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2012 11: 242 originally published online 19 March 2012Planning TheoryThomas Hartmann

managementWicked problems and clumsy solutions: Planning as expectation

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Corresponding author:Thomas Hartmann, Utrecht University, Faculty of Geosciences, Department Human Geography and Planning, PO-Box 80 115, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands Email: [email protected]

Wicked problems and clumsy solutions: Planning as expectation management

Thomas HartmannUtrecht University, The Netherlands

AbstractIn 1973, Horst W Rittel and Malvin A Webber introduced the term ‘wicked problem’ in planning theory. They describe spatial planning as dealing with inherent uncertainty, complexity and inevitable normativity. This contribution picks up the concept of wicked problems, reflects on it from a planning-theoretical perspective, and proposes the use of Cultural Theory’s concept of clumsy solutions as a response to wicked planning problems. In discussing public participation processes in spatial planning, it is then shown what clumsy solutions mean for spatial planning. The four rationalities of Cultural Theory are then used to explain why public participation in planning can become wicked, and how these rationalities provide a response that copes with this wickedness.

Keywordspolyrationality, participation, expectation management, uncertainty, complexity

Introduction

How should we plan? Two theoretical concepts are brought together here to reflect on this fundamental question of planning theory: the concept of wicked problems, which Horst W Rittel and Melvin A Webber developed in their 1973 paper on dilemmas in a general theory of planning (Rittel and Webber, 1973), and clumsy solutions, which origi-nates from Cultural Theory and has been developed by Marco Verweij, Michael Thompson and their colleagues (Verweij et al., 2006). The combination of the two con-cepts offers a new perspective on wicked spatial planning problems. Clumsy solutions, namely, advise us not to pursue perfect solutions for uncertain, complex and normative problems, but rather to search for just-viable solutions, which are less perfect, but there-fore responsive to different rationalities (Verweij et al., 2006). In doing so, in this paper I develop Davy’s (2008) claim to explore the ‘frontiers of polyrationality’.

440427 PLT11310.1177/1473095212440427HartmannPlanning Theory

2012

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This paper consists of three main parts: wicked problems, clumsy solutions, and the combination and application of both for spatial planning. In the first part, we explore the relevance of the concept of wicked problems for contemporary spatial planning theory. Spatial planning faces different expectations, interrelations and norms, which make plan-ning inherently uncertain, complex and normative. Planning theory, it is asserted, has not yet found an answer to such wicked problems. The second part of the paper introduces Cultural Theory and its theorems: the four rationalities – each representing one particular type of expectation – and the impossibility theorem, which states that these four are rep-resented in every social situation. At the end of part two, the concept of clumsy solutions is outlined. In part three I discuss how the concept of clumsy solutions could resolve wicked problems by using the fourfold scheme of expectations and its rationalities. The concept is then applied to participation (exemplary for other planning methods), to show how the different expectations from clumsy solutions could be used for participation processes in spatial planning. Finally, a claim is made for a purposeful management of expectations as a viable way to provide clumsy solutions.

Wicked planning problems

‘Planning problems are inherently wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 160). Planning encompasses the determination of the way from an observed condition to a desired con-dition. Rittel and Webber explain that during the industrial and post-war periods, plan-ning addressed problems that appeared to be relatively easy – ‘definable, understandable and consensual’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 156): infrastructure needed to be improved, wastewater treated, houses built or reconstructed, industrial areas provided and so on. This period of tame problems was over in the 1970s (Baum, 1977). Planning theorists then started to reject rationalism (Baum, 1977) and positivism (Allmendinger, 2002) as the prevalent paradigm, since it was unable to cope with the inherent uncertainties and complexities of planning problems: planning problems became wicked.

A wicked problem can be characterized by the following properties: it cannot be definitively formulated, it has no ‘stopping rule’ and it is always unique (and so is its solution). A solution to a wicked problem is not ‘true-or-false’, but ‘good-or-bad’; such a solution cannot be tested, and there are no enumerable options of solutions. In addition, a wicked problem can be considered as a symptom of another problem, and the choice of explaining a wicked problem determines the problem’s resolution. Such problems are never solved; ‘at best they are only re-solved – over and over again’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 160). Planning theorists are discussing different approaches to coping with such wicked planning problems, and recent discussions have identified uncertainty, complex-ity and normativity as inherent to spatial planning (see e.g. De Roo and Silvia, 2010; Gunder and Hillier 2009; Hillier, 2010).

Uncertainty

Uncertainty results from the inability to derive future outcomes rationally from certain activities, because there is more than one rational expectation of the future (Renn, 2008: 1). Most definitions of spatial planning contain ‘the future’ and ‘space’ in a wider or narrower



244 Planning Theory 11(3)

sense (Hillier, 2010: 12–13). So, planners need to make decisions about the future, without knowing it. This procedure is a challenge for spatial planning – or as the authors put it in the title of their article, a ‘dilemma in a general theory of planning’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973). To some extent, planners need to guess (Paterson, 2007: 516) and experiment (Hillier, 2010: 14). This situation incorporates uncertainty, which can lead to unexpected results. For example, for a long time, planning was growth-oriented (many Building Codes contain regulations predominantly for growing cities); it was thus rational to subsidize private building activity and provide building land on greenfield sites; in many European countries planners now seek regulations to cope with shrinking cities or land thrift (Davy, 2009). In the 1980s, planners tried to realize the car-friendly city; now planners and policy-makers endeavour to keep cars out of city centres, with tolls for example (as in London). Spatial planners have permitted building on riverside property; now, they try to restrict such developments, since they have become inappropriate in the wake of increasing flood risk (Hartmann, 2011). It cannot be predicted whether or not past spatial plans have been in line with what present or future planners want to achieve. The uncertainty results from the inability of humans to foresee – to expect – what will happen in the future. The unexpected disturbs what planners design as the achievable planning result – and makes spatial plan-ning wicked. Finally, planners have to deal with the unexpected (Bertolini, 2010: 82).

Complexity

Planning theory ought to provide answers that help planners cope with the unexpected, but ‘there is no universal accepted or rationally required strategy for evaluating different options with uncertain consequences’ (Renn, 2008: 42). This uncertainty is also reflected in planning theory: there is no single comprehensive planning theory out there (Hendriks, 1999: 426; Hillier, 2010: 3); rather, planning theory consists of various theories from many disciplines (Needham, 1988: 11). Allmendinger showed in developing a post-positivist typology of planning theories that planning theory has become more fragmented and more pluralistic (Allmendinger, 2002). In the past few decades, paradigm shifts have taken place in society and also in spatial planning, leading us into a ‘post-positivist’, ‘post-industrial’, ‘post-Fordism’ or ‘post-modern’ era (Hendriks, 1999: 425). We will not elaborate the (partially slight) differences between these shifts, because for this contribution the impor-tant outcome of all these post-isms is that, in the past few decades, planning theorists have recognized that the identification of the causes of a situation in a complex network goes beyond rationalist reasoning (De Roo and Silvia, 2010; Gunder and Hillier, 2009).

This complexity implies that establishing a line of argument along objectively rational axioms based on rationalistic methods and bureaucratic rules is not easy (Baum, 1977: 409). Planners have lost confidence in top-down hierarchical planning. Planning with perspectivistic incrementalism (Schmals, 1999), planning by projects, or mixed scanning (Etzioni, 1967) are all attempts to cope with complexity.

Normativity

What makes planning even more difficult is the insight that planners invariably apply a certain concept of justice – and, in so doing, reject other concepts of justice (Davy, 1997:



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255). This normative implication of planning decisions, combined with the uncertainty and complexity, makes planning even more wicked. We can conclude that there is no single truth in spatial planning, but rather pluralism (Hendriks, 1999: 425). In other words, different stakeholders have different answers, because they perceive the world through different lenses (Baum, 1977: 414). So, different perceptions and concerns of different stakeholders constrain spatial planning (Bertolini, 2010: 83). Planning is seen ‘as situated “in between” conflicting or at least disputing parties’ (Forester, 2004: 246). Facts and values are inseparably mixed up in planning processes (Allmendinger, 2002: 84).

As a consequence, each planning decision affects the values of stakeholders. Consultation and deliberation do not help in such situations because ‘one cannot use the term “truth” without the required quotation marks’ (Van Eeten, 1999: 3). The assumption that conflicts can be resolved by bringing the conflicting parties together around a round-table is a ‘mental shortcut’ (Billé, 2008). Rather, wicked problems are like dialogues of the deaf: ‘In a dialogue of the deaf we are confronted with policy arguments that lead in fundamentally different directions’ (Van Eeten, 1999: 6). In this highly political field, doubts and dilemmas are inevitable (Healey, 2009: 444). This situation challenges plan-ners in practice because it takes away the idea of detached and objective spatial planners, and frames them instead as players in a political game (Forester, 1996: 254). The ‘clients’ of ‘city planners’ – citizens, investors, land users – became ‘restive’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 155), because ‘people not only have interest; they care about them as well’ (Forester, 1996: 256). We can conclude so far that spatial planning is not only inherently uncertain and complex, but it also contains a normative dimension.

Finally, uncertainty is an inherent feature of dealing with the future; the complexity is a result of a failure of rationalism, and the normative emerges from the necessity that planners make decisions in a highly political field. This uncertainty, complexity and normativity cannot be resolved by using rational arguments, because of the manifold expectations about the aims and means of spatial planning. This multiplicity makes it swicked. Already in 1977, Baum had found that a theory to analyse this diversity of expectations of the world could help planners (Baum, 1977: 415). Such a theory should help them think differently (Forester, 1996: 241). A theory is needed that is capable of reducing the number of possible rational expectations without neglecting pluralism. Such a theory would help planners face the uncertainty, complexity and normative of planning – thus it would help resolve wicked problems.

Cultural Theory provides a model to reduce the number of possible expectations to four. The theory distinguishes four rationalities: hierarchism, individualism, egalitarian-ism,1 and fatalism. The two main reasons for taking a closer look at this theory are: four is a manageable number of rationalities, and the theory does not blame other rationalities, but makes it possible to analyse its pluralism (Douglas, 1999: 411).

Cultural Theory’s four expectations

Mary Douglas, an anthropologist, is acknowledged to be the founder of Cultural Theory. Thompson, Wildavsky and Ellis and others developed the theory referred to as ‘Cultural Theory’ (Ellis and Thompson, 1997; Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990). Although Benjamin Davy brought the theory as the ‘Theory of Polyrationality’2




into the field of spatial planning (Davy, 1997, 2008), it does not yet seem to be well rec-ognized in the discipline.

The four

Basically, the theory is built on a simple scheme to distinguish the rationalities of hier-archism, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism: the grid-and-group scheme. This assumes that every social action can be assigned to two independent dimensions: grid and group. Grid indicates the extent to which a decision-maker is bounded (actually: bounds itself) to externally imposed structure, rules and prescriptions. A high grid stands, accordingly, for heteronymous decision-making; a weak grid refers to a high degree of self-determination. The second dimension – group– indicates whether an indi-vidual is likely to join a group or prefers to act as an individual. The higher the group dimension, the more group-bounded is the decision made (see for more details Thompson et al., 1990). The theory, however, gives no explanation of where the two dimensions come from; it just ascertains that these two dimensions form a diagram with four quadrants: high grid/low group, high grid/high group and so forth. Rationalities can be located in each quadrant, each as a combination of the two dimensions grid and group (see Figure 1).

Each rationality is driven by particular expectations about how the world reacts to interventions, the ‘myths of nature’ (Thompson et al., 1990: 27). The scheme is depicted with icons of a ball in a landscape. The ball represents the world; the landscape repre-sents the behavioural characteristics of the world towards interventions (Thompson et al., 1990: 25–37). With the help of the myths of nature, the characteristics of each rationality can be explained. The descriptions below are derived to a great extent from the Schwarz and Thompson overview of the rationalities (1990: 66–67).

STRONG GRID

STR

ON

G

GR

OU

PWE

AK

G

RO

UP

WEAK GRID

hierarchism

egalitarianismindividualism

fatalism

Figure 1. The grid-and-group scheme of Cultural Theory, derived from Schwarz & Thompson, 1990: 9. Reprinted with permission of the University of Pennsylvania Press.



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Egalitarianism. Egalitarianism3 envisions the world lying on top of a hill in unstable equi-librium. There is an inherent threat that even a small disturbance will destroy the equilib-rium irreversibly. Consequently, the world is perceived as being in danger, and nature is ephemeral; an urgent response is recommended. From this perspective, it is rational not to experiment – because an experiment may fail, but there is no scope for failures, as they are irreversible and have severe consequences. In the grid-and-group scheme, this ratio-nality is assigned to a high degree of group, and a low degree of grid. For egalitarianism, the result of an action is more important than the process; worry or moral responsibility are reasons for taking action; equality, democracy and community are higher values than individual liberty or institutional integrity, for instance. The preferred concept of justice is the concept of social justice, as represented by John Rawls, or environmental justice movements (Rawls, 2005).

Recent discussions of spatial planning and planning theory ask for more participative and collaborative approaches. For example ‘communicative planning’ promotes planning which minimizes inequalities of power by participation (Huxley, 2000: 369). Klaus Selle advises that planning should be carried out less by law and regulations and more by con-sensus and cooperation (see e.g. Selle, 2000). Healey describes ‘collaborative planning’ as an interactive governance process (Healey, 2003: 104). Such approaches not only reflect an egalitarian rationality to a great extent, but also neglect the other rationalities. For example, Ostrom promotes community-based planning schemes, because hierarchical planning schemes tend to fail to govern the complexity of the world (Ostrom, 2007). That these assignments of the different approaches are just rough simplifications is evident. However, the assignment of the ideas about planning makes sense in contrast with the other rationalities.

Individualism. Individualism pursues an opposite expectation of how the world reacts to interventions. The landscape looks more like a valley; the world seems to lie below in the valley. This situation is rather robust. A disturbance might move the ball to the right or the left, but in the end it always rolls back down again. Accordingly, individuals can experiment with the world and each fault is also an opportunity to benefit from it. There is no inherent need to cooperate or act in a group; rather, self-determination and indi-vidual liberty are the important values. The most severe risk according to this rationality is inefficiency through market failure. Individualism values performance; the preferred concept of justice is elitist justice (Davy, 1997).

For planning, individualism advises neoliberal schemes, but experimental planning approaches are also welcome. Spatial planning has to serve economic welfare and achieve efficient allocations and, very crucially, has to respect individual property rights. Representatives of an individualistic spatial planning theory would have to be searched for in the economics field: Ronald Coase, for example, would certainly be a supporter. Another result of individualistic spatial planning, is the trend in European urban policy towards more regional competitiveness (Frank, 2006: 51). Individualism provides a rational explanation for tradable development rights, active land policy and other com-petitive planning schemes, which lead to public-private partnerships in municipal plan-ning (Heinz, 1993), or more project-oriented planning experiments such as during the Emscher-Park International Building Exhibition in the 1990s (see e.g. Kurth et al., 1999).




Although it rejects over-restrictive planning, individualism is not against spatial plan-ning completely. Rather, spatial planning has to facilitate economic development, as Sorensen and Day (1981) point out in their piece about ‘libertarian planning’. These ideas are opposed to the concepts assigned to egalitarianism, but they also differ funda-mentally from the hierarchic rationality.

Hierarchism. As in egalitarian rationality, hierarchism expects the world to lie on top of a hill – but in contrast with egalitarianism, there is a dip on top so that the equilibrium is relatively robust. There is some scope for trial and error, but only within certain boundar-ies. Beyond these, the world is falling down, the equilibrium has been destroyed. Accord-ing to this expectation, planners need to have expert knowledge about the scope of flexibility within this dip on top of the hill and determine the boundaries. A rational way of doing this is to set up rules and regulations. Hierarchism therefore needs a strong group adhesion and a strong grid. According to this rationality, nested levels of hierarchy are important to maintain the equilibrium. The ideal of fairness of hierarchism is utilitar-ian justice. As in Thomas Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’, the members of society (thus, strong group adhesion is essential) give power to an institution. Members of the group are equal in the process (equality before the law); the integrity of the institutions is important in keeping the ball on top of the hill.

Hierarchism promotes top-down planning. The technocratic planner – balancing dif-ferent interests, finding the optimal allocation of land uses and determining them in a binding land-use plan based on expert knowledge – acts according to hierarchism. Such ‘traditional’ planning aims to control land use (Albrechts, 2004: 744). One argument for such hierarchism in planning is the legal certainty it provides (Albrechts, 2004: 745). Another line of argument arises from the tragedy of the commons, which leads to the claim for stronger planning hierarchies (e.g. Wegener, 2012).

Fatalism. The fourth corner in the diagram accommodates fatalism. The perception that we cannot know how the world reacts, and we cannot influence events, is depicted by a flat landscape in which the world (the ball) lies. This conception results in a fatalistic rationality. This is not a rationality of indifference, but a rationality where individuals do not believe in the controllability of the world. The strong grid is externally determined and, owing to the weak group dimension, exerting influence on the grid is not possible. This rationality does not believe in justice at all, just in luck. In contrast with the active competition of rational ideas between Egalitarianism, Individualism and Hierarchism, Fatalism is the passive rationality of the four.

This rationality neglects planning because of the complexity and wickedness of the world. If one expects the world to be set up according to this rationality, planning scepti-cism is a rational response.

Why four?

Several questions arise from the explanations above. First: why four? Are there not more rationalities? But also: How do they interrelate? What is the relevance for wicked plan-ning problems? I address these questions in the following sections.



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Cultural Theory confines the number of rationalities to four. This number reflects a simplification. There might be graduations along the grid and group axes, which lead to a subdivision of more rationalities.4 Also, adding a third dimension to the grid-and-group scheme would increase the number of rationalities. But four seems to be a reasonable number of rationalities to manage their pluralism, but complex enough to avoid dualisms (e.g. state vs. market, top-down vs. bottom-up, macro vs. micro), which often lead to discussions about the preferred option (Thompson et al., 1990: 21). The four rationalities provide a system of plausible rather than empirically demonstrably true cultures (ration-alities) (Dake, 1992: 24) – although there has been some empirical proof for the exist-ence of the four rationalities (see e.g. Dake, 1992; Rippl, 2001).

Besides the reasonable and manageable number of rationalities, the second advantage of using Cultural Theory is that it facilitates the analysis of a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, in which ‘the arguments that drive the controversy make sense’ (Van Eeten, 1999: 2–3). The four rationalities help to identify the motives behind the arguments, but they also enable the telling of different rational stories about a situation that are rational on their own, but appear to be irrational from the perspective of the other rationalities (Paterson, 2007: 516). This multiplicity is crucial because it helps us understand why in certain situations addi-tional information, communication and round-table discussions fail (see also Billé, 2008).

Clumsy solutions

How do the four rationalities interrelate? Before answering this question, an important theorem of Cultural Theory must be explained: the impossibility theorem.5 This states that the four rationalities emerge in every social situation (Thompson et al., 1990: 87). So, every social situation incorporates individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchism and fatalism. In other words, if for some reason a certain situation excludes one or more of the rationalities, they will pop up in the course of time. These missing rationalities all have their own rational story of the situation concerned. This story is neglected by the prevalent rationality. Thus, a situation that is not fully polyrational cannot be robust (Davy, 2004: 144) – it will be prone to change through the involvement of the missing rationalities.

The theory provides an explanation for this situation in the ‘typology of surprise’: if the four rationalities exist, and each has its justification (each is rational, none can be rejected as irrational), then every situation can be described from each rationality. Consequently, the world is polyrational. Vice versa, if the world is polyrational, none of the rationalities is capable of describing the whole picture. They can all describe the world partially, unable to overcome their own rationalities without contradicting them-selves. There is a non-trivial probability to be surprised if another rationality is also able to describe a situation rationally. So, when a dominant rationality cannot explain what happens, it is surprised and another rationality takes over (Thompson et al., 1990: 71–75). This process produces a permanent dynamic imbalance of rationalities (Thompson et al., 1990: 87). In ‘Clumsy Floodplains’ I explained how the four rationalities tempo-rarily dominate certain situations in floodplains, and how this domination influences the management of these areas. Building on the arguments of Verweij and Thompson (2006), I proposed a clumsy solution for the floodplains (Hartmann, 2011).




A clumsy solution proposes polyrationality by design (Verweij and Thompson, 2006). By including all four rationalities in a solution, it cannot be surprised by the unexpected, because it contains all expectations. This situation, however, requires the clumsy solu-tion for each rationality to be rational enough not to be withdrawn. On the other hand, a clumsy solution can – per definition – never be ideal or perfect, because the four ration-alities contradict each other. How does a clumsy solution help spatial planning deal with wicked problems? Below, I reflect on the relation between Cultural Theory and wicked problems before discussing the added value of the concept of clumsiness as a response to such problems.

Clumsy solutions for wicked problems

Cultural Theory helps us understand wicked problems: A wicked problem cannot be definitely formulated (Rittel and Webber, 1973). From the point of view of Cultural Theory we can add: A wicked problem cannot be definitely formulated by one rational-ity. Rather, there are four rational ways of formulating a problem. If we look at a spatial phenomenon – gentrification in an inner urban area for example – there are different ways of describing it as a planning problem. The egalitarian story would probably look at gentrification as a threat to the local community, which is pushed out of the neighbour-hood by rich yuppies; the individualistic story would describe gentrification as a success story of the development of a neighbourhood; hierarchism would probably look at gen-trification by analysing statistical data and would seek to elaborate a measure for the optimal mixture of original inhabitants and yuppies; the fatalist description of the phe-nomenon would see it neither as a problem nor as a chance – it is not predictable whether the phenomenon is good or bad, it just occurs. These problem descriptions contradict each other. In sum, they depict gentrification as a wicked planning problem owing to the cacophony of the different voices of the rationalities. In accordance with Webber and Rittel, it is easy to find that the sum of definitions leads to a situation where there is no ‘stopping rule’. Such are familiar problems in spatial planning.

These different stories also explain why there is no single solution. A solution to a wicked problem is not ‘true-or-false’, it cannot be tested and there is not an enumerable number of solutions. In the last point, Cultural Theory contradicts Rittel and Webber. There are at least four rational solutions. From the point of view of Cultural Theory there is indeed no true or false solution to a wicked problem. Thompson exaggerates this: ‘If you’re having to ask who is right (worse still, if you already know who’s right) you’re wrong’ (Thompson, 1997: 209). So, the four rationalities would pursue different solutions to the gentrification case. The egalitarians would probably try to strengthen the local communi-ties, establish planning cells, a Charette workshop or other participatory methods. Planners acting out individualism would probably encourage new enterprises to settle in the area and try to stimulate the property market by abolishing planning hurdles that protect the contem-porary spatial structure. Planners would see the gentrification as a chance for the city. Hierarchism, on the other hand, would seek to set up rules and regulations for a moderate and steered gentrification process. These planners would like to control the process – using formal instruments. Fatalism would not intervene at all in the gentrification process – an approach that is widely neglected by planners, but which also has its justification.



Hartmann 251

Finally, Rittel and Webber have described a wicked problem as a symptom of another problem. Following Cultural Theory, this situation can result if the description of the problem and the description of the symptom of the other problem come from different rationalities. The egalitarian rationality, for example, takes the point of view of individu-alists, who regard gentrification as a chance, as proof that the local people and the local culture as a whole are threatened by the economic forces of the gentrification process.

Thus, wicked problems appear wicked if they are not regarded through the lens of all rationalities. Looking through the lens of other rationalities, however, does explain why and how planning problems are wicked. Does Cultural Theory also provide a solution to such wicked problems?

Clumsiness as a concept

Since, by definition, spatial planning is concerned about the future, planners try to create solutions that will last for a very long time (Needham, 2006: 139). This time-aspect of plan-ning and the pursuit of planners for sustainability on the one hand, and on the other the time-aspect of the emergence of the four rationalities (namely that they do not necessarily have to be present every time, but that they can be hidden) makes Cultural Theory valuable for spatial planning. Cultural Theory provides planners with a tool to look into the future through different lenses – through different rationalities. Of course, Cultural Theory is not the only possible way of looking at different futures, but it is a viable way, because it is plausible, it avoids blame, and it reduces the indefinite options to four, which seems to be a reasonable and manageable number of rationalities. It is, in other words, a way for plan-ners to expect the unexpected: it is, from the point of view of one rationality, unexpected.

Planning with the unexpected is not only valuable, but also challenging. ‘Representations of reality and its consequences for action’ (Van Eeten, 1999: 6) are inseparable. ‘A prob-lem definition inevitably predisposes certain solutions, and vice versa’ (Van Eeten, 1999: 6). The impossibility theorem of Cultural Theory advises planners to pursue a clumsy solution rather than an ideal one (Verweij and Thompson, 2006). The concept of clumsy solutions arises from the idea ‘that, when we are faced with contradictory definitions of problem and solution, we must choose one and reject the rest’ (Verweij et al., 2006: 19). In their book Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World, Marco Verweij and his colleagues explain that, for a clumsy solution, all rationalities need to be taken into account in the policy process. This process is the ‘essence of clumsiness: all the “voices” heard, and responded to by the others’ (Verweij et al., 2006: 8). Planners, Davy claims, need to work with such polyrational situations (Davy, 2008: 301). But how? Such planning with the unexpected requires methods to hear and to respond to the expectations of the rationalities (Verweij et al., 2006: 8)

Wickedness of public participation in spatial planning

The easiest approach to hear and respond to all rationalities in a planning process is to create a participative planning process. Participation is a very common method in spatial planning (Paterson, 2007: 524). Usually, participation is discussed with respect to its degree of citizen empowerment, as the famous ‘ladder of citizen participation’ described




by Arnstein suggests (Arnstein, 1969). Participation as a tool to get rationalities involved in a planning process requires managing the different rationalities and its expectations beyond such single-dimensional approaches to participation. Rather, the method of par-ticipation needs to be adapted to the four rationalities. But how to address the rationali-ties? According to Leino and Laine, the key to participation is essential in recognizing why people participate (or not) in planning processes (Leino and Laine, 2011: 1–2). The four rationalities – derived from Cultural Theory – provide four different motives:6

Egalitarianism: I care. Egalitarianism builds on a strong community, with a high degree of self-determination. Egalitarians do not believe in formal planning procedures, predeter-mined plan displays, or participation steps to legitimize plans. Rather, the expectation that the world is about to crash down from the hill (as explained earlier) leads to an action derived from urgency and responsibility. Not constraining actions to formal procedures, but setting up civil action groups, protest activities or other initiatives that activate a community, is rational. This conclusion does not necessarily mean that egalitarians neglect any development, but that they are much more sensitive to change, because they neglect trial and error. In short: the egalitarian motive to participate is ‘I care’. This ratio-nality is probably most open to egalitarian planning approaches – collaborative planning schemes, consensus-oriented planning and so forth.

Individualism: I can. An individualistic motive to participate in a planning process differs from an egalitarian motive. Following the ideal of liberty and self-determination, indi-vidualists take action in a planning process if it threatens liberty or if it opens new oppor-tunities. In other words, the main motive is based on individual benefits. Individualism also prefers chances and opportunities in the planning process over formal procedures. Probably, stakeholders try to negotiate their issues or set up a Prisoner’s Dilemma (as Davy, 1997 advises for weak parties). Also, Rational Choice Theory and the concept of the homo economicus might provide models for individualistic planning interventions. In short, ‘I can’ leads the individualistic stakeholder to participate.

Hierarchism: I may. Hierarchism promotes the idea of regulation and the law. A reason for participating in a planning process is because one thinks ‘I am entitled’ to participate and to co-decide about spatial planning. A prototype of an individualistic participant in a planning process follows the formal procedures, knows the regulations and accepts the final decisions. The ideal individualist participates out of a civic duty to contribute to a legitimization of the planning process. Hierarchists believe that, as long as the system works smoothly, the world will not roll down the hill. This belief is the reason for sup-porting the formal planning procedures.

Fatalism: I don’t. In a planning process, fatalism is the response of the mass of people who do not participate. They are not uninterested in spatial planning, but they expect the world to be just too complex to predict or even influence the outcome of a plan. Their short slogan towards participation in a planning process is: ‘I don’t’ participate. On first glance, this type of participant seems to be irrelevant in spatial planning – but it is not. Imagine a planning process where virtually everybody takes up action (acting out one of the other



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three rationalities). The consequence would be extraordinarily long and exhaustive planning processes. Thus, fatalists are an important rationality in the planning process.

Managing expectations

Cultural Theory facilitates the analysis of different rational motives to participate in a planning process, not by looking at the content of an argument, but at the intrinsic ratio-nalities behind an argument. The impossibility theorem states that all four of these motives are present in every planning situation. They are probably not always dominant at the same time, but the impossibility theorem and the derived concept of clumsy solu-tions advises planners to incorporate all four rationalities in a planning process. This statement indicates what is meant by planning as expectation management.

How to incorporate the four rationalities to establish a clumsy solution? I have intro-duced participation as an example to show how the rationalities interact in a planning process. In literature and legislation, three purposes of participation are repeatedly named: improving the quality of a democratic process, gathering knowledge to increase the quality of plans and increasing legitimacy (Schröer, 2010; Selle, 2010; Van Coenen et al., 2001). In addition, a rational purpose can sometimes be to avoid participation.

From the point of view of the four rationalities, each of the four types is suited to one of these four purposes; egalitarian participation motives mobilize large groups of citizens. It is the basic idea of citizen empowerment that underlies this rationality. So, this group can serve the purpose of increasing the democratic quality of a planning process. To achieve this purpose, planning methods are needed that activate citizens by using the intrinsic motivation of egalitarians: ‘I care’. Such methods can be derived from planning theoretical approaches as assigned to egalitarianism. Individualism is driven by the idea of ‘I can’. The rationality is suited to bringing up good and innovative ideas in the planning process by including a competitive element. This rationality might be useful in gathering knowledge and improving the quality of planning. In contrast with planning methods to activate egalitarians, individualists respond to participation methods that encourage them to bring in ideas and implementation capacity. Hierarchism, however, seems to serve the purpose of increasing the legitimacy of a plan, because participants act out this rationality by following and supporting the formal planning procedures. So, to increase legitimacy, methods prescribed in the law are of most relevance. Fatalism is a rationality that is useful in accelerating and deregulating planning processes – a situation where participation can be an obstacle. The challenge for spatial planners now is to combine the methods above in a way that allows all four rationalities to be addressed by a viable method. The typology of rationalities and its assignment of types and purposes of participation help managing the different expectations in a viable way – and thus establish a clumsy solution.

Conclusion

Our central question was how to cope with wicked problems in spatial planning. Wicked problems have been broken down into three constraints of contemporary spatial plan-ning: uncertainty, complexity and normativity. In the light of this wickedness, expecta-tions rather than rational decisions are important for spatial planning. Because there are




so many different expectations, their pluralism appears to be unexpectable. Cultural Theory provides a model to reduce the pluralism of expectations to a manageable number – namely, four. In addition, Cultural Theory provides a concept of how to deal with plural rationalities that correspond with the different expectations: clumsy solutions. In applying the concept to participation, Cultural Theory enables us not only to analyse the pluralism of expectations, but also to manage it. In using the different expectations deliberately, we are able to plan with the unexpected by managing rational expectations.

Notes

1 Davy (2008) uses the term ‘community’, but the original term is ‘egalitarian’.2 Cultural Theory is the original but misleading name, since it might lead to the more general

field of cultural theory; Davy’s name for the theory describes better what the theory is about, namely different rationalities.

3 The reification of the rationalities is used here to simplify the text. Actually, the subject that envisions the world in a particular way is a person that acts out the respective rationality in a particular situation.

4 In fact, within Cultural Theory there is a discussion about whether there is a fifth rationality in the grid-and-group scheme (namely in the middle of the diagram) (Mamadouh, 1999: 401). This fifth rationality – the hermit – is regarded as one that does not interact at all with the world.

5 The name of this theorem is also not self-explanatory. It states that it is impossible for all four rationalities not to emerge in social situations.

6 Again, we start with the egalitarian rationality, but it is important to recognize that the four rationalities are not in any particular order or hierarchy

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Author Biography

Thomas Hartmann is post doc researcher at the Department of Human Geography and Regional Planning at Utrecht University, where he teaches planning theory. After his study of spatial plan-ning, he completed his PhD, ‘Clumsy Floodplains – Responsive Land Policy for Extreme Floods’, at the School of Spatial Planning, TU Dortmund. Together with Barrie Needham, he edited the book Planning by Law and Property Right Reconsidered.



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