pmc affirmative - seniors - gds 2010

8/7/2019 PMC Affirmative - Seniors - GDS 2010

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PMC Affirmative GDS 2010Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday

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Georgetown Debate Seminar 1

***PMC Affirmative***

***PMC Affirmative***.................................................................................................................................................................... 11AC Plan Text ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4

***Inherency*** ............................................................................................................................................................................... 5

Inherency High Now ....................................................................................................................................................................... 6Inherency High Now ....................................................................................................................................................................... 7Inherency High Now ....................................................................................................................................................................... 8Inherency High Now/Courts Failing ................................................................................................................................................ 9Inherency PMCs Unsustainable ..................................................................................................................................................... 10Inherency Fate Undetermined ........................................................................................................................................................ 11Inherency PMC Under UCMJ .................................................................................................................................................... 12Inherency PMC Unregulated Now ................................................................................................................................................. 13

***Afghanistan Advantage***......................................................................................................................................................... 141AC Afghanistan Advantage ............................................................................................................................................................ 151AC Afghanistan Advantage ............................................................................................................................................................ 161AC Afghanistan Advantage ............................................................................................................................................................ 17

1AC Afghanistan Advantage ............................................................................................................................................................ 181AC Afghanistan Advantage ............................................................................................................................................................ 191AC Afghanistan Advantage ............................................................................................................................................................ 20Afghanistan A2: Turns .................................................................................................................................................................. 21Afghanistan Civilian Casualties ..................................................................................................................................................... 22Afghanistan Civilian Casualties ..................................................................................................................................................... 23Afghanistan Relations/Stability ..................................................................................................................................................... 24Afghanistan Terrorism/Counter-Insurgency ................................................................................................................................... 25

***Human Rights Advantage*** ..................................................................................................................................................... 261AC Human Rights .......................................................................................................................................................................... 27Human Rights Terrorism ............................................................................................................................................................... 28Human Rights Leadership ............................................................................................................................................................. 29

Human Rights Leadership ............................................................................................................................................................. 30Human Rights North Korea ........................................................................................................................................................... 31Human Rights EXT....................................................................................................................................................................... 32Human Rights EXT....................................................................................................................................................................... 33Human Rights EXT....................................................................................................................................................................... 34Human Rights EXT....................................................................................................................................................................... 35Human Rights EXT....................................................................................................................................................................... 36

***International Law Advantage*** ................................................................................................................................................ 371AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 381AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 391AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 401AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 411AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 421AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 431AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 441AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 451AC International Law Advantage ................................................................................................................................................... 46International Law Geneva ............................................................................................................................................................. 47International Law Geneva ............................................................................................................................................................. 48International Law Geneva ............................................................................................................................................................. 49International Law Geneva ............................................................................................................................................................. 50International Law Geneva ............................................................................................................................................................. 51


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International Law Geneva ............................................................................................................................................................. 52International Law Generic ............................................................................................................................................................. 53International Law Mercenaries ...................................................................................................................................................... 54International Law Mercenaries ...................................................................................................................................................... 55International Law Mercenaries ...................................................................................................................................................... 56International Law Human Rights ................................................................................................................................................... 57International Law Inherency .......................................................................................................................................................... 58International Law Geneva/A2: PMC Not Mercenary ...................................................................................................................... 59International Law Geneva Spec Recruited................................................................................................................................... 60International Law Geneva Direct Participation ............................................................................................................................ 61International Law Geneva Financial Gain ................................................................................................................................... 62International Law Geneva A2: Corporate Structure ..................................................................................................................... 63International Law A2: No Basis for PMC in ILaw ........................................................................................................................ 64International Law A2: UMCJ Now ................................................................................................................................................ 65International Law A2: UMCJ Now ................................................................................................................................................ 66International Law A2: UMCJ Now ................................................................................................................................................ 67International Law A2: Different Ground CP .................................................................................................................................. 68International Law A2: Statutes Now .............................................................................................................................................. 69International Law A2: Private Actors Not State Actors .................................................................................................................. 70

***Iraq Advantage*** ..................................................................................................................................................................... 711AC Iraq Advantage ........................................................................................................................................................................ 721AC Iraq Advantage ........................................................................................................................................................................ 731AC Iraq Advantage ........................................................................................................................................................................ 741AC Iraq Advantage ........................................................................................................................................................................ 751AC Iraq Advantage ........................................................................................................................................................................ 76Iraq Stability ................................................................................................................................................................................. 77Iraq No Accountability .................................................................................................................................................................. 78Iraq No Accountability .................................................................................................................................................................. 79Iraq Counter Insurgency ................................................................................................................................................................ 80

***Multilateralism Advantage*** ............ .............. ............. ............. ............. .............. ............. ............. ............. ............. .............. ... 81Multilateralism Internal ................................................................................................................................................................. 82

Multilateralism Internal ................................................................................................................................................................. 83Multilateralism Internal ................................................................................................................................................................. 84Multilateralism Internal ................................................................................................................................................................. 85Multilateralism Iraq HR Internal.................................................................................................................................................... 86Multilateralism Impact ..................................................................................................................................................................... 87

***PMC Bad*** ............................................................................................................................................................................. 88PMC Bad Extinction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 89PMC Bad War .............................................................................................................................................................................. 90PMC Bad Stability ........................................................................................................................................................................ 91PMC Bad Stability ........................................................................................................................................................................ 92PMC Bad Stability ........................................................................................................................................................................ 93PMC Bad Stability ........................................................................................................................................................................ 94

PMC Bad Global Spillover ............................................................................................................................................................ 95PMC Bad Laundry List ................................................................................................................................................................. 96PMC Bad Democracy ................................................................................................................................................................... 97PMC Bad Warfighting .................................................................................................................................................................. 98PMC Bad Warfighting .................................................................................................................................................................. 99PMC Bad Warfighting ................................................................................................................................................................ 100PMC Bad Monopolizing Violence ............................................................................................................................................... 101


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***Solvency*** ............................................................................................................................................................................ 102Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 103Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 104Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 105Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 106Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 107Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 108Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 109Solvency Blackwater Specific Cards ........................................................................................................................................... 110Solvency Regulation ................................................................................................................................................................... 111Solvency Legal Action Key ......................................................................................................................................................... 112

***A2: Stuff*** ............................................................................................................................................................................ 113A2: Spending ................................................................................................................................................................................. 114A2: Spending ................................................................................................................................................................................. 115A2: Market Checks / Cost Effective ............................................................................................................................................... 116A2: Presidential Powers ................................................................................................................................................................. 117A2: T Presence............................................................................................................................................................................ 118A2: T Presence/Substantial .......................................................................................................................................................... 119A2: Withdraw Not Possible ............................................................................................................................................................ 120

A2: PMC Good .............................................................................................................................................................................. 121A2: Neoliberalism ............ ............. .............. ............. ............. ............. .............. ............. ............. ............. ............. .............. ............ 122A2: Neoliberalism ............ ............. .............. ............. ............. ............. .............. ............. ............. ............. ............. .............. ............ 124


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1AC Plan Text

PLAN: The United States federal judiciary should rule that its contracts with private military companies

performing combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should be terminated on the ground they violate

international law by meeting the definition of a mercenary under Article 47 of Protocol 1 of the Geneva

Conventions. Well clarify.


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***Inherency***


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Inherency High NowPrivate military contractors are on the rise in Afghanistan 60,000 more this year despite lack of

accountability and overlapping contracts

Siddique 10

Abubakar Siddique, Private U.S. Contractors Back In The Spotlight In Iraq, Afghanistan, January 8 2010http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Use_Of_Private_Contractors_Back_In_Spotlight_In_Iraq_Afghanistan/1924419.html

In her opening statement to the U.S. Senate's Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight on December 17, Senator ClaireMcCaskill (Democrat, Missouri) said that the number and cost of contractors in Afghanistan is projected to risesubstantially with the anticipated increase in U.S. troops in the country. "We know that there are more than 100,000contractors currently working in Afghanistan," McCaskill said. "The number of Defense Department contractors alone mayreach 160,000 in the next year." U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill McCaskill then noted the key findings of her recent trip toIraq. "I had many different things that happened on that trip that are seared into my hard drive," she told the subcommitteehearing. "Realizations about the lack of coordination and organization between various pots of money," McCaskill said."Amazing lapses in scoping contracts. And making contracts definite enough so that they can be enforced particularly, fromany kind of accountability standpoint and the government getting their money back, when it had been abused and misusedby contractors." In 2008, the U.S. nonprofit Human Rights First estimated that there were "well over 200,000 U.S.government private contractors in Iraq, far greater than the number of U.S. military personnel." Former European Union

diplomat Martine van Bijlert, who spent years in Afghanistan, tells RFE/RL that contracting in general and securitycontracting in particular is a "big unknown." Van Bijlert, who now works for the Afghan Analyst Network, a privatenonprofit research group, says private contracting is a big issue for several reasons. "First of all, you have the issue of the[U.S.] Department of Defense contracting and then subcontracting a lot of its responsibilities and you lose some of theaccountability there," she says. "[Then] there is the issue of having international private security companies often acting ontheir own behalf -- acting with quite a sense of impunity as well -- as illustrates in incidents like the killing of localnationals and difficulties in bringing that to trial."

Obama is increasing private security levels despite pledges not to

Siddique 10Abubakar Siddique, Private U.S. Contractors Back In The Spotlight In Iraq, Afghanistan, January 8 2010http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Use_Of_Private_Contractors_Back_In_Spotlight_In_Iraq_Afghanistan/1924419.html

Van Bijlert suggests that the employment of local Afghan security firms is also a major, but less known, problem. "You are

arming and entrenching local armed groups," she says. "And where international groups...would leave -- they are [only] aproblem as long as they are there -- the national groups will actually stay to be a problem potentially for quite a long while."She suggests that, despite public pledges by U.S. President Barack Obama's administration to change how U.S. troops andcivilians operate on the ground, the administration is finding it difficult to change "patterns and relationships." A recentreport issued by Senator McCaskill's staff states that in the case of Afghanistan, the use of private contractors has risensharply under the Obama administration. From June 2009 to September 2009, there was a 40 percent increase in DefenseDepartment contractors in Afghanistan. During the same period, the number of armed private security contractors workingfor the Defense Department in Afghanistan doubled, increasing from approximately 5,000 to more than 10,000," the reportstates. Van Bijlert says the Obama administration is under a lot of pressure to show short-term results, and "securityconcerns tend to override other concerns." Van Bijlert argues that with the Afghan, American, and European publicincreasingly becoming aware of the problems associated with the hiring of private contractors in war zones, governmentsshould keep accountability in mind when considering hiring more. Van Bijlert notes that "One of the issues is that theycannot act with impunity," citing a "worst-case scenario" in which such individuals kill citizens and are not heldaccountable. "Another issue is [the] accountable spending of money."


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Inherency High Now

Private Military Corporation contracts high now and are set to increase DoD contracts, future military

projections and favorable political climates ensure the growth of the industry in the coming century

Wallwork 05

Major Richard D Wallwork, RA British Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and GeneralStaff College, 1/2/2005, Operational Implications of Private Military Companies in the Global War on Terror,http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA436294&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Since 1994, the U.S. DoD has entered into 3601 contracts with twelve PMCs worth over $300 billion. Since thecommencement of the GWOT, in simplistic terms,the expectations of U.S. foreign policy versus capabilities of the U.S.military can only mean more business for PMCs given the oft complained overstretch of U.S. forces and the avowedpolicy of not using the draft by the Bush administration. According to D.B. Des Roches, spokesman for the PentagonsDefence Security Cooperation Agency,the war on terrorism is the full employment act for these guys.84 The marketappears ready for wider employment of PMCs and the key for companies to access future international contracts will be todevelop good reputations for efficiency, ethics and humanitarianism.85Since the tacit acceptance by the U.S. governmentin the 1990s of the utility of PMCs, despite many opinions to the contrary, the political climate is now such, as is theattitude to privatization, that the utilization of these companies is politically acceptable and is widely supported.86Companies are rushing to take the opportunities presented to them by the DoD not only overseas, but also in the

Continental United States. For example, the DoD contracts out 4300 private security jobs to guard Army bases in contractsworth around $1.2 billion. This fact has raised concern amongst the Senate Armed Services committee, especially over theguarding of sensitive sites that contain, for example, chemical and nuclear weapons.87


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Inherency High NowPMCs are flourishing now, they have been on the rise since the end of the Cold War there is been NO

effort at regulation, oversight, or a code of conduct leaving PMCs in a legal grey zone

Debusmann 06

Bernd Debusmann, Special Correspondent for Reuters, FEATURE-In Iraq, contractor deaths near 650, legal fog thickens, 10/10/06http://today.reuters.com/news/articleinvesting.aspex?view=CN&storyID=2006-10-10T150938Z_01_N10275842_0_IRAQ-USA-CONTRACTORS-FEATURE.XML&rpc=66&type=qcna

The war in Iraq has killed at least 647 civilian contractors to date, according to official figures that provide a stark reminderof the huge role of civilians in supporting the U.S. military. The contractor death toll is tracked by the U.S. Department ofLabor on the basis of claims under an insurance policy, the Defense Base Act, that all U.S. government contractors andsubcontractors working outside the United States must take out for their civilian employees. In response to questions fromReuters, a Labor Department spokesman said there had been 647 claims for death benefits between March 1, 2003, andSept. 30, 2006. The Defense Base Act covers both Americans and foreigners, and there is no breakdown of the nationalitiesof those killed. The Pentagon does not monitor civilian contractor casualties. The death toll of civilians working alongsideU.S. forces in Iraq compares with more than 2,700 military dead and, experts say, underscores the risks of outsourcing warto private military contractors. Their number in Iraq is estimated at up to 100,000, from highly-trained former special forcessoldiers to drivers, cooks, mechanics, plumbers, translators, electricians and laundry workers and other support personnel.

A trend toward "privatizing war" has been accelerating steadily since the end of the Cold War, when the United States andits former adversaries began cutting back professional armies. U.S. armed forces shrank from 2.1 million when the BerlinWall came down in 1989 to 1.4 million today. "At its present size, the U.S. military could not function without civiliancontractors," said Jeffrey Addicott, an expert at St. Mary's University in San Antonio. "The problem is that the civiliansoperate in a legal gray zone. There has been little effort at regulation, oversight, standardized training and a uniform code ofconduct. It's the Wild West out there."


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Inherency High Now/Courts FailingThe use of PMCs have grown dramatically but the USFG has no means to control them US Courts

specifically have been impotent in checking abuses

Tepperman 02

Jonathan D., Editor of Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2002, The New Republic, Can Mercenaries Protect Hamid Karzai?The use of PMCs has grown dramatically over the last decade; there are now about 35 such firms in the United Statesalone. DynCorp, a 56-year-old corporation with 23,000 employees and an annual income of almost $2 billion, is one of thebiggest. Its rivals include Virginia-based mpri and Texas-based Kellogg Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, DickCheney's former employer. The newfound popularity of such companies is easy to understand. After the end of the coldwar, the United States slashed its active-duty military personnel from around two million to 1.4 million. This shrinkage hascaused manpower shortages within the services and a glut of retired officers flooding the private sector. The contraction ofthe American military also coincided with the largest economic expansion in U.S. history, an era when many policymakerscame to assume that private companies could perform public tasks better than government bureaucrats. And sometimes theycan. PMCs often perform a wide variety of noncombatant roles with a high level of professionalism. DynCorp maintainsmilitary aircraft, runs communications systems, and helps to manufacture the U.S. Army's anthrax vaccine, among othertasks. But, while PMCs may hate being thought of as mercenaries, they sometimes do end up sending men with guns toforeign countries under American auspices. Unfortunately for Karzai, in this area, PMCs' records have been disastrous. The

first problem with using PMCs as soldiers may ironically help to explain the idea's appeal. It is almost impossible to figureout what they or their client in this case, the U.S. government is up to. PMC employees abroad work in a legalnetherworld. As contract employees, they are not subject to the U.S. military's code of conduct. Nor are they subject to U.S.law, since it does not extend to most offenses committed abroad. And, while PMC employees are technically subject to thelaws of the country in which they serve, those states usually have weak judicial systems. According to Peter W. Singer, aBrookings Institution expert on PMCs and author of the forthcoming book Corporate Warriors, "These companies operatein areas where the local legal system is either unable or unwilling to hold these guys accountable." In practice, then,America's freelance warriors are free to misbehave and to escape the consequences. When a number of DynCorpemployees working in Bosnia were recently found to be running a sex-slavery ring, the Army's Criminal InvestigationDivision dropped its inquiry after determining the men fell outside of its jurisdiction. U.S. courts proved to be similarlyimpotent, and the fragile, corrupt Bosnian legal system did no better. Similarly, if Karzai's new bodyguards decide to floutthe law in Afghanistan, a nation with ample opportunity for profiteering and corruption, there is very little that anyoneKarzai, the Pentagon, or U.S. courts will be able to do about it.


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Inherency PMCs UnsustainablePrivate militaries are not sustainable or inevitable they are training ex-Afghan milita that want will

start an Afghani civil war once the U.S. leaves

Robichaud 07

Carl Robichaud is a Program Officer at the Century Foundation, where he writes on nonproliferation and directs the Foundation'sAfghanistan Watch program. Private Military Contractors also Creating Problems in Afghanistan, World Politics Review10/31/2007, http://www.centuryfoundation.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1721

The men comprising these forces are mostly Afghans, former combatants from mujahideen militias. As a result, relianceupon these forces has had the pernicious consequence of sustaining and empowering some of the nation's mostirresponsible actors. Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan, argues that security contractors "have hired, armed,and trained militias that were supposed to be demobilized and disarmed, enabling them to persist and profit as part of the'private sector,' awaiting the spark that will set off another civil war." One example cited by Rubin is Din MuhammadJurat. Jurat, a Northern Alliance militia leader who has been implicated in organized crime and in the murder of aparliamentarian, secured a lucrative position with USPI. He now provides "former" fighters from his militia as securityguards for reconstruction projects. Just this year, his men were involved in the beating of Afghanistan Attorney GeneralAbdul Jabbar Sabet, who belongs to a different faction. Reliance on these sorts of actors, argues Rubin, is "corrupting theAfghan police and administration." Behind the Crackdown A "crackdown" on some of these firms may well be in order.

According to some sources, however, the Ministry of the Interior's recent closures were not driven by a desire to achieveaccountability but a desire to consolidate power. One Kabul insider, quoted by Rubin on his blog, noted that the timing ofthe "crackdown" is suspicious, since it comes just as the ministry completed a set of legal regulations that would bring theindustry under control. The regulations, finalized on Aug. 5, have "since been put on the shelf by the [government ofAfghanistan] which has started now to 'crack down' instead of introducing a legal procedure. . . . I cannot help theimpression that some competitors closely linked to the president are trying to (a) extract bribes from the PSCs for not beingshut down arbitrarily and (b) eliminate rivals." It is no coincidence, he argues, that "nobody so far has questioned the PSCsowned by illustrious people" or "operating under the control of local warlords . . . in the East and South either." LookingAhead In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, security contractors have filled a power vacuum that was created when the administrationopted for a military deployment with neither the size nor the mandate to stabilize the country. The coalition's inability toestablish security, and its subsequent failure to stand up an effective police training effort, forced it to rely upon hired help."If you don't have enough military forces, very often that is a way out then, to count on private security companies,"observes Maj. Gen. Bruno Kasdorf, chief of staff with the NATO forces in Afghanistan. Even the Kabul official quoted byRubin acknowledges that "The real challenge to the government is the fact that the Ministry of Interior does not have the

capacity to replace the protection guaranteed by the private companies outside of Kabul." National police could replacesome of the guards in the capital, but they are not yet up to harder missions like guarding the Kajaki Dam in Helmand. Soin the short run, the United States and NATO will rely heavily upon private firms to provide security and to train theAfghan police. This is especially the case in police training, for which DynCorps won a multibillion dollar contract, and incounternarcotics. But this necessity should not obscure the fact that this model has grave costs that go far beyond thefinancial. In the case of Afghanistan, over-reliance upon Afghan security firms threatens to corrupt the government andperpetuate illegal militias even as over-reliance upon international security firms threatens to undermine Afghan support fora foreign presence. In the short run, we may be stuck with a heavy reliance upon private security contractors, but we shouldnot pretend that this approach was inevitableor that it is sustainable.


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Inherency Fate UndeterminedPrivate military firms are being examined on the grounds of human rights abuses and treaty violations

but the their fate is uncertain

Barnes 07

America's own unlawful combatants? Using private guards in Iraq could expose the U.S. to accusations of treaty violations, someexperts think. THE WORLD, October 15, 2007, Julian E. Barnes, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON As the Bush administration deals with the fallout from the recent killings of civilians by privatesecurity firms in Iraq, some officials are asking whether the contractors could be considered unlawful combatants underinternational agreements. The question is an outgrowth of federal reviews of the shootings, in part because the U.S. officialswant to determine whether the administration could be accused of treaty violations that could fuel an international outcry.

But the issue also holds practical and political implications for the administration's war effort and the image of the U.S.abroad. If U.S. officials conclude that the use of guards is a potential violation, they may have to limit guards' tasks in warzones, which could leave more work for the already overstretched military. Unresolved questions are likely to touch offnew criticism of Bush's conduct of the unpopular Iraq war, especially given the broad definition of unlawful combatants thepresident has used in justifying his detention policies at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The issues surrounding the privatesecurity contractors are being examined by lawyers at the departments of State, Defense and Justice. Disagreements aboutthe contractors' status exist between agencies and within the Pentagon itself. "I think it is an unresolved issue that needs to

be addressed," said a senior Defense Department official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was notauthorized to discuss the subject. "But if that is in fact the case, what the heck are we doing?" The use of private contractorsby the U.S. military and governments worldwide began long before the U.S invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but it hasmushroomed in recent years. With relatively little controversy, contractors have assumed a greater share of support andlogistics duties traditionally handled by uniformed military, such as protecting diplomats inside a war zone. On Sept. 16, aBlackwater USA security team guarding U.S. diplomats was involved in a shooting that killed as many as 17 Iraqis.Blackwater said its personnel were under attack, but Iraqis said the team began the shooting. Other incidents portraying theprivate guards as aggressive and heavily armed have since come to light. The guards also operate under immunity fromIraqi law -- immunity was granted in 2004 by U.S. officials -- and in a murky status with respect to American laws.


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Inherency PMC Under UCMJPrivate military contractors are not legally bound by chain of command or the Uniform Code of Military

Justice, lax regulation and non-existent information sharing makes abuses by PMCs inevitable

Avant 04

Deborah Avant, associate professor of political science and international relations at George Washington University, Sunday,Washington Post, May 9 2004, What Are Those Contractors Doing in Iraq? http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10163-2004May8?language=printer

When the United States deploys its military forces, the process is easily understood: Active or reserve officers, who reportup the chain of command to the president according to rules set by Congress and governed by the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, go overseas. The media cover deployments and the public is informed. But there are no standard procedures fordeploying private security workers under military contracts, which makes it far more difficult to gather information aboutwho they are, what they're doing and for whom. They are not part of the military command; they are not covered by thecode of military justice. The events of the last few days illustrate those differences well. When reports of abuses at AbuGhraib surfaced, it was clear that the 800th Military Police Brigade (which includes the 372nd Military Police Company,home to many of the accused) was in charge of the prison; prisoner interrogations were run by the 205th MilitaryIntelligence Brigade. But Taguba's report also mentions four civilian contractors, all of whom were assigned to the 205thMilitary Intelligence Brigade. Two of those civilians, Steven Stephanowicz and John Israel, were "either directly or

indirectly responsible for the abuses" at Abu Ghraib, the report says. A third contractor, Adel Nakhla, is named as atranslator -- and a suspect. A fourth, Torin Nelson, was said to be a witness. Both Nakhla and Nelson are listed asemployees of Titan Corp., a security contractor based in San Diego. The report identified Stephanowicz as an interrogatorworking for CACI; Israel, an interpreter, was also said to be working for CACI, although the company has denied that.Some news reports have identified Israel as an employee of Titan, which in turn has said he works for one of itssubcontractors. So, we are not even sure for whom these contractors work or worked. Nor do we know how many othercontract employees were -- and may still be -- working at the prison. (In his testimony before the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee on Friday, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld put the number of contract interrogators and linguists at AbuGhraib at about 40; other Pentagon officials cited different figures in their testimony.) We do not know precisely what rolesthese contract employees had at the prison or to which group or agency they were accountable. To trace that, we wouldneed to know the contracting agent -- someone representing a group within the Army, probably, but which one? MilitaryIntelligence? The Iraqi Survey Group (a Defense Intelligence Agency unit responsible for investigating weapons of massdestruction and reportedly in charge of the most important Iraqi prisoners)? And how would civilians such as Stephanowiczand Israel have become such a dominant force at a military facility? To whom did they answer on a daily basis? We cannot

simply consider where they sat in the chain of command (as we can with military forces). We need to know who issued thecontract and what it said. And that is not easy information to obtain. A General Accounting Office review of contractedmilitary services last year cited problems stemming from this lack of information. The agency's report, which focused onservices delivered in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, found that Department of Defense management of contractors variedwidely. Smooth operations require that commanders in the field be able to oversee contractors, but in fact the officer who isexpected to ensure that a company meets the terms of its contract may be back in the United States. Field commanders haveno easy way to find out what exactly a contractor has been sent to do. All of this makes oversight difficult even among theexecutive agencies that hire private security. These problems with oversight in Iraq are not limited to Abu Ghraib prison.While we know how many military forces are in the country, even the federal government doesn't seem to know how manycontractors are there. In an April 2 letter to Rumsfeld, Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) requested information about the number ofprivate security personnel and their role in Iraq. In a May 4 letter in response, L. Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, put thatnumber at "approximately 20,000," most of whom, he said, were under contract to Iraqi companies or foreign privatecompanies -- not to American forces. His list of the private security companies working in Iraq, though, included neither

CACI nor Titan, which suggests that the real number may be far higher.


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Inherency PMC Unregulated Now

PMCs are unregulated MEJA still contains loopholes and lacks enforcement

(MEJA = Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act

Harvey, 08

(Thomas B. Harvey, J.D. Candidate at the Saint Louis University School of Law, Comment: Wrapping Themselves in the AmericanFlag: The Alien Tort Statute, Private Military Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations, 53 St. Louis L.J. 247, Lexis )

Although there have been several incidents involving PMCs that raised questions of accountability and oversight, n91 most prominently the aforementioned abuses at Abu

Ghraib, n92 the Blackwater shooting of September 16, 2007 sparked renewed investigations into the oversight, regulation, and

liability of PMCs working for the United States abroad.n93After hearings conducted by U.S. Representative Henry

Waxman regarding Blackwater's activities in Iraq, including testimony from Blackwater's founder Erik Prince,n94the

House of Representatives acted.n95On October 4, 2007, the House passed an expansion of MEJA, attempting to close the

loopholes that have allowed PMCs to escape prosecution for crimes committed while in Iraq working for [*258] the U.S.government. n96 Initially passed in 2000 and subsequently expanded after revelations of contractor involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal, the House seemingly believedthat MEJA could provide a mechanism for the oversight and regulation of PMCs in Iraq. n97 The next sections detail how MEJA has evolved over the years in attempts by

Congress to close its gaps and to find in it a mechanism to hold PMCs accountable. However, we will see that due to a combination of l ack of enforcement and loose drafting,

MEJA remains inadequate as a tool to regulate PMCs. A. MEJA 2000 n98 Congress officially extended federal criminal l aw to civilians working for the DOD when it passedthe Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA 2000). n99 MEJA 2000 held certain civilian employees and contractors, [*259] as well as their employees,

criminally liable for acts that were a felony under U.S. law. n100 While not e xplicitly intended to regulate PMCs, MEJA 2000 did apply to those contractors who were hired bythe DOD. n101 However, MEJA 2000's language was vague enough that it did not apply to contractors hired by any other governmental department. n102 This jurisdictional

gap, which the Act was intended to close, left out employees of the State Department, the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug EnforcementAgency (DEA). n103 Under MEJA 2000, most PMCs were effectively unpunishable under U.S. law for crimes committed abroad. n104 In the next section, this Comment wi ll

discuss how Congress sought to address this gap in jurisdiction through a revision of M EJA 2000 following PMC abuse at Abu Ghraib. B. MEJA 2004 n105 The events at AbuGhraib led to a revision of MEJA 2000 in an attempt to close the above mentioned jurisdictional gaps. n106 Because some o f the people involved in Abu Ghraib were civilian

contractors working for departments other than the DOD, such as the Central Intelli gence Agency (CIA) and the Department of the Interior, they could not be prosecuted underMEJA 2000. n107 To address the gap, Congress passed an Act amending MEJA 2000 "to extend its juri sdictional coverage to employees and contractors of other federal

agencies," including "employees and contractors of "any provisional authority.'" n108 Unfortunately, jurisdiction was limited to those engaged in employment related to thesupport of a "mission" of the DOD.n109 The Act's ambiguity sparked questions about whether its limited jurisdictional extension actually closed the gaps in coverage that

concerned its drafters. n110 Contractors could escape liability if their activities did not support a mission of the DOD, even if those activities would be illegal if committed in the

United States. [*260] C. MEJA 2007: House Bill 2740: MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007n111In response to theBlackwater shooting of September 16, 2007, the House of Representatives passed House Bill 2740 on October 4,

2007.n112This most recent revision of MEJA reflects the House's desire to address specifically the issue of contractor

accountability. n113The Bill adds the following language after paragraph two of MEJA: while employed under a contract(or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contractis carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed

Forces is conducting a contingency operation.n114Significantly, the Bill explicitly includes contractors working under any

department,n115which indeed addresses some of the above mentioned concerns with respect to illegal activity committedabroad while under contract with the U.S. government. At first glance, this legislation seems to have taken substantive stepstoward closing the significant jurisdictional gaps in the previous versions of MEJA. However, upon closer inspection, itappears that MEJA 2007 remains ambiguous, providing contractors with the room they need to avoid liability. MEJA 2007creates another loophole by leaving "close proximity" undefined in the clause "or in close proximity to an area (as

designated by the Department of Defense)."n116This ambiguity seems to allow for any range of interpretations regardingthe applicability of the provision. Further, no version of MEJA would apply to assaults by striking, beating, or wounding, in

spite of the fact that such actions are a violation of international law when the victim is a prisoner. n117Thus, if a DOD

employee or contractor beat a prisoner while overseas, he or she would not be subject to liability under MEJA. n118These

offenses, although clearly punishable through [*261] the employer, do not meet MEJA's requirement that they bepunishable by a one-year minimum penalty. n119 Finally, while more serious offenses are subject to MEJA, no contractorshave been prosecuted under it during the "Global War on Terrorism," suggesting "that the Department of Justice lacks the

desire and resources necessary to pursue such cases." n120According to some scholars, the key issue is "whether Congress

provides the resources and the Justice Department takes those resources and puts them in the field to conduct theseinvestigations, and ultimately brings cases where they're warranted." n121In sum, MEJA could work if there were adequate

will and resources to enforce it. n122However, until that moment is reached, criminal prosecution under MEJA cannotaddress the problems raised by PMCs, and victims of PMC abuse will have to seek alternative measures to redress theirinjuries.


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***Afghanistan Advantage***


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1AC Afghanistan Advantage

Observation One: Afghanistan

The number of PMCs in Afghanistan is increasing This causes civilian backlash and hurts U.S. security

objectivesHRF, 6-18Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch Group based in D.C., Group Urges Commission to Advance Accountability for PrivateMilitary Contractors, Protect Civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, June 18 th 2010http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2010/alert/624/

Washington, DC Human Rights First today urged members of the Commission on W artime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan to advocate policies designed to minimize t herisk of harm to civilians and to ensure that private military contractors are held criminally responsible for serious abuses. The group offered reform recommendations in written

testimony to the commission and noted that failure to implement changes to current policy will threaten America's national security interests. "Private securitycontractors are being asked to function in active combat zones in ways that dangerously blur the line between civilians andthe military. Consequently, contractors have continued to engage in hostile activity with minimal command, contractual, orjudicial oversight. This has put other civilians, and America's security interests, at risk and contributed to a lack of politicalwill to hold contractors accountable when they engage in criminal activity," said Human Rights First. The group went on tonote that to correct this, the definition of what is an "inherently governmental" function should reflect a strong preferencethat contractors not engage in hostile activity. Contractors must also be held responsible by a robust and adequately-

resourced judicial system when they commit crimes, and additional, credible, oversight must be exercised in the field. Theorganization stated that private sector employees permeate virtually every component of the mission in Iraq andAfghanistanfrom filing paperwork to using deadly force. As of May 2010, the Department of Defense estimates that itemploys over 207,000 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, of which at least 28,000 are classified as "Private SecurityContractors." Human Rights First noted that this number will grow in the coming months as the Afghan "surge" takesshape. The Congressional Research Service estimates that another 20,000-50,000 will be required to support that strategy.Similarly, the State Department and USAID report that they employ around 9,000 and 16,700 contractors respectively in the United States' main combat zones, an estimate thatthe GAO suspects severely under-represents the actual contractor force of each agency. Private security contractors provide protection to convoys of vital supplies to U.S. bases,

conduct interrogations, guard the perimeter of the U.S. embassies and consulates, and act as the personal security detail for U.S. diplomats. Human Rights First's testimony

noted, "The U.S. government has relied more on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan than at any other time. With thisincreased reliance on contractors have come increased incidents of serious criminal violations. Yet, only a handful of U.S.contractors have been prosecuted for criminal misconduct. By failing to hold contractors accountable for acts of violenceand abuse abroad, the United States has created a culture of impunity which has fostered great hostility among civilianpopulations towards the United States. This threatens the safety of U.S. military personnel and contractors as well as

undermines the U.S. mission."

PMCs annihilate local support for American presence

Kosiak, 08Steven M. Kosiak, 2008, Vice President for Budget Studies at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, frequent speaker ondefense issues, providing expert testimony before House and Senate Committees, and has been published in multiple majornewspapers, Military Manpower for the Long Haul, CSBA Publicationhttp://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_.pdf

Although the precise number of private contractors deployed in these operations is unknown, the number in I raq alone is reportedly approximately 160,000.132 These

contractors are used in a wide variety of roles and come from at least 30 different countries, ranging from local Iraqis to American and British workers to Guatemalans andUgandans.133 Private contractors play a major role in providing in-country logistical support for operations in I raq and Afghanistan, with some 20,000 American contractors as

well as large numbers of host-country or third-country nationals employed in these roles.134 More controversial has been the use of private contractors as security guards.

According to one estimate, in 2006 there were some 181 private security companies working in Iraq alone, with some 48,000 employees.135 Military commanders have

substantially less control over private contractors than they do over military personnel. As CBO has noted, A military commander can influence the

contractor employees behavior through the contracting officer and the contractors desire to satisfy the customer, but thecommander has limited direct control over any one employee.136 Moreover, unlike military personnel, civilians andcontractors participating in undeclared wars and contingency operations are not generally subject to the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice (UCMJ), further reducing their accountability to military commanders.137 Another problem is that privatecontractors tend to have a narrower perspective concerning their roles. For example, private security guards may well focussolely on protecting their clients, and discount the negative impact their actions might have on the broader military aim ofwining the hearts and minds of the local population. By contrast, military personnel are much more likely to see thenecessity of performing their duties in a way that does not, if at all possible, alienate or offend the local population. Theresult is that, even if private security contractors are well trained and well intentioned, they may operate in a way thatundermines the US militarys efforts.


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Preventing civilian casualties is critical to cut off the Talibans support base, preventing resurgence

Jones, 07Seth G. Jones, Ph.D. and M.A. in political science, University of Chicago; A.B., Bowdoin College, Afghanistan's Local Insurgency

1-31, http://www.rand.org/commentary/013107IHT.htmlThe rising violence and the near certainty of a Taliban spring offensive have triggered calls for an increase in U.S. militaryforces in Afghanistan. But a military strategy is not likely to succeed. Counterinsurgencies are almost always won byestablishing a viable and legitimate government at the local level that can win popular support. In Afghanistan, all politicsis local. The country's history is littered with empires that failed to understand this reality, from Alexander the Great morethan 2,000 ago to the British and Soviet empires more recently. The Taliban and its allies certainly understand theimportance of local politics. They have successfully re-emerged by co-opting or threatening local villagers, and promisingbetter governance and security than the current Afghan government. On my most recent trip to southern Afghanistan inJanuary, I saw that the message of the Taliban clearly resonated with a growing number of locals in southern and easternparts of the country. Afghans are frustrated by the lack of development over the past five years, and unhappy withwidespread government corruption. This makes the Taliban's threat real and significant. The Taliban and its allies have astrong presence in local villages throughout such provinces as Kandahar and Helmand, and are preparing sustainedoperations. It is telling that the Taliban's primary target is not U.S. or NATO forces, but local Afghans. This reflects theunderstanding that the local population represents the center of gravity, as Mao Zedong famously wrote. The lesson for theUnited States and NATO is stark. They will win or lose Afghanistan in the rural villages and districts of the country, not inthe capital city of Kabul. And if they are to win, they must begin by understanding the local nature of the insurgency.

PMCs undermine our military war effort and roles in Afghanistan

Schulman, 10Daniel Schulman is Mother Jones' Washington-based news editor. Are Contractors Undermining US War Efforts? By DanieSchulman | Thu Jan. 21, 2010 11:56 AM PST http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/01/are-contractors-undermining-us-war-efforts

According to CRS, "Many analysts believe that regulations governing PSCs are only enforced in Kabul; outside Kabulthere is no government reach at present and local governors, chiefs of police, and politicians run their own illegal PSCs."These illegal operations serve various clients, including, the CRS report notes, "NATO and the U.S. Government." Thismeans that as the US and NATO are actively pushing to strengthen Afghan governance, they are simultaneouslyempowering players who are flouting Afghan law. The CRS report also states pretty plainly that the conduct of securitycontractors has damaged the US mission in Afghanistan and Iraq: Abuses committed by contractors, includingcontractors working for other U.S. agencies, can also strengthen anti-American insurgents. There have been published reports of localnationals being abused and mistreated by DOD contractors in such incidents as the summary shooting by a private security contractor of an Afghan who was handcuffed, theshooting of Iraqi civilians, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in I raq. (It should be noted that there have also been reports of military personnel abusing and

otherwise mistreating local nationals, including the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison. CRS has not conducted an analysis to determine whether the incidence ofabuses is higher among contractors than it is among military personnel.) Many of the high-profile reports of PSCs shooting local nationals or otherwise acting irresponsibly

were committed by contractors working for the Department of State. Some of these incidents include the reported shooting of Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy employees, theshooting of 17 Iraqi civilians at a Baghdad traffic circle in Nisoor Square by Blackwater employees, and the recent controversy over the behavior of security contractors from

Armour Group who were hired to protect the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. Of the six incidents listed above, five were committed by U.S. companies and U.S. nationals.According to many analysts, these events have in fact undermined the U.S. mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. An IraqiInterior Ministry official, discussing the behavior of private security contractors, said Iraqis do not know them asBlackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans. One senior military officer reportedly stated that the actions of armedPSCs can turn an entire district against us. Some analysts also contend that PSCs can be a direct threat to the legitimacyof the local government. These analysts argue that if counter-insurgency operations are a competition for legitimacy but thegovernment is allowing armed contractors to operate in the country without the contractors being held accountable for theiractions, then the government itself can be viewed as not legitimate in the eyes of the local population. These analysts point

to the recent court decision dismissing the case against former Blackwater employees as a case in point where thelegitimacy of the U.S. and local government is being undermined by the actions of PSCs. The perception that DOD andother government agencies are deploying PSCs who abuse and mistreat people can fan anti-American sentiment andstrengthen insurgents, even when no abuses are taking place. There have been reports of an anti-American campaign inPakistan, where stories are circulating of U.S. private security contractors running amok and armed Americans harassingand terrifying residents. U.S. efforts can also be undermined when DOD has ties with groups that kill civilians or government officials, even if the perpetrators werenot working for DOD when the killi ngs took place. In June 2009, the provincial police chief of Kandahar, Afghanistan, was killed by a group that worked as a private security

contractor for DOD. Despite the role contractors may have played in setting back US efforts, don't expect the US to end its reliance on them anytime soon. According to CRS,"Many analysts and government officials believe that DOD would be unable to execute its mission without PSCs." The same is surely true of the other agencies working in Iraq

and Afghanistan.


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Lack of local support means our counter-insurgency strategy will fall in Afghanistan

Khan, 09Daud Khan, A Afghan political analyst and a journalist based in Afghanistan (US Winning Afghans' Hearts and Minds?

http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1248188004863&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout)Now, the US administration has been changed, with a new forces command and a new strategy; to win the hearts and mindsof Afghans. Under the new strategy, as ordered by General Stanley McChrystal the new commander of the US forces inAfghanistan foreign troops have to avoid air strikes in civilian areas up to the highest possible level. At the same time,they had to get close to Afghans and even to live among them to ensure their safety against the Taliban in order to win theirhearts. In this way, they believe that US and UK troops would not only win the hearts of Afghans, but also stop or at leastreduce fresh recruitments for the Taliban that mainly draw their main power from the remote, backward, and poverty-stricken areas. However, a recent statement of the British forces commander General David Richard raised many eyebrowswhen he said that his country's forces could stay in Afghanistan for 30 or 40 years. This is something new and surprisingfor Afghans, who want NATO countries to conclude the war and leave the country as soon as possible. This statement bythe incoming UK general appeared at a time when a recent survey conducted by the Independent revealed that the majorityof the British public believes that the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable, and UK troops shall withdraw immediately. Alocal news agency in Afghanistan, as part of its election coverage, interviewed almost all key presidential hopefuls. Whenquestioned about the status of the foreign troops on the Afghan soil, most of interviewed candidates replied that they wouldask foreign troops to declare a timeframe for their pull-out from the country. Looking at the political and security situationin Afghanistan, no one can say that the future president would be so powerful to ask the NATO and US troops to announcea timeframe. It is obvious that the candidates are asking US and NATO to leave just to attract Afghans toward their agenda,because they fully know that the majority of their countrymen are now fed up with fighting. However, for reasons quiteobvious, the US and UK troops want to stay in Afghanistan and continue fighting the Taliban as the two countries, as wellas their NATO allies, want to eliminate Al-Qaeda, their real enemy. As Al-Qaeda is still intact, and have their strongholdand bases in the border regions of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States and the United Kingdom feel at risk.They believe that in order to avoid war (against Al-Qaeda) on their own homeland, they want to fight the same inAfghanistan, no matter how long it may take. Fighting Prudent Enemy: Besides, the increasing strength of Taliban inPakistan's tribal areas and other cities of the nuclear-armed country has perturbed the United States and its NATO allies;they are going to double their efforts to overcome the threat to their own people and countries. Commenting on the Afghanscenario and the future of foreign troops in this landlocked country, analyst Waheed Muzhda said that the best option for

NATO countries is to have a timeframe, address the security issue at the earliest, and pull out of Afghanistan. Muzhdabelieves that a longer stay would cause more civilian deaths, attracting much popular anger, and hence leading to moresupport bases for the Taliban. He foresees more violence in days ahead as militants have now extended their operations tothe northern and western zones of the country, once considered peaceful and out-of-the-reach of the Taliban. The similarapprehensions were recently shown by the UN special envoy to Afghanistan Kai Eide and a NATO commander, who bothadmitted that the Taliban have spread to the northern zone. As for violence, Muzhda said that there was no solution to theproblem. "Kill one and it would create 10 more," he added. Muzhda asked for talks through tribal elders with all those whoare ready to talk.


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Taliban resurgence to capture Kandahar and Afghanistan instability will collapse Pakistan Causes

fundamentalist takeover and escalating global nuclear conflict

Morgan, 07

Stephen Morgan, Former British Labour Party Exectutive Committee Member, Political Psychologist, 3/4/2007 [Stephen, ""Betteranother Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?"," http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639]

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the warintensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comeswith eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer all of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures atleast half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatistPashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the breakup of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in thecontext of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings,probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d'tat. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The factthat in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "Osama" (not a Pakistaniname) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditionswould be ripe for a coup d'tat by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take

power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shiralaw would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil warconditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni andminority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. Theprophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan toPalestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over intoIndia both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms andinsurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out.Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is areal possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibilityof unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their useagainst India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by AlQaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a realstrategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War

with China and Russia pitted against the US.

Pakistan coup leads to a nuclear shootout with India and extremist takeover in Saudi Arabia and Egypt

Ricks, 01Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer, At Pentagon: Worries Over War's Costs, Consequences; Some Fear RegionaDestabilization, Retribution Against U.S., 10-21, Lexis

The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclearweapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appearedthat the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroyPakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war,said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games. Having both the United States and India fighting

Muslims would play into the hands of bin Laden, warned Mackubin Owens, a strategist at the Naval War College inNewport, R.I. "He could point out once again that this is the new crusade," Owens said. The next step that worries expertsis the regional effect of turmoil in Pakistan. If its government fell, the experts fear, other Muslim governments friendly tothe United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might follow suit. "The ultimate nightmare is a pan-Islamic regime thatpossesses both oil and nuclear weapons," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies.


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Pakistan-India conflict leads to extinction

Fai, 01Executive Director of the Kashmiri American Council, The most dangerous place,7-8, lexis

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crownedwith a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, adisputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable Indiaand Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear

volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalypticvision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generallyplace Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thorough reds to bolster theirnuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongsttheir populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,or indicated and inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

Takeover of Saudi Arabia cuts off their oil supply

Cohen, 06

Ariel, heritages finest, reducing US dependence on middle eastern oilhttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/NationalSecurity/bg1926.cfm 4/7

Even more frightening is the prospect of jihadis mounting an outright takeover of the country. Under such a scenario,radical Islamists dedicated to overthrowing the Al Saud regime would slowly build up their forces until they could exploit arevolutionary situation created by a succession struggle, a political assassination, or some other circumstantial trigger.Uprisings, if not checked, could lead to the regimes overthrow and political turmoil, which would deeply affect oilproduction capacityand immediately and directly threaten Western experts and workers in Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Ladenhas stated his belief that oil should cost $145$200 per barrel.[24] If radical Wahhabis succeeded in taking over SaudiArabia, they would likely drastically reduce production. The radical regimes anti-Western policies, including the pursuit ofnuclear weapons, could trigger Western economic sanctions, which would likely include limits on investment and spareparts for the oil industry or even an outright trade boycott. Furthermore, if the survival of the worlds economy isthreatened, military action to remove an al-Qaedatype regime could not be ruled out.

The impact is extinctionRiddoch, 04Dr. Malcolm, Faculty of Communications and Creative Industries, Edith Cowan University, June 19, 2004http://www.melbourne.indymedia.org/news/2004/06/72000_comment.php

There are lots of recent 2004 reports s peculating about the Saudi's ability to increase production suggesting that the peak plateau may already have arrived with midpoint by

2008. OPEC is apparently pumping at its full rate, while everyone else from the Russians, US, North Sea to our own oil fields are apparently depleting already. The firstmajor oil shockcould be as early as the fourth quarter o f this year and some analysts suggest that the Saudi's are on the verge of a collapse in their major Gawar oil field,the largest in the world. According to what I've read, if this all turns out to be true then we're currently on the threshold of a gigantic transition in the structure of our modernglobalised industrial civilization, a transition that humanity seems completely unprepared for. More than just the price of petrol at your local bowser, cheap oil means cheap

road/rail haulage and international shipping as well as air travel, it means cheap food produced by mechanised industrial agriculture with its pe trochemical pesticides andfertilizers, more than just underwriting the value of the US dollar and their domestic economy it upholds the global stock markets and banking system. Cheap oil has paid for our

modern lifestyles since WW2. The end of cheap oil will mean a lot more than $4 per litre and rising, just to drive a car around. Beyond thecurrent oil wars and the short term economic effects of unstable oil supply and prices over the next 5 years, peak oilthreatens an irreversible global economic decline that will force a massive, radical and sustained change in our way of life aswe transition to alternative energy sources and the economic/political order they support. The cost of everything will rise and rise with the poorest of us t he first to start

suffering. A terminal economic decline will begin with a recession in Australia the size of the one that occurred in WW2, and this possibility is already being discussed in ourmainstream media. Think an end to public we lfare across the board, food stamps and eventually food riots, massive rising unemployment, the collapse of Medicare and publichospitals, a severe crisis in the cost and delivery of water ... but at least the roads will be less congested, more room for the ul tra wealthy and their gas guzzling limousines. At

worst peak oil could mean a complete global economic collapse sometime after 2010, middle class poverty and the breakdown of law andorder, truly gigantic starvation in the third world and the unrestrained outbreak of global warfare with the risk of numerous 'limited'nuclear conflagrations. It could ultimately mean the extinction of the human species through global nuclear war and itscompanions famine and pestilence.


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Failure in Afghanistan leads to spurs of radical instability throughout Central Asia

Szayna and Oliker, 05Senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and policy analyst at RAND Corporation, Olga and Thomas, Faultlines

of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Armyhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR1598.sum.pdfThe situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the troop presence of U.S., Russian, and other forces in the regionmay serve to catalyze state failure in a number of ways, perhaps making significant conflict more proximate than it mightotherwise have been. Refugee flows into the region could strain the treasuries and stretch the capacities of states to dealwith the influx. They can also potentially be a mechanism for countergovernment forces to acquire new recruits andassistance. This is of particular concern given the history of Al Qaeda and Taliban support to insurgent groups in CentralAsia, as well as the ethnic links and overlaps between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. To date, the r ise ofinsurgencies linked to radical Islam has either caused or provided an excuse for the leadership in several states to becomeincreasingly authoritarian, in many ways aggravating rather than alleviating the risk of social unrest, and it is entirelyplausible that this trend will continue. Moreover, if the U.S.-Russian relationship improves, Russian officials may takeadvantage of the opportunity, combined with U.S. preoccupation with its counterterror campaign, to take actions in Georgiaand Azerbaijan that these states will perceive as aggressive. Meanwhile, U.S. forces in the region may be viewed as targetsby combatants in the Afghanistan war and by insurgent efforts against the Central Asian governments. The situation inAfghanistan will almost certainly have an impact on the faultlines in Central Asia and possibly those in the South Caucasus.While it remains too early to predict just what that impact might be, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, thereremains excellent reason to believe that over the next 15 years separatists will continue to strive to attain independence (asin Georgia) and insurgency forces to take power (as in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). This could spread from thecountries where we see it currently to possibly affect Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. It could also result inresponses by states that see a neighboring insurgency as a threat, and by others that pursue insurgents beyond their ownborders. Insofar as U.S. forces stay involved in the region, it could draw the United States into these Central Asian andSouth Caucasus conflicts.

Nuclear War

Starr, 01S. Frederick, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute @ Johns Hopkins, The war against terrorism and u.s. bilateral relations with the nationsof central asia, December 13, online

However, this does not mean that US actions are without risk to the Central Asian states. Quite the contrary.For a decadethey have faced not only the dangers arising from Afghanistan but also the constant thr

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