plj volume 37 number 3 -07- recent decisions - civil law

7/28/2019 PLJ Volume 37 Number 3 -07- Recent Decisions - Civil Law

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Here, an information of illegal possession of blasting caps was dec-lared to be a bar to a second information for illegal importation of the same articles. The relaxation seems to be based on certain cir-cumstances existing in the particular cases which call for the mitiga-tion of the rigor of the established rule.

The decision in the Tinamisan case is a reaffirmation of thatestablished doctrine on double jeopardy. It finds further justifica-tion in that dynamite fishing, which has increasingly grown rampantall over the Islands, should be arrested if our fish and other marineresources are to be preserved. This ruling constitutes an effectiveaid towards that imperative and salutary end.

Civil Law-Liability of the Wife for Debts Contracted by the Hu,sband

ROBERTOLAPERALand PURIFICACIONLAPERALvs. RAMONKATIGBAKand EVELINAKATIGBAK

G. R. No. L-4299, prom. Jan. 31, 1952

The relation of husband and wife at law affects to a certain ex-tent the legal rights and interests in property. In the Philippines,a civil law country, the ownership by the wife of her own propertyis recognized. The provisions of the old and new Civil Codes areevidences of this fact,! Common-law jurisdictions like the severalstates of the United States, in the Married Women's Property Rightshave recognized her general legal estate. They also recognize thata wife's equitable separate estate is not liable for the debts of her husband, or to process in the enforcement of such debts. 2

The case of Laperal vs. Katigbak 3 deals with such property re-lations of husband and wife. The spouses Ramon and Evelina Ka-'tigbak were sued by the plaintiffs for the recovery of a certain sum based on two causes of action. Evelina moved for and obtained a dismissal of the complaint against her on the ground that therewas no sufficient cause of action as regards her,4 hence plaintiffsappealed.

The first cause relates to four promissory notes which had beensigned by Ramon Katigbak in favor of the plaintiffs. The second relates to jewelry received by Ramon for sale on commission basisand evidenced by a receipt signed by Ramon alone. The notes aswell as the value of the jewelry not having been paid, the hereinaction was brought against the defendant spouses.

1 Art. 1382, Spanish Civil Code-"The wife retains the ownership of the para-

phernal proOperty." Art. 136 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides likewise.2 Huntington .••.Saunders, 120 U. S. 78; Botts .••.Gooch, 11 SW 42.3 G. R. No. L-4299, prom. Jan. 31, 1952.4 Rule 8, Sec. 1(f), Rules of Court.



In affirming the order of dismissal, the court stated that thewife need not be included in the complaint as a party defendant.There was and could be no personal liability of the wife as her husband was not her agent,5 nor did he contract for her. 6 A husband may be constituted an agent of his wife expressly by means of a power of attorney.7 It is only as such agent that he could bind thewife. There being no such appointment, neither could it be implied

that such an agency took place, it results that there is no liability.The wife is the owner 8 a,nd administrator of her paraphernal

property, unless she has delivered the same to her husband by meansof a public instrument empowering him to administer it. 9 Unlesssuch administration has been transferred to the husband, he can-not bind the paraphernal property.l0 Neither can such property be made to answer for the debts of the husband,ll Even if such ad-ministration has been given to the husband, in order to bind the paraphernal property, the husband's debts must be for the household expenses or must have redounded to the benefit of the family and

that the separate property of the husband as well as the conjugal property is insufficient to cover the same. U ;' No proof to this ef-

5 Art. 1710, Spanish Civil Code-"An agency may be express or implied. Anexpressagencymay be created by a public or private instrument or given orally.... "

Art. 1869, Civil Code of the Philippines-"Agency may be express or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence.or lack of action or his failure to repu-diate the agency,knowing that another is acting in his behalf without authority.... "

6 Art. 1259, Spanish Civil Code-"No one can contract in the name of another without being authorized by him or without having his legal representation in accord-ance with law.... "

Art. 1317, Civil Code of the Philippines-"No one may contract in the name of another without being recognized by the latter or unless he has by law a right torepresent him. . . ."

T Phil. Sugar Estates De'Yelopment Co. 'Y.Poizat, 48 Phil. 536; Orden de Domi-nicos 'Y.De Coster, 50 Phil. 115.

8 Art. 1382, Spanish Civil Code. See note 1, supra. For corresponding provi.sion in the Civil Code .of the Philippines, Art. 136, see note 1, supra. Also Rodriguez'Y.De la Cruz, 8 Phil. 665; Al'Yaran 'Y.Marquez, 11 Phil. 263.

{)Art. 1384, Spanish Civil Code-"The wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband before a notaryfor the purpose of conferring its management upon him. . . ." The corresponding provision in the Civil Code of the Phil. is Art. 137, which proOVides likewise.

10 Eliot 'Y.Montemayor, 9 Phil. 693; People's Bank and Trust Ca. 'Y. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil. 167.

11 Ah'aran 'Y.Marquez, 11 Phil. 263; Vargas 'Y.Egamino, 12 Phil. 56; Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil. 255.

12 Art. 1385(2), Spanish Civil Code-"The property itself (paraphernal) shallalso be liable in cases falling under Art. 1362 should that of the husband and dowry property be insufficient to cover the liabilities referred therein." Art. 1362, SpanishCivil Code refers to unappraised dowry which shall be liable for usual daily expensesof the family, incurred by the wife or her order, with the tacit consent of the husband but in this case, the property belonging to the conjugal partnership and that belongingto the husband must first be established. For corresponding provisi.onin the CivilCode of the Phil., see Art. 138(2) .



fect having been offered, the paraphernal property is not liable.The husband is personally responsible with his private funds and atmost the assets of the conjugal partnership,13 of which he is theadministrator. L4 To reach these property, it is unnecessary to im- plead the wife 15who should not be joined as defendant in actionsaffecting his rights in property in which she has no interest,16

The attachment of the receipts for jewelry as an integral partof the complaint negatives the allegation that the wife was alsoan agent of defendant. Such allegation, according to the court, must be considered as a mere legal inference from the marital relationand not based on the actual contract.

The plaintiffs claim the applicability of the new Civil Code,17 but the transactions having occurred before June, 1950, the provisionsof the New Civil Code does not apply,18 The application of the NewCivil Code would not change the decision however, as a comparison

of th~ provisions of the Spanish Civil Code and the present CivilCode with respect to property relations between spouses would re-veal that there is no substantial alteration. .Any difference occursonly in the language of the provisions. In effect, the Court wastherefore applying both Codes to the case at bar.

13 Art. 1401(3) of the Spanish Civil Code which is also embodiedin Art. 153(3)of the Civil Code of the Phil. provides that the fruits, income or interest collectedor accrued during the marriage, derived fr.omthe partnership property or from that which belongs separately to either spouse forms part of the conjugal property.

Art. 1385, Spanish Civil Code-"The fruits of the paraphernal property form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and are subject to the payment of debtsand expensesof the household. . . ." and Art. 1386-"The fruits ,of the paraphernal property cannot be made subject to the payment of personal obligation of the husband unless it is proved that such obligation redounded to the benefit of the family." Jayier y. Osmeiia, 34 Phil. 336; Quintos de Ansaldo and Ansaldo y. Sheriff, 64 Phil.115; Ossorio y. Posadas, 56 Phil. 748; La Corporacion de Padres Agustinos y. Ansaldo,66 Phil. 566; Mirasol y. Lim, 59 Phil. 701, 709.

14 Art. 1412, Spanish Civil Code-"The husband shall be the manager of theconjugal partnership." (Same provision in Art. 165, Civil Code of the Phil.)

16 Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against the wife and he is

not a necessaryparty defendant. Noyes y. Webster [ny. Co., 197 So. 390; Shafer Y. Shafe, 37 N. E. 2d 69.16 Smith Y. Sellers, 284 S. W. 1034; Sander 'V. Crum, 125 S. E. 919.17 Civil Code of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 386.18 Obiter dictum in Laperal 'V. Katigbak, see note 3, supra.



Civil Law-Moral Damages Awarded for Physical Suffering and Mental Anguish.

ENRIQUE LAYDA V. THE HON. COURTOF ApPEALS AND ALFREDO BRILLANTESG. R. No. L-4487, Prom. Jan. 29,1952

The new Civil Code 1 has new provisions on moral damages.Our Supreme Court in its early decisions interpreted Art. 1902 2 of the old Civil Code in the light of either the judgments of the Su- preme Court of Spain 3 or the opinions of distinguished Spanish jur-ists 4. which decisions denied allowance of damages for pain suffered at the time of the accident and during confinement at the hospital. 5

These, in spite of knowledge on the part of the court that damagesfor pain and suffering were allowed in the United States. 6 Theconcept of damages under Art 1902 of the old Civil Code is limited only to actual compensatory damages, 7 nothing more, nothing less, 8

although as was remarked in the case of Algarra v. Sandejas, "ac-tual damages under the American system, include pecuniary recom- pense for pain and suffering, injured feelings, and the like." 9 Actualcompensatory damages under Art. 190'2 as interpreted by the Su- preme Court in Meralco v. Velasco does not extend to such incidents,lo

1 R. A. 386, Arts. 2217, 2218, 2219, and 2220 are all new provisions.2 Art. 2176 of the new Civil Code was taken from Art. 1902 of the old Civil

Code. It restates the rule that any person who by an act or ,omission causes damageto another through his fault or negligence is liable for the damage so done.

3 Marcelo Y. Velasco, 11 Phil. 287..

4 Marcelo Y. Velasco, op. cit., at p. 290, quoting Manresa-"The obligation im- posed by said article (1902) comprises the two items on the two terms that are presentin every indemnity in accordance with Art. 1106 of the said Code, that is the amountof the loss which may have been suffered, and that of the profit which a person mayhave failed to realize."

5 Marcelo Y. Velasco, see note 3, supra.6 Marcelo Y. Velasco, see note 3, supra.7 Art. 2199, R. A. 386-"Except as provided by law or by stipulation one is

entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by himas he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatorydamages."

Lord, Owen, & C O . Y. Wood (120 Iowa 303; 94 N. W. 842)-"Compensatorydamages as indicated by the word employed to characterize them simply make good or replace, the loss caused by the wrong." "Actual damages are compensatory only."(Gen. Stat. Minn, 1894, sec. 5418). The purpose for the award of actual damagesis to compensate f.or the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty (See Field Y.

Munster, 32 S. W. 417) "except in those cases where the law authorizes the imposi-tion of punitive or exemplary damages ... " (Marker Y. Garcia, 5 Phil. 557).

8 Algarra Y. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 284.9 Art. 2197, R. A. 386 provides that: "Damages may be: (1) actual or compen-

satory, (2) moral, (3) nominal, (4) temperate or moderate, (5) liquidated, or (6)exemplary or corrective.

10 In the case of Algarra Y. Sandejas, at p. 296, see note 8, supra, it was held that "actual compensatory damages are those allowed for tortious wrongs, under the



This denial of the award of moral damages was predicated not onlyon Spanish court decisions and commentaries but also on the ideathat physical suffering, mental anguish, and similar injuries are in-capable of pecuniary estimation. l1 In the familiar case of Lilius v. Manila Railroad,12 a new note was struck on our law of damagesin the sense that moral and patrimonial damages including pain and suffering, were allowed for permanent deformity.13

Moral damages,L4 though incapable of pecuniary computation 15are recoverable if they are the proximate result 16of the defendants'wrongful act or omission. This is indicative of the ancient maximthat when there is a wrong there is a remedy,17 It is unquestionablethat the loss or injury occasioned by grief, anxiety, worry, or mentalanguish "is just as real as in other cases." 18 What need be done

Civil Code; nothing'more, nothing less." The new Civil Code in Art. 2195 makes

the provisions ,of Title XVIII on Damages applicable to all obligations mentioned in Art. 1157 to wit: law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-deliets.11 Report of the Code Commission, p. 74.12 59 Phil. 758.13 Attention is called to the case of Castro 'If. Acro Taxicab Co., G. R. No. 49155,

Dec. 14, 1948 wherein the doctrine laid d,ownin the .caseof Lilius 'If. Manila Rail-road was reaffirmed in the sense that indemnity for moral and patrimonial damagesincluding physical pain and suffering were awarded to the plaintiff. "With this theSupreme Court accomplishes in this jurisdiction a true symbiosisof Spanish law and American Law. and the court places itself, further, justly in unison with the spirit and progressive march of the time. The Supreme Court does not introduce any reformin the Civil Code; all that the Court does is amplify the interpretation of the juridicalconcept of damages including in the same moral and physical pain or suffering; butall within the Code." This case was decided in 1948 under the old Civil Code.

14 Art. 2217-"Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,seri.ousanxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humilia-tion, and similar injury." (Civil Code) "It includes any and all damages that ahuman being may suffer in any and all the manifestations of his life: Physical or materi~l,moral or psychological,mental or spiritual, financial,economic, social,political,religi.ous." (Pedecto,]., concurring in the case of Castro 'If. ACTOTaxicab Co., seenote 13, supra.)

15 "In truth the admeasurement of suffering in terms of money is a most clumsydevice; but it is the best device which the law knows and it is a device which the lawwill employ until something better is discovered. To forbid the considerationof theseother elements of mental suffering because the scales are not sufficiently delicate for their admeasurement is equally to condemn the use of the scalesin the very cases and for the very purposes now admittedly sanctioned by law." (Merrill 'If. Los AngelesGas & Electric Co., 111 Pac. 534, 540.

16 Art. 2219, R. A. 386 and Art. 2220 also provides other instances whereinmoral damages may be recovered.

17 Report p f the Code Commission, p. 74.18 Report of the Code Commission, p. 74; "Damages for mental anguish are not

remote. They are direct and consequential." (Merrill 'If. Los Arngeles Gas & Elec.Co., at p. 540, see note 15, supra).



therefore is to show the commission of the wrongful act or omis-sion and that the moral damage was the proximate result there--from. 19

In the instant case, the petitioner, Enrique Layda, a passenger in the truck owned by Alfredo Brilliantes which was driven by JesusBayona, was injured as a result of the collision of the truck withthe side of a mountain. After 14 days of confinement in the hospital, Layda was released, but as he was not yet feeling well, hedecided to submit to another x-ray examination by Dr. Daniel Le-desma, who found a green-stick fracture on the 8th and 9th ribs.These ribs took 3 months to solidify and return to their normal con-dition. Since the accident occurred Layda could not work, and suf-fered pains for nearly six (6) months. An action for damages was brought against Brilliantes. The lower court found Brilliantes guiltyof negligence and awarded the petitioner P4,000moral damages and P915.00actual damages. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment "a quo" but reduced the moral damages to P500.00and the actual damages to P495.55.

In the adjudication of moral damages, the very nature of moraldamages as being incapable of exact pecuniary computation 20 ren-ders it imperative for the courts to exercise a wide degree of dis-cretion in determining the amount of the award. The court has to put itself in the injured party's place 21 and take into account the dif-ferent circumstances of the case. The injured party's reputation

19 Whether the moral damages was the proximate result of the wrongful act or omission is the subject of divided decisions in the United States. Important of noteis the case of Linn Y. Duquesne Borough, 204 Pa. 551; 54 .Atl. 341; 93 Am. St. Rep.2800; holding "anguish of mind, whoIly sentimental, arising from a contemplationof a disfiguring of person, cannot be considered for the purpose of sweIling dam-ages. . . ." In the legal sense "pain and anguish of mind" are confined to "such pain and .anguish .of mind as occur necessarily and spontaneously from any injury of or shock to the nerves of sensation or such pain and anguish as remain during thecontinuance of the original and exciting cause and arising therefrom. But where theinjury only comes about by reflection or contemplation, then, in the legal sense, it is

not caused by the injury, but arises and is produced by a combination of causes other than the injUry."In the Merrill case (see note 15 at p. 540, supra) the foIlowing was enunciated:

"Physical pain is but one of many forms of mental suffering. If the law contem- plated an award of damages solely f.or physical pain, it is meaningless to say thatrecovery may also be had on mental suffering. It is equaIly meaningless to say thatthe mental suffering must be that occasioned by the physical pain for then the latter phrase would alone be sufficient to convey the fuIl meaning of the law."

20 Art. 2217, R. A. 386.• 21 ':It is mere self-stultification to believe that it will do other than to make upI'S verdIct under the rule which, while not one at law is one of well-nigh universalhuman conduct, the rule of "Put yourself in his place." (Merrill Y. Los AfTlgeles Gas& Elec. Co. at page 540, see note 15, supra.)



for beauty,2~his relations to his family,23his or her matrimonialfuture,24 social standing,25economicand financial stature, his ner-vous temperament, ability to stand shock, his age, "the nature of hisinjuries, whether permanent or not," 26 plays an important part. Inthis case the Supreme Court took into consideration the circum-stances surrounding the injury 27 in awarding to the petitioner theamount of 'P4,()O Oas moral damages. This decision is to be dis-tinguished from the decisionin the Acro Taxicab case. 28 Both caseshave a "marked parallelism" of facts and circumstances.

The Supreme Court supported its decisionby the precedent setin the cases of Lilius v. Manila Railroad and Gutierrez v. Gutierrez(56 Phil. 177). In the latter case the "defendants were sentenced to indemnify the plaintiff in the sum of P5,000 as moral damagesin spite of the fact that said plaintiff "was neither young nor good looking, nor had he suffered any facial deformity, nor did he havethe social standing" that Sonya Maria Lilius enjoyed. Attentionis called to the pertinent part of the decision in the instant case,to wit: "It is true that petitioner is a mere farm laborer, whilethe plaintiff in the Acro Taxicab case was a general utility man, but this difference in their position or earning capacity cannot beconsidered of significance for the reason that in the determinationof moral damages the human value and the dignity of man are of paramount consideration." A marked shift from adjudicating moraldamages on the basis of social position or earning capacity to thehigher category of human value and dignity of man seems to in-dicate the present position which our Supreme Court has taken withrespect to moral damages.

Actual damages were not duly proved by the petitioner beforethe Supreme Court and since this is a question of fact which de-

22 Lilius Y. Manila Railroad Company (see note 12, supra) where 'PI0,000 wasawarded for a pennanent deformity on the face and left leg of a young and beautifulsociety woman.

23 "Worry and anxiety over the future of his family would be a great element of mental suffering to a man dependent upon his own exertions for his and then: support."(Merrill 'Y . Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. at p. 540, see note 15, supra).

24 Lilius 'Y. Manila &ilroad Co. (see note 12, supra) where '5,000.00 was awarded

for a permanent deformity on the face and legs of a four-year old girl which ruined her matrimonial future.

25 "It would not constitute any element of suffering to a man of abundant meansand wealth, identically injured." (Merrill Y. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. at p. 540,see note 15 supra).

26 Merrill Y. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. (at p. 540, see note 15, supra).21 Petitioner was thrown out of the truck and fell unconscious with blood stream-

ing from his nose and mouth. He had internal hemorrhage, pains on the right chestaggravated by bleeding and coughing. He developed traumatism of the chest. . .He had three fractured ribs and suffered pains for nearly six months.

28 "In the Acro Taxicab case, see note 13, supra, the offended party suffered less physical suffering than the petitioner in the case at bar. He did not fall from thetaxi. He never lost consciousness, and had no internal or external hemorrhage. Helooked so well that he only stayed in the hospital for a few days." P3,000.00 wasawarded for physical and mental suffering in this case.



volves upon the Court of Appeals to determine--the findings of theCourt of Appeals on such question of fact cannot be disturbed bythe Supreme Court.

The strictness which characterized the decisions of the SupremeCourt with respect to personal injuries caused by motor vehicle ac-cidents which necessitates the allowance of moral damages commen-surate as far as practicable with the mental anguish suffered find justification not so much in the increasing number of motor vehiclesas in the present state of mind of our motor vehicle drivers and oper-ators in their flagrant disregard for human life. No more sternwarning could be found than in the decision itself. In assuming his public trust as a public utility operator, the respondent "vouches thathe would only employ good and reliable equipment and competent personnel and in accepting passengers, he agrees that he will bringthem safely to the place of destination. Here, he violated his trustand breached his contractual obligation to the public. There is need of imposing a stern and commensurate indemnity to the victim toserve as an exemplary measure and as a warning to all similarlysituated to put a stop to the rampant and seemingly ever increasingaccidents and mishaps caused by a flagrant disregard of traffic lawsand regulations."

Private Corporation-The Power of the Secu,rities and ExchangeCommission To Regulate Private Corporations

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOM.

V. PIMENTELG. R. L-42,28,Prom. January 23, 1952

The Corporation Law of the Philippines confers the right toinspect the books of a corporation to "any (of its) directors, me:m,- bers, or stockholders," 1 provided his sole object is to inform himself as to the manner in which the business of such corporation is beingconducted 2 and that the right of inspection is exercised at a reason-able hour. s In the event the management of the corporation refusesto allowany of the persons authorized to inspect the books of the cor-

.1 Sec. 51, par. 2, Corporation Law of the Philippines (Act No. 1459).This provision as interpreted in Philpotts Y. Phil. Manufacturing Co., 40 Phil.

471, 473: "The right of inspection given to a stockholder-ean be exercised either by himself or by any proper representative or attorney-in-fact, and either with or withoutthe attendance of the stockholder. This is in conformity with the general rule thatwhat a man may do in person he may do through another."

2 State Y. Pacific Brewing, 21 Wash. 451, 58 Pac. 584; TOLENTINO,COMMEN-TARIESON COMMERCIAL LAws OF THE PHIL., Vol. II (Sixth Ed.), p. 758.

3 Sec. 51, par. 2; Corporation Law; Clawson Y. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 Pac.729; Pardo Y. Hercules Lumber Co.,49 Phil. 964, 966: "the right of inspection can be exercised at reasonable hours. This means at reasonable hours on business daysthroughout the year, and not merely during some arbitrary period of a few dayschosen by the directors."

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