pixel ( , 4 6 0 - eli schwartz · j. fridrich, m. goljan, m. chen, “imaging sensor noise as...

1
Source camera Identification For 8/9 cameras no misidentification observed For most of cameras less than 1% misidentification estimated Similar results to published work Project Goals II. Image forgery detection Does the Image contain regions which do not fits the source camera characteristics? I. Image Source identification Does a certain image was taken by a certain camera? (Camera – a device not a model) Evidence in court Forensics Intelligence Image copyrights Forged Image published by Reuters during the 2006 Lebanon War Forged Image published by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Motivation Sensor Uniqueness PNU Reference Pattern Estimation Noise Extractor Average Image from Camera Denoised Image Noise Many images needed to estimate the camera PNU Reference Pattern Noise is extracted using wavelet base denoiser PNU is the only constant element Averaging Due to manufacturing inconsistencies each sensor pixel react differently to light Pixel output: A & B values differ from pixel to pixel Pixel Light Value Intensity A B Pixel Non Uniformity PNU B Image Classification Correlation( , ) NOISE PNU Reference Patterns MAX { } Assuming we have a set of suspected cameras Correlation of the noise residual (n) with the PNU Reference Pattern (P) of each camera , n n P P cor n P n n P P Maximum correlation camera is selected: Correlation calculated for each pixel - Done by correlating the pixel environment - Correlation image: Applying a threshold - Pixel correlation distributions: - The threshold was set empirically - Detecting only 50% of tampered pixels - Minimizing false detection 128 128 Correlation( , ) PNU Reference pattern Noise Correlation Value For a single pixel = Low correlation (suspected area) High correlation Original Forged Detection Experiments & Results Summary I. We tested 9 different cameras 9 x 100 training Images 9 x 140 test Images II. Camera selection for each image III. Miss identification rate was estimated - Correlation distribution estimated - False Acceptance & False Rejection estimated (as function of the threshold) - Threshold was set to minimize error rate Source camera Identification Camera model Miss Rate Observed For the Tested Images Miss Rate Estimation for Large Amount of Images Canon IXY 900 0% 2.9% Canon A700 0% 0% Canon S3 (1) 0% 0.75% Canon S3 (2) 0% 0.61% Canon A610 0% 0.68% Nikon D70 (DSLR) 0% 0.5% Canon A530 0% 0.41% Fujifilm S5600 10.7% 9.68% Panasonic DMC-FZ5 0% 1.01% 9 x 75 Images forged & tested Forgery Method: Random sized rectangle -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 x 10 -3 PDF Correlation -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Threshold FAR/FRR FAR FRR Forgery detection Correlation of all images with Canon IXY 900 PNU FA/FR for Canon IXY 900 Winner of the 2011 Thomas Schwartz Award Determining Image Origin & Integrity Roi Hochman & Eli Schwartz, Supervised by Ori Bryt Results 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 % Pixels Correctly Identified as Forged Pixels Falsely Identified as Forged Our results State-Of-The-Art Results Forgery detection 99.8% of forgeries detected Better than state of the art results Achieved with simpler algorithm References: J. Lukáš, J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, “Digital Camera Identification from Sensor Pattern Noise”, IEEE Trans. of Inf. Forensics and Security, 2006. J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, M. Chen, “Imaging Sensor Noise as Digital X-Ray for Revealing Forgeries”, Proc. of 9th Inf. Hiding Workshop, France, 2007. -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 x 10 4 128 Tampered Non-Tampered Remove Small disturbances Enlarge the detected area Forgery Detection Goals & Motivation Sensor Characterizing

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Page 1: Pixel ( , 4 6 0 - Eli Schwartz · J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, M. Chen, “Imaging Sensor Noise as Digital X-Ray for Revealing Forgeries”, Proc. of 9th Inf. Hiding Workshop, France,

• Source camera Identification

• For 8/9 cameras no misidentification observed

• For most of cameras less than 1% misidentification estimated

• Similar results to published work

Project Goals

II. Image forgery detection

Does the Image contain regions which do not fits the source camera characteristics?

I. Image Source identification

Does a certain image was taken by a certain camera?

(Camera – a device not a model)

• Evidence in court

• Forensics

• Intelligence

• Image copyrights

Forged Image published by Reuters during the 2006 Lebanon War

Forged Image published by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

Motivation

Sensor Uniqueness

PNU Reference Pattern Estimation

NoiseExtractor

Average

Image from Camera Denoised Image Noise

• Many images needed to estimate the camera PNU Reference Pattern

• Noise is extracted using wavelet base denoiser

• PNU is the only constant element → Averaging

• Due to manufacturing inconsistencies each sensor pixel react differently to light

• Pixel output:

• A & B values differ from pixel to pixel

Pixel Light

Value IntensityA B

Pixel

Non

Uniformity

PNU B

Image Classification

Correlation( , )

NOISE

PNU Reference Patterns

MAX { }

• Assuming we have a set of suspected cameras

• Correlation of the noise residual (n) with the PNU Reference Pattern (P) of each camera

,n n P P

cor n Pn n P P

• Maximum correlation camera is selected:

Correlation calculated for each pixel

- Done by correlating the pixel environment

- Correlation image:

Applying a threshold

- Pixel correlation distributions:

- The threshold was set empirically

- Detecting only 50% of tampered pixels

- Minimizing false detection

128

128

Correlation( , )

PNUReference

patternNoise

Correlation ValueFor a single pixel=

00.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Low correlation(suspected area)

High correlation

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Original

Forged

Detection

Experiments & Results

Summary

I. We tested 9 different cameras

• 9 x 100 training Images

• 9 x 140 test Images

II. Camera selection for each image

III. Miss identification rate was estimated

- Correlation distribution estimated

- False Acceptance & False Rejection estimated

(as function of the threshold)

- Threshold was set to minimize error rate

Source camera Identification

Camera model

Miss Rate Observed

For the Tested Images

Miss Rate Estimation for

Large Amount of Images

Canon IXY 900 0% 2.9%

Canon A700 0% 0%

Canon S3 (1) 0% 0.75%

Canon S3 (2) 0% 0.61%

Canon A610 0% 0.68%

Nikon D70 (DSLR) 0% 0.5%

Canon A530 0% 0.41%

Fujifilm S5600 10.7% 9.68%

Panasonic DMC-FZ5 0% 1.01%

• 9 x 75 Images forged & tested

• Forgery Method:

• Random sized rectangle

-0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.150

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3x 10

-3 PDF

Correlation

-0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Threshold

FAR/FRR

FAR

FRR

Forgery detection

Correlation of all images with Canon IXY 900 PNU

FA/FR for Canon IXY 900

Winner of the 2011 Thomas Schwartz Award

Determining Image Origin & Integrity

Roi Hochman & Eli Schwartz, Supervised by Ori Bryt

Results

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000

20

40

60

80

100

120

%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1000

100

200

300

400

500

600

%

Pixels Correctly Identified as Forged Pixels Falsely Identified as Forged

Our results

State-Of-The-Art Results

• Forgery detection

• 99.8% of forgeries detected

• Better than state of the art results

• Achieved with simpler algorithm

References:

J. Lukáš, J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, “Digital Camera Identification from Sensor Pattern Noise”, IEEE Trans. of Inf. Forensics and Security, 2006.

J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, M. Chen, “Imaging Sensor Noise as Digital X-Ray for Revealing Forgeries”, Proc. of 9th Inf. Hiding Workshop, France, 2007.

-0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.20

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5x 10

4 128

Tampered

Non-Tampered

00.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

RemoveSmall disturbances

Enlarge the detected

area

Forgery DetectionGoals & Motivation

Sensor Characterizing