Syllabus

Course Information

Course title: Game TheoryCourse Economics-109number:

Coursediscipline:Coursedescription:

Course date:

Location:

Meetingday(s):

Meetingtime(s):

Prerequisite(s):InstructorName:

Email:Office location:

Office hours:

Economics'

In this course we will study strategic situations, in which each player's behavior can affect the well-being of theother players. "Strategy" is the process of deciding how to act in these situations, taking into account the likelybehavior of tl:1eother players. "Game theory" is the study of strategic situations, using a general framework andtools that can be applied across the entire range of situations. Althoughgame theory can be useful in anevolutionary context, we will focus on human interactions, and assume that people behave in a rational manner. Inaddition to exploring abstract theory, we will also consider a variety of applications from economics, politicalscience, and sports. '

Tuesday, January 4, 2005 through Saturday, March 19, 2005Center Hall 105

Tuesday and Thursday

2:00 - 3:20

Economics 100A-B or Economics 170A-B

David A. Miller,Assistant Professord9miller@ucsd.eduEconomics 228

Group Q&ATuesdays, 3:30-4:30 in Sequoyah 244; individual meetings by appointment. Please refrain from askingquestions over email except for administrative matters.

Teaching Assistant IName: Julie Lee

Email:

Office hours:j 138Iee@econ.ucsd.edu

TBA

Teaching Assistant II

Name: Ecyan Tomlin

Email: bt.::>mlin@ucsd.edu

Office hours: TBA

Textbooks

Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, Joel Watson, New York:W. W. Norton, 2002, ISBN0-393-97648-3Requiredreading:

QuizzesWhen: Weekly. There will be 8 quizzes in all. You will have a window of several days in which to take each quiz, but once

you start a quiz there will be a strict time limit.

Description: Eachquiz can be worthup to 15 points. Nocollaborationis allowed.Quizzescan be foundon the course web site.MidtermExam . ~

Date: Tuesday, February 1, in MandevilleAuditorium,at the normal class time.

Description: 200 point~. The midterm exam covers all the material in the first 8 lectures, including chapters 1-11 and 13-14.Final Exam

Date: Thursday,' March 17, 3:00-6:00pm

Description: 500 points. The final exam covers the entire course, with an emphasis on new material since the midterm exam.

Online participationDescription: Bonuspoints willbe awardedfor participationin specificonlineactivities.These may includesurveys,games,

practice problems, and discussions. Activities will be announced in class.

GradingGeneral:

Regrading:

Quiz and exam grades will be added up and curved. Bonus points will be added *after* the curve.

For quizzes, regrade requests should be submitted by email to Julie Lee. For exams, regrade requests should be

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submitted to Julie Lee on paper with a written explanation within one week after exams are returned, but theinstructor will regrade the entire exam. Each regrade request will be accepted only at the discretion of the grader orthe professor.

Class rulesCollaboration:

Electronicdevices:

No collaboration is allowed on quizzes and exams.

Cell phones, beepers, and other such devices must be turned off during class. Computer games, internet browsing,and music players are not allowed in class, nor are any other electronic devices to be used for personalentertainment during class.

Academic HonestyGeneral: Students are encouraged to alert the professor to incidents of possible cheating. The professor and TAs are required

to report incidents of suspected cheating to the administration. Cheating will be considered grounds for a reduced orfailing grade on the assignment or for the course.

UCSDpolicy: Students are reminded of the UCSDPolicyon Integrity of Scholarship, at http://www-senate. ucsd.edu/manual/appendices/app2.htm# AP14.

Adding the classPolicy: To add the class, contact KimberleyNewmark, knewmark@ucsd.edu in the Economics Undergraduate Affairs Office,

Sequoyah Hall 245. Economics,Management Science, and Math & Econ majors and minors must have completed theprerequisites to add the class. Others must have completed Math 20c. Exceptions may be made for transferstudents, graduate students, and students planning to graduate in March.

.1. Part I: Representing Games

.. 1.1. Jan. 4: Introduction; Extensive Form (chs. 1-2, Appendix A)

.. 1.2. Jan. 6: Extensive form; Strategies (chs. 2-3, 14)

.. 1.3. Jan. 11: Normal form; Beliefs &.expected utility; Dominance (chs.4-6)

"IT2. Part II: Static settings

.. 2.1. Jan. 13: Rationalizability; Location (chs. 7-8)

. 2.2. Jan. 18: Best response; Nash equilibrium (chs. 6, 9)

. 2.3. Jan. 20: Applications of Nash equilibrium (chs. 8,10)

. 2.4. Jan. 25: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (ch. 11)

. 2.5. Jan. 27: Contract in static settings (ch. 13)3. Feb. 1: Midterm exam

.. 4. Part III: Dynamicsettings.. 4.1. Feb. 3: Extensive form; Subgame perfection (chs. 2,14-15)

.. 4.2. Feb. 5: Applications of subgame perfection (chs. 16-17)

.. 4.3. Feb. 8: Bargaining (chs. 18-19)

. 4.4. Feb. 10: Negotiation equilibrium; Applications of negotiation (chs. 20-21)

. 4.5. Feb. 15: Repeated games (ch. 22)

.. 4.6. Feb. 17: Repeated games and applications (chs. 22-23)

.. 4.7. Feb. 22: Repeated game applications; Risk in contracting (chs. 23, 25).. 5. Part IV:Randomnessand information

.. 5.1. Feb. 24: Incomplete Information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium (chs. 24, 26)

.. 5.2. Mar. 1: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (ch. 28)

.. 5.3. Mar. 3: Trade with Incomplete Information (ch. 27)

. 5.4. Mar. 8: Signaling &.reputation (ch. 29)

5.5. Mar. 10: Current research in game theory

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