1

Planning and spatial organization of a Campaign Military Barracks in the face

of the terrorist threat – methodological contributions

Nuno André Ventura Alves

nuno.alves@tecnico.ulisboa.pt

Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, Portugal

October 2015

Abstract

Nowadays the military missions have high complexity, not only due to the economic and military effort of nations,

but also due to the current threats scattered and diffused across the globe. In this context, there is the multi-faceted,

irregular and unpredictable terrorist threat using disproportionate and exaggerated violence to achieve a certain

purpose. This creates a new problem to the military, namely the creation of resilient campaign barracks, prepared and

designed to increase the safety and protection of men and women, equipment and facilities.

At national level, the Portuguese Army has no content or military doctrine related to campaign barracks. This

work appears as a possible aid and reflection tool on this topic.

First, one focused on the conceptual understanding of the topic in question through literature review and

interviews. Then, a practical analysis of the Military Barracks in Lebanon, which worked as a case study, was carried

out.

The result of this study intends to serve as an input for future projects of campaign barracks, through a detailed

and comprehensive characterization of their transient nature over time (life cycle of a barracks), through the suggestion

of some features to adopt in their design and layout and also through the reference to a set of adaptation and defence

strategies against the terrorist threat, which will increase their resilient capacity.

KEYWORDS: Campaign barracks, terrorist threat, resilience, Lebanon, life cycle.

1. Introduction

The architecture and military engineering were responsible for building military structures that later allowed for

the development of Greek, Roman and medieval towns, which, in most cases, were conditioned or even boosted by the

military barracks, fortifications, walls, etc. [1]. From then on, the paradigm has changed and the barracks are now

designed with different objectives, so it is possible to identify two types of barracks, the permanent and the campaign

barracks.

On the one hand, the permanent barracks are built in times of peace with a permanent nature in which all the

infrastructure exhibits permanent buildings and areas of expansion and/or enlargement [2]. They are built in accordance

with the needs and commitments of the defence and they are spatially and socially framed in a particular region or place.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Portuguese Army only worked in the design of this type of barracks, and it

conceived a spatial organization model, the CANIFA model1 [3].

Regarding the campaign military barracks (CMB), due to lack of information and since it is a current competence

of military engineers, it is of the utmost importance to study, disseminate and contribute to the evolution of knowledge

on this topic, since today the progressive involvement of the country in military missions abroad with limited duration

and the proliferation of terrorist threats justify the reflection on models of temporary military facilities that are resistant

and resilient to the likelihood of terrorist attacks. This latent threat places specific demands on the planning and design

1 Model based on interdependency relationships between functional areas (proximity and distance) developed by the now extinct Directorate of the

Army Fortification and Works Service at the time of the Estado Novo, being characterized by their rigid and orthogonal patterns based on functionality

and spatial organization [4].

2

of a CMB, and it seems to make sense to rethink the aspects related to safety, safeguarding hygiene, functionality,

operation capability and the preservation of the monitoring capacity of the barracks structures.

Thus, the main objective is to contribute to the improvement of the guidelines and recommendations to be

implemented in CMB projects given the terrorist threat, contributing to increased knowledge of the Portuguese Army on

this topic, enabling the development of projects with more discretion, safety, functionality and operationality.

The main sources that serve as the basis for this study are the international documentation and standards of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of the North American Army (US Army), the work developed in Portugal

in this area expressed through written documents and oral testimonies and also the practical analysis of the Portuguese

Barracks in Lebanon.

2. Campaign military barracks

The Campaign Barracks are a set of military facilities and infrastructures that provide the safety and well-being

of the military during military missions, ensuring a functional, safe, economic and operational response in compliance

with them. They are divided into 11 functional areas that are grouped into service infrastructures (force protection,

communications, energy, water supply, waste management and climatization) and accommodation infrastructures (food,

hygiene, living, working, and logistics) [5].

They also have a temporal classification depending on the time of stay and type of presented buildings - organic

(less than 2 months), early (between 2 and 6 months), temporary between 6 months and 2 years, semi-permanent or

permanent over 2 years, being the distinction of the latter based on the percentage of facilities of a temporary or

permanent nature [5].

The design of a campaign barracks is a multidisciplinary exercise that takes into account many factors that are

different from mission to mission, which leads to the conclusion that there is no correct layout, just several possibilities

that enable the success of the mission [6]. Therefore, its planning is based on three important aspects, namely the

location school (land, access, nearby populations, etc.), the areas and functional spaces (spatial relationships and

interdependencies of facilities) and the layout design (size, number of military and vehicles, etc.).

The Portuguese military experience in this field are insufficiently documented and materialized, since similar

occurrences have taken place only in Africa during the colonial war in a different context, under a different threat and

with no functionality and organizational concerns [3].

3. Terrorist threat and system resilience

Carrying out a conceptual analysis of terrorism in a coherent way proves to be a complex task, given the wide

range of criteria which, historically, have changed its type, the geography of the operation, the organizational structure,

the target, the means employed and its modus operandi [7]. Trying to offer a cross-cutting definition to the various

perspectives, terrorism can be defined as the disproportionate and excessive use of violence that ignores any type of

legal, moral or humanitarian limitation, in order to maximize the psychological effect of terror, fear and insecurity [8].

It is a form of war that differs from conventional wars, with the inherent characteristics, for example, of

unpredictability and surprise, cruelty and spectacularity, exhaustive planning and effective and efficient implementation

that involves two forms of organization: pyramid (a leader who commands the subordinates) and network (decentralized

command structure) [9]. All these ideas will converge in the asymmetric attacks with high level of destruction in the

campaign barracks where military forces are stationed, and those are armed attacks, IED2 attacks, CBRN attacks, cyber

2 Improvised Explosive Device;

3

attacks and sabotage. These forms of attack require a new way of conceiving the barracks particularly in terms of

security and defence, with protective works (Hesco bastions and T-walls) and others like the bunkers, watchtowers,

shooting positions, obstacles and barriers and the big spectacle of the entrance and exit control device.

In short, the protection process of the stationed force is not in itself a final state, but a living and dynamic process

with the objective of complementing, repairing and constantly strengthening the protective works to face the new threats,

needs, innovations and tactical changes of the terrorist group [10]. For this reason, a stationed force must be capable

of developing a resilient nature.

The association of resilience in the campaign military barracks is, therefore, highlighted, since this is the ability

of a system to absorb a disturbance, undergo a change and essentially maintain the same function, structure, identity

and retroactions" [11]. Thus, the construction of a resilient system aims to remove or reduce the exposure of the

organizations to threats and hazards through the development of protective measures intended to reduce the probability

and the consequences of a disruptive event, responding effectively and efficiently [12]. In terms of campaign military

barracks it translates into three crucial pillars: protection and security (active and passive defence, redundancy, etc.),

planning (information, study, risk analysis, etc.) and responsiveness (military, logistics, functional, operational, etc.).

4. Case study: Lebanon Barracks

In support to the United Nations in resolving

the armed conflict in Lebanon, Portugal began its

participation in the UNIFIL3 on November 24, 2006

and ended it on June 27, 2012, in a total of 11

engineering contingents.

With that purpose in mind, a campaign military

barracks, called Ubique Camp, was built near

Shaama. This barracks comprises an area of 30 000 m2

with an outer perimeter of about 800 m (300 by 100).

4.1. Analysis and Temporal Evolution

Firstly, according to the NATO classification

(2008), this is a semi-permanent barracks since it had a

period of activity of over two years and mainly contained

infrastructures with a temporary nature (about 66%),

which indicates that the military mission would have a

limited time duration.

Regarding the development of the barracks over

time, it should be noted the first three years of mission,

when there was clearly a continued evolution of works

and living conditions, security and self-sustainability of the

force (about 80% of the full project), as shown in Figure 2.

3 UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. UNIFIL's mission is to assist the Lebanese Government in exercising sovereignty over its territory through the support to the Lebanese Armed Forces in stabilizing peace and security in the operations area, to ensure that it is not used for hostile activities of any kind and whenever request, support the Lebanese Government to maintain the security of its borders and entry points in order to prevent the recurrence of

hostilities and create the conditions for lasting peace [13].

Figure 1 – Portuguese barracks in Lebanon Source: ID archives

Figure 2 – Cumulative graph of the evolution of the construction of the Lebanon CMB

4

Lastly, it should be noted that the initial project conceived by the Army Infrastructure Directorate was not fully completed

due to land, economic, human and material and human resources conditioning factors, and other practical reasons.

4.2. Functional Analysis

At this point, the morphology, structure and

spatial organization of the barracks were analysed. It was

observed in the initial project a planned, regular and

heterogeneous morphology with a mesh that

approximates the cross-linked, however, afterwards, in

practice, it was concluded that this was rather uneven. As

structural elements, the command, the protective

structures, the parade, the arms depot, the entrance/exit

and the vehicles and military equipment (figure 3).

Regarding the spatial organization, an assessment of

the proximity and distance between the facilities of each

functional area was carried out using a scale from 1 (very far away) to 5 (very near) as shown in Figure 4.

The major conclusion is the proximity of the force

protection with the remaining functional areas, which

means that it should be integrated throughout the

barracks and not bounded only on the perimeter or the

entrances. It is thus a crucial element in the development

of the barracks so it is distinguished from the rest for not

being limited to a set of grouped or nearby facilities or

structures that perform or manage a function, but rather

a set of works that provide protection and safety to the

military and equipment distributed throughout the

barracks.

We also highlight the close proximity between the

communications and the areas aimed to the production

of energy and the great distance between the water

supply areas (including tanks) and septic tank (later WWTP) which is justified since there is no water pollution and

contamination, and also the close proximity between the sanitary facilities and climatization areas and the

accommodation, which is quite logical to ensure the comfort of the military.

4.3. Metrics Analysis

The design of the military barracks is based on principles of organization, functionality and safety, somewhat

similar to what is required in the planning of cities and urban spaces. In order to achieve a better assessment of the

organization and occupation of physical space in these barracks, one can find inspiration in urban rates currently used

in urban planning, with a view to building a basis for the comparison and analysis of the above mentioned principles.

The most relevant parameters carried out in this study are presented in Table 1.

Figure 3 – Layout of structural elements in the barracks

Figure 4 – Layout of structural elements in the barracks

5

Parameter Value

obtained Notes

Occupation rate 𝑖0=24.7 %

This rate is the ratio of the ground area occupied by buildings and the total area of the ground under study, i.e., the

relationship between the "full" (building) and the "empty" (building free ground), it is possible to realize that approximately

one quarter is ground which was used for the construction of facilities and infrastructures. It is a logical and acceptable

given the specifics of a military barracks with a temporary nature, involving space available for the development of other

activities, such as areas for car parking, protection areas, streets, etc.

Utilization rate 𝑖𝑢=0.3 This quotient expresses the quantity of building of a given plot of land, so that the value obtained is similar to a low-density

morphology since the amount of construction is not high.

Volumetric index 𝑖𝑉= 0.47

This index, in particular, does not seem to be very relevant or decisive in this type and analysis since most of the buildings

were only one floor buildings or with a relatively low ceiling, except for accommodation in 2 floors and the workshops with

a ceiling height of about 5 meters.

Density 𝑑=47 Military per

ha

The density value in urban areas is a parameter of comfort and well-being of the population, however, in the specific case

of the campaign military barracks, it can serve as a reference for its sizing, i.e., it can give an idea of the space required

for a barracks with a certain number of military. Like the class densities used in urban planning, it is advisable to create

low ranges, medium and high density of military personnel according to type of mission, length of stay and needs to

provide a quicker and easier project.

Percentage of free space

% 𝐸𝐿=16.95%

The percentage of free space may be, at most, compared to the percentage of public space in urban areas, so that the

value obtained is considerably lower than the one that is practiced in several neighbourhoods of Lisbon4. If eventually a

buffer zone (relief and protection area along the perimeter of the barracks) is proposed, this percentage increases very

quickly, and one could have values equal to or higher than those in the cities.

Percentage of waterproofed

area

% 𝐴𝑖𝑚𝑝=88.38%

The value obtained is quite high, which is expected to a military barracks due to the existence of paved circulation areas,

vehicles and machinery parking, etc. at the expense of green spaces such as gardens. It should be noted that at the early

stage of the construction of the barracks, there are quite permeable areas that only during its life cycle will become

waterproof.

Percentage of parking area

%𝐴𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒=7.7 % Regarding this value obtained, and since there is no basis of comparison, it may be useful for a future project, keeping

with a reference range between 5% and 10% of the area for vehicles and machinery parking.

Parking area per vehicle

𝐴𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒=32.4 m2

Comparing this value with the reference values in [15], one knows that the floor space for parking can vary essentially

between 20 and 30 square meters. The value obtained is slightly higher, however, it is totally acceptable since in the

military missions, vehicles are generally heavy and therefore if the value obtained were higher, it would also be credible.

Capitation of military

equipment

𝐶𝑒𝑞 = 50.2 𝑚2

per military

The value obtained is higher than the reference value used in the cities (between 20-30 m2/person) and that can be

justified by the high number of military equipment required for the fulfilment of the mission and the needs of the military.

Capitation of leisure areas

𝐶𝐿𝑧 = 21.5 𝑚2 per military

In terms of this parameter, given that there is no strong reference for comparing and being in the military context under a

particular threat, this low area value per military is justified, however, it is of the utmost importance to understand and

study the impact of leisure and relaxation areas of the military so that their psychological component remains unchanged

throughout the mission.

Capitation of subsoil areas

𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 3.4 𝑚2 per military

This value intends to understand the space reserved for each military inside the bunkers. This type of facilities is only

used in case of emergency. So, the value obtained is quite reasonable, since the compression humanly acceptable levels

may be close to that presently used in transport systems. Can the accommodation in bunkers endure in time due to the

threat, may establish a limit that matches the sufficient deck area of existence for all military personnel, for example, to

lie down on the floor with a minimum of convenience (can If considered by military 2x1m) which would place the limit

between 2 and 3m2 for military. Still, it should be noted that this value may be decreased, since the bunkers are also

prepared for storage of supplies and equipment, communications area and ward.

4.4. Security and protection analysis The threats to the military barracks in the Lebanese theatre of operations were mainly based on Hezbollah, a

political and military organization of Lebanon Shia Muslims, created in 1982 in the context of the southern invasion of

Lebanon by Israel. The organization has a broad spectrum of action capabilities, including the planning and execution

of terrorist attacks, the use of conventional combat and/or guerrilla, the use of advanced technology and very

sophisticated equipment and also a psychological action capacity that is extremely accurate and enhanced when used

in the areas of influence which facilitated the support of the people.

The main actions were the use of undercover agents, IED attacks, VBIED5 attacks, VBIED suicide attacks,

rockets and grenades launching, snipers attacks, kidnapping and abduction.

Figure 5 shoes a few examples of protective works carried out by the Portuguese military in the barracks.

4 Values compared to those presented in [14]. 5 Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device – is an improvised explosive device placed within a car or other vehicle and then detonated. It is often used as a terror weapon or to kill people or create damage to buildings near the blast site since they can transport a large quantity of explosives without attracting suspicious.

Table 1 – Metrics evaluation

6

Hesco bastions

Watchtowers

Fence (barbed wire)

Bunker

Used in most of the barracks perimeter, but also within it,

serve as protection of facilities and infrastructures. Easy shape

and quick to execute which allows immediate protection.

3 watchtowers were used in this barracks. They allow for a large capacity of observation

throughout the entire area surrounding the barracks. They are mounted in two stages, the first being the attachment of the prefabricated

metal structure to the ground and the second the placing of the circular metallic box on the top.

It is a form of control and separation of the outer perimeter and that was widely used at the beginning of the construction of the barracks while there were no other materials and equipment.

Protective work which provides greater security to the military as it serves as a shelter against a

possible attack. In this barracks, two bunkers were built allowing

the refuge of all military and some supplies.

Patrol path

Shooting position

T-Walls

Entrance and exit control

device This type of works is mainly

intended for the prevention or surveillance that requires the

existence of an easily passable patrol path for a good and rapid detection of potential threats or

attacks outside.

In addition to the watchtowers, there were along the perimeter of the barracks various shooting

positions. Here their mission was not the surveillance, but to provide the barracks with the capability of responding to outside threats trying

to immediately eliminate outbreaks from the enemies.

Reinforced concrete element usually used as a protection of buildings or delimitation of the

barracks perimeter. High element that prevents the ability

to watch the interior from the outside.

It serves to reduce the speed of vehicles approaching the

barracks, control their approach, inspect and if necessary

immobilize or restrict their movements.

Since the protection of the force is a crucial point in the course of all activities, a set of security measures was

outlined to be adopted by the military in their daily lives, in their work activities and in the fulfilment of the mission.

To conclude the synthesis of the protection and security it is of utmost importance to note that the Hezbollah

did not make any attack or attempt to attack the Portuguese barracks, there were no occurrences associated with the

other threats identified in the preceding chapter nor the occurrence of any type of accident with the Portuguese military,

and therefore the overall balance was very positive.

5. Methodological Contributions

5.1. Temporal nature of a CMB

The campaign military barracks assume immediately a temporary nature, as they may last only a few months

or remain in operation for several years and therefore the essence of their planning, design and construction is based

on the temporary nature. They may present different variants that initially depend on the form of construction, after the

occurrence or not of terrorist attacks over time and ultimately the final purpose given to the barracks.

Figure 6 suggests the evolution of living conditions and vulnerabilities throughout the various phases in order to

characterize the CMB.

The vulnerabilities and living conditions only begin to be quantified from phase 3 which corresponds to the work

or construction of the CMB. Here the level of vulnerability of the military force stationed reaches a maximum (option I)

for what it may be alleviated if, for example, a security force is deployed while building the barracks, thus decreasing

this value (option 2). At this stage, the living conditions increase slowly.

Phase 4 is the only one whose temporal bar cannot be quantified. Although four years have been defined in

Figure 6 (value similar to the one in the case study), variants may occur. The first corresponds to option I in which,

during the occupation and operation of the CMB, no type of attack occurs, limiting the vulnerability to a reduced level

and maintaining the living conditions at a high level. The second variant (option II) represents the existence of attacks

Figure 5 – Protective works

7

on the barracks which

immediately causes an

increase in the vulnerabilities

and the consequent decrease

in living conditions due to the

destruction or incapacitation

of some facilities.

Phase 5 corresponds

to the final stage of the

barracks, and here we may

have some solutions to its

outcome. The first solution

consists of a theorized

solution that involves the full

dismantling and destruction of all facilities and infrastructures (Option I) in which vulnerability increases slightly at the

beginning of the dismantling and then falls sharply, such as living conditions since it ceases to exist. The second

possibility corresponds to a partial dismantling of the facilities in which facilities are subsequently used for a purpose

other than the military purpose, and then the living conditions will decrease slightly (Option II) or suffer some

improvement (Option IV) or even maintain the same (Option III). Regarding the vulnerabilities, if the intention is a new

use other than the military purposes, then the threat no longer makes sense and vulnerability ceases to exist (Option

III). Finally, the CMB may not be dismantled, i.e., it may be given to another military force on mission or even donated

to the host nation as a military base, and thus the threat level (Option II) remains as the life conditions (Option III).

Only knowing the stages of evolution of a CMB in detail, its design and its construction can be improved both in

terms of safety, functionality, economy and operationality.

5.2. Adaptation Strategies In addition to the concepts of defence and protection of the barracks and the wide range of security measures

to be adopted by the military throughout the mission, it is necessary to outline adaptation strategies of the military force

during the mission period. In this context, inherently arises the idea of the barracks resilience as a way to combat its

vulnerabilities that are based on three vectors:

Reduce exposure and risk factors;

Improve the sturdiness of systems, i.e., their ability to deal with adverse situations;

Improve the resilience of systems, i.e., their ability to recover from unsatisfactory conditions;

Based on these assumptions, we present in Table 2 a set of recommendations to provide a CMB with increased

resilient capacity over time given the terrorist threat. The set of measures presented are divided into two groups, namely

the detection, control and prevention (E1) and those related to combat, protection and adaptation (E2). With this set of

measures it is intended to increase the resilience of a barracks and facilitate the decisions to be adopted in everyday

activities developed within the campaign barracks on mission.

Figure 6 – Full life cycle of a CMB

8

5.3. Security and Protection

Regarding the security and protection, it is

suggested, as for the buildings, the adoption of the

concept of lines of defence (figure 7). The lines of

defence are a concept and consist in the definition of

concentric lines (perimeters) with respect to a building

and/or "property" that requires protection, where

different areas correspond to the different security

strategies [16].

The first line of defence is related to security

along the outer perimeter of the barracks and there is

between the perimeter and the barracks itself a safety

distance/empty space that functions as a buffer zone

(security buffer). It should also be taken into account

everything that surrounds the barracks, namely the type

of land use, the construction types, the nature of the

activities carried out, etc. These are some of the factors

that should be the focus of permanent and

comprehensive study to foresee and prevent the

planning, preparation and execution of terrorist attacks.

The second line of defence is part of the

security along the barracks outer perimeter itself with all types of protective works, such as Hesco bastions, T-Walls,

fences, outdoor lighting, access control, shooting and observation positions, etc. There should also be an easy and

convenient field of observation and communication between the first and the second line of defence.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

ADAPTATION STRATEGY IN A CAMPAIGN MILITARY BARRACKS

Control and monitoring of personnel providing services within the barracks;

Avoid placing unoccupied containers and areas for storage of materials along circulation areas and other public access areas since they may be used for the placement of IEDs;

Dissemination and sharing of information to all military about threats, types of attacks and measures to be taken in case of attack;

The force stationed should practice response drills and procedures to be adopted in the event of various types of attacks;

Carry out periodic inspections to the operation and conditions of the various services;

Paths and roads with fast connections and easy access between facilities and infrastructures to enable a quick escape or shelter;

In all the works in contact or exposed to the outside of barracks, place monitoring devices and motion sensors;

Creation of models and databases in order to assist the management of the space (control of areas) and relief operations in case of attack;

Provide the military force with equipment and trained staff to proceed with the disinfection and cleaning of facilities and equipment after a possible CBRN attack;

Adopt physical systems that require the reduction of vehicles speed and allow a careful inspection, and are provided with devices able to immobilize and destroy the vehicles;

Strong military capacity adapted to the field and the military in the shooting positions capable of responding to the outside;

Creation of positions for vehicles and military sheltered by land or by human construction to respond to possible air strikes.

Provide all facilities with firefighting means, namely fire extinguishers;

Full coverage of the barracks grounds with firefighting means, including hoses and points of water supply;

Camouflage and disguise of works or highly important infrastructures or facilities used for storing resources and relevant armament;

Use of modular and prefabricated facilities in less important activities/in activities with less presence of military that, when destroyed, are easy, quick and cheap to build;

Use of organic means to maintain communications (transmissions military vehicles);

Creation of response and defence plans in case of attack

Creation of redundant facilities distributed throughout the barracks;

E2 - Combat, protection and adaptation

Creation of software able to detect attacks on our communications and also that enables to plug up the enemy’s communications;

Comprehensive study and information sharing with other forces and entities about the active terrorist groups;

Invest on the flexibility of some facilities and activities over time to confuse and hinder possible target facilities;

Avoid concentration of various facilities and activities since in case of attack they increase the damages substantially and decrease the force's operationality;

Use of outdoor sports facilities and other places to hide and camouflage important facilities;

Creation of escape and evacuation points in installations where there is the presence of military;

Require compliance with all safety measures and procedures provided for all the military in their daily lives in all activities in the barracks;

Observation and surveillance of permanent outer perimeter;

Creation of a network of information sources external to the barracks;

Use of cameras, lights and motion sensors on the perimeter of the barracks;;

E1 - Detection, control and prevention

Strengthen the protection of all the works in contact or exposed to the outside with coatings, building materials or natural elements;

Redundancy of facilities for power supply and distributed throughout the barracks;

In case of sabotage of the water supply network or the tanks, create quick and effective detection filters to prevent poisoning or spread of diseases;

Change, if necessary or possible, road traffic lanes, near the most critical areas, as an indirect way to control of movement and access;

Provide, in the immediate vicinity of the most critical areas, wooded areas and/or creation of fountains and lakes that work as natural barriers, increasing the distances;

In the specific case of bunkers, they should serve as a refuge to face CBRN attacks, explosives, rockets;

The bunkers must be prepared to accommodate not only the military, but groceries, armament and communications equipment for a period of 48 hours;

Change the position on the grounds of a bunker in case of enemy attack that causes its destruction, hindering a new enemy onslaught;

Redundancy of medical supplies and spaces, in addition to the ward, capable of supporting this type of activities;

Storage of bottled water in sufficient quantity in the event of emergency or attack;

Isolation with protective barriers and building and natural elements throughout the areas intended for dangerous weapons and military equipment;

Figure 7 – Scheme of lines of defense

Table 2 – Adaptation Strategies

9

Lastly, the third line of defence is associated with the facilities and infrastructures themselves, particularly in

terms of the architecture, the structural elements and the building elements. It should also take into account the

concealment or camouflage of some infrastructures and the construction of bunkers.

In short, the adoption of this defence concept adapted to the barracks is suggested, in which the main innovation

is the adoption of the security buffer between the first and the second line of defence.

5.4. Other Contributions

At this point it is of the utmost importance to present some ideas that work as guidelines for a future barracks

project that have not yet been proposed in this text and that result from the assessment and the case study analysis

and the author's personal opinion.

Some proposals for amendments with regard to the NATO doctrine (2008) related to the functional areas are

suggested, namely:

Elimination of the functional area of climatization and its integration in the functional area of energy due to the

little relevance presented throughout the case study, both in terms of area occupation and in terms of relations

among the other functional areas;

Adoption of a functional area associated to the possible existence of heliports, since they require specific

facilities and infrastructures that differ from the other functional areas (such as track, warehouses, etc.). They

deserve special attention due to the dimensions (areas) and their function.

In terms of the layout and shape of the barracks, to adopt simple shapes, preferably quadrangular with one or

two main axes, a patrol path along the entire perimeter and secondary axes connecting to the main axis; Thus, the

shapes, layout and organization of the barracks should be as simple as possible in order to avoid big detours and

distance from functional areas and to allow easy movement and communication with the different activities. In addition,

here must be a concern to put the activities and nearby facilities of which complement each other or have a common

function, also because the lattice structure is the one with more flexibility in adapting and adjusting before unexpected

situations.

In case of projected barracks which remain in operation for over 6 years, to develop and create sustainable

solutions in terms of the functional areas of food, energy, waste management (construction of WWTP) and water supply

promoting as far as possible, the self-sufficient unit (solar energy, waste composting, water storage tanks rain, etc.).

Lastly, in terms of spatial sizing, it is proposed the adoption of some of the previously calculated urban

parameters or, at least, of the same order of magnitude, such as for example, the utilization rate, the occupancy rate,

the area intended for parking, the capitation of the subsoil area, the percentage of area intended for streets and even

the percentage of area intended for parking.

6. Conclusions and future developments

It is concluded that the ideas and principles of design of permanent barracks, namely the functional areas, the

interdependency closeness and distance relationships, and the spatial organization are a good working basis for the

design of campaign barracks. In these, a good solution will include the integration of facilities and protective structures

around the barracks, with a robust and lasting character and with redundancy to ensure manoeuvre space and time to

the military.

Thus, as the cities, also the barracks must be increasingly more resilient, i.e., capable of not only withstand the

adversities but also to adapt to new realities, threats and attacks, and that is why protection must be an essential concern

when planning and designing, and primary concern throughout the barracks life cycle.

10

It is concluded that the establishment of standards and benchmarks for campaign military barracks that work as

aids to its sizing is required, but in order to achieve that it is necessary to carry out an comprehensive study of the

various campaign barracks projects associated with the types of missions, needs, number of men and women, etc.

However, the values calculated in the Lebanon barracks could serve as the first reference/basis for the development of

this topic.

This mission has also served as an opportunity for the Portuguese military and the Military Engineering to

enhance their expertise and implement all that is theorized during peacetime, namely the construction of a campaign

barracks and the use of the most varied equipment and techniques during the mission.

In brief, with this study about the Portuguese barracks in Lebanon, not only the real importance of this mission

for the development of the Portuguese Army capacities is presented, but also the analysis that should continue to be

carried out in order to achieve a sound basis of knowledge in this area. In the future, this dissertation intends to contribute

to:

Create of a Portuguese handbook about campaign barracks;

Develop of a computer application that allows managing all the conditioning factors and parameters involved in

the design of a campaign barracks and can generate alternative configurations of the same;

Study of operating (or service) metrics that are of interest for the management of the barracks and the mission,

such as the number of exits/campaigns, mileage, fuel consumption, amounts of materials, equipment, etc;

Develop of similar studies in several campaign barracks of other armies and compare the results obtained in

order to reach a general conclusion;

Deepen the concept of resilience at a militarily level and how to deal with it in terms of organization and

command.

Bibliographic References

[1] Ramos, Major ENG José Augusto Gonçalves, (1970a). Fortificação e Arquitetura Militar, 2.º Volume 1ª Parte – Noções Gerais

dos Aquartelamentos e seus Edifícios, Serviços Gráficos da Academia Militar, Lisboa.

[2] S.n. (1938). Notas sobre Elaboração de Projetos de Quartéis, Revista Militar, nº7, Lisboa.

[3] Picado, Arquiteto Rui Manuel Silva Coelho, 2014. Interviewed by Nuno Alves in Direção de Infraestruturas do Exército (Lisboa)

a 27 de October de 2014;

[4] Mascarenhas, Tenente-General António (2011). “A Engenharia Militar Portuguesa − Evolução e Ação no 3.º Quartel do Século

XX − Áreas a Investigar”, Jornal do Exército, nº 603, pp 16-25;

[5] NATO (2008). NATO Guide for Field Accommodation, Land Capability Group 7 on Battlefield – Mobility and Engineer Support;

[6] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2009). BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, Washington DC;

[7] Laqueur, Walter (2003). No End to War, Terrorism in The Twenty-First Century, 1ª edição, The Continuum Internacional

Publishing Group Inc, Nova Iorque;

[8] Martins, Raúl François Carneiro (2010). Acerca de “Terrorismo” e de “Terrorismos”, Cadernos do IDN, Instituto de Defesa

Nacional, Lisboa;

[9] CIA, Central Intelligence Agency (2003). https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-

terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf (accessed in 26/04/2015);

[10] Headquarters Department of the Army (2009). Protection FM 3-37, Washington DC, PIN: 085751-000;

[11] Walker, B., C. S. Holling, S. R. Carpenter, e A. Kinzig (2004). “Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological

systems”, Ecology and Society;

[12] McAslan, Alastair (2010). “Organisational Resilience: Understanding the Concept and its Apllication”, Torrens Resilience

Institute, Adelaide, Australia;

[13] Maio, Cor Hermínio, Fernandes, TCor Monteiro, Pires, TCor Manuel, Couto, TCor Vale, TCor, Almeida, João, Costa, TCor

Martins, … Pio, SCh Carlos, (2012). Ao Serviço da Paz: A Engenharia Militar Portuguesa na UNIFIL, Tancos.

[14] Salgado, Manuel e Lourenço, Nuno (2006). Atlas Urbanístico de Lisboa. 1ª edição, Argumentum edições, Lisboa, ISBN: 978-

972-8479-46-6;

[15] IMTT (2011). Site do Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes Terrestres,

http://www.conferenciamobilidade.imtt.pt/pacmob/politicas_estacionamento/Politicas_de_Estacionamento_Marco2011.pdf,

accessed in 16/09/2015;

[16] Conceição, Luís Filipe Marques dos Santos (2008). Proteção e Segurança de Edifícios face a Ataques Terroristas. Lisboa,

Master's thesis for obtaining the Master's Degree in Military Engineering, Instituto Superior Técnico;