregarding therecommendations. According to asafety study conducted by the DanishMaritime Authority, during the periodfrom 1st January 2002 to 30th June 2005alone, 22 ships grounded in the GreatBelt and none of these ships had a piloton board at the time.

The Danish Maritime Authority letter

illustrates and emphasises that it ishighly recommended to utilise theexpertise and local knowledge of pilots,and that as a minimum, vessels sailingthrough the Great Belt or The Soundfollow IMOs recommendation onnavigation through the entrance of theBaltic Sea.

Denmark has also launched aprocedure whereby all vessels enteringDanish waters without ordering apilot in accordance with the IMOrecommendation will be contacted inorder to draw their attention to the

recommendations on the use of pilots.When a ship does not comply, themaster will be informed that Denmarkfinds it inconsistent with safe navigation

Gard Loss Prevention CircularNo. 02-06

practices and procedures to neglect anIMO recommendation. These ships willbe reported to the maritime authority inthe ships flag state.

The following documents are availableat www.gard.no under News in the LossPrevention section: The Danish Maritime Authority Letter. IMO resolution MSC.138(76) Intertanko model charterparty clausesin recognition and support of IMO res

MSC 138(76).

General information on Pilotage inthe Baltic can be found at the BalticPilotage Authorities Commissionwebsite at: http://www.balticpilotage.com and http://www.pilotage.dk

Vessels to which the IMOrecommendations do not apply areadvised to navigate with extra cautionthrough the entrances to the Baltic Sea,i.e. the Great Belt (Route T) and TheSound. A guide to navigation in Danishwaters can be found at:http://www.frv.

dk/en/ifm/navigation/navigation_ntdw.htm


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Pilot on board!

Gard News looks at some aspects ofthe relationship between pilots andseafarers.

Areas of riskDespite the pilots duties andresponsibilities, his presence onboard does not exempt the Masterand the OOW from their duties andresponsibilities for the ships safety.This is quoted from the IMO Code of

Nautical Procedures and Practices, andshould be well known to seafarers. Itis, however, a fact that a large portionof navigation-related accidents occurswhen a pilot is on board. The reasonfor this is obvious: the pilot is sent onboard because the national authoritiesconsider the area an increased risk,and in increased risk situations therewill always be accidents. However, it isGards clear understanding that pilotsprevent far more accidents than theycause, but the picture is complex, andthere is reason to study this in moredetail.

Navigation-related accidents aretraditionally split into three maingroups: collisions, groundings and

contact damage (typically collisions withpiers, etc.). Despite more advancedtechnology, the implementation ofSTCW 95 and a strong focus on thehuman element as well as fatigue,the expected decline in number ofaccidents per year has not takenplace. In addition, the tendency is thataccidents are more severe and moreexpensive than ever before.

As indicated above, a pilot is sent onboard because the national authoritieshave assessed that there is an increasedrisk in the area. This risk can be relatedto navigational hazards, geographicalareas that are vulnerable to pollution,there can be special regulations relatedto the cargo that the ship is carrying. Insome countries the masters experienceis assessed, after a number of pilot-assisted port calls the master may beapproved for entry without pilot. Therecan also be other reasons related to,for instance, military installations in thearea. It is also important to note that

pilot requirements are at each individualcountrys discretion. Rules may and willtherefore vary from country to country.


So in situations where the navigationalrisk exceeds a given limit, nationalauthorities respond by sending apilot on board. This is where thechallenges start: to a large extentbridge team management trainingfocuses on co-operation among thebridge team and less emphasis isplaced on situations where outsidersare introduced. Bridge manuals referto pilot to pilot navigation and

little or nothing is said about how toact when the pilot has embarked. Inshort, the pilot is expected to deliverthe service he is paid to deliver andlimited consideration is given to hisco-operation with the bridge team.For that reason in many situations onedoes not achieve the desired increasedlevel of safety; on the contrary, theresponsibility for navigation is simplytransferred from one person to another.

CommunicationIn accidents where a pilot is involvedthere is one factor that is frequentlypresent: limited or no communicationbetween the master and the pilot.There may be language problems andmisunderstandings, unclear instructions


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to the bridge personnel about howto monitor the pilots actions andthe bridge personnel may be over-confident about the pilots abilities. Insome situations the pilot may not befamiliar with the particular design ofthe navigational systems available onboard. Very often these accidents may

be avoided if there are clear instructionsavailable from the ship management onhow to handle situations with pilots onboard.

Lessons learnedIt is possible to extract some lessonsfrom the above examples.

Voyage planning used to be a criticalfactor and the common response fromthe crew was why should we plan thepassage when the pilot always bringswith him an alternative passage plan?.It is Gards experience that this has

improved: electronic charts have madeit easy to adjust the ships voyage planaccording to that brought on board bythe pilot and attention from port statecontrol officers has put this item onthe agenda. It is also imperative thatthe pilot be briefed about the vesselsmanoeuvring capabilities. This includesrate of turn, propeller arrangement,output on the various manoeuvringorders and general ship data. In short,any information that can improve thepilots performance must be available.Many shipowners have developed so-called pilot cards for that purpose.

These have proved to be effective andgreatly appreciated by the pilots.

Language barriers have been andwill continue to be a challenge; thesecan be related to communicationbetween the pilot and the crew, as wellas understanding the communicationbetween the pilot and assisting partiessuch as shore staff, mooring boats and/or tugs. Very often these barriers can begreatly reduced by a thorough reviewof the passage prior to commencingit. The pilot can also be requested tocommunicate with external parties in

a common language, or to translatehis communication with them for thebridge team. Many accidents arerooted in surprises and unexpectedsituations that could have been avoidedif the pilot and the bridge team had acommon understanding about how thepassage would be carried out.

The impact of commercial pressureshould not be underestimated. Thismay result from a variety of reasons: the terminal wishes to maximiseutilisation of the piers and requireseffective (high speed) approach to theterminal; some pilots are paid per pilotage and

increase speed for that reason; charterers require maximumutilisation of the ship, and under keelclearance may be challenged. Thisoccurs particularly in river passages.The availability and suitability oftugs and mooring boats should alsobe considered: in many situationsthese are too small or too few for thepurpose, but are accepted due to thecommercial pressure.

Cultural differences should also beconsidered. The pilot is perceived asan authority and in many cultures it is

difficult to correct or even questiona decision made by an authority.Corrections to obvious errors maytherefore be delayed and in some casesnot put forward at all. Reluctance to getinvolved in a situation has contributedto several severe marine accidents. Inparticular, this may be a problem whenthe master is not on the bridge. It istherefore important that all membersof the bridge team have the necessaryauthority and confidence to interfereif they are in doubt. This can only beachieved by active leadership andinvolvement by the master. The IMO

Code of Nautical Procedures andPractices also states: If in any doubtas to the pilots actions or intentions,the officer in charge of the navigationalwatch shall seek clarification from thepilot and, if doubt still exists, shallnotify the master immediately and takewhatever action is necessary before themaster arrives.

Common understandingThe first step to reduce the risk ofnavigation-related accidents whena pilot is on board is a commonunderstanding by the bridge team

of the risks involved. These includegeographical hazards as well as culturaland management-related challenges.Introducing company pilot handlingprocedures in the ship managementsystem has proved to be effective. Inaddition to voyage planning, theseshould include routines for pre-voyage

briefing, monitoring of the pilotsactivities and communication betweenpilot and officer of the watch (OOW)/master. Exchange of information is alsomentioned in the IMO Code of NauticalProcedures and Practices: Themaster and the pilot shall exchangeinformation regarding navigation

procedures, local conditions and theships characteristics.

ConclusionIn summary, much progress will beachieved by implementing some simplesteps in the ship procedures: Active use of pilot cards for transfer ofship information. Implementation of companyprocedures for pilot handling. Making bridge teams aware ofcultural challenges that may occur whena pilot is on board, and giving themthe confidence and authority to seek

clarification when in doubt. Taking into consideration thecommercial pressure that may beimposed by pilots, charterers andterminals.

Bon voyage!


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Pilot on the bridge -Role, Authority and

ResponsibilityIntroductionAs you are aware, many navigationalincidents leading to groundings andcollisions involve pilots. The primaryproblems involve the role, responsibilityand authority of the pilot onboard. ThisLoss Prevention Circular focuses on4 case study examples of pilot aidedgrounding and collision followed bygeneral guidance on the prevention ofthese types of incidents.

Case 1: Collision with terminaldolphinAt 0200 hrs, Vessel 1 was giveninstructions to leave a pre-designatedanchorage and proceed to loadcargo at the terminal. The vessel wasunderway at 0254 hrs and two pilotsboarded at 0354 hrs. The vessel enteredthe breakwater with the Master on thebridge.

The vessel made routine visits at that

location thus the Master thus feltcomfortable with the berthing routines.The vessel passed the breakwater at8.5 knots even though the maximumpermitted speed was only 5 knots.

Although the Master observed that theywere exceeding the maximum speed,the Master did not attempt to bring thisto the attention of the pilots.

Four tugs were requisitioned toassist the vessel in berthing at theterminal. Due to the excessive speedof the vessel, the tugs had difficulty

maintaining speed to keep up withthe vessel as she made her way to theterminal.

As the vessel approached the terminal,all verbal communication between thepilots and the tugs were in the locallanguage (non-English) that was notunderstood by the Master. The aft tugwas made fast after the vessel enteredthe breakwater and was quite close tothe berth.

The forward tug approached while thevessel was only 50 metres from theberth. Furthermore, before the linecould be made fast on the vessel, thetug started pulling on the line, therebythe entire line was run out and wasno assistance to the vessel. The tworemaining tugs were of no assistanceat all.

As a result, the vessel lost control andcould not be stopped before collidingwith the mooring dolphin. Extensivedamage was caused both to the shipand to the mooring dolphin.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:(1) The vessels speed was excessivewhen trying to connect to the tugs.(2) There was a lack of communicationbetween the pilot and the masterat many stages while transitingthe channel. There was little or noinformation exchanged regarding thedocking plan and how the 4 tugs wereto be put to use and coordinated.(3) The Master did not insist that pilotnot exceed the maximum allowablespeed as it entered the breakwater.

(4) The pilot, when communicating withthe tugs, was speaking a language thatwas not understood by the Master. Thismade it difficult for the Master to have a

Gard Loss Prevention CircularNo. 04-00

proper situational awareness.(5) The Master was over-confident as tothe abilities of the pilot.

Case 2: Grounding at mooringHaving arrived at port to load, astrong east to south-easterly windprevented Vessel 2 from commencingcargo operations via feeder vessels.On a following morning, the Masterreceived orders from his agents toproceed, with pilot embarked, to amore protected location to commencecargo operations. However, BritishAdmiralty Charts of the area are notparticularly detailed. The pilot had onlya photocopy of a larger scale local chart.

At 1606 hrs the port anchor of the vesselwas dropped approximately on the50 m contour line on the photocopymap. The vessel had 8 shackles of chain(approximately 220 m) in the water that,the Master estimated, gave a distance

of about two cables from the anchorto the stern of the vessel and thusprovided a turning radius of about twocables.

The vessel was moored on a headingof 150 and, in the Masters estimation,outside the 20 m contour line shouldshe swing right round. The vessels echosounder transponder is situated in thebow of the vessel and when she initiallyanchored it was observed that therewere 33 m of water indicated under thekeel.

The pilot assured the Master that thevessel was on good holding ground andthat the loaded draft would be 11.8 m.The Master was satisfied that the shipwas anchored in a good position.

On the final day of loading (four dayslater), the wind had shifted to the westand the vessel was now on a headingof 289 . The Masters intention was thatthe ship should arrive at its dischargelocation with an even keel. Therefore,the intention was to complete loadingwith a trim by the stern of 45 cm. Inorder to achieve this, it was agreed that

the last 700 tonnes of cargo were to beused for trimming purposes.

At 1520 hrs the feeder vessel gavenotice to commence loading the


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remaining 700 tonnes. At 1540 hrs, the

Chief Officer of the vessel boarded thefeeder vessel and noted the draft of hisvessel was 11.12 m forward and 10.52m aft. The trim at the head surprisedhim. He was concerned that they werenot able to attain the 45 cm sterntrim. Loading was suspended while hechecked his calculations. In addition,he requested that the ballast tanks besounded since he believed that theship should not have had a head trimat the time. At 1600 hrs the First Officernotified the Master of his concern.

At 16.15 hrs the aft draft was checkedagain. It remained at 10.52 m despitecontinuous loading into no. 7 hold. Theythen realised the vessel was agroundand loading was suspended at 1620 hrs.The ships heading remained steadyat 289 . At 1800 hrs the steering gearwas extensively damaged with therudderstock protruding approximately20 cm above the steering flat.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:

(1) When the wind veered, the anchorposition changed from being in the leeof the land to being in the lovart side of

a new port where additional cargo wasto be loaded. It was estimated that itwould take 25 hours to complete thepassage.

The vessel had not made the enginesready for passage at the time the pilotsboarded. They had determined that the

vessel had approximately 12 hours morethan necessary to make the passage.The Master was aware that some pilotswould not take the vessel through thepassage at night and told the pilot thatdeparture could be postponed untildaybreak.

The pilot assured the Master that itwas safe to sail at night. The Masterthen suggested that they take a routewhere the channel was wider. However,the pilot preferred and recommendedanother passage. This passage wasrecommended for day passage only

and required a number of sharp turns tonavigate. However, due to commercialpressure, night passage for the routesuggested by the pilot was allowed.

The Master and pilot exchanged moreinformation about the vessel and thenthe Master ordered the engines to beprepared for departure. At 2100 hrs thecrew was called to their manoeuvringstations and began unmooring. At 2137hrs full manoeuvring speed was orderedand executed.Five persons were in the wheelhouse:

the Master, pilot, apprentice, OOW andthe helmsman. The OOW used one ofthe radars when unoccupied by one ofthe pilots and plotted fixes on the charton average of every 5 minutes.

A number of minor manoeuvres weremade between 2127 hrs and 2218 hrs.At 2218 hrs, the ship prepared to makea 60-degree turn to port at 11.5 knots.At 2225 hrs, the pilot began the plannedport turn by ordering a 10 degrees portrudder. Having observed the vesselsreaction to this rudder angle was notquick enough, the pilot increased the

rudder angle to 20 degrees. The rateof turn increased but after the turn wascompleted, the vessel ended up closerto the shore on her starboard side thanwas intended.

From this moment on, the Masterbecame particularly vigilant and closelymonitored the rudder orders. He didnot communicate his concern to thepilot. There was little or no time toexchange opinions on this matter sincethe vessel was approaching anothertight turn of 50 degrees to starboard topass between two islands.

At the required location, the pilotissued a 10 degrees starboard rudderat a point at a point where one of the

the land, a most unfortunate position

to be anchored in. At that point in timeit would have been prudent to changeanchor position towards the other shore.(2) Eight (8) shackles of chain on 33meters depth was somewhat excessive.The recommended ratio is three to fourtimes the depth depending on depthand holding ground.(3) Neither the vessel nor the pilot hadthe proper charts with the requiredcontour details of the location theyfinally anchored.(4) The vessel crew made incorrectassumptions as to the consequencesto the ship if she swung about. The

crew should have taken continuoussoundings at the location they wereanchored since limited information wasavailable.(5) The ships crew were over-confidentwith the pilots assessment as to thewater depth of where the ship wasanchored. This should have led them tobe more diligent.

Case 3: Grounding whilenavigatingAt 2040 hrs Vessel 3, a pilot and hisapprentice at the wharf boarded thegeneral cargo ship. The vessel hadcompleted loading at approximately1600 hrs and was preparing a transit to


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islands was 3.5 cables (0.55 km) aheadof the vessels wheelhouse. The Masterconsidered this rudder angle may behave been insufficient to obtain therequired rate of return but hesitatedto change the pilots orders. He didhowever make sure the rudder indicatorneedle moved to the requested 10 to

starboard.

The pilot observed that the vesselwas slow to react to his order of 10starboard rudder and ordered a 20starboard rudder. Neither the time northe vessels exact position was recordedwhen this order was given, however, thedistance to the island was decreasing.

Having heard the pilots last order,the Master ordered the rudder hardto starboard. The Masters order wasrepeated by the pilot and was executedby the helmsman. The bow of the vessel

cleared the island and kept sweepingto starboard. However, the vesselsport side was observed to be quicklyapproaching the island.

At 2231 hrs, with the islands northerntip several metres off of the vessels portside and ahead of the wheelhouse, thepilot ordered the rudder hard to portand stop engine. A slight vibration wasfelt followed by the distinct touch of ahard object. Some seconds later, air washeard escaping from the tanks.

Although no oil was spilled in the water,

the vessel was ascertained to havedamage to her side shell plating. Theshell plating was punctured in severalplaces allowing seawater to ingress intoan empty ballast and fuel tanks.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:(1) There was a lack of proper voyageplanning. The time between when the

pilots boarded the vessel and whenthe ship got underway was quite shortparticularly since they had 12 hoursmore than necessary to make the transitto the next port.(2) The pilot insisted transiting adirection that was recommended for daytravel. The Master should have insisted

in following the recommended route.However, he was also familiar with thepilot since he had made routine visits tothis location and felt over-confident inthe pilots recommendations.(3) There was a significant breakdownof communication between the Masterand the pilot. Once the first order for10 degree rudder didnt result in therequired rate of change in direction wasmade, the Master should have beenaware that another 10 degree rudderorder in the second turn would notacquire the desired results. He shouldhave communicated this to the pilot

and/or discussed the manoeuvringcharacteristics: (1) during the pre-voyagebriefing, (2) after the first 10 degreerudder order that was changed to a20 degree rudder, and/or (3) just afterthe pilots second 10 degree ruddercommand.(4) There was a lack of fundamentalseafaring skills used for the tight turningmanoeuvre to starboard. A standardpractice of reducing the speed of thevessel, commanding the turn, andthen bringing the vessel back up tomanoeuvring speed should have beenused.

Case 4: Grounding whilenavigatingAt 1300 hrs Vessel 4 departed partiallyloaded with two pilots on board. Thepilots agreed to alternate their watch.Pilot 1 was to conduct the vesselbetween 1300 and 1800 hrs and Pilot 2between 1800 and 2300 hrs and so on.From 1300 to 2300 hrs the passage was

without any significant incident otherthan the vessel encountering someconcentrations of fishing vessels.

After the change of watch at 0000 hrs,personnel on the bridge comprised ofthe second officer, who the OOW, Pilot1, and the quartermaster who was at

the helm. The visibility had been gooduntil approximately 0100 hrs when thevessel entered a light haze. The radarshad been placed on the 12-mile rangeat the time. By 0125 hrs, the visibilityhad decreased to about 150 metres. Nodedicated lookout was posted.

At approximately 0113 hrs the vesselreported its position to the local MarineCommunications and Traffic Service(MCTS). The vessel also stated that theirETA to the point where the next coursealteration was planned was 0240 hrs.

Communication between the pilot andthe OOW was conducted in English andthere were no communication barriers.

The OOW had been recording theposition of the vessel at approximately15-minute intervals on the chart in use.The pilot did not refer to those positionsnor did he refer to the chart to refreshhis memory. The pilot carried a personalcourse book that he used to navigatethe vessel. This book had no provisionsfor recording of ETA or the actual timeof course alternations. The pilot reliedsolely on his memory to keep track of

the vessels position.

At approximately 0130 hrs, the pilotsaw on the radar, what he believed, tobe the entrance to the passage andbegan the required course alteration tostarboard. The pilot did not reconfirmthe vessels position prior to the coursealteration. The OOW took a range andbearing of a point of land and notedthese values on the chart. Before the


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OOW had time to plot the vesselsposition on the chart, the pilot began acourse alteration. The OOW returned tothe conning position and ensured thehelmsman promptly executed the pilotsorders.

Shortly after reaching the new heading,the pilot realised that the vessel wasnot on the proper course and ordereda hard-a-starboard helm in the hopesof bringing her around but this wasunsuccessful and the vessel groundedat 0135 hrs.

Depth soundings were taken in the areaof the grounding and it was determinedthat the bow was firmly aground and thestern was afloat in deeper waters. Thevessel sustained extensive damage toshell plating and internals in way of stemto No. 3 double-bottom tanks.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:(1) There was a substantial lack of bridgeresource management (BRM). TheOOW and/or the Master should havebeen more diligent about ensuringthat the OOW was there to reconfirm

decisions made by the pilot. This couldhave been done through better verbalcommunication between the pilot andthe OOW.(2) The pilot did not reconfirm hismental model of his position beforemaking the critical turn. The OOW,did not have the proper situationalawareness with regard to the vesselsposition. The pilot did not reconfirmthe vessels position prior to the coursealteration. When the pilot gave theorder to turn, the OOW only focusedupon whether the helmsman madethe turn. He didnt reconfirm that they

turned at the proper location.(3) The weather played a marginalrole in the grounding. However, asa precaution, the vessel may haveconsidered placing a dedicated lookout.

Recommendations and LessonsLearned(1) The Master is in command of the shipat all times with only one exception:when transiting through the PanamaCanal. Therefore, it is always the dutyof the Master and OOW to keep asituational awareness of all activitiesof the pilot. Although the pilot is mostknowledgeable about local waters, it isthe responsibility of the Master/OOWto verify position through proper use ofcharts, radars and other position fixingdevices and follow local rules on speedand routing.

(2) Voyage planning is crucial in allsituations including when pilots are onboard. Sufficient time should be allowedfor proper communication between theMaster, pilots and OOWs. This voyageplan should include every importantactivity starting from the embarkationof the pilot, in and out of the berth, andfinally the disembarkation of the pilot.

(3) If the pilot is to command tugsand/or personnel at a berth in alanguage that is foreign to the crew,

the Master must demand that the pilotcommunicates with the Master and/orOOW in a common language

(4) When the piloted voyage is takingthe vessel through narrow waters, youshould mark wheel-over points eitheron the chart or at the radar screen inorder to know when you are reachingpoints of no return. This helps toallow the pilot, Master, and/or OOW tokeep a better situational awareness.

(5) The ships crew is normally the

most knowledgeable regarding themanoeuvring capabilities of the ship.Detailed descriptions of the shipsmanoeuvring characteristics shouldbe communicated during the voyage

planning stage. In addition, the Masterand/or OOW should communicatemanoeuvring capabilities during thevoyage, as necessary. The Master andOOW should never feel hesitant todiscuss these matters with the pilot ifthey feel it necessary to do so.

(6) Ensure that the vessel is equippedwith the necessary updated charts forthe intended voyage. It is not sufficientto rely on the pilot to provide thisinformation.

(7) The OOW should always closelymonitor the activities of the pilot. Manytimes, the pilot will not necessarilycommunicate with the OOW regardingthe vessel and/or voyage. The OOWshould not hesitate to communicatewith the pilot on any relevant mattersregarding the vessel or the voyage.

(8) The OOW should not only bediligent with regard to his duties toensure the pilots orders are properlyfollowed but also to monitor the pilotsactivities. If the OOW has concernsregarding the pilots activities, he should

contact the Master immediately.

(9) The vessel should have clearprocedures and instructions to Mastersand OOWs on what to do with a pilotonboard. These should be included aspart of the ships safety managementsystem (SMS).

(10) BRM is an important activity toensure safety. Any BRM training shouldinclude how to handle the change incommunication, command, and controlwhen a pilot takes over navigation of

the ship.


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Who is to blame?

The voyage continues and the pilotgives instructions regarding thenecessary course alterations, as thefairway becomes gradually narrower.The ship is still at full speed.

The pilot calls the harbour master (inhis native language) and tells him thatETA (estimated time of arrival) will bein half an hour. He also gives the threetugs waiting to assist berthing the ship

an update on the situation (also in hisnative language). There is no requestfor translation from the second mateand no information is volunteered bythe pilot.

We continue full ahead. Trafficincreases as we enter sheltered waters.The background lights from theharbour area make it difficult to seethe difference between moving andstationary objects.

Mr Mate, can you prepare to receivethe first tug on port bow? We will have

starboard side alongside. (Two othertugs are also ordered but this is notmentioned by the pilot).

Aye-Aye, sir, says the mate.

The pilot contacts the tugs on the VHFagain (still in the local language) and,as he is talking, his mobile phone rings.The mate calls the master, who entersthe bridge after a couple of minutes.

Useful lessons can be learned from thefollowing incident, which could happenanywhere, any time, with almost anyship.

The incidentGood afternoon, Mr Captain. Ill takeover. Starboard 10, come to two five sixdegrees and full ahead.

Starboard 10 to two five six degrees,

full ahead. She is all yours, Mr Pilot.

We are on board an ordinary tanker,on an ordinary day, approaching anordinary terminal somewhere in theWestern Hemisphere. The weather isgrey but the visibility is not too bad,although it is early evening. The speedis slowly increasing and the last lightof day is rapidly disappearing. Theatmosphere on the bridge is relaxed.

Full speed, Mr Pilot, 14 knots.

Full speed. Thank you, Mr Captain.

The pilot and the master continuetalking about everyday matters such asthe weather, how long they are stayingat the berth, etc.

Im leaving the bridge, says themaster. I have to prepare some papersbefore we berth. The second mate willassist you. If you need me, just tell himand he will get hold of me.


He consults the radar and although it ismany years since the last time he was inthis harbour, he feels somewhat uneasywith our present speed, as we arerapidly approaching the inner part ofthe harbour. The master is tempted toask the pilot to reduce the speed, butfor some odd reason he does not. Thepilot orders half ahead and continuesto talk in his mobile phone. We areapproaching the berth and the master

is more and more anxious about thespeed, so he politely suggests the pilotto reduce the speed. The pilot explainsthat there is another ship waiting toleave the berth and he has to board itas soon as possible.

The first tug is closing in on port bowand is ready to receive the heaving linefrom the ship. The second mate, whohas just left the bridge, is now on theforecastle making his first attempt atthe heaving line, but misses the tug.He sees that they are now alarminglyclose to the berth and hurries to do his

second attempt. This time he succeedsand reports back to the bridge thatthe line from the tug is on board andsecured. At the same time the pilot,who has just finished his telephone call,is at the bridge, hectically instructingthe tugs on how to berth the ship, stillin the local language this time with araised voice.


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The tugs seem to have problemskeeping up with the speed of our shipand this is communicated to the pilot.The distance to the berth is rapidlydiminishing and the pilot asks for slowastern. The master, who is really gettingnervous now, orders slow astern andeven increases this to half astern. The

pilot orders the aft tug to start pulling inorder to reduce the speed of our ship.

The master finally realises that there isno way he can avoid hitting the berthand orders full astern. Because of thefull astern manoeuvre, the ship does anuncontrolled starboard turn and hits theberth with a speed of 2 knots, makinga 3-metre long gash on the starboardbow and causing extensive damage tothe berth.

What went wrongThe situation described above could

happen anywhere, any time, with a lotof ships trading the seven seas of today.

Can we learn something from thisincident? The vessels speed was excessive. When trying to connect to the tugsthe ships speed was too high. There was lack of communicationbetween the pilot and the master atmany stages while transiting the fairway.There was little or no informationexchanged regarding the docking planand how the three tugs were to be putto use and co-ordinated.

The master did not insist that thepilot should reduce the speed as theyapproached the harbour area. The pilot, when communicating withthe tugs, was speaking a language thatwas not understood by the master. Thismade it difficult for the master to befully aware of the situation. The master was over-confident of theabilities of the pilot.

And guess what: the pilot will ofcourse blame the master for interferingin his efforts to manoeuvre the shipsafely alongside because he orderedfull astern!

Recommendations and lessonslearned

The master is in command of the shipat all times with only one exception:when transiting through the PanamaCanal. Therefore, it is always the dutyof the master and the officer of thewatch (OOW) to be aware of all actionsof the pilot. Although the pilot is moreknowledgeable about local waters,it is the responsibility of the master/OOW to verify the position through theproper use of charts, radars and otherposition fixing devices and follow localrules on speed and routing. Voyage planning is crucial in allsituations including when pilots are

on board. Sufficient time should beallowed for proper communicationbetween the master, pilots and OOWs.This voyage plan should include everyimportant activity starting from theembarkation of the pilot, entry andexit from the berth and finally thedisembarkation of the pilot. If the pilot communicates with tugs,etc., in the local language (which islikely), the master should ask him toexplain what was said in a commonlanguage (probably English). When the voyage under pilotagetakes the vessel through narrow waters,

one should mark wheel-over pointseither on the chart or at the radarscreen in order to know when pointsof no return are reached. This helpsthe pilot, master, and/or OOW to havebetter situational awareness. The ships crew is normally themost knowledgeable regarding themanoeuvring capabilities of the ship.Detailed descriptions of the ships

manoeuvring characteristics shouldbe communicated during the voyageplanning stage. In addition, the masterand/or OOW should communicatemanoeuvring capabilities during thevoyage, as necessary. The master andOOW should never hesitate to discussthese matters with the pilot if they feel

it necessary to do so. One should ensure that the vessel isequipped with the necessary updatedcharts for the intended voyage. It is notsufficient to rely on the pilot to providethis information. The OOW should always closelymonitor the activities of the pilot. Manytimes the pilot will not communicatewith the OOW regarding the vesseland/or voyage as necessary. The OOWshould not hesitate to communicatewith the pilot on any relevant mattersregarding the vessel or the voyage. The OOW should not only be diligent

with regard to his duties to ensure thatthe pilots orders are properly followed,but should also monitor the pilotsactivities. If the OOW has concernsregarding the pilots activities, heshould contact the master immediately. The vessel should have clearprocedures and instructions to mastersand OOWs on what to do with a piloton board. These should be included aspart of the ships safety managementsystem (SMS). Bridge resource management (BRM)is important to ensure safety. AnyBRM training should include how to

handle the change in communication,command, and control when a pilottakes over navigation of the ship.

Who is to blame?Who is then to blame? In practice, both,master and pilot, but it is important tokeep in mind that as the master is incommand of the ship, he is the one whogets the blame!


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8/10/2019 Pilotage Marc

pilotage march 2011-2

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