pla vs aggrava

7/31/2019 PLA vs Aggrava

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PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA,in his capacity as Directorof the Philippines Patent OfficeFACTS:A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against CeledonioAgrava, in hiscapacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondentDirector issued acircular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination forthe purpose ofdetermining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before thePhilippines Patent Office

The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinationsand is licensed by theSupreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in goodstanding, is duly qualified topractice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondentDirectors holding an

examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violationof the law. Therespondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely orpurelythe practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge andtraining as amatter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passedthe examinationcan practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the longtime he is holdingtests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.ISSUE:Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and theprosecution ofpatent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.HELD:The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before thePatent Office

the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and theprosecution of their

applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of theirrights in patent cases.Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation andapplication of otherlaws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established inaccordance with thelaw of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases orlitigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any workinvolvingthe determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore,the lawprovides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision ofthedirector. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively ormostlytechnical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be takennot to acourt or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, whichis not the case.

In re Cunanan

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANANResolution March 18, 1954Facts:Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance withthe said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking itsprovisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked theaforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsiderationof their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court firstreviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.Issue:WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NOHeld:RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from

insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement ofattorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function andresponsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been sogenerally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attemptas this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seemsclear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power todetermine the qualifications may reside.On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments ofthe government.


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It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Courtand the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fixthe minimum conditions for the license.

People vs HolgadoFacts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with

slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the

house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of

her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was justinstructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney,he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and

must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio todefend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated.

Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for acriminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to

be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the

accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The

record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real andwhether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea

guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of theaccused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a

good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the courtbecame satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and

found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrongfor the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome aqualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the

accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him andthe seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner, vs.JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J.FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.

Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attorney-client

relationship with her when, before the trial of the case, she went to defendants counsel,gave him the papers of the case and other information relevant thereto, although she wasnot able to pay him legal fees. That respondents law firm mailed to the plaintiff a writtenopinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on thebasis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submittingthose papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services. Atty. Franciscoappeared as counsel for defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after.Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her and defendant.

Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?


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Held: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not merely one ofprincipal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legapoint, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legaform such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like.

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should haveemployed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that anyretainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that theattorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation washad. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with hisattorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice orassistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, thenthe professional employment must be regarded as established.

An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer orcounselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when heis giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, oradvocating his client's cause in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the

part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by thelatter.

That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava andthat, this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, wouldnot vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other paperspersonal and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to supportthe doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorneyfrom accepting the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of whatinformation was received by him from his first client.

An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against hisclient in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, heacquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequentadverse employment"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure hisfuture services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counselfor being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering servicesto the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence ofan express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of theservices contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay hisattorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."


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Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 whichreads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement ofOctober 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this casewithout the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to theprosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which thegovernment would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accusedassumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 thatthe trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status

of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. Thedefense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 281963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, andSeptember 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Uponpetition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of thiscase is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is remindedthat at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that thegovernment witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted insuch order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and tothe court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on

Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesmato continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of hisobligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilegeburdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in theprofession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such beliefit may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity.It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of serviceand not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required

of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7

"There isneed anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate thatmembership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The lawis a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in theperformance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoidany frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be requiredto act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration shouldnot occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore thatother pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to.That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly hecannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him ascounsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision ofIn re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was deoficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exactfrom its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official dutiesespecially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays inthe prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such aview in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as suchcounsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant


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himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professionaability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. Theaccused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For,indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose ofsocial conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehensionthat considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, thewelfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be renderednugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado inthese words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given anopportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does notinclude the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have noskill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may beconvicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish hisinnocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for

this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become aconstitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for theCourt to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whetherhe desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio fohim if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of hisown." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even moreemphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard byhimself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for thecommission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to beinformed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates

the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shallbe inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of anaccused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdrawas counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the taskentrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an electionregistrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely atpresent, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise beassumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himselsufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only toerase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. Theadmonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there aretimes, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over thepromptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

pla vs aggrava

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