planters and politics in peru, 1895-19191 1895-1919

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Planters and Politics in Peru,1895-19191

MICHAEL J. GONZALES

Elite family networks with overlapping economic and political powerhave been a basic feature of Latin America.2 Their influence wascharacteristically strong during the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies as the export economies expanded and national governments,particularly in the larger nations, advocated order and progress at theexpense of participatory democracy. Historically, the influence of the eliteshas been primarily a regional phenomenon underpinned by ownership ofland, mines, or lucrative commercial enterprises. They formed economic,political, and blood alliances to control production of vital products,monopolise local government and, on occasion, initiate bold entre-preneurial initiatives. Examples include the thirty families who dominatedhenequen production and local government in nineteenth-centuryYucatan,3 the Grupo Monterrey who ran the industrialising economy ofnortheastern Mexico during the Porfiriato,1 and the Paraiba oligarchy whocontrolled cotton production, municipal government, and local taxrevenues during the Brazilian Old Republic (1889-1930).5 Moreover,ambitious elites from different regions sometimes formed powerfulpolitical alliances to gain control over national governments. For example,oligarchs from Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais took turns running Brazil

1 Research for this article was funded by a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1974-5 andby a Fulbright Fellowship in autumn 1987. I thank Bill Albert and Nils Jacobsen fortheir detailed comments on this paper.

2 Diana Balmori, Stuart F. Voss and Miles Wortman (eds.), Notable Family Networks inLatin America (Chicago, 1984). Also see the numerous studies cited in theirbibliography.

3 Alan Wells, 'Family Elites in a Boom-and-Bust Economy: The Molinas and Peons ofPorfirian Yucatan', Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 62 (1982), p. 224.

4 Alex M. Saragoza, The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State, 1SS0 to 1940 (Austin, Texas,1988).

5 Linda Lewin,' Some Historical Implications of Kinship Organization for Family-basedPolitics in the Brazilian Northeast', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 21, no.1 (1979). PP- 262-92-

Michael J. Gonzales is Director, Center for Latino and Latin American Studies, andProfessor of History at Northern Illinois University.

J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 23, JIJ-J41 Printed m Great Britain 5 I J

Planters and Politics in Peru, 1895-19191

MICHAEL J. GONZALES

Elite family networks with overlapping economic and political power have been a basic feature of Latin America. 2 Their influence was characteristically strong during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the export economies expanded and national governments, particularly in the larger nations, advocated order and progress at the expense of participatory democracy. Historically, the influence of the elites has been primarily a regional phenomenon underpinned by ownership of land, mines, or lucrative commercial enterprises. They formed economic, political, and blood alliances to control production of vital products, monopolise local government and, on occasion, initiate bold entrepreneurial initiatives. Examples include the thirty families who dominated henequen production and local government in nineteenth-century Yucatan,3 the Grupo Monterrey who ran the industrialising economy of northeastern Mexico during the Porftriato,4 and the Paralba oligarchy who controlled cotton production, municipal government, and local tax revenues during the Brazilian Old Republic (1889-1930).5 Moreover, ambitious elites from different regions sometimes formed powerful political alliances to gain control over national governments. For example, oligarchs from Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais took turns running Brazil

1 Research for this article was funded by a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1974-5 and by a Fulbright Fellowship in autumn 1987. I thank Bill Albert and Nils Jacobsen for their detailed comments on this paper.

2 Diana Balmori, Stuart F. Voss and Miles Wortman (eds.), Notable Family Networks in Latin America (Chicago, 1984). Also see the numerous studies cited in their bibliography.

3 Alan Wells, 'Family Elites in a Boom-and-Bust Economy: The Molinas and Peons of Porfirian Yucatan', Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 62 (1982), p. ZZ4.

4 Alex M. Saragoza, The Monterrry Elite and the Mexican State, iSBo to 1940 (Austin, Texas, 1988).

6 Linda Lewin, 'Some Historical Implications of Kinship Organization for Family-based Politics in the Brazilian Northeast', Comparative Studies in Society and HistOry, vol. 2 I, no. 2 (1979), pp. 262-9 2 •

Michael J. Gonzales is Director, Center for Latino and Latin American Studies, and Professor of History at Northern Illinois University.

J. Lat. Am". Stud. '3. )' )-)4' Pr;nt,d,. Creat Brita;n Pl

http://journals.cambridge.org


516 Michael J. Gon^aks

during the Old Republic,6 and, according to Peter H. Smith, a 'genuine

power elite' representing an ' interlocking of the political and economic

domains' controlled Mexico under Diaz.7 It has also been argued that a

'landed aristocracy' ruled Argentina from 1912 to 1916,8 and that wealthy

elites led by the Larrain Salas clan 'limited government to the elite' in

nineteenth-century Chile.9

No group is more closely identified with the coastal elite in Peru during

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than sugar and cotton

planters. Henri Farve has even written that 'the Peruvian oligarchy is, of

course, "sugar" and "cotton"'.10 This linkage between economic

interests and class emerged because planters were among the wealthiest

members of coastal society, belonged to the most prominent social clubs

in Lima (especially the Club Nacional), went to the most prestigious

private schools in the capital, and were recognised by Peruvians from all

walks of life as elites.11 What makes planters especially important during

this period is the crucial political role they played as deputies, senators,

ministers, and presidents. This convergence of class and political power

led Jorge Basadre to call the period from 1895 to 1919 the 'Aristocratic

Republic'.

Until recently, students of this era had stressed the social and political

homogeneity of the coastal elite and their skill at gaining political office

and protecting their economic interests. This generalisation was chal-

lenged, however, by Rory Miller in articles written in 1982 and 1988.

Among other things, he argues that not all members of the elite were

planters, serious personal and political differences divided members of the

6 Joseph L. Love, Sao Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, iSXp-ipj? (Stanford, 1980); JohnD. Wirth, Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation, iSSp-ipj? (Stanford, 1977); andJoseph L. Love and Bert J. Barickman, 'Rulers and Owners: A Brazilian Case Studyin Comparative Perspective', Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (1986),pp. 745-65.

7 Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico (Princeton, 1979),p. 216.

8 Peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict among Political Elites,1904-1};; (Madison, Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 26-7.

9 Mary Lowenthal Felstiner, ' Kinship Politics in the Chilean Independence Movement',Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 56, no. 1 (1976), pp. ;8-8o.

10 ' El desarrollo y las formas del poder oligarquico en el Peru', in Jose Matos Mar (ed.),La oligarquia en el Peru (Buenos Aires, 1969), p. 83. Other significant works on thePeruvian elite include: Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru,trans, by Paul Stevenson (London, 1970); Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo,Apogeoy crisis de la Reptiblica Aristocrdtica, 4th ed. (Lima, 1987); Dennis L. Gilbert, Laoligarquiaperuana: historta de tresfamilias (Lima, 1982); Rory Miller, 'The Coastal Eliteand Peruvian Politics, 1895-1919'', Journal ofLatin American Studies, vol. 14.no. 1 (May,1982), pp. 97-120; and Rory Miller, 'La oligarquia costena y la Republica Aristocraticaen el Peru, 1895-1919', Revista de Indias, vol. xlviii, nos. 182-}, pp. 551-66.

11 Gilbert, 'La oligarquia'.

5 16 Michael J. Gonzales

during the Old Republic, 6 and, according to Peter H. Smith, a 'genuine power elite' representing an 'interlocking of the political and economic domains' controlled Mexico under Diaz. 7 It has also been argued that a , landed aristocracy' ruled Argentina from 1912 to 1916,8 and that wealthy elites led by the Larrain Salas clan 'limited government to the elite' in nineteenth-century Chile. 9

No group is more closely identified with the coastal elite in Peru during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than sugar and cotton planters. Henri Farve has even written that' the Peruvian oligarchy is, of c~urse, " sugar" and "cotton"'. 10 This linkage between economic interests and class emerged because planters were among the wealthiest members of coastal society, belonged to the most prominent social clubs in Lima (especially the Club Nacional), went to the most prestigious private schools in the capital, and were recognised by Peruvians from all walks of life as elites. ll What makes planters especially important during

this period is the crucial political role they played as deputies, senators, ministers, and presidents. This convergence of class and political power led Jorge Basadre to call the period from 1895 to 1919 the' Aristocratic Republic '.

Until recently, students of this era had stressed the social and political homogeneity of the coastal elite and their skill at gaining political office and protecting their economic interests. This generalisation was challenged, however, by Rory Miller in articles written in 1982 and 1988. Among other things, he argues that not all members of the elite were planters, serious personal and political differences divided members of the

6 Joseph L. Love, Siio Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, /889-/937 (Stanford, 1980); John D. Wirth, Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation, ISS9-/937 (Stanford, 1977); and Joseph L. Love and Bert J. Barickman, 'Rulers and Owners: A Brazilian Case Study in Comparative Perspective', Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (1986), pp. 743-61.

7 Labyrinths of Power.' Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico (Princeton, 1979), p.216.

B Peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy.' Conflict among Political Elites, /904-/9JJ (Madison, Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 26-7·

9 Mary Lowenthal Felstiner, 'Kinship Politics in the Chilean Independence Movement', Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 16, no. I (1976), pp. 18-80.

10 'El desarrollo y las formas del poder oligarquico en el Peru', in Jose Matos Mar (ed.), La oligarquia en el Peru (Buenos Aires, 1969), p. 83. Other significant works on the Peruvian elite include: Fran<;ois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru, trans. by Paul Stevenson (London, 1970); Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo, Apogeo y crisis de la Republica Aristocrdtica, 4th ed. (Lima, 1987); Dennis L. Gilbert, La oligarquia peruana.' historla de tres familia! (Lima, 1982); Rory Miller, 'The Coastal Elite and Peruvian Politics, 1891-1919', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 14, no. I (May, 1982), pp. 97-120; and Rory Miller, 'La oligarqula costefia y la Republica Aristocratica en el Peru, 1895-1919', Revista de Indias, vol. xlviii, nos. 182-3, pp. IjI-66.

11 Gilbert, 'La oligarquia'.



Planters and Politics in Peru 517

same political party, relations between the executive branch and congresswere frequently inharmonious, highland elites could not always becontrolled from Lima, and planters and their interest groups were notalways able to protect their industries. He is so unconvinced of thepolitical effectiveness of the coastal elite, especially planters, that heconcludes: 'It is important to recognise the possibility of a divorcebetween wealth and economic influence and political control.' Amongother things, he suggests that more research is needed on publicadministration and electoral politics, and the general discourse of politicsat the local and regional levels.12

Miller's articles raise several important questions and serve as acorrective to a case that has been overstated. This article explores some ofhis suggestions by analysing the motivations and effectiveness of plantersin the political arena and their relationship with the state. This leads tosome general observations about the Aristocratic Republic as well as adetailed discussion of the 1906-7 campaign by Ramon Aspfllaga Barrerafor election to Congress. This focus provides an analysis of both nationaland provincial electoral politics, and a close look at one of the mostimportant political families of the period. My conclusions underscoreMiller's observations regarding the intense personal and political divisionsthat separated prominent planter-politicians, the importance of localissues to planters, the key role of families in political organisation, and thelack of a coherent political agenda among planter—politicians. At the sametime, I believe that it would be a mistake to remove planters from thecentre stage of politics or to underestimate their political influence. Iremain impressed by their ability to get what they wanted from the state,either through legislation, the electoral process, political influence, orpersonal friendships. I am equally impressed with their ability to standabove the law in suppressing dissent on their estates and in surroundingtowns, and in using force and intimidation to control workers. No othergroup in Peruvian society came close to enjoying the same degree ofpolitical clout as the planters.

The great political influence of the planters accurately reflected thenature and organisation of the Peruvian state. Suffrage was limited toliterate adult male property owners, and elections were controlled by elite-dominated political parties with the power to alter the results. Plantersused the system to gain high political office and then fashioned policiesgenerally favourable to their interests. Moreover, their elite status gavethem additional authority in the provinces beyond elected office. There isno denying, however, their capacity for collective self-destruction. The

12 Miller, 'La oligarquia costena', p. 562; Miller's argument is more fully developed in'The Coastal Elite and Peruvian Polities'.20 LAS 23

Pianters and Politics in Peril l 17

same political party, relations between the executive branch and congress were frequently inharmonious, highland elites could not always be controlled from Lima, and planters and their interest groups were not always able to protect their industries. He is so unconvinced of the political effectiveness of the coastal elite, especially planters, that he concludes: 'It is important to recognise the possibility of a divorce between wealth and economic influence and political control.' Among other things, he suggests that more research is needed on public administration and electoral politics, and the general discourse of politics at the local and regional levels. 12

Miller's articles raise several important questions and serve as a corrective to a case that has been overstated. This article explores some of his suggestions by analysing the motivations and effectiveness of planters in the political arena and their relationship with the state. This leads to some general observations about the Aristocratic Republic as well as a detailed discussion of the 1906-7 campaign by Ramon Asplllaga Barrera for election to Congress. This focus provides an analysis of both national and provincial electoral politics, and a close look at one of the most important political families of the period. My conclusions underscore Miller's observations regarding the intense personal and political divisions that separated prominent planter-politicians, the importance of local issues to planters, the key role of families in political organisation, and the lack of a coherent political agenda among planter-politicians. At the same time, I believe that it would be a mistake to remove planters from the centre stage of politics or to underestimate their political influence. I remain impressed by their ability to get what they wanted from the state, either through legislation, the electoral process, political influence, or personal friendships. I am equally impressed with their ability to stand

above the law in suppressing dissent on their estates and in surrounding towns, and in using force and intimidation to control workers. No other group in Peruvian society came close to enjoying the same degree of political clout as the planters.

The great political influence of the planters accurately reflected the nature and organisation of the Peruvian state. Suffrage was limited to literate adult male property owners, and elections were controlled by elitedominated political parties with the power to alter the results. Planters used the system to gain high political office and then fashioned policies generally favourable to their interests. Moreover, their elite status gave them additional authority in the provinces beyond elected office. There is no denying, however, their capacity for collective self-destruction. The

12 Miller, 'La oligarquia costeiia', p. 562; Miller's argument is more fully developed in 'The Coastal Elite and Peruvian Politics'.

20 LAS 23



518 Michael J. Gon^ales

elites' penchant for personal and political bickering led to internal splitsthat weakened their party and facilitated the rise of a dictatorship in 1919.

The Aristocratic Republic: myth or reality?

Throughout the nineteenth century Peru rarely functioned in harmonywith its republican constitutions. With rare exceptions, army generalscontrolled the presidency and ruled without an integrated and efficientadministrative apparatus. The newly-created state was divided by regionaleconomic agendas, race, and unstable borders. It had an overwhelminglyilliterate citizenry and no democratic traditions. It had neither a nationalbourgeoisie nor a working class, but diverse groups of Indian peasants,black slaves, urban artisans, Chinese indentured servants, provincial elites(usually large landowners), heirs of colonial aristocrats, and a small butinfluential group of Limeno merchants.

The latter prospered during the guano boom (1840—80) as middlemenfor large British merchant houses, who sold the fertilizer on consignmentin Europe, and as financiers and speculators.13 They were understandablyshocked when in 1868 the Balta government, at the urging of financeminister Nicolas de Pierola, granted Dreyfus & Sons of Paris monopolyrights over guano sales in Europe, in return for cancelation of Peru'ssubstantial foreign debt and a guaranteed income.14 Faced with the loss ofconsiderable income, guano merchants formed the Civilista party,campaigned against the Dreyfus Contract, and managed to gain thepresidency in 1872. Thus, Peru's first civilian political party andgovernment was formed by the commercial bourgeoisie in response to agovernment initiative that threatened its economic interests.

Civilian rule did not last long as President Manuel Pardo wasassassinated, and Peru stumbled into the War of the Pacific (1879-83)against Chile, which resulted in military defeat, occupation, and loss ofterritory. Military governments presided over the subsequent economicand political chaos until 1895, when the two major political parties, theCivilistas and the Democratas, formed a coalition and gained thepresidency. This was certainly an alliance of strange bedfellows as theparty of the commercial bourgeoisie was now supporting its former arch-enemy Nicolas de Pierola, the head of the Democratas, for the presidency.In a classic example of realpolitik, the Civilistas recognised that none oftheir leaders commanded the charismatic appeal of the flamboyant Pierola,who had led armed men through the streets of Lima and bridged the

13 Alfonso W. Quiroz, ha deuda defraudada: consolidation de ISJOJ dominio economico en el Peru(Lima, 1987).

14 Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies (Cambridge, Mass., i960); and HeraclioBonilla, Guano y burguesia en el Peru (Lima, 1974).

j 18 Michael J. Gonzales

elites' penchant for personal and political bickering led to internal splits that weakened their party and facilitated the rise of a dictatorship in 1919.

The Aristocratic Republic: myth or reality?

Throughout the nineteenth century Peru rarely functioned in harmony with its republican constitutions. With rare exceptions, army generals controlled the presidency and ruled without an integrated and efficient administrative apparatus. The newly-created state was divided by regional economic agendas, race, and unstable borders. It had an overwhelmingly illiterate citizenry and no democratic traditions. It had neither a national bourgeoisie nor a working class, but diverse groups of Indian peasants, black slaves, urban artisans, Chinese indentured servants, provincial elites (usually large landowners), heirs of colonial aristocrats, and a small but influential group of Limefio merchants.

The latter prospered during the guano boom (1840-80) as middlemen

for large British merchant houses, who sold the fertilizer on consignment in Europe, and as financiers and speculators. 13 They were understandably shocked when in 1868 the Balta government, at the urging of finance minister Nicolas de Pierola, granted Dreyfus & Sons of Paris monopoly rights over guano sales in Europe, in return for cancelation of Peru's substantial foreign debt and a guaranteed income. 14 Faced with the loss of considerable income, guano merchants formed the Civilista party, campaigned against the Dreyfus Contract, and managed to gain the presidency in 1872. Thus, Peru's first civilian political party and government was formed by the commercial bourgeoisie in response to a government initiative that threatened its economic interests.

Civilian rule did not last long as President Manuel Pardo was assassinated, and Peru stumbled into the War of the Pacific (1879-83) against Chile, which resulted in military defeat, occupation, and loss of territory. Military governments presided over the subsequent economic and political chaos until 1895, when the two major political parties, the Civilistas and the Dem6cratas, formed a coalition and gained the presidency. This was certainly an alliance of strange bedfellows as the party of the commercial bourgeoisie was now supporting its former archenemy Nicolas de Pierola, the head of the Dem6cratas, for the presidency. In a classic example of realpolitik, the Civilistas recognised that none of their leaders commanded the charismatic appeal of the flamboyant Pierola, who had led armed men through the streets of Lima and bridged the

IS Alfonso W. Quiroz, La deuda defraudada: consolidacion de 18Jo y dominio economico en el Peru (Lima, 1987).

14 Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); and Heraclio Bonilla, Guano y burguesia en eI Peru (Lima, 1974).




barracks and civilian traditions in Peruvian politics. As Civilista leaderFrancisco Rosas explained, 'only a man who can ride a horse could bepresident of the Republic', and Pierola was the only civilian politicianwho qualified. For his part, Pierola noted that 'without the Civilistas, itis impossible to govern', and that 'it would be very difficult to distinguishbetween the differences of the principles of the two parties'.15 Both sidesagreed that political stability and the regeneration of the export economywere high priority items. The Pierola Administration (1895-9) initiated along period of civilian rule characterised by the rapid development ofplantation agriculture and mining, and subsequent domination of thepresidency by the Civilistas. Sugar planters figured prominently in theseadministrations with Eduardo Lopez de Romana (1899—1903) andJose Pardo (1904-8; 1915-19) occupying the presidency,16 and otherplanters serving in key cabinet posts, the senate, and chamber of deputies.For example, Antero Aspillaga Barrera, co-owner of both sugar andcotton plantations, served variously as finance minister, deputy fromChiclayo, senator from Lima, president of the Senate, mayor of Lima, andhead of the Civilista party. In addition, Augusto B. Legui'a, who manageda sugar cane plantation and married a sugar heiress, served as Civilistapresident from 1908 to 1912. It is probably safe to say that almost everysugar and cotton planter occupied some political position during theseyears.17

Coinciding with their political ascendency, sugar and cotton plantersenjoyed remarkable prosperity. Both industries benefited from technicalimprovements, favourable market prices, the acquisition of more stableworkforces, and close financial ties with British merchant houses.18 As aresult, the Aspillagas earned 810,817 pounds sterling from 1911 to 1922from their sugar and cotton estates. Rafael Larco Herrera, a prominentsugar planter and Civilista politician, netted 5 5 5,973 pounds sterling from1909 to 1922, and the Gildemeisters, politically influential sugar growers,earned 948,641 pounds sterling from 1919 to 1922 alone.19

15 Steve Stein, Populism in Peru (Madison, 1980), p. 27.10 Lopez de Romana owned the plantation Chucarapi on the southern coast, and Pardo

(the son of Manuel Pardo) inherited Tuman, on the northern coast.17 Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo, Apogeo y crisis, pp. 84-9;; Michael J.

Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, ifyj-rpjj, LatinAmerican Monograph No. 62 (Austin, Texas, 1985), ch. li.

18 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, chapters ii and iii; W. S. Bell, An Essay on the PeruvianCotton Industry, iSsij-1920 (Liverpool, 1985); and Michael J. Gonzales, 'The Rise ofCotton Tenant Farming in Peru, 1890-1920', Agricultural History, vol. 6;, no. 1(Winter, 1991), pp. 51—71.

19 Bill Albert, An Essay on the Peruvian Sugar Industry, 1880-1920 and the Letters of RonaldGordon, Administrator of the British Sugar Company in Canete, 1914-1920 (Norwich, 1976),pp. 126a-127a.

20-2

Planters and Politics in Peru ~ 19

barracks and civilian traditions in Peruvian politics. As Civilista leader Francisco Rosas explained, 'only a man who can ride a horse could be president of the Republic', and Ph:rola was the only civilian politician who qualified. For his part, Pierola noted that' without the Civilistas, it is impossible to govern', and that' it would be very difficult to distinguish between the differences of the principles of the two parties' .15 Both sides agreed that political stability and the regeneration of the export economy were high priority items. The Pierola Administration (1895-9) initiated a long period of civilian rule characterised by the rapid development of plantation agriculture and mining, and subsequent domination of the presidency by the Civilistas. Sugar planters figured prominently in these administrations with Eduardo Lopez de Romaiia (1899-1903) and Jose Pardo (1904-8; 1915-19) occupying the presidency/6 and other planters serving in key cabinet posts, the senate, and chamber of deputies. For example, Antero Aspl1laga Barrera, co-owner of both sugar and cotton plantations, served variously as finance minister, deputy from Chiclayo, senator from Lima, president of the Senate, mayor of Lima, and head of the Civilista party. In addition, Augusto B. Leguia, who managed a sugar cane plantation and married a sugar heiress, served as Civilista president from 1908 to 1912. It is probably safe to say that almost every sugar and cotton planter occupied some political position during these years. 17

Coinciding with their political ascendency, sugar and cotton planters enjoyed remarkable prosperity. Both industries benefited from technical improvements, favourable market prices, the acquisition of more stable workforces, and close financial ties with British merchant houses. IS As a result, the Aspl1lagas earned 810,817 pounds sterling from 19I1 to 1922 from their sugar and cotton estates. Rafael Larco Herrera, a prominent

sugar planter and Civilista politician, netted 555,973 pounds sterling from 1909 to 1922, and the Gildemeisters, politically influential sugar growers, earned 948,641 pounds sterling from 1919 to 1922 aloneY

16 Steve Stein, Populism in Peru (Madison, 1980), p. 27. 16 Lopez de Romafia owned the plantation Chucarapi on the southern coast, and Pardo

(the son of Manuel Pardo) inherited Tuman, on the northern coast. 17 Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo, Apogeo y crisis, pp. 84-95; Michael J.

Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 187J-19}}, Latin American Monograph No. 62 (Austin, Texas, 1985), ch. Ii.

18 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, chapters ii and iii; W. S. Bell, An Essqy on the Peruvian Colton Industry, 182J-1920 (Liverpool, 1985); and Michael J. Gonzales, 'The Rise of Cotton Tenant Farming in Peru, 1890-1920', Agricultural History, vol. 65, no. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 51-71.

19 Bill Albert, An Essay on the Peruvian Sugar Industry, 1880-1920 and the Leiters of Ronald Gordon, Administrator of the British Sugar Company in Canete, 1914-1920 (Norwich, 1976), pp. 126a-127a.

20·2




This convergence of wealth and high political office makes it difficultto divorce the two, as Miller suggests. Nevertheless, some qualifiers arein order. Certainly, not all presidents during these years were planters, andnot all prominent Civilistas were planters. The fortunes of PresidentsManuel Candamo (1903—4) and Guillermo Billinghurst (1912—14) camefrom commerce and mining, respectively, and Billinghurst was not aCivilista. Other important Civilistas included Jose Payan, a rich banker,Luis Miro Quesada, owner of the leading daily El Comercio, and severalmiddle class lawyers.20 However, this does not strike me as unusual. Itwould have been bizarre for planters to have occupied every importantpolitical post and to have dominated an entire political party. The pointis that they were especially conspicuous as leading Civilistas andofficeholders.

Miller accurately points out that the elite-dominated executive branchhad a difficult time controlling Congress. Although the president hadthe power to make all government appointments, in practice these weredelegated to ministers. Cabinet members could be censured by Congressand many of them were dismissed after rancorous debates that left deeppolitical and personal scars.21 This was a structural weakness in theorganisation of the government that made it difficult for the executive tofunction efficiently.

There were additional reasons for the inharmonious relationshipbetween the executive and congress. Although Peru was perhaps thefarthest thing from a model republic, one should expect some tensionbetween the two branches of government in a system that was neither adictatorship nor a monarchy. Conflicts can also be attributed to differentsocial and economic backgrounds. All presidents during this period werefrom the coast (especially Lima),22 which was the most urbanised anddeveloped section of the country, while most members of Congress werefrom the interior. No one has attempted a systematic analysis ofoccupational and social status of Congressmen, but many Congressmenwere landowners and members of the provincial elite. If they wereimportant sheep ranchers, miners, or merchants their economic interestswould coincide, in general terms, with those of coastal planters. However,most provincial hacendados (gamonales) were not as wealthy or export-oriented as planters, and they depended heavily on the exploitation ofIndians as labourers and personal servants. Planters were not sociallyprogressive, but they understood modern technology, international

20 Miller, 'La Oligarqui'a', pp. 553-4. Interestingly, Payan was a Cuban emigre.21 Ibid.; Miller, 'Coastal Elite', p. 114.22 A possible exception was Lopez de Romana who was from Arequipa, located

somewhat inland. However, Lopez also owned the largest sugarcane plantation on thesouthern coast and resided for periods of time in Lima.

52.0 Michael]. Gonzales

This convergence of wealth and high political office makes it difficult to divorce the two, as Miller suggests. Nevertheless, some qualifiers are in order. Certainly, not all presidents during these years were planters, and not all prominent Civilistas were planters. The fortunes of Presidents Manuel Candamo (1903-4) and Guillermo Billinghurst (1912-14) came from commerce and mining, respectively, and Billinghurst was not a Civilista. Other important Civilistas included Jose Payin, a rich banker, Luis Mira Quesada, owner of the leading daily EI Comercio, and several middle class lawyers. 2o However, this does not strike me as unusual. It would have been bizarre for planters to have occupied every important political post and to have dominated an entire political party. The point is that they were especially conspicuous as leading Civilistas and officeholders.

Miller accurately points out that the elite-dominated executive branch had a difficult time controlling Congress. Although the president had the power to make all government appointments, in practice these were delegated to ministers. Cabinet members could be censured by Congress and many of them were dismissed after rancorous debates that left deep political and personal scars.21 This was a structural weakness in the organisation of the government that made it difficult for the executive to function efficiently.

There were additional reasons for the inharmonious relationship between the executive and congress. Although Peru was perhaps the farthest thing from a model republic, one should expect some tension between the two branches of government in a system that was neither a dictatorship nor a monarchy. Conflicts can also be attributed to different social and economic backgrounds. All presidents during this period were from the coast (especially Lima),22 which was the most urbanised and developed section of the country, while most members of Congress were from the interior. No one has attempted a systematic analysis of occupational and social status of Congressmen, but many Congressmen were landowners and members of the provincial elite. If they were important sheep ranchers, miners, or merchants their economic interests would coincide, in general terms, with those of coastal planters. However, most provincial hacendados (gamonales) were not as wealthy or exportoriented as planters, and they depended heavily on the exploitation of Indians as labourers and personal servants. Planters were not socially progressive, but they understood modern technology, international

20 Miller, 'La Oligarqu{a', pp. j l3-4. Interestingly, Payan was a Cuban emigre. 21 Ibid.; Miller, 'Coastal Elite', p. 114.

22 A possible exception was Lopez de Romafia who was from Arequipa, located somewhat inland. However, Lopez also owned the largest sugarcane plantation on the southern coast and resided for periods of time in Lima.



Planters and Politics in Peru 5 21

finance, and overseas markets. Sugar growers also could not avoid usingwage labour, which eventually forced them to deal with a variety ofproblems in modern labour management. Finally, most planters weremore familiar with London and New York than they were with Cuzco andPuno, and they considered provincials socially and culturally inferior.23

These considerable social, cultural, and economic differences undoubtedlymade cooperation between the planter-dominated executive and the/̂wowaZ-dominated congress more difficult at times, even among

politicians from the same party.As Miller observes, planters sometimes failed to prevent the passage of

legislation detrimental to their interests, most notably pro-labour laws andexport taxes. During the First World War, the combination of falling realwages for workers and soaring profits for exporters created tremendouspressure for the passage of this type of legislation. A series of strikesshook Lima and north coast sugarcane plantations, and President Pardowas compelled to approve the eight-hour day for industrial workers andan export tax on sugar. Although these laws were hard for planters toaccept (including Pardo), they were politically prudent gestures to anemerging proletariat. Moreover, neither law hurt planters that much. Onthe plantations, the eight-hour day only affected sugar mill workers, whoconstituted approximately 20 % of the workforce, and planters profitedenormously during these years and could well afford an export tax. Theydid not like it, but it was arguably the only concession that they had tomake to the public good and it may have inadvertently earned them amodicum of good will. Cotton planters should also be credited withscoring a major political victory by avoiding a tax on their product.24

Planters won other concessions from the government during theAristocratic Republic. For example, in 1898 the Pierola governmentsanctioned the importation of Japanese contract labourers to alleviatelabour shortages on coastal plantations. Over the course of the next thirtyyears, over 17,000 Japanese entered the country and contributedsignificantly to increased sugar production on the central and south-central coasts.25 Moreover, in 1915 the Benavides government granted the

23 On sugar planters and the sugar industry see Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture; and onsocial and economic conditions in the highlands see Nils P. Jacobsen, 'Land tenure andSociety in the Peruvian Altiplano, Azangaro province, 1770—1920' (unpublished PhDdiss., University of California, Berkeley, 1982); and Michael J. Gonzales, 'Neo-colonialism and Indian Unrest in Southern Peru, 1868-1898', Bulletin of Latin AmericanResearch, vol. 6, no. 1 (1987), pp. 1-26.

24 Pe te r B lanchard , The Origins of the Peruvian Labor Movement, rSfy-ip? (P i t t sbu rgh ,1982); G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, ch. ix.

26 G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, p p . 1 1 8 - 2 0 ; and Tora je Ir ie , ' H i s t o r y of JapaneseM i g r a t i o n to P e r u ' , t rans , by Wil l iam Hime l , Hispanic American Historical Review, vo l .2i, nos. i & ii (Aug. and Nov. 1951).


finance, and overseas markets. Sugar growers also could not avoid using wage labour, which eventually forced them to deal with a variety of problems in modern labour management. Finally, most planters were more familiar with London and New York than they were with Cuzco and Puno, and they considered provincials socially and culturally inferior. 23

These considerable social, cultural, and economic differences undoubtedly made cooperation between the planter-dominated executive and the gamonal-dominated congress more difficult at times, even among politicians from the same party.

As Miller observes, planters sometimes failed to prevent the passage of legislation detrimental to their interests, most notably pro-labour laws and export taxes. During the First World War, the combination of falling real wages for workers and soaring profits for exporters created tremendous pressure for the passage of this type of legislation. A series of strikes shook Lima and north coast sugarcane plantations, and President Pardo was compelled to approve the eight-hour day for industrial workers and an export tax on sugar. Although these laws were hard for planters to accept (including Pardo), they were politically prudent gestures to an emerging proletariat. Moreover, neither law hurt planters that much. On the plantations, the eight-hour day only affected sugar mill workers, who constituted approximately 20 % of the workforce, and planters profited enormously during these years and could well afford an export tax. They did not like it, but it was arguably the only concession that they had to make to the public good and it may have inadvertently earned them a modicum of good will. Cotton planters should also be credited with scoring a major political victory by avoiding a tax on their product. 24

Planters won other concessions from the government during the Aristocratic Republic. For example, in 1898 the Pierola government

sanctioned the importation of Japanese contract labourers to alleviate labour shortages on coastal plantations. Over the course of the next thirty years, over 17,000 Japanese entered the country and contributed significantly to increased sugar production on the central and southcentral coasts. 25 Moreover, in J 9 J 5 the Benavides government granted the

23 On sugar planters and the sugar industry see Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture; and on social and economic conditions in the highlands see Nils P. Jacobsen, 'Land tenure and Society in the Peruvian Altiplano, Azangaro province, 177O-19zo' (unpublished PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 198z); and Michael J. Gonzales, 'Neocolonialism and Indian Unrest in Southern Peru, 1868-1898', Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 6, no. 1 (1987), pp. l-z6.

24 Peter Blanchard, The Origins of the Peruvian Labor Movement, ISS}-1919 (Pittsburgh, 198 z); Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, ch. ix.

2& Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 118-zo; and Toraje Irie, 'History of Japanese Migration to Peru', trans. by William Himel, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. Zl, nos. i & ii (Aug. and Nov. 19P).



522 Michael ] . Gon^ales

Gildemeisters the right to renovate the port of Malabrigo and to link it byrail with their sugarcane plantation Casa Grande. The use of private docksand railway facilities greatly reduced the cost of importing and exportingmaterials and, according to outraged merchants in Trujillo, allowed theGildemeisters to develop a large retail business on their estate. Notcoincidentally, the granting of the concession came shortly after theGildemeisters had made a private loan of 44,000 pounds sterling to theBenavides government.26

Given planters' political influence, it has been suggested that they couldhave sought price supports for their products, or a currency policy thatconsistently favoured exporters.27 Exporters probably favoured a weaknational currency because they sold most of their products to industrialnations with strong currencies, and would therefore profit more in theexchange. However, Peru remained on the gold standard from 1901 to1914, when its currency became inconvertible and declined in value. Thesecircumstances initially worked against the interests of exporters, but thedecline in the value of Peruvian currency coincided with recordcommodity prices and production levels. The result was unprecedentedprofits.

Planters probably did not pursue price supports for their industriesbecause such programmes would have been politically controversial andfinancially risky. In the first place, commodity subsidies most commonlyoccurred in European nations, which could afford them, and not ineconomically unstable Third World countries. A case could perhaps bemade for price supports in sugarcane monocultures, where the entireeconomy depended on this crop, but Peru's export economy was relativelydiversified. Moreover, sugar planters did not even pay an export tax until1917, and cotton growers avoided this tax altogether. It would have beendifficult to justify price supports for industries that did not pay taxes,especially during periods of record profits.

Miller accurately observes that planters were primarily concerned withlocal, family, and business affairs and did not always have a clear agendafor national issues. However, this is hardly surprising. There were fewprofessional politicians in Peru at this time, but many politically ambitiousindividuals and interest groups who sought to protect a variety of socialand economic concerns. There was also an assortment of conservativeCatholics and middle-class professionals who had their own agendas andfound a political niche inside and outside of the Civilista party. Political

26 P e t e r F . K l a r e n , Modernisation, Dislocation, and Aprismo, La t i n A m e r i c a n M o n o g r a p hn o . 32 (Aust in , Texas , 1973), pp . 7 0 - 8 3 .

27 Personal communication from Bill Albert, August 1990.

522 Michael]. Gonzales

Gildemeisters the right to renovate the port of Malabrigo and to link it by rail with their sugarcane plantation Casa Grande. The use of private docks and railway facilities greatly reduced the cost of importing and exporting materials and, according to outraged merchants in Trujillo, allowed the Gildemeisters to develop a large retail business on their estate. Not coincidentally, the granting of the concession came shortly after the Gildemeisters had made a private loan of 44,000 pounds sterling to the Benavides government. 26

Given planters' political influence, it has been suggested that they could have sought price supports for their products, or a currency policy that consistently favoured exporters. 27 Exporters probably favoured a weak national currency because they sold most of their products to industrial nations with strong currencies, and would therefore profit more in the exchange. However, Peru remained on the gold standard from 1901 to 1914, when its currency became inconvertible and declined in value. These

circumstances initially worked against the interests of exporters, but the decline in the value of Peruvian currency coincided with record commodity prices and production levels. The result was unprecedented profits.

Planters probably did not pursue price supports for their industries because such programmes would have been politically controversial and financially risky. In the first place, commodity subsidies most commonly occurred in European nations, which could afford them, and not in economically unstable Third World countries. A case could perhaps be made for price supports in sugarcane monocultures, where the entire economy depended on this crop, but Peru's export economy was relatively diversified. Moreover, sugar planters did not even pay an export tax until 1917, and cotton growers avoided this tax altogether. It would have been difficult to justify price supports for industries that did not pay taxes, especially during periods of record profits.

Miller accurately observes that planters were primarily concerned with local, family, and business affairs and did not always have a clear agenda for national issues. However, this is hardly surprising. There were few professional politicians in Peru at this time, but many politically ambitious individuals and interest groups who sought to protect a variety of social and economic concerns. There was also an assortment of conservative Catholics and middle-class professionals who had their own agendas and found a political niche inside and outside of the Civilista party. Political

26 Peter F. Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo, Latin American Monograph no. 32 (Austin, Texas, 1973), pp. 70-83.

27 Personal communication from Bill Albert, August 1990.



Planters and Politics in Peru 5 2 3

mavericks, however, usually had to create their own power base. Forexample, Guillermo Billinghurst, former mayor of Lima and wealthymineowner, used working-class support to pressure a Civilista-dominatedCongress into accepting his election to the presidency in 1912.28

Nevertheless, even Billinghurst could not last for long. When hecontinued to court the popular classes after his election, the Civilistasconspired with the army to overthrow him and place General OscarBenavides in power. After two years, Benavides handed over thepresidency to Jose Pardo, Civilista stalwart and sugar planter.29

Planters' participation in national politics did not prevent them frommanaging their affairs in the provinces. For example, Miller providesmany examples of the Aspi'llagas' preoccupation with local issues in theSana Valley: they frequently quarrelled with neighbouring planters overirrigation water, with the nearby town of Sana over land, and with theirown workers over higher wages. Miller argues that this demonstratesthe planter—politicians' periodic withdrawal from national politics, theinformal nature of politics, and intra-class conflict. However true this maybe, it also demonstrates planters' concern with protecting theirinvestments and, ultimately, it underscores their political skill. Let uslook at Miller's examples. The Peruvian coast is a desert and the onlyregular source of water for drinking and irrigation is the rivers that flowdown from the Andes. As plantations expanded in size in the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a correspondingincrease in the demand for irrigation water. The big losers in the growingcompetition for water were the small farmers, Indian communities, andtowns, as the new national water code, passed in 1902 during theadministration of sugar planter Lopez de Romana, gave large landownersfirst priority in irrigating their land.30 Moreover, many water-starvedsmall farmers and communities sold out to planters, who dramaticallyincreased the size of their estates during this period. For example, CasaGrande grew from 724 hectares in 1850 to 40,848 hectares in 1927, theplantation Roma from 1,449 hectares in 1850 to 19,777 hectares in 1927,and the estate Pomalca from 1,912 hectares in 1896 to 7,267 hectares in1924.31 When lawsuits over landownership arose between growers and

28 The Civilista candidate, incidentally, was Antero Aspfllaga Barrera.29 Peter Blanchard, ' A Populist Precursor : Gui l lermo Bil l inghurst ' , Journal of La/in

American Studies, vol. 9 (1977), pp. 2; 1-73- The Civilistas always enjoyed some militarysupport, even during the nineteenth century. Moreover, following the AristocraticRepublic some politically active planters, such as the Aspfllagas, served as key advisorsto military dictators in the 1930s and from 1948 to 1956.

30 G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, p p . 4 3 - 4 ; M a n u e l Pasapera (ed.) , Ley de aguas con susantecedentes. Cddigo y Reg/amento Aguas (L ima, 1902).

31 G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, p p . 4 2 - 5 2 , tables 7 - 1 1 .


mavericks, however, usually had to create their own power base. For example, Guillermo Billinghurst, former mayor of Lima and wealthy mineowner, used working-class support to pressure a Civilista-dominated Congress into accepting his election to the presidency in 1912.28 Nevertheless, even Billinghurst could not last for long. When he continued to court the popular classes after his election, the Civilistas conspired with the army to overthrow him and place General Oscar Benavides in power. After two years, Benavides handed over the presidency to Jose Pardo, Civilista stalwart and sugar planter. 29

Planters' participation in national politics did not prevent them from managing their affairs in the provinces. For example, Miller provides many examples of the Aspillagas' preoccupation with local issues in the Sana Valley: they frequently quarrelled with neighbouring planters over irrigation water, with the nearby town of Sana over land, and with their own workers over higher wages. Miller argues that this demonstrates the planter-politicians' periodic withdrawal from national politics, the informal nature of politics, and intra-class conflict. However true this may be, it also demonstrates planters' concern with protecting their investments and, ultimately, it underscores their political skill. Let us look at Miller's examples. The Peruvian coast is a desert and the only regular source of water for drinking and irrigation is the rivers that flow down from the Andes. As plantations expanded in size in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a corresponding increase in the demand for irrigation water. The big losers in the growing competition for water were the small farmers, Indian communities, and towns, as the new national water code, passed in 1902 during the administration of sugar planter Lopez de Romana, gave large landowners first priority in irrigating their land. 30 Moreover, many water-starved small farmers and communities sold out to planters, who dramatically increased the size of their estates during this period. For example, Cas a Grande grew from 724 hectares in 1850 to 40,848 hectares in 1927, the plantation Roma from 1,449 hectares in 1850 to 19,777 hectares in 1927, and the estate Pomalca from 1,912 hectares in 1896 to 7,267 hectares in 1924.31 When lawsuits over landownership arose between growers and

28 The Civilista candidate, incidentally, was Antero Aspillaga Barrera. 29 Peter Blanchard, 'A Populist Precursor: Guillermo Billinghurst', Journal of Latin

American Studies, vol. 9 (1977), pp. ZS 1-73. The Civilistas always enjoyed some military support, even during the nineteenth century. Moreover, following the Aristocratic Republic some politically active planters, such as the Aspillagas, served as key advisors to military dictators in the 1930S and from 1948 to 19S6.

30 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 43-4; Manuel Pasapera (ed.), Ley de aguas con sus antecedentes. Codigo y Reglamento Aguas (Lima, 190Z).

31 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 4Z-SZ, tables 7-11.



5 24 Michael J. Gonzales

communities, planters usually emerged victorious. For example, theAspfllagas won a long-standing suit with the neighbouring town of Sanain 1913, and when frustrated townspeople rioted against the court'sdecision, troops herded them into jails and protected plantationproperty.32 On other occasions, the Aspfllagas and other planters benefitedenormously from the intervention of troops to crush strikes on theirestates,33 about which more will be said later.

Miller raises an important question regarding the composition of thecoastal elite.34 Dennis Gilbert wrote about the ' 24 friends' who met everyThursday evening in the Club Nacional to set Peru's political agenda, andthe impression is given that these patriarchs dominated national affairs.35

This is an exaggeration because, as Miller points out, the executive did notalways secure its wishes with the legislature and members of the middleclass participated in government.36 Miller also questions the existence ofa coastal elite because the so-called oligarchy included families from thecolonial aristocracy (such as the Pardos) as well as others of recentimmigrant origin (such as the Aspfllagas, Larcos, and Chopiteas.)37

However, as Gilbert points out, there were several 'blood and gold'marriages during this period that united aristocratic lines with newmoney. This process strengthened the elite and facilitated its politicalinfluence.38

Anticipating dependency theory, Jorge Bravo Bresani wrote in 1969:'In reality, the oligarchy does not exist except through delegation fromthe outside and through the acceptance of the middle classes.'39 WhatBravo stressed was the importance of foreign capital in mining, plantationagriculture, and other areas of the Peruvian economy, and, by implication,the limitations imposed on Peruvian development by the structure of theworld economy. Recent research has shown, however, that Peruvian elitesowned most of the sugar and cotton plantations and Peru's slowdevelopment was caused both by economic imperialism and a variety ofinternal causes.40 Moreover, the economy actually grew from 1895 to 1919as a result of increased investment in technology and transportation aswell as favourable market prices for Peru's principal exports. Peruvianelites were never simple tools or economic appendages of foreign capitaland they were quite capable of taking independent action. Peruvians

32 G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, p . 52. 33 Ibid., chapter ix.34 Miller, 'La Oligarquia', pp. 553-4. 35 Tresfamilias, p. 37.36 Miller, 'La Oligarquia', pp. 554, 561. 37 'The Coastal Elite', pp. 104-7.38 Gilbert, pp. 37-40.39 ' M i t o y real idad de la o l igarquia p e r u a n a ' , in M a t o s M a r (ed.) , ha oligarquia, p . 68.40 See R o s e m a r y T h o r p a n d Geoffrey Be r t r am, Peru, 1&99-1977: Growth and Policy in an

Open Economy ( N e w Y o r k , 1978); A lbe r t , An Essay on the Peruvian Sugar Industry,1880-1920; and G o n z a l e s , Plantation Agriculture, chs . ii a n d iii.


communities, planters usually emerged victorious. For example, the Aspl1lagas won a long-standing suit with the neighbouring town of Sana in 1913, and when frustrated townspeople rioted against the court's decision, troops herded them into jails and protected plantation property.32 On other occasions, the Aspillagas and other planters benefited enormously from the intervention of troops to crush strikes on their estates,33 about which more will be said later.

Miller raises an important question regarding the composition of the coastal elite. 34 Dennis Gilbert wrote about the' 24 friends' who met every Thursday evening in the Club Nacional to set Peru's political agenda, and the impression is given that these patriarchs dominated national affairs. 35

This is an exaggeration because, as Miller points out, the executive did not always secure its wishes with the legislature and members of the middle class participated in government.36 Miller also questions the existence of a coastal elite because the so-called oligarchy included families from the

colonial aristocracy (such as the Pardos) as well as others of recent immigrant origin (such as the Aspl1lagas, Larcos, and Chopiteas.)37 However, as Gilbert points out, there were several 'blood and gold' marriages during this period that united aristocratic lines with new money. This process strengthened the elite and facilitated its political influence. 38

Anticipating dependency theory, Jorge Bravo Bresani wrote in 1969: 'In reality, the oligarchy does not exist except through delegation from the outside and through the acceptance of the middle cIasses.'39 What Bravo stressed was the importance of foreign capital in mining, plantation agriculture, and other areas of the Peruvian economy, and, by implication, the limitations imposed on Peruvian development by the structure of the world economy. Recent research has shown, however, that Peruvian elites owned most of the sugar and cotton plantations and Peru's slow development was caused both by economic imperialism and a variety of internal causes. 40 Moreover, the economy actually grew from 1895 to 1919 as a result of increased investment in technology and transportation as well as favourable market prices for Peru's principal exports. Peruvian elites were never simple tools or economic appendages of foreign capital and they were quite capable of taking independent action. Peruvians

32 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, p. 52. 34 Miller, 'La Oligarquia', pp. 553-4. 36 Miller, 'La Oligarquia', pp. 5j4, 56!. 38 Gilbert, pp. 37-40 .

33 Ibid., chapter ix. 36 Tres familias, p. 37.

37 'The Coastal Elite', pp. 104-7.

39 'Mito y realidad de la oligarquia peruana', in Matos Mar (ed.), La oligarqula, p. 68. 40 See Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru, 1899-1977: Growth and Policy in an

Open Economy (New York, 1978); Albert, An Essay on the Peruvian Sugar Industry, 1880-1920; and Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, chs. ii and iii.




invested heavily in commercial agriculture, finance, urban real estate, andother areas.41 They were generally on good terms with foreign investors,but they developed their own economic agendas. For example, a group ofPeruvian investors that included Juan Pardo (the president's brother) andthe Aspillagas won a major legal dispute with the giant US miningconglomerate, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, that netted them millionsof dollars in profit.42 The elite did not look to foreigners for legitimisation,and the same can be said more emphatically with regard to the middleclasses. Their numbers were still small during the Aristocratic Republicand they did not become politically influential until later.

It is not my contention that the Civilistas and planters controlled everyfacet of political life during the Aristocratic Republic. They simply hadmore power and influence than any other party or economic group.Moreover, given Peru's vast size, its relatively poor transportation andcommunication networks, and its underdeveloped bureaucracy,43 thecentral government could not control much of what went on in theprovinces. In fact, beyond revenue collection, elections, and keeping thepeace, most administrations probably paid little attention to the interior.In the far reaches of the highlands and Amazonia, large landowners withhundreds of dependent Indian ' servants' usually controlled local officesand political affairs.44 The exact nature of their political relationship withthe coastal elite has yet to be determined. On the other hand, the positionof coastal sugar and cotton planters was unique because they weresimultaneously members of the Limeno and provincial elites. In the capital,they held high national office and rubbed elbows with the oldest, mostaristocratic families, and on their plantations they stood at the pinnacle ofregional society.

Political influence and social and economic control

In the provinces, planters tended to have it both ways: they benefitedwhen the state intervened to crush strikes and stifle political dissent, andwhen the state left them alone to police and punish their own workers.

41 Thorp and Bertram, pp. 21-145. Alfonso W. Quiroz, 'Financial Leadership and theFormation of Peruvian Elite Groups, 1884—1930', Journal of Latin American Studies', vol.20, no. i (May 1988), pp. 49-81. Among those elites who diversified were the Pardosand the Aspfllagas. However, both continued to earn the bulk of their income fromexporting sugar.

42 Denn i s L. Gi lber t , ' T h e Ol igarchy and the Old Regime in P e r u ' , Cornell Universi tyDisser ta t ion Series, no . 69 (January, 1977), p p . 4 4 - 7 .

43 Joaqui 'n Capelo est imated that there were only 500 bureaucrats in Lima in 1900. InFlores Ga l indo and Burga, p . 85.

44 In Puno, elites belonged to various political parties, including the Civilista, which hadsimilar platforms favouring economic development and public works. Personalcommunication from Nils Jacobsen, 28 May 1990.


invested heavily in commercial agriculture, finance, urban real estate, and other areas. 41 They were generally on good terms with foreign investors, but they developed their own economic agendas. For example, a group of Peruvian investors that included Juan Pardo (the president's brother) and the Aspl1lagas won a major legal dispute with the giant US mining conglomerate, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, that netted them millions of dollars in profit. 42 The elite did not look to foreigners for legitimisation, and the same can be said more emphatically with regard to the middle classes. Their numbers were still small during the Aristocratic Republic and they did not become politically influential until later.

It is not my contention that the Civilistas and planters controlled every facet of political life during the Aristocratic Republic. They simply had more power and influence than any other party or economic group. Moreover, given Peru's vast size, its relatively poor transportation and communication networks, and its underdeveloped bureaucracy,43 the central government could not control much of what went on in the provinces. In fact, beyond revenue collection, elections, and keeping the peace, most administrations probably paid little attention to the interior. In the far reaches of the highlands and Amazonia, large landowners with hundreds of dependent Indian 'servants' usually controlled local offices and political affairs. 44 The exact nature of their political relationship with the coastal elite has yet to be determined. On the other hand, the position of coastal sugar and cotton planters was unique because they were simultaneously members of the Limefio and provincial elites. In the capital, they held high national office and rubbed elbows with the oldest, most aristocratic families, and on their plantations they stood at the pinnacle of regional society.

Political influence and social and economic control

In the provinces, planters tended to have it both ways: they benefited when the state intervened to crush strikes and stifle political dissent, and when the state left them alone to police and punish their own workers.

U Thorp and Bertram, pp. 21-145. Alfonso W. Quiroz, 'Financial Leadership and the Formation of Peruvian Elite Groups, 1884-1930', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 20, no. i (May 1988), pp. 49-81. Among those elites who diversified were the Pardos and the Aspfllagas. However, both continued to earn the bulk of their income from exporting sugar.

42 Dennis L. Gilbert, 'The Oligarchy and the Old Regime in Peru', Cornell University Dissertation Series, no. 69 (January, 1977), pp. 44-7.

43 Joaquin Capelo estimated that there were only 500 bureaucrats in Lima in 1900. In Flores Galindo and Burga, p. 85.

44 In Puno, elites belonged to various political parties, including the Civilista, which had similar platforms favouring economic development and public works. Personal communication from Nils Jacobsen, 28 May 1990.



526 Michael J. Gonzales

Planters were accustomed to exercising considerable control over labour.Slavery had not been abolished until 1854, and slaves were subsequentlyreplaced with Chinese indentured servants whose experience resembledthat of slaves.45 When indentured servitude came to an end in 1874,planters recruited Chinese as wage labourers and subjected them to a harshregime of social control characterised by debt peonage, corporalpunishment (including executions), imprisonment in plantation jails, andother heavy-handed controls. The state helped planters in theseendeavours by forcing the Chinese to buy identity cards, ignoringlabourers' civil rights, and helping to capture runaways.46

By the 1880s, Chinese labourers were being replaced on sugarcaneplantations by wage labourers from contiguous highland regions, and oncotton plantations by tenants and sharecroppers from local peasantcommunities. Both of these transformations were linked to themodernisation of plantation agriculture, and they complicated labourmanagement in the decades ahead. Although both sugar and cottonplanters relied heavily on non-violent methods of control during thisperiod, they never completely abandoned violence and intimidation.47 Forexample, planters continued to maintain jails on their estates and toimprison peons or tenants they judged guilty of crimes or disruptiveactivities. Prime candidates were captured runaways, who sometimes werealso severely beaten.48 Planters also maintained private police forces topatrol workers' compounds, keep the peace, admonish workers foruncleanliness and idleness, and guard the planters' residence.49 Byallowing growers to maintain their own police forces and jails, the stateinformally surrendered some judicial authority to them.

There was also considerable collusion between planters and localofficials in the recruitment and control of labour. Labour contractors, onwhom sugar planters depended to supply their estates with peons,

45 Wat t Stewart , Chinese Bondage in Peru ( D u r h a m , N C , 1951).46 Michael J. Gonzales , 'Chinese Plantat ion Worke r s and Social Conflict in Peru in the

Late Nine teenth Cen tu ry ' , Journal of Latin American Studies, vol . 21 , no . 3 (Oct . 1989),p p . 385-424.

47 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, chapters viii and ix; Gonzales, ' The Rise of CottonTenant Farming in Peru, 1890—1920'.

48 Manuel Torres to Carlos Gutierrez, 1 July 1907, El Archivo del Fuero Agrario, Lima(hereinafter referred to as AFA); M. Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 25 June 1919,Patapo to Chota, AFA; Manuel Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 15 Nov. 1918, Patapoto Chota, AFA; V. Mires to Catalino Coronado, 2; March 1910, Patapo to Chota,AFA; J. Orrego to Catalino Coronado, Patapo to Chota, 15 Sept. 1916, AFA; V. Miresto Catalino Coronado, 22 April 1910, Patapo to Chota, AFA.

49 'Pr incipales obligaciones de los guardianes de la Hacienda Cayalti, 1928 ' , A F A ;Joaqufn Gut ie r rez to Aspillaga He rmanos , 19 A u g . 1915, Cayaltf to Lima, A F A ;Joaqufn Gut ie r rez to Aspillaga H e r m a n o s , 3 March 1916, Cayalti to Lima, A F A ;Aspillaga H e r m a n o s to Joaqui 'n Gut ie r rez , 23 March 1916, Cayalti to Lima, A F A .

j 26 Michael]. Gonzales

Planters were accustomed to exercising considerable control over labour. Slavery had not been abolished until 1854, and slaves were subsequently replaced with Chinese indentured servants whose experience resembled that of slaves. 45 When indentured servitude came to an end in 1874, planters recruited Chinese as wage labourers and subjected them to a harsh regime of social control characterised by debt peonage, corporal punishment (including executions), imprisonment in plantation jails, and other heavy-handed controls. The state helped planters in these endeavours by forcing the Chinese to buy identity cards, ignoring labourers' civil rights, and helping to capture runaways.46

By the 1880s, Chinese labourers were being replaced on sugarcane plantations by wage labourers from contiguous highland regions, and on cotton plantations by tenants and sharecroppers from local peasant communities. Both of these transformations were linked to the modernisation of plantation agriculture, and they complicated labour management in the decades ahead. Although both sugar and cotton planters relied heavily on non-violent methods of control during this period, they never completely abandoned violence and intimidation. 47 For example, planters continued to maintain jails on their estates and to imprison peons or tenants they judged guilty of crimes or disruptive activities. Prime candidates were captured runaways, who sometimes were also severely beaten.48 Planters also maintained private police forces to

patrol workers' compounds, keep the peace, admonish workers for uncleanliness and idleness, and guard the planters' residence. 49 By allowing growers to maintain their own police forces and jails, the state informally surrendered some judicial authority to them.

There was also considerable collusion between planters and local officials in the recruitment and control of labour. Labour contractors, on whom sugar planters depended to supply their estates with peons,

45 Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru (Durham, NC, 19) I).

46 Michael J. Gonzales, 'Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru in the Late Nineteenth Century', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 2 I, no. 3 (Oct. 1989), pp. 38)-424.

47 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, chapters viii and ix; Gonzales, 'The Rise of Cotton Tenant Farming in Peru, 1890-1920'.

48 Manuel Torres to Carlos Gutierrez, 1 July 1907, El Archivo del Fuero Agrario, Lima (hereinafter referred to as AFA); M. Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 2) June 1919, Patapo to Chota, AFA; Manuel Coronado to Catalino Coronado, I) Nov. 1918, Patapo to Chota, AFA; V. Mires to Catalino Coronado, 2) March 1910, Patapo to Chota, AFA; J. Orrego to Catalino Coronado, Patapo to Chota, Ij Sept. 1916, AFA; V. Mires to Catalino Coronado, 22 April 1910, Patapo to Chota, AF A.

49 'Principales obligaciones de los guardianes de la Hacienda Cayaltl, 1928', AFA; Joaquin Gutierrez to AspI1laga Hermanos, 19 Aug. 1915, Cayaltl to Lima, AFA; Joaquin Gutierrez to AspI1laga Hermanos, 3 March 1916, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; AspI1laga Hermanos to Joaquin Gutierrez, 23 March 1916, Cayalt! to Lima, AFA.




sometimes doubled as local officials. For example, recruiters DanielOrrego and Catalino Coronado served as governor (district head) of SantaCruz and sub-prefect of Chota, respectively, during the early twentiethcentury.50 Holding office undoubtedly helped contractors avoid pros-ecution for illegal recruitment tactics, such as exaggerating wages orplying prospective labourers with liquor, of which they were frequentlyguilty.51

Planters also routinely called upon local officials to quell minordisturbances and enforce discipline on estates. For example, in 1915 a riotbroke out on the Aspillagas' sugarcane plantation Cayaltf after plantationpolice had beaten and jailed a popular merchant. Workers turned on thepolice, forced them to take refuge in the planters' mansion and embarkedon an orgy of looting and drunkenness. Order could only be restoredwhen armed mayordomos joined forces with police from the neighbouringtown of Sana to force workers back into their homes.52 On anotheroccasion, the manager of the Aspillagas' cotton estate Palto accused atenant of stealing a yoke and some locks. Instead of filing charges, themanager took the accused to the local police station where he was lashedand forced to spend the night in jail.53 Local officials also helped sugarcanegrowers capture indebted peons who had run away. Runaways numberedin the hundreds and cost planters thousands of dollars and valuable labourpower. Planters organised posses composed of mayordomos, contractors,and governors and pursued peons deep into the interior. As an addedincentive to governors, north-coast sugar planters offered them one sol forevery runaway they captured. If posses failed, planters still had the optionof suing runaways in court.54

60 Contract, Daniel Orrego and Hacienda Pomalca, 26 Jan. 191 o, AFA; AspfllagaHermanos to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 8 Feb. 1906, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; ManuelCoronado to Catalino Coronado, 21 Sept. 1916, Patapo to Lima, AFA.

61 C. D. Scott, 'Peasants, Proletarianisation and the Articulation of Modes of Production:The Case of Sugarcane Cutters in Northern Peru, 1940-1969', Journal of Peasant Studies,vol. 3 (April 1976), pp. 321—41; Miguel Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 22 Aug. 1918,Patapo to Chota, AFA; Cesar Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 16 Oct. 1918, Patapoto Chota, AFA; Aspfllaga Hermanos to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 27 June 1889, Cayaltf toLima, AFA; Aspfllaga Hermanos to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 31 July 1889, Cayaltf toLima, AFA; Aspfllaga Hermanos to Aspfllaga Hermanos, n Oct. 1892, Cayaltf toLima, AFA; interview with Galindo Bravo, CAP Pucala, 26 June 1975.

62 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Antero Aspfllaga Barrera and Baldomero AspfllagaBarrera, 30 Dec. 1915, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA.

53 Joaqufn Gutierrez to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 19 Aug. 1915, San Jose to Lima, AFA;Joaqufn Gutierrez to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 3 March 1916, Pisco to Lima, AFA;Aspfllaga Hermanos to Joaqufn Gutierrez, 23 March 1916, San Jose to Lima, AFA.

64 Vfctor Aspfllaga Taboada to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 14 Oct. 1908, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA;N. Tello to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 29 Nov. 1905, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; VfctorAspfllaga Taboada to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 11 Aug. 1908, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA;


sometimes doubled as local officials. For example, recruiters Daniel Orrego and Catalino Coronado served as governor (district head) of Santa Cruz and sub-prefect of Chota, respectively, during the early twentieth century. 50 Holding office undoubtedly helped contractors avoid prosecution for illegal recruitment tactics, such as exaggerating wages or plying prospective labourers with liquor, of which they were frequently guilty. 51

Planters also routinely called upon local officials to quell minor disturbances and enforce discipline on estates. For example, in 1915 a riot broke out on the Aspl1lagas' sugarcane plantation Cayaltf after plantation police had beaten and jailed a popular merchant. Workers turned on the police, forced them to take refuge in the planters' mansion and embarked on an orgy of looting and drunkenness. Order could only be restored when armed mayordomos joined forces with police from the neighbouring town of Sana to force workers back into their homes. 52 On another occasion, the manager of the Aspfllagas' cotton estate Palto accused a tenant of stealing a yoke and some locks. Instead of filing charges, the manager took the accused to the local police station where he was lashed and forced to spend the night in jail. 53 Local officials also helped sugarcane growers capture indebted peons who had run away. Runaways numbered in the hundreds and cost planters thousands of dollars and valuable labour power. Planters organised posses composed of mayordomos, contractors, and governors and pursued peons deep into the interior. As an added incentive to governors, north-coast sugar planters offered them one sol for every runaway they captured. If posses failed, planters still had the option of suing runaways in court. 54

60 Contract, Damel Orrego and HaCIenda Pomalca, 26 Jan. 1910, AF A; Aspillaga Hermanos to Aspillaga Hermanos, 8 Feb. 1906, Cayahi to Lima, AFA; Manuel Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 21 Sept. 1916, Patapo to Lima, AFA.

51 C. D. Scott, 'Peasants, Proletarianisation and the Articulation of Modes of Production: The Case of Sugarcane Cutters in Northern Peru, 1940-1969', Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 3 (April 1976), pp. 32 1-41 ; Miguel Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 22 Aug. 1918, Patapo to Chota, AFA; Cesar Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 16 Oct. 1918, Patapo to Chota, AFA; Aspillaga Hermanos to Aspillaga Hermanos, 27 June 1889, Cayah{ to Lima, AFA; Aspillaga Hermanos to Aspillaga Hermanos, 31 July 1889, Cayaltl to Lima, AFA; Aspillaga Hermanos to Aspillaga Hermanos, II Oct. 1892, Cayaltl to

Lima, AFA; interview with Galindo Bravo, CAP Pucala, 26 June 1975. 62 Ramon Aspillaga Barrera to Antero Asp11laga Barrera and Baldomero Asp11laga

Barrera, 30 Dec. 191), Cayah{ to Lima, AFA. 53 Joaquin Gutierrez to Aspillaga Hermanos, 19 Aug. 1911, San Jose to Lima, AFA;

Joaquin Gutierrez to Aspillaga Hermanos, 3 March 1916, Pisco to Lima, AF A; Aspillaga Hermanos to Joaquin Gutierrez, 23 March 1916, San Jose to Lima, AFA.

M Victor Aspillaga Taboada to Aspt1laga Hermanos, 14 Oct. 1908, Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; N. Tello to Aspillaga Hermanos, 29 Nov. 190), Cayaltf to Lima, AFA; Victor Aspillaga Taboada to AspI1laga Hermanos, II Aug. 1908, Cayaltl to Lima, AFA;



5 28 Michael ]. Gon^ales

Planters commanded the attention of local officials because of theirstatus, wealth, and political influence. Under Peru's centralised system ofgovernment, planter-politicians also had a major voice in naming anddismissing local officials. For example, in 1913 the Prefect of Lambayeque,the most powerful regional official, formally accused the Aspillagas ofstealing land from the town of Sana. When a copy of the report reachedAntero Aspfllaga Barrera, in less than a week he arranged to have theprefect dismissed and replaced with someone of his choice.55 Moreover,according to the new water code of 1902, the largest landowners couldalso select members of local water districts. Not surprisingly, they tendedto choose themselves or their cronies, which gave them direct controlover vital water resources. There is even evidence that planters purposelydenied water to small farmers to force them into selling out.56

The tangible result of planters' political influence at the local levelwas greater control over workers, neighbouring communities, and waterresources. However, planters needed the state most when it came tosuppressing strikes on their estates. Sugar workers' strikes occurred forthe first time during the Aristocratic Republic and were the result of rapidmodernisation, the massive recruitment of wage labour, regimented workroutines, high inflation, ideological influences from the urban proletariat,and the contradiction of soaring profits and falling real wages. None of theplanters' efforts at social control could stop these historical currents fromproducing an atmosphere of confrontation.57 A wave of strikes sweptthrough north coast sugarcane plantations between 1912 and 1917 and,despite some efforts at negotiation, the army was eventually called in toforce strikers back to work and prevent the formation of unions.58

The strike that erupted in the Chicama Valley in 1912 was the largestin Peruvian history. It began on the Gildemeisters' Casa Grande estate andquickly spread to the neighbouring plantations of Cartavio and Chiquitoy,

Manuel Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 6 Oct. 1916, Patapo to Chota, AFA; V. Miresto Catalino Coronado, 18 Feb. 1910, Patapo to Chota, AFA; V. Mires to CatalinoCoronado, 2; Feb. 1910, Patapo to Lima, AFA.

66 Antero Aspfllaga Barrera to Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera and Baldomero AspfllagaBarrera, 23 Oct. 1913, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; Antero Aspfllaga Barrera to RamonAspfllaga Barrera and Baldomero Aspfllaga Barrera, 30 Oct. 1913, Cayalti to Lima,AFA.

66 Pasapera, hey de aguas...; Peter F. Klaren, Modernisation; pp. 56-7; Victor AspfllagaToboada to Aspfllaga Hermanos, 30 Aug. 1907, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; La Reforma(Trujillo), 22 Aug. 1917. " Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, ch. ix.

58 Detailed discussions of these strikes are available in ibid.; Albert, Peruvian Sugar Industry,pp. I78a-2o8a; Peter F. Klaren, Modernisation, pp. 33-49.

j 28 Michael]. Gonzales

Planters commanded the attention of local officials because of their status, wealth, and political influence. Under Peru's centralised system of government, planter-politicians also had a major voice in naming and dismissing local officials. For example, in 1913 the Prefect of Lambayeque, the most powerful regional official, formally accused the Aspl1lagas of stealing land from the town of Sana. When a copy of the report reached Antero Aspl1laga Barrera, in less than a week he arranged to have the prefect dismissed and replaced with someone of his choice. 55 Moreover, according to the new water code of 1902, the largest landowners could also select members of local water districts. Not surprisingly, they tended to choose themselves or their cronies, which gave them direct control over vital water resources. There is even evidence that planters purposely denied water to small farmers to force them into selling out. 56

The tangible result of planters' political influence at the local level was greater control over workers, neighbouring communities, and water

resources. However, planters needed the state most when it came to suppressing strikes on their estates. Sugar workers' strikes occurred for the first time during the Aristocratic Republic and were the result of rapid modernisation, the massive recruitment of wage labour, regimented work routines, high inflation, ideological influences from the urban proletariat, and the contradiction of soaring profits and falling real wages. None of the planters' efforts at social control could stop these historical currents from producing an atmosphere of confrontation. 57 A wave of strikes swept through north coast sugarcane plantations between 1912 and 1917 and, despite some efforts at negotiation, the army was eventually called in to force strikers back to work and prevent the formation of unions. 58

The strike that erupted in the Chicama Valley in 1912 was the largest in Peruvian history. It began on the Gildemeisters' Casa Grande estate and quickly spread to the neighbouring plantations ofCartavio and Chiquitoy,

Manuel Coronado to Catalino Coronado, 6 Oct. 1916, Patapo to Chota, AFA; V. Mires to Catalino Coronado, 18 Feb. 1910, Patapo to Chota, AFA; V. Mires to Catalino Coronado, 25 Feb. 1910, Patapo to Lima, AFA.

66 Antero Asp11laga Barrera to Ramon Asp11laga Barrera and Baldomero Asp11laga Barrera, 23 Oct. 1913, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; Antero Asp11laga Barrera to Ramon Asp11laga Barrera and Baldomero Aspl1laga Barrera, 30 Oct. 1913, Cayalti to Lima, AFA.

66 Pasapera, Ley de aguas ... ; Peter F. Klaren, Modernization, pp. 56-7; Victor Asp11laga Toboada to Asp11laga Hermanos, 30 Aug. 1907, Cayalti to Lima, AFA; La Reforma (Trujillo), 22 Aug. 1917. 67 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, ch. ix.

68 Detailed discussions of these strikes are available in ibid.; Albert, Peruvian Sugar Industry, pp. I 78a-208a; Peter F. Klaf(~n, Modernization, pp. 33-49'




and to Laredo in the Moche Valley. When strikers' demands for higherwages, better housing, and other improvements were rejected, theyburned cane fields, sacked stores, and broke expensive machinery beforethe local police, militia, and the army brought a temporary peace to theregion. In the end, as many as 150 workers lost their lives.59

Five years later a series of strikes rocked several plantations in theChicama and Lambayeque valleys. Demanding higher wages to offsetrising prices, strikers shut down Casa Grande, Cartavio, Chiclin, andPomalca estates during a period of peak market prices. After a half-hearted effort at negotiation, planters, who despaired at losing recordprofits, called in the army to force labourers back to work at gunpoint.60

These interventions demonstrated planters' influence in Lima and theimportance of their industries to the national economy. Although theseeds for a working-class movement on the sugarcane plantations hadbeen planted as early as 1912, state repression played an important role inpreventing its fruition for several decades. Subsequent strikes werecrushed by the army in 1921 and 1931, and the unionisation of sugarworkers was not legalised until the mid-1940s, only to be outlawed againduring the Odria dictatorship from 1948 to 1956.61

Getting elected in Peru: Ramon Aspillaga Barrera's campaign for Deputy,1906-j

That planters made good use of their political influence is clear, but themethods they used to gain political office, especially elected office, remainunexplored by historians. It is well-known that the Civilista party was theprimary vehicle to political power for planters. However, we know littleabout the electoral process and what combination of factors influenced theresults. Ramon Aspillaga Barrera's campaign for deputy from PiscoProvince in 1906-7 provides several insights into these historicalproblems. Aspfllaga's election depended heavily on personal and familyconnections among the area's provincial bourgeoisie. The Civilista partydid not provide funds, party workers, or other kinds of support associatedwith modern political parties. However, party membership and en-dorsement was crucial to a successful campaign, and there was competitionamong Civilistas for official party backing.

69 Albert, Peruvian Sugar Industry, p. 106a; La Reforms, 8-11 April 1912; 15 April 1912;18 April 1912; 19 April 1912.

60 La Keforma, 1-2 June 1917; 4 June 1917; La Industria (Trujillo), 4 June 1917; Albert,Peruvian Sugar Industry, pp. i8ya-i88a; Ramon Aspillaga Barrera to Antero AspfllagaBarrera, 12 July 1917, AFA; Ramon Aspillaga Barrera to Antero Aspillaga Barrera, 17July 1917, AFA. 81 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 176-85.


and to Laredo in the Moche Valley. When strikers' demands for higher wages, better housing, and other improvements were rejected, they burned cane fields, sacked stores, and broke expensive machinery before the local police, militia, and the army brought a temporary peace to the region. In the end, as many as I5 ° workers lost their lives. 59

Five years later a series of strikes rocked several plantations in the Chicama and Lambayeque valleys. Demanding higher wages to offset rising prices, strikers shut down Casa Grande, Cartavio, Chiclin, and Pomalca estates during a period of peak market prices. After a halfhearted effort at negotiation, planters, who despaired at losing record profits, called in the army to force labourers back to work at gunpoint. 60

These interventions demonstrated planters' influence in Lima and the importance of their industries to the national economy. Although the seeds for a working-class movement on the sugarcane plantations had been planted as early as 1912, state repression played an important role in preventing its fruition for several decades. Subsequent strikes were crushed by the army in 192. 1 and 1931, and the unionisation of sugar workers was not legalised until the mid-1940S, only to be outlawed again during the Odria dictatorship from 1948 to 1956.61

Getting elected in Peru,' Ramon Aspillaga Barrera's campaign for Deputy,

[9 06-7

That planters made good use of their political influence is clear, but the methods they used to gain political office, especially elected office, remain unexplored by historians. It is well-known that the Civilista party was the primary vehicle to political power for planters. However, we know little about the electoral process and what combination of factors influenced the results. Ramon Asp11laga Barrera's campaign for deputy from Pisco Province in 1906-7 provides several insights into these historical problems. Aspt1laga's election depended heavily on personal and family connections among the area's provincial bourgeoisie. The Civilista party did not provide funds, party workers, or other kinds of support associated with modern political parties. However, party membership and endorsement was crucial to a successful campaign, and there was competition among Civilistas for official party backing.

59 Albert, PertlVian Sugar Industry, p. lo6a; La Reforma, 8-11 April 1912; q April 1912; 18 April 1912; 19 April 1912.

60 La Reforma, 1-2 June 1917; 4 June 1917; La Industria (Trujillo), 4 June 1917; Albert, Peruvian Sugar Industry, pp. 187a-188a; Ramon Aspillaga Barrera to Antero Aspillaga Barrera, 12 July 1917, AFA; Ramon Aspillaga Barrera to Antero Aspillaga Barrera, 17 July 1917, AFA. 61 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 176-8).



5 3° Michael J. Gon^ales

Serious disputes erupted between party leaders over access to office,personal affronts, and political effectiveness. At this juncture, there is littleevidence that debates over ideology or programmes (with a fewexceptions, such as the export tax on sugar), fuelled these conflicts.Bickering among Civilista elites undoubtedly made them more vulnerableto political leaders with superior organisational skills and the ability tomanipulate the popular classes. That such a political leader, Augusto B.Leguia, emerged from among the Civilista hierarchy is fitting, as he couldobserve the weaknesses of the political elite and the party from the inside.In 1919 Legui'a won the presidency and proclaimed the 'New Nation',which promised a great deal to workers, Indians, and the petitebourgeoisie. However, after a period of political consolidation duringwhich many planter—politicians were exiled, Leguia offered little to anyonebeyond the nouveau riche and foreign business interests.62

During the Aristocratic Republic, electoral politics were fencingmatches between elites and their supporters. Suffrage was limited toliterate adult male property owners, who voted at election tables {mesasreceptoras) manned by members of a particular party. The results thenpassed through a maze of electoral committees controlled on the coastduring the early twentieth century by the Civilista party. The process wasobviously susceptible to considerable fraud and influence peddling.Nevertheless, it was an improvement of sorts over barracks politics whichrelied on violence and offered even less pretence of a democratic process.63

Ramon Aspillaga Barrera was well-positioned to become deputy fromPisco in 1907. The Aspillaga family had acquired a cotton plantation(Palto) in the province in 184964 and had maintained residences on theestate and in town for over fifty years. Thus, they had numerous relatives,business associates, and employees in the province on whose politicalsupport they could count.65 Ramon also had a legacy to the post becausehis brother Ismael had been elected Pisco's first deputy in 1901, only to diein office.66

Ramon Aspillaga also stood to benefit from his family's long-timeaffiliation with the Civilista party. His father, Ramon Aspillaga Ferrebii,was an early supporter of Manuel Pardo, the founder of the party and

62 I. G. Bertram, 'Development Problems in an Export Economy: A Study of DomesticCapitalists, Foreign Firms and Government in Peru, 1919-1930', unpublished DPhilthesis, Oxford University, 1974; Cotler, Closes, ch. iv.

83 Jorge Basadre, Eleccionesy centralismo en el Peru (Lima, 1980).64 Gilbert, 'Oligarchy', p. 162.8S Aspillaga family correspondence from the plantation Palto, ca. 1860-1930, AFA.66 See below for a brief discussion of Ismael's campaign. Some details about the political

history of Pisco are in M. Castillo Negron, Monografia de Pisco (Lima, 1947), pp. 295-6-


Serious disputes erupted between party leaders over access to office, personal affronts, and political effectiveness. At this juncture, there is little evidence that debates over ideology or programmes (with a few exceptions, such as the export tax on sugar), fuelled these conflicts. Bickering among Civilista elites undoubtedly made them more vulnerable to political leaders with superior organisational skills and the ability to manipulate the popular classes. That such a political leader, Augusto B. Leguia, emerged from among the Civilista hierarchy is fitting, as he could observe the weaknesses of the political elite and the party from the inside. In 1919 Leguia won the presidency and proclaimed the 'New Nation', which promised a great deal to workers, Indians, and the petite bourgeoisie. However, after a period of political consolidation during which many planter-politicians were exiled, Leguia offered little to anyone beyond the nouveau riche and foreign business interests. 62

During the Aristocratic Republic, electoral politics were fencing

matches between elites and their supporters. Suffrage was limited to literate adult male property owners, who voted at election tables (mesas receptoras) manned by members of a particular party. The results then passed through a maze of electoral committees controlled on the coast during the early twentieth century by the Civilista party. The process was obviously susceptible to considerable fraud and influence peddling. Nevertheless, it was an improvement of sorts over barracks politics which relied on violence and offered even less pretence of a democratic process. 63

Ramon Aspl1laga Barrera was well-positioned to become deputy from Pisco in 1907. The Aspl1laga family had acquired a cotton plantation (Palto) in the province in 184964 and had maintained residences on the estate and in town for over fifty years. Thus, they had numerous relatives, business associates, and employees in the province on whose political support they could count. 65 Ramon also had a legacy to the post because his brother Ismael had been elected Pisco's first deputy in 19°1, only to die in office. 66

Ramon Aspt1laga also stood to benefit from his family's long-time affiliation with the Civilista party. His father, Ramon Aspl1laga Ferrebu, was an early supporter of Manuel Pardo, the founder of the party and

62 1. G. Bertram, 'Development Problems in an Export Economy: A Study of Domestic Capitalists, ForeIgn Firms and Government in Peru, 1919-1930', unpublished DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1974; Cotler, Clases, ch. iv.

63 Jorge Basadre, Elecciones y centralismo en el Perri (Lima, 198o). 64 Gilbert, 'Oligarchy', p. 162. 66 Asp11laga family correspondence from the plantation Palto, ca. 1860-1930, AFA. 66 See below for a brief discussion of Ismael's campaign. Some details about the political

history of Pisco are in M. Castillo Negron, Monografia de Pisco (Lima, 1947), pp. 295-6.




Peru's first civilian president.67 During the 1880s, his older brother,Antero, emerged as a key party leader. He served as finance minister, partypresident, and president of the Senate on four different occasions,68 It isnot surprising that during the heyday of the party's influence — whenelection was almost guaranteed - Ramon also sought office.

Little information has survived on the campaign of Ismael AspillagaBarrera for deputy in 1901. He had the backing of several local dignitaries,which he considered tantamount to 'popular support',69 and he solicitedthe backing of others. For example, he sought the endorsement of CarlosAlvarez Calderon, scion of a local elite family and prominent Civilista,who was not especially close to the Aspillagas. When Alvarez politelydelayed his backing, Ismael asked Manuel Candamo, Civilista candidatefor president and head of the party, to intervene on his behalf.70

This letter writing campaign was carried out from Lima, while localarrangements were entrusted to close business associates and familymembers. For example, a key aid was Gerardo Perez y Perez, a cousin whoowned an import-export firm and managed the Aspillagas' business affairsin Pisco. Among other things, Perez organised local political meetings,kept a close eye on municipal officials in Pisco, and gauged the relativestrength of the opposition.71

The exact nature of the opposition to Ismael Aspillaga is unclear fromthe remaining documentation. His opponent, Miranda, was discounted byPerez who insisted that Aspillaga enjoyed broad support from bothCivilistas and Democratas. The opposition managed to anger Ismael byquestioning the strength of his support in a letter to the influential Limadaily El Comercio, but this had no practical impact on the election.72

When election day came, the Aspillagas counted on the backing of theirnumerous employees, as seen in this letter to the manager of Palto:

As you know, on May 25 the election in Pisco for deputy will begin, and ourbrother Don Ismael Aspillaga is a candidate. Renters from Palto and San Joseshould already favour Don Ismael Aspillaga, and in his name you should

67 El Peruano (Lima), 16 Feb. 1886; Gilbert, 'Oligarchy', p. 163, 168-9.68 Gilbert, 'Oligarchy', p. 170-1.69 Ismael Aspillaga to Senor Parroco, Dr D. Jose G. Escate, 15 Feb. 1901, Lima to Pisco,

AFA.70 Ismael Aspillaga Barrera to Carlos Alvarez Calderon, 15 Feb. 1901, Lima to Pisco,

AFA; Ismael Aspfllaga Barrera to Carlos Alvarez Calderon, 23 Feb. 1901, Lima toPisco, AFA.

71 Ismael Aspillaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 23 Feb. 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA; IsmaelAspillaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 1 March 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA; IsmaelAspillaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 2 March 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

72 Ismael Aspillaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 1 March 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA; IsmaelAspillaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 2 March 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA.


Peru's first civilian president. 67 During the 1880s, his older brother, Antero, emerged as a key party leader. He served as finance minister, party president, and president of the Senate on four different occasions. 68 It is not surprising that during the heyday of the party's influence - when election was almost guaranteed - Ramon also sought office.

Little information has survived on the campaign of Ismael Aspl1laga Barrera for deputy in 1901. He had the backing of several local dignitaries, which he considered tantamount to 'popular support', 69 and he solicited the backing of others. For example, he sought the endorsement of Carlos Alvarez Calderon, scion of a local elite family and prominent Civilista, who was not especially close to the Aspillagas. When Alvarez politely delayed his backing, Ismael asked Manuel Candamo, Civilista candidate for president and head of the party, to intervene on his behalf. 70

This letter writing campaign was carried out from Lima, while local arrangements were entrusted to close business associates and family members. For example, a key aid was Gerardo Perez y Perez, a cousin who owned an import-export firm and managed the Aspl1lagas' business affairs in Pisco. Among other things, Perez organised local political meetings, kept a close eye on municipal officials in Pisco, and gauged the relative strength of the opposition. 71

The exact nature of the opposition to Ismael Aspl1laga is unclear from the remaining documentation. His opponent, Miranda, was discounted by Perez who insisted that Aspillaga enjoyed broad support from both Civilistas and Democratas. The opposition managed to anger Ismael by questioning the strength of his support in a letter to the influential Lima daily EI Comercio, but this had no practical impact on the election. 72

When election day came, the Aspillagas counted on the backing of their numerous employees, as seen in this letter to the manager of Palto:

As you know, on May 25 the election in Pisco for deputy will begin, and our brother Don Ismael Aspillaga is a candidate. Renters from Pal to and San Jose should already favour Don Ismael Aspillaga, and in his name you should

67 EI Peruano (Lima), 16 Feb. 1886; Gilbert, 'Oligarchy', p. 163, 168-9' 68 Gilbert, 'Oligarchy', p. 170-1.

69 Ismael Asp11laga to Senor Parroco, Dr D. Jose G. Escate, 15 Feb. 19°1, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

70 Ismael Aspillaga Barrera to Carlos Alvarez Calderon, 15 Feb. 1901, Lima to Pisco, AF A; Ismael Aspillaga Barrera to Carlos Alvarez Calderon, z 3 Feb. 19°1, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

71 Ismael Aspt1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, z 3 Feb. 1901, Lima to Pisco, AF A; Ismael Aspt1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 1 March 19°1, Lima to Pisco, AF A; Ismael Aspt1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, z March 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

72 Ismael Aspt1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 1 March 1901, Lima to Pisco, AF A; Ismael Aspt1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, z March 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA.




assemble them and tell them to vote for him. Get instructions from Mr. Perezregarding details and be advised to comply with these orders.73

When the votes were counted, Ismael Aspillaga Barrera received amajority, and after the results passed through the various Civilista-controlled election boards, he was declared deputy from Pisco.74

The campaign of Ramon Aspillaga Barrera in 1906-7 relied on the samebusiness and family associates. His campaign differed significantly,however, because he faced a serious challenge from within the Civilistaparty. This forced him to campaign for the backing of both voters andparty leaders. The first candidate to enter the race was Armando Macedoy Maza, a Civilista hacendado from Humay who had the backing of somelocal notables and claimed to be the official party candidate.75 This caughtAspillaga off guard and forced him to campaign vigorously for votes andwithin the party for an open election.

Ramon's task was complicated by his family's rocky relationship withPresident Jose Pardo and presidential nominee Augusto B. Legufa. TheAspillagas are usually characterised as conservatives and Pardo as a'young Turk'.76 Nevertheless, no one ever mentions what policies orideologies divided these people and, although some differences probablyexisted, they were all politically conservative and economically liberal.The Aspillaga correspondence suggests that disputes arose primarily overaccess to office, political power within the party, and the effectiveness ofleaders in pursuing policies of mutual benefit. It is abundantly clear thatparty leaders were easily offended and harboured personal grudges forlong periods of time. It is also instructive that Ramon Aspillaga was ableto stand for Civilista deputy from Pisco without the support of eitherPardo or Legui'a. As Ramon put it, although ' the Pardo government is nofriend of ours... President Pardo is not capable of contradicting mycandidacy'.77 Ramon's confidence stemmed from his strong politicalsupport in Pisco and his family's power base within the party. Pardo wasalso nearing the end of his term and his influence may have been ebbing.Ramon made it known to the president that' Pisco is not a province in thesierra, and that Macedo can do what he wants, but we will continueforward with enthusiasm'. Pardo remained cool toward the Aspillagas,stating to a friend of Ramon's: ' I don't know why the Aspillagas are

73 Aspfllaga Hermanos to Tomas Acevedo, 22 May 1901, Lima to Palto, AFA.74 Ismael Aspfllaga Barrera to Senor Presidente de la Junta Escrutadora de la Provincia

de Pisco, 17 June 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA.75 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to C. Cespedes, 17 Oct. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon

Aspfllaga Barrera to Tomas Bull, 20 Oct. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspillagaBarrera to Gerardo Perez, 13 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

76 S te in , Populism, p p . 29, 32.77 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Tomas Acevedo, 29 Oct. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA.


assemble them and tell them to vote for him. Get instructions from Mr. Perez regarding details and be advised to comply with these orders. 73

When the votes were counted, Ismael Aspl1laga Barrera received a majority, and after the results passed through the various Civilistacontrolled election boards, he was declared deputy from Pisco. 74

The campaign of Ramon Aspl1laga Barrera in 1906-7 relied on the same business and family associates. His campaign differed significantly, however, because he faced a serious challenge from within the Civilista party. This forced him to campaign for the backing of both voters and party leaders. The first candidate to enter the race was Armando Macedo y Maza, a Civilista hacendado from Humay who had the backing of some local notables and claimed to be the official party candidate. 75 This caught Aspfllaga off guard and forced him to campaign vigorously for votes and within the party for an open election.

Ramon's task was complicated by his family's rocky relationship with

President Jose Pardo and presidential nominee Augusto B. Leguia. The Aspl1lagas are usually characterised as conservatives and Pardo as a 'young Turk '.76 Nevertheless, no one ever mentions what policies or ideologies divided these people and, although some differences probably existed, they were all politically conservative and economically liberal. The Aspl1laga correspondence suggests that disputes arose primarily over access to office, political power within the party, and the effectiveness of leaders in pursuing policies of mutual benefit. It is abundantly clear that party leaders were easily offended and harboured personal grudges for long periods of time. It is also instructive that Ramon Aspl1laga was able to stand for Civilista deputy from Pisco without the support of either Pardo or Leguia. As Ramon put it, although' the Pardo government is no friend of ours ... President Pardo is not capable of contradicting my candidacy'.77 Ramon's confidence stemmed from his strong political support in Pisco and his family's power base within the party. Pardo was also nearing the end of his term and his influence may have been ebbing. Ramon made it known to the president that' Pisco is not a province in the sierra, and that Macedo can do what he wants, but we will continue forward with enthusiasm '. Pardo remained cool toward the Aspillagas, stating to a friend of Ramon's: 'I don't know why the Aspillagas are

73 Aspfllaga Hermanos to Tomas Acevedo, 1.2 May 1901, Lima to Palto, AFA. 74 Ismael Aspfllaga Barrera to Senor Presidente de la Junta Escrutadora de la Provincia

de Pisco, 17 June 1901, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 75 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to C. Cespedes, 17 Oct. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AF A; Ramon

Aspfllaga Barrera to Tomas Bull, 20 Oct. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Aspll1aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 13 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

76 Stein, Populism, pp. 29, F. 77 Ramon Aspll1aga Barrera to Tomas Acevedo, 29 Oct. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA.




estranged from my government and supporting the policies of Legufa.'78

This shows an important split within the party, and contradicts SteveStein's conclusion that 'Pardo's first presidential term (1904-8) was a timeof almost unequalled internal political peace within the governingparty.'79

The Aspfllagas' supposed alliance with Legui'a quickly shattered andposed another threat to Ramon's campaign. The animosity stemmed froma verbal clash in the senate between Senator Antero Aspfllaga Barrera andcabinet minister Legui'a. The intensity of the exchange was such that anAspfllaga supporter, Federico Mendoza, actually struck the minister. AsRamon relayed the incident: 'After Dr. Legufa's insulting language, DonFederico Mendoza, who is incapable of killing a flea, gave him two blowswith his cane and, according to everyone, they appear to have been well-placed.'80

Although Ramon approved of the caning, he worried that Legufamight oppose his candidacy. Since the Aspfllagas were no longer onspeaking terms with the minister, Ramon asked a close friend, HeraclidesPerez, to make an appointment with the powerful minister. Perezinformed Legufa that Aspfllaga enjoyed the backing of 'everyone inPisco', and accused him of opposing Aspfllaga's candidacy. Legufarejoined that he was on bad terms with both Armando Macedo and theAspfllagas, but was especially upset with the latter because they hadrefused to greet him since the 'famous debate in the senate'. It isinstructive that both parties remained bitterly angry over personalaffronts, and apparently not over policy issues.81

Four months later, the Aspfllagas were still refusing to speak withLegufa, who had made an effort to patch things up. President Pardo finallyintervened and, through an emissary, asked Antero to speak with Legufa.However, as Ramon explained, Antero refused:

[AJlthough Minister Legufa has warmly congratulated Antero, we have beendistancing ourselves from him because of his insults in parliament. Naturally, LaPrensa exaggerates and gives its own political interpretation to the incident, butthe truth is that Antero's honour does not allow him to accept the congratulationsor greetings of Legufa in public because of the great satisfaction Legufa wouldreceive.88

78 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 10 Dec. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA; RamonAspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, Lima to Pisco, 11 Dec . 1906, A F A .

79 Populism, p . 30; Miller also refers to the per iod from 1903-8 as one of politicalha rmony . ' L a Oligarqui 'a ' , p . 553.

80 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 9 Jan . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .81 R a m o n admit ted tha t : ' n o s o t r o s le habi'amos qu i tado el s a ludo ' . R a m o n Aspfllaga

Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 9 Feb . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .82 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 18 June 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA.


estranged from my government and supporting the policies of Legu{a.'78 This shows an important split within the party, and contradicts Steve Stein's conclusion that 'Pardo's first presidential term (1904-8) was a time of almost unequalled internal political peace within the governing party.'79

The Aspt1lagas' supposed alliance with Leguia quickly shattered and posed another threat to Ramon's campaign. The animosity stemmed from a verbal clash in the senate between Senator Antero Aspillaga Barrera and cabinet minister Leguia. The intensity of the exchange was such that an Aspt1laga supporter, Federico Mendoza, actually struck the minister. As Ramon relayed the incident: 'After Dr. Leguia's insulting language, Don Federico Mendoza, who is incapable of killing a flea, gave him two blows with his cane and, according to everyone, they appear to have been wellplaced.'80

Although Ramon approved of the caning, he worried that Leguia might oppose his candidacy. Since the Aspillagas were no longer on speaking terms with the minister, Ramon asked a close friend, Heraclides Perez, to make an appointment with the powerful minister. Perez informed Leguia that Aspillaga enjoyed the backing 'of 'everyone in Pisco', and accused him of opposing Aspillaga's candidacy. Leguia rejoined that he was on bad terms with both Armando Macedo and the Aspt1lagas, but was especially upset with the latter because they had refused to greet him since the 'famous debate in the senate '. It is instructive that both parties remained bitterly angry over personal affronts, and apparently not over policy issues. 81

Four months later, the Aspillagas were still refusing to speak with Legula, who had made an effort to patch things up. President Pardo finally intervened and, through an emissary, asked Antero to speak with Leguia.

However, as Ramon explained, Antero refused:

[A]lthough Minister Leguia has warmly congratulated Antero, we have been distancing ourselves from him because of his insults in parliament. Naturally, La Prensa exaggerates and gives its own political interpretation to the incident, but the truth is that Antero's honour does not allow him to accept the congratulations or greetings of Leguia in public because of the great satisfaction Leguia would receive. 82

78 Ramon Aspillaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 10 Dec. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, Lima to Pisco, II Dec. 1906, AFA.

79 Populism, p. 30 ; Miller also refers to the period from 1903-8 as one of political harmony. 'La Oligarquia', p. 553.

80 Ramon Asp11laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 9 Jan. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 81 Ramon admitted that: 'nosotros Ie habiamos quitado el saludo'. Ramon Asp11laga

Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 9 Feb. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 82 Ramon Asp11laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 18 June 1907, Lima to Pisco, AF A.



534 Michael ]. Gon^ales

In general terms, this posture corresponds with the observation ofFlores Galindo and Burga that elites were excessively concerned withdeference and manners and were easily offended.83 Within a politicalcontext, this certainly weakened party unity, needlessly complicatedgovernment, and made the Civilistas vulnerable to Billinghurst in 1912and to Legufa in 1919.

Although Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera believed that he could win withoutthe support of either Pardo or Leguia, he still worried that the party mightdeclare his Civilista rival, Armando Macedo, the official party candidate.As it was, Macedo had gained some support simply by spreading therumour of his official candidacy, which had forced Ramon to waste timedenying the story.84 It is unknown to what extent Antero AspfllagaBarrera intervened on his brother's behalf behind closed doors in Lima.Antero was distracted for a while by the illness of another brother,Baldomero, whom he had accompanied on a cruise to Chile. Upon hisreturn, he wrote several letters to uncommitted voters asking them tosupport Ramon,85 and he probably helped win the backing of JavierPrado Ugarteche. Prado, son of former president Mariano Ignacio Prado,was a key member of the Junta Central of the Civilista party. Ramonreminded Prado that Pisco had supported his father's rise to power in1864, and that the province had backed Civilista candidates since theparty's inception. He asked him to help win the support of a localhacendado and his manager, with whom Prado was acquainted.86

Political machinations in Lima were obviously important to theoutcome of the election. If Macedo were declared the official partycandidate, it would seriously hurt Aspfllaga because the party controlledthe maze of electoral committees that 'analysed' the ballots. Moreover, asJorge Basadre has noted, there was considerable electoral fraud duringthis period.87

From the beginning, Aspfllaga had fashioned a well-organisedcampaign that focused on lining up the support of eligible voters,monitoring local politicians and electoral committees, and deflectingnegative campaign propaganda. Aspfllaga also presented a platformstressing economic development and public order, themes that wereuniversally palatable to his constituency and consistent with other ' orderand progress' governments in Latin America.

83 Apogeo y crisis, p p . 9 1 - 1 0 0 .84 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Tomas Acevedo, 29 Dec. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA.85 Antero Aspfllaga Barrera to Enrique Villagarcia, 2 March 1907, Lima to lea, AFA;

Antero Aspfllaga Barrera to Augusto Ri'os, 5 March 1907, Lima to lea, AFA; AnteroAspfllaga Barrera to Augusto Ri'os, 6 March 1907, Lima to lea, AFA.

86 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Javier Prado Ugarteche, 25 Feb. 1907, Lima to Lima,AFA. 87 Elections, p. 57.


In general terms, this posture corresponds with the observation of Flores Galindo and Burga that elites were excessively concerned with deference and manners and were easily offended. 83 Within a political context, this certainly weakened party unity, needlessly complicated government, and made the Civilistas vulnerable to Billinghurst in 1912 and to Leguia in 1919.

Although Ramon Aspl1laga Barrera believed that he could win without the support of either Pardo or Leguia, he still worried that the party might declare his Civilista rival, Armando Macedo, the official party candidate. As it was, Macedo had gained some support simply by spreading the rumour of his official candidacy, which had forced Ramon to waste time denying the story.84 It is unknown to what extent Antero Aspillaga Barrera intervened on his brother's behalf behind closed doors in Lima. Antero was distracted for a while by the illness of another brother, Baldomero, whom he had accompanied on a cruise to Chile. Upon his

return, he wrote several letters to uncommitted voters asking them to support Ramon,85 and he probably helped win the backing of Javier Prado Ugarteche. Prado, son of former president Mariano Ignacio Prado, was a key member of the Junta Central of the Civilista party. Ramon reminded Prado that Pisco had supported his father's rise to power in 1864, and that the province had backed Civilista candidates since the party's inception. He asked him to help win the support of a local hacendado and his manager, with whom Prado was acquainted. 86

Political machinations in Lima were obviously important to the outcome of the election. If Macedo were declared the official party candidate, it would seriously hurt Aspl1laga because the party controlled the maze of electoral committees that' analysed' the ballots. Moreover, as Jorge Basadre has noted, there was considerable electoral fraud during this period. 87

From the beginning, Aspillaga had fashioned a well-organised campaign that focused on lining up the support of eligible voters, monitoring local politicians and electoral committees, and deflecting negative campaign propaganda. Aspillaga also presented a platform stressing economic development and public order, themes that were universally palatable to his constituency and consistent with other' order and progress' governments in Latin America.

83 Apogeo y crisis, pp. 91- 100•

84 Ramon Asp11laga Barrera to Tomas Acevedo, 29 Dec. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA. 85 Antero Asp11laga Barrera to Enrique Villagarcia, 2 March 1907, Lima to lea, AF A;

Antero Aspl11aga Barrera to Augusto Rios, 5 March 1907, Lima to lea, AF A; Antero Asp11laga Barrera to Augusto Rios, 6 March 1907, Lima to lea, AFA.

86 Ramon Asp11laga Barrera to Javier Prado Ugarteche, 25 Feb. 1907, Lima to Lima, AFA. 87 Elecciones, p. 57.




From Lima, Aspfllaga wrote a stream of personal letters solicitingcampaign contributions from known supporters and asking for thebacking of the uncommitted. By September, 1906 he had collectedSoles/. 1,452.00 from twenty-three different contributors, who includedhacendados, merchants, and the local priest.88 He reminded voters of hisfamily's roots in the province, the popular nature of his candidacy, hisstrong commitment to the development of agriculture and commerce, andmutual friends and political associates. Aspfllaga even solicited the votesof Macedo's supporters.89 He clearly sought a broad mandate fromproperty owners, not just a winning margin. This was not simply aquestion of ego, but a tactic to prevent the party leadership from publiclybacking Macedo. Such a declaration would be politically controversial ifRamon could garner written pledges from the vast majority of registeredCivilistas.

Aspfllaga instructed his campaign organisers to talk with voters, tokeep a close eye on local politicians, and to organise rallies in support ofhis candidacy. These tasks were primarily entrusted to his cousinsGerardo Perez and Pelegrin Roman, who had managed the successfulcampaign of Ismael Aspfllaga Barrera in 1901. An important objective wasto reassure voters that the election had not been predetermined. In RamonAspfllaga's words:

You can say to friends that the official candidacy of Mr. Macedo is not certain andthat ours is a popular candidacy that follows all the prerequisites of the law andwill be respected by the National Committee. In a town like Pisco, on whosebeaches General San Martin walked for the first time and for a short while wascapital of the Republic, their vote cannot be falsified nor forged.90

Ramon had a similar concern with regard to electoral officials. Hethoroughly understood electoral laws and procedures and warnedauthorities not to steal the election. For example, the president of theJunta Directiva Departamental del Partido Civil de lea was reminded thathe had benefited from Antero's political support and that this was an openelection. Ramon concluded: 'as soon as possible you should inform thecommittee of which you are president of the truth, and nothing but the

88 List of contributors, dated Sept. 1906, Aspfllaga correspondence, Hacienda Palto,AFA.

99 There are dozens of these letters in the Palto correspondence from June to Decemberof 1906. Examples include: Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to J. Barnechea, 29 Oct. 1906,Lima to Hacienda Zarate, AFA; Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Daniel Villa, 12 July1906, Lima to Hacienda Monterola, AFA; Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to FranciscoPasara Cisneros, 20 Nov. 1906, Lima to Hacienda Mencia, AFA; Ramon AspfllagaBarrera to Fermi'n Tangiiis, 26 Nov. 1906, Lima to Hacienda Urrutia, AFA; RamonAspfllaga Barrera to Jorge Bull, 18 July 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

90 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Tomas Acevedo, 12 Dec. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA.


From Lima, Aspl1laga wrote a stream of personal letters soliciting campaign contributions from known supporters and asking for the backing of the uncommitted. By September, 1906 he had collected Soles;' l.4p.OO from twenty-three different contributors, who included hacendados, merchants, and the local priest. 88 He reminded voters of his family's roots in the province, the popular nature of his candidacy, his strong commitment to the development of agriculture and commerce, and mutual friends and political associates. Aspt1laga even solicited the votes of Macedo's supporters. 89 He clearly sought a broad mandate from property owners, not just a winning margin. This was not simply a question of ego, but a tactic to prevent the party leadership from publicly backing Macedo. Such a declaration would be politically controversial if Ramon could garner written pledges from the vast majority of registered Civilistas.

Aspt1laga instructed his campaign organisers to talk with voters, to keep a close eye on local politicians, and to organise rallies in support of his candidacy. These tasks were primarily entrusted to his cousins Gerardo Perez and Pelegrin Roman, who had managed the successful campaign ofIsmael Aspt1laga Barrera in 1901. An important objective was to reassure voters that the election had not been predetermined. In Ramon Aspt1laga's words:

You can say to friends that the official candidacy of Mr. Macedo is not certain and that ours is a popular candidacy that follows all the prerequisites of the law and will be respected by the National Committee. In a town like Pisco, on whose beaches General San Martin walked for the first time and for a short while was capital of the Republic, their vote cannot be falsified nor forged. 90

Ramon had a similar concern with regard to electoral officials. He thoroughly understood electoral laws and procedures and warned authorities not to steal the election. For example, the president of the Junta Directiva Departamental del Partido Civil de Ica was reminded that he had benefited from Antero's political support and that this was an open election. Ramon concluded: 'as soon as possible you should inform the committee of which you are president of the truth, and nothing but the

88 List of contributors, dated Sept. 1906, Aspt1laga correspondence, HaCienda Palto, AFA.

89 There are dozens of these letters in the Palto correspondence from June to December of 1906. Examples include: Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to J. Barnechea, 29 Oct. 1906, Lima to Hacienda Zarate, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Daniel Villa, 12 July 1906, Lima to Hacienda Monterola, AFA; Ramon Aspt1laga Barrera to Francisco Pasara Cisneros, 20 Nov. 1906, Lima to Hacienda Mencia, AF A; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Fermin Tangiiis, 26 Nov. 1906, Lima to Hacienda Urrutia, AFA; Ramon Aspl1laga Barrera to Jorge Bull, 18 July 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

90 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Tomas Acevedo, 12 Dec. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA.



536 Michael ]. Gon^ales

truth, regarding the relation between the elections in Pisco and mycandidacy'.91 Ramon was also careful to place supporters on the Junta deRegistro Provincial, the committee which authenticated voter roles inPisco province. This allowed him to ascertain if his supporters hadregistered, to safeguard against their disqualification, and to scrutinise theeligibility of Macedo's supporters.92 Aspillaga also ran a slate of candidatesin the municipal elections in Pisco in December, 1906, which emergedvictorious by a slim margin.93

Early on in the campaign Ramon Aspillaga authorised a campaign aideto tell 'friends and citizens' in the province that he favoured a series ofmeasures relating to economic development, public order, education, andhealth:

I authorize you to announce to friends and citizens from Humay, Huancan andthe valleys that if I am elected, as agriculturalist and property owner, I promise:to improve the roads and bridges that the Departmental Committee of lea shouldhave attended to long ago; to carry out a complete cleansing of the towns andvalleys to eliminate epidemics; to create rural police stations that will guarantee,along with public authority, life and property which we deserve as agriculturalists,property owners, and taxpayers. I will also try especially hard to see that the newlaw on primary education has real and effective application in the districts andvalleys. Finally, I pledge total support to the projects and laws that contribute tothe progress of our agriculture, which is one of the principal sources of wealthof the country.64

This declaration was as close as Aspillaga came to a campaign platform.It reflected general concerns among property owners and offeredsomething to all citizens. Epidemics had ravaged the Peruvian coast fordecades, laying waste to villages and Indian communities and threateningtowns and plantations. On their sugarcane plantation, Cayalti, theAspillagas had initiated a series of health measures designed to prevent anepidemic from decimating the workforce and bringing production to ahalt.95 Ramon's concern over epidemics in the Pisco area probablyemanated from similar concerns over cotton production and profitability.At Cayalti, the Aspillagas favoured limited primary education as a meansof disciplining lower-class children and preparing them to becomeobedient and efficient workers. They clearly did not favour publiceducation as a vehicle for facilitating social mobility or integrating Peru's

91 R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Enr ique Villagarcia, 4 Feb . 1907, Lima to lea, A F A .92 R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Jose A. Bringas, 24 Jan . 1907, A F A ; R a m o n Aspillaga

Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 23 Feb. 1907, A F A .93 R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 15 Dec. 1906, Lima to Pisco, A F A ; R a m o n

Aspillaga Barrera to Carlos Cespedes, 16 Dec . 1906, Lima to Pisco, A F A ; R a m o nAspillaga Barrera to Pelegrin R o m a n , 18 Dec . 1906, Lima to Pisco, A F A .

94 R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to T o m a s S. Acevedo , 21 July 1906, Lima to Pal to , A F A .95 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. 15 5—9.


truth, regarding the relation between the elections in Pisco and my candidacy'.91 Ramon was also careful to place supporters on the Junta de Registro Provincial, the committee which authenticated voter roles in Pisco province. This allowed him to ascertain if his supporters had registered, to safeguard against their disquaHfication, and to scrutinise the eligibility of Macedo's supporters. 92 Aspl1laga also ran a slate of candidates in the municipal elections in Pisco in December, 1906, which emerged victorious by a slim margin. 93

Early on in the campaign Ramon Aspl1laga authorised a campaign aide to tell' friends and citizens' in the province that he favoured a series of measures relating to economic development, public order, education, and health:

I authorize you to announce to friends and citizens from Humay, Huancan and the valleys that if I am elected, as agriculturalist and property owner, I promise: to improve the roads and bridges that the Departmental Committee of lea should have attended to long ago; to carry out a complete cleansing of the towns and valleys to eliminate epidemics; to create rural police stations that will guarantee, along with public authority, life and property which we deserve as agriculturalists, property owners, and taxpayers. I will also try especially hard to see that the new law on primary education has real and effective application in the districts and valleys. Finally, I pledge total support to the projects and laws that contribute to the progress of our agriculture, which is one of the principal sources of wealth of the country.94

This declaration was as close as Aspillaga came to a campaign platform. It reflected general concerns among property owners and offered something to all citizens. Epidemics had ravaged the Peruvian coast for decades, laying waste to villages and Indian communities and threatening

towns and plantations. On their sugarcane plantation, Cayalt!, the

Aspl1lagas had initiated a series of health measures designed to prevent an

epidemic from decimating the workforce and bringing production to a halt. 95 Ramon's concern over epidemics in the Pisco area probably

emanated from similar concerns over cotton production and profitability. At Cayalt!, the Aspillagas favoured limited primary education as a means of disciplining lower-class children and preparing them to become obedient and efficient workers. They clearly did not favour public

education as a vehicle for facilitating social mobility or integrating Peru's

91 Ramon Aspl1laga Barrera to Enrique Villagareia, 4 Feb. 1907, Lima to lea, AFA. 92 Ramon AspJ1laga Barrera to Jose A. Bringas, 24 Jan. 1907, AFA; Ramon Asp11laga

Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 23 Feb. 1907, AFA. 93 Ramon Asp11laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, I j Dec. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AF A; Ramon

Asp11laga Barrera to Carlos Cespedes, 16 Dec. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Asp11laga Barrera to Peiegrin Roman, 18 Dec. 1906, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

94 Ramon Asp11laga Barrera to Tomas S. Acevedo, 21 July 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA. 95 Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture, pp. I j 5-9.




diverse ethnic and racial groups into the larger society.98 Improvementsin public transportation and police protection would have benefitedeveryone. However, planters would profit the most from improved roadsand port facilities, and public authority was frequently used by planters tosuppress workers.

In general, Ramon's platform was consistent with the themes of'order and progress' found in modernising regimes in Porfirian Mexicoand Old Republican Brazil, which were heavily influenced by positivismand Social Darwinism. For example, both governments promoted railwayconstruction, plantation agriculture, social control (e.g. the rurales), andforeign investment, while paying little or no attention to the welfare ofblacks, Indians, workers and peasants.97

The Aspfllagas certainly believed that white elites should rule, and thatpoor blacks, Indians, and Chinese should labour.98 These sentiments wereprobably shared by Armando Macedo who, like Aspfllaga, was a Civilistahacendado. In such a race, voter preference was probably determinedprimarily by personal and business associations and party endorsement.Campaigning was largely limited to letter writing and private conver-sations, although Ramon Aspfllaga also believed that public demon-strations in favour of his candidacy would influence undecided voters anddiscourage the party from endorsing his opponent. He saw rallies as' public manifestations of our strength and our power'" and ordered hiscampaign aides to organise them in several locations.100 For the largerrallies in Pisco, the campaign provided transportation, a band, politicaloratory, and an impressive luncheon:

For this Sunday you should arrange a good lunch comprised of 1,000 to 2,000well-prepared sausages, some 3,000 bread rolls, cheese, wine, chicha, and beer (butnot distilled spirits) in abundance. Everything should be in generous proportionsand in an appropriate locale to lunch and to walk among the people and alongthe beach.101

In contrast to Aspillaga's efforts, we know little about ArmandoMacedo's campaign. He gained the initiative by entering the election first,and he vigorously sought official party endorsement. Macedo also enjoyedthe support of influential politicians throughout the campaign, including

88 Ibid., pp. 166-7.87 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican

Revolution (Chicago, 1981), part i; Love and Barickman, 'Rulers and Owners'; andThomas H. Holloway, Immigrants on the hand: Coffee and Society in Sao Paulo, i$86-i9}4(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1980).

98 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Antero Aspfllaga Barrera, 14 June 1917, Cayalti to Lima,AFA.

98 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Tomas S. Acevedo, 29 Dec. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA.100 Ram<5n Aspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 30 Jan . 1907, L ima to Pisco , A F A .101 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 9 Feb. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA.


diverse ethnic and racial groups into the larger society. 96 Improvements in public transportation and police protection would have benefited everyone. However, planters would profit the most from improved roads and port facilities, and public authority was frequently used by planters to suppress workers.

In general, Ramon's platform was consistent with the themes of 'order and progress' found in modernising regimes in Porfirian Mexico and Old Republican Brazil, which were heavily influenced by positivism and Social Darwinism. For example, both governments promoted railway construction, plantation agriculture, social control (e.g. the rurales), and foreign investment, while paying little or no attention to the welfare of blacks, Indians, workers and peasants. 97

The Aspl1lagas certainly believed that white elites should rule, and that poor blacks, Indians, and Chinese should labour. 98 These sentiments were probably shared by Armando Macedo who, like Aspillaga, was a Civilista hacendado. In such a race, voter preference was probably determined primarily by personal and business associations and party endorsement. Campaigning was largely limited to letter writing and private conversations, although Ramon Aspl1laga also believed that public demonstrations in favour of his candidacy would influence undecided voters and discourage the party from endorsing his opponent. He saw rallies as 'public manifestations of our strength and our power ,99 and ordered his campaign aides to organise them in several locations. 10o For the larger rallies in Pisco, the campaign provided transportation, a band, political oratory, and an impressive luncheon:

For this Sunday you should arrange a good lunch comprised of 1,000 to 2,000

well-prepared sausages, some 3,000 bread rolls, cheese, wine, chicha, and beer (but not distilled spirits) in abundance. Everything should be in generous proportions and in an appropriate locale to lunch and to walk among the people and along the beach.101

In contrast to Aspl1laga's efforts, we know little about Armando Macedo's campaign. He gained the initiative by entering the election first, and he vigorously sought official party endorsement. Macedo also enjoyed the support of influential politicians throughout the campaign, including

96 Ibid., pp. 166-7. 97 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico; Europe, the United States, and the Mexican

Revolution (Chicago, 1981), part i; Love and Barickman, 'Rulers and Owners'; and Thomas H. Holloway, Immigrants on the Land; Coffee and Society in sao Paulo, 18S6-19J4 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1980).

98 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Antero Aspfllaga Barrera, 14 June 1917, Cayalt! to Lima, AFA.

99 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Tomas S. Acevedo, 29 Dec. 1906, Lima to Palto, AFA. 100 Ramon Aspillaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 30 Jan. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 101 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 9 Feb. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA.




Carlos Alvarez Calderon who asked Ramon Aspfllaga to withdraw fromthe race and run for senator from lea.102 Macedo was also friends with thesubprefect of Pisco, who used strong-arm tactics to break up some ofAspillaga's campaign rallies before Ramon could have him replaced.103

Macedo likewise benefited from being president of the Junta Directiva delPartido Civil from Pisco, which allowed him to appoint the electoralcommittee from the province. Even in Peru, however, such a clear conflictof interest raised eyebrows. Aspillaga successfully protested against thecomposition of the electoral committee and then made certain that severalof his supporters, including campaign heads Perez and Roman, wereplaced on the Junta Directiva.104 Although Aspillaga had managed tocounter each of Macedo's moves, he still lamented: 'After all of thischicanery by Macedo, I don't doubt that there is someone in thegovernment or in the Central Committee of the Civilista party whoencourages it in order to upset me or to discourage my friends.'105

Macedo's last chance was to be named official party candidate,something that Aspillaga had fought against from the start. That issue wasfinally resolved in March, 1907, when party headquarters in Lima declareda ' free election' for deputy from Pisco, which meant that Civilistas werenot bound by a party endorsement.106 President Pardo and futurePresident Leguia had made Ramon Aspillaga sweat for as long as possible,but they could not deny him the office. Aspillaga had emerged victoriousin the intra-party struggle and could now focus on getting out the voteand monitoring the electoral process.

Macedo was reportedly ' furious' with party leaders and threatened towithdraw from the race. However, Aspillaga refused to believe it. Hewrote letters to key local politicians and electoral officials demanding a fairelection, and Antero asked Senators Ri'os and Alvarez Calderon from leato remain neutral. Ramon also remained intimately engaged in the detailedand politically-charged process of selecting electoral committees at theprovincial, departmental, and national levels, and reminded his supportersof important aspects of electoral laws and regulations.107

As election day approached, Aspillaga instructed his campaign workers102 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to Gera rdo Perez, 16 Jan . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .103 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 2 Jan . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A ; R a m o n

Aspillaga Barrera to G e r a t d o Perez, 30 Jan . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .104 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 21 Jan . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A ;

R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 9 Feb . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .105 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 9 Feb . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .106 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to Pelegrin R o m a n , 9 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .107 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 14 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA;

Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 13 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA;Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 11 May 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA;Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 11 May 1907^), AFA.

j 38 Michael J. Gonzales

Carlos Alvarez Calderon who asked Ramon Asp11laga to withdraw from the race and run for senator from Ica. 102 Macedo was also friends with the subprefect of Pisco, who used strong-arm tactics to break up some of Asp11laga's campaign rallies before Ramon could have him replaced. 103

Macedo likewise benefited from being president of the Junta Directiva del Partido Civil from Pisco, which allowed him to appoint the electoral committee from the province. Even in Peru, however, such a clear conflict of interest raised eyebrows. Aspl1laga successfully protested against the composition of the electoral committee and then made certain that several of his supporters, including campaign heads Perez and Roman, were placed on the Junta Directiva. 104 Although Aspl1laga had managed to counter each of Macedo's moves, he still lamented: 'After all of this chicanery by Macedo, I don't doubt that there is someone in the government or in the Central Committee of the Civilista party who encourages it in order to upset me or to discourage my friends.'105

Macedo's last chance was to be named official party candidate, something that Aspl1laga had fought against from the start. That issue was finally resolved in March, 1907, when party headquarters in Lima declared a 'free election' for deputy from Pisco, which meant that Civilistas were not bound by a party endorsement. 106 President Pardo and future President Leguia had made Ramon Aspl1laga sweat for as long as possible, but they could not deny him the office. Aspl1laga had emerged victorious in the intra-party struggle and could now focus on getting out the vote and monitoring the electoral process.

Macedo was reportedly 'furious' with party leaders and threatened to withdraw from the race. However, Aspl1laga refused to believe it. He wrote letters to key local politicians and electoral officials demanding a fair election, and Antero asked Senators Rios and Alvarez Calderon from lea to remain neutral. Ramon also remained intimately engaged in the detailed and politically-charged process of selecting electoral committees at the provincial, departmental, and national levels, and reminded his supporters of important aspects of electoral laws and regulations. 107

As election day approached, Aspl1laga instructed his campaign workers

102 Ramon Aspl11aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 16 Jan. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AF A. 103 Ramon Aspl11aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 2. Jan. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon

AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 30 Jan. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 104 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 2.1 Jan. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AF A;

Ramon Aspl11aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 9 Feb. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 105 Ramon Aspl11aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 9 Feb. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 106 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Pelegrin Roman, 9 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 107 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 14 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA;

Ramon Aspl11aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 13 March 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Aspl11aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, II May 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Aspl11aga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, II May 1907(b), AFA.




to get out the vote. Designated aids (Jefes de decena) were sent out to bringeligible voters to the election tables {mesas receptoras). Those voters whohad to travel long distances received 'a day's wage and a gift', which wasprobably illegal, but within the bounds of traditional political patronage.Aspillaga even made certain that the election tables had sufficient clericalsupplies.108

Such attention to detail assured smooth going on election day. Onemonth later, after the ballots had meandered through the maze ofCivilista-controlled electoral committees, Ramon Aspillaga Barrera wasdeclared deputy from Pisco Province.109 Far from a tribute to participatorydemocracy, his election was testimony to elite power politics within adivided party and social class.

Once in office, Aspfllaga fulfilled several campaign pledges. Forexample, he sought support from the central government for improvingmail service, port facilities, and irrigation networks, and for establishinga rural police station. He secured results in at least two areas: agovernment engineer surveyed local river systems with the objective ofhelping planters with flooding and other problems, and a Comisario Ruralwas established.110

Aspillaga was also concerned with rumours that officials in Pisco anda local priest were engaged in corrupt activities. Through Gerardo Perez,he relayed his ' repugnance' over stories of embezzlement of public fundsand advised municipal officials to do better or face an 'officialinvestigation'.111 He also spoke with the archbishop regarding the priest,who was quickly transferred to Chincha Alta, a backwater where onlypeasants would suffer from his improprieties.112

The new deputy from Pisco was also deeply involved in party politicsin Lima. For example, in 1909 a senate seat became vacant in lea and many

108 R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 11 May 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A ;R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 20 May 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A .

109 R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Pelegrin R o m a n , 20 May 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A ;R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Jun ta Escru tadora de la Provincia de Pisco, 18 J u n e 1907,Lima to Pisco, A F A .

110 R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Maxmil iano E. Bellido, 9 Oct . 1907, Lima to Pisco, A F A ;' M e m o r a n d u m para el Senor Di rec tor General de Correos y Telegrafos ' , 31 Aug .1907, A F A ; R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to J u a n Jose Miranda, 18 Feb. 1908, Lima toPisco, A F A ; R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Juan Jose Miranda, 19 Feb. 1908, Lima toPisco, A F A ; R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Vicente del Solar, 4 March 1908, Lima toPisco, A F A ; R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Alcalde Bellido, 28 A u g . 1908, Lima toPisco, A F A ; R a m o n Aspillaga Barrera to Alcalde Bellido, 30 Aug . 1908, Lima toPisco, A F A ; R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to Ju l io M. Laca, Subprefect of Pisco, 17 Sept.1908, Lima to Pisco, A F A ; R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to Senor Alcalde del H. ConsejoProvincial , Pisco, 15 Oct . 1908, Lima to Pisco, A F A .

111 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to G e r a r d o Perez, 22 March 1909, Lima to Pisco, A F A .112 R a m o n Aspfllaga Barrera to Cipr iano M. Agiiero, 3 Aug . 1909, Lima to Pisco, A F A .

Planters and Politics in Peru j 39

to get out the vote. Designated aids Uefes de decena) were sent out to bring eligible voters to the election tables (mesas receptoras). Those voters who had to travel long distances received 'a day's wage and a gift', which was probably illegal, but within the bounds of traditional political patronage. Asp11laga even made certain that the election tables had sufficient clerical supplies. l08

Such attention to detail assured smooth going on election day. One month later, after the ballots had meandered through the maze of Civilista-controlled electoral committees, Ramon Asp11laga Barrera was declared deputy from Pisco Province. 109 Far from a tribute to participatory democracy, his election was testimony to elite power politics within a divided party and social class.

Once in office, Aspfllaga fulfilled several campaign pledges. For example, he sought support from the central government for improving mail service, port facilities, and irrigation networks, and for establishing a rural police station. He secured results in at least two areas: a government engineer surveyed local river systems with the objective of helping planters with flooding and other problems, and a Comisario Rural was established. no

Asp11laga was also concerned with rumours that officials in Pisco and a local priest were engaged in corrupt activities. Through Gerardo Perez, he relayed his' repugnance' over stories of embezzlement of public funds and advised municipal officials to do better or face an 'official investigation ,.nl He also spoke with the archbishop regarding the priest, who was quickly transferred to Chincha Alta, a backwater where only peasants would suffer from his improprieties. 112

The new deputy from Pisco was also deeply involved in party politics in Lima. For example, in 1909 a senate seat became vacant in Ica and many

108 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, I I May 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 20 May 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

109 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Pelegrin Roman, 10 May 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Junta Escrutadora de la Provincia de Pisco, 18 June 1907, Lima to Pisco, AF A.

lIO Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Maxmiliano E. Bellido, 9 Oct. 1907, Lima to Pisco, AFA; 'Memorandum para el Senor Director General de Correos y Telegrafos', 3 I Aug. 1907, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Juan Jose Miranda, 18 Feb. 1908, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Juan Jose Miranda, 19 Feb. 1908, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Aspl1laga Barrera to Vicente del Solar, 4 March 1908, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Alcalde Bellido, 28 Aug. 1908, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Asp111aga Barrera to Alcalde Bellido, 30 Aug. 1908, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Julio M. Laca, Subprefect of Pisco, 17 Sept. 1908, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon Asp111aga Barrera to Senor Alcalde del H. Consejo Provincial, Pisco, Ij Oct. 1908, Lima to Pisco, AFA.

11l Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 2Z March 1909, Lima to Pisco, AFA. 112 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Cipriano M. Aguero, 3 Aug. 1909, Lima to Pisco, AFA.



54° Michael J. Gon^ales

Civilista leaders, including the Aspfllagas and President Leguia, preferredthe Democratic candidate (Oleachea) over the Civilista choice (AlfredoPicasso). On the other hand, former President Pardo, who was stillfeuding with Leguia, supported Picasso. Antero Aspfllaga was thenpresident of the Junta Central Directiva of the Civilista party and couldnot publicly support an opposition candidate. Nevertheless, that is exactlywhat Leguia asked him to do. Ramon Aspfllaga believed that everyone onthe electoral committee from Pisco would support Oleachea, except forArmando Macedo, the committee's president. Ramon wrote to Picassodeclaring his neutrality in the election and informing him that he had toldhis friends to do likewise. The Civilistas did not need to befriendDemocrats to rule, but in this case Oleachea was a 'personal friend' ofLeguia's and had been an 'useful man' in the senate.113 One is struck bythe propensity of the Civilista leadership to disagree, for old grudges tolinger, and for divisions to emanate from personal and politicalconsiderations rather than from ideology.

Conclusion

Who ruled in Peru? During the Aristocratic Republic the centralgovernment was controlled primarily by officials of the Civilista party,and all presidents were persons of wealth and high social standing. Sugarplanters played an especially conspicuous role in government as presidents,cabinet ministers, senators, and deputies. They also enjoyed considerableauthority at the regional level, which helped them control land, water, andhuman resources. It would be difficult to identify another economic groupthat approached planters in political influence.

The discourse of politics at the regional level remains largely unexploredby Peruvianists. During the Aristocratic Republic, access to the Chamberof Deputies depended on the interplay of national party leaders with theprovincial bourgeoisie. Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera needed support fromsome high party officials as well as substantial backing from local elites.On the provincial level, his campaign was organised around a circle offamily and business associates, and campaigning primarily consisted ofletter writing, private conversations, and rallies. The Civilista party coulddecisively affect the outcome of the election by endorsing a candidate orby altering vote counts in party-controlled electoral committees at theprovincial, departmental, and national levels. In Aspfllaga's case, the partyeventually declared an open election and did not change the results of theballoting. However, this required extensive lobbying in Lima and careful

113 Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 22 March 1909, Lima to Pisco, AFA;Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 22 March 1909(13), Lima to Pisco, AFA;Ramon Aspfllaga Barrera to Alfredo Picasso, 22 May 1909, Lima to Lima, AFA.


Civilista leaders, including the Aspl1lagas and President Leguia, preferred the Democratic candidate (Oleachea) over the Civilista choice (Alfredo Picasso). On the other hand, former President Pardo, who was still feuding with Leguia, supported Picasso. Antero Asp111aga was then president of the Junta Central Directiva of the Civilista party and could not publicly support an opposition candidate. Nevertheless, that is exactly what Leguia asked him to do. Ramon Aspl1laga believed that everyone on the electoral committee from Pisco would support Oleachea, except for Armando Macedo, the committee's president. Ramon wrote to Picasso declaring his neutrality in the election and informing him that he had told his friends to do likewise. The Civilistas did not need to befriend Democrats to rule, but in this case Oleachea was a 'personal friend' of Legu{a's and had been an 'useful man' in the senate. 1l3 One is struck by the propensity of the Civilista leadership to disagree, for old grudges to linger, and for divisions to emanate from personal and political

considerations rather than from ideology.

Conclusion

Who ruled 1n Peru? During the Aristocratic Republic the central government was controlled primarily by officials of the Civilista party, and all presidents were persons of wealth and high social standing. Sugar planters played an especially conspicuous role in government as presidents, cabinet ministers, senators, and deputies. They also enjoyed considerable authority at the regional level, which helped them control land, water, and human resources. It would be difficult to identify another economic group that approached planters in political influence.

The discourse of politics at the regional level remains largely unexplored by Peruvianists. During the Aristocratic Republic, access to the Chamber of Deputies depended on the interplay of national party leaders with the provincial bourgeoisie. Ramon Asp111aga Barrera needed support from some high party officials as well as substantial backing from local elites. On the provincial level, his campaign was organised around a circle of family and business associates, and campaigning primarily consisted of letter writing, private conversations, and rallies. The Civilista party could decisively affect the outcome of the election by endorsing a candidate or by altering vote counts in party-controlled electoral committees at the provincial, departmental, and national levels. In Aspl1laga's case, the party eventually declared an open election and did not change the results of the balloting. However, this required extensive lobbying in Lima and careful

1I3 Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 22 March 1909, Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Gerardo Perez, 22 March 1909(b), Lima to Pisco, AFA; Ramon AspI1laga Barrera to Alfredo Picasso, 22 May 1909, Lima to Lima, AFA.




monitoring of the appointment of electoral committees and the recordingof votes.

Ramon Aspillaga's political correspondence reveals a badly dividedCivilista leadership that harboured personal grudges for long periods oftime. Traditionally, scholars have viewed the first Pardo Administration(1904—8) as one of great harmony among party leaders, and have arguedthat serious splits did not emerge until 1912. However, it is now clear thatby 1906 President Pardo and Augusto B. Legui'a were at odds, and that theAspillagas were feuding with both of them. Such bickering made theCivilistas vulnerable to the popular political maverick GuillermoBillinghurst in 1912, and to the rebel among them, Legui'a, in 1919.


monitoring of the appointment of electoral committees and the recording of votes.

Ramon Aspfllaga's political correspondence reveals a badly divided Civilista leadership that harboured personal grudges for long periods of time. Traditionally, scholars have viewed the first Pardo Administration (1904-8) as one of great harmony among party leaders, and have argued that serious splits did not emerge until 1912. However, it is now clear that by 1906 President Pardo and Augusto B. Leguia were at odds, and that the Aspl1lagas were feuding with both of them. Such bickering made the Civilistas vulnerable to the popular political maverick Guillermo Billinghurst in 1912, and to the rebel among them, Leguia, in 1919.


planters and politics in peru, 1895-19191 1895-1919

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