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THE

ARGUMENT

^ i H E proper Subjedl of this Dialogue is The ChiefGood of Man : the Defign of it is to fjew^ thatMans chief Good is Moral Virtue The Subjefi is intro-duced, hy fati97g the different Opinions of Socrates andPhilebus, concernijig the Nature of That Good^ wherein theHappinefs of Man is to be fou?td\ Opinio7iSy which^ itfee7ns^ they had jufi before feverally avowed. Philebus,a Man firongly prepoffeffed with the DoSirine ^Ariftippus,had afferted^ that this Good was Pleafure, meani?tg Plea-y^r^i^/i? Senfation, or Pleafure felt thro the outward SenCcs.On the other hand^ Socrates had fuppofed the Sovereign

Good of Man to be placed in Mind, and iji the Energysof Mind 071 Me7ital SubjeBs. Philebus, in fuppo?-t of hisown Affertion^ had been hara7igui77g^ for a long Tijne toge-gether^ after the Man7ier of the Sophifls ; until he fou7idhis Spirits and hiiagination.^ or perhaps his Stock of plau-fible ArgtmientSi quite exhaufed. He had therefore de-

fred

6 The A P. G U ]M E N T.

fired his friend Protarchus, a young Gentleman^ who ap-pears to have been a Follo'wer of Gorgias, to take up theControverfy^ and carry it on in His Stead a/id BehalfProtarchus had confeitted^ and had engaged himfelf fo todo. Immediately on this Engagement^ at this very pointof time^ tlye prefent Dialogue commeiices : accordingly^ itis carried o;z, chiefly betisceen Socrates and Protarchus.Butj as Philebus is the Principal Perfon^ whofe Opinioncofnhats againfl That of Socrates, a?id as no higher aCharaSler is given to Protarchus, than That of AcceiTarj",or Second to Philebus, i?i this argumentative Cofnbat^ theDialogue, now before us, very properly, and conflfle7ttly

with the Rule ', which Plato feems to have laid down t9himfelf in naming his Dialogues, hath the Name given it

of Philebus. In all the printed Editio?is it is in tit led

A Dialogue concerning Pleasure. The general Accountof it, jufl now given, pjows, that with equal reafon it mightbe intitled A Dialogue concerning Mind. Bt/t, in truthsneither Pleafure, nor Mind, (confdered as intelligent,) isthe principal SubjeB, herein treated of . Inquiry i?ideed ismade into the nature (?/" Pleafure, and the nature of '^1\nd ;but this is do?ie with no other apparent or profejfed View^than to make it evident, that Neither of them, fingly, and

fepdrately from the Other, can ever co?tflitute the Happi-nefs of fuch a Compound-Being as Man. Not, that the

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^ See the Synopfis, or General View, page 22.

Drift

The argument. 7

Drift of thefe Inquiry s is ;//^^r/y Negative, or tends 07ily toJJjow, What is not the Chief Good of Man. For thz In-fuffLcic72Cy of eitherMmd alo?.'e^ or Pleafiire aloite^ to HumanHappinefsy beijig 'in the comfe of the Dialogue acknow^leged by Both Partys, naturally leads them to inquireinto the efTcntial nature of that Chief Good ; and Whatit is, which either conftitutes or produces the Happinefs ofMa?i. If then this Inquiry appears to be made ijt thePhilebus, a77d if the Dialogue is found to end with theRefult of fuch Inquiry^ we prefmne^ that the Title, givento it in this 7ra72flation, is the fttefl^ and the 7nof worthy

of it, as hei?ig expreffve of the principal Subjed', thereintreated of. Ficinus, however, i7ititles it de Summo Bono,concerni72g the Sovereign Good, (abfolutely a72d univer-fally,) without fpccifying its particular reference to theHuman Nature. And it jnujl be ad7nitted, that he isvery excufable ifi fo doing. For the Principle of T'hatwhich will appear to be the Chief Good of Man, will ap-pear alfo to be the Effence of Good, G(?(7(^Univerfal, andthe Good of Every Being in Nature. Be it obfe7'-ved, how-ever, that, if the properTixX^ of this Dialogue beThat, whichis given it by Ficinus, it will follow, that the peculiarDefign of it is to i7ivefligate the Divine Nature; a7idto foi7U out to us, in What the Eflence of the Supreme

Being co77ftfl,s. But This is the great Defign of Plato inall his Writi7tgs : every One of them hath This End ulti-mately

8 The ARGUMENT.

mately in View ; and All of them confpire together toaccomplijfj it. Perhaps indeed The Philebus contributesmore to it thaji any Oite other Dialogue. For in IVhatPart of Nature^ in What Rank of Things^ thro WhatMedium, doth the Divi?ie Being appear fo co7ifpicuous^ ashe does in the Mind, Heart, aiid Life of a wife and goodMan ? No other Beings (with whom We are acquaintedhere on Earth,) hejides Man, appears to partake of thofepure Forms, the OhjeSis of the Divi7ie Mind : 720 otherBeiiigy than Man, appears to be endued with Confcience, that is, with a Feeli7ig of God within him, or i7i hisown Heart : arid the Life of no other Particular Bei7igybefdes an honeft and good Man, is a vifibk D if play ofthorow Integrity and univerfal Benevolence. By purify-ing our Ideas, we are, in fo7ne i/ieafure, united to theDivine Mind ; by purifying our Hearts, we are tmited tothe Divine Will ; and by the Purity of our Lives, led in

the conflant PraSlife of Univerfal Juftice, we partake ofthe Divine Goodnefs, and e7ijoy the Happinefs of thatParticipation. Thro Wifdom and thro Virtue, thus it is,

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that a Ma7i k7iows and feels within hinfelf Truth andGood, never ceajing tofpri7ig up ; and thus he not only drawsfrom, but co7itinually drinks at their pure Foimtai7t. Now 'tis well known, that the rational and ufual way ofdifcovering the Virtue of fo7ne particular River-waters,and how far they are corrupted by any extraneous Filth,6 gathered