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They did so only because they fundamentallymisread what the collapse of the Soviet Union meant: the ideologicaltriumph of liberal capitalist democracy over communism, not theobsolescence of hard power.

For Hegel, it was the Battle of Jena, in 1806, thatrang the curtain down on the war of ideas. . Adapted to the post Cold War

world, this argument was taken tomean that in the future, states would have to adopt the principles ofliberal capitalism to keep up. no social formother than liberal democracy provided enough freedom and dignityfor a contemporary society to remain stable.

With history over, the focus shiftedfrom geopolitics to development economics and nonproliferation,and the bulk of foreign policy came to center on questions such asclimate change and trade.

Para Oba ma: the United States most important priorities involved promoting the liberal world order, not playingclassical geopolitics.

the world is looking less post-historical by the day.

China, Iran, and Russia are all pushing back against the political settlement of the Cold War.

Iran wishes to replace the current order in theMiddle East led by Saudi Arabia and dominated by Sunni Arabstates with one centered on Tehran.

Across the region, the Arab Spring has weakened Sunniregimes, further tilting the balance in Irans favor.

these states have undermined the Eurasian geopoliticalorder in ways that complicate U.S. and European efforts to construct a

posthistorical, win-win world. the win-win outcomes that Americans so eagerly seek will sometimes

be held hostage to Russian geopolitical interests. the public shares the elite consensus that in a post Cold War world, the

United States ought to be able to pay less into the system and get moreout

outro lado: Order building is not premised on the end of geopolitics; it is about how to

answer the big questions of geopolitics. The military capabilities aggregated in this U.S.-led

alliance system outweigh anything China or Russia might generate

for decades to come.

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Allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have sought to draw the UnitedStates into playing a greater role in their regions. The result is what thehistorian Geir Lundestad has called an empire by invitation.

World War II made the answer clear: the co untrys prosperityand security depended on access to every region.

In the mid-1980s, India and Japan were the only Asian democracies, but sincethen, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailandhave joined the club.

Democratization has put China and Russia in a geopolitical box.

Near Eastern Promises as the problems of one society spread to its neighbors and spark new

conflicts Syria: a steady influx of Russian arms, Iranian funds, and Hezbollah

troops,

For much of its existence, Saudi Arabia has drawn legitimacy from itsofficial support for orthodox clerics.

just as previous administrations have learned, the region has a tendencyto pull the United States back in, even when it wants out.

Far Eastern Promises

But bilateral ties are developing in such a way that anydisagreements produced by the pivot will be addressed in the broadercontext of a more stable and cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship

Asia consumes some 30 million barrels of oil every day,more than twice the amount that the EU does.

Chinas attempts to change the territorial status quo in the East China and South China seas for example, by establishing an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea over islands administered by Japan present an immediate challenge.