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Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

Review: Islam, Religiopolitics, and Social Change. A Review ArticleAuthor(s): Jerrold D. GreenSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 312-322Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/178498 .

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Islam, Religiopolitics, and Social

Change.A Review ArticleJERROLD D. GREEN

The Universityof Michigan

IslamicResurgencein the Arab World,editedby Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (New York:

PraegerPress,1982)

MilitantIslam,byG. H. Jansen(NewYork:HarperandRow, 1979)

Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, by Edward Mortimer(New York:VintageBooks, 1983)

In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power, by Daniel Pipes (New York: BasicBooks, 1983)

Althoughthe trade-offbetween relevance and intellectualismis hardlya new

one, the IranianRevolutionraisedthe visibilityof Islam and moved studies ofit fromthe arcaneto the

superficial. Despitethe fact that the former is more

enlighteningthan the latter, it also necessitatesa "blurringof genres."1 Forthe studyof Islamicpolitics requiresunderstandingboth of Islam, its history,

theology, and so on (the realmof humanists)and of the dynamicsand con-

cepts of sociopoliticalchange (the bailiwick of social scientists). Neither the

humanitiesnor the social sciences can boast a monopoly on wisdom. Yetscholarsclaimingmembershipin bothunions, rarelythe two simultaneously,haveproduceda pasticheof writingswhen in fact what is needed is a corpus.

The fact that Islamic politics falls at the nexus of the humanities and the

social sciences poses a significantepistemologicalchallenge. Humanists, itseems, are concerned with Islam, while social scientists are interested in

Muslims.2Or, to escape this obviously false dichotomy,we might posit that

I would like to thank Dr. KhurshidAhmad and Dr. Hassan Turabifor theirgraciousnessduringmy recent visit to IslamabadandKhartoum.Althoughthis paperprovidedsubstantialfodder for

disagreement,I benefittedimmenselyfrom our discussions. I would also like to thank several

colleagues in the United States for their insights: MumtazAhmad, Fouad Ajami. Said Amir

Arjumand,Zvi Gitelman,DavidF. Gordon,DonaldHerzog, DanielLevine, PeterMcDonough,Augustus R. Norton, BarryRubin, Peter Wallensteen, Aram Yengoyan, and Marvin Zonis.

Naturally,all the usual exemptionsfrom responsibilityapply.I See CliffordGeertz, "Blurred Genres: The Refigurationof Social Thought," in his Local

Knowledge:Further Essavs in InterpretiveAnthropology(New York: 1983), pp. 19-35.2 Although this distinction is hardly a new one, it remains for many Muslims a quite

provocativeone. I amgratefulto a memberof the ulemain Bangladeshwho pointedit out to meaftera lectureI deliveredat the Islamic Foundationin Dhaka on March15, 1983.

0010-4175/85/2780-0923 $2.50 ? 1985 Society for ComparativeStudyof Society andHistory

312



ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 313

the question confrontingscholarsof Islamicpolitics is the same as thatelud-

ing Islamic activists themselves-what is the relationshipbetween what

should be (Islamic doctrine)and what is (Islamicpolitical activism).3A gap exists. Such gaps usually separatedoctrinefrom practiceand are

hardly uniqueto Islam. Samuel Huntington,for example, considers this di-

lemma in a recent study of American politics. Looking at the 1960s, he

capturesthe spiritof this turbulentdecade, noting that widespreadpoliticalactivism "was a reaffirmationof traditionalAmericanideals andvalues." A

studentleaderof the time states that:

Wedo notproclaima New Truthtochallengetheoldmythsofearliergenerations.Weinsteadinvoke the Old Truthsandchargeyou . . . withdesertingthose truths.You are

theapostates,notwe. Youare,in effect,thesubversives;we are theloyalists,whoproudlyreaffirmtheprinciplesthatyou ignore.

Huntingtonattributesthis eloquent statementto what he terms the "Ideals

versusInstitutions"(IvI) gap in Americanpolitics. For the Tantalusof ideals

impels its followers to "compare practice to principle . . . reality to ide-

al . . . behavior to belief."4 Every country in the Islamic umma (community)claimspolitically significantnumbersof citizens who, with referenceto theirown societies, would subscribe to the statementby the American student

leader. The IvI gap highlightstensions in manypolities wherethe exigenciesof day to day politics obscure the dreams of foundingfathers. Profitsobviate

prophets. This is usually the case in those states whose elites depend onIslamic legitimacy (Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, Iran) and those who do not

(Iraq,Syria, PahlaviIran).Fordespitethe orientationsof prevailingpoliticalelites, Islam is "still . . . part of the common sense of everyday life and

hence it is politically potent."5 Elites cannotignoreIslam, they also cannotbase all political life on it.

RELIGIOPOLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGEThe journalistic (G. H. Jansen, Edward Mortimer)and historical studies

(Daniel Pipes) can usefully be compared, to the detrimentperhaps,of thelatter.All begin with surveys of Islamic historywhich are standardizedandfor the most part interchangeable.Is scholarshipin Islamic history really asmonodimensionalas they makeit appear?Whydo modernIslamichistorians

rely solely on one another'sbooks? Why are Arabic and Persian languagesourcesused so sparingly, if at all? A varietyof cliches tend to characterize

3 Gustave E. von Grunebaumpoints out this gap as well, writing: "The gap between what

oughtto be andwhatis, is strongin any religion, but it seems to be particularlystrongin Islam."

Quoted in Pipes, p. 48. But von Grunebaum'sconcern here is with religion in a much more

narrowlydefined sense than is mine.4 The preceedingquotationsare fromSamuelP. Huntington,AmericanPolitics: ThePromise

of Disharmony(Cambridge:1981), p. 3.5 MichaelM. J. Fischer, Iran: FromReligious Dispute to Revolution(Cambridge:1981), p.

38.



314 JERROLD D. GREEN

suchstudies as well. "Islam is not a religionbutrathera wayof life." "Islamdoes notrecognizedistinctionsbetween state andreligion." These truismsare

fundamentallycorrect. Yet time and again they arebreathlesslypresentedasexcitingnew discoveries ratherthan well-knownfacts. And how these factors

explaincontemporaryevents is left unclear.Furthermore,such superficialitydoes not recognize that there exists in a more universalsense an engine forsocial change which might be termed "religiopolitics."

Religiopoliticscan be simply defined as those situationsin which relationswith God provide shape and meaningto one's political actions and orienta-tions. As liberalismor socialism serve as political ideologies, so too can

Christianity,Islam, or Judaism,althoughperhapsin differentways. That this

theoreticalrelationshipreflects Islamic doctrinedoes not mean that it reflectspolitics in Islamic societies. Also, there are other cases which can shed lighton the characterof religiopolitics as a more broad-gaugedmeans of so-

ciopolitical change. LiberationTheology in LatinAmerica,the MoralMajor-ity in the United States, Poland's SolidarityMovement, Apartheidin South

Africa,andZionism in some of its manyhues are all inspiredby religionwith

political beliefs being mediated through man's spiritualrelationshipwithGod. Are these cases all so different'?At one level they are. Yet why wouldHassan al-Bannaconcern himself with events in Latin America?6 Was he

merely more cosmopolitanthanare those who have studied him'?

Certainly, level of analysis here is crucial. Yet Max Weber, despite his

innumerableinsights into the relationshipbetweenreligionandpolitics, was

probablywrong when he wrote:

All politicsis orientedto the materialfacts of thedominantinterestof thestate,torealism,andto the autonomousend of maintainingtheexternalandinternaldistribu-tionof power.Thesegoals, again,mustnecessarilyseemcompletelysenselessfromthereligiouspointof view.7

But is there a religiouspointof view? Does it not differ from faith to faith andoften within faiths?It seems almost tautologicalto note thatreligiopoliticalactivists seek a greatersymmetrybetweentemporalandspiritualconcernsin

statemanagement.Perhapsmid-level theory may proveuseful, for whereon

one level macroanalysisis likely to forward certain useful generalizations,microanalysiswill frameeach case as unique.Seekinga balance between thetwo is the essence of comparativeresearch, after all. And the search for

paradigms,patterns, similarities and/or differences is certainly superiortothin description.

This problemtends not to be recognized by those writingson Islam and

6 This interestingfact was related to me by my late colleague Professor RichardMitchell, a

pioneerin the study of religiopoliticalmovements in Egypt. Personalcommunication,Spring1982.

7 Max Weber. TheSociology of Religion (Boston: 1963), p.235.




politics. While some emphasizegrandsimilarities(Pipes), othersemphasizedifferences (Mortimer).8Each fails however, as there is no single answer.

Both similarities and differences exist. Unfortunately,the descriptionsonwhich they are based in much of the currentliteratureare neithersystematicnor testable.

Whatis being arguedfor here is awarenessof the utilityof religiopoliticsas

a conceptualvariable. What is needed is an attemptto determine what sim-

ilarities and differences link/distinguishIslamicpolitics from these extant in

otherfaithsandeven within Islam itself. Religiopolitics maybe understoodas

a type of politicalmobilization. We can distinguishinstitutionalIslam which

attemptsto buttresselite legitimacy, frompopularIslamwhich is oftengearedto challengingelites.9 There are even cases in which we find both at work.The IvI gap exists in every countryin the umma. No Islamic governmentis

acceptableto all Muslims and there is no universallyrecognized oppositionmovement. The reasonsfor this are best pointedout by Mortimer,who notes

that Islamhas developeddifferentlyin disparatesocieties. AlthoughIslamasa pristinebelief structurecan claim a doctrinalpurityand universality,the

introductionof Islam into a society of necessity makes it partof a complexskein of pre-existent primordialand ascriptive ties defined by language,culture, social class,

generationaldifferences, history, and so forth. Islamic

activiststhemselves have repeatedlytriedto operationalizeIslam with mixed

success. Khomeini the oppositionistgeneratedfar more popular supportin

Iranandin the ummathan does Khomeinithe head of state. Islamic doctrinein the test tube is farbetter definedthan is Islam as a guide for statemanage-ment. And Islamas an ideology becomes significantlyless importantwhen itis confrontedby the imperativesof a state'snationalinterest. SecularistSyriaquite comfortablysupportsthe Islamic Republic of Iranwhich accepts this

supporteven as Hafez al-AssadslaughtersIslamic activists far closer to Iran's

worldview than is Assad himself.Given the heterogeneityof the umma we might ask what factors unite

Muslims, which divide them? Or, again, what is the relationshipbetweenIslam andMuslims? Studiesof Sufi politics in Senegalor Qaddafi'sviews onIslam are intrinsically fascinating. Yet such narrow sketches of individualcases have not markedlyadvancedour understandingof Islam's broaderroleas a frameworkfor sociopolitical change. Studentsof religiopolitics, Islamic

8 On the whole, the Mortimervolume is the more persuasiveof the two.9 For an analysis of the relationshipbetween the two, see Daniel Levine, "The Institutional

Churchand the Popularin Colombia," mimeo., 1983. FouadAjami looks at this issue from adifferent perspective. Relying on transcriptsof court proceedings from the trials of Islamicactivists,Ajamicites debates between supportersof popularIslamicgroups(thedefendants)andde factorepresentativesof institutionalIslam(theprosecutors).The issue has never been present-ed in quitethis way andmakesfascinatingreading.See his "In the Pharaoh'sShadow:ReligionandAuthorityin Egypt," in Islam in the Political Process James P. Piscatori,ed. (New York:1983), pp. 12-35.




or otherwise, must begin to refine their questions, typologize their cases, and

build/test theories. Ali Dessouki points this out in an excellent introductory

chapter to his edited volume where he notes that: "Islamic movements haveto be seen in relation to the specific process of social change taking place in

their societies, in particular to issues of the changing position of classes and

groups, political participation, identity crisis, the stability of regimes,and distributive justice" (p. 8). Dessouki's prescriptions are both prudent and

sound. He does not advocate a mutually exclusive approach, but rather a more

well-rounded understanding of how the past influences the present, how re-

ligion becomes politicized and vice-versa. Islamic opposition groups are

products of the very sociopolitical orders they oppose. At the same time,those elites who attempt to buttress their own legitimacy through reliance on

institutional Islam are at least as committed to political survival as they are to

the spiritual values they so fervently espouse. Max Weber notes that "the

man who is concerned for the welfare of his soul and the salvation of the souls

of others does not seek these aims along the path of politics. Politics has quitedifferent goals, which can only be achieved by force." 0 Although this max-

imalist view may seem unduly cynical, the record of those political elites in

the umma who rely on Islam for legitimacy seems to verify Weber's insight.Can

politicalleaders who claim

highlevels of

religiositymaintain the same

level and character of commitment to their core spiritual values while in

power? Certainly there are many in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Islamic

Republic of Iran who question the "Islamic-ness" of their leaders. Weber is

no less skeptical about oppositionists, asserting that:

? . . emotional revolutionis followed by traditionalistroutine.The hero of faith, and,even more, faith itself fades away or becomes . . . partof the conventionaljargonof

politicalphilistinesand technicians.This developmenttakesplace withespecial speedin ideological struggles,becauseit is usuallyconductedor inspiredby trueleaders, the

prophetsof the revolution.

As I note above, profits, political in this context, obviate prophets:

... as withevery apparatusof leadership,so here, one of the necessaryconditions ofsuccess is to empty the ideas of all content, to concentrateon mattersof fact, and to

carrythrougha processof intellectual(i.e. or spiritual)'proletarisation'in the interestsof 'discipline.' The followers of a warriorof faith, once they have achievedpower,tend to degenerateinto a thoroughlycommonplaceclass of office-holders.12

Although it appears that Weber may have recently visited Tehran, my pointhere is not to denigrate religiopolitical activists/leaders or even to question

their commitment to the religious values they espouse. Rather, it is to argue

10 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Weber:Selections in TranslationW. G. Run-

ciman, ed. (New York: 1978), p. 223.

" Ibid., p. 222.12 Ibid., p. 222.




thatreligiopoliticsis politics much like otherpolitics. The two influenceone

another,but claims by religiopoliticalactivists to have some sort of special

mandatefrom God which raisesthem abovepolitics tend not to be persuasive.For as Weber also notes ". .. he who meddles with politics, who in other

words makes use of the instrumentsof power andviolence, concludesa pactwith infernalpowers."'3 Thatreligiopoliticalactorsexaggeratethe religiouscontentof theiractions, while denyingthepoliticalcontent,makesthe task of

the scholarsomewhat more difficult. For it is in the relationshipbetween thetwo that the IvI gap appearsto be most critical and the objectivity of the

scholarmost unwelcomeby those being studied. Those tryingto interpretthe

politicalbehaviorof AyatollahKhomeini aresubjectto chargesof being anti-

Islamic. Theirscholarlycredentialsandgoals are eitherignoredor dismissed.

Being a Westernerand a non-Muslimprovidesanotherreasonfor dismissal,

althoughthese flaws tend to evaporatewhen one praisesthe Imaminstead of

tryingto understandhim. Yet if Muslim activists and intellectualscan claim

to understandthe West, even if only to dismiss it, why is it that Westernersare viewed as being unableto appreciatethe Middle East and beyond?

This issue, only tangentiallytoucheduponhere, raisesquestionsabout the

ability of scholars to study societies which are not theirown. An importantcorrelateto

this, althoughone that is

usually overlooked,relates to one's

abilityto studyone's own society. Ideally, both issues should be raised. But

recognitionthatreligiopoliticsis a subsetor a particulartypeof politicsallowsus to apply the tools of our craft to the study of such politics everywhere.

Despite the possible abuse of some of these tools (e.g., development,elite,and dependencytheories have all been debased, at times), it should be re-memberedthat the ax murdereris sent to prison, not the ax. Certainlya

sensitivity to what makes each case unique is an importantas an ability to

glean useful generalizations.The problem with much of the literatureon

Islamand politics is the relative absence of the latter.

RELIGIOPOLITICS AS A CONCEPTUAL VARIABLE

The foregoing analysis suggests that religiopolitical activity is particularlyappropriatefor comparative political analysis. Religiopolitics can be con-ceived of as a conceptualvariable about which certain tentativepropositionscanbe articulated.Thepurposeof thepropositionsis to challengethegrowinggroupof scholars who are exploring specific religiopoliticalexperiences tocast their analyses in a broadercomparativemode. Such analysis would

permitthe growthof scholarshipthat is intellectuallycumulativeratherthandiffuse andidiosyncratic.All of thepropositionsareapplicableto bothinstitu-tionalandpopularreligion. And in fact, some of thepointsin thepropositionsare touched upon in the studies reviewed here, but not in a particularly

13 Ibid., p. 220.




systematicfashion. Althoughnot meant to be comprehensive,these proposi-tionscan serve as a useful startingpointfor understandingandcomparingthe

role of religion in a varietyof polities irrespectiveof faith.

1. Although religion is conventionally viewed as an element of tradi-

tionalism,recent cases of religiopoliticsare often the productof mod-ernization and social change. They are most likely to prosper duringcrises of identity, ideology, legitimacy, and/orparticipation.

Periodicoutburstsof religiopolitical activity should not be allowed to ob-scurethe fundamentalrole of religionas a source of strengthand sustenance

for adherentsof innumerablefaithsover countless centuries in all corners oftheworld. In recenttimes, suchcommitmentshave beenespeciallysignificant

byproductsof the modernizationprocess. For in societies undergoingrapidtransformation,religion frequentlyserves as a culturallyauthentic and spir-ituallysatisfyinganchorto the familiarandthe understood.Furthermore,"in

light of the absence of conventional participatorymechanisms, formalized

religiousorganizationscan, andin the view of some religiousleaders,shouldserveas vehicles for improvingthequalityof life fortheiradherents."14 Suchsentimentsare

recognizedboth

by politicalelites and counterelites.

2. Religiopolitics is a common type of political mobilization or counter-

mobilization,not merely a theological ritual.

3. Religion providesa particularperspectivefor evaluatingsocial, politi-cal, and economic conditions. The form of such politics is heavilyinfluenced by religious symbols, values, and idioms. Thus, re-

ligiopolitics may be analyzed in comparisonor in contrastwith other

ideologies, mostof whichare concernedwith similarsorts of issues that

are perceivedand addressedin differentidioms.Religiopolitics provides a particularlens, which differs across faiths, for

evaluatingrelevantissues. These issues areusuallynotreligiousin a doctrinalsense. That is, religion is more than doctrineor liturgy and in a politicalcontext functions as an ideology not unlike other, more secular, ideologies.Religiousactivists are concernedwith social, economic, political, and moral

questions. As a filter for processingsuch issues, religiopoliticsmay be per-ceived as a rallying point for addressingthem.15As a means for mobiliza-

tion/countermobilization,religion has obvious advantages.Yet such mobili-

zation is most definitely political mobilizationfor the accomplishmentofpolitical goals.

14 JerroldD. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization(New York:

1982), p. 150.'5 R. StephenHumphreyslooks at the historical dimensionof this issue in "The Contempo-

rary Resurgencein the Contextof Modem Islam," in Dessouki, pp. 67-83.




4. The political componentof religiopoliticsbecomes at least as signifi-cant as the religiousone as the goals of theparticipantsarenotreligious

per se.

5. Religious doctrine grows more malleable as the role of religion in

politics increases

As religiopoliticalactivists increase their involvement in the day to day

political life of a polity, the agendaof issues and problemswith which theyare confronted is not likely to be resolved on the basis of religious doctrine

alone.16 Religious dogma providesguidanceon economic andpoliticalissues

onlyin the most

generalterms. And the

complexityof

twentieth-centurylife

frequentlycompels religiopolitical leaders to go beyond conventional doc-

trinal sources in search of formulas for state management.Pursuit of thenationalinterestis likely to supercedestrict adherence to religious canons.Given the necessityof makingtelephoneswork ordefendingthe state,narrow

compliance with religious doctrine often becomes a luxury rather than a

possibility.The exigencies of day-to-daylife exacerbatethe gap between the

spiritualandthe temporal. Religiopoliticalleaders eitherconsciously or sub-

consciouslywill attemptto obscure this exacerbationon the basis of the very

doctrinalfactors which they rely on to enhance theirlegitimacy. In a conflictbetweenthe profaneand the spiritual, particularlywhen questionsof poweranddominanceare at stake, the profaneis likely to win out, yet in a fashionthat will be disguised, not highlighted.

6. Religiopoliticsredefines the criteria for and natureof elite legitimacywhile changing the form more than the content of governmentalactivity.

Religiopolitics changes the form of political life. Different symbols and

idioms are relied upon while the standardsfor elite legitimacywill be modi-fied. Yet despite the emergenceof a new political elite, its appearancewilldiffer farmorethan will the contentof its actions. Theproblemsconfrontinga

society change far less frequentlythan do the personnel managing it. The

rules of thepoliticalgame may be transformed,but the gameremainsbasical-

ly the same.

7. Religiopoliticsbringsan assortmentof moral issues to public life andthen

proceedsto

ignore manyof them.

Due to the flexibility of religious doctrine and the complexity of state

management,the religiopoliticalactivist's stated concern with moral issues

16 Foran excellent analysisof the relationshipbetweenpolitical thoughtandpracticefromthe

perspectiveof the thinkersthemselves, see CharlesE. Butterworth,"PrudenceVersus Legit-imacy:The PersistentTheme in Islamic Political Thought," in Dessouki, pp. 84-114.




will be outstrippedby his eagernessto preservehis political power-a powerhe attributesto his moralsuperiorityyet which is moredependenton the use

of force.

8. Religiopolitics is frequentlyan intense statementof some form of na-tionalismand/or ethnicity.

Thereis no suchthingas pure religion. Religiopoliticsis as much a productof historical andculturaldevelopmentsin a society as it is of narrowerspir-itual ones. 17 It is often indistinguishablefrom moreseeminglysecularfactorssuch as nationalismor ethnicity. While pan-religiousstatementsand actions

may seem to contradictthis, all states, even those managedby clergy-politi-cians, feel that their interpretationof religion is the best one and such in-

terpretationbecomes synonymous with a particularisticethnic or nationalinterest.

9. Social class is a relativelyweakexplanatoryvariablefor understandingthe growthof religiopolitics.

Given that religiopolitics is part of a melange of factors resulting from

economic, political, ethnic, nationalist,and otherstimuliit is difficultto link

religiopoliticalcommitmentsto any particularsocial class. Different contexts

promotedifferentoutcomes;to assume thatreligiopoliticsis the productof a

clever clergy manipulating unsophisticated peasants/workers is simplyincorrect. 18

CONCLUSIONS

Throughoutthis essay it has been argued that Islamic politics should be

understoodunder thelarger

rubricof what has been termedreligiopolitics,

a

type of political activity common to numerousfaiths in a wide variety of

polities. Thecropof books reviewedheretend, with some notableexceptions,to promote narrowdescriptionrather than broad-gaugedunderstanding.19

Empirically,ratherthanspiritually,there is no such thing as a single Islam.To studyIslamicpolitics with a greateremphasison religionthanpolitics is

foolhardy.As Fazlur Rahman notes:

... an important problem that has plagued Muslim societies . . . is the peculiarrelationshipof religion and politics and the pitiablesubjugationof the formerto the

17 For a discussionof this issue see "Pakistan:Islam as Nationality," in Mortimer,pp. 186-229.

18 Saad Eddin Ibrahimhas paidparticularattentionto this issue. See, for example, "Islamic

Militancyas aSocial Movement:The Case of Two Groupsin Egypt," in Dessouki, pp. 117-37.Membersof the groups looked at by Ibrahimare primarilymiddle class in origin.

19 The exception is the Dessouki volume, which claims several excellent chapters.




latter . . . For, instead of settingthemselves to genuinely interpretIslamicgoals to berealized through political and governmentchannels . . . what happensmost of the

time is a ruthlessexploitationof Islam for partypoliticsandgroupintereststhatsubjectsIslamnotonlytopoliticsbuttoday-to-daypolitics;Islamthusbecomessheerdemagoguery.Unfortunately,theso-calledIslamicpartiesinseveralcountriesarethemostblatantlyguiltyof suchsystematicpoliticalmanipulationofreligion.Theslogan,'inIslamreligionandpoliticsareinseparable'is employedtodupethe commonmanintoacceptingthat,insteadof politicsor the stateservingthelong-rangeobjectivesofIslam,Islamshouldcome to servethe immediateandmyopicobjectivesof partypolitics.20

The hypocrisy lamented by Rahman is reminiscent of that discussed byWeber.But the problemis less attributableto Islamthan to those who abuse

it. Just as political practice everywhereoften resultsin a betrayalof the veryidealscynically putforthby the betrayersthemselves, Islamicpolitics arenot

necessarilyin accordwith the fundamentalpreceptsof Islam.TheIvIgap maywell be universal.

As I note atthe outset, the studyof religiopolitics,or forourpurposeshere,Islamicpolitics, falls at the nexus of the humanitiesand the social sciences.

Yet, the commondenominatorfor the studyof Islamicpolitics seems to lie atleast as much with the political as with the Islamic-this point is stronglyemphasizedby Rahman.Historiansand their

protegesin

journalismcan trace

the growthand developmentof Islam. They seem less adeptat the study ofsocieties andpolitics, at least in the studies reviewedhere. Perhapsthe prob-lem lies in historicalscope and method.Some historiansexhibita remarkableambivalence towards their own craft. Pipes, for example, claims to "relyheavily on languageskills, philology, and the studyof texts" in researchinghis book(p. 24). Yet to approachtwentieth-centurypoliticsarmedonly withamedievalist's understandingof philology and texts seems inadequate atbest.21 As for language skill, the volume's notes claim only a handful of

perfunctoryreferencesto works in

Arabic(nonein Persian, Urdu,and so on),while The New YorkTimes appearswith depressingregularity.Finally, thesection on contemporaryIslamic politics is superficialin the extreme, withJordanbeing "analyzed" in three sentences (p. 220) and the entire PersianGulf in only eight sentences (p. 230).

A field as diverse as Middle East historycannotbe judged by its weaker

components.But it is evident thatpolitical writingon Islam is of a standardlower than that on politics elsewhere, as well as that on other aspects of

politics in the Middle East, such as political developmentor economy. Al-

thoughno one will arguethatthe social sciences are an intellectualpanacea,20 FazlurRahman,Islam and Modernity:Transformationof an IntellectualTradition(Chi-

cago: 1982), p. 150.21 Inconcert with the tools of social science they can be quitevaluable,however. Forthe use

of philology, for example, see CliffordGeertz, "Deep Play:Notes on the BalineseCockfight,"in his, TheInterpretationof Cultures (New York: 1973), pp. 412-53.




they are certainly superiorto no analytical perspectiveat all. The problemmaybe that the moretraditionalhistorians,who know little of the systematic

studyof contemporarypolitics, have a vested interestin portrayingIslam asthe independentvariablein religiopolitics.Weber, Rahman,and othersarguethatit may well be the dependentone. Presumably,the truerelationshiplies

somewherebetweenthese extremes. Explorationof this questionalone could

sparkaninterestingdebate.An importantchallengeawaitsboth historiansandsocial scientists. Let us hope they rise to it.

pipies in the path of god critique

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