pletro plmpinella.truth and persuasion in baumgarten's aesthetica

8/20/2019 Pletro Plmpinella.TRUTH AND PERSUASION IN BAUMGARTEN'S AESTHETICA

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PlETRO PlMPINELLA

TRUTH AND PERSUASION IN BAUMGARTEN'S AESTHETICA

IN RELATION TO CROCE'S CRITICISM*

Th e Aesthetica of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, as is known, gave its

name to the modern theory of art.1 The work was originally published in

two volumes, in 1750 and 1758 respectively. Both the concept and the term

make their first appearance in the short work written in his youth Medi

tationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (1735).2

In this early work Baumgarten justifies his choice of the term 'aestheti

ca' as follows: «The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have al

ready carefully distinguished between things perceived (αισθητά) and thingskno wn (νοητά) [...]. Things kn own are to be known by the super ior faculty

as the object of logic; things perceived are to be known by the inferior fac

ulty, as the object of the science of perception, or aesthetic».3 As the reflec

tions on art in the early work are restricted to poetry, aesthetics is identified

wi th philoso phical poetics or the science of poetics, namely with «the sci

ence guiding sensate discourse to perfection».4

* This text is the extended vers ion of a paper given at the conference of the Eighth

International Congress on the Enlightenment (Bristol 2127 July 1991). I wish to thank John

Ward, Charles Davis, Gill Bepler (Wolfenbüttel) for their help in revising the English text of

the first draft and Felicity Lutz for the revision and partial translation of the final text. Ά. G. BAUMGARTEN, Aesthetica, G. Olms Verlag, HildesheimZiirichNew York,1986.

2 The english translations of the passages are from A. G. BAUMGARTEN, Reflections on

poetry. Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, translated with the Original

Text, an Introduction, and Notes, by KARL ASCHENBRENNER and WILLIAM B. HOLTHER,

University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954. As far as I know, the Aestheti

ca has never been translated into English.3 Ibid., § 116: «Existente definitione, terminus definitus excogitari facile potest, graeci

iam philosophi et patres inter αισθητά et νοητά sedulo semper distinxerunt, satisque apparet

αίσθητά iis non solis aequipollere sensualibus, quum absentia etiam sensa (ergo phantasmata)

hoc nomine honorentur. Sunt ergo νοητά cognoscenda facúltate superiorum obiectum logi-ces, αίσθητά, επιστήµης αισθητικής sive Aestheticae».

4 Ibid., § 115: «Philosophie poética est per § 9 scientia ad perfectionem dirigens oratio-

nem sensitivam». See ibid., § 9: «Oratio sensitiva perfecta est Poema, complexas regularum


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'Truth and Persuasion in Baumgarten's Aesthetica35

est Aesthetica (lógica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris)».9 To what end doesaesthetics as the logic of the lower cognitive faculty guide sensate cogni-tion? The answer is given with all desirable clarity in the Aesthetica·. «Aestheti-ces finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis. Haec autem est pulcri-tudo».

10

We are now able to state some major theses of Baumgarten's aesthet-

ics:First: Beauty means the perfection of sensate cognition.Second: Sensate cognition springs from the lower part of the cognitive

faculty, which is a different source of cognition from the higher part, whichis understanding and reason.

Third: The logic of the higher part of the cognitive faculty is logic inthe traditional and narrow sense, whose aim is the perfection of intellectualcognition: «Lógica [. . .] est philosophia cognitionis intellectualis perficien-dae».11 Aesthetics on the other hand is the philosophy or the science of sen-sate cognition, whose perfection is beauty.

As the two parallel definitions show, Baumgarten constructs his no-

tion of aesthetics in a strictly analogous manner to the concept of logic inthe narrow sense, so that the divisions of the latter are also valid for the for-mer: aesthetica naturalis corresponds to lógica naturalis, aesthetica artifiáalis to lógi-

ca artificialis}2 The same may also be said as regards the division of both dis-ciplines into connata and acquisita. The parallelism is confirmed by the factthat Baumgarten considers logic in the narrow sense to be the elder sister ofaesthetics: «soror eius natu maior».13

9 A. G . B A U M G A R T E N , Metaphysica (Editio VII), G . Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-New York1982, § 533.

10 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 15.11 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Acroasis lógica in Christianum L. B. De Wolff, in Chr. Wolff, Gesam-

melte Werke, III. Abt.-Materialien und Dokumente, Bd. 5, G. Olms, Hildesheim-Zürich-NewYork 1983, § 9.

12 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 2-3: «Naturalis facultatum cognoscitivarum in-feriorum gradus solo usu citra disciplinalem culturam auctus Aesthetica Naturalis dici potest,et distinguí, sicuti lógica naturalis solet, in connatam, ingenium pulcrum connatum, etacquisitam, et haec denuo in docentem et utentem. Ad naturalem accedentis artificialis aes-thetices, usus inter alios maior erit [. . .]». See also Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 2: «Wir ma-chen hier eine Einteilung wie in der Logik. Ein jeder brachte ein natürliches Vermögen zuschließen mit auf die Welt, das er durch Regeln der Kunst verbesserte. Ein jeder bringt auchein natürliches Vermögen schön zu denken mit auf die Welt, das eben wie jenes in der Logikdurch Regeln verbessert werden kann; und wir können hier das Verhältnis setzen: Wie sichdie künstliche Logik zur natürlichen verhält, so verhält sich die künstliche Ästhetik zur natür-lichen».

13 A. G . B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 13. See also Kollegium cit., § 13: «Wir nennen die


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'Tr uth and Persuasion in Baumgarten's Aesth etica 35

tive features of ideas and not their psychological source. Baumgarten, how

ever, following Wolff, related the different species of ideas to different parts

of the cognitive faculty, while referring distinct representations to the high

er part. Thus within the broad framework of human cognition Baumgarten

divides the field of intellectual knowledge: «horizontem logicum (territo

rium et sphaeram rationis et intellectus)» from the field of aesthetic knowl

edge: «horizontem aestheticum (territorium et sphaeram pulcri rationis ana

logi)».17

In spite of the continuity between the different species of ideas, the

two fields of human knowledge are quite sharply divided. Intellectual

knowledge refers to understanding and reason, sensate knowledge refers to

the analogon rationis, namely the complex of powers, that make up sensate

cognition and include not only the senses but also, and preeminently, the

capacity to grasp the nexus between sensations in a confused manner.18

This

capacity consists in such powers as sensate wit, sensate perspicacity, sensate

memory, the faculty of imagining, the faculty of judging, the expectation of

similar cases, the sensate characteristic faculty.19

All these powers are re

quirements of that part of the character of the successful artist, which

Baumgarten terms «ingenium venustum et elegans connatum».20

Another

very important part of the character felicis aesthetici is the artistic temper

ament, «temperamentum aestheticum connatum», which includes the capac

ity for enthusiasm, that is «impetus aestheticus, pulchra mentis incitatio,

έ νθουσιασµός».21

So far I have attempted to sketch some basic features of Baumgarten's

conception of aesthetics as the science of sensate cognition, and of the na

1 7 A . G. BA U MGA RTEN , Aesthetica cit., § 119.

18 A. G. BAUMGARTEN, Metaphysica cit., § 640: «[. . .] Analogon rationis, complexum fa

cultatum animae nexum confuse repraesentantium».19 Ibid., § 640: «Nexum quorundam confuse, quorundam distincte percipio. Ergo habeo

intellectum nexum return perspicientem, i. e. Rationem, et facultates nexus confusius cogno

scentes, quales 1) inf erior facultas identitates rerum cognosce ndi, quo ingenium sensitiv um,

2) inferior facultas diversitates rerum cognoscendi, quo acumen sensitivum pertinet, 3) me

moria sensitiva, 4) facultas fingendi, 5) facultas diiudicandi, quo judicium sensitivum, 6) ex

pectatio casuum similium, 7) facultas characteristica sensitiva. Hae omnes, quatenus in re

presentando rerum nexu rationi similes sunt, constituunt Analogum Rationis, complexum

facultatum animae nexum confuse repraesentantium». See URSULA FRANCKE, Kunst als Er

kenntnis. Die Rotte der Sinnlichkeit in der Ästhetik des A. G. Baumgarten, «Studia Leibnitiana Sup-plementa» 9 (1972).

20 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 29:


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Truth and Persuasion in Baumgarten 's Aesthetica 27

the model of the concept of perfection from Leibniz's theory of possibleworlds. The actual world, which exists, is only one of an infinite number ofpossible worlds that could have existed. God chose the actual world be-cause it is the best of all possible worlds, for He does nothing without a rea-son. 'Best' in this connection is explained as 'containing the most essence'or as 'achiving maximum effect with minimum outlay' or as 'most perfect,

that is, simplest in its laws and richest in phenomena'. 24 All these for-mulations are equivalent, but the last is the most useful for explainingBaumgarten's concept of aesthetic perfection: the more perfect a work ofart, the more comprehensive will be its constituent elements and the morethey will display harmonious unity: «We observed a little while ago that thepoet is like a maker or a creator. So the poem ought to be like a world.Hence by analogy whatever is evident to philosophers concerning the realworld, the same ought to be thought of a poem».25

Before Baumgarten, Leibniz and Wolff only ascribed perfection to log-ical truth in the narrow and specific sense. According to them, a cognitionis most perfect insofar as it is a distinct, complete, adequate and, but only

for Leibniz, also intuitive, namely insofar as it accomplishes all degrees oflogical distinction. Unlike Leibniz and Wolff, Baumgarten also claims per-fection for sensate cognition, which is obscure, clear and confused. Hencehe identifies beauty with the perfection of such a cognition, which is ulti-

des Mannigfaltigen zu Einem (unbestimmt was es sein sollte), giebt für sich ganz und garkeine objektive Zweckmäßigkeit zu erkennen; weil da von diesem einem als Zweck (was dasDing sein sollte) abstrahiert wird, nichts als die subjective Zweckmäßigkeit der Vorstellungenim Gemüthe des Anschauenden übrig bleibt [. . .]». (Kritik der Urtheilskrafi cit., p. 227). Ac-cording to Baumgarten the focus perfections or the Grund der Vollkommenheit of a work of art isyielded by thematic unity: «Id cuius repraesentatio aliarum in oratione adhibitarum rationem suffiden-tem continet, suam vero non habet in aliis, est Thema. Si plura fuerint themata, non sunt connexa;pone enim A esse thema, Β item, si fuerint connexa aut ratio sufficiens τοΟ A est in Β aut xoö

Β in A, ergo aut Β aut A non est thema. Jam vero nexus est poeticus; ergo poema unius thematis perfectius illo, eut plura themata. Hinc intelligimus Horatii illud: Sit quod vis {seil, ultimate repraesen

tarè) simplex duntaxat et unum» ( Meditationes cit., §§ 66 — 67).24 See Β. MATES, The Philosophy of Leibni% Metaphysics and Language, Oxf ord New York,

1986 (chap. IV: Possible Worlds). Despite Mates' reservation : «It is by no means clear, even

within Leibnitian doct rine, that these conditions, whateve r they may mean, are equivalent to

one another» {ibid., p. 70), the quoted formulations may be assumed as equivalent. See also

A. HEINEKAMP, ZU den Begriffen realitas, perfectio und bonum metaphysicum bei Leibnt% Akten des

internationalen LeibnizKongresses, Hannover, 14. — 19. November 1966, Bd. I, «Studia

Leibnitiana Supplementa», Wiesbaden 1968, pp. 207222 and G. RONCAGLIA, Cum Deus cal

culai — God's Evaluation of Possible Worlds and Logical Calculus, «Topoi», vol. 9, 1, 1990.25

A. G. BAUMGARTEN, Meditationes cit., § 68: «Dudum observatum est, poetam quasi

factorem sive creatorem esse, hinc poema esse debet quasi mundus. Hinc κατ' άναλογίαν de

eodem tenenda, quae de mundo phílosophis patet».

3


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physical reality or truth, are both subjective.31 But the way of mirroring itdiffers in the two types of knowledge. Rational truth is proper to generalconcepts and general judgements.32 General knowledge is reached throughabstraction, insofar as the individual features of an object, precisely thosefeatures which make it a particular and concrete thing, that is ens omnimodedeterminatum, are left out of consideration.33 Formal logical truth is attained

at the expense of material or concrete truth.34 On the contrary aestheticknowledge mirrors metaphysical reality in the richness of its concretenessand therefore possesses more metaphysical reality than logical reality. Themore determined the manner in which aesthetic knowledge mirrors an indi-vidual in the richness of its determinations, the more it attains metaphysicaltruth.35 Thus Baumgarten sets the material perfection (perfectio materialis) ofaesthetic knowledge against the formal perfection (perfecüo formalis) of logicalknowledge. In a work of art what is lost in formal perfection, is regained inmaterial perfection: what is abstraction if not the loss of determinate reality?

31 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 424: «Posset metaphysica Veritas obiectiva, ob- jec tive ve ro ru m repraesentat io in data anima subiec tiva d id Ver ita s, vel eti am in verbis facileslogicam eandem dicamus cum plurimis, sed latius, ut in re conveniamus, cuius potissimumcaussa haec repetuntur aliquantulum altius. Iam enim reor liquidum esse, Veritatem, meta-physicam, vel obiectivam quum dixeris, ut lubet, in anima data sic repraesentatam, ut det ineadem veritatem logicam latius dictam, vel mentalem et subiectivam, nunc obversari in-tellectui potissimum in spiritu, dum est in distincte perceptis ab eodem, Logicam StrictiusDictam, nunc obversari analogo rationis, et facultatibus cognoscendi inferioribus, vel unice,vel potissimum, aestheticam ».

32 Ibid.., § 440: «Veritas Aestheticologica vel est universalium et notionum, iudiciorum-que generalium, vel singularum et idearum. Ilia Generalis, haec Singularis esto».

33 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Metaphysica cit. § 148: «Complexus omnium determinationum inente compossibilium est Omnímoda eius Determinado. Hinc ens aut est omnimode de-

terminatum, aut minus. Illud est Singulare, (individuum), hoc Universale».34 A. G . B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 5 6 0 : «Equidem arbitror philosophis apertissi-

mum esse iam posse, cum iactura multae magnaeque perfectionis in cognitione et veritatelógica materialis emendum fuisse, quicquid ipsi perfectionis formalis inest praecipuae. Quidest abstractio, si iactura non est?» See ibid., § 558: «Hinc humanum veritatis Studium nuncformalem [perfectionem] potissimum intendit, quod fieri non potest sine dispendio materia-lis, nunc materialem [perfectionem] potissimum amplectitur, neque potest idem, nisi cumdetrimento formalis».

35 Ibid., § 440: «Veritatis generalis in obiecto nunquam tantum veritatis metaphysicae de-tegitur, praesertim sensitive, quantum in obiecto veritatis singularis. Quoque generalior estVeritas aestheticologica hoc minus veritatis metaphysicae in eiusdem obiecto, et omnino, etpraesertim analogo rationis, repraesentatur». See also ibid. § 561: «Iam supponatur veritatisaestheticologicae Studium aliquando fem praesertim in perfectionem eiusdem materialem, ethinc amplecti obiecta veritatis metaphysicae, quae potest, determinatissimae».


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'Truth and Persuasion in Baumgarten's Aesthetica 35

characteristic traits is different from that between mediate characteristictraits. The notae mediatae are in a subordinate relation from the nota Ínfima tothe nota maxima, through a progressive process of abstraction that involvesall the intermediate characteristic traits. On the contrary, the notae immediataeare in a relation of juxtaposition, given that there cannot be a relation ofsubordination between them, since by definition none of them is the char-acteristic trait of a characteristic trait, but they are all equally characteristictraits of the same thing (notae ipsius ret).40 The characteristic traits of exten-sively clear knowledge can therefore be known only through cognitio sensitiva.

Extensive clarity is the instrument for obtaining richness of contentwhich is the attribute of knowledge in its most beautiful form and thus forattaining the determinate reality which characterizes individuals: «In the ex-tensively very clear representations more is represented in a sensate waythan in those less clear; therefore, they contribute more to the perfection ofa poem. For this reason extensively clearer representations are especiallypoetic».41

Since Leibniz does not find any logical means of deducing the concept

of individual, he has to admit, the only means of knowing individuals is toobserve them. Baumgarten becomes aware that mere observation (experientiastricte dicta) does not suffice for the purpose of perfectio cogitionis sensitivae,which aims to represent individuals. As individuals mirror each other andthe endless universe, most representations of them remain obscure. An artistmust therefore be ready to permit obscure representations to arise, repre-sentations which, as Baumgarten says, lie in the fundus animae, in the depths

40 Kant, who used Meier's Auszug as the basic text for his logic lectures, defines the rela-tion between the notae immmediatae as a relation of coordination: «Es giebt aber auch ein Ver-haeltnis der Coordination, und diese findet bey unmittelbaren Merckmalen statt, alwo ein jedes beson deres Merckmal ein neuer E rkenntnis-Grund ist» {Logik Blomberg, in Kant's gesam-melte Schriften cit., Bd. XXIV: Kants Vorlesungen, Bd. I, Berlin 1966, p. 108). Kan t {ibid) specifiesthat the relation of subordination is closed between the nota Ínfima and the nota summa, where-as the relation of coordination is open and can be compared to an infinite line. The Kantiancommentary is usefull for clarifing two aspects of the Baumgartian logic of aesthetics: firsdyit is easier to under stand why Baumgarten considers every perceptio as ratio alterius perceptionsand reinterprets the rhetorical concept of argumentum as perceptio {Aesthetica, § 26 and § 540:«Perceptio quatenus est ratio, est Argumentum»; «Ergo et omnis ad cogitandum materies, ra-tio alterius perceptionis, perceptio»); secondly it is easier to understand why the characteristictraits of an extensively clear perception, that are therefore in a relation of coordination, canbe known only by the faculties of sensate cognition, which Baumgarten comprehensivelycalls analogon rationis.

41 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Meditationes cit., § 17: «In extensive clarissimis repraesentationi-bus plura repraesentantur sensitive quam in minus Claris, ergo plura faciunt ad perfectionempoematis. Hinc repraesentationes extensive clariores sunt maxime poeticae¡>.


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makes up the mundus poetarum.11,1 But how may fictions, both the so-calledtrue fictions and the so-called heterocosmic fictions, be compatible with veri-tas poética? The concept of figmenta vera may appear at first glance to be quiteinconsistent. Baumgarten himself is aware of this problem and in the Aesthe-tica he struggles mightily to resolve this complex question.48 The key to the

notion of heterocosmic fiction can be traced back to this wolffian theory. See Aesthetica,op. cit., § 441: «Hinc Veritas singularis de contingentibus aut ea sistit, ut possibilia et parteshuius universi, et haec Veritas cum veritate absolute necessariorum maxima dicitur Strictis-sime, popularique sermone simpliciter, Veritas, aut ut possibilia alterius universi, eiusquepartes, cognitioni hominum mediae, Veritas Heterocosmica».

41 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 513. Cfr. Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 513:«Der ganze Inbegriff aller Vorstellungen von anderen Zusammenhängen, die Dichter undwitzige Köpfe schon ausgedacht haben, ist die Welt der Dichter» and § 525: «Wir sind nichtSklaven der Dichterwelt, man kann auch etwas setzen, was andere vor uns nicht geset-zet. [. . .] D er große Hau fen wird das, was wir von den Erdic htung en gesagt hab en, Lügennennen; allein der Vernünftige, der die Regeln kennet, wird es nicht zugeben. Es sind Wahr-heiten und zuweilen sehr große Wahrheiten, die in einem anderen Zusammenhange hättengeschehen können und die zu meinem Endzwecke bequemer sind als die Begebenheiten ausdiesem Zusammenhange der Dinge».

48 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 478: «Quousque tandem abutere patientia nostra?quamdiu nos etiam furor iste tuus eludat? Quem adfinem sese ejfraenata iactabit audacia? Tun c vero ma-gister veritatis lógica ac aethicae publice constitutus mendacia commendes, velut aliquandosplendida, et falsa veris miscere, tanquam operam maximopere nobilem? Hac ego circiter ra-tione videor audire mihi quosdam obloquentes [. . .]» and ibid., § 471: «Quid autem illud estambiguitatis? Nunc falsa conceduntur, nunc denuo dissuadentur aesthetico? Die sententiamexplicite». Benedetto Croce quotes the above passages and considers them as manifesting adifficulty from which Baumgarten is not able to extricate himself (Β. CROCE, Rileggendo cit.,p. 12). See also p. 10: "Tuttavia, quella definizione, quell'enunciato [the definition of beauty

as perfectio cognitionis sensitiva^ , che fu il maggior contributo del Baumgarten alla scienza estéti-ca, fu anche il limite oltre il quale egli non poté andaré, e che non poté pensare e determinarenei particolari, senza, in quel conato, essere spmto o respinto verso vie erronee o impigliarsi,vanamente dibattendosi, in un labirinto inestricabile". This severe judgement cannot conceal

that Croce was the first in modern times to re-estimate the importance of Aesthetica. He ac-knowledges that Baumgarten has the merit of being, with certain limitations, the inventor ofa new science: «Se anche il Baumgarten avesse errato nel venir poi a determinare quel che è ilproprio della poesía, resterebbe sempre che egli intravide, presentí o indovinô, e affermô,che la poesía ha qualcosa di originale e bisogna perció assegnarle una posizione indipendentee una scienza corrispondente, e, per bene fermare questo punto, conferí a questa scien2a unnome che le fosse proprio e che le rimase acquisito» {ibid., p. 6). However, though Crocemaintains that he wants to give a historical judgement of Baumgarten's aesthetics {ibid. p. 16-17), his attitude is to measure Baumgarten's theses against his own theoretical convictions orat least to want to distinguish 'what is alive from what is dead' in Baumgarten, under the as-sumption that what is worth preserving in Baumgarten's Aesthetica re-emerges in his own Es-tética (Β. CROCE, Estética come scienza dell'espressione e lingüistica generale, Laterz a, Bari 1922). Inthis work his criticism of Baumgarten is even more severe: «In tutta l'Estetica del Baum-garten, fuori del titolo e delle prime definizioni, si sente la muffa dell'antiquato e del comune


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elaborating what from a logical and metaphysical point of view constitutesan essential and revolutionary contribution to the modern theory of art.Baumgarten has succeeded in bringing back the categories of traditionalrhetoric to the philosophical grounds of aesthetics and in expounding thelatter through the former. Failure to appreciate this aspect of Baumgarten'sideas, precludes an understanding of the meaning and importance of Baum-garten's aesthetic thought.

Baumgarten divides the first part of his Aesthetica, namely aesthetica arti- fic ial is docens, into six points, that correspond to the six major tasks of the

successful artist (curae feliäs aesthetici).51 He relates these tasks to six classes ofargumenta·, richness of content, ubertas related to argumenta locupletantiar, great-

ness or nobility of content, magnitudo related to argumenta augentia·, truth, veri-tas related to argumenta probantia\ light, lux related to argumenta illustrantia·, per-

suasion, persuasio related to argumenta persuasoria·, vividness, vita related to ar-

gumenta moventia.52

51 «Prima cura sit in rebus cogitandis Ubertas (copia, abundan tia, multi tudo, divides,

opes), sed Aesthetica, qua datum subiectum, certus cogitaturus, de dato obiecto, certa cogi-tandi materia, plura pulcre cogitare possit» (. Aesthetica, § 115); «Secunda cura sit in rebus ve-nuste cogitandis Magnitudo, sed Aesthetica, quo nomine 1) pondus obiectorum et gravi-tatem, 2) proportionatarum obiectis cogitationum, 3) cum foecunditate utrorumque, com-plectamur» {ibid., § 177); «Tertia cura sit in rebus eleganter cogitandis, Veritas, sed Aesthetica,i. e. Veritas quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est» {ibid, § 423); «Verioris in cogitando pulcritu-dinis elegantiarumque studiosus quarto loco Lucem, claritatem, et perspieuitatem cogitato-rum omnium sectetur, sed aestheticam, quae vel analogo rationis ad discrimina rei per-spiciendae sufficiat» {ibid., § 614); «Pulcritudinem cogitationum in primariis quintam numer-amus, certitudinem sensitivam, analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis etverisimilitudinis conscientiam et lucem, Persuasionem, sed Aestheticam» {ibid., § 829). The

Aesthetica has remained incomplete and the section «vita cognitionis aesthetica» was neverwritten.

52 Quintilian defines the argumentum in the generic sense as subject of discourse and in

the specific sense as «ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quodest dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmât» {Institutio oratoria, 5.X.U, The Loeb Clas-sical library Cambridge, Massachusetts - London 1985, II, p. 208) and the topoi as sedes argu-mentorum (ibid., p. 212). Baumgarten fuses the two definitions of argumentum·. «Wir habenschon erklärt, was wir ein Argument nennen, nämlich eine Kenntnis, insofern sie zur Ver-schönerung einer anderen Kenntnis etwas beiträgt» (Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 142) andtranslates them into the terms of gnoseologia inferior transvaluating the concept of ratio fromargumentative nexus to connection between percetions: «Perceptio quatenus est ratio, estArgumentum. Sunt ergo argumenta locupletantia, nobilitantia, probanda, illustrantia, per-suadentia, moventia, quorum aesthetica non solum poscit vim et efficaciam, sed etiam ele-gantiam [. . .] Figurarum sententiae tot, quot argumentorum, sunt genera [. . .] Ergo et om-nis ad cogitandum materies, ratio alterius perceptionis, perceptio» ('Aesthetica, § 26 and § 540).Baumgarten can thus arrange subjects and figures along a scale that corresponds to a newtopic: «Erit itaque secundum hanc intensionis scalam argumentum et figuram pulcerrima,


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related questions: firstly the relations between logic and rhetoric and sec-ondly those between rhetoric and aesthetics. Baumgarten shows an acuteawareness of the doctrinal status of rhetoric and of its connection both tologic and aesthetics. He contests first the supremacy of rhetoric over logicas claimed by Cicero and by contemporary as well as ancient sceptics. Onthe other hand, Baumgarten claims, against modern dogmatics, that not on-ly probable knowledge, which obtains in rhetoric, but also sensate cogni-tion, which obtains in aesthetic knowledge, displays its specific truth. 56

Hence he rejects the Platonic conception of rhetoric as ars fallendi, that is asan art of deceit: «Aesthetica, quam minus inadaequate, ac Plato rhetoricen,describas, nec, ut Plato, non artem, sed peritiam, verum et peritiam, et ar-tem quandam gratiae ac voluptatis, non qualemcunque persuasionem fa-bricator, sed, quae se deceat, bonam, et vere elegantem, nec est, quam Athe-neus rhetoricen dick, ars fallendi».57 As we see, Baumgarten rejects the Pla-tonic devaluation of rhetoric, which may also apply to aesthetics, andmoreover characteri2es aesthetic persuasion specifically as bona, namely freeof any reproachable aim and as vere elegans, namely endowed with its own

peculiar beauty.Baumgarten's use of rhetorical concepts to explain the specific natureof aesthetic knowledge as opposed to logical knowledge, led Croce to be-lieve that Baumgarten assimilates aesthetics to rhetoric or, as he prefers toterm it, to oratory, as far as the central and essential point of Veritas aestheticais concerned.58 This statement would be exact if 'assimilates' were under-stood to mean the comparison Baumgarten makes between the logic ofrhetoric and the logic of aesthetics as opposed to logic in the narrow sense

complete cognoscatur ab analogo rationis, ut talis, id est completa cum certitudine et per-suasione».

56 Ibid., § 480: «Non solum adversus Ciceronem et scepticos academicosque, vel veteres,

vel recentes, lubenter admitto dari rationi et intellectui puriori ac distinction per scientias as-surgere nonnunquam ultra verisimilitudinem, non ad plenam quidem et omnibus numerisabsolutissimam, completam tarnen et earn, quae omnem oppositi formidinem excludat, verinotitiam et perspicientiam: sed id etiam addo, quod pauci recentiorum dogmaticorum forteconcédant, inesse iam ipsis sensitivis et confusis animae perceptionibus nonnihil completaetarnen certitudinis, et conscientiae vera quaedam ab omnibus falsis distinguendi sufficien-tiam».

57 Ibid., § 835.58 B E N E D E T T O C R O C E , Rilegiendo cit., p. 12 : «Per siffatta più o meno consapevole assi-

milazione con l'oratoria, la verità estetica si configura nel Baumgarten, come quella asser-zione vera o falsa che sia, che il lettore di poesía, secondo le particolarí condizioni di culturain cui si trova, secondo i luoghi, i tempi e le circostanze, accetta per vera; [. . .] importa che ilfalso sia verisimile, o splendide mendax, e il vero non sia falsisimile, sec ondo la parola da lui con-iata [. . .]».


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Croce therefore points out that there is in Baumgarten a duplicityof points of view: on the one hand he confirms the Leibnitian lex continuibetween the various kinds of representation and on the other he intro-duces two distinct fields of knowledge, aesthetic knowledge and logicalknowledge in the narrow sense. However the continuity between kindsof representation does not prevent Baumgarten from establishing a clear-

cut dividing line between territcmum aestheticum and terñtorium logicum. Con-tinuity between objects of thought, namely between kinds of repre-sentation, does not imply confusion between aesthetic and logical knowl-edge.61 The difficulty arises if the Crocian distinction between the formsof consciousness is presupposed valid, since it is certainly incompatiblewith continuity between the various kinds of representation. ThereforeCroce does not discover a difficulty that actually exists in Baumgarten'sthought, but introduces one by postulating his dialettica dei distincti.62 From

aestheticae sunt, quae et quatenus analogo rationis, salva venustate, sensitivae repraesentaripossunt, vel manifesto, et explicite, vel cryptice in omissis enthymematum enunciationibus,

vel in exemplis, in quibus tanquam concretis, haec abstracta deprehendantur». The con-nections, that Baumgarten establishes between objects and between the functions of the in-ferior and superior faculties of knowledge in the field of aesthetic, provides the interpretativeprinciple for that genre of poetry whose contents is doctrinal or pratical-moral, generallytermed genus aestheticodogmaticum (Aesthetica cit., § 567), which is divided into theoreticum and

practicum, the poetry of Lucretius is collocated in the first sub-genre: «Lucretius est exemplumcogitandi generis aestheticotheoretici» ( Aesthetica cit., § 576). The relation that Croce estab-lishes between aesthetic activity and the other activities of the spirit via the 'dialettica dei di-stinti' (see note 62) does not provide such powerful! interpretative principles for Dante's po-etry as may be seen from La Poesia di Dante, Laterza, Bari 19568 (1920) and from the sub-sequent essays in 1M Poesia, Laterza , Bari 1936, cap. IV and in Conversazioni critiche. Serie terza,Laterza, Bari 1932, cap. V, pp. 204-207.

61 See above note 22. See also Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 1: «Wir müssen deutlichdenken, wir müssen schön denken, aber wir müssen die Grenzen zwischen beiden sehr wohl

unterscheiden» and § 569: «Logisch und ästhetisch denken ist der Form nach sehr un-terschieden, ob es gleich der Materie nach oft einerlei sein kann. Der Dichter und der Philo-soph können beide einen Satz auszuführen haben, z. B. das Lob Gottes aus seinen Vollkom-menheiten erweisen. Die Materie ist einerlei, allein ein jeder wird sie auf eine andere Art aus-führen».

62 B. C R O C E , Rileggendo cit., p. 10-11: «Che cosa sono queste tre classi di percezioni (leoscure, le confuse e le distinte), ora, ai nostri occhi, per noi che le riconsideriamo e le ri-pensiamo dopo più di due secoli di nuove analisi e di nuove sistemazioni? Tre distinte formedella coscienza, delle quali le percezioni 'oscure' corrispondono alla pratica passionalità osentimento che si dica, le 'confuse' ma 'chiare' alla pura conoscenza intuitiva ossia alla fanta-sia, e le 'chiare' e insieme 'distinte' alia conoscenza intellettiva, critica e filosófica, ossia alpensiero. Tre forme, tra le quali non c'è passaggio gradúale quantitativo: un sentimento, perricchezza, per intensità che acquisti, restera sempre sentimento e non diventerà mai in-tuizione; l'intuizione símilmente, per ampia che si faccia, non diventerà mai concetto e giudi-


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In fact only those general truths which can be demonstrated may be said to

be true in the narrow and pr oper sense.65

Hence aesthetic truth must be

equated with verisimilitude, in other words, equated with that degree of

truth, which although not completely certain, includes nothing that may be

regarded as false.66

Referring to the authority of Cicero and Aristotle, he

terms such knowledge εικός et verisimik.61

We see that this is the first and

more general requirement (a potiori). But there are other important require

ments for the verisimilitude of aesthetic knowledge which pertain to «poe

tische Erdichtungen».68

First it is completely unmarked by inconsistency,

65 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 478: «Man lernet sehr oft nicht

einmal, was wahr ist, und fordet es doch immer von anderen, ohne es selbst zu wissen. Wirerkennen etwas als wahr, wann wir es demonstrieren können; dies Reich ist aber sehr engeund erstreckt sich nur auf die allgemeinen Wahrheiten [. . .] Wir können also nicht alleinwahr nennen, was demonstriert ist; es sind noch mehr Dinge, die man nicht überzeugend er-kennet, die aber der schöne Geist demnach setzen muß. Hieraus fließet, daß er wahrschein-lich denken muß: das ist, daß er Dingen setzen muß, darin ein gewisser Grad der Wahrheitist, welche aber doch nicht gewiß wahr sind, sondern ohne merklichen Widerspruch wahr

scheinen». Croce does not take into due account the distinction between logical truth in thenarrow sense of the term, which pertains to demonstrative knowledge and probable truth,which pertains to knowledge that cannot be demostrated but is nonetheless not contradic-tory and therefore refers to possible things.

66 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica, § 483: «Est ergo Veritas aesthetica a potiori dicta veri-similitude, ille veritatis gradus, qui etiamsi non evectus ad completam certitudinem, tamennihil contineat falsitatis observabilis».

67 Ibid., § 484. For Aristode (Poetics 1451 b) the actions that the poet imitates must re-spond to the criterion of verosimilitude (είκός) and therefore be possible (δυνατά). However,even the unlikely peripeteia of tragedy, that arouse surprise, do not offend the criterion of

poetic verisimilitude, since, according to Agathon's maxim it is likely that some events occur

unlikely {ibid. 1456 a). Even the impossible (ώδύνατον) under certain conditions, one of which

is the poet's skill, can contribute to the succès of the mimesis {ibid. 1460 b). The concept ofείκός is taken up in the Rhetorics, where verisimilitude acts as a premiss for the arguments that

tend to persuasion and that are distinguished therefore from logical argumentations, whichmove from necessary premises (ibid. 1355 b 1357a).

68 See A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 484: «Die Alten hießen die

schöne Wahrheit είκός, sowie die Sitten im Schönen ήθος. Sobald sich nun die Einbildungskraft so ein Bild malet, von dem ich rede, und ich finde es nicht sogleich nach einem gewis

sen Satz falsch, so rechn e ich es unter das είκός[. . .]. Es werde n zwahr fals che Dinge mit un

terlaufen, aber sie sind nur logisch und im weitläufigen Verstände falsch, und sie sind wahr-scheinlich, weil verschiedene Gründe und ein gehöriger Zusammenhang bei ihnen zu findenist». At the end of Abteilung 31: Poetische Erdichtungen {ibid., § 525) Baumgarten writes: «Das,was wir schön erdichten, ist nur ein kleiner Teil aus einem anderen Zusammenhange derDinge, und dieser kleiner Teil kann besser sein als ein kleiner Teil dieser Welt. Wir habenhier sogar den Augustinus für uns, der diese Erdichtungen nicht Lügen, sondern nur Figurender Wahrheit nennt. Nicht alles, was erdichtet ist, sagt er, ist eine Lüge, sondern das nur, wasnicht bezeichnet; wann es aber etwas bezeichnet, so ist es eine Figur der Wahrheit [. . .] weil


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Truth and Persuasion in Baumgarten 's Aesthetica 27

In reviewing the set of conditions for aesthetic verisimilitude, one be-comes aware that they increasingly lose logical features and acquire the au-tonomous features that pertain to perfect sensate cognition, namely to be-auty.

The logic of sensate cognition is expounded with the aid of rhetoricalconcepts, but it is not identical or assimilated to these. Beauty is defined by

the concept of aesthetic perfection. The work of art, as we have seen, isequated with a world where the greatest variety of features reign compatiblewith their harmonious unity. The contents of a work of art are as far as pos-sible individual and hence the artist must choose themes that are as far aspossible determinate and extensively clear: «tandem sibi singularia legat the-mata, in quibus regnet perfectio materialis».74 These themes will then be ex-pressed with the specific characteristics required by perfectio cognitionis sensiti-vae. Therefore everything that is in contrast to beautiful form, that does notpossess absolute elegance, light decorum, elegant perspicuity, fullness oflife, intrinsic persuasiveness, effectiveness in delighting and moving, is ex-cluded from the work of art.75 This set of concepts that define the perfectio

materialis of the work of art, Baumgarten terms Studium veritatis absolutum, sedaestheticum,76 It is precisely the search for a specifically aesthetic truth ( ipsumveritatis Studium aestheticum) that forces the artist to choose, f or the sake of be-auty, that which from a strictly logical point of view may even appearfalse.

77

The truth is specifically aesthetic insofar as it is known through sensate

gius imbiberint, modo nunc et inter meditationis tuae Seriem vel habeant, de iis, quae pro-pinas, aut probabilitatem aestheticam, aut saltim in oppositum superponderantes rationesnon habeant animo satis praesentes, ut obscurent id omne, quod tuis superest elegantis veri-similitudinis».

74 Ibid., § 565.75 Ibid.: «Circumfundatur notarum ingenti multitudine. Reiecerit, quas non admittit pul-

cra forma. Restent, quarum vix unam desiderari brevis, sed eleganter plena, rotunditas, ve-nusta dignitas, tum absoluta, veritatis ipsius materialis perfectio, elegans vividitas et necessa-rius meditationi nitor, intima persuasio, vita praesertim et ad delectandum ac movendum ef-ficacia patiatur». See also Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 22: «Die Metaphysik hat uns schongelehrt, daß die Kenntnis um so viel besser ist, je reicher, edler, richtiger, klarer, gewissen-hafter und lebhafter sie ist. Diese 6 Kennzeichen geben ihr ihre Vorzüge. Die ästhetischeKenntnis muß ebendieselben haben, sie muß reich, edel, wahr, voll Licht, gewiß und lebhaftsein».

76 Ibid., § 566.77 Ibid., § 500: «Ipsum veritatis Studium, quod esse potest, maximum mentiri non-

nunquam, i. e. latissime falsa, aut ea cogitare cogit, quae num logice strictissime sint omninovera, ipse nescit, aestheticum».

3


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Benedetto Croce still claims that Baumgarten holds a contradictoryposition with regard to aesthetic truth and attempts to overcome this byavailing himself of 'oratoria'. In Croce's view oratory is «a practical under-taking, which does not have as its aim the discovery and affirmation of thetruth but has its end in persuasion and suggestion». 88 By equating per-suasion with the overwhelming or the submission of minds, Croce fullymisses the point of Baumgarten's theory of aesthetic truth and persuasion,if my previous arguments are sound.89

The above observations have attempted to demonstrate that Baum-garten has recourse to the language of rhetoric in order to clarify thetrue nature of aesthetic knowledge as opposed to logical knowledge inthe narrow sense. Rhetorical language was the only well-established lan-guage which the poetic tradition placed at his disposal. If one is preju-diced against rhetoric it becomes difficult to understand that Baumgartenuses rhetoric as a device for setting forth his revolutionary conception ofaesthetics as a logic of sensate cognition and of beauty as the perfection

88 B. C R O C E , Rileggendo cit., p. 11, cit. in no te 6 3 . See Conversazioni Critiche. Serie ter^a, cit.,p. 179: «Il carattere pratico dell'oratoria è dimostrato dal fatto che si differenziano gli oratoriin quanto viri boni dicendiperiti e in quanto uomini semplicemente rivolti a produrre l'effetto acui mirano, rispondente a un interesse, quale che esso sia: cioè in oratori etici e oratori utili-tari, etico-politici o meramente politici. Il che non ha da vedere con la loro eccellenza orato-ria, perché nell'un tipo e nell'altro vi sono i capaci e gl'incapaci, gli abili e gl'inetti».

89 Baumgarten could repeat to Croce: «Aesthetica [mea\ , quam minus inadaequate, acPlato rhetoricen, describas [. . .] nec est, quam Atheneus \te consentiente ] rhetoricen dicit, arsfallendi». Despite his unsympathetic evaluation of a central and decisive issue of Baum-garten's aesthetics, namely the theory of aesthetic truth and persuasion, Croce's essay ismoving evidence of his love for the Aesthetica·. «Da più decenni cercavo invano, in cataloghi epresso librai antiquari, una copia della rarissima Aesthetica del Baumgarten, da me letta e stu-

diata a suo tempo per prestito ottenutone da una biblioteca tedesca, ma che avevo vaghezzadi possedere come primo libro recante il titolo di una scienza alla quale molta parte della miavita è legata. E, quando non ci pensavo più, o quando meno ci pensavo, or'è qualche setti-mana, uno dei librai, che tenevano in nota la mia richiesta, mi annunció di mettere a mia di-sposizione [. . .] il libro giunse, l'esemplare era veramente bello, freschissimo, due volumettiin dodicesimo [. . .] e io li rivoltai tra le mie mani e li contemplai con gioiosa soddisfazione»(Rileggendo cit., p. 1). Croce was probably the only person in Italy to possess a copy of the

Aesthetica until his friends dedicated a reprint, preceded by the Meditationes, to him for his sev-entieth birthday, published by Laterza, Bari 1936. Croce had published, suis impensis, the firstmodern edition: A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Meditationes Philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema per-tinentibus, reprint of the only 1735 edition, edited by Benedetto Croce, Napoli 1900. The 1936Laterza edition of the Meditationes, based on Croce's edition, was used by Heinz Paetzold inthe edition with the parallel German translation published by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg1983.


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eral rhetoric may be defined as the science which treats generally of theunperfected presentation of sensate representations, and general poeticsas the science which treats generally of the perfected presentation of sen-sate representations».91 Later in the Aesthetica he is fully aware of the rolerhetoric plays in aesthetics on the condition that it is reformulated tomeet the needs of aesthetics. In fact he writes that «aesthetica surgit al-tius, suamque post se trahit rhetoricen, ultra questiones civiles in magissublimia».92 As we see, Baumgarten states with considerable clarity thataesthetics occupies a higher position, one that is more noble in compari-son with rhetoric, and autonomous. Moreover, aesthetics has its ownparticular rhetoric, one that is not coterminous with traditional rhetoric.

91 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Meditationes cit., § 117: «Iam quum perfecte hoc fieri possit et im-perfecte, hoc doceret Rhetorica Generalis scientia de imperfecte repraesentationes sensitivas pro-

ponendo in genere et illud Poética Generalis sáentia de perfecte proponendo repraesentationes sensitivas in

genere».92

Ibid., § 836. See also A. G . B A U M G A RT E N , Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., § 5 : «Die Äs-thetik geht viel weiter als die Rhetorik und Poetik und ist also nicht mit ihr einerlei; ebenso-wenig ist sie mit der Kritik einerlei».


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44 Pie tro Pimpinella

Baumgarten distinguishes between persuausion, the aim of which is tomove and incite minds, and theoretical persuasion, for


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44 Pie tro Pimpinella

cognition.78 This cognition possesses its specific complete certitude and, aswe shall see, persuasion.79 Baumgarten constructs his theory of aestheticcertainty by degrees: aesthetic tru th is a potion, namely primary from the log-ical point of view, likely but, considered in its specific nature of sensate cog-nition, it is completely certain. Thus it is understandable why Baumgartenequates beauty of thought with sensate certitude, certitude which springs

from analogon rationis. To the extent that he defines aesthetic truth in thisway, Baumgarten considers this concept in itself and to be guided by a dif-ferent logic from that of reason.

Sensate certitude reveals itself in the luminous consciousness of sen-sate truth or verisimilitude, namely in aesthetic persuasion.80 As in thecase of probability Baumgarten distinguishes between logical persuasionand aesthetic persuasion, namely between conviction, which is the dis-tinct consciousness of truth and aesthetic persuasion, which is indistinctand sensate.81 Thus when he says that persuasion is as much the task of

78 Ibid., § 423: «Tertia cura sit in rebus eleganter cogitandis, Veritas, sed Aesthetica, i. e.

Veritas, quatenus sensitive cognoscenda est».79 Ibid., § 481: «Veritas quaedam, etiam aesthetica, tamen complete cognoscatur ab ana-logo rationis, ut talis, id est completa cum certitudine et persuasione».

80 Ibid., § 829: «Pulcritudinem cogitationum in primariis [. . .] quintam numeramus, cer-titudinem sensitivam, analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis consci-entiam et lucem, Persuasionem, sed Aestheticam».

81 Ibid., § 832: «Conscientia veritatis distincta, convictio est, indistincta et sensitiva, per-suasio». Croce does not take this distinction into account and maintains that the recourse torhetoric is responsible for the confusion between logical knowledge and aesthetic knowl-edge: «Da questa sostituzione dell'effetto oratorio alla verità poética provengono, tanto in luiche nel Meier, non solo talune puerilità che si prendono con le molle e delle quali perciô nonparlo, ma la teoría assurda dei concetti, giudizi e sillogismi estetici (cioè di quello che è il pro-prio operare délia cognitio distincta in quanto distincta e che viene sventat amente trasfer ito nellacognitio confusa)» (B. C R O C E , Rileggendo cit., pp. 12-13). In fact Baumgarten always remains

faithful to the distinction between sensate representations and distinct concepts or repre-sentations: «Repraesentationes sensitivae [. . .] obscurae et clarae sunt repraesentationes poeticae»·,«Repraesentationes distinctae completae adaequatae profundae per omnes gradus non sunt sensiti-vae, ergo nec poeticae.» (Meditationes cit., § 12, 14). Analogously iudicium sensuum, iudicium in-tuitivum, that pertains to aesthetics are never confuse d with iudicium intellectuale, iudicium logicum,that pertains to the sphere of logic. In the lessical filing being carried out at the LIE, theterm syllogismus recurs four times in the Aesthetica, in the § 862 (twice), 875 and 877 and neverin syntagmatic connection with aestheticus. These paragraphs are all found in Sectio LI devotedto Confirmatio, which is persuasio diretía et ostensiva and is set against reprehensio, which is logicalrefutation; confirmatio is therefore also called logicae refutations analogon (Aesthetica, § 855).Baumgarten distinguishes yet again between the operation of logic in the narrow sense of theterm and the operation of aesthetics, between ratio and analogon rationis and in this context hespecifically confirms the distinction between persuasio aesthetica and convictio lógica·. «Si con-firmaturus eleganter tibi permiseris aliquando necessarian! aliquam etiam argumentationem


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44Pie tro Pimpinella

namely fiction can be heterocosmic but not Utopian: «Fictions in whichthere is much that is mutually inconsistent are Utopian, not heterocosmic;hence there is nothing self-contradictory in poetic fiction».69 Secondly aes-thetic cognition must be unequivocal and completely certain only howeveras regards its sensate nature.70 Thirdly, it has to be probable from the logicaland aesthetic points of view. 'Probable' in general means that it has moreelements for being accepted than for being rejected. Baumgarten distin-guishes logical probability from aesthetic probability, the grounds for theformer are found in distinct cognition, while the grounds for the latter arefound in sensate cognition.71 Moreover aesthetic verisimilitude obtains evenin representations which from a logical point of view are doubtful or im-probable, on the condition that they are aesthetically probable. 72 As the lastcondition, Baumgarten states that however low the degree of probabilitymay be, it can be accepted if it is endowed with elegance.73

es dieselbe in ein viel schöneres Licht setzt». In the corresponding § 525 of the Aesthetica,Baumgarten quotes in full Augustine's passage from the Quaestionum Evangeliorum libri duo (II,

51). Croce reports Augustine's words and notes that Baumgarten «se ne era rimasto colpito,non per questo le aveva bene intese (si vedano le spiegazioni che inframmette nel paragrafo enel luogo corrispondente delle Vorlesungen)» (Β. CROCE, Rileggendo cit., p. 13). An unfore warned reader would not find any hint of misunders tandin gs in Bau mgarten's explanatio ns,

also perhaps because Croce's elusive indication is not very helpful. Croce is very struck by

the objections Baumgarten raises as regards poetical fictions, like the one replied to with the

quotation from Augustine: «has certe fictiones concedes esse mendacia: cur itaque définis, il-lustras, distinguís et analógica saltern commendare videris?» Croce {ibid., p. 12) attributesthem to a critical awareness, that Baumgarten tries in vain to silence. In fact these obiectionsdo not pose insurmountable problems, at least for the expert of aesthetics: «Der große Hau-fen wird das, was wir bisher von den Erdichtungen gesagt haben, Lügen nennen; allein derVernünftige, der die Regel kennet, wird es nicht zugeben» (Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., §525).

m A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Meditationes cit., § 57: «Figmenta in quibus plura sibi invicem re-

pugnant sunt utópica, non heterocosmica; hinc in figmentis poeticis nil sibi invicem répugnât».70 A. G . B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 4 8 5 : «Erunt itaque aesthetice vera, id est, veri-

similia, 1) sensitive et intellectualiter complete certa, qua sunt prius, 2) sensitive tantum com-plete certa, in quibus adhuc intellectus suam non exercuit operam, 3) logice et aesthetice pro-babilia, qua sunt posterius».

71 Ibid.·. «Probabilia quoniam sunt, quibus ad dandum assensum plus rationis est, quamad denegandum; et Improbabilia, quibus ad denegandum assensum plus rationis est, quam addandum: quando rationes dubitandi et decidendi, pro assensu et contra eundem distinctecognoscuntur, oritur Probabilitas Lógica, si sensitive, Aesthetica. A potiori desumitur de-nominatio, quoties est quaedam probabilitas aestheticologica».

72 Ibid., § 486: «Verisimilia aesthetica erunt 4) logice forte dubia, immo improbabilia,modo sint aesthetice probabilia».

73 Ibid.·. «5) aesthetice etiam dubia et improbabilia, non aliis solum, quam quibus potissi-mum venuste cogites, sed etiam his ipsis forsan alias, quando rationes contra assensum lar-


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and if it did not have an evaluative nature. In actual fact Croce means by'assimilation' «the substitution of the oratory effect for poetic truth» andthis interpretation entails an explicit devaluation of rhetoric.59 But Croce'sinterpretation, as we shall attempt to show, is not justified by the text of the

Aesthetica.

The substitution of oratory effect for poetic truth, is, in Croce's opin-

ion, the consequence of a difficulty from which Baumgarten could not ex-tricate himself, in other words, the impossibility of reconciling two contra-sting theories: on the one hand continuity between the various kinds of rep-resentation (obscure, clear, confused and distinct) and on the other thedistinction between territonum aestheticum and territorium logicum. M

59 Ibid.: «Ma questa assimilazione délia verità estetica alla verità o piuttosto alla non veri-tà oratoria offende, in pari tempo, la coscienza della poesía, che sa che l'incanto délia be-llezza non è l'inganno nel quale cade la credulità, e la coscienza morale, che non puô riceverenella cerchia del vero la falsità, né consentire alla più piccola indulgenza verso di questa».

60 Ibid., p. 11: «Siffatta concezione del rapporto tra le varie forme della percezione o dellacoscienza, e l'altra concezione dell'Estetica come scienza indipendente e del conoscere poéti-

co come anteriore a quello logico e avente la propria perfectio nella pulcritudo, erano sostan-zialmente contrastant! tra loro; e, di necessità, o la prima avrebbe dovuto dimostrare fallace edissolvere l'altra, e soffocare in culla la neonata scienza dell'Estetica, o questa avrebbe dovu-to, rioperando, correggere profondamente e trasformare il concetto della coscienza, delle sueforme e del suo modo di operare». In fact links between the lower and the higher part of thecognitive faculty hold in Baumgarten's aesthetics for several good reasons. Firsdy sensitivecognition is a step towards distinct cognition: «Obi. 5) confusio mater erroris. Resp. a) sedconditio, sine qua non, inveniendae veritatis, ubi natura non facit saltum ex obscuritate indistinctionem. Ex nocte per auroram meridies» ( Aesthetica cit., § 7). Secondly understandingand reason play an important though secondary role in aesthetic knowledge: «Ad ingeniumvenustum, A) facilitates cognoscitivae inferiores, earumque dispositiones naturales; Β) facilitates cognoscitivae superiores, quatenus a) intellectus et ratio per Imperium animae in semet

ipsam multum non raro conferunt, ad excitandas facultates inferiores, b) consensus harum et

apta pulcritudini proportio saepe non nisi per intellectus et rationis usum obtinetur, c) ma

gnae vividitatis in analogo rationis consectarium spiritui naturale Pulcritudo intellectus et Rationis, perspicientiae nexus extensive distinctae» {Aesthetica cit., § 3038). Finally, the object of

pulchre cogitare is not only what is clear and confused, but also what is distinct, although the

latter must be 'hidden' in beatifull representations, which in themselves are not distinct: «Wir

nennen zwar die Ästhetik eine Wissenschaft von der sinnlichen Erkenntnis; allein nicht de-shalb, als wenn alles sinnlich und gar nichts deutlich darinnen wäre, nein, sondern weil dieHauptbegriffe sinnlich bleiben, so wie man das einen deutlich und scientifischen Vortragnennt, wo die Hauptbegriffe deutlich sind. In dem sinnlichen Vortrage sind die deutlichenBegriffe versteckt. Die Schönheit wird hier nicht in die Verwirrung gesetzet, sondern es wirdgezeigt, wie verworrene Vorstellungen schön werden sollen» (Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., §17). See also Aesthetica, § 123: «Horizonti aesthetico logicoque possunt esse multae materiaecommune, hic ideo, quia aliquid in scientiis pertractatur, non excluditur idem ex sphaera pul-critudinis omnino, sed quatenus punctim et minutim cum accuratione philosophica mathe-maticaque conciperetur» and § 443: «Veritatum aestheticologicaram generalium eae tantum


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problem is found in the traditional rhetorical conception of truth. In thisprecise sense, truth is not the rigorous formal deduction of an assertion or aset of assertions, but that verisimilitude, which relies on the orator's skill tomake a discourse evident or at least credible. Thus it may be said: just as rea-son is capable of strict logical demonstration, so the analogue of reason (pul'-crut» rationis analogori) is capable of attaining aesthetic truth by means, which

are in a peculiar way similar to those of the orator.49To develop this main thesis Baumgarten makes use of the categories

of classical rhetoric. In order to grasp the specific role that rhetoric plays inBaumgarten's theory of art, one has to bear in mind that he bases the struc-ture of his aesthetica artificialis docens on the rhetorical doctrine of inventio. As Ihave intimated, the 'aesthetica artificialis docens' in fact corresponds to the'lógica artificialis docens'. Baumgarten thus first models his aesthetics onlogic and then structures the main theoretical part of his aesthetics in ac-cordance with the most important part of the art of rhetoric, namely in-vention. Rhetoric plays a subordinate but very important role in Baum-garten's Aesthetica.^ Rhetoric performs for Baumgarten the crucial role of

[. . .] L'eccellente Baumgarten, uomo pieno di calore e di convinzione, spesso cosí schietto evivace nel suo latino scolastico, è una simpatica e ragguardevole figura nella storia de-U'Estetica, ma sempre della scienza in formazione, non délia formata, dell'Estetica condenda,non della condita» (ibid., p. 240-241). The essays, reprinted in Storia dell'estetica per saggi andthence also Rileggendo, had the aim of giving «una nuova e più positiva e più varia esposizionedella storia della disciplina» compared to that one «troppo polémica e negativa» in the Estética(see Avverten^à).

49 Croce criticizes Baumgarten's undertaking for being contradictory: «Ció si vede nelBaumgarten, che fa replicad e vani sforzi (particolarmente nelle sezioni della sua opera in-torno alia Veritas aesthetica e alia verisimilitude) per asserire una forma di verità che dovrebbeessere insieme — conforme alla esigenza peculiare della concezione monistico-astratta o gra-

dúale quantitativa - la medesima di quella lógica, quantunque imperfetta, e — conforme allaesigenza peculiare della scienza dell'Estetica - perfetta di propria perfezione e bella di quellaluce che si chiama la bellezza» (Rileggendo cit., p. 11). But, as we have seen, Baumgarten dis-tinguishes two areas of knowledge, each of which possesses its own logic, the lógica facultatiscognosativae inferioris and the logic of the superior faculties (intellect and reason) and its ownperfection, the perfectio materialis of aesthetic cognition and the perfectio formalis of rational cog-nition respectively.

50 Leibniz-Wolffian gnoseology plays a major role. A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Sciagraphia ency-clopediaephilosophicae, hrsg. von J. Förster, Halle 1769, § 25: «Gnoseo logia (die Wissenschaft zudenken, die Logik in weiterer Bedeutung), (Lógica significatu latiori) est scientia cognitionistarn cogitandae quam proponendae, philosophiae organicae pars potior. [. . .] Quia omniscognitio vel sensitiva vel intellectualis, erit scientia cognitionis I) sensitivae, II) intellectualis.Prior est Aesthetica (die Aesthetik, die philosophische Theorie der schönen Wissenschaf-ten)».


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Metaphysical reality in its determination is then better attained through aes-thetic knowledge than by logical means. Metaphysical reality is, according toLeibniz, the reality of individuals, since only monads are real in a strictlymetaphysical sense. In fact, aesthetic knowledge is according to Baumgartenthe knowledge of individuals: «Individuals are determined in every respect.Therefore particular representations are in the highest degree poetic».36 The

problem now arises: how is material perfection to be attained through par-ticular representations. This problem has both a logical and a rhetorical as-pect, which are intertwined. The logical aspect of Baumgarten's aestheticsas a logic of the lower part of the cognitive faculty relies on the distinctionbetween intensively clearer and extensively clearer representations (repraesen-tationes intensive clariores and repraesentationes extensive clariores).

v The distinction

between the two sorts of clear representations is Baumgarten's contributionto the logic of ideas, which was elaborated by Leibniz, on Cartesiangrounds, and taken up by Wolff. Two degrees of clarity are defined in thisdistinction, intensive clarity, due to the greater clarity of the characteristictraits of a representation (claritas intensive maior) and extensive clarity due tothe greater number of characteristic traits of a representation (claritas exten-sive maior). The function of clear representations is to permit the recognitionor individuation of a thing. In this function extensively clear representationsplay the preeminent role, since the clarity of a representation increases inproportion to the number of characteristic traits. The greater the number ofcharacteristic traits, the greater its degree of clarity.38

The characteristic traits of an extensively clear representation may bedefined, in Meier's words, as «unmittelbare Merkmale (notae immediatae,

proximae)» to distinguish them f rom «mittelbare Merkmale (notae mediatae, re-motaé)» that characterize distinct notions.39 The relation between immediate

36 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Meditationes cit., § 19: «Individua sunt omnimode determinata,ergo repraesentationes singulares sunt admodum poeticae>>.

37 Ibid., § 16: «Si in repraesentatione A plura repraesententur quam in Β C D etc., sint tarnen omnes confusae, A erit reliquis Extensive Clarior».

38 A. G. BAUMGARTEN, Metaphysica cit., § 531: «Ergo multitudine notarum augetur clari

tas. Claritas claritate notarum maior, Intensive (a), multitudine notarum, Extensive Maior (b)

dici potest». Clear representations remain below the limit of distinction ( infra distinctionem)

and thus are said to be confused or indistinct: «Quum clarae repraesentationes sint poeticae, aut

erunt distinctae aut confusae, iam distinctae non sunt, ergo confusae» (.Meditationes cit., § 15).39

G. F. MEIER, Auszug aus der Vernuftlehre, Halle 1752, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, hrsg.

vo n der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. XVI: Kant's handschriftlich-er Nachlaß; Bd. III: Logik, Berlin-Leipzig 1924. See N. H I N S K E , Kant-Index, Band I: Stellenindexund Konkordanz ψ George Friedrich Meier «Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre», FrommanHolzboog,StuttgartBad Cannstatt 1986.


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mately confused, that is indistinct.26 Leibniz was aware that perfect logicalknowledge is seldom attained by men and it is by no means attainable whenan individual thing is the cognitive object, because the individual includesan infinity of attributes and therefore the concept is not completely ana-lyzable. A paradox still arises in Leibnitian thought: individuals, that consti-tute the actual metaphysical reality, are unknowable: «Car (quelque paradoxe

que cela paroisse) il est impossible à nous d'avoir la connaissance des in-dividus et de trouver le moyen de determiner exactement l'individualitéd'autre chause, a moins de la garder elle meme». 27 The knowledge of an in-dividual object implies the knowledge of its principle of individualization,which allows one to deduce all the attributes of its complete notion. 28 Butthis is impossible, at least for man, because knowing a priori an individualnotion would imply knowing the whole universe, since individuals are mir-rors of the universe.29

Leibniz still admits that perfect knowledge, which is sometimes attain-able in mathematics, is abstract and therefore incomplete. Baumgarten ad-mits this, but also claims that aesthetic knowledge is capable of perfectionand, like the knowledge of an individual, is concrete and in a special way al-

so complete. Both the rational or logical in the narrow sense and the sen-sate or aesthetic knowledge have as their aim the objective metaphysical re-ality or truth.30 Rational and sensate knowledge, insofar as they mirror meta-

26 See the interpretation of the American editors of the Meditationes·. « When it is saidthat poetry is confused, it is meant that its representations are fused together and not sharplydiscriminated. (The reader of the Reflections must be careful to keep fusion foremost here andno t confusion in the derogatory sense)» (Reflections cit., Introducti on, p. 21). This interpret ation,quoted with approval in the contemporary literature, is suggestive but imprecise from thelogical point of view. See below my approch to the concept of extensive clarior.

21 G . W. L E I BN I Z , Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain, in Die philosophischen Schriften,hrsg. von C. I. Gerhardt, G. Olms, Hildesheim, Bd. 5, p. 268.

28

G. W. L E I BN I Z , Discours de metapbysique, in Die philosophischen Schriften, hrsg. von C. J.Gerhardt, G. Olms Verlag, Hidesheim-New York 1978, Bd. 4, p. 433: «Ainsi il faut que leterme du sujet enferme toujours celuy du prédicat, en sorte que celuy qui entendroit parfaite-ment la notion du sujet, jugerait aussi que le prédicat luy appertient. Cela estant, nous pou-vons dire que la nature d'une substance individuelle ou d'un estre complet, est d'avoir unenotion si accomplie qu'elle soit suffisante à comprendre et à faire deduire tous les prédicatsdu sujet à qui cette notion est attribuée».

29 Ibid., p. 434: «On peut même dire que toute substance porte en quelque façon le ca-ractère de la sagesse infinie et de la toute-puissance de Dieu, et l'imite autant qu'elle en estsusceptible. Car elle esprime qoyque confusement tout ce qui arrive dans l'univers, passé,present ou avenir, ce qui a quelque ressemblance à une perception ou connoissance infinie[. . .]».

30 A. G . BA U M G A RT E N , Metaphysica cit., § 8 9 : «Veritas metaphysica (realis, obiectiva, ma-terialis), est ordo plurium in uno».


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ture of such cognition. The question now arises: what does Baumgartenmean when he states that sensate cognition must attain its perfection in or-der to create beauty? As we have seen, Baumgarten's definition of beautyimplies the perfection of sensate cognition (perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, Voll-kommenheit der sinnlichen Erkenntnis).12 The concept of perfection is definedby Baumgarten according to Leibniz and to Wolff as unity or consensus in

variety (Einigkeit in der Vielheit, consensus in vanetate)P Baumgarten borrows

22 A. G . BAUMGARTEN, Kollegium über die Ästhetik cit., §§ 14 - 16: «Alles was schön ist,gehöret in ihr [der Ästhetik] Feld, sobald es aber deutlich wird, gehöret nicht hierher. Sobaldich in der sinnlichen Erkenntnis Vollkommenheiten finde, die deutlich werden, so be-kümmere ich mich nicht mehr als ein Ästheticus darum [. . .] Die Vollkommenheiten oderUnvollkommenheiten der sinnlichen Kenntnis gehen den Ästhetiker nur insofern an, in-sofern er sie als schön oder als häßlich erkennet».

23 A. G . BA UMG A RTEN , Metaphysica cit., § 94 : «Si plura simul sumpta unius rationem suf-ficientem constituunt, consentiunt, consensus ipse est perfectio, et unum in quod con-sentitur, ratio perfectionis determinans (focus perfectionis)». See G . W . LEIBN IZ, Initia et Spe-

cimina Scientiae novae Generalis, in Die philosophischen Schriften, Bd. VII, p. 87: «Nun die einigkeitin der Vielheit ist nichts anders als die Übereinstimmung, und weil eines zu diesem näherstimmet als zu jenem, so fließet daraus die Ordnung, von welcher alle Schönheit herkommt,und die Schönheit erwecket liebe». See CH R. W O LF F , Philosophiaprima sive Ontologia, in Gesam-melte Werke, II. Abt. Lateinische Schriften, Bd. 3, hrsg. J. ECOLE, Olms, Hildesheim-NewYork 1977, § 503: «Perfectio est consensus in varietate, seu plurium a se invicem differ-entium in uno. Consensum vero appello tendentiam ad idem aliquod obtinendum». As isknown, Kant criticized the use of the concept of perfection in order to define beauty and judgeme nt of tas te: «Das Geschmac ksurt eil ist vo n de m Begrif fe der Vollkommenheit gän -zlich unterschieden. Die objective Zweckmäßigkeit kann nur vermittelst der Beziehung desMannigfaltigen auf einen bestimmten Zweck, also nur durch einen Begriff, erkannt werden.Hieraus allein schon erhellt, daß das Schöne, dessen Beurteilung eine bloß formale Zweck-mässigkeit ohne Zweck, zum Grunde hat, von der Vorstellung des Guten ganz unabhängigsei, weil das letztere eine objective Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. die Beziehung des Gegenstandes

auf einen bestimmten Zweck, voraussetzt» (Kritik der Urtheilsknrft, Akademie Textausgabe, V,Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1968, p. 226). Kant's objection applies only to Wolffs conceptionof perfection. In fact Wolff identifies the principle of perfection ( Grund der Vollkommenheit)with a specific aim, as may be seen from his definition quoted above and from the followingexample: «Die Zusammenstimmung des Mannigfaltigen machet die Vollkommenheit derDinge aus. Z. E. die Vollkommenheit einer Uhr beurtheilet man daraus, daß sie die Stundenund ihre Theile richtig zeiget. Also ist der Grund von der Vollkommenheit der Uhr, die rich-tige Anzeige der Zeit» [Deutsche Metaphysik, § 152-153). Asking for the principle of perfectionequals to asking «quinam sint corporum usus et fines et quinam sint partium singularum ususet fines» (Cosmología, § 539). On the contrary Baumgarten, although he makes use of Wolffsformule consensus in varietate, he identifies the focus perfectionis with unity (unum) and not withaim. Therefore, as regards the concept of perfection, Baumgarten is mainly indebted to Leib-niz. Baumgarten's definition of perfection is rather akin with Kant's subjective Zweckmäßigkeitder Vorstellungen·. «Das Formale in der Vorstellung eines Dinges, d. i. die Zusammen stimmu ng


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Hence there is a strict symmetry between the two disciplines: just aslogic, which includes both analytica and dialéctica, is the ars rationis, so aesthet-ics, the theory of the liberal arts, is ars analogi rationis. Both are arts insofar asthey give rules to the knowledge that lies in human nature, namely to nat-ural logic and natural aesthetics respectively. Both are sciences, or philo-sophical disciplines insofar as they are able to prove their principles a priori.

These principles are deduced from psychology, which according to Wolffsupplies principles both for sensate and for intellectual cognition. ThusBaumgarten can state: «Since psychology affords sound principles, we haveno doubt that there could be available a science which might direct the low-er cognitive faculty in knowing things sensately».14

In his Psjchologia Empírica Wolff divides the lower par t of the cognitivefaculty, which deals with obscure, clear and confused representations fromthe higher part, which deals with distinct representations possibly becomingcomplete and adequate.15 The Wolffian theory of the cognitive faculty canbe regarded as a psychological reshaping of the logical classification of ideasto be found in Leibniz.16 Leibniz classifies ideas according to dichotomies:

obscure/clear, confused/distinct, adequate/inadequate, symbolic/intuitive.It is a purely logical classification because Leibniz considers only the cogni-

Logik die ältere Schwester der Ästhetik in Ansehung der Theorie, sonst würde in Ansehungder Ausübung die Ästhetik die ältere sein. Nach den Ideen, nach welchen wir die Logik ein-geteilt, werden wir auch die Ästhetik einteilen». One implication of this text is underlined byB. CRO CE, Rileggendo /Aesthetica del Baumgarten, Trani 1933 (Extract fro m 'La Critica', XXXI ,1,1933; reprinted under the title L.'


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In the later mature work the concept of aesthetics explicitly covers thetheory of all arts, that is of all liberal arts: aesthetica is theoria artium liberalium.This larger scope of the concept of aesthetics does not affect his originalcontent, which remains the same, as it is found in the first paragraph of the

Aesthetica·. «Aesthetica (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, arspulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae"5. In

the early work it is stated that oratio sensitiva means discourse involving sen-sate representations and that philosophical poetics presupposes in the poeta lower cognitive faculty, which is the source of sensate cognition. 6 As inthe Aesthetica it is stated that beauty consists in perfectio cognitionis sensitivae,similarly in the Meditationes the poem is defined as oratio sensitiva perfecta.1

We need, Baumgarten argues, a logic in its broader sense to guide thelower cognitive faculty in the sensate cognition of things. He adds: «But hewho knows the state of our logic will not be unaware how uncultivated thisfield is».8 In fact, logic by its very definition is restricted to rather narrowlimits, as it is considered to be the science for the direction of the highercognitive faculty in apprehending the truth. Baumgarten realizes that the

need for a logic of sensate cognition must be met by aesthetics, as he expli-cidy states in the Metaphysical «scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi

conformandum poema Poetice, scientia poetices Philosophia Poética, habitus conficiendipoematis Poe-

sis, eoque habitu gaudens Poeta».5 A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Aesthetica cit., § 1. Baumgarten was aware of the originality of his

undertaking: «Die Ästhetik als eine Wissenschaft ist noch neu; man hat zwar hin und wiederRegeln zum schönen Denken gegeben, aber man hat in den vorigen Zeiten noch nicht denganzen Inbegriff aller Regeln in eine systematische Ordnung in Form einer Wissenschaft ge-bracht, folglich kann auch dieser Name vielen noch unbekannt sein» (A. G. B AUMGAR TEN,Kollegium über die Ästhetik , in B E R N H A R D P O P P E , Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Seine Bedeutungund Stellung in der Leibni^Wolffischen Philosophie und seine Begehungen Kant. Nebst Veröffen-tlichung einer bisher unbekannten Handschrift der Ästhetik Baumgartens, Robert Noske, Borna-

Leipzig 1907, § 1).6A. G. B A U M G A R T E N , Meditationes cit., § 3: «Repraesentationes per partem facultatis

cognoscitivae inferiores sint Sensitivae», § 4: «Oratio repraesentationum sensitivarum sit sen-sitiva» and § 115: «Quum vero in loquendo repraesentationes eas habeamus, quas comuni-camus, supponit philosophia poética facultatem in poeta cognoscitivam inferiorem».

7 Ibid., § 7: «Oratio sensitiva perfecta est cuius varia tendunt ad cognitionem repraesen-tationum sensitivarum» and § 9: «Oratio sensitiva perfecta est Poema».

8 Ibid., § 115: «Haec [facultas] in sensitive cognoscendis rebus dirigenda quidem esset perLogicam sensu generaliore, sed qui nostram seit logicam, quam incultus hic ager sit, non ne-sciet. Quid? si ergo quos aretiores in limites reapse includitur Lógica etiam per ipsam defini-tionem in eosdem redigeretur, habita pro scientia vel facultatem cognosàtivam superiorem dirigente in

cognoscenda veritate ? Tunc enim daretur occasio philosophis no n sine ingenti lucro inquirendiin ea etiam artificia, quibus inferiores cognoscendi facultates expoliri possent, aeui et ademolumentum orbis felicius adhiberi».


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48 Pietro Pimpinella

of this cognition.90 The misunderstanding on this point is not surprising,if one takes into account the complexity of Baumgarten's doctrine ofaesthetic truth and the fact that he couched it in outdated systems of an-cient rhetoric and poetics. Nevertheless one must bear in mind twoweighty assertions made by Baumgarten himself. Already in the Medi-tationes he sets rhetoric against general poetics or philosophia poética·. «Gen-

90 On the extent of the deep-rooted prejudice against rhetoric in the idealistic culturedominant in Italy during the first half of the century, see C. Vasoli's contribution to the vol-ume of collected writings Attualità delta retorica, Liviana Editrice, Padova 1975. G. Folena'sintroduction mentions the sources of this attitude in nineteenth-century Italian and Germanculture. «Croce fin da giovanissimo nutre ripugnanza per il tradizionale insegnamento gram-maticale e retorico» ( T . D E M A U R O , Introdu^one alla semantica, Laterza, Bari 1971, p. 103).Croce the theorist, whose name is linked with the theory of the identity of language and art,can but be irritated by the use of rhetoric for the purposes of aesthetics. However Croce thehistorian at other times shows a quite different awareness of the importance of rhetoric inthe history of aesthetics. In the essay Ini^ja^jone all'estetica del Settecento ( 1 9 3 3 ) , in which twofundamental aspects of the aesthetic of this century are sharply distinguished: that linked tothe notion of taste for the beautifull, which Kant also follows, an that linked to «l'indaginedel prodursi della poesia e dell'arte», Croce writes: «Siffatta indagine intorno alia natura della

poesia e dell'arte era in corso da secoli, formando una tradizione scientifica che potrebbe de-nominarsi 'aristotélica' in quanto procedeva soprattutto dalla Poética e dalla Retorica aristo-télica: una tradizione parallela all'altra sul bello, e che, anche dove pareva che a questa in cer-to modo si accostasse o s'intrecciasse, ne rimaneva intimamente distinta e distaccata. Qui sitravagliava e cresceva la vera e propria Estética, ed è strano (o strano non è, per gü anzidettipreconcetti sul primato delle idee di bello e di piacere) che gli storici dell'Estetica abbianogettata quella tradizione nel fondo del quadro, quando addirittura non l'hanno ignorata» (Sto-ria dell'esteticaper saggi cit., p. 134). It is paradoxical that Croce himself ignores this tradition inhis essay on Baumgarten: the Aristotelian line which inspires Baumgarten in his criticism ofPlato and Cicero and consequently in the use he makes of rhetoric in the Aesthetica, is mistak-en for the vulgata of Platonic position. Again at the end of the brief essay Estética del Rinasci-mento. Ea poética di Fracastoro ( 1 9 2 4 ) , Croce writes: «Non dimentichiamo che l'Estetica, inquanto scienza filosofica della poesia, si matura nel corso del Seicento come dottrina dellaelocuzione o persuasione retorica contrapposta a quella della dimostrazione dialettica, come

lógica della poesia, contrapposta alia lógica della filosofía e della scienza. Cosi nel Baum-garten, ideatore di una speciale scienza della Aesthetica; cosi nel gigante Vico, che era di pro-fessione un maest ro di retorica» (ibid. p. 38). Paradoxically in Rileggendo Croce forgets this dis-tinction between the logic of poetry and the logic of science attributing Baumgarten, as wehave seen, a conception of Veritas aesthetica as «una forma di verità che dovrebbe essere in-sieme — conforme alla esigenza peculiare della concezione monistico-astratta o gradúalequantitativa — la medesima di quella lógica, quantunque imperfetta». This criticism occursaroun d three decades after th e essays contained in part VI (Per la storia dell'estetica italiana) ofProblemi di Estética, in which Croce shows his first-hand knowledge of the Renaissance andseventeeth-century débats on retoric, on the relations between rhetoric and dialectic, and onthe logical implications of these debates.

pletro plmpinella.truth and persuasion in baumgarten's aesthetica

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