polar prospects: a minerals treaty for antarcticaif a major minerals discovery is made in the...

Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty forAntarctica

September 1989

NTIS order #PB90-125403

Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty forAntarctica, OTA-O-428 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September1989).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 89-600718

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)

Foreword

Few places remain on the Earth where rules for allocating natural resources andregulating their development are not at least reasonably well established. On land and withinrelatively narrow strips of adjacent coastal waters, dominion over resources-and thus thepower to allocate and regulate-is largely settled. Although not universally accepted, generalrules have even been established to regulate any future mineral exploitation of the deepseabeds, the vast ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction. Antarctica, by virtue of extremeisolation and a unique political history, is the last major area of the world without some systemof governance for mineral resource activities. Rules establishing such a system, although notyet in force, are embodied in a new treaty, the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of AntarcticMineral Resource Activities. The treaty does not presume that minerals will ever be developedin Antarctica. Rather, it establishes a framework for considering whether activities may beallowed and for regulating any activities that are permitted.

Four committees of the Congress, the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and onCommerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committees on Foreign Affairs andon Merchant Marine and Fisheries asked OTA to evaluate the implications of this new treatyfor the United States. The Senate has a constitutional responsibility to give its advice andconsent to ratification of the treaty. Both houses of Congress will have to pass legislation toimplement the treaty should it be ratified. OTA’s report on the Minerals Convention isintended to provide a timely and useful reference to the Congress as it considers these topics.

This report identifies U.S. interests in Antarctica and evaluates the Minerals Conventionrelative to these interests. It examines the status of knowledge about the resources ofAntarctica, the potential impacts of minerals development, and the technical, economic,environmental, geological, and political constraints to development in Antarctica.

We received substantial assistance from many individuals and organizations in the courseof this study. Special thanks go to OTA’s Antarctica Advisory Panel; to participants in thethree workshops convened during the study; to the project’s contractors; and to experts in theNational Science Foundation, the Department of State, the Department of the Interior, theMar ine Mammal Commission, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.We also gratefully acknowledge our sister congressional agency, the Congressional ResearchService, for again sharing its expertise. However, OTA remains solely responsible for thecontents of this report.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

OTA Antarctica Advisory Panel

Norman AndersonAnderson, Genssler & Schwab, Inc.

Don AnthonyBP Exploration, Inc.

James BarnesEnvironmental Policy Institute

Jonathan I. CharneySchool of LawVanderbilt University

Robert H. Rutford, ChairmanPresident, University of Texas, Dallas

Paul DaytonScripps Institution of Oceanography

Ira DyerDepartment of Ocean EngineeringMassachusetts Institute of Technology

David ElliotByrd Polar Research CenterOhio State University

Robert FriedheimSchool of International RelationsUniversity of Southern California

Joseph N. GittelmanShell Western E&P, Inc.

James JacksonAmerican Petroleum Institute

Lee KimballWorld Resources Institute

Deborah ShapleyFreelance Writer

Brian ShoemakerFormer Commander, Naval Support Forces,

Antarctica

Simon StraussConsultant on Metal Markets

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members.The panel does not however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for thereport and the accuracy of its contents.

iv

OTA Antarctica Study Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert W. Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Project Staff

William E. Westermeyer, Project Director

William Barnard, Senior Analyst

Peter Johnson, Senior Associate

James E. Mielke, Specialist in Marine and Earth Sciences l

Contributing Staff

John Newman, Analyst, Energy and Materials program

Contractors

Melvin Conant, Conant & Associates

John Garrett

Edward Horton, Deep Oil Technology

Lauriston King, Texas A&M University

Maurice Magee, Magee Consulting

Bernard Oxman, University of Miami

Denzil Pauli

Deborah Shapley

James Smith, University of Houston

Administrative Staff

Kathleen A. Beil, Administrative Assistant

Sally Van Aller, Secretary

l~nwwlon~ Re=~ch ~Niw, Sc]encc Policy Division, Librag of ConiTssv

ContentsPage

Chapter l. Summary, Issues, and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2. U. S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention . . . . . . 37

Chapter 3. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . . . . 57

Chapter 4. Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Chapter 5. The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil andMinerals Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Appendix A. Development of an Antarctic Oil Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Appendix B.Metal Mining in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Appendix C. The Antarctic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Appendix D.The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. . 186

Appendix E. Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Appendix F. OTA Workshop Participants and Other Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Appendix G. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Appendix H. Acronyms and Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Chapter 1

Summary, Issues, and Options

Photo credit Ann Hawthorne

CONTENTSPage

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4THE CURRENT REGIME AND UNITED STATES POLICY FOR ANTARCTICA.. 6THE CONVENTION ON THE REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC MINERAL

RESOURCE ACTIVITIES .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Why Was the Minerals Convention Negotiated’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8How Does the Convention Work’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

RATIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Is the United States Better Off With the Minerals Convention or Without It’?.... . . . . 12Does the Agreement Advance U.S. Interests’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Are There Different Types of Agreements That Would Be Better Than

the Minerals Convention’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Can Provisions of the Existing Agreement Be Made More Satisfactory If We

Choose Not To Ratify It in Its present Form? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16THE RESOURCE POTENTIAL OF ANTARCTICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR

OIL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR

HARD MINERALS DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Advancing the Foreign Policy Goals of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Establishing a Regulatory and Institutional Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Data and Information Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31The Liability Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

FigureFigure Pagel-l. Antarctica . $........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. O. .. ... ... O....... . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 1

Summary, Issues, and Options

SUMMARYAntarctica, home to penguins, seals, and

whales and long of interest to explorers andscientists, is under increasing scrutiny as apotential source of valuable minerals. Althoughlittle is currently known about Antarctica’smineral resources and no mineral deposits ofcommercial interest have been discoveredyet, the potential that a discovery may bemade is increasing. Moreover, the 1959 Ant-arctic Treaty, the basic agreement governing thecontinent, did not establish guidelines for min-eral resource activities. As a result, the UnitedStates and other Parties to the Antarctic Treatylaunched negotiations in 1981 leading to theconclusion of the Convention on the Regulationof Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities in1988.

The Convention on the Regulation ofAntarctic Mineral Resource Activities wouldprovide a framework to guide future deci-sions on whether Antarctic minerals shouldbe developed, and if so, under what circum-stances. While the Convention would establishrules governing minerals development, it doesnot presume that any exploration or develop-ment will ever take place.

Like virtually all treaties, the Minerals Conven-tion is a compromise agreement. It took 7 yearsto negotiate and brokers the interests of claim-ants and nonclaimants, of developed and devel-oping countries, and of countries with interestsin mineral resources and countries mainly con-cerned with the environment. Alternatives to theConvention include declaring Antarctica offlimits to any minerals activities. Given thehistory of Antarctic claims, the multilateralnature of the negotiation, and the conflicting

interests at stake, it is doubtful that a funda-mentally different compromise could havebeen negotiated.

For over three decades, the United States hasadvanced four main interests in Antarctica:maintaining the region as a zone of peace,preserving the freedom of scientific research,protecting the environment, and preserving anopportunity for U.S. industry to develop Antarc-tic resources if and when it becomes feasible todo SO.

If a major minerals discovery is made inthe absence of an international agreementabout Antarctic minerals, an unregulated“gold rush” could follow, unraveling theAntarctic Treaty System and damaging allU.S. Antarctic interests. The Minerals Con-vention would help maintain the continent’slongstanding peace and stability. It would ena-ble consideration of mineral resource activities.And, although some environmental groups wouldprefer banning all minerals development inAntarctica, the Convention is one of the strong-est international environmental protection agree-ments negotiated to date. OTA concludes thatratification of the Minerals Convention wouldadvance U.S. interests.

OTA does not expect that either an oildeposit or metal mine would be developed inAntarctica sooner than about three decades,if ever. Geologic, economic, environmental,and political constraints to minerals develop-ment there currently are substantial. A commer-cial oil or hard mineral deposit in Antarcticawould have to be of world-class size and qualityto be developed economically. Probably only ahandful of such undiscovered resources are leftin the world.

Any development that does occur will inevi-tably cause local environmental impacts. More

1 Herelnaf~r refem~ 10 aS hC ‘‘ Minerals Convcntlon, or, more simply, as the ‘‘ COnvMHIOn.

-3–

4 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

significant impacts might result from a major oilspill. Even the strong environmental standardsestablished by the Minerals Convention—including the provision that no exploration ordevelopment is to be allowed until technologyand procedures are available for safe operations—cannot guarantee prevention of all development-related accidents.

U.S. ratification of the Convention does notpresume that the United States will sponsorprospecting, exploration, or development. How-ever, if the Convention enters into force, theUnited States will have to decide which agencyor agencies will represent it in Conventioninstitutions. As well, domestic implementinglegislation should address the need for a regula-tory structure to manage any minerals activitiesthe United States may sponsor.

Domestic legislation should also address thedata and information needs that are likely togrow if U.S. minerals-related activities increase.Even if the United States does not itself sponsorsuch activities, environmental baseline data willbe required to help the United States effectivelymonitor activities of other nations and to partic-ipate influentially in the Convention’s institu-tions.

Because the United States may expand environ-mental data gathering, monitoring, and mineralsreconnaissance and would need to regulate anyOperators it sponsors, the Congress shouldconsider institutional arrangements for futureU.S. Antarctic activities. The present approach,which assigns primary authority to the NationalScience Foundation, may serve adequately. Or,Congress could consider granting responsibilityfor minerals activities to the Department of theInterior, the National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration, or perhaps to a small MineralsCommission or a new U.S. Antarctic Agency.

Applied research needs related to potentialminerals activities do not at this time appear tobe more important than the basic research thathas been the focus of the U.S. program under the

Antarctic Treaty. However, modest funding fordata acquisition would help advance long-termU.S. interests; cooperative projects among Par-ties to the Minerals Convention would helpreduce the high costs of both applied and basicresearch.

Before exploration and development may beconsidered in Antarctica, a supplemental agree-ment on liability must be negotiated. The U.S.Senate must consider whether to give its adviceand consent to ratification of the MineralsConvention before the Liability Protocol isnegotiated or wait until it has been finalized.

INTRODUCTIONAntarctica has intrigued mankind for more

than two centuries, certainly at least sinceCaptain James Cook attempted to prove theexistence of the southern continent as part of hissecond great voyage beginning in 1772. Specu-lation about the possibility of finding valuableresources in Antarctica began early. However,until recently the practicality of developingmineral resources in this coldest, stormiest, andmost isolated land mass on Earth seemed toofarfetched to deserve serious consideration.Mineral resource development in Antarctica isprobably about three decades away under themost optimistic scenarios, and it may possiblynever occur. Still, the countries most involved inAntarctica (the signatories to the 1959 AntarcticTreaty) determined in the mid-1970s that iteventually would be necessary to negotiate aregulatory framework for managing mineralresource activities there. In 1981, after they hadconcluded an agreement for regulating exploita-tion of marine living resources, they began tonegotiate a minerals regime.

On June 2, 1988, after a 7 year effort, theUnited States and 32 other nations completednegotiation of a treaty to regulate possible futureprospecting, exploration, and development ofoil and other minerals in Antarctica. The treaty,known as the Convention on the Regulation ofAntarctic Mineral Resource Activities, provides

Chapter I-Summary, Issues, and Options ● 5

a framework for determining what, if any,minerals exploration and development will beallowed to take place in Antarctica and forregulating any minerals activities that are per-mitted. Before the Convention can take effect,however, it must be ratified by at least 16members of the subset of participants to theMinerals Convention who have special inter-ests and responsibilities in Antarctica. TheUnited States, long one of the most active andinfluential countries in Antarctica, is a promi-nent member of this group, known as theAntarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs).Additional members include the other originalsignatories of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and 10more recent signatories that currently conductresearch in Antarctica.2 The United States alsois one of nine countries that, individually, coulddetermine the fate of the Minerals Convention:If the United States, the Soviet Union, or anyone of the seven countries with territorialclaims in Antarctica do not become a party tothe Convention, it will not enter into force.However, ratification by the United Statescould encourage others to do so.

This assessment addresses the questions sur-rounding whether the United States shouldratify the Minerals Convention, and, if it does,how the Federal effort could be organized toaddress the needs created by U.S. ratification.Central to this study is the description andanalysis of the Minerals Convention in chapter3. The Convention, and specifically implica-tions of ratifying or not ratifying it, cannot becompletely understood in isolation, so chapter 2presents a brief history of the United States inAntarctica, a review of current U.S. interests,and a summary of why the United States andother countries decided to negotiate the Miner-als Convention. Chapter 4 describes the mineralresource potential of Antarctica, and chapter 5describes the environmental impacts of mineralsactivities. The status of technologies for exploit-

ing Antarctica’s mineral resources and a briefdiscussion of the economic feasibility of devel-opment are in appendixes A and B. Thecomplete texts of the Antarctic Treaty and theMinerals Convention are included as appen-dixes C and D, respectively.

This first chapter summarizes OTA’s find-ings and presents several options for organizingthe Federal effort in Antarctica if the MineralsConvention is ratified. The United States has astrong interest in preserving the Antarctic TreatySystem. The Minerals Convention supplementsand strengthens this unique system of govern-ance. Its entry into force would help ensure thatAntarctica remains peaceful and demilitarizedand that the current spirit of cooperation amongATCPs prevails. The Minerals Convention isnot intended to, and does not, promoteAntarctic minerals development. Equally itdoes not ban minerals development alto-gether. Rather, it sets out a framework ofstandards and principles (including stringentenvironmental standards) with which any per-mitted activities must comply and establishesinstitutional mechanisms to evaluate proposedactivities. Although not completely satisfactoryto either commercial or environmental interests,the Convention, OTA finds, strikes a workablebalance between environmental protection andresource development.

It is unforeseeable whether Antarctic miner-als will ever be developed: however, severalnations will continue to conduct geological andgeophysical research that may lead to a discov-ery. Political, environmental, geologic, eco-nomic, and technological hurdles to mineralsdevelopment will continue to be significant.Technological hurdles may be the least difficultto overcome. By establishing a frameworkregime, the ATCPs have taken a large steptoward ensuring that minerals questions do notbecome a source of conflict and, hence, thatAntarctica is maintained as a zone of peace.

2~e tom “m~r of ATCps is now 22; an addllion~ 17 states arc sl~atorles of tie An~ctic Treaty. Thirty-k states attended the find m~lngof k Minerals Convention. A complete list is given m ch, 2, p, 25.


THE CURRENT REGIME ANDUNITED STATES POLICY FOR

ANTARCTICA

Antarctica is the only continent with nocommonly recognized national boundaries. Sevenof the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties(ATCPs) have made claims to parts of Antarc-tica, of which three overlap.3 Neither the UnitedStates nor any other nonclaimant country hasrecognized these claims. However, both theUnited States and the Soviet Union have re-served the right to make future claims inAntarctica based on their historic activities. Thelack of an agreed legal status for Antarcticais a key consideration in any effort to manageactivities on the continent. To date, govern-ance has been achieved through negotiation andconsensus, not exclusive sovereign control. Thisunique regime was established by the AntarcticTreaty and applies to the area south of 60degrees south latitude (figure l-l).

The Antarctic Treaty emerged in the wake ofthe 1957-58 International Geophysical Year,during which scientists from 12 nations estab-lished research stations throughout Antarcticaand, in the process, developed cooperativerelationships that both scientists and diplomatsfelt should be continued. In negotiating the 1959Treaty, the 12 original parties pledged to use thecontinent for peaceful purposes, established aninspection system, and froze the dispute overclaims. Claims would neither be accepted,denied, qualified, nor clarified; instead, theclaims issue was sidestepped. They also agreedin the treaty that freedom of scientific researchwould continue, and that research plans, person-nel, and results would be freely exchanged; thatthere would be neither nuclear explosions orweapons testing of any kind nor disposal ofradioactive wastes in the Treaty area; and thatATCP-designated observers would have free

access—including aerial observation—to anyarea and could inspect all stations, installations,and equipment.

The Antarctic Treaty, while limited in itsobjectives, is a highly successful multilateralagreement. The Treaty has fostered cooperativeactivity in Antarctica and has kept it demilita-rized for the nearly 30 years since its inceptionin 1961. One of the Treaty’s limitations (al-though it did not seem important at the conclu-sion of negotiations in 1959) is that it does notaddress the ownership or regulation of Antarc-tica’s mineral resources. However, in the pastATCPs have been able to respond to issueswhen it has become important to do so, and,under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty, haveagreed on a number of additional measuresregulating activity in Antarctica. For instance,environmental concerns were initially addressedin the 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conserva-tion of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. These conser-vation measures prohibited the killing, captur-ing, or molesting of any mammal or bird nativeto Antarctica without a permit. They alsoestablished the basis for creating SpeciallyProtected Areas.

Over the last 17 years, three additionalconventions have been added to create what isnow commonly known as the Antarctic TreatySystem (ATS). In 1972 the Convention for theConservation of Antarctic Seals, which soughtto prevent the overexploitation of seals, wasadopted. It entered into force in 1978. TheConvention on the Conservation of AntarcticMarine Living Resources (CCAMLR—see ch.5) was adopted in 1980 and entered into force in1982 as a means to foster conservation andprudent management of the living resources ofthe Southern Ocean, particularly Antarctic krilland finfish. The 1988 Minerals Convention isthe most recently negotiated agreement. Unlike

s~e ~ven cl~a[ ~a~s are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The claims of Mgentia, Chic,and the United Kingdom overlap.

Chapter 1-Summary, Issues, and Options ● 7

Figure l-l—Antarctica

,, I ,

, South Moz

, 1

1

,Argentina

Chile

■✍

.

,

. ,

Antarctica,

, 1.

Scientific research station■

New

ZealandI l l

– + — . .

— .

Antarctica covers an area of about 5.4 million square miles, making;t the fifthbeneath a thick continental ice sheet.

largest continent. About 98 percent of Antarctica IS buried

SOURCE U S. Government, 1982

8 ● Polar prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR, its deci-sionmaking proceduresconsensus.

The United Statesinterests in Antarctica:

1.

2.3.

4.

maintaining thepeace,

do not always rely on

has four fundamental

region as a zone of

preserving freedom of scientific research,preserving the Antarctic environment,andproviding an opportunity for U.S. pri-vate industry to exploit Antarctic re-sources if and when it becomes feasibleand appropriate.4

The United States has an interest in promotingpolitical stability in the region, so the regiondoes not become, in the words of the preambleto the Antarctic Treaty, ‘‘the scene or object ofinternational discord. There is, of course, someinherent tension among all these U.S. interests.Should minerals development commence, thetension between exploitation, environmentalprotection, and scientific research can be ex-pected to increase. To further these interestsduring the past 30 years, the United States hasstriven to become an influential force in allelements of the Antarctic Treaty System.

Since 1965 U.S. Antarctic policy has beencoordinated and managed by the AntarcticPolicy Group (APG), an inter-agency task forceestablished by a directive from President John-son. It includes representatives of the Secretaryof State (chairman), the Director of the NationalScience Foundation (NSF), the Secretary ofDefense, and of other agencies as appropriate.On February 5, 1982, President Reagan issueda policy memorandum essentially reiteratinglong-standing U.S. policy that the U.S. Antarc-tic Program (administered by NSF’s Division of

Polar Programs) would be maintained “at alevel providing an active and influential pres-ence in Antarctica designed to support the rangeof U.S. Antarctic interests. ’ Important meansfor realizing these interests have been promotionof international scientific cooperation and con-tinued efforts to strengthen the Treaty System.This “presence ‘‘ includes the conduct of scien-tific research in major disciplines; year-roundoccupation of the South Pole and two coastalstations; and maintenance of a continent-widelogistics capability. The NSF has primary re-sponsibility for budgeting, logistics, and supportof scientific research. The National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) was di-rected in 1984 (under the Antarctic MarineLiving Resources Convention Act) to fund andconduct directed research projects related to themarine living resources of Antarctica.

THE CONVENTION ON THEREGULATION OF ANTARCTIC

MINERAL RESOURCEACTIVITIES

Why Was the Minerals ConventionNegotiated?

Until relatively recently, there was littleperceived need to establish rules for regulatingthe exploitation of nonliving resources in Ant-arctica. Antarctica is isolated and among themost difficult places in the world to operate.During the 1970s, however, a combination ofscientific, technological, and political factorsbegan to change perceptions of Antarctica’smineral resource potential and to increase Ant-arctic Treaty Consultative Parties sense ofurgency about developing a minerals regime.

The ATCP’s negotiated an agreement gov-erning the possible future exploitation of Ant-

4U. S$ ~~ctic interests have been discussed in ‘‘The U.S. Anmctic ~o~~,’ a report submitted by the Office of Management and Budget to theCommittees on Appropriation of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, May 1983. See also, David A. Colson, Aswtant Ugal Adviser,Department of State, “l%e United States Position on Antarctica, ” Cornelf Inrernationaf Law Journaf, vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 1986, pp. 291-300, andAnmrctica, f984. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, ‘Ikdmology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, andTransportation. 98th Cong., 2d SCSS. Statement of R. Tbcker Scully, Director, Oceans and Polar Affairs, Department of State. pp. 7-9.

s~te HOW Memm~dum 6646, United States Antarctic Policy and FYogriiIM. Feb. 5, 1982.

Chapter 1-Summary, Issues, and Options . 9

Pbto credit. US Geological .%fV@y

McMurdo Station on Ross Island, the main U.S. researchbase in Antarctia Observation Hill is in the background.

arctic minerals for a number of interdependentreasons. The Antarctic Treaty itself is silentabout regulation of mineral resource activities.This posed few problems in the first two decadesof the Treaty’s existence. However, scientificstudy of the continent has caused what wasvirtually terra incognita in 1959 to becomegeologically better known by the early 1980s.Occurrences of minerals have been found which,if discovered in large and rich deposits, couldattract commercial interest. In addition, technol-ogy to exploit resources has improved. Al-though such technology has been developed foruse in other regions, some of it could be adaptedto recover offshore hydrocarbons or to mineAntarctic minerals.

As early as 1%9 several ATCP governmentsreceived inquiries from companies interested ingeophysical oil prospecting offshore. Both thedramatic rise in oil prices in 1973 and scientificdrilling in the Ross Sea stimulated furthercommercial interest. (The Ross Sea drilling didnot necessarily indicate an oil or gas deposit. )No agreed procedures were in effect at the timeto authorize prospecting, and the governmentswhich were approached believed that if theyallowed their nationals to prospect, they couldupset the stability of the ATS. In 1977 the

ATCPs adopted a recommendation urging vol-untary restraint on ‘‘exploration and exploita-tion’ conditional on progress toward a mineralsregime. Over the years both claimants andnonclaimants alike had developed a strong stakein the preservation of the ATS.

From 1972 on, Antarctic mineral resourcediscussions became a regular item on the agendaof ATCP meetings. At their eleventh meeting inBuenos Aires in 1981, the ATCPS formallydecided to negotiate a minerals regime forAntarctica. As negotiations got underway in1982, separate negotiations to establish theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of theSea were winding down. Some in the UnitedNations questioned the legitimacy and effective-ness of the ATS and proposed that Antarctica beconsidered in a broader international forum asocean issues had been. Because of their activeinvolvement in Antarctic activities, ATCPshave long held that they possess special interestsand responsibilities in Antarctica, and that theymanage a legitimate international legal systemfor the continent. They have therefore resistedall attempts to transfer authority over Antarcticato the United Nations. Indeed, heightened U.N.interest in Antarctica provided the ATCPsadditional motivation to conclude negotiationsalready underway.

How Does the Convention Work?

The Minerals Convention provides a frame-work for determining the acceptability of min-eral resource activities and for regulating anyactivities determined to be acceptable. The 67main articles and 12 annex articles of theConvention establish the general principles,specify the legal obligations of the Parties, andcreate the institutions and procedures necessaryfor decisionmaking. No minerals activity is totake place except in accordance with theConvention and unless significant environ-mental impacts can be avoided.6

6.ktS. 3 and 4.


Of necessity, the Minerals Convention is acarefully crafted compromise agreement Negotia-tors had the difficult task of dealing with thereality of the differing juridical positions ofclaimant and nonclaimant countries. They alsohad to try to balance the interests of thedeveloped and developing states among thegroup, of states with free market and centrallyplanned economies, and of states stressingenvironmental protection versus states stressinga regime that would facilitate minerals develop-ment activities. In addition, the value of Antarc-tica for other uses, such as science, tourism,wilderness, and the harvesting of marine livingresources had to be given appropriate weight.Hence, the Minerals Convention is complicated,even though it provides only a framework andnot a complete and detailed code for regulatingmineral resource activities.

The Minerals Convention would establishfive institutions: a Commission, RegulatoryCommittee(s), an Advisory Committee, a Spe-cial Meeting of Parties, and an Arbitral Tribu-nal, plus a Secretariat to serve all five. TheCommission and any Regulatory Committeesestablished are the only decisionmaking institu-tions.7 The Commission includes ATCPs andany other Parties actively engaged in resourceactivities or related research. It has broadauthority for determining whether and wheremineral resource activities may take place andfor establishing general rules and proceduresapplicable to all minerals activities. The detailsof regulating these activities will be worked outafter entry into force of the Convention andwhen and if interest is expressed in suchactivities. The Commission is also charged withdetermining the composition of RegulatoryCommittees and may review some of theiractions.

No exploration or development would beallowed unless specifically authorized by the

Commission. One of the Commission’s mostconsequential decisions will be to decide whe-ther to allow consideration of exploration anddevelopment in specific areas. This thresholddecision to ‘‘identify”8 an area would trigger aprocess that could ultimately result in develop-ing a deposit. Such a decision would require aconsensus of all (presently 22) Commissionmembers and must be based on adequatedata and information. Reaching consensusamong this many diverse parties on such animportant decision may well be very difficult.

If the Commission decides to identify an areaof Antarctica for exploration and developmentof a particular mineral resource, a RegulatoryCommittee for that area would be established.Regulatory Committees would be comprised ofa total of four claimant states and six non-claimant states, and would in all cases includethe United States, the Soviet Union, and therelevant claimant(s) (if any) in the area identi-fied. States conducting approved activities in thearea would also become members. RegulatoryCommittees would be responsible for specify-ing detailed requirements for exploration anddevelopment of the area. These requirementswould have to be consistent with any generalguidelines established by the Commission, butthe Regulatory Committees, and not the Com-mission, would be the primary managers of anydevelopment activities in their respective areas.

The Scientific, Technical, and EnvironmentalAdvisory Committee will give expert advice tothe Commission and Regulatory Committees onall scientific, technical, and environmental as-pects of minerals resource activities. One of themost important functions of the Advisory Com-mittee is to evaluate environmental and techni-cal assessments of proposals to ‘identify" areasand of plans for exploration and development.Membership is open to all Parties to theMinerals Convention, but the Advisory Com-

T~e ~1~~ Tfib~aJ can only mn&r decisions for disputes refemd tO k

Ems is & tem Ud in the Minerals Convention to refer to opening an area for possible exploration and developrnew

Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 1 I

mittee has no independent decisionmaking power.Likewise, the Special Meeting of Parties, whosefunction is to advise the Commission on whe-ther identification of an area for exploration anddevelopment is consistent with the provisions ofthe Minerals Convention, has no independentdecisionmaking power.

Some groups are concerned about the relativepower of the Commission and RegulatoryCommittees, as well as the lack of decisionmak-ing authority of the Advisory Committee.Groups opposed to development prefer thatmost power be vested in the Commission wheremore votes are required to take any action. Theymistrust the smaller Regulatory Committees,which, they believe, would have a greaterinterest in accommodating development. Somecountries (i.e., developing and nonconsultativeparties) preferred vesting the Commission withmore authority so that they could play more ofa role in decisionmaking. Pro-developmentgroups, 10 conversely are concerned that the

Commission has too much power. Also, theclaimant states preferred that Regulatory Com-mittees be allocated substantial decisionmakingpower. The checks and balances built into theinstitutions, including their composition andvoting procedures, as well as the authority ofeach, reflect the compromises that werenecessary to achieve a mutually acceptableagreement in a complex, multilateral setting.The United States and the Soviet Union will berepresented on all Regulatory Committees aswell as on the Commission.

Resource activities are divided into threedistinct phases in the Minerals Convention:prospecting, exploration, and development. Toengage in any of these activities, a potentialdeveloper (an ‘Operator’ in Convention terms)must be sponsored by one of the Parties to theConvention. Sponsors must evaluate and certifythe fitness of Operators and oversee their

activities to ensure their compliance with theConvention. Sponsors that fail to ensure thattheir Operators are able to meet Conventionobligations could incur liability for damages.Sponsoring States must also support and defendthe interests of their Operators in institutionmeetings. If the United States decides to sponsorminerals activities, it must prepare to regulateOperators that may apply.

Prospecting is subject to the same standardsas exploration and development, but oversightof prospecting is primarily the responsibility ofthe Sponsoring State. Prospecting as defined inthe Convention is not normally expected to havea significant or long-lasting impact on theenvironment. Exploration and development- ifallowed in specific areas—would be regulatedin accordance with detailed prescriptions andmore extensive oversight by the institutions, inaddition to that by the Sponsoring State.

Once an area is “identified’ and the Regula-tory Committee established for that area deter-mines specific application requirements, anOperator would be required to obtain an explo-ration permit. Permission to explore must bebased on information adequate to enable in-formed judgments to be made by the institu-tions. The permit is granted if two-thirds of theCommittee members (which must include ma-jorities of both claimants and nonclaimants onthe Committee) approve the application. Suc-cessful applicants are granted exclusive rights toexplore for a specific resource, subject tospecific terms and conditions of a ManagementScheme (i.e., contract). The Operator is alsogranted an exclusive right to develop anydeposits found, but this right is subject to reviewafter the development application (which re-quires a complete description of developmentplans) is submitted. Modifications to the devel-opment plan may or may not be requested by theCommittee. There are conflicting interpreta-

gFor ~xmp]e, tie &ttwctjc md Southern Coalition, an enwronrncntid ~brella iWuP

l~or exmple, tie ~encm Mintng Congress and the American pe~olctm ~[i[u~


tions as to whether development is automaticallyapproved if the requisite majority in the Com-mittee cannot agree about what modificationsare necessary or if there must be positiveagreement on modifications before develop-ment may proceed. The details of this processare described and evaluated in chapter 3.

Before it can enter into force, the MineralsConvention must be ratified by 16 of the 20founding ATCPs.11 Moreover, before any ex-ploration and development can take place, anumber of conditions must be met. Signifi-cantly, the details of a liability system must firstbe negotiated and ratified in a separate protocol(see page 33). In addition to the sufficiency ofinformation requirements noted above, the envi-ronmental standards must be met and technol-ogy and procedures must be available for safeoperations and for compliance with environ-mental regulations. There must also exist acapacity to monitor key environmental parame-ters and ecosystem components and to respondeffectively to accidents.

RATIFICATIONCONSIDERATIONS

The United States Constitution states that thePresident “shall have Power, by and with theAdvice and Consent of the Senate, to makeTreaties, provided two-thirds of the Senatorspresent concur. . . ‘‘ Thus, the Senate must passjudgment on whether completed treaties shouldbe ratified by, and become binding on, theUnited States.12

U.S. ratification of the Minerals Conventioninvolves consideration of many questions, butthey seem to boil down to 4 basic concerns:

1. Is the United States better off with orwithout this agreement?

2. Does the agreement advance U.S. inter-ests?

3.

4.

Are there different types of agreementsthat would be better than the MineralsConvention?Can the provisions of the existing agree-ment be made more satisfactory if wechoose not to ratify it in its present form?

Is the United States Better Off With theMinerals Convention or Without It?

The consequences of not ratifying the Miner-als Convention depend in part on whether an oilor mineral deposit that is, or could become,economically exploitable is found in Antarctica.If none is discovered, failure to ratify theMinerals Convention probably will not havesignificant economic or environmental implica-tions. Political implications, however, couldstill be significant because the inability to reachagreement would portend a weakening of theATS.

Despite their varying attitudes about thedesirability of developing Antarctic minerals,ATCPs have concluded a framework regime tomake later decisions as to whether any part ofAntarctica shall be opened for exploration ordevelopment. Hence, although some environ-mental groups have sought to ban any mineralsactivities, ATCPs declined to take such action.

If the Convention does not enter into forceand countries have not otherwise prohibited allresource development in Antarctica, the unclearlegal status of Antarctic minerals may deterpotential investors from risking large sums ofmoney on exploration and development. Hence,a significant discovery may be less likely if theConvention is not in force. However, scientistscould make a major discovery in the course oftheir research there. So could other partiesengaged in prospecting thinly veiled as research.If a major deposit is discovered and the Conven-

1 IS= ch. 3 for details, table 3-1, p. a.

lzcon~ssio~ Research Service, Librtuy of Congress, ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, ” a studyprepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

Chapter 1---3 Summary, Issues, and Options ● 13

.

.

Photo credit US. Geological Survey

Mt. Erebus, the 12,447-foot volcano forming the apex of Ross Island. McMurdo Station is a tiny speck at the tip of the snow andice-covered peninsula to the right of the volcano’s summit.

tion has not entered into force, ATCPS may feelthey are no longer bound by the “voluntaryrestraint’ policy in effect since 1977.

Most of the parties involved in the Conven-tion negotiations believe that a major discov-ery made in the absence of the Conventioncould initiate an unregulated “gold rush,”which could lead to the unraveling of theentire Antarctic Treaty System. The Partiesdecided they needed an agreement prior to amajor minerals discovery, because it would beharder to reach an agreement afterwards. Anagreement concluded after a major discovery ismade might have fewer environmental safe-guards or be less balanced between nonclaimantand claimant interests.

In the absence of an agreed multilateral legalframework, exploitation might be subject onlyto the laws of the country sponsoring it or toconditions agreed bilaterally between a Spon-soring State and a claimant state. In either casethe rules would not necessarily be designed toprotect the Antarctic environment. Moreover,whatever regulations were deemed to apply maynot be in the interests of the other countries thatcontend they also have a stake in Antarctica’sresources. Friction could result if any statedecided to act unilaterally or with one other,ignoring others’ interests in the region. Thepotential for friction is especially great in theAntarctic Peninsula, the continent most hospi-table area. The Peninsula is claimed by threestates: Chile, Argentina, and the United King-


dom. The 1982 Falkland Islands war is areminder that military conflict can occur in theregion.

If the Convention is not ratified and animportant mineral deposit is found, claimantstates could conclude they have much to lose bycompromise with others. Dormant claims couldbe reasserted by a claimant willing to risk goodrelations among fellow ATCP members for thesake of exclusive benefits from resources in‘ ‘its’ area. Likewise, nonclaimants that attemptresource exploitation in a claimed area wouldrisk the hostility of other ATCP members and ofthe relevant claimant(s). Even unregulated ex-ploitation of the single unclaimed “slice” ofAntarctica could potentially undermine or de-stroy the ATS.

The United States is a prime architect andsupporter of the ATS. Consistent with thisinterest, it took a lead role in negotiating theConvention to strengthen the System by fillinga large gap. Even though the Minerals Conven-tion does not address all details of how mineralsdevelopment shall be regulated, it is a keyevolutionary step, without which the ATSwould be incomplete.

Since there is potential for breakup of theATS if a major discovery were made in theabsence of the Convention, the Parties are betteroff with regulations than without them. Animportant consideration in whether the requirednumber of ATCPs will ratify the Convention ishow fairly they perceive they have been treatedon the claims issue. Protection of the juridicalpositions of both claimant and nonclaimantcountries is an essential element in this and otheragreements of the ATS. The Minerals Conven-tion does not resolve the claims issue, but skirtsit like other ATS agreements. Conceivably,some nonclaimant states could reject the Con-vention because they believe it goes too far inrecognizing special interests of claimants. Con-versely, some claimant countries may considerrejecting it because ratification would mean

recognition that claimants do not have exclusivemineral rights in areas they claim. To reach anagreement, ATCPs have had to compromise onissues related to claims; negotiators for bothclaimant and nonclaimant states appear to haverecognized that doing so is in their mutualinterest.

If the Convention is ratified, ATCPs may thenbe able to devote more attention to otherpressing Antarctic issues, including the presentproblematic rise of tourism in the region,and-in light of the recent vessel accidents inAntarctic waters—improved vessel safety andpollution control and a general liability regimeto cover pollution incidents. Even if no explora-tion and development occur, the Convention atleast provides a clearer regime for prospecting.

Does the Agreement Advance U.S. Interests?As mentioned, the United States has a strong

interest in strengthening the ATS as a means ofkeeping the region peaceful. The Conventionadvances this interest by keeping the territorialdispute frozen and by addressing the long-standing gap in the ATS on mineral resources.The United States was key in negotiating theAntarctic Treaty in order to prevent Antarcticafrom becoming ‘‘the scene or object of intern-ational discord. ’ The Treaty prohibits any meas-ures of a military nature, including establish-ment of military bases, carrying out of militarymaneuvers, or testing of any weapons. 13 TheTreaty also ensures that the United Statesbenefits from its sizable past investment inAntarctica and current expensive year-roundpresence there. It enables freedom of access tothe entire region. The United States has been astrong leader in the development of the Antarc-tic Treaty System. The United States can ensurethat its leadership role continues through ratifi-cation of the Convention and continued partici-pation in elaborating it.

By carefully prescribing conditions underwhich activities could take place, the Miner-

IJAntarctic Treaiy, Art. 1.

—

Chapter I-Summary, Issues, and Options ● 1 5

als Convention advances the U.S. interest inpreserving the Antarctic environment. Interms of environmental protection, the Conven-tion may be one of the strongest internationalagreements negotiated to date.14 If mineralsexploration and/or development goes forward,there could nevertheless be serious environ-mental consequences. The Convention does notdetail all elements of the environmental protec-tion program. Moreover, how compliance andenforcement would work and how strong theregime would be in practice is uncertain at thisstage. Nevertheless, prospecting, exploration,and development will have to meet stringent andbinding environmental standards and be subjectto rigorous impact assessment procedures. Whilethe Convention makes development possibleunder certain circumstances, it does notpresume that any development will takeplace.

The United States also has an interest inproviding an opportunity for U.S. private indus-try to develop Antarctic resources if and whensuch development is feasible and appropriate.The regime established by the Convention is notintended to promote Antarctic minerals devel-opment. In fact, it contains some stringentcontrols on development. The hurdles that apotential developer would have to clear beforeproposed minerals development could proceedare demanding. On balance, the Conventionappears to be weighted more toward restrict-ing development than assisting it. Potentialdevelopers are concerned about environmentalprotection requirements and also about havingto satisfy the concerns of many different coun-tries before being allowed to proceed with aproject. Like environmentalists, they worry thatelements of the regime are ambiguous.15 Somehave argued that the Minerals Convention

discriminates against private entrepreneurs andfavors state-controlled enterprises that receivegovernment funds, but this conclusion is diffi-cult to prove.

Despite these concerns, U.S. private compa-nies who have studied it generally supportratification of the Convention, if somewhatunenthusiastically. The current Convention ispreferable to no agreement, they argue. U.S.companies already are used to complying withstringent regulations in the United States andabroad, so they should be able to do so inAntarctica if the potential economic gain isadequate. U.S. companies would not be inter-ested in Antarctica’s minerals resources in theabsence of an established legal regime.

Achieving an appropriate and workable bal-ance between environmental protection andresource development is difficult in any context.In the Antarctic, both must be weighed againstthe primary U.S. interest of strengthening theATS and its underlying principles. In the longrun, issues of concern to both commercialand environmental interests may be secon-dary, so long as these underlying principles,which assure the political stability of theregion, are maintained.

Are There Different Types of Agreements ThatWould Be Better Than the Minerals

Convention?

The most discussed alternative is banning allmineral resource activities in Antarctica, possi-bly by designating the entire continent as aworld park or ATCP-administered wildernessreserve. Several ATCPs have indicated opposi-tion to mining in Antarctica and stated that theywould prefer a “full protection option” if theMinerals Convention is not ratified.l6 T h eAntarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, which

lq~tkr frm ~ ~b~l, In~m~m~ ~ti[ute for fivironment ~d &velopment-North America, to Jacques-Yves Cousteau, the CousteauSociety, Sept. 19, 1988.

15s=, for Cxmplc, tie diwusslm abut the appropriate interpretation of M. 54, in ch. 3! P. 80.

16& of AU*W 1989 two c]~~t co~~es, Fr~ce ~d Aus~~ia, had not si~~ tie Convention. Each has stated that 1[ k COtlKITLS ilbolll lk

environmental impacts of mineral resource activities. Signature indicates an intent to ratify but is not required for ratification or accession. SIX ‘AustraliaAdvocates ‘Wddemess’ Status for Antarctica,” Chmrian Science Monitor, May 24, 1989, p. 4,


represents a number of environmental organiza-tions, has recently urged adoption of an Antarc-tic Conservation Convention instead of theMinerals Convention.17 A ban on developmentwould eliminate controversy over minerals ac-tivities and would advance U.S. environmentalinterests. But unanimous support among theATCPs for an outright ban would be difficult toachieve. Certain states, including the UnitedStates, also wish to assure access to the conti-nent’s resources, with the proviso that nosignificant harm should be inflicted on itsenvironment. This option has no chance ofsuccess unless all states with policies of main-taining national access to Antarctic minerals canbe persuaded to change them.

Even if some resource development is al-lowed, the vast majority of Antarctica, includingmost of the 2 percent that is ice-free, is likely toremain essentially undeveloped. In addition, theMinerals Convention effectively bans mineralresource activities absent a consensus decisionto allow them in a specific area. Even then, aseparate consensus decision is required to openeach area considered.

Other theoretical alternatives include:

1.

2.

3.

4.

scrapping the present Antarctic TreatySystem in favor of a regime managed bythe United Nations,recognizing the claims and treating Ant-arctica as no different from any other areaunder sovereign control,convincing claimants to exchange theirexclusive claims for a condominium inwhich all ATCPs would jointly own Ant-arctica’s resources, ordoing nothing, hoping that the status quowould not be challenged by a majorresource discovery.

For different reasons, it does not appear that aninternational consensus could be reached for anyof these potential alternatives. Regarding the

first alternative, ATCPs have strongly opposedinvolving the United Nations in the past andbelieve only those countries with demonstratedspecial interests in Antarctica should be fullyentitled to participate in establishing and operat-ing a regime for the continent. They also realizetheir own influence would be diluted in thebroader U.N. forum.

On possible recognition of claims, alternative2, neither the United States, which reserves theright to make a claim of its own, nor othernonclaimants have been willing to seriouslyconsider changing long-held claims policies. Inthe case of the overlapping claims of Chile,Argentina, and the United Kingdom, whichclaim should be accepted? And if the UnitedStates or Soviet Union should ever decide tomake claims, the situation would become evenmore difficult. Likewise, alternative 3, cancel-ing claims in favor of a condominium, hasalways been rejected by the claimants. It alsobecomes more problematic as the number ofATCPs continues to increase. In general, giventhe history of the claims, the multilateralnature of the negotiation, the conflictinginterests at stake, and the unique juridicalstatus of Antarctica, it is unlikely that afundamentally different regime could havebeen negotiated.

Can Provisions of the Existing Agreement BeMade More Satisfactory If We Choose Not To

Ratify It in Its Present Form?

The provisions of the Minerals Conventionwere negotiated as a package, and compromisewas the price of an agreement. The Conventioncannot be amended until 10 years after it entersinto force. The Convention must either beratified or accepted as is or rejected. The UnitedStates, with its veto, as well as each of theseven claimant states and the Soviet Union,can unilaterally prevent the Convention fromentering into force. A veto would carry no

17An~ti~ ~ so~~cm ~ ~~tion, “Permanent Protection for Antarctica: A Conservation Convention is Urgently Needed, ” ASOCInformation Paper No. 2, May 11, 1989.

Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 17

assurance that the parties would try to negotiatea different accord. If the Convention doesenter into force, the United States or anyother Commission member could preventexploration and development later by exer-cising its veto at the area identification stage.

Ratification of the Minerals Convention wouldadvance important U.S. interests in Antarctica,including securing nondiscriminatory access toAntarctica’s mineral resources and protectingthe environment, as well as in maintaining thepeace and strengthening the ATS. There are nocompelling reasons for the United States toreject the Minerals Convention. As a member ofall the regime’s institutions, the United Statescould be influential in the continuing evolutionof the Minerals Convention, as well as inprotecting U.S. interests. Moreover, implement-ing legislation required to enable domesticagencies to carry out resource-related responsi-bilities in Antarctica provides an opportunity forCongress to define environmental and develop-ment interests and to clarify U.S. interpretationsof ambiguous elements of the regime.

THE RESOURCE POTENTIALOF ANTARCTICA

Although several countries are conductinggeologic research in Antarctica and interestin prospecting is growing, little is currentlyknown about its actual mineral resources.There are no known mineral deposits ofcommercial interest. The limited knowledgeabout Antarctica’s mineral resources has beengained through fieldwork by geologists andgeophysicists, mostly in the 2 percent of thecontinent that is not covered by ice or on thesurrounding continental shelves. Some insightinto the possible prospects for ore mineraliza-tion or petroleum accumulation in Antarcticahas been gained through knowledge of thedeposits that have been found on the surround-ing continents in related geological environ-ments. This has been possible because Antarc-tica is thought once to have been part of a larger

Photo credit U S Geo/ogca/ survey

Aerial view of the U.S. South Pole Station.

continent called Gondwana that, before break-up, included South America, Africa, southernIndia, and Australia.

The best prospects for petroleum explorationare the offshore sedimentary basins surroundingAntarctica. Sedimentary basins on the continentare covered by the thick ice cap, and thus, in theabsence of significant technological develop-ments, are inaccessible for exploitation. Basedon what is currently known about the thickness,organic content, age, and thermal history ofsediments in offshore basins, the most interest-ing areas are the Weddell and Ross embaymentsin West Antarctica, and Prydz Bay and theWilkes Land margin in East Antarctica.

Until detailed exploration in these sedi-mentary basins is carried out, includingextensive seismic surveys and exploratorydrilling, meaningful estimates of resourcepotential cannot be made. Past estimates ofAntarctica’s oil potential have been based onvirtually no data and may be very misleading.


While some Antarctic basins may ultimatelyattract commercial interest, the sedimentarybasins in the surrounding continents that havecounterparts in Antarctica are not, for the mostpart, major petroleum producing areas. The U.S.Geological Survey estimates that a generalreconnaissance program for all of Antarcticacould cost about $250 million over a 10-yearperiod, the largest cost element being logisticalSupport (See ch. 4 ) .

Scientists have discovered small amounts,termed occurrences, of many different types ofmetallic and nonmetallic minerals in Antarctica.However the only known substantial mineralaccumulations, or deposits, in Antarctica areiron ore and coal. Low-value, high-volumedeposits such as these, which are plentifulelsewhere in the world, would not be ofeconomic interest in Antarctica. It is highlyunlikely that an export market for Antarctic coalor iron ore would develop.

The Antarctic Peninsula presents the bestopportunity for finding hard mineral depos-its on the continent, in part because of thegreater proportion of exposed rock there.Based on the geology of the Peninsula, the bestprospects for discovery are base metal (copper,lead, and zinc) and precious metal (gold andsilver) deposits. Outside the Antarctic Penin-sula, the chances of finding mineral deposits inexposed areas are small. One exception could bethe Dufek Intrusion in the northern PensacolaMountains 300 miles from the coast, althoughlittle of it is exposed. This intrusion has apossible analog in the mineral-rich BushveldComplex in southern Africa, and thus, couldhost platinum group metals, chromium, copper,cobalt, and/or nickel. Virtually all of the poten-tially economic minerals known to occur inAntarctica are currently abundant in other, moreaccessible areas of the world.

The prospects for finding placer deposits ordeposits enriched by weathering are also lowthroughout Antarctica. The required near-

surface weathering processes and significantparticle transport by running water have notoccurred in Antarctica since the onset of glacia-tion 35 to 40 million years ago. Furthermore,these types of deposits tend to be found inlowland areas rather than on mountain tops,which comprise most of the exposed rock inAntarctica.

ENVIRONMENTALCONSIDERATIONS

The potential for minerals development inAntarctica raises concerns about the impactsthat minerals activities could have on the area’sterrestrial and marine ecosystems and atmos-phere. The Minerals Convention includes bind-ing general standards and procedures designedto ‘ensure that any resource development thatdoes take place occurs in an environmentallysound manner. However, the Convention doesnot provide detailed environmental regulations.The key to minimizing and mitigating adverseenvironmental impacts will be future elabo-ration of more detailed criteria and regulationsto interpret and apply the general standards,guidelines, and procedures. United States imple-menting legislation may provide a measure ofthe environmental protection regulations andprograms that eventually will be developedcollectively by the Parties. In addition, muchmore environmental data and information willbe needed before decisions about the acceptabil-ity of minerals activities can be made.

The Minerals Convention contains importantcompliance and enforcement provisions. How-ever, there are important questions about howwell these provisions will work in practice.Strong enforcement provisions have been diffi-cult to agree on in the Antarctic context becausethey are interpreted by claimants as bearing ontheir rights to police their national territory. Anyissues that touch on claims may not be treated asthoroughly as those in which sovereign rightsare not an issue.

Chapter 1--Summary, Issues, and Option ● 19

Local impacts from any minerals develop-ment that does take place will be unavoida-ble. Mere construction of facilities, for instance,not to mention land-based mining itself, willhave significant but probably only very localimpacts. Siting of facilities in any case may bedifficult: facilities will likely be constructed onsolid ground, and good facility sites are rare andpotentially already occupied by wildlife orscientific bases. It is doubtful that resourceactivities will be allowed in environmentallysensitive areas or in areas important to science.

A major oil spill from a tanker accident, suchas the recent Exxon Valdez accident in Alaska,or a well blowout, although rare events, wouldbe two of the more significant unintentionalimpacts associated with development and wouldhave regional as well as local impacts. Inparticular, such a spill in a coastal area couldhave substantial and long-lasting effects onlarge numbers of birds and/or marine mammals;a similar spill in the open ocean would be of lessconcern. As illustrated by the recent oil spillby the Argentine supply and tourist vesselBahia Paraiso, the Antarctic Treaty Consul-tative Parties are not now adequately pre-pared to contain and clean up offshore oilspills in Antarctica. (To its credit, however, theU.S. National Science Foundation mounted itsresponse effort quickly). Improvements in tech-nology and response capability could—andundoubtedly will—be made prior to any Antarc-tic oil development; however, oil spill equip-ment and countermeasures for use in harshenvironments are limited at present. Although itis essential to be as prepared as possible, it isunlikely that significant amounts of oil could berecovered from a major accident in any harshoperating environment, including Antarctica,using today’s best recovery technology.

Environmental impacts from past activities inAntarctica would probably be considered bymost people to be insignificant. Most impacts(e.g., disposal of wastes generated by normalhuman activities) have been restricted to the

terrestrial and nearshore marine environments inthe immediate vicinity of the 48 year-round and19 summer research stations operated by 18nations. Undoubtedly, the most significant pastimpacts have been caused in offshore areas byoverharvesting fur seals, whales, and fish.However, human activity has been increasing inAntarctica and is likely to continue to grow.Future impacts can be expected to increase aswell. Minerals development per se is not ex -pected to be an immediate concern. Of moreimportance in the near-term will be activitiesrelated to science, tourism, harvesting of livingresources, and perhaps minerals prospecting.Environmental impacts associated with geologi-cal and geophysical prospecting are likely to beinsignificant and no different from those associ-ated with similar science activities, unless doneon a large scale by many countries.

Mineral resource development in Antarctica,and especially accidents resulting from explora-tion or development, could adversely impactsome research projects and the value of Antarc-tica as a science laboratory. Projects dealingwith biological processes or ecosystem dynam-ics would likely be most affected by nearbydevelopment activities or oil spills. However,most Antarctic research would probably not beadversely impacted by resource activities. Un-derstanding of oceanography, marine ecology,meteorology, and cold-region engineering couldbe improved by the research needed to preparefor resource recovery.

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICCONSIDERATIONS FOR OIL

DEVELOPMENTWhether oil companies will have the techni-

cal capabilities to develop any large fields foundin Antarctica depends on both the specificenvironmental and geological conditions wherethe field is located and on the status of’ technol-ogy. Whether they will have the incentive todevelop a field depends on profitability and risk,both political and financial. Considering eco-


nomic and political constraints, as well as thelong lead times that would be required toproduce oil in Antarctica, OTA does notexpect that any oil production would takeplace in Antarctica sooner than the next 30years, if ever.

It is unlikely that anything smaller than aworld-class giant (500 million to 5 billionbarrels of recoverable oil) or super-giant (over 5billion barrels) field with high productivity willever be economic to develop in Antarctica (seech. 4 and app. A). Probably only a handful ofsuch large, high-quality fields are left to befound in the entire world, so a discovery inAntarctica would be likely to attract commercialinterest.

The rigorous environment of Antarctica issuch that oil production there will probably bemore difficult than production thus far anywhereelse in the world. Most of Antarctica is colder,stormier, and more isolated than other challeng-ing areas in which the oil industry has operated,and it has a continental shelf three to six timesdeeper than the global mean. Even so, requiredtechnologies for some types of Antarcticdevelopment will probably not be substan-tially different from those now used, orcontemplated for use, by major firms in otherharsh operating areas. Offshore technologieshave evolved in discrete, incremental steps overthe last 20 years, as industry has moved into evermore difficult areas. Exploration is currentlyunderway, for instance, in the relatively shallowbut seasonally ice-covered Beaufort andChukchi Seas offshore Alaska and Canada; theiceberg-prone region between Greenland andeastern Canada; and the North Sea, NorthAtlantic, and Norwegian Sea. To date, the mostsignificant production experience in harsh envi-ronments has been in the North Sea, butproduction in very deep water has begun in suchareas as the Gulf of Mexico and offshore Brazil.

The easiest type of offshore development thatcan be contemplated-and likely the first type of

development that would be tried in Antarctica—would be one in an area relatively free oficebergs. For this type of development, most ofthe technology is available, although a completesystem would require combining technologiesdeveloped for ice-covered areas and for deepwater. The industry does not yet have muchexperience operating in environments character-ized by both deep water and seasonal sea iceand/or icebergs.

In areas where icebergs are likely to be aproblem, additional technology development,some of which is underway now in other hostileareas, will be needed. Since long lead times andappropriate economic incentives will be neededin any case to bring a field into production inAntarctica, the required technology is likely tobe available by the earliest credible date aproject could be brought on stream. Technolo-gies for use in other hostile areas (e.g., theiceberg-prone Labrador Sea) are likely to con-tinue to be improved, and these would beavailable for use in Antarctica.

It will likely be technically possible toproduce oil from under Antarctica’s ice shelvesand moving ice cap some day; however, newtechnology will be needed to develop any fieldsfound in these areas.

OTA constructed several hypothetical scenar-ios (see app. A) to illustrate likely technologyrequirements for offshore oil development inAntarctica and to gain some insight into theeconomics of producing oil there. This model-ing exercise, although fraught with uncertainty,indicates at least a doubling of current world oilprices would be required to develop a very largeoil deposit on a commercial basis in Antarctica.OTA assumed very favorable circumstances inits scenarios: first, that a world-class giant fieldis discovered in an area in which production istechnically feasible; second, that the timing ofdevelopment is far enough in the future so thatall pre-production activities can be accom-plished and all needed technology is available;


and third, that the Parties determine that devel-opment in the area in which the field is locatedis consistent with the standards of the MineralsConvention and that they assure the developerrights to produce the field. If these assumptionsare not realized, an Antarctic developmentprospect probably would not go forward.

OTA also examined briefly the potential forproducing Antarctic oil in the context of futureworld liquid fuels supply and demand. Given themany uncertainties involved in projecting whatmay occur 30 years or more from now, defini-tive statements are not possible. There appear tobe enough proven reserves of conventional oilon hand to satisfy world oil demand at leastthrough 2020. Also, many alternatives to the useof conventional oil exist--ego, unconventionalheavy oil, tar sands, and oil shale-which givenhigher prices could ultimately contribute sig-nificant amounts of energy to the world supply.Conservation and the greater use of alternativesto liquid fuels may become more important asthe price of oil rises. Global warming couldinduce countries to decrease the use of fossilfuels. All these factors would tend to delay ordeter serious consideration of Antarctic oil.Even so, the discovery of a large oil fieldanywhere in the world, including Antarctica,will attract commercial interest. If such a field isfound in Antarctica and could be developed at aprofit, chances are high that someone will wishto do SO.

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICCONSIDERATIONS FOR HARD

MINERALS DEVELOPMENT

Some insight into the technical feasibility ofdeveloping a hard minerals mine in Antarcticacan be gained from the experience of mining inthe High Arctic. Mining has been conducted insevere winter climates north of the Arctic Circle

for more than 30 years, and technologies forboth open pit and underground mining haveevolved to cope with the attendant difficultoperating conditions. The costs to developArctic mines are much higher than those formines in more temperate climates. Thus, onlyworld-class deposits in relatively accessibleareas, like the Polaris lead-zinc mine locatedalong the coast of Little Comwallis Island innorthern Canada, have been economic to de-velop. Such deposits typically contain in situ orevalued at more than $200 per ton.

In general, mining operations in most ofAntarctica will be even more difficult and costlythan operations in the Arctic, given Antarctica’sgreater isolation and more severe climate. Mineswould have to be located on land massesgenerally free of snow and ice. Transportation offuel and concentrates would be difficult andcostly tasks. Port facilities would be expensiveand hard to locate, build, and maintain. How-ever, world-class deposits of equal or greatersize and quality to those now being mined inthe Arctic could probably be mined economi-cally in the reasonably accessible parts ofAntarctica, such as coastal locations on theAntarctic Peninsula. Existing mining, process-ing, and transportation technology could beadapted for use in these areas. In place ore valuesof from $200 to $400 per ton, depending on thelocation, would probably be required.

The hard mineral deposits with the bestprospects for economic recovery in Antarc-tica would be low-volume, high-value depos-its such as gold, particularly if found on theAntarctic Peninsula. A reasonably accessible,high-grade gold deposit would be a relativelygood economic prospect because the gold prod-uct would not be as costly to transport as bulkierore concentrates. The likelihood of economicexploitation of hard minerals outside theAntarctic Peninsula is low, especially in therelatively inaccessible inland areas. Develop-ing a mine in the interior of Antarctica would beextremely difficult, and it is unlikely that mining


USGS field camp at Lake Vanda in Dry Valley area near McMurdo.

initially would be conducted year round in harshinterior areas. The transportation system forinterior operations also would be very expen-sive.

It is not obvious whether a hard mineraldeposit or an oil field would be the first to beexploited in Antarctica if resources are discov-ered and exploration is allowed. Either would beof interest if it were of world-class quality. it isclear, however, that before any adequate assess-ment of resources can be made, much more

Photo credit U.S Geological Survey

geology and mineralwill need to be assem-

knowledge about thepotential of Antarcticabled; furthermore, before any deposit could beexploited, temporal data about the operatingenvironment will be needed, and detailed andexpensive exploration of specific sites wouldhave to be undertaken. Although one study hasbeen optimistic about the feasibility of develop-ing mineral resources in Antarctica’s interior,OTA has concluded that this study has underes-timated the costs and difficulties of Antarcticmining. 18

18M. Magee, ‘ ‘Assessment of Mhung and Process ‘Ikchnolo~~ for Antarcmc Mineral Development, ” OTA Contractor report, Nov. 1988. See alsoD.K. Beike, “An Engineering Evaluation of Mining m Antarctica: A Ca..c Study of I%mnum,” Master’s Thesis, University of’ ‘lkxas at Austin, May1988.

Chapter 1---Summary, Issues, and Options . 23

IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS

Introduction

The Senate must give its advice and consentto U.S. ratification of the Minerals Convention.If the Convention is ratified and enters intoforce, both Houses will have to approve imple-menting legislation so the Federal Governmentcan meet at least its minimal obligations as aparty to the Convention (e.g., designating repre-sentatives to the Commission, Regulatory Com-mittee(s), etc.).

The minerals negotiations have been thedriving force in the recent evolution of theAntarctic Treaty System. The United States,through the policies, programs, and institutionalarrangements it chooses now, can influence theevolution of the Antarctic regime and helpassure that Antarctica remains a zone of peace.Congress has an opportunity, beyond meetingminimal legal requirements, to guide U.S.Antarctic policy through the implementing legisla-tion it adopts.

At one level, implementation requires that thebroad foreign policy, political, and nationalsecurity interests of the United States arefulfilled. At a second level, domestic regulatory,operational, and scientific needs related to anyminerals activities the United States may chooseto sponsor need to be considered. These needswould vary, depending on the scope of mineralsactivities the United States decides to undertakeor promote. The more involved the UnitedStates becomes (or plans to become) in Antarc-tic resource development, the larger the requiredFederal effort may need to be.

This section begins with a brief discussion ofthe steps that should be taken in implementinglegislation to ensure that the foreign policyinterests of the United States are safeguarded.The primary requirement is to designate Federalagency representatives to the institutions estab-lished by the Minerals Convention.

Ratification of the Minerals Conventiondoes not require or presume that the UnitedStates will itself become involved in mineralsprospecting, exploration, or development, oreven that it engage in minerals-related re-search. Other countries may undertake mineralsactivities, however, even if the United Statesdoes not; thus, the United States must have somecapability to evaluate proposed activities ofothers. If the United States decides to sponsorprospecting itself, it must establish the addedcapability to evaluate and regulate Operators itmay sponsor. A U.S. decision to sponsorexploration and development in the futurewould require an even broader capability. Animportant aspect of implementing legislationwill be to establish a regulatory and institutionalstructure for managing any minerals activitiesthe United States may sponsor in Antarctica.The second part of this section considers generalregulatory needs and evaluates four possiblelead agencies for Antarctic minerals affairs. Afifth alternative, creation of a United StatesAntarctic Agency, is considered as a futurepossibility if general U.S. activities in Antarc-tica increase significantly.

Data and information needs are likely to growin proportion to the level of U.S. involvement inAntarctic minerals activities. These needs arediscussed in the third part of this section inrelation to the type and timing of mineralsactivities the United States could undertake.

Since a separate protocol on liability isrequired to be negotiated and ratified before anyexploration or development in Antarctica maybe allowed, the Senate may wish to consider theimplications of ratifying the Minerals Conven-tion before this protocol has been negotiated andof delaying ratification until after a protocol hasbeen concluded. A discussion of this issue ispresented in the last part of this section.


Advancing the Foreign Policy Goalsof the United States

The most important justification for ratifyingthe Minerals Convention is to safeguard andpromote the foreign policy and political objec-tives of the United States-that is, to protect theATS and preserve Antarctica as a zone of peace.If the Convention is ratified, the United Statescan advance these objectives and maintain acontinuing leadership role among the ATCPs byactively participating in it. At a minimum then,the United States will have to decide whichagency or agencies will represent it in theConvention institutions and participate inrelevant policy determinations. The UnitedStates is entitled to be represented in allinstitutions created by the Minerals Convention.

The interagency Antarctic Policy Group (APG)determines U.S. Antarctic policy. All U.S.representatives to the institutions of the Conven-tion would be bound by the policies establishedby this group. As Chairman of the APG and leadnegotiator on Antarctic policy issues, the De-partment of State currently represents the UnitedStates at all ATS meetings. Other Federalagencies and private sector organizations arerepresented on U.S. delegations to these meet-ings. The U.S. representative to the MineralsConvention Commission and to the SpecialMeeting of Parties must have the authority torepresent the broad spectrum of specific U.S.interests in Antarctica. Hence, the Departmentof State is the most appropriate candidate torepresent the United States at meetings of theseinstitutions; other U.S. agencies could be in-cluded in the delegation as appropriate. Becausethe Department of State represents the UnitedStates at other ATS meetings, it is also theFederal agency best qualified to coordinateresponsibilities under the Minerals Conventionwith other ATS responsibilities.

The Convention establishes an AdvisoryCommittee responsible for providing advice tothe other institutions on the full range of

Photo credif U S Geological Survey

All directions point north from the South Pole. The geodesicdome at the U.S. South Pole Station is in the background.

scientific, environmental, and technical issues.Each Party’s representative must have suitablescientific, technical, or environmental compe-tence or be accompanied by experts and advi-sors. Either the State Department, as overallcoordinator of U.S. Antarctic policy, or atechnically qualified U.S. expert could representthe United States on the Advisory Committee. Inany case, it will be essential to draw on theexpertise available in the National ScienceFoundation, the Department of the Interior, theNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-tion, the Environmental Protection Agency, theMarine Mammal Commission, the academiccommunity, and industry. Wide-ranging exper-

Chapter1--Summary, Issues, and Options ● 25

tise will also be required to make the decisionsassigned to the Regulatory Committees, if andwhen they are established.

Establishing a Regulatory and InstitutionalStructure

At the present time, little or no interest existsin resource development per se, but severalnations appear to be interested in prospecting. Amajor policy issue for the United States is todecide whether to sponsor prospecting. Even ifit does not become a sponsor, other countries arelikely to do so. Thus, if the United States wishesto be actively and responsibly involved in theinstitutions of the Minerals Convention and,specifically, in ensuring that others comply withthe Convention’s environmental and other pro-visions, it will need to establish some capabilityfor evaluating the prospecting (and potentiallyalso the exploration and development) activitiesof Operators sponsored by other countries.

If the United States decides to sponsorprospecting itself, a basic obligation would be toensure that the Operators it sponsors act in amanner consistent with the principles of theMinerals Convention. In this case, implement-ing legislation would need to address how toregulate the Operators it sponsors, what infor-mation is required to make informed judgmentsabout prospecting (and how to obtain it), andwhich agency or agencies will be in charge ofany program established to carry out theseactivities.

The agency assigned to handle sponsorship ofprospecting would need to have the capability toguide preparation of the prospecting notificationto the Commission, to evaluate and possiblyprepare environmental impact assessments, andto monitor the activities of Operators. Imple-menting legislation might include proceduresand information requirements for sponsoring,evaluating, and certifying U.S. Operators seek-ing to undertake Antarctic mineral resourceactivities; procedures for meeting environmentalimpact assessment requirements; procedures

and criteria for determining that an operator hasand maintains the necessary substantial andgenuine link with the United States; proceduresand criteria for determining the financial andtechnical qualifications of operators; proceduresand criteria for suspending or terminating spon-sorship; provisions to make violations of theConvention violations of U.S. law; and provi-sions establishing at least an interim liabilityregime for prospecting pending entry into forceof the liability protocol.

Initially, there may actually be little that aFederal entity responsible for prospecting wouldbe required to do. The data and informationrequirements to demonstrate consistency withMinerals Convention standards will be rela-tively small compared to what would be re-quired for exploration and development, and theimpacts associated with prospecting are ex-pected to be negligible. In addition, the amountof activity likely to take place in the near termis not likely to be great. Hence, new responsibili-ties could probably be accomplished by a smallstaff. A similarly small program would beindicated if the United States decides not tosponsor prospecting itself but only to establishthe capability to evaluate and monitor Operatorsfrom other countries. In designing a programand assigning responsibility for evaluating andoverseeing prospecting, Congress and the Ad-ministration may want to keep in mind that thesame entity may be called on later to considerand regulate exploration and development.

Currently, no existing agency has the fullrange of experience and capabilities to imple-ment a prospecting program (and potentially anexploration and development program as well).Beyond its major role in coordinating andadvancing U.S. Antarctic policy, the Depart-ment of State is not equipped to play a major rolein regulating minerals activities. It does not havethe experience, the mandate, or the technicalexpertise to evaluate and regulate operators or tomanage any directed research. Indeed, onlythree executive agencies approximate the


legislative mandate and experience requiredto meet the major demands of the MineralsConvention: the National Science Founda-tion, the Department of the Interior, and theNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-stration in the Department of Commerce.

The National Science Foundation (NSF)

The National Science Foundation has beenactive in Antarctica since 1957 and responsiblefor U.S. research activities there since 1971. TheFoundation’s United States Antarctic Programis responsible for research, operations, andlogistics. The Program’s budget requests aremade and defended by NSF. Unless there is amajor change in U.S. Antarctic policy, NSF willcontinue to play a major role on the continent.

There are four reasons why NSF might bechosen to administer a mineral resource pro-gram. First, the Foundation’s support for Ant-arctic research has provided a sound basis foraddressing the environmental and resource in-formation needs required if prospecting, explo-ration, and development are undertaken. Sec-ond, any effort in Antarctica must depend onreliable logistics, experience, and capability.The National Science Foundation, in closecooperation with the U.S. Navy, has developedthe necessary skills and has the specializedequipment required for working in the conti-nent’s hostile environment. It could provideuseful advice to commercial operators in Ant-arctica. Third, NSF has established strong ties tothe relatively small community of academicresearchers and program managers whose ex-pertise will be critical for addressing the re-source and environmental assessment issuescentral to the Convention. Finally, successiveadministrations have charged the Foundationwith responsibility for a wide range of U.S.

Antarctic activities; thus, NSF has an estab-lished legitimacy domestically and internatio-nally.

There are, however, limits to an expandedNSF role. The National Science Foundation’soverall mandate is to be the primary Federalpatron for basic academic research. One conse-quence has been a deep reluctance to support inany sustained fashion the environmental moni-toring, survey, or baseline activities anticipatedby the Minerals Convention and typically per-formed by mission-oriented agencies, and asimilar reluctance to support directed researchaimed at determining the resource potential ofAntarctica. 19 Although NSF has been respon-sive to proposals generated by academic scien-tists, it has not assumed leadership for develop-ment of the kinds of resource assessmentprograms of increasing interest to other govern-ment agencies, environmentalists, or commer-cial interests. For example, the Foundation didnot play a prominent role in the negotiation ofthe marine living resources treaty (CCAMLR)or the Minerals Convention. Even with addi-tional funds, NSF’s academic constituency wouldbe reserved in its enthusiasm for such anexpanded role, particularly since it could meanthat funds for basic research would be divertedto support the applied work needed to supportU.S. minerals activities. However, NSF couldacquire the capability to undertake long-termmonitoring in Antarctica if directed to do so.

More generally, NSF has expressed littleinterest in developing long-range policies for theU.S. Antarctic Program outside the continuedsupport for basic research and logistics. Forexample, it does not support a separate policyand planning staff that addresses issues such astourism and resource development except as

I~e ~tenti~ fmconfllct wl~ ml=lon age~ies Wm su=e~~ by the U.S. Gdog]cd Survey, which ~gud I.M t-he ‘ ‘dhated shofi-te~ ~~~ch’called for in President Reagan’s 1982 policy statement did not meet long-term needs in earth sciences. Furthermore, the charge to NSF to supportuniversity and Federal agency research in Antarctica put federal agencies m competition with academic instituhons for funds, rather than establishingfunding opportunities that would nurture complementary agency and university programs. The Role of the Natwnai Science Foundation m PolarRegwrts-A Report to the National Science Board (NSB-87-128), p, 8.


they affect NSF’s basic science mission.20

Moreover, the Foundation has no natural re-source management experience or responsibilities.To assign NSF the responsibility for implement-ing the Minerals Convention would requireadditional staff experienced in the administra-tive, procedural, technical, and economic dimen-sions of resource management, and would marka significant departure from the Foundation’straditional basic research mission.

The National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA)

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-stration includes among its missions responsi-bility for directed and applied research tosupport marine resource management. Its areasof direct responsibility include fisheries, marinemammals (in conjunction with the Fish andWildlife Service), marine and estuarine pollu-tion, and the implementation of the 1980 DeepSeabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, includingassessment of the environmental impacts ofdeep seabed minerals development. The Na-tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrationis generally perceived as more responsive thanother resource management agencies to theconcerns of environmental interests, and hasalso received the support of the deep oceanmining industry for its responsiveness to thespecial requirements of that industry.

Although NOAA’s field experience in Ant-arctica is limited relative to NSF’s, NOAAscientists have conducted research in the South-ern Ocean. The y have also conducted research inthe Arctic in support of the U.S. Alaskan OuterContinental Shelf leasing program.21 The Na-

tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrationalso has extensive environmental data archivingcapabilities. For example, the National Environ-mental Satellite Data and Information Servicecompiles and maintains a variety of Antarcticdata sets. In response to the requirements of theAntarctic Marine Living Resources ConventionAct of 1984 (Public Law 98-623), NOAA hasbeen given responsibility for directed researchon the living marine resources of Antarctica.The information generated by this program willbe essential for environmental impact assess-ments of proposed oil and gas activities on theAntarctic continental margin.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-stration also has research and managementresponsibilities for deep seabed hard minerals.The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Actof 1980 (Public Law 96-283) mandated thatNOAA establish procedures for the orderlyexploration and commercial recovery of manga-nese nodules from the deep seafloor. The act isrelevant to the Antarctic Minerals Conventionbecause it provides a regulatory framework forthe management of mineral resources beyondthe limits of U.S. jurisdiction. The absence ofterritorial control required that the United Statesbase its jurisdictional claims on the power of theUnited States to regulate activities of its citizensoutside its territory.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-istration grants licenses for exploration andpermits for commercial recovery for areas of thedeep seabed selected by an applicant who mustprove financial and technological capability toconduct the proposed work. The agency is alsorequired to prepare an environmental impact

mA ~mpmhenslvemvlew of NSF’s rolc in polar regions indirectly acknowledged that the Foundation hid not playd a pmmticnt rok in policy issueswhen it remmmended that it become more active in policy analysis and decision-making on Arctic and Antarctic policy issues through evaluation ofpotential policy issues and options. The Role of the National Science Foundation in Polar Regiom, ibid., p. 52.

zlwl~out ~=~ng s~ll~tles ~ f=, the exwneme ~ tie arctic is instructive. Prior to 1973, there WitS little information available with which toassess the impact of oil and gas development, particukuly along the Alaskan margin. Because the Depanrnent of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management(BLM) lacked the inhouse capabilities to work on the Alaskan shelf, it contracted with NOAA in 1974 to design and manage an environmental studiesprogram, the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Assessment Program (OCSEAP) for Alaskan Studies. The program has since become one of themost comprehensive programs of its kind for the collation and assessment of arctic environmental information. NOAA contracted with the U.S.Geological Survey for much of the geology and gwphysical wok cmduc[ed. Oil and (2ZJ Technologies for the Arcfic and Deepvater, (Washington,DC: U,S, (lmgrcss, Office of lkchnology Assessment, OTA-O-270, May 1985), p. 165.


statement before granting a license or permit,both of which are contingent on steps to protectenvironmental quality and to conserve themineral resource. Although commercial deepocean mining has yet to occur, NOAA hasestablished a framework to accommodate theseactivities once they become economically at-tractive. The National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration also has a fleet of vesselscapable of conducting and supporting researchin Antarctica.

However, NOAA has much less experience inAntarctica than NSF. Moreover, it has had nolegal mandate, research experience, or manage-ment responsibility for onshore minerals.22

While NOAA has developed a scheme tomanage deep ocean mining, it has so far noexperience in managing development of theseresources. More generally, assignment of soleresponsibility to NOAA for both scientific andminerals management responsibilities could under-mine NOAA’s identity in the environmentalcommunity as a resource conservation agency.

The Department of the Interior

Interior has a clear legislative responsibilityas well as broad experience on a wide range ofmineral and environmental resources in theUnited States and U.S. Exclusive EconomicZone (EEZ). Interior’s activities are pursuedthrough several agencies in the department, inparticular, the Minerals Management Service(MMS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and theBureau of Mines (BOM).

Minerals Management Service-MMS isresponsible for offshore minerals leasing andlease management under provisions of the OuterContinental Shelf Lands Act. The MineralsManagement Service has programs to:

. manage the leasing of oil and gas and otherminerals in offshore areas under the juris-

●

●

●

diction of the United States (including U.S.Arctic areas),supervise mineral exploration, develop-ment, production, and operations in accordwith permits and leases issued by thedepartment,collect and distribute revenue due theFederal Government from onshore andoffshore mineral leases, andassess environmental impacts associatedwith minerals development in offshoreareas subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

In 1973, Interior initiated the EnvironmentalStudies Program to gather information foraccelerated leasing on the U.S. outer continentalshelf (OCS). First located in BLM, and thenmoved to the MMS when it was established in1982, the program generates environmentalinformation used by the Secretary of the Interiorand by the environmental assessment and leas-ing management divisions of MMS to meet theirresponsibilities under the National Environ-mental Policy Act and the OCS Lands Act. Mostof the work of this program is contracted touniversity researchers.

Bureau of Land Management—The Bureauis responsible for conducting programs for theconservation, development and management ofboth surface and mineral resources on thenation’s public lands (including U.S. Arcticareas). The Bureau’s main task is to managethese holdings and their resources from amultiple use perspective by seeking the best mixof uses that an area can sustain to provide thegreatest public benefit. Specific energy andmineral programs include resource evaluation,leasing, and supervision of Federal and Indiancoal, oil and gas, geothermal resources, oilshale, tar sands, and nonenergy minerals. Inaddition, BLM prepares environmental impactassessments of proposed minerals development,implements measures to mitigate negative envi-

= the other hand, Antarctica’s cmshore minerals are not, according to the U.S. view, within our national jurisdiction, and in this sense they aresimilar to deep seabed minerals. NOAA argues that it should be in charge of all rmcmrces beyond national jurisdiction, whether on land or at sea

Chapter I---Summary, Issues,and Options ● 2 9

ronmental effects, and administers laws govern-ing mining on public lands and the sale ofminerals.

U.S. Geological Survey-The Survey ischarged with enlarging the Nation’s knowledgeabout the extent, distribution, and character ofwater and other natural resources, and thegeological processes, structures, and hazardsthat affect the development and use of the land.It pursues this mandate through a program ofmapping, geological research, and mineral andenergy resource assessments on land and in theEEZ. Specifically, USGS researchers producegeophysical, geological, and geochemical mapsand analyses which show the distribution, age,composition, structure, and physical propertiesof the rocks and mineral deposits at and beneaththe Earth’s surface. It also provides informationon geologic hazards such as earthquakes, volca-noes, landslides, and land subsidence that affecthuman safety, urban development, and engi-neering design of sensitive structures. Moregenerally, USGS provides data and analysis foruse by other Federal and State agencies in themanagement of public lands, wilderness studies,and multiple use planning, and in national policydeterminations including energy developmentand mineral resource availability. Several USGSscientists have experience doing geological andgeophysical research in Antarctica.

Under the National Mineral Resources Assess-ment Program (NAMRAP), USGS has con-ducted systematic regional assessments of min-eral resource potential in the United States. Theassessments have been used for land use deci-sions as well as by private industry exploring forspecific deposits. Based on NAMRAP experi-ence and related geological studies and subjectto congressional appropriations, the Surveycould conduct a two-part program for Antarcticaif the Convention enters into force: first, aregional resource assessment of the entire conti-nent; and second, a more detailed study of areasthat could have deposits of economic value.

Bureau of Mines—The Bureau of Mines isthe principal Federal agency responsible forconducting research on mineral reserves and theproduction, consumption, and recycling of min-eral materials. The Bureau’s mission is to helpassure that the United States has the mineralsupplies necessary to maintain national securityand economic growth at low social and environ-mental costs. The Bureau also fosters andencourages minerals production by the privatesector so that national needs can be supplied bydomestic sources.

If emphasis is to be on the managementaspects of Antarctic minerals prospecting, ex-ploration, and development, then assigning amajor role to Interior would be a reasonablechoice, given the experience of the domestic oil,gas, and minerals industry with the proceduresand regulatory requirements of the variousInterior agencies. Such an orientation wouldalso be compatible with the historical emphasison resource development in the Department ofthe Interior. Together, USGS, MMS, BLM, andBOM have the experience and expertise toconduct exploratory studies, establish realisticterms and conditions for minerals activities inboth onshore and offshore areas of Antarctica,and to establish the regulatory requirementsassociated with these efforts.

Despite this experience with environmentaland resource assessment, Interior has had littleexperience managing resource activities outsidethe continental United States. Were it to beassigned major responsibility for Antarctic min-eral affairs, it would need to choose a leadagency within Interior. Otherwise. responsibil-ity and visibility for Antarctic affairs would bediffuse and fragmented.

A New, Independent Commission—Ratherthan assigning regulatory responsibility to anexisting Federal agency, a new institution couldbe created, such as a small commission. It could


resemble the Marine Mammal Commission,23

for instance. An Antarctic Minerals Commis-sion could be given responsibility to monitorinterest and trends in Antarctic minerals activi-ties, initially tracking and evaluating proposalsof other countries. The new agency could bedesigned to grow and take on additional respon-sibilities as the need arises. If the United Statesdecides to sponsor prospecting, for instance, thecommission could become the focal point forevaluating and regulating U.S. operators. Withan appropriate budget, environmental and re-source information needs could be contracted tothe appropriate Federal agencies and/or touniversities or private contractors.

One advantage of a new institution is that turfbattles among present agency responsibilitiescould be set aside. It could also coordinate theactivities of several interested Federal agencies.A disadvantage could be its likely low visibility;it also may have little to do in the near term.Without the protection of a cabinet department,it could be vulnerable to budget cuts. Also,because it would be small, it would succeed orfail on the strength or weakness of only a fewindividuals.

Additional Considerations Should the Uni-ted States Decide to Sponsor Exploration andDevelopment— Most experts would agree thatthere is no urgency to develop details of thelarger Federal effort that would be required if atsome future date the United States decides tosponsor exploration and development. Theseactivities are unlikely to attract interest for atleast several decades. If the United Stateseventually decides to sponsor exploration anddevelopment, the institutional structure we mayestablish to oversee prospecting could be ex-panded to handle the additional responsibilitiesthat sponsorship of exploration and develop-ment would entail. Any of the four agenciesdiscussed could be assigned added responsibili-ties. On the other hand, U.S. involvement in

development activities would signal a muchhigher level of U.S. activity of all kinds inAntarctica than exists today or is likely in thenear future. When the level of U.S. activity doesincrease significantly, however, it may be usefulto meld all or most U.S. Antarctic activities intoone organization. The United Kingdom and theSoviet Union have already done so.

Creating a U.S. Antarctic Agency (USAA),an independent agency with responsibility forthe full range of U.S. interests on the continent,would be a major departure in the managementof Antarctic policy. The essential features ofsuch an agency would be its independent statusand comprehensive responsibility for planning,implementing, and managing all U.S. activitiesin Antarctica, including logistics. Establishmentof such an agency would be premised on theassumption that U.S. activities in Antarctica willincrease in the future; that realization of U.S.security, environmental, economic, and scien-tific interests will require increased involvementin these activities; and that present Federalinstitutional arrangements are ill-prepared torespond to these needs.

The United States Antarctic Agency could becharged with responsibility for resource andenvironmental assessments and management,for support of scientific research, and formaintaining the infrastructure required to con-tinue the national presence in Antarctica, includ-ing logistics. Technical responsibilities could befunded by the USAA but performed by otheragencies. For example, NSF could continue tofund basic research projects without beingencumbered by pressure to conduct directedresearch or to provide and manage logistics. TheNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-tion could continue to conduct assessments andresearch on marine living resources. The Geo-logical Survey could conduct studies on geo-logical resources and natural hazards. Althoughsome funding might come from agency budgets,

m~e me m~ Comlssion is a small, independent executive branch agency with responsibility for developing, reviewing, and tigrecommendations on actions and policies for all Federal agencies with respect to marine mammal protection and conservation,

Chapter I---Summary, Issues, and Options ● 31

most could be allocated to the USAA anddirected according to a long-range plan towhichever agency was most appropriate to carryout a specific task.

Such an agency would provide a clear politi-cal, administrative, and managerial focus forAntarctic affairs in the United States and meetthe need for greater coordination among agen-cies with Antarctic responsibilities. Because itwould be charged with comprehensive responsi-bilities, it would be in a good position to contendwith the interrelationship of issues. Account-ability for U.S. Antarctic policy would beclearly defined, both for political oversight andinternational collaboration. The Agency couldhave the ability to integrate plans, priorities, andnational interests with budgets, and hence be ina strong position to pursue the full range of U.S.interests within funding constraints.

Efforts to establish an independent agency forAntarctica could be challenged on severalgrounds. First, there is an innate resistance toincreasing the number of government agencies.A number of simpler institutional alternativesfor implementing Antarctic policy already exist.Second, creation of an independent agencywould elevate Antarctic affairs to a level ofvisibility that is arguably not warranted at thistime. The issue-by-issue approach which hascharacterized U.S. involvement over the pastdecade has seemed to provide an adequateresponse to realizing international obligationsand national interests on the continent. Third,the APG now plays a significant interagencycoordinating role and may resist creation of anew agency that would diminish its authority.Fourth, development of a comprehensive, coor-dinated Antarctic program, implicit in the crea-tion of an independent agency, implies a muchhigher level of funding than may be acceptablepolitically at present. Finally, a new institutionmay threaten the resources devoted to basicresearch in Antarctica.

Data and Information Needs

The United States is not obligated to under-take any basic or directed research as a conse-quence of ratifying the Minerals Convention.Data and information requirements at the pros-pecting stage will be relatively minor, butrequirements for exploration and especially fordevelopment—if they occur—will be substan-tial. Available information about the Antarcticenvironment is not now sufficient for makinginformed decisions about opening parts ofAntarctica for exploration and development (orfor regulating activities in areas once they areopened).

Two categories of information will be espe-cially important:

baseline environmental information withwhich to assess the significance of changesin the ecosystem likely to result fromminerals activities, andinformation about the basic geological,geophysical, and geochemical characteris-tics of Antarctica.

To date, there has been virtually no effort to planor to support the long-term commitment offunds for long-term environmental monitor-ing.

24 AS for geological survey and assessment,

an important implementation issue is the extentto which the government will contribute toresource assessments to assist domestic miner-als companies in identifying those areas worthyof more detailed evaluation and possibly devel-opment.

A program to acquire data and informationshould be tailored to the level of resourceactivity anticipated. A first step in meetinginformation needs could be to compile relevantdatabases and information on research programsand agency plans and then identify priorityresearch needs, logistics requirements, and fund-ing estimates. As for directed environmental

24A ~xcc@on h~ ~n tie CC-R fiays~m Moni[ormg ~o~am, reali~ h tie Unitd S[a[es through the LJ, S Antarctic Marine LivingResources Program administered by NOAA.


research, the United States might wish, at aminimum, to begin compiling environmentalbaseline data. Such data would be essential forevaluating potential impacts if the United Statesdecides to become involved in mineral resourceactivities and/or to evaluate the impacts of plansof other countries that may decide to sponsoractivities. The United States does have a smallprogram to gather some oceanographic datapursuant to its responsibilities under the Con-vention on the Conservation of Antarctic MarineLiving Resources, even though it does not nowfish in Antarctic waters and is unlikely to do soin the near future.

As far as decisionmaking in the institutions ofthe Minerals Convention is concerned, therewould be little need for the results of minerals-related research in Antarctica until an area isunder consideration to be opened for explorationand development. Considering the current lowlevel of industry interest in Antarctica and thehigh probability that Antarctic resource devel-opment is three or more decades away, theredoes not appear to be a compelling need atthis time for a major Federal effort to assessAntarctica’s resources A modest reconnaissanceprogram may be justified if the United Stateswishes to promote long-term U.S. commer-cial interests in Antarctica and/or to acquireadditional influence in institution meetings.Some U.S. researchers want to establish a moreaggressive minerals assessment program. Sev-eral countries have acquired more offshoregeophysical data than the United States, so aU.S. program could help the United Statesremain competitive with other interested coun-tries. Specific requirements for reconnaissancedata are discussed in chapter 4. In general,industry presumably will be responsible forassessing resource potential beyond basic recon-naissance and for obtaining information neededfor environmental impact assessments for spe-cific areas.

The lead agency designated for managingAntarctic minerals activities will most likely be

assigned responsibility for defining data andinformation needs even if other agencies, aca-demic institutions, and/or the private sector arecontracted to carry out some of the work. Theagency designated to handle data and informat-ion might initially be assigned the relativelysimple responsibility for verifying informationprovided by applicants (including non-U.S.applicants) for prospecting, and, ultimately, forexploration and development. It could also begiven responsibility for obtaining informationneeded to predict and detect impacts. If desired,broader authority could be assigned the agencyto assess resource potential as well. Alterna-tively, responsibility for acquiring environ-mental and resource data could be delegated toseveral agencies. Capabilities for acquiring andevaluating environmental and resource informa-tion could be an important consideration whendesignating a lead agency. As noted, no singleagency currently has all the capabilities re-quired.

A model for a directed research program is theplan implementing CCAMLR. After ratifyingCCAMLR in 1982, the United States estab-lished the Antarctic Marine Living ResourcesProgram to provide information for conserva-tion and management of marine living resourcesin the oceans surrounding Antarctica. TheNational Science Foundation was directed tocontinue supporting basic research of Antarcticmarine ecosystems while NOAA was directed todesign an applied research program to provideinformation needed to detect, monitor, andpredict the effects of fishing and associatedactivities on target, dependent, and relatedspecies and populations. The National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration’s plan de-scribes priority research needs for the im-plementation of the Convention, identifies whichof those needs are to be fulfilled by the UnitedStates, and specifies the design of the directedresearch and funds, personnel, and facilitiesrequired for the research.


An important consideration in designing aresearch program will be its cost. Conceivably,NSF could be directed to allocate more of itsexisting basic research budget to minerals-related activities. However, funding for miner-als research within a fixed budget could only beaccomplished at the expense of other research.Currently, applied research does not appearmore important or timely than basic researchthat may have to be sacrificed. Given the presentslight interest in minerals development, modestfunding for data acquisition seems acceptable. Ifinterest increases, a larger effort would bejustified.

Cooperative projects among the Parties tothe Minerals Convention would help reducethe high costs of basic and applied research.United States’ backing of joint research wouldfurther its longstanding goal of internationalcooperation in Antarctica. Joint research alsowould avoid unnecessary duplication and assureall participants equal access to data. The Na-tional Science Foundation’s Deep Sea DrillingProgram and its successor, the Ocean DrillingProgram, should be considered as models. Asfor prospecting, under certain conditions (e.g.,when efforts would otherwise be duplicated)“group s h o o t s ” could be considered, in whichcompanies pool their resources to conduct initialseismic exploration in frontier areas. Finally,ATCPs should be encouraged to make theirseismic and other scientific data freely availableas intended under the terms of the AntarcticTreaty. Countries which have not been asdiligent as the United States in releasing seismicdata should be encouraged to do so.

The Liability Protocol

Liability issues are covered in Article 8 of theMinerals Convention. However, the Conventiondoes not treat liability issues in detail. TheParties agreed that before any minerals explora-tion and development can occur, a protocol

specifying the details of a system of liability forenvironmental damage related to minerals ac-tivities must be negotiated and ratified in thesame manner as the Minerals Convention.25 Itmay include limits on liability, how unmetliability will be satisfied, and what means to useto assess and adjudicate liability claims.26

If the Minerals Convention is ratified beforethe liability protocol is ratified, prospecting (butnot exploration and development) may begin,subject to the general provisions of Article 8 andother specified interim measures. During thisperiod, Parties are to ensure that recourse will beavailable in their national courts for adjudicatingliability claims, including possible claims by theCommission itself, against any Operator(s) theymay sponsor. However, domestic legislationand/or agency regulations will have to interpretthe Article 8 guidelines for prospecting; theliability regime for prospecting cannot be articu-lated solely through judicial proceedings.

The specific provisions of the liability protocol—and, in particular, those relating to limits onliability--could have an important impact onfuture minerals activities in Antarctica. Shouldthe United States Senate give its advice andconsent to ratification of the Minerals Con-vention before the liability protocol is negoti-ated or wait until after it has been negoti-ated?

Several arguments favor ratification of theConvention prior to negotiating and/or ratifyingthe liability protocol:

Even without additional liability measures,ratification of the Convention would streng-then the ATS.Exploration and development may notproceed under any circumstances until theliability protocol has been ratified. Interimliability measures need only be consideredfor prospecting, and impacts associated

2SS= ch. 3, p, 86, for *tils.

?.6Neg@~i~s fm tie Li~ility ~otml ~ve not commenc~ as of September 1989, but could kgti kfore tie end of tie Yem.


with prospecting are not expected to besignificantly different from those associ-ated with similar research activities alreadytaking place.It may take several years to negotiate andratify the liability protocol. In the mean-time, a resource discovery could be made---a situation the Parties would like to avoidin the absence of a regulatory framework.The representatives from the countries thatnegotiated the Minerals Convention are,for the most part, still active and involvedin Antarctic affairs. They constitute aninstitutional memory of how and why theminerals regime was negotiated. In severalyears these participants may be doing otherthings. Unless the Convention is ratified inthe next few years, this institutional mem-ory may be lost, and with it, the bestopportunity for ratifying the Convention.The United States could set an earlystandard for effective implementation ofthe Minerals Convention. A domestic li-ability regime included as part of imple-menting legislation could be used to streng-then the U.S. position in negotiating theprotocol as long as it did not unduly tie itsdelegation’s hands. Thus, Congress and theExecutive Branch would be the arbiters of

the competing interests asserted by domes-tic industry and environmental groups onthe liability question.

Two arguments favor waiting to ratify theMinerals Convention until the liability protocolhas been negotiated.

The remaining unnegotiated aspects ofliability are potentially important. For in-stance, what will be the requirements for abackup source of liability if an Operatorcannot pay or if limits on liability areexceeded?The U.S. may have more leverage over thecontent of the liability protocol if it makesratification of the Minerals Conventioncontingent on negotiating satisfactory termsfor the protocol. This strategy is availableto other countries as well, however, and, ifmany countries pursue it, may be counter-productive. Special interest groups, in par-ticular, may favor negotiating the protocolbefore ratifying the Convention: industry isconcerned about the protocol because itfears the limits on liability may be set toohigh, thereby making economic operationsmuch more costly, if not impossible. Someenvironmental groups, correspondingly, fearthat limits to liabilitv mav be set too low.

Chapter 2

J

.

u.s. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention

Photo cr9dit: Ann Hawthorne

LC-130 at Beardmore South Camp

CONTENTSPage

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38ANTARCTICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

EVOLUTION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41UNITED STA= ANTARCTIC INTERESTS ● * * . * * . . . * * * * * * . * . * . . * . . * * . * .*.***... 46

Geopolitical and Strategic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Environmental Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48Scientific Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

WHY THE CONVENTION? WHY NOW? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50THE ATCPs AND THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

FigureFigure Page2-1. Antarctic Territorial claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

TableTable Page2-1, Antarctic Treaty Nations **. .** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Chapter 2

U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and theOrigin of the Minerals Convention

SUMMARYThe United States has a long history as a leader in

Antarctic exploration and research. It has alsoinfluenced the development of the Antarctic TreatySystem, The 1959 Antarctic Treaty is largely aproduct of U.S. efforts.

U.S. interests in Antarctica can be grouped intofour categories: geopolitical and strategic, environ-mental, scientific, and economic. The paramountgeopolitical and strategic interest of the UnitedStates is to maintain Antarctica as an area of peaceand cooperation. Environmental and scientific inter-ests are driven by the desire to preserve the uniqueecological systems of the continent, study therelationship of Antarctica to the global environment,and use Antarctica as a laboratory for the study ofnatural processes. Economic interests are futureoriented. It is uncertain whether hydrocarbons orother minerals, if discovered, would be economi-cally recoverable. However, the United States shareswith other consumers and importers of hydrocarbonsand minerals an interest in assuring nondiscrimina-tory access to Antarctic resources.

The vehicle through which the United States haspursued these interests is the Antarctic TreatySystem (ATS). The Antarctic Treaty System in-cludes the Antarctic Treaty, recommendations adoptedby consensus at consultative meetings, and separateconventions adopted at special consultative meet-ings. The ATS establishes a framework withinwhich those nations making claims to parts ofAntarctica and those, such as the United States,which neither recognize such claims nor assert onesof their own, can cooperate without prejudice to theirlegal positions. The ATS serves U.S. interests instability, free access to all of Antarctica, participa-tion in regulation of Antarctic activities for environ-mental and other purposes, and avoidance of conflictwith the Soviet Union or others.

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs)formally decided in 1981 to negotiate an agreementgoverning exploitation of Antarctic minerals. Sev-eral reasons contributed to this decision:

First, the Antarctic Treaty itself is silent aboutmineral resource activities since, in 1959, there wasno pressing need to address them and the negotiatorsunderstood the practical difficulty of achieving amore comprehensive agreement,

Second, by enabling scientists unhindered accessto ail parts of the continent, what was virtually terraincognita in 1959 was better known by the early1980s, Occurrences of many minerals have beenidentified in Antarctica that, if found in large enoughand rich enough deposits in relatively ice-free areas,would attract commercial interest.

Third, technology to exploit resources has im-proved significantly since the Antarctic Treaty wasnegotiated. Oil companies are venturing into off-shore areas in the Arctic and mining companies. areoperating in high latitude areas of Alaska, Canada,Sweden, and the Soviet Union. While some newtechnology will still have to be developed, technol-ogy is no longer a decisive limiting factor inAntarctic development.

Fourth, as early as 1969 commercial enterprisesexpressed some interest in prospecting in Antarctica.The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties realizedthat permitting such activities without an agreedregulatory system could upset the stability of theAntarctic Treaty.

Fifth, ATCPs perceived that they would be muchmore likely to reach an agreement before any majordiscoveries were made. The maintenance of politicalstability must therefore be viewed as a primary,although not exclusive, reason for negotiation of theMinerals Convention.

A factor which spurred ATCPs to completenegotiations that were already underway was theincreasing interest of the United Nations in Antarc-tica. ATCPs have long held that by virtue of theexistence of claims and bases for claims and of along history of successful administration of Antarc-tica, they possess special rights and responsibilitiesthere. They have resisted any attempts to considerAntarctic issues in the United Nations.

-37-


The cornerstone of the ATS, the AntarcticTreaty, runs indefinitely. However, any of theConsultative Parties may call for a conference toreview operation of the Treaty once 30 years after itsentry into force have elapsed, i.e., beginning in 1991.This date is probably not as significant as some havesuggested, but perceptions are important. Having aminerals regime in place before 1991 would bestrong evidence that the ATCPs are capable ofdealing with problems as they arise.

INTRODUCTIONAlthough negotiated as a separate treaty, the

Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic MineralResource Activities does not stand alone. It is themost recent of a series of agreements concerningconduct of activities in Antarctica. To understandwhy the Convention was negotiated and why it tookthe form it did-and, therefore, the consequences ofaccepting or rejecting the Minerals Convention—itis necessary to know something about creation of theAntarctic Treaty in 1959 and of the evolution of theAntarctic Treaty System (ATS).

The United States has played a major role indevelopment of both the ATS and the MineralsConvention. This chapter examines the history ofU.S. involvement in Antarctica and summarizesU.S. Antarctic interests. It also reviews the AntarcticTreaty and elements of the Treaty System, Finally,it discusses why the Minerals Convention wasnegotiated and the relationship between the Antarc-tic Treaty signatories and the United Nations.Chapter 3 describes and evaluates provisions of theMinerals Convention.

HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENTIN ANTARCTICA

There is evidence that an American sealer, Cap-tain Nathaniel B. Palmer of Stonington, CT, mayhave been the first to sight the continent of Antarc-tica in November 1820, although both Great Britainand the Soviet Union claim similar honors. This is ofsome significance not only for nationalistic pride,but also since, historically, discovery has sometimesbeen an element in establishing sovereign rights.

Initial mention of the continent goes back to theancient Greeks who postulated that a great southernland mass existed to ‘‘balance” the continents in thenorth. The Maoris of New Zealand also have vaguelegends of a white kind somewhere to the south,Maps produced in 16th century Europe depict anAntarctic continent, Terra Australis Re, which bearsa strong resemblance to Antarctica on modem maps,yet historical records indicate the continent was notyet discovered.2

Documented Antarctic history begins with thevoyages of Captain James Cook of the British Navy.Captain Cook sailed completely around the conti-nent between 1772 and 1775. His two ships probedsouth at several points, but each time were turnedback by heavy pack ice without sighting land. He didobserve birds that he believed came from landfurther south. One significant accomplishment ofCaptain Cook’s in the Antarctic region was hisdiscovery of South Georgia Island in the SouthAtlantic. Here he reported seeing fur seals, anobservation which soon served as a magnet drawingAmerican and British seal hunters further south.

It seems likely that seal hunters were the first toactually sight Antarctica. However, since theyfrequently kept their discoveries secret to protecttheir hunting areas, there are no existing records ofthe discovery of Antarctica before 1820. On January30th of that year, a British ship under CaptainEdward Bransfield reported sighting what may havebeen the mainland or what may have been an islandoff the coast of the Antarctic Peninsula. During thesame year two Russian ships under the command ofAdmiral Thaddeus Bellingshausen sighted at severalplaces what might have been land or might havebeen icebergs frozen in the pack ice, Bellingshausenwould make no claim until he was sure. Finally, onJanuary 28, 1821, he saw a mountainous coast thathe named Alexander I Land. Alexander I Land hassince been shown to be a large island separated fromthe continent.

Meanwhile, on November 18, 1820, the AmericanCaptain Nathaniel B. Palmer sighted the continentnear the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula. On February7, 1821, another American, Captain John Davis, sent

IHeK~~~r refe~~ to as tie ‘‘~er~s convention,’ or, more simply, &$ the ‘‘Convention. ’

ZJ.G Weihaupt, “Historic Cartographic Evidence for Holocene Changes in the Antarctic Ice Cover, ” EOS, VOI. 65, No. 35, Aug. 28, 1984, pp.493-501.

Chapter 2-U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convenationn . 39

a boatload of men to look for seals on the shore ofwhat is now called Hughes Bay on the continentitself. Captain Davis wrote in his logbook, ‘‘I thinkthis Southern Land to be a Continent. ”3 He wasright, but it took nearly 20 years before enoughsightings had been made along the coast to be sure.The proof largely came from an expedition in1838-42 led by Lieutenant Charles Wilkes of theU.S. Navy, who sighted land at numerous pointsalong the coast over a distance of 1,500 miles. Thiswas the first Antarctic expedition sponsored by theU.S. Government. The existence of a continent-sized land mass was firmly established by the early1840’s as two other expeditions (British underJames Ross, and French under Dumont d’Urville)added their sightings of land at several other pointsaround the coast of Antarctica.

Following the discovery period, there was littleactivity in Antarctica for the next 50 years. Interestrenewed by the end of the century, spurred by newmethods of whaling, scientific curiosity, and thespirit of adventure. The first expedition to winterover in the Antarctic was a Belgian expedition whospent the winter of 1898 aboard its ship which hadinadvertently become frozen in the ice pack. Thenext year a British expedition spent the winter in ahut on land near the western entrance to the RossSea. These two expeditions began what has becomeknown as the heroic period of Antarctic explorationduring which the United States was relativelyinactive in Antarctica.

In rapid succession followed the British NationalAntarctic Expedition under Captain Robert Scott(1901 04), the German Antarctic Expedition (1901-03), the Swedish Antarctic Expedition (1901-03),the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition (1902-04), the French Antarctic Expedition (1903-04), theBritish Antarctic Expedition (1907-09), the SecondFrench Antarctic Expedition (1908- 10), the Amund-sen expedition (1910-12), the second Scott expedi-tion (1910-1 3), the Japanese expedition (191 1-1 2),a second German expedition (1911-12), the Austra-lian Antarctic Expedition (191 1-14), and the BritishImperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition (1914-16). Nearlyall of these had some assistance from their govern-ments, although contributions from scientific socie-

ties and wealthy industrialists were also important.Curiously, two of the earliest nations to exploreAntarctica, Russia and the United States, wererelatively inactive in Antarctica at this time. TsaristRussia was preoccupied with wars, revolution, andan Arctic sea route to Siberia; the United States waspreoccupied with the insular possessions it hadacquired from Spain, Alaskan gold, and Arcticexploration. Increasing numbers of whalers wereactive in Antarctica during this time. Many of theminvestigated places not previously seen and mappedharbors and other features. In 1905-06, the Nor-wegians sent the frost factory ship to Antarcticwaters, freeing whalers from the need for landstations. The remains of several whaling stations canstill be seen on South Georgia Island.

The heroic period reached its climax in 1911 and1912 when the South Pole was reached. The first toarrive was the Norwegian explorer, Roald Amund-sen, and his party, followed a month later by CaptainRobert Scott and four other Englishmen. Scott andhis party perished on their return. When theirremains were recovered a year later, they were foundto have with them 30 pounds of rocks, gathered fortheir scientific value. World War I brought an end tothe “heroic age” of Antarctic exploration.

The United States returned to Antarctica follow-ing World War I, and with that return came themodem era. The war had given rise to aviation, andaviation brought the United States to the forefront ofAntarctic exploration, a position it retains to thepresent day. Airplanes were not the first machines inAntarctica. The heroic age had been served by thesteamship, and tractors had been tried experimen-tally on the land. But the new generation of Antarcticexplorers were aviators in search of exploits, asmuch as explorers eager to seize novel tools forgeographic discovery.4

Between the heroic age and the InternationalGeophysical Year (IGY) in 1957-58, the UnitedStates dominated Antarctic exploration. The leadingfigure of this effort was Admiral Richard E. Byrd.The Byrd expedition of 1928-30 was the first of aseries of Antarctic expeditions in which Byrd andothers, on behalf of the United States, saw, mapped,and claimed more land than expeditions of any other

3u.s. ~~[ic proj~~ Officer, /nrroduction (o Atiarcncu, Jmwy 1%1. p. 12.

4S.J. ~ne, The /cc, A journey t.o Anmrcmu (New York, NY: Batlantmc Books, 1986), p. 96.


Photo credit. Steve Zimmer

Biscuits and marmalade, frozen for 75 years, inside RobertScott’s hut at Hut Point on Ross Island. The hut is

preserved as a site of historic significance.

nation. 5 During this expedition Byrd and threecompanions became the first to fly over the SouthPole, This expedition also made significant overlandjourneys and established that the continent wasbisected by a single mountain range, now called theTransantarctic Mountains. Byrd led his secondAntarctic expedition in 1933-35; his third, with theU.S. Antarctic Service, in 1939-41; his fourth, withthe Antarctic Developments Project of the U.S.Navy, in 1946-48; and his last, as honorary chief ofOperation Deep Freeze (which supported the Ameri-can contribution to the IGY), in 1954-58.

Through Byrd’s efforts an American presence wasfirmly reestablished in Antarctica, and a generationof explorers and scientists gained polar experience

who would staff future American expeditions. Bythe time of the IGY, the United States had seen andestablished a basis of claim (although a U.S. claimhas never officially been made) for 80 percent ofAntarctica.6 This area overlaps the claims of all ofthe other claimants and is symbolically reflected inthe continuous U.S. occupation of a station at theSouth Pole. In addition, through the use of aircraftand the Pole station as an inland refueling site, theUnited States has maintained the capability to reachany point on the continent. The United States hassponsored more scientific research in Antarcticathan has any other nation.

Another American Antarctic explorer to capturethe imagination of the public was Lincoln Ellsworth.Ellsworth’s ambition was to fly across the continentof Antarctica. In 1935, he succeeded in flying thelength of the Antarctic Peninsula but was forced toland 16 miles short of his goal. Ellsworth and hispilot walked the rest of the way to Little America,Byrd’s earlier base on the Ross Sea.

World War II brought a temporary halt toAmerican activity in Antarctica. Following the war,despite emerging as a global power, the UnitedStates did not carry out its pre-war plan to establishpermanent stations in Antarctica. Instead, the nextAmerican Antarctic activity was to mount a massiveexpedition in 1946-47 given the code name Opera-tion Highjump. This expedition, involving 13 ships,4,700 servicemen, and 51 scientists and observerswas under the effective command of Rear AdmiralR.H. Cruzen, although Admiral Byrd was Officer inCharge. Operation Highjump was the largest assaultever mounted in Antarctica. Participants in theexpedition discovered more of Antarctica than allprevious expeditions combined. The following yearthe U.S. Navy carried out a second expedition, calledOperation Windmill. One of its major purposes wasto relate aerial pictures taken the previous year toprecise ground points so the areas discovered byOperation Highjump could be mapped accurately.

In 1950, a group of American and British scien-tists suggested a global International GeophysicalYear during 1957-58 to correspond to a predictedperiod of unusual sunspot activity. The proposal waspresented to the International Council of Scientific

Chapter 2-U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 41

Unions (ICSU), which endorsed it in 1951. The18-month IGY, which began on July 1, 1957, wasthe first world wide scientific effort to involveAntarctica. Previous cooperative efforts, the Firstand Second Polar Years (1882-83 and 1932-33) hadstressed the Arctic. Now, however, advances inlogistics and technology that had grown out ofWorld War 11 made feasible geophysical studies inAntarctica. Consequently, Antarctica was a majorelement in the IGY.

Despite conflicting territorial claims in Antarcticaand East-West tensions during the 1950s, theinternational cooperation achieved in Antarcticaproved that scientific research could transcendpolitical differences. The International GeophysicalYear opend the “age of science” in Antarctica,which legacy continues.7 A dozen nations partici-pated in Antarctic studies, establishing 50 stationsthere. Today, there are 22 nations with substantialresearch programs in Antarctica. The InternationalGeophysical Year activities in Antarctica madesignificant contributions to a number of fields,including upper atmospheric physics, glaciology,meteorology, and studies of the Earth’s magneticfield. Seismic data were gathered and overlandtraverses were made by the United States, SovietUnion, Great Britain, and France. These countriesobtained a wealth of information on ice temperature,density, and thickness; on surface elevations; and onmagnetic and gravity fields, The United Statesestablished a station at the South Pole, which it hasoccupied year-round ever since. By virtue of itstechnology, long history of Antarctic exploration,mapping, its extensive scientific research, andbasis for a huge potential claim, the United Stateshad become a dominant power in Antarcticmatters.

By the time the IGY was drawing to a close at theend of 1958, scientists and diplomats believed thatthe program in Antarctica was too valuable toterminate and that the international cooperationachieved during this period should be maintained.This common desire by the diplomats and scientists,particularly those of the United States, led to theconclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.

EVOLUTION OF THE ANTARCTICTREATY SYSTEM

Seven countries claimed sovereignty over terri-tory in Antarctica in the first half of the 20th century(figure 2-l). These countries are Argentina, Austra-lia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and theUnited Kingdom. Several criteria, doctrines, orprinciples have been put forward as a basis ofestablishing territorial claims. One is discovery,which is the basis for the British claim to theAntarctic Peninsula and the France’s claim in EastAntarctica. The more common criterion is the sectorprinciple, which is based on the concept of continu-ity or proximity under which some northern coastalnations claim offshore islands by extending bounda-ries from the ends of their main landmass toward theNorth Pole. Arctic islands, however, are nearby andgeologically continuous with their respective land-masses of Asia and North America, whereas vastdistances separate southern countries from theirclaims in Antarctica. Australia, New Zealand, Ar-gentina, and Chile have invoked sector claims basedon contiguity with Antarctica and sectoral exten-sions from their coasts. Another criterion is continu-ous occupation, also invoked by Argentina who hasoperated a weather station on Laurie Island since1904. Norway also bases its claim to two islands anda coastal region on early occupation and use of theareas by its whaling captains.

The United Kingdom was the frost country toclaim territory in Antarctica. It did so in 1908 byclaiming a sector reaching to the Pole south of theFalkland Islands including the South SandwichIslands, South Georgia, South Shetland, and SouthOrkney Islands, and the Antarctic Peninsula. Thisclaim was further refined in 1917 to avoid inadver-tently claiming part of the Chilean and Argentinemainland. New Zealand was the next claimant in1923, soon followed by France in 1924 (France’soriginal claim was to the coastal area but wasenlarged to include a sector to the Pole in 1938),Australia in 1933, Norway in 1939, Chile in 1940,and Argentina in 1943.

All announced claimants except Norway haveclaimed wedge-shaped sectors terminating at theSouth Pole. Norway has claimed the coastal area

TIbid., p, 16,


Figure 2-l—Antarctic Territorial Claims

50------ _- - - - -

I “ 1 ,

South Atlantic Ocean “’’’’.,,/’ \

/’ . .7Sco t ia/ S e 8

Argentine’M@

-%

British claim -

Chiiean claim B e h q

/’

/’.- .

. .

.

/

\\, k

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. . , \ .\

120’-’ , /\

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I n d i a n , “O c e a n/’”

,. ‘\ /,

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S o u~th P a c i f i c O c e a n . . ~... ’

Seven ciaims have been made to parts of Antarctica. The claims of Argentina, Chiie, and the United Kingdom overlap in the ArtarctcPeninsuia area. One section of Wst Antarctica has never been ciaimed.

SOURCE: U.S. Government, 1989.

Chapter 2.--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 43

between 20° W. and 45° E., but has left the northernand southern boundaries of its claim vague, appar-ently to avoid undercutting its claim in the Arctic.The claims of three of the countries, Argentina,Chile, and the United Kingdom, overlap and conflictin the area of the Antarctic Peninsula, which is southof Cape Horn. Territorial claims in Antarctica havenot received general recognition by the internationalcommunity. Mutual recognition of claims has beenlimited to Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway,and the United Kingdom. Although Chile andArgentina do not recognize each other’s claims, in1941 they issued a joint declaration stating that theonly countries with sovereignty over the AntarcticPeninsula are Chile and Argentina. The UnitedStates and the Soviet Union have made noterritorial claims in Antarctica and do not recog-nize the claims of others. However, both have‘‘reserved” their ‘‘rights” to assert claims in thecontinent. By not recognizing other claims and byplacing one of its IGY stations in the middle of thelarge unclaimed sector and another at the South Polewhere six claims converge, the United States be-came a strong moderating influence on the claimsissue during the IGY. The Soviet Union provided anadditional moderating influence by seeking a stakein the region rather than a specific territorial claimand by insisting on being part of any politicalsolution.

The International Geophysical Year successfullysubmerged the issue of the territorial status ofAntarctica to avoid political controversies that mightbe detrimental to scientific cooperation. Earlier, in1948, the United States had proposed a solution toterritorial claims in Antarctica through governanceby a claimant condominium (which the UnitedStates would join by announcing a claim), but theproposal drew slight interest from only two of theclaimants. In 1956, India presented a trusteeshipproposal before the United Nations, but the proposalwas unsuccessful. By then, the United States hadabandoned the decision to announce a claim and wasseeking a cooperative agreement along the lines ofa plan by Julio Escudero Guzman of Chile (the

Escudero proposal), who proposed a moratorium onthe Antarctic sovereignty dispute while concentrat-ing on scientific research.

It became clear to the 12 nations involved inAntarctic research that there would be a significantbenefit if the work begun during IGY could becontinued. On May 2, 1958, the United Statesproposed to the other participants, Argentina, Aus-tralia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand,Norway, the Soviet Union, the Union of SouthAfrica, and the United Kingdom, that they shouldjoin ‘‘in a treaty designed to preserve the continentas an international laboratory for scientific researchand insure that it be used only for peaceful pur-poses. ’ Preliminary talks in Washington werestalled by Chilean and Argentine reluctance to agreeto international control and by Soviet objections tothe existing Antarctic claims of other nations. Atreaty was negotiated and signed on December 1,1959. The United Kingdom became the first nationto ratify the Antarctic Treaty on May 31, 1960.United States ratification followed on August 18,1960, and the treaty entered into force on June 23,1961. The entire text of the Treaty, which containsonly 14 articles, is presented in appendix C.

The Antarctic Treaty transformed a regionbeset by international rivalry to one character-ized by peace and cooperation. Short, simple in itslanguage, and deliberately lacking institutions, theTreaty has significantly diffused actual and potentialdisputes. The Treaty is administered through regularconsultative meetings of all ATCPs, hosted by eachparticipating nation in turn. The Treaty dealt withthe most difficult question, sovereignty and nonre-cognition of claims, in a simple and pragmaticmanner. Article 4 provides that nothing in the Treatyshall be interpreted as a renunciation or diminutionof a claim or basis for a claim and that no acts takingplace while the Treaty is in force shall constitute abasis for supporting an existing claim or for estab-lishing a new one. Any other attempt to resolve thisissue, by opting for one solution or another, wouldlikely have led to no solution at all and probably tocontinued rivalry. 9 Yet it is on the basis of thisagreement that disputes about sovereignty have

Bus. conwe~~, HOW Comlflm on Foreign Relations, Subeommitttx on National Stxurity POllCy and SCienUfiC Evelopmenth T~ pofiric~

Legacy of the International Geophysmd Year, Committee Print by Harold Bullis, Congressional Research Semice, 1973, p. 57.

9F,0. Vicuna, “Antarctic Conflict and International Cooperation, ” Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment (Washington, DC: National AcademyhSS, 1986), p. 61.


-..

’ -

.

Photo credit : Ann Hawthorn

Geodesic dome at the U.S. South Pole Station. The U.S. base is located at the convergence of the Antarctic claims.

come to be controlled. This same pragmatic ap-proach also made possible the successful conclusionof the Antarctic Minerals Convention.

The original Parties to the Treaty were the 12nations that were active in conducting research in theAntarctic during the International Geophysical Yearof 1957-58 (table 2-l). They have the right to attendmeetings provided for in article IX of the Treaty(consultative meetings) and are accordingly knownas Consultative Parties. In addition, the AntarcticTreaty provides for other states who have acceded tothe Treaty and have demonstrated significant scien-tific activity in Antarctica to become ConsultativeParties. Ten additional countries have become Con-sultative Parties by this process. Only ConsultativeParties may participate in decisionmaking.

On the basis of Treaty provisions and throughconsultative meetings a growing complex ofarrangements for regulating activities of states inAntarctica has evolved. This complex of arrange-ments is known as the Antarctic Treaty System(ATS). It includes recommendations adopted atconsultative meetings and separate conventionsadopted at special consultative meetings. Statesparty to the Treaty must give appropriate effect to theconventions and measures adopted pursuant to them.There have been nearly 150 agreed recommenda-tions to governments since 1961. These cover a widespectrum of activities in Antarctica including thefollowing:

. cooperation in meteorology and in the ex-change of meteorological data;

Chapter 2--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 45

Table 2-l—Antarctic Treaty Nations(In chronological order by year of accession)~

Consultative nations Acceding nations

Original Treaty members Poland (1961)b

(1959):ArgentinaAustraliaBelgiumChileFranceJapanNew ZealandNorwaySouth AfricaSoviet UnionUnited KingdomUnited States

Czechoslovakia (1962)Denmark (1965)The Netherlands (1967)Romania (1971 )German Democratic Republic

(1974)bBrazil (1975)bBulgaria (1978)Federal Republic of Germany

(1979)bUruguay (1980)bPapua New Guinea (1981 )Itaiy (1981 )b

Peru (1981 )Spain (1982)b

People’s Republic of China(1983)b

titer cosultative nations: India (1983)b

Poland (1977) Hungary (1984)Federal Repubiic of Finiand (1984)

Germany (1981 ) Sweden (1984)bBrazii (1 983) Cuba (1984)India (1983) Republic of Korea (1 986)Peopie’s Repubiic of Democratic People’s Republic

China (1985) of Korea (1987)Uruguay (1985) Greece (1987)German Democratic Austria (1987)

Republic (1987) Ecuador (1987)Itaiy (1987) Canada (1988)Spain (1988) Colombia (1 989)Sweden (1988)ah Of M I, 1888.bNow m-mdtative parties.

SOURCE: Natlonai Sclenc@ Foundation, Antafcfk Journal of the Urvted

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Sfates, vol. XXIII, No 4, D-mber 1988, p 8; March 1989,p. 6.

cooperation in telecommunications, includingprocedures for communicating among stationsin Antarctica;cooperation in air transport and logistics;control of tourism, including development ofguidance for visitors to Antarctica;a recommended code of conduct for stations inAntarctica and recommendations for develop-ing procedures to assess impacts of operations;andthe preservation of historical sites;

In addition, consultative meeting recommendat-ions have led to the negotiation of separate agree-ments and conventions. In 1964 the parties to theAntarctic Treaty adopted the Agreed Measures for

the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.The original measures were supplemented in 1972and 1985. As the Agreement now stands, itsprovisions:

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●

Forbid the killing, wounding, capturing, ormolesting of native mammals or birds withouta special permit.Oblige treaty members to minimize harmfulinterference with Antarctic living conditionsand to alleviate pollution of nearshore waters.Protect biological communities within Spe-cially Protected Areas (SPAS) where research,plant and animal collection, and vehicularaccess are denied. There are now 17 SPAS.Another 28 sites have been protected forresearch purposes through their designation asSites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). Itis also likely that additional areas will bespecially designated in the future for tourismand or multiple uses so that the impacts on theseareas can be better controlled.Prevent the importation of nonindigenous spe-cies. Any such species must be issued a permitand kept under controlled conditions, removedfrom Antarctica, or destroyed.Encourage the alleviation of water pollution.

The United States ratified these measures in 1978through passage of the Antarctic Conservation Act(Public Law 95-541). In accordance with this law,the Director of the National Science Foundationprescribes regulations, designates protected areas,and issues permits for actions that would otherwisebe prohibited.

After some limited harvesting of seals in 1964, the14 parties to the Antarctic Treaty drew up theConvention for the Conservation of AntarcticSeals, which was signed in 1972 and entered intoforce in 1978. The Convention totally protects thefur, elephant, and Ross seals from exploitation;prohibits the taking of seals that are in the water,except in limited numbers for scientific purposes;and sets annual quotas, seasons, and capture zonesfor crabeater, leopard, and Weddell seals. 10 Enforce-ment of the agreed-upon conservation measuresdepends entirely on the self-policing policies of thesignatory nations.

10D.B. Smiff, ‘‘Living Resources: Seals, Oceanus, vol. 31, No, 2, Summer 1988, pp. 71-74


The Convention on the Conservation ofAntarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)was developed in the 1970s in response to heavyfishing and the consequent depletion of fish stocks.It entered into force in 1982 for all water within.about 1,000 miles of Antarctica.1112 The UnitedStates ratified this convention in 1984 throughpassage of the Antarctic Marine Living ResourcesConvention Act (Public Law 98-623). This conven-tion encourages the study, management, and conserva-tion of living resources within Antarctica’s overallmarine ecosystem, rather than focusing on individ-ual species of commercial importance. Here again,each of the 23 nations signing the treaty is responsi-ble for unilateral implementation of its provisionsand any agreed-upon conservation measures.

Since its very beginning, the Antarctic TreatySystem has been science oriented. The scientificcommunity was instrumental in bringing the nego-tiators together to conclude the Treaty itself. Anongovernmental body, SCAR (Scientific Commit-tee on Antarctic Research), that had been formed tocoordinate IGY scientific activities in Antarctica,was made a permanent committee of the Interna-tional Council of Scientific Unions even before theTreaty entered into force. The Scientific Committeeon Antarctic Research continues to be an importantvehicle through which scientists formulate andcoordinate their research activities in Antarctica.Equally important, SCAR serves as a scientificadvisory body to Consultative Parties. Recently, atthe initiative of the United States, the Managers ofNational Antarctic Programs (MNAP) establisheditself as a new and separate organization to work inconjunction with SCAR. The Scientific Committeeon Antarctic Research continues to frame researchthat is international in scope and MNAP considersthe means of coordinating the implementation ofmeritorious projects. The Managers of NationalAntarctic Programs also reviews air safety, wastemanagement, and other technological areas.

The system that has evolved under the AntarcticTreaty is both simple and pragmatic, which is alsolargely why it has been flexible and innovative inresponding to challenges. In contrast to most othercollective international undertakings, the AntarcticTreaty System has created new institutions andtechniques only when necessary. This decentralized,evolutionary approach has permitted the institutionsthemselves to be tailored to the function they weredesigned to perform.13 This functionally-orientedsystem demonstrates how Consultative Parties dealwith new challenges, such as those generated byresource issues. Indeed, the emergence of bothliving and mineral resource issues has been amajor impetus to the evolution of the system andmay well be the key to its future.14

UNITED STATES ANTARCTICINTERESTS

The first comprehensive statement of U.S. inter-ests in Antarctica was issued by the NationalSecurity Council (NSC) in 1948, 11 years beforeconclusion of the Antarctic Treaty.l5 The NationalSecurity Council stated that:

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Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposesonly and shall not constitute a source ofinternational discord;U.S. rights and interests throughout Antarcticamust be protected;freedom of exploration and scientific researchshould be guaranteed;there should be free access to develop naturalresources;activities in Antarctica should be guided byestablished nonpreferential rules; andsound orderly administration of the area shouldbe established.

U.S. interests in Antarctica have evolved since 1948,but they have been characterized much more bycontinuity than by change. When in 1965 Harlan

1 IK. s~~~ and A.F. Ryan, ‘‘Antarctic Marine Living Resources, ’ Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 59-63.lzSIWmV ~auon~ ~ CCA~ include tie prlnclp~ fishing ~~~ties of the world, including Japan with 13 percent of the world’s catch, tie soviet

Union with 12 percent, China with 8 percent, and Chile and the Umted States with 6 percent each.

ISR.T. Scully, * ‘The Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System—The Institutional Perspective, Antarcric Treaty System AtJ Assessment ( Washington,DC. National Academy Press, 1986), p. 405.

IdIbid., p. 406.IsOffice of M~agernen[ ~d Budget, ‘ ‘The U.S. Antflctic ~O~tlm, ’ a report to the Commlttem on Appropnatlon of the U.S. Scna(c md }{(~u.se of

Rcptt~tiUiVC& Mily 1983, ilpp, A.

Chapter 2-U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 47

Cleveland, then Assistant Secretary of State forInternational Organization Affairs, articulated U.S.objectives, they were much the same as in 1948.Important new elements in 1965 were the U.S.support for the Antarctic Treaty—the vehicle whichestablished an orderly administration for Antarctica-and the U.S. objective of making a special effort ‘topreserve Antarctic animal and plant life. ’ 16

Five years later President Nixon noted that U.S.interests consisted of maintaining the AntarcticTreaty and ensuring that Antarctica will continue tobe used only for peaceful purposes and shall notbecome an area or object of international discord.U.S. interests would focus on fostering cooperativescientific research for the solution of worldwide andregional problems, including environmental moni-toring and prediction and assessment of resources;and protecting the Antarctic environment and devel-oping appropriate measures to ensure the equitableand wise use of living and nonliving resources.17

Although this reformulation gives greater emphasisto U.S. environmental interests in Antarctica, the listis similar to those of 1948 and 1965, and remainsessentially the same as of 1989.

U.S. interests in Antarctica can be grouped intofour different categories: geopolitical and strate-gic, environmental, scientific, and economic.

Geopolitical and Strategic Interests

Since conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959,relations among states active in Antarctica havebeen relatively stable. This stability has been main-tained despite the existence of fundamental legal andpolitical differences regarding the status of Antarc-tica and the rights of states and private parties toconduct activities in Antarctica. Three basic politi-cal facts about Antarctica are central:

1. seven states have made territorial claims overparts of Antarctica, and some claims overlap;

2. the United States, the Soviet Union, and othernonclaimants do not recognize those claims,and assert a right (subject to their treaty

obligations) for themselves and their nationalsto conduct activities anywhere in Antarcticawithout being subject to the consent or controlof a foreign government; and

3. the United States and the Soviet Union eachbelieve that they have a basis for making aclaim over Antarctica.

These facts give rise to two potential sources ofconflict:

1.

2.

conflict between existing or future territorialclaimants where claims overlap; andconflict between territorial claimants andstates that do not recognize the territorialclaims.

The broader issue of potential conflict between rivalblocs for military superiority in Antarctica looms inthe background.

The Antarctic Treaty represents an attempt tominimize existing sources of conflict, avoid newsources of conflict, provide a framework for coop-eration in the common interest, and address conflictsthat may arise. It achieves this by demilitarizingAntarctica, opening all Antarctic areas and stationsto inspection, providing for freedom of scientificresearch, preserving claimant and nonclaimant posi-tions, and establishing a system for consultation andregulation of activities by the states concerned forscientific, environmental, and other purposes. Itdoes not resolve the underlying differences regard-ing territorial claims but, in essence, attempts tosidestep them. Thus far, the Antarctic Treaty andrelated agreements that now comprise the AntarcticTreaty System have furthered U.S. interests inavoiding or minimizing conflict in Antarctica, and itis in the interest of the United States to continue tosupport these agreements. 18

The greatest potential challenge to the systemderives from the territorial claims. It would be naiveto expect that the territorial claimants would longaccept the compromise embodied in the AntarcticTreaty if they thought perfection of their territorial

16u.s. ~n=ss, !jju~omlt~ on ~rnt&~ m-j Insular Affairs, Committee on Lnterior and Insular Afftir$ Antarctic Report I %f. Hearings, H.Rep. 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 30.

ITOffiW of ~c white How RWS Swmtary, October 13, 1970, ‘ ‘U.S. Antwctic policy, ” Hearing, Subcommittee on Oceans and InternationalEnvironment, Cornmitt& on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 1975, p. 30.

ISJ.D. Negroponte, ‘‘The Success of the Antarctic Treaty, ’ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Pubhc Affairs, Washington, DC, current policy No.937, Apd 1987.


claims could be achieved at an acceptable price.Argentina and Chile, in particular, are subject tostrong nationalistic pressures on the issue. A chal-lenge for U.S. policy is to avoid encouragingperceptions abroad that U.S. opposition to foreignterritorial claims is weakening.

Another potential threat to the stability of thesystem is posed by increasing interest in Antarcticminerals. This has revived the question of sover-eignty and spurred interest in Antarctica by theUnited Nations General Assembly. The AntarcticTreaty System has succeeded in part because itlimits participation in decisions to states that con-duct significant levels of activity there. All AntarcticTreaty decisions are made by consensus, and keyMinerals Convention decisions would be made byconsensus. In general, the larger a decisionmakinggroup becomes, the more difficult consensus is toachieve. However, even as ATCPs worry aboutdilution of influence as participation grows, theyhave encouraged participation in the ATS as the onlylegitimate regime for Antarctica.

In general, U.S. political and strategic inter-ests, particularly with respect to any systemgoverning Antarctic mineral resources, would bepromoted by seeking to:

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maximize U.S. influence with respect todecisions regarding any aspect of Antarc-tica;maximize the influence of states substan-tially affected by the decisions being taken;avoid steps that could raise the expectationsof the territorial claimants regarding specialinfluence over their claimed areas; anddiscourage demands for global participationin decisionmaking.

Environmental Interests

The Antarctic environment is unique and largelyunspoiled: Antarctica supports unique wildlife; itsice comprises most of the world’s fresh water;marine mammals and birds migrate there from greatdistances to feed on abundant krill and fish. How-ever, much remains to be learned about Antarcticecosystems and about the relationship of the Antarc-tic environment to the global environment,

Interest in preserving wilderness suggests nominerals activities at all should be allowed in theareas to be preserved. Careful study of potentialenvironmental impacts and requirements is neededto minimize the impacts of minerals-related activi-ties.

Environmental values are potentially at risk byany resource development allowed in Antarctica.Preservation of a vast wilderness on an increasinglysettled and developed planet has esthetic, scientific,and moral value itself. Minerals development bringswith it—as a trade-off against the benefits of theprocessed materials-infrastructure that has someunavoidable environmental impacts. Some miningtechniques could alter the landscape for long peri-ods. A significant oil spill from a rig or tanker coulddestroy many creatures and despoil significant areasfor a long period of time given the slow rate ofdecomposition in frigid climates. Risks of accidentin such a harsh climate are higher than in moreamenable areas.

In general, these environmental interests sug-gest

●

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●

that the United States should:

maximize the incentives to observe soundenvironmental practices;maximize research and the disclosure ofdata about Antarctica; andwith respect to the system governing Antarc-tic mineral resources, avoid direct or indi-rect incentives (e.g., the absence of taxes orroyalties) that might make Antarctica moreattractive for development than other partsof the world.

Scientific Interests

Given its location and characteristics, and becauseit is largely uninhabited by man, Antarctica is aunique laboratory for scientific research. The infor-mation gained directly by scientists, and indirectlyfrom others conducting activities in Antarctica, cangreatly enhance knowledge not only about Antarc-tica but about natural processes and phenomena ingeneral. Experience also demonstrates that newknowledge, no matter how remote from practical useit may seem at the time, can become the basis forsignificant practical developments in the future.

Chapter 2--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention ● 49

The availability of knowledge is maximized ifminimum restrictions are placed on the conduct ofscientific research, and if public release of data andinformation by scientists and others, including thoseengaged in resource activities, is encouraged. At thesame time, the unique value of Antarctica as apristine natural laboratory (e.g., for research onglobal climate change) is maximized if humanactivity that might significantly alter that environ-ment is restricted.

In general, these interests parallel and rein-force environmental interests and have manyformal expressions within the ATS. They alsosuggest the following objectives with respect tothe system governing Antarctic mineral resources:

. minimize interference with scientific re-search;

. maximize controls on minerals activity thatmay diminish scientific values; and

. maximize the incentives for disclosing dataand information about Antarctica at allstages of minerals development.

Economic Interests

It is not clear if or when extraction of Antarctic oiland gas or other mineral resources, if discovered,would prove attractive to investors. This depends inlarge measure on prices for the commodity, alterna-tive sources of supply, and the value of a givenresource deposit in comparison to the substantialinvestments required and risks posed by an ex-tremely harsh and remote physical environment.

The United States shares with other consumersand importers of hydrocarbons and minerals aninterest in assuring that Antarctic resources areavailable for extraction in response to market forcesin order to meet world demand at minimum prices.The United States also has an economic, and to someextent political and strategic, interest in the diversityand security of its sources of supply of importantcommodities so as to avoid concentrated depend-ence on foreign sources subject to political ormilitary disruption or manipulation. This interestgenerally points in the same direction as theconsumer interest, although it may introduce apreference for greater involvement by American orallied companies.

In addition, the United States has an interest inmaximizing the opportunities for productive eco-nomic activity by its nationals. This interest gener-ally is advanced if extraction and processing ofAntarctic mineral resources generates Americanemployment and revenues directly or indirectlythrough utilization of American products and serv-ices.

The United States also has an interest in minimiz-ing the costs of administering any system ofgovernance for Antarctic mineral development. Tothe extent those costs are not passed onto miners, theAmerican taxpayer will bear a share of those costs.To the extent the costs are passed on to miners,investment may be discouraged.

In general, these economic interests suggest thefollowing objectives for the United States withrespect to the system governing Antarctic min-eral

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resources:

facilitate investment in response to marketforces by establishing necessary ground rules,ensuring predictability and security of in-vestment, and otherwise minimizing therestraints on investors;minimize the influence of governments ororganizations hostile to the economic inter-ests of United States over the resourceregime;maximize the opportunity for investment byAmerican companies; andminimize the cost of the system of govern-ance.

The present ATS serves U.S. interests in politicalstability, access to all of Antarctica now and in thefuture, participation in the regulation of Antarcticactivities for environmental and other purposes, andavoidance of conflict with the Soviet Union orothers. Moreover, the United States has been a leaderthroughout the development of the Antarctic TreatySystem. The Antarctic Treaty itself is in largemeasure a U.S. proposal, and the United States haslong pursued its interests in part through a policy of‘‘active and influential presence’ on the continent.Continued U.S. participation in the ATS will helpensure a continued leadership role for the UnitedStates.


There is inevitably some tension among thedifferent political, economic, scientific, and envi-ronmental interests of the United States in Antarc-tica. The Antarctic Minerals Convention, discussedin some detail in the next chapter, reflects judgmentsabout the balance among conflicting U.S. interests,between the interests of the United States and otherstates involved in the negotiation, and about therelative priority to be accorded those interests,

WHY THE CONVENTION?WHY NOW?

Though historically there was little perceivedneed for rules concerning mineral resource exploita-tion in Antarctica, by the 1970s a combination ofscientific, technological, and political factors beganto change the Antarctic Treaty Parties’ perception ofthe need for rules governing mineral resourcedevelopment.

The sticky issue of the territorial claims wassidestepped in 1959 in order to reach a limited butstill important agreement. The compromise, en-shrined in article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,provided the glue which held the Treaty together andenabled the Parties to continue unhindered scientificresearch throughout Antarctica, prevent the conti-nent’s militarization, prohibit the use of Antarcticafor disposal of nuclear waste, and, in general,promote cooperative activities.

By enabling scientists unhindered access to allparts of the continent, what was virtually terraincognita in 1959 was better known by the early1980s. To be sure, scientists still have only“scratched the surface’ of the 2 percent of thecontinent that is exposed, but they know thatAntarctica is geologically similar to other continentsunder the ice. It contains occurrences of manyminerals that, if found in large enough and richenough deposits in relatively ice-free areas, wouldattract commercial interest. Scientists have alsodiscovered that Antarctica was once a part of asupercontinent that has long since broken apart, nowknown as Gondwana or Gondwanaland.

Although there is evidence that Antarctica’scontinental shelves may contain oil and gas, nocommercial drilling has been done, and whether anylarge hydrocarbon deposits exist is unknown. Com-mercial interest has also been dampened by theextremely difficult operating conditions that wouldbe faced by producers in Antarctica. Nevertheless,many experts believe that if large deposits are foundin Antarctica, they may one day be exploited.

Technology to exploit resources has improvedsignificantly since the Antarctic Treaty was negoti-ated. For instance, technology has evolved forexploiting offshore oil—a resource that might be ofparticular interest if found in sufficient quantities inAntarctica (see app. A). Oil companies are venturinginto ever deeper water in search for new prospectsand into seasonally ice-covered areas of the Arcticand sub-Arctic. 19 Moreover, mining companies arealready operating several mines in high latitudearctic areas of Alaska, Canada, Sweden, and theSoviet Union under conditions similar in some waysto those that would be found in some parts ofAntarctica, notably the Antarctic Peninsula (see app.B). In some cases, for instance, in the case of ahigh-grade gold deposit in the Antarctic Peninsula,technology may already be available to profitablydevelop a high-grade resource. In most instances, atleast some if not a significant amount of technologywill still need to be developed before exploitationmay proceed (particularly in environmentally soundterms and with regard to safety and economics).Nevertheless, technology developments are no lon-ger seen to be a limiting factor.

As early as 1969 at least three inquiries werereceived by ATCP governments from companiesinterested in geophysical prospecting in Antarc-tica.20 While prospecting does not normally requirea legal system for protecting investments in aparticular site, it does raise questions of the legalright to prospect and of environmental regulation. Intheory, any territorial claimant might regard itsexisting domestic mining laws as applicable to itsAntarctic territory. Yet, if it purported to regulateprospecting based on its territorial claim, it couldprovoke a dispute over the legal status of Antarctica.

I$JU.S. ~n=W, Office of lkchnology Assessment, Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater, OTA-O-270 (Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Ofiice, May 1985).

T,M. Aubunt, Amurctic Luw and Politics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 243.

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Chapter 2--U.S. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention . 51

Similarly, if a nonclaimant purported to regulateprospecting in a claimed area, it could provoke adispute. Thus, not only were no common and agreedprocedures in effect at the time for issuing permitsfor prospecting activities, but the countries ap-proached by commercial firms understood that ifthey issued permits unilaterally, they could upset thestability of the Antarctic Treaty.

In 1973 the price of oil rose dramatically, an eventwhich further stimulated interest in Antarctica’sresources by commercial firms and by ATCPgovernments. 21 Sometime in early 1975, for exam-ple, Texas Geophysical Instruments applied to theU.S. State Department for a permit to prospect in theRoss and Weddell Seas .22 The permit was not issued.

Over the years the “claimants” and “non-claimants’ alike had developed a strong stake in thepreservation of the Antarctic Treaty, which despiteits shortcomings, has enabled unhindered scientificresearch and has kept Antarctica peaceful anddemilitarized, The Antarctic Treaty ConsultativeParties and other parties to the Antarctic Treaty wereaware of new developments in science and technol-ogy and thus of the increased probability that at leasta few potentially valuable deposits would possiblybe discovered in the ice-free areas of Antarctica.Outside the ATCP group, some environmentalistsexpressed the hope that no resource developmentactivities would ever be allowed in Antarctica.These groups argued that the mere existence of aminerals regime would unduly promote resourcedevelopment there. Thus, in establishing a regula-tory system, no matter how stringent its elements,legal uncertainty is removed, making it easier forpotential developers to risk undertaking mineralsactivities. Few ATCPs were willing to considerbanning all resource activities in Antarctica. Theywere convinced, however, that if no minerals agree-ment existed, disputes could arise over minerals.

They feared that a major discovery in the absence ofa regime would encourage a developer to proceed,subject only to its national laws or those of aterritorial claimant.23 Further, they perceived thatthey would be much more likely to reach anagreement before any major discoveries were made.The maintenance of political tranquility must there-fore be viewed as a primary, although not exclusive,reason for negotiation of the Minerals Convention.

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties beganto respond to the gradual increase in interest aboutthe resource potential of Antarctica by 1970. In-itially, only informal discussions were held. Theminerals issue first appeared on an ATCP meetingagenda at their seventh official meeting in 1972. Atthis time ATCPs agreed to initiate a study of theeffects of mineral exploitation and to discuss thissubject in more detail at the next regular ATCPmeeting in 1975. During the interim, scientistsaboard the Glomur Challenger discovered traces ofnatural gas near Antarctica, 24 OPEC (the Organiza-tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries) establishedits oil embargo, and the Soviet Union established aresearch base near the Dufek Mass if ‘to prospect forminerals over a 5-year period. ’25 Also. a very roughestimate by the U.S. Geological Survey of the ‘‘inplace” oil and gas resources of Antarctica appearedin the press, for the first time making official figuresof Antarctica’s resource potential available.26 Theestimate, although based on virtually no data andsince discredited, took on a life of its own and fueledspeculation that Antarctica could be a significantnew source of much-needed oil.

At the 1975 Consultative Party meeting, theATCPs resolved to hold a special preparatorymeeting on the sensitive minerals issue and directedthe Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research toprepare a report on the environmental impact ofminerals development, 27 The Special meeting, held

21shq]ey, op. CIL, fOOmOte 5! p. IX’

22u,s. conge~s, su~ommlttw on &ems ~d Intematjond Envirortrnent, Committee on Foreign Relations, ‘ ‘U.S. Antarctic poll~Y, ’ He~ng, U.S.Senate, 94th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 1975, p. 18.

~L A K~b~, T& An~rctlc M1mraL con}e~wn, s~i~ Repofi of tie Intemation~ kf.ituw for Environment and Development-–North America,Jdy 198i, p. 27.

24~owevcr, ~ ~~~ out in Ch, 4, ~s l~ely h~ no significance wi~ reg~d to tie formation of PW_O]ellm.uAubm, op. Cit., foo~ok 201 p “

MAubm, op. Clt,, fOOtIlOk 20* p ‘s’

27~e ~.n iS ~om ~ he E-A rep~, for Environment~ ~p~l Assessment of Mmer~ Resouce Exploration md Exploitation in httiI’CUCa,

It was edited and published in 1979 by SCAR as “Possible Envlronrnenud Effects of Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica. ”


in Paris in 1976, made it clear that the ATCPs hadmany differences about how to handle the mineralsissue. One important result, however, was an infor-mal moratorium on exploration and exploitationpending a timely solution to the problem. A formalrecommendation urging voluntary restraint whileprogress is made toward an agreed mineralsregime was adopted by the ATCPs at the ninthConsultative Party meeting in London in 1977.

Increasing attention was given to the mineralsissue at the ninth and tenth Consultative Partymeetings in 1977 and 1979, and recommendationsconcerning minerals were adopted at both meetings.Nevertheless, the development of a regime toregulate nonliving resources took a back seat to thequestion of living resources during this period. TheAntarctic Treaty Consultative Parties tackled livingresources first because some fishing and harvestingof krill was already occurring in Antarctica andincreased unregulated exploitation-potentially en-ough to jeopardize some species-was expected.Also, living resources were judged by many to be afar easier issue with which to deal than nonlivingresources, and successful negotiation of a livingresources agreement might smooth the way for moredifficult minerals negotiations.

A formal decision to negotiate a minerals regimefor Antarctica was made at the eleventh ATCPmeeting in Buenos Aires in July, 1981. Specifically,Recommendation XI- 1, which evolved from recom-mendations made at the previous two meetings,recommended that ‘‘a regime on Antarctic mineralresources should be concluded as a matter ofurgency. ” The Recommendation endorsed the con-vening of a special consultative meeting (subse-quently termed the Fourth Special Antarctic TreatyConsultative Meeting), and it established principlesby which the new regime would be governed. TheAntarctic Treaty Consultative Parties agreed that:

1. the Consultative Parties should continue toplay an active and responsible role in dealingwith the question of Antarctic mineral re-sources;

2. the Antarctic Treaty must be maintained in itsentirety;

3. protection of the unique Antarctic environ-ment and of its dependent ecosystems should

be a basic consideration;4. the Consultative Parties, in dealing with the

question of mineral resources in Antarctica,should not prejudice the interests of all man-kind in Antarctica; and

5. the provisions of article IV of the AntarcticTreaty should not be affected by the regime.28

Principles 2 and 5, in particular, express theATCP’s desire that the new convention be anintegral part of the Antarctic Treaty System, that itin effect strengthen the System by filling a signifi-cant gap in the collection of agreements governingAntarctica, Principle 5 recognizes the sensitivity ofthe claims issue, but also expresses the desire andwillingness of ATCPs to negotiate a minerals regimethat sidesteps the issue—just as was done in theliving resources agreement. Principle 4 denotes inessence that the ATCPs consider that only thosestates with significant interests in Antarctica-theATCPs themselves-should be involved in negoti-ating the new regime (but that they intend to ‘‘bearin mind” the interests of other countries). Andprinciple 5 reveals one of the important reasons fornegotiating. These basic principles are restated in aslightly different form in the preamble to theMinerals Convention.

THE ATCPs AND THEUNITED NATIONS

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties do notview Antarctica as being similar to other uninhab-ited regions of the world-e. g., the seabeds beyondthe limits of national jurisdiction-that may besusceptible to international management or control.Because of the existence of claims and bases forclaims and of the long history of successfuladministration of Antarctica, ATCPs have longheld that they possess special rights and responsi-bilities there. Some developing countries not partyto the Antarctic Treaty actively dispute the view thata relatively small group of countries have earned theright to decide what is in the interests of the entireinternational community, what the ‘‘entry fee’ willbe for Consultative Party status, or generally howAntarctica will be regulated. The Antarctic TreatyConsultative Parties have therefore vigorously re-sisted U.N. attempts to increase its influence in

~R~~en~on XI-1, Antarctic Mineral Resources, paragraph 5.

Chapter 2--US. Involvement in Antarctica and the Origin of the Minerals Convention . 53

Antarctica. The ATCPs contend that the AntarcticTreaty meets all criteria for a regional agreementunder chapter VIII, article 52 of the United Nationscharter and is thus consistent with the principles andpurposes of the United Nations. In the early 1970srepresentatives of several developing countries triedto include Antarctica in the Law of the Seadiscussions and to designate it, along with the deepseabeds, as part of the “common heritage ofmankind, The ATCPs, including Chile and Argen-tina, the two original developing-country consulta-tive parties, resisted these attempts.29

In the wake of the ATCPs decision to startnegotiating a minerals regime for the continent andas the Law of the Sea negotiations were windingdown at the end of 1982, the interest of U.N.members in Antarctica grew. The question ofAntarctica was first placed on the U.N. GeneralAssembly agenda in 1983, subsequent to a speech inwhich the Malaysian Prime Minister argued that the‘‘uninhabited lands’ of Antarctica did not belong tothe colonial powers claiming them and that it wastime to negotiate a new international agreement forthe continent.30

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Partieshave continued to resist any attempt to considerAntarctic issues in a broader forum. Each year,however, the question of Antarctica is considered inthe U.N. General Assembly. Most recently, theGeneral Assembly expressed “its conviction thatany minerals regime on Antarctica, in order to be ofbenefit to all mankind, should be negotiated with thefull participation of all members of the internationalcommunity, ’ and further expressed ‘its deep regretthat the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties haveproceeded with negotiations and adopted [the Min-erals Convention], ’31

A global negotiation would challenge the under-lying premise of the Antarctic Treaty, namely thatdecisionmaking should be limited to states withsubstantial scientific activities in Antarctica. Ant-arctic Treaty Consultative Parties perceive that thischallenge could threaten the stability achieved bythe Antarctic Treaty System. In part, the decision to

complete an Antarctic Minerals Convention now,within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty Sys-tem, represents an attempt to preempt efforts to dealwith the question in the United Nations or someother multilateral forum.

Although ATCPs have been steadfastly unwillingto negotiate a new, more fully international agree-ment for Antarctica under the auspices of the UnitedNations, they have taken some steps to respond toU.N. concerns. They have, for instance, madeinformation about their deliberations more avail-able, enlarged the role of observers, and expandedrelations with international organizations havingscientific and technical interests in Antarctica. Overtime, also, more countries have acceded to theAntarctic Treaty. Although the number of countriesis still in the minority, 39 nations have now acceded,22 of which are now also Consultative Parties. Withthe addition of China and India, more thanthree-fourths of the world’s population is repre-sented. Moreover, virtually all countries withdirect and substantial interests in Antarcticahave acceded to the Antarctic Treaty and relatedagreements. If the Minerals Convention is notratified, U.N. efforts to establish an alternativeregime could be given renewed impetus.

Concern about U.N. efforts to supplant the ATSwas an additional reason for ATCPs to completenegotiations for a minerals convention. One finalreason relates to the provision of the AntarcticTreaty that enables any of the Consultative Parties tocall for a conference of all Parties to reviewoperation of the Treaty beginning 30 years after itsentry into force, that is, any time after June 23,1991.32 The 1991 date is probably not as significantas some authors have suggested. Consultationsamong ATCPs are already extensive, occurring nowat the biennial Consultative Meetings, at meetings ofthe Living Resources Convention, at meetings of theScientific Committee on Antarctic Research, etc., aswell as during negotiations of the Minerals Conven-tion itself. Hence, ATCPs regularly review operationof the Treaty. Moreover, the possibility for amend-ing the Antarctic Treaty at the review conference, as

29shw]ey, op. cit., footnote 5 I P. 222

30 Shwlcy, op. cit., footnote 5) P 218“

31um~ N~om (jeneral As~mbly, 43d WSS., ‘‘Quesuon of Antarctica, ’ A/RES/4Y83, Agenda Item 70, Jan. 26, 1989.32AnMmic Treaty, art. 12(2a).


suggested in article 12, can already be done at anytime, and the process by which the Treaty could beamended in the review conference is the same as theprocess by which the Treaty is generally amended.It will be as procedurally difficult to modify theTreaty in 1991, or thereafter, as it is now.33

Nevertheless, perceptions are important, and having

a minerals regime in place before 1991 would bestrong additional evidence that ATCPs are capableof dealing with problems as they arise. And, havingjust dealt with one of the most difficult issuesthreatening the stability of the Treaty System,ATCPs would be free to turn their attention to otherimportant upcoming Antarctic matters.

33sh@ey, op. cit., fOOUIOE 5* P. 231“

Chapter 3

The Convention on the Regulationof Antarctic Mineral Resource

Activities

Photo credit: Ann Hawthorne

South Pole and Flags

CONTENTSPage

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .GENERAL PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Regulatory Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Scientific, Technical, and EnvironmentalThe Arbitral Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .Advisory. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Special Meeting of Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .DECISION MAKING AND COMPROMISE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A FRAMEWORK REGIME AND UNCERTAINTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prospecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Identification of an Area for Exploration and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SUSPENSION, MODIFICATION, CANCELLATION, AND PENALTIES . . . . . . . . . . .BUDGET AND REVENUE CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OPERATORS AND SPONSOR STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LIABILITY AND RESPONSE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE MINERALS CONVENTION . . . . . . . .DISPUTE SETTLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5758596262626464646565676868717479848485868789

FiguresFigure Page3-1. Prospecting: Articles 37 and 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693-2. Opening an Area: Articles 39-41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .723-3. Exploration: Articles 4 and 43-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763-4. Development: Articles 53 and 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Table3-1. What Must Occur

Antarctica . . . . . . .Before Exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

and+.. .

Development Can Take Place in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

3-2. The Institutions of the Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-3. Prospecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-4. Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-5. Blocking Power on a Regulatory Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-6. Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-7. Dispute Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60637078798089

Chapter 3

The Convention on the Regulation ofAntarctic Mineral Resource Activities

SUMMARYThe Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic

Mineral Resource Activities creates the means fordetermining the acceptability of resource activitiesand for regulating any activities determined to beacceptable. It is a compromise agreement. Its finalform is due in large part to the fact that seven claimshave been made to parts of Antarctica, but that noother states accept the validity of those claims. It isalso a result of the need to find a way to balance theinterest of many countries in protecting Antarctica’senvironment, yet still allow for the possibility ofminerals development in and around the continent.The attempt to balance competing interests is key tounderstanding the composition, voting procedures,decision-making authority, and other checks andbalances established by the Minerals Convention. Itis also key to understanding provisions for regulat-ing resource activities and protecting the environ-ment. The Convention is not intended to promoteresource development: it seeks to be neutral, neitherpromoting nor prohibiting development.

The Minerals Convention is intended to be anintegral part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).It compensates for the fact that the Antarctic Treatydoes not address mineral resource questions. If leftunaddressed, the Treaty Parties believe this omis-sion could lead to instability and possibly a break-down of the ATS. Such a breakdown is not in theinterest of the United States: on the contrary, theUnited States has long held the ATS as a model ofeffective international cooperation.

The Minerals Convention is a framework regime.It does not contain a detailed mining code but relieson general guidelines and some specific require-ments and prohibitions, much as a general statutedelegating authority to an administrative agencymight do. The Parties avoided detail because of thedifficulty of anticipating all regulatory require-ments. The institutions created in the MineralsConvention, in particular the Commission and theRegulatory Committee(s), will be responsible forestablishing details of the regime.

The Minerals Convention contains potentiallystrong environmental protection provisions. Forinstance, binding dispute settlement procedures willapply to all measures related to environmentalprotection. The principal uncertainties regardingenvironmental protection are how well the compli-ance and enforcement provisions of the Conventionwill work in practice and what terms such as‘‘adequate and ‘‘significant” mean in relation toenvironmental measures.

The hurdles a potential minerals developer wouldhave to clear before a proposed development couldproceed are demanding. Initiating exploration anddevelopment under the terms of the Convention willbe difficult. However, commercial enterprises rec-ognize that they are better off with a mineralsagreement than without one.

Minerals prospecting, exploration, and develop-ment must be sponsored by a Party to the Conven-tion. Sponsoring states must evaluate Operators theysponsor and oversee their activities. Sponsors mustalso be prepared to support and defend the interestsof their Operators in institution meetings.

One of the most difficult issues the AntarcticTreaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) faced was theissue of liability for activities that result in damageto the Antarctic environment. The Minerals Conven-tion contains general liability provisions, but theATCPs must negotiate a separate Liability Protocolbefore any exploration and development can beconsidered in Antarctica. Prospecting may proceed,subject to the general liability provisions of theConvention.

Ratification of the Minerals Convention wouldadvance important U.S. environmental, scientific,economic, and political and strategic interests inAntarctica. For different reasons, development-minded and environmental groups see the Conven-tion’s lack of detail as a shortcoming. In the long run,this concern may be less important than whether theConvention helps to maintain peace and stability inthe region.

–3 l –


INTRODUCTIONThe Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs)

recognized in the 1970s that an agreement aboutpotential minerals activities in Antarctica eventuallywould be needed. They perceived that knowledgeabout Antarctica’s geology was steadily increasing,that the technical feasibility of developing anymineral resources that might be found in Antarcticawas improving, and that a major resource discoveryin the absence of an agreed regime for managingminerals activities could lead to a weakening of theAntarctic Treaty System. A formal agreement toestablish an Antarctic minerals regime was made atthe ATCP’s 1981 Buenos Aires meeting. It was notimmediately apparent, however, that a mutuallyacceptable agreement could be reached. While theATCPs were generally agreed that the ATS must bepreserved and that the Antarctic environment mustbe protected, not all Treaty parties had the same viewabout how to accomplish these and other ends. Howwould the interests of claimant and nonclaimantstates be balanced without compromising the juridi-cal positions of either? Could Antarctica’s environ-ment be adequately protected (and if so, how)without banning all minerals development there?How were revenues derived from any permittedminerals activities to be divided? Who would pay(and how much) in the event of an accident such asan oil spill? The Convention on the Regulation ofAntarctic Mineral Resource Activities addressesthese and other issues. This chapter describes andevaluates this new treaty.

The Minerals Convention was adopted on June 2,1988, after 6 years of negotiations. It applies to thesame area as the Antarctic Treaty, or all land, iceshelves, islands, and continental shelves south of 60°s.1 The Convention creates the means for determin-ing the acceptability of mineral resource activitiesand for regulating any activities determined to beacceptable. The 67 main articles and 12 annexarticles of the Minerals Convention establish thegeneral principles, specify the legal obligations ofthe Parties, and create the institutions and proce-dures necessary for decisionmaking. In effect,Parties to the Convention have said that in somecircumstances Antarctica% resources may bedeveloped, but only if significant environmental

impacts are unlikely to result from developmentand only if established uses of Antarctica are notjeopardized.

The Minerals Convention does not automaticallyopen Antarctica to resource development activities.Although the Convention does not prohibit thepossibility of developing any mineral resourcesdiscovered in Antarctica, neither is it intended topromote development. Indeed, certain standards andprocedures established by the Convention imposestringent requirements on resource developmentconsidered acceptable. Second, the Minerals Conven-tion does not automatically close all of Antarctica toresource development, While development of thoseparts of Antarctica designated as Specially ProtectedAreas (SPAs) or Sites of Special Scientific Interest(SSSIs) is automatically prohibited, all other areasmay be considered for development activities. Manyof the areas considered for resource developmentwill be eliminated, however, if it is determined thatdevelopment would have significant adverse effectson the environment or on scientific or historicvalues. Obviously, the Minerals Convention doesnot completely satisfy those intent on preserving allof Antarctica in a pristine state, nor does it com-pletely satisfy potential developers, who wouldbenefit from a less restrictive regime regulatingaccess to the continent. Third, the Minerals Conven-tion is not intended to be a detailed mining code,specifying how all possible situations are to behandled and eliminating all uncertainty. It is in-tended, rather, that more detailed rules and regula-tions will be developed when and if necessary by theinstitutions established by the Convention. Thus, itis a framework regime, to be considered as anotherstep forward—not the final step-in the evolution ofthe Antarctic Treaty System.

The Minerals Convention is a carefully craftedcompromise. Negotiators had the difficult task ofdealing with the differing juridical positions ofclaimants and nonclaimants and of balancing theinterests of developed and developing states, ofstates with free market and centrally planned econo-mies, and of states with varying attitudes about theenvironment. The relative importance of competing‘‘uses’ of Antarctica-minerals development, sci-ence, tourism, pristine wilderness, etc.—also had to

1~ exW@on is ~nti~n~ SheIVCS south of 60” S. which extend from islands north of 60” S.

Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 59

be considered. As a result, the Minerals Conventionis a complicated agreement, despite its frameworknature. Like similar multilateral agreements, it wasnegotiated as a package deal. That is, the UnitedStates and other participants in the negotiations mustnow either accept the Convention as it is or reject allof it. Changes in the Convention will not beconsidered. Table 3-1 indicates what must occurbefore minerals development can commence inAntarctica.

An explicit hierarchy of actors with a stake inAntarctic minerals issues exists. At the top of thishierarchy are the Antarctic Treaty ConsultativeParties or ATCPs. The ATCPs are the most influen-tial set of Antarctic actors and the only group withrights to participate in decisionmaking under theterms of the Antarctic Treaty. ATCPs, as of Novem-ber 25, 1988, are automatically accorded decision-making status under the Minerals Convention.2 Atpresent, there are 22 ATCPS.3 They are the original12 signatories of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the10 additional states that have subsequently demon-strated a special interest in Antarctica through theconduct of substantial scientific research there.Seventeen other Parties to the Antarctic Treaty donot have Consultative Party status. However, anyParty to the Antarctic Treaty, in addition to ATCPs,may become a Party to the Minerals Convention(and any member of the United Nations may becomea Party to the Antarctic Treaty). On June 2, 1988, 13of the then 16 non-ATCP Parties to the AntarcticTreaty adopted the Minerals Convention along withthe ATCPs. All Parties to the Minerals Conventionmay participate in the Scientific, Technical, andEnvironmental Advisory Committee and in theSpecial Meeting of Parties, but these institutions donot have any decisionmaking authority. Any Party tothe Minerals Convention, which undertakes substan-tial minerals-related research or which sponsorsexploration or development, may participate in thedecisionmaking organs of the Convention while it iscarrying out these activities. Observer status to theCommission and Advisory Committee establishedby the Minerals Convention is open to any Party tothe Antarctic Treaty not participating in the MineralsConvention and may be accorded, as appropriate, in

the Commission, the Advisory Committee, and theSpecial Meeting of Parties to international organiza-tions, including non-governmental organizations,with special interests in Antarctica. Only otherParties to the Minerals Convention may send ob-servers to Regulatory Committee meetings,

Two other types of actors play significant roles inthe Convention. A Sponsoring State—one sponsor-ing resource activities-may be any Party to theMinerals Convention, regardless of ATCP status.Operators—those undertaking resource activities—must be sponsored and may be a Party, an agency ofa Party, a juridical person established under the lawof a Party (e.g., a corporation), or a joint ventureconsisting of any combination of these entities.

GENERAL PRINCIPLESSeveral important general principles are estab-

lished in chapter 1 of the Convention. Among themost important is that the Convention is an integralpart of the Antarctic Treaty System, in effect fillinga gap in it. As part of the ATS, Parties strove to makethe Convention consistent with other agreements ofthe system, including the Antarctic Treaty and theConvention on the Conservation of Antarctic Ma-rine Living Resources (art. 10). Parties consideredit especially important that their positions onterritorial claims continue to be protected, andthus article 9 of the new treaty essentially repeatsarticle 4 of the Antarctic Treaty, the modus vivendiemployed to sidestep the claims issue. The MineralsConvention, thus, does not resolve conflicts overclaims, but provides the means by which resourcesmay be developed (or at least considered fordevelopment) despite differences. If the Conventionis successfully implemented, it would be unneces-sary to resolve the claims issue, which may beunsolvable in any case, and the unique jurisdictionalarrangement in Antarctica would continue as before.

One important way in which the Minerals Con-vention is directly tied to the Antarctic Treaty is thatthose Parties to the Minerals Convention that werealso Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty onthe date the Convention was opened for signature(20 of the current 22) are automatically entitled to

2New AT~~ *1]] & ~rd~ ~lslom~lng status In tic co~lsslon ~less one-third of commission mcmbcrs obj~(. Ar_t, ] 8(4).

s~gentina, Aus~~ia, Bel~um, Br~il, Chl]e, China, Federal Rcpubilc of Germany, France, German Democrauc RCPUIIC, ~dw 1t~Y~ Japm, NewZealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Swden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.


Table 3-l-What Must Occur Before Exploration and Development Can Take Place In Antarctica

1. The Minerals Convention must be formally signed.Signature may take place during a l-year period beginning Nov.25, 1988,n The 20 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs)and 13 Non-Consultative Parties (NCPs) that participated in thelast session, where the Convention was adopted by consensus,are eligible to sign. The United States signed the Convention onNOV. 30, 1988.

2. The Minerals Convention must be ratified by 16 of the 20ATCPs that adopted it. Among the 16 must be 11 developed and5 developing ATCPs. Also among this group must be all 7 of theATCP claimant countries; the United States and the Soviet Union(the 2 non-claimants that reserve the right to make a claim); andat least an additional 7 non-claimant ATCPs, 3 of which must bedeveloping nations. This configuration assures participation byall of the states necessary to meet the membership requirementsof ail of the Convention’s institutions. The ratification processcould take several years.b

3. A Protocol to the Minerals Convention elaborating additionalrules and procedures regarding liability must be negotiated andratified in the same manner as the Minerals Convention. Negotia-tions to complete the Protocol could begin in 1989 or 1990. Theymay take several years.c

4. The Commission must consider adopting additional meas-ures related to, inter alia; a) protection of the Antarctic environ-ment; b) safe and effective expiration and development tech-niques; c) prospecting; d) the availability and confidentiality ofdata; e) maximum block sizes; f) the circumstances under whichManagement Schemes may be suspended, modified, or can-celed; g) financial regulations; h) fees payable for applications;and 1) levies payable by Operators engaged in exploration anddevelopment. d

5. Prospecting would likely take place. Some prospecting mayoccur before the Liability Protocol is completed. It can be done

without prior authorization by the institutions established by theConvention and is subject to the same standards of acceptabilityas expiration and development.”

6. On behalf of an Operator, a Party to the Convention mustpropose a specific geographic area of Antarctica to be openedfor expiration and development. This would be expected tooccur once some prospecting had been done by one or moreOperators and areas of interest had been identified.f

7. Once an area is proposed, a consensus decision to openthe area must be made by the Commission. Supporting informa-tion, including a detailed environmental impact assessment,must accompany a request to open an area. Information ade-quate to enable informed judgments must be available. TheCommission must elaborate opportunities for joint ventures orother forms of participating.g

8. The environmental assessment must conclude that theactivity will not result in any significant adverse environmentalimpacts; that technology and procedures are available for safeoperations and for compliance with environmental regulations;that the capacity exists to monitor key environmental parametersand ecosystem components; and that the capacity exists torespond effectively to accidents.h

9. Following the Commission decision to open an area, andbefore any specific applications to conduct exploration/development may be considered, the Regulatory Committee forthe particular geographic area must be established. The Commit-tee must draft general requirements governing applications andterms and conditions, giving effect to the standards in Article 4.I

10. Inspection procedures must be provided for each areaidentified for possible expiration and possible development.]

%rt. 60.b~t 62 ~d thg Fln~ ~

cArt. 8(7).ht. 21.e~t. 37

‘Art, 39,gkt. 39 and 41.W . 4 .‘Art. 43(3).JArt, 12(8).

SOURCE: OffI- of Technology Assessment, 1989.

membership on the Commission established by theConvention. Membership is also granted non-ATCPParties currently sponsoring exploration or develop-ment or currently engaged in research related to theConvention (art. 18(2)). Only these ATCPs haveautomatic voting privileges and the right to partici-pate in many key decisions.

To further promote consistency with other ele-ments of the Antarctic Treaty System the Partiesspecified that all decisions should take intoaccount the need to respect other established usesof Antarctica, including scientific research, longthe most important activity there; the conservation-including rational use-of marine living re-

sources; and tourism, an important and rapidlygrowing activity. The Convention makes clear thatthe Parties must consider possibly conflicting estab-lished uses in determining whether to open an areato exploration and development (art. 41(lb)). TheConvention grants inspectors designated accordingto rules established in the 1959 Antarctic Treatyrights to inspect all stations, installations, equip-ment, etc. related to minerals activity in the Antarc-tic Treaty area. It also provides for the designationof inspectors by each member of the Commissionand by the Commission as a group. Thus, consis-tency with the inspection provisions of the AntarcticTreaty is also promoted.


Photo credlt US. Geological Survey

Looking north along the western side of the Sentinel Range. Located near the base of the Antarctic Peninsula, the highest mountainsin Antarctica are found here.

Another important general principle is that no opposite of the exploitation principle established forexploration or development may take place un- the marine living resources of Antarctica under theless specifically authorized. The standards and Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Ma-process for authorizing exploration and development rine Living Resources (CCAMLR), wherein fishingtake up much of the Convention. This principle is the activities are deemed acceptable unless specifically


prohibited. The prohibition of resource activitiesunless authorized would not affect activities bycountries that are not party to the Minerals Conven-tion. While in theory this could be a problem, inpractice virtually all countries that have the capa-bility to exploit resources in Antarctica were in-volved in negotiating the Convention. Moreover, aslong as the Convention retains its legitimacy, anyattempt to exploit resources outside the MineralsConvention would be looked on with disfavor by theParties and would probably not succeed. Pros-pecting, unlike exploration and development, doesnot require specific authorization.

As a general rule, authorization for a specificproject depends on a finding that the project willnot cause significant adverse effects on atmos-pheric, terrestrial, or marine environments, in-cluding significant effects on:

● air and water quality;. species of flora or fauna;● endangered or threatened species; and● biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic, or

wilderness areas of special significance (art. 4).

Cumulative effects are also to be taken into account,as are activities that could cause significant adverseeffects on global or regional climate or weatherpatterns. Interpretation of the term “significantimpacts’ is left up to the Commission or RegulatoryCommittee members, as the case may be, withadvice from the Advisory Committee. Authori-zation for an activity also depends on the exis-tence of adequate technology, the ability tomonitor key environmental parameters, and theability to respond effectively to accidents.

INSTITUTIONSThe Minerals Convention provides for the estab-

lishment of five institutions (i.e., a Commission,Regulatory Committee(s), an Advisory Committee,an Arbitral Tribunal, and a Secretariat) and a SpecialMeeting of Parties. Table 3-2 identifies membership,decisionmaking authority, voting procedures (ifapplicable), and key functions for each of theseinstitutions.

The Commission

The Commission is one of the two decisionmak-ing institutions established by the Minerals Con-

vention and the only one to which all of the Partieseligible to participate in making decisions belong.Unlike the Regulatory Committees, which wieldauthority only within designated areas of Antarctica,the authority of the Commission extends to all of thearea covered by the Minerals Convention. TheCommission has broad authority for establishinggeneral rules and procedures applicable to allprospecting, exploration, and development, and todispute settlement. Many of the details for theseprocesses have not yet been elaborated, so theCommission will have much important work to doif the Minerals Convention is ratified. The Com-mission is also charged with determining the compo-sition of Regulatory Committees and with reviewingsome of their actions. One of the Commission’s mostimportant responsibilities is to determine, by aconsensus vote, whether or not to identify an area forpossible exploration and development for a particu-lar resource. An affirmative decision would triggerthe process that could ultimately result in developinga deposit.

Regulatory Committees

If the Commission decides to “identify” (open)apart of Antarctica for exploration and development,a Regulatory Committee will be appointed by theCommission for that area. Regulatory Committeemembers are chosen from the Commission and thusform a subset of Commission members. This subsetis selected to include Parties with knowledge of theparticular area and to achieve a political balance,particularly between claimants and nonclaimantsand between developed and developing countries.Each Regulatory Committee is responsible forformulating detailed requirements for explorationand development within its area consistent with thegeneral guidelines established by the Commission.The Regulatory Committees, therefore, and not theCommission, will be the primary managers of anyexploration and development that may occur withinthe identified area.

As the primary managing bodies, RegulatoryCommittees will have the power, among otherthings, to set general requirements for the conduct ofexploration and development within the designatedarea, to issue or deny exploration and developmentpermits, to devise Management Schemes (con-tracts), and to suspend, modify, or cancel Manage-

Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 63

Table 3-2—The Institutions of the Convention

The CommissionMembership: 1 ) All Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties—thereare 22-as of Nov. 25, 1988; 2) Any other Party that undertakessubstantial research relevant to decisions about mineral activities;3) Any Party that sponsors exploration or development during theperiod that the relevant Management Scheme for the explorationor development is in force. Art. 18.Decsionmaking authority Yes.Voting Procedures Consensus voting on the decision to identifyan area for exploration and development, on budgetary matters,and on elaboration of the principle of non-discrimination; three-quarters majority of the members present and voting on mattersof substance; a simple majority of members present and voting onprocedural matters. Art. 22.Key functions:●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

To designate areas in which resource activities shall beprohibited or restricted. Arts. 13(2) and 21 (lb).To adopt measures for the protection of the Antarctic environ-ment. Art. 21(c).To determine whether or not to identify (open) an area forpossible exploration and development. Arts. 21 (Id), 41, and

To adopt general measures relating to prospecting. Arts. 21 (1 e)and 37(13).To establish and determine the composition of RegulatoryCommittees. Arts. 21(1 k) and 29.To review the actions of Regulatory Committees, in particular,decisions to approve Management Schemes or to issuedevelopment permits. Arts. 21(1 1) and 49.To adopt measures related to international participation andjoint ventures, especially with developing country Parties. Arts.6, 21(1 m), and 41 (id).To adopt general measures relating to the circumstances underwhich Management Schemes may be suspended, modified, orcanceled. Arts. 21(1 n) and 51(6).To make decisions on budgetary matters and to adopt financialregulations. Arts. 21(1 o) and 35.To adopt measures regarding fees and levies payable byOperators. Arts. 21 (1p) and 21 (1q).To draw attention to activities by Parties that affect compliancewith Convention obligations. Arts. 7(7) and 21(1 s).To determine the disposition of revenues. Art. 21 (r).To establish additional procedures for third-party disputesettlement. Arts. 21(v) and 59.To adopt measures on availability and confidentiality of dataand information. Arts. 16 and 21(1 h).

Regulatory CommitteesMembership: 1 ) Each Committee to consist of 10 membersselected from the group of Commision members, 4 of which mustbe claimants and 6 of which must be non-claimants. Included onall Committees formed must be: a) the member(s) that have madeclaims in the area being considered; and b) the United States andthe Soviet Union, neither of which have made claims but both ofwhich assert a basis of claim in Antarctica. Three of the tenmembers must be developing countries. In addition to the basic10: 2) the Commission member that proposed opening the areaIf that member is not otherwise a member of the Committee, untilsuch time as an application for an exploration permit is lodged; 3)Parties that lodge exploration permits during the period theapplication is being considered; and 4) Parties whose applicationsresult in approved Management Schemes for as long as theManagement Scheme is in force, Art. 29.

Decisionmaking authority YesVoting procedures: A two-thirds majority of those present andvoting for key votes (i.e., approval of Management Schemes or ofmodifications to Management Schemes), the two-thirds majorityto include both a simple majority of the claimants and a simplemajority of non-claimants on the Committee; a similar “cham-bered” two-thirds majority, with “at least half” from each chamberfor decisions concerning adoption or revisions of general guide-lines for exploration and development; a simple two-thirdsmajority on other matters of substance; a simple majority of thosepresent and voting on procedural matters. Art. 32.Key functions:● Subject to general measures adopted by the Commission, to

prepare for managing the area for which it was formed, i.e., todivide the area into blocks, to establish fees and procedures forhandling applications, and to determine a method of resolvingcompeting applications. Arts. 31(a) and 43(2).

● To adopt general guidelines for exploration and development,Arts. 21 (la), 43(3), and 43(5).

● To consider applications for exploration and development. Art.31 (lb).

. To issue exploration permits and approve ManagementSchemes, the specific terms and conditions for exploration anddevelopment. Arts. 31(1c) and 44-48.

● To issue development permits. Art. 54(5).● To monitor exploration and development activities. Art. 31(d).. To suspend, modify, or cancel Management Schemes if it is

determined that unanticipated and/or unacceptable impactshave resulted or are about to result. Arts. 31(1 e), 51, and 54.

The Scientific, Technical, and Environmental AdvisoryCommitteeMembership: All Parties to the Convention. Art. 23.Decisionmaking authority No.Key functions:●

●

●

To provide advice on scientific, technical, and environmentalissues to the Commission and Regulatory Committees. Arts.26(2), 26(3), 27, 40(1 ), 43(6), 45(3), 51(2), 52, and 54(6),To evaluate environmental and technical assessments to assistdecisions by the Commission and Regulatory Committees. Art.26(4).To provide advice to interested developing country Parties andother Parties on issues within its competence, including trainingprograms related to scientific, technical, and environmentalmatters bearing on Antarctic mineral resource activities andopportunities for cooperation among Parties in these programs.Art. 26(6).

The Arbitral TribunalMembership: One arbitrator from the Party commencing thedispute proceedings; one arbitrator from the other Party to thedispute; a third arbitrator chosen jointly by the parties to thedispute (from a list of arbitrators composed of representativesfrom each Party to the Convention, as are the other two) andunconnected to either of the Parties. Where there are more thantwo parties to the dispute, the Parties having the same interestappoint one arbitrator. Annex Art. 3.Decisionmaking authority: Yes--for those disputes referred to it.Voting procedure: All decisions in areas within its competence bymajority vote; all arbitrators must vote. Annex Art. 12.

Key functions: To resolve disputes between two or more parties.Annex Art. 10.

Continued on next page


Table 3-2-The Institutions of the Convention-Continued

The Secretariat Comment The Special Meeting of Parties gives an opportunity toKey function: To serve the Institutions of the Convention. all Parties-not just those who have qualified to participate in theSpecial Meeting of parties decision-making institutions-to express their opinions aboutMembership: All Parties to the Convention, Art. 28(2). whether exploration and development in areas being consideredDecisionmaking authority No. for “identification” would be consistent with the principles of the

Key function: Convention.. To consider whether identification of an area for exploration and

possible development by the Commission is consistent with theConvention, Arts. 28 and 40(3).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989

ment Schemes. Some of the decisions of theRegulatory Committees are subject to review by theCommission, but the Commission is limited in itsability to require Regulatory Committees to alterdecisions. Other Regulatory Committee decisionsare subject to binding dispute settlement.

The Scientific Technical, and EnvironmentalAdvisory Committee

This committee, to be composed of representa-tives with relevant specialized expertise, was estab-lished to give expert advice to the Commission andRegulatory Committees on all scientific, technical,and environmental aspects of minerals resourceactivities. The Committee also provides a forum forconsultation and cooperation for the collection,exchange, and evaluation of information. One of themost important functions of the Advisory Commit-tee is to evaluate comprehensive environmental andtechnical assessments of proposals to open areas toexploration and development and of exploration anddevelopment plans (art, 26(4)). Membership is opento all Parties-that is, to Convention signatorieswithout voting rights as well as to Commissionmembers-to the Minerals Convention, but theAdvisory Committee has no independent deci-sionmaking power. The reports of the AdvisoryCommittee must reflect the conclusions reached atits meetings and all views expressed by members ofthe Committee. While lacking decisionmaking author-ity, the advice of the Advisory Committee isnevertheless likely to be taken seriously by theCommission and Regulatory Committees, for sub-stantive and political reasons.

There has been some concern that Parties’ desig-nated representatives on the Advisory Committeemay be subject to pressures to ignore their “techni-cal” role and provide opinions that reflect politicaldecisions taken within their countries. There appearsto be no way to prevent this; it can only be guardedagainst by the ‘‘sunshine’ provisions in the regime(open meetings and reports) and by the internationaland public pressure likely to result from abuse oftheir technical function.4

The Arbitral Tribunal

Parties to disputes arising out of the interpretationor application of the Minerals Convention areencouraged to try to resolve them on their own.When this cannot be accomplished within 12months, a three-person Arbitral Tribunal may beestablished or the dispute may be submitted to theInternational Court of Justice (art. 56(1)), Disputesrelated to the discretionary powers of the Commis-sion or Regulatory Committees are not subject to theauthority of the Arbitral Tribunal, and other limita-tions to the types of disputes that maybe decided bythe Tribunal apply. However, for those disputessubmitted to the Tribunal, decisions are intended tobe final and binding. Tribunals will consist of onearbitrator from each of the two disputing parties (orgroup of parties with a similar interest) and a thirdarbitrator acceptable to both disputants,

The Secretariat

The Commission may establish a Secretariat staff,as necessary, to support the work of the otherinstitutions of the Minerals Convention. Parties tothe Convention on the Conservation on AntarcticMarine Living Resources (CCAMLR) found it

4LA Kimb~], “’l%e Antarctic Minerals Convention, ” Special Report, International Imtitute for Environment and Development-NorthAmerica, July 1988, p. 29.


necessary to establish a Secretariat to support livingresources activities; however, a secretariat has yet tobe established to support Antarctic Treaty activities.At issue is whether the establishment of a perma-nent, central staff will prejudice the juridical posi-tions of countries. Some claimant states, in particu-lar, have been opposed to creating a permanentsecretariat for the Antarctic Treaty meetings, pre-ferring instead to continue the current practice ofrotating secretariat functions.

Special Meeting of Parties

Like the Advisory Committee, the Special Meet-ing of Parties is composed of representatives of allParties to the Convention but has no independentdecisionmaking authority. The sole function of thisbody is to advise the Commission on whetheridentification of an area for exploration and develop-ment is consistent with provisions of the Conven-tion. The Special Meeting of Parties is designed toafford some opportunity for all Parties to participatein the institutions of the Minerals Convention.Although the Special Meeting of Parties lacks anyformal power, it maybe difficult for the Commissionto ignore an opinion that development in a specificarea would be inconsistent with the Convention.

DECISIONMAKING ANDCOMPROMISE

The decisionmaking systems of the Convention,like most voting systems in international organi-zations, proceed on the assumption that each statecasts one vote.5 They attempt to accommodate stateswith more substantial interests by using two basictechniques, often in combination. The first is toconfine some or all decisions to organs with smallmembership, thereby maximizing the affirmativeand negative voting power of the small group ofmembers, some of whom may be guaranteed perma-nent membership. This is true of the Commissionand especially of Regulatory Committees. Thesecond is to maximize protection for negativeinterests by requiring more than a simple majority

for some or all decisions, running the gamut from atwo-thirds majority to consensus, and possiblyincluding concurrent votes of certain states orgroups of states. Under the Convention, the Com-mission requires three-quarters majority votes orconsensus for decisions, while the Regulatory Com-mittees utilize simple two-thirds majorities for lessimportant matters of substance and concurrenttwo-thirds majorities of its constituent groups (claim-ants and nonclaimants) for the most importantmatters.

This system has an unavoidable trade-off. Themore a state seeks to enhance its own blockingpower, the more it is compelled to grant similarpower to at least some other states, thereby makingan affirmative decision more difficult. b It is possibleto convert negative power into affirmative power byinsisting on approval of one’s affirmative agenda asa condition for allowing approval of someone else’saffirmative agenda. The difficulty is that every stateor group of states with negative power can do thesame thing.

The question of U.S. influence concerns not onlythe direct voting power of the United States, but thevoting power of states likely to share U.S. interestsor otherwise inclined to accommodate those inter-ests. Where underlying interests are complex, sup-port can be difficult to predict. Some governmentswith which the United States has very good bilateralrelations attach considerable importance to theirrelations with Third World leaders or other votingblocs in international organizations. Some majorindustrial states and U.S. political and military alliesare territorial claimants in Antarctica. U.S. interestsand theirs might diverge on matters affecting theclaims. At least juridically, the Soviet Union’sapproach to Antarctica is similar to that of the UnitedStates, yet its behavior in decisionmaking for a couldbe influenced by the general state of U.S.-Sovietrelations and divergent political, economic, or stra-tegic interests.

The Parties had to balance the interests ofclaimants, nonclaimants, and other cross-cutting

5We1@t~ “Otlng, in ~hlch each s~te is accord~ a different number of voux in accordance with a fOITnu]a designed tO reflWt relative inkrest Orcontribution, is uwd in some commodity arrangements and funding institutions.

%e virtues and problems of negative voting power are amply dcmonsLrated by the voting system in the UN. Security Council. According a vetoto each of the five permanent members tends 10 assure adequate suppon from the major powers for deasions with Important international securityimplications, and seines to protect each of them and their allies from adverse dwislons. At the same tune, the veto power cam substantially limit theresponsiveness of the Council to situations in which affu-matlve deciswns are deemed useful by the United States or others.


interest groups in order to achieve an agreement. Thechecks and balances embodied in the responsibili-ties, decisionmaking authority, voting procedures,and composition of each institution try to achievethis political compromise. A certain amount of‘‘horse-trading’ by the claimant and nonclaimantgroups and by market and centrally planned countieswas necessary in order to obtain a mutually accept-able result.

Some will see the compromises made in theMinerals Convention as going too far and preju-dicing the legal positions of either claimant ornonclaimant groups or of surrendering too much toeither environmental protection or of development.The Minerals Convention is the first Antarcticagreement in which any special rights areaccorded to the seven claimant States as claim-ants. In no other ATS agreement has a claimant beengiven an express right to a special position by virtueof being a claimant, or been accorded any expressright to a special role with respect to the particulararea it claims. The Convention explicitly establishesa decisionmaking structure for Regulatory Commit-tees that divides claimants and nonclaimants intoseparate groups. Moreover, a state with a territorialclaim to a particular area has, by virtue of that claimto that particular area:

●

●

●

●

●

a right to serve on a Regulatory Committeeestablished for an area that includes the area itclaims (art. 29);a right to influence which of the other territorialclaimants will sit on that Regulatory Commit-tee (art. 29);a right to demand that the Regulatory Commit-tee ‘‘have recourse’ to it in considering anapplication for an exploration permit and therelated Management Scheme (art. 46);a possible argument that its interests are enti-tled to special respect in any disposition ofsurplus revenues from the area it claims (art.35); anda possible argument that it has a duty to takemeasures in the area it claims to ensurecompliance with the Convention (art. 7).

On the other hand, if claimants ratify this Conven-tion, they will forgo ever having exclusive rights to

any resources found in their claimed territory(although in return they will gain access to allAntarctic resources and a role in all Commissiondecisions). While claimant States’ expectation ofexclusive rights to resources in ‘‘their’ areas mayhave been unrealistic, it might be argued that theConvention is the latest and most serious erosion ofclaimant ‘‘rights’ in Antarctica, beginning with theAntarctic Treaty, and despite treaty language statingthat preexisting judicial positions will not be af-fected by it.

The special interest of the United States and theSoviet Union as states having a basis for a claim inAntarctica is also specifically recognized in theConvention. The United States and Soviet Unionmust be represented on all Regulatory Committees,and, hence, have been accorded many of the samespecial rights as claimant states. Arguments aboutwhether claimants or nonclaimants benefit morefrom the Convention will probably remain incon-clusive.

Even though some states will have a larger voicein the Regulatory Committees, the general interestsof all Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties areprotected by the functions of the Commission. AllParties also may express their concerns in theAdvisory Committee and Special Meeting of Par-ties.

Claimants wanted the Regulatory Committee tohave more discretionary powers because they werewary of the nonclaimant majority on the Com-mission, But many nonclaimants wanted the Com-mission to be strong and to review RegulatoryCommittee actions.7 In the end, the Commission wasgiven power to set parameters for rulemaking by theRegulatory Committees and to review certain Regu-latory Committee actions. Hence, neither the claim-ant nor the sponsoring state within the RegulatoryCommittee, nor the Committee itself, have blanketdiscretion. Each is limited by the functions assignedto the Commission and subject to the advice of theAdvisory Committee on technical and environ-mental issues.8 Although the United States hadpreferred all decisions to be made by less thanunanimous votes, so that no single state would havea veto, U.S. negotiators went along with the consen-


sus rule for the ‘‘trigger’ decision on whether toopen an area-so long as less than unanimous voteswere used in the Regulatory Committees afterinvestments had begun.

Some environmental groups criticize this divisionof authority, which gives Regulatory Committeesimportant independent power. They argue that theCommission should have the ultimate authority toapprove or deny all key decisions.9 Env ironmentalistsfear the smaller Regulatory Committees are likely tobe composed of states seeking to cut a deal topromote development, and thereby will sacrificeenvironmental safeguards. Although the Commis-sion may review Regulatory Committee actions,they argue, it will not have the power to overturndecisions that could harm the environment. While aCommission with the authority to overturn Regula-tory Committee decisions might be more responsiveto environmental concerns, there is no guarantee thatit would be. Also, a Regulatory Committee wouldhave difficulty ignoring the Commission’s guide-lines when developing a Management Scheme, aswell as later suggestions made by the Commission,the advice of the Advisory Committee, or the viewsof individual States with strong environmentalconcerns.

Finally, since the Commission has the responsi-bility to open areas to exploration and developmentand to designate members of the Regulatory Commit-tee for each area, it can assure a balance ofdevelopment and environmentally inclined states ineach Regulatory Committee. Given the diversity ofinterests of the Parties, it is difficult to see how anagreement could have been reached that vested allimportant power in just one of the institutions.

A FRAMEWORK REGIME—ANDUNCERTAINTY

The Minerals Resource Convention has beentermed a framework regime. It does not contain adetailed mining code or regulations. Rather it relieson general guidelines and some specific requirementsand prohibitions, much as a general statute dele-gating authority to an administrative agency mightdo. The details of many of the elements of the new

regime have not yet been specified and will not bespecified until it is necessary to do so. With respectto exploration and development, most of the regula-tory system will be put into place for each area ofAntarctica when that area is identified (opened) bythe Commission for receipt of applications forexploration and development. Some of the condi-tions and guidelines will be specified by theCommission at the time it identifies the area. Theremainder will be determined by the RegulatoryCommittee established for the particular area, eitherby general regulation or in the context of theManagement Scheme applicable to a particularOperator in a particular block within the larger areafor which the particular Regulatory Committee iscompetent. Even though many details remain to beworked out, the Convention is still elaborate and byfar the lengthiest of the ATS agreements.

The flexibility of this system is an advantage tothe Parties to the Minerals Convention. Too muchdetail is probably not desirable now since it isimpossible to anticipate all requirements the Con-vention must meet. On the other hand, the gapsremaining in the regime may be seen by potentialOperators as disadvantages.

Some of the regime’s lack of detail (and inseveral cases ambiguity) is seen as a shortcomingby both development-minded and environmentalgroups. 10 For example, investors in resource devel-opment generally want to know the ‘‘rules of thegame” early so that, before making substantialinvestments, they can decide if the expected returnsare worth the risks. The Convention does not specifywhat levies Operators will have to pay to support theConvention or the amount of ‘*payments in thenature of, and similar to taxes, royalties, andpayments in kind. ” Also unknown are the Opera-tor’s specific liabilities. However, much uncertaintyshould be resolved in a Management Scheme priorto the time an Operator must commit substantialcapital to an operation, and uncertainty at theprospecting stage would not be costly.

Security and predictability are also important toinvestors, especially once a Regulatory Committeeapproves a Management Scheme and issues an

9AIKUCUC and Soutiem (lean (hhtion, ‘ ‘Analysis of the ConventIon on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, ’ ASOCInformation Paper 19884 October 1988, p. 6.

1OS= ~tuc~c @ sou~cm ~~ c~l[ion, ibid,; ~~, QT’A w~rk~~p on tic An[~Cti~ ~lnerii]s Coil}’cllllon, ~, 15, 1~~~,


exploration permit (see below). Can development bestopped even after significant investments in explo-ration have been made and performance criteria havebeen met? Article 54, discussed in more detailbelow, is ambiguous on how this decision would bemade.

Similarly, environmental groups are concernedthat some aspects of uncertainty and ambiguity inthe Convention may work to the disadvantage ofenvironmental protection. For instance, the MineralsConvention requires that information ‘adequate’ toenable informed judgments be available beforemajor decisions (such as opening an area) can bemade (art. 4(1 )). Also, no minerals activity is to takeplace unless it would not cause “significant”adverse effects on air and water quality (art. 4(2a)).Although words such as “significant” and “ade-quate” are subjective, it would have been difficult totie the Parties down to more specific terms and stillreach agreement. These terms will be defined inmore detail by the institutions as necessary.

THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENTPROCESS

The Convention divides resource activity intoprospecting, exploration, and development (tables3-3, 3-4, and 3-6).

Prospecting

Prospecting is the first phase in the resourceexploitation process (figure 3-1 and table 3-3). Itconsists of those methods and techniques that helpminers determine targets for more intensive explora-tion. Successful prospecting may lead to explorationand development if economic conditions warrantand if the environment would not be ‘significantlyharmed.

The methods used in prospecting are not easilydistinguishable from those methods scientists em-ploy in acquiring basic geophysical, geochemical,and geologic knowledge, nor are the results. Also,the geophysical research of some countries inAntarctica is carried out by the same organizationsthat would conduct prospecting activities. Thedifference between scientific research and prospect-

ing is largely a matter of intent. The distinction isrelevant because the Minerals Convention allowsprospecting data to be held as proprietary whereas,under terms of the Antarctic Treaty, the results ofscientific research must be made freely available toall.

Exploration and development, as defined in theMinerals Convention, have not yet commenced inAntarctica. This is due in large part to the fact thatthere is little current interest in such activities. In1977 the Antarctic Treaty Parties formally agreed torefrain from exploration and exploitation in Antarc-tica pending progress toward a regime governingthese activities.11 But geophysical and other surveyshave been conducted as scientific research-thoughthey may produce information of potential commer-cial value-and thus, have not been subject to thevoluntary restraint agreement on exploration. Unfortu-nately, the data from some past “research’ surveyshave not been released yet, thus raising speculationabout whether these data were collected for researchor for commercial purposes. Moreover, there havebeen varying interpretations of when data should bereleased.

The Minerals Convention clearly distinguishesbetween prospecting and exploration. The Final Actof the Convention extends the policy of voluntaryrestraint the Parties adopted in 1977 pending entryinto force of the Minerals Convention. The policynow specifically applies to prospecting as well as toexploration and development. Geophysical and othersurveys may still be carried out as scientific re-search, but as research, the results must be madefreely available. One result may be that fewergeophysical surveys will be undertaken until theConvention enters into force. Potential prospectorsare unlikely to run the risk of engaging in any‘‘questionable’ scientific research that may beviewed as prospecting prior to entry into force of theMinerals Convention, for they could lose theirproprietary rights to this data.12

Prospecting under the Minerals Convention issubject to much less oversight by the Convention’sinstitutions than exploration and development. Itmay be undertaken prior to the opening of an area tothese activities, Explicit authorization is not re-

I IR~omm~&on IX- 1, 9th ATCM, Lmdon, 1977.lzwb~], op. cit., footnoted, p. 4.


Potential operatorsubmits relevantdata to Sponsor.

Sponsor notifiesCommission ofOperator plans, trans-mits environmentaland other information.

Figure 3-l—Prospecting: Articles 37 and 38

Sponsor on behalf of Commission meets tooperator, provide take “appropriateclarification. action.”

No

NoSponsor responsible Ifor ensuring Operatormodifies plans oractivities.

Yes

I

11 No

Prospecting notallowed or canceled.

Data released.

SOURCE: Offio@ of Technology Asaeasment, 19S9.

quired because prospecting activities are expected to prospecting may be prohibited or canceled or planshave no greater impact than similar scientific may be altered if Commission members haveresearch. Thus, for ‘the most part, prospecting sufficient concerns about planned or ongoing activi-activities are expected to be of short duration and to ties.leave little trace behind. Prospectors are subject tothe same general requirements and obligations set Prospectors may hold data they obtain as proprie-forth in the Convention, however, including those tary for at least 10 years if it has commercial value,meant to safeguard the Antarctic environment. And but significantly, prospecting confers no special


Table 33-Prospecting

Definition: Activities, including logistic support, aimed at identi-fying areas of mineral resource potential for possible explorationand development, including geological, geochemical, and geo-physical investigations and field observations, the use of remotesensing techniques, and collection of surface, seafloor, andsubice samples. Such activities do not include dredging orexcavations, except to obtain small-scale samples, or drilling,except shallow drilling not to exceed 25 meters. Art. 1(8).General provisions:•

●

●

●

Does not confer upon any Operator any right to Antarcticmineral resources. Art. 37(1 ).Does not require authorization by the institutions of theConvention. Art. 37(2).Data of commercial value may be retained, as long as theSponsoring State certifies that they continue to have commer-cial value. Art. 37(10).Notification of prospecting by Sponsoring State must beaccompanied by fees (yet to be established) and by: a)identification of the general area for prospecting, b) identifica-tion of the mineral resource(s) under investigation, c) adescription of the methods to be used and the general workprogram, d) an assessment of the possible environmentalimpacts of the prospecting, e) measures to be used to avoidand/or to mitigate any harmful impacts, and f) proof that theOperator has a substantial and genuine link with the Sponsor-ing State and is financially and technically qualified to carry outthe prospecting. Art. 37(7a-f).

Institutional oversight● Minimal, but if a Commission member is concerned that

prospecting is not being conducted in a manner consistent withthe Convention or that planned prospecting would not beconsistent with it, the member may ask for a clarification. If it isstill concerned, in concert with at least five other Commissionmembers, it may call a meeting to take appropriate action. Art.38.

SOURCE: Offkx of Technology ksiewment, 19S9.

rights to an area. Exclusive rights to explore anddevelop an area may be obtained only after therelevant area has been opened, competing applica-tions to explore the same parts of the area have beenresolved, and an exploration permit has been issued.It does not appear that this uncertainty will operateas a significant deterrent to the oil and gas industryin prospecting. This industry is generally used to asystem under which investments in prospecting willnot necessarily entitle them to exclusive rights toexplore or exploit in the area in which theyconducted prospecting. The mining industry, on theother hand, neither has the financial resources thatthe oil and gas industry has for prospecting andexploration nor is as used to spending large sumswithout the certainty that it will acquire rights to itsdiscoveries.

. The Commission may adopt additional general measuresconcerning prospecting applicable to all operators. Arts. 37 and38.

● As appropriate, the Advisory Committee provides advice to theCommission. Art. 26(2a).

Key sponsor obligations:●

●

●

●

●

●

To notify the Commission on behalf of its Operator at least 9months before planned prospecting, the notification to includethe information listed above. (Presumably, in cases whereOperators and Sponsors are independent of each other, theOperator will supply this information to the Sponsor, who will inturn certify it and forward it to the Commission.) Art. 37.To ensure that Operators are qualified to undertake pros-pecting in conformance with the Convention, and especiallythat they have the appropriate financial and technical means torespond to threats to the environment. Art. 37.To ensure that Operators have the financial capacity to meetliability standards, Art. 37.To ensure that Operators conduct themselves with due regardto the rights of other Operators in the area. Art. 37.Where modifications to a proposed prospecting plan or toongoing prospecting are deemed necessary, to ensure that theplan or activity of the Operator is modified. Art. 38.To ensure that response action is taken in the event that theOperator fails to do so. Art. (37(3a)).

Operator obligations● Maintain the financial and technical means to conduct all

activities in compliance with the Convention. Art. 37.. Maintain a substantial and genuine link with the Sponsoring

State. Art. 37.● Conduct all activities with due regard to other Operators’ rights.

Art. 37.. Unless waived, remove all installations and equipment after

prospecting ceases and rehabilitate the site. Art. 37.

Some prospecting is likely to occur at arelatively early date if the Minerals Convention isratified and enters into force--even if near-terminterest in developing Antarctica’s resourcesremains slight. Companies and nations that take a“long view” about exploiting Antarctica’s re-sources may wish to be in a position to evaluate theeconomic and technical feasibility of resource ex-ploitation, anticipating that prices will eventually behigher. 13 Prospecting may not lead immediately toexploration and development, however, in partbecause the economics of development may notwarrant proceeding beyond the prospecting phase.For this reason, when the United States considersimplementing legislation for the Minerals Conven-tion, it may wish to devote somewhat more effort todeveloping regulations applicable to domestic pros-

‘31bid., p. 4,


pectors. There is likely to be additional time inwhich to formulate domestic implementing legisla-tion for exploration and development of Antarctica’sresources,

Identification of an Area forExploration and Development

One of the most important decisions specified bythe Convention is how an area of Antarctica isopened for exploration and development. If aprospector determined that there was sufficientincentive to proceed with intensive exploration of aparticular site, the prospector would request that itsSponsor ask the Commission to identify (open) thearea in question (figure 3-2). The Commission’sdecision to open an area must be made byconsensus. This is the decision that triggers theformation of a Regulatory Committee, considerationof exploration and development permits, develop-ment of a Management Scheme, and, in general,greatly increased activity. The Commission mustdecide whether identifying all or part of the area isconsistent with Convention standards, and, in the-ory, Commission members will base their vote on allrelevant information submitted by the requestingParty, other interested Parties, the Advisory Com-mittee, and the Special Meeting of [All] Parties.

To the extent that the United States is reluctantfor any reason, such as environmental concerns, toallow an area of Antarctica to be opened toexploration, the consensus voting requirement en-sures that opening the area can be blocked. However,if the United States wants an area opened, any othermember of the Commission could block its request.Since some state member might oppose opening anarea on environmental or other grounds or seek toimpose conditions which effectively do the samething, the U.S. interest might be thwarted. Anenvironmental group’s opposition, if based on plau-sible evidence, might serve as the pretext for a state’snegative vote.

It is not clear what financial, temporal, or otherdisincentives to proceeding with exploration mightdeter a state or company from seeking to have anarea opened to exploration applications relativelyearly. While OTA predicts that actual developmentis unlikely absent a very valuable find and extremelyfavorable projected market conditions, it is less clear

how far in advance a serious effort would be madeto ‘‘trigger’ the system by seeking to open an area.One of the biggest deterrents to opening an area islikely to be the need for adequate information, Oneincentive for early application to open areas toexploration and development is the provision thatprospecting data must be made public after 10 years,although there are also provisions to extend the10-year protection of such data (art. 37).

It is likely that the more important an area is likelyto be to consumers, the greater will be the pressureon the Commission members to approve a request toopen it. The ‘‘nightmare’ scenario of a Westerncountry, in desperate need of oil, being frustrated byCommission vetoes is improbable. If the situationwere that critical to the West, a threat to denouncethe Convention would presumably be real. In thatcase the possible collapse of the Convention (andlikely the entire Antarctic Treaty System along withit) would be viewed by all Parties with alarm.

The Commission includes some oil exportingstates (e.g., the United Kingdom and Norway). Nonehas thus far associated itself with a cartel, However,it is possible the consensus requirement couldinspire a member of OPEC (the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries) to invest in theAntarctic research necessary to join the Commis-sion, so as to gain a veto over the decision to openAntarctica to oil exploration and development.However, an economically motivated move by an oilexporter to restrain Antarctic production wouldlikely unite the existing group of states active inAntarctica, in part because most are consumers andin part because they perceived that their system wasbeing manipulated for outside ends. In such anatmosphere, it is not likely that the attempt to blockconsensus would long survive. The same argumentis likely to be true for hard minerals exporters.

Would the presence of the Soviet Union on theCommission likely be a problem for the UnitedStates? The Soviet Union is certainly capable ofusing its veto for purely political ends. Whether, inparticular circumstances, it would do so is anothermatter. If the question arose at a time when theSoviet Union was seeking better relations with theWest or more Western capital and investment, thechances of a veto are reduced. If the question aroseat a time of high tension, the Soviet Union would


Figure 3-2-Opening an Area: Articlea 3941

Special meeting ofStates Parties toadvise Commission. Advisory

CommitteeadvisesCommission.

i

Commission considers o m m i a - all relevant informationsion to identify an area submitted by request-for exploration and ing Party, other Parties,development of a Advisory Committee,particular resource and Special Meeting of

States Parties

Yes t

Area size adjusted

Sea exploration off limits part notflow chart. considered further.

Adjustments made.

Yes

No further No4action.

Yes

IArea Opened forexploration anddevelopment.

Yes

No

SOURCE: Office of Technology Asewment, 1989.

Chapter 3—The Convention on (he Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 73

nevertheless have to consider its interests in main-taining the stability of the Antarctic system and itsinterests as a consumer of the commodity concerned.The Soviets would also have to consider whetherthey have an interest in developing Antarctic min-eral resources themselves. If that country considersundertaking mineral development, it might be de-terred from vetoing a U.S. request so as not to triggera U.S. veto of its own request.

While these scenarios are unsettling, they are notvery likely. Two other scenarios are likely to be ofmore concern: 1) when there is genuine disagree-ment about the environmental hazards of opening anarea, and 2) when other states demand to participatein a proposed minerals activity, whether the UnitedStates or some other state sponsors the activity.

Genuine Disagreement Over Environmental Haz-ards—This situation may be less unsettling for theUnited States because U.S. interests include aninterest in protecting the environment, because theUnited States is already among the more environ-mentally concerned Commission members, andbecause U.S. companies have substantial experiencein working with environmental constraints andbearing their added costs. Any proposed develop-ment that is likely to survive our domestic politicalprocess is unlikely to attract strong and genuineforeign opposition on environmental grounds. Thisis particularly true since U.S. environmental proce-dures and standards are likely to apply to anydecision by the U.S. Government to propose theopening of an area or to sponsor an applicant. At thesame time, any environmental organizations thatactively oppose opening an area can be expected tofocus lobbying efforts on those countries most likelyto cast a dissenting vote,

Demands for Participate---Intemational partici-pation, especially by developing country Parties, isencouraged by the Convention (art. 6). Demands forparticipation could come from a variety of sourcesand for political or economic reasons. A territorialclaimant, for instance, might demand to participatein a venture in order to establish the principle thatexploitation in ‘‘its’ area requires its participation,thereby guaranteeing de facto accommodation of itsclaims. Alternatively, developing countries mightdemand to participate for ideological reasons (one

could find the economic interests of a state or ofprivate companies in one or more proto-industrialstates behind the ideological rhetoric),

A foreign state’s demand to participate mayincrease the cost of the venture to the Operator. Onthe other hand, development of Antarctic resourcesis likely to be so expensive that investors will mostlikely spread the risk by forming joint ventures (app.A presents a scenario of how a joint venture mightwork).

The Convention limits the role of the Commission‘‘to ‘elaborating opportunities’ for joint ventures ordifferent forms of participation’ (art.41 ( Id)). Thereis also helpful interpretive language in the Final Actconcerning the ‘‘freedom of choice’ of an investorregarding partners in a joint venture, including termsof their partnership. Nevertheless, there will beample opportunity for bargaining. Potential inves-tors will have to consider that even if a veto in theCommission can be avoided, both the Soviet Unionand a territorial claimant over the area in questionwill wind up on the relevant Regulatory Committee,and would thus be in a position to influence futuredecisions if their interests are not accommodated.

It is also possible that one or more Commissionmembers will demand a price for their cooperationin supporting a decision to open an area. Such pricemay be unrelated to the Antarctic minerals regime,in which firm diplomacy may contain Antarcticbargaining to Antarctic issues. However, if the priceof support is relevant to the Antarctic mineralsregime or other Antarctic diplomacy, then ‘‘log-rolling, a time-honored characteristic of collectivedecisionmaking bodies, is likely.

The Convention’s provisions for opening an areafor exploration and development:

●

●

●

●

guarantees that no area will be opened over theobjections of the United States;comes close to guaranteeing that no area will beopened for development over well-foundedenvironmental objections;does not assure that any area of Antarctica willbe opened; andsubjects states that seek to open an area to avariety of demands that may have to beaccommodated to open the area.


The consensus requirement supplies a great dealof protection for U.S. environmental and scientificinterests, but little protection for potential U.S.economic interests. It protects U.S. interests instability in Antarctica by guaranteeing the consent ofall substantially interested states before explorationand development is undertaken. If, however, signifi-cant concessions to territorial claimants are made asthe price of a decision to open an area, the consensusrequirement may prejudice the long-term stability ofthe current Antarctic system, and long-term U.S.political, legal, economic, and environmental inter-ests.

From the point of view of the petroleum andmining industries, the number of sovereign statesinvolved in the decisionmaking process, as exempli-fied by the requirement for a consensus decision toopen an area, is worrisome. United States interna-tional oil companies are accustomed to, and adept at,negotiating with all sorts of governments on anindividual basis. But to have to satisfy a large groupof countries, each with somewhat different interests,is daunting, even if the Sponsor is the more directlyinvolved party in the process.14 Private companies,whether domestic or foreign, might indeed preferdealing with a single sovereign power in Antarcticaif such an option were possible.

Exploration

Once an area has been opened for exploration anddevelopment, Operators may seek approval forexploration (figure 3-3 and table 3-4).

Application Procedures

The Regulatory Committee must initially estab-lish procedures for receipt of applications forexploration or development permits. Subject to anydecisions by the Commission regarding maximumblock size and application fees, the RegulatoryCommittee will then divide the area into blocks andset the relevant application fees.

The Regulatory Committee will also establishprocedures for resolving competing applications forthe same block where the applicants have notresolved the matter themselves. Those procedures

must include priority for the application with thebroadest participation among interested Parties,including developing countries in particular.

These decisions require a two-thirds majority ofthe states present and voting, that is 7 out of thenormal 10 votes. (States that abstain are normallynot considered to be ‘voting.’ Four negative voteswould be necessary to block a decision if there wereno abstentions or only one abstention. If there weretwo to four abstentions, three votes would besufficient to block (table 3-5).

To the extent that an issue arises that relates to adifference in principle with the territorial claimants,four claimants, if united, will be able to block anydecision favored by six nonclaimants.

To the extent that an issue arises that relates to thegeneral interests of Western consumer nations, theUnited States should not normally find it toodifficult to find three additional negative votes (ortwo additional negative votes and two abstentions)to block adverse decisions. The four territorialclaimants on the Committee will come from amongthe following group of seven: Argentina, Australia,Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, and theUnited Kingdom. At least two of the four mightnormally be expected to share many of the sameinterests as the United States, or at least favoraccommodation of substantial United States con-cerns. In that case, the United States would need topersuade only one of the five other nonclaimants ofits point of view. It is probable that the nonclaimantgroup will include at least one additional Westernstate, for example an European Economic Commu-nit y member or Japan, particularly if the fourclaimants include only two Western states.

The Regulatory Committee can, if it wishes,establish a limit on the number of blocks that may beaccorded to any given Party (art. 43(2)). A block sizelimitation could pose a problem for Operators, whodesire as much assurance as possible that the area inwhich they are granted exclusive rights will be largeenough to contain the size deposits necessary foreconomic development. If individual blocks arelarge enough in the first place, the potential problemcan be avoided. Moreover, given the multinationalnature of the oil and mining industries, and their

14j.N. G~~, “me Anwctlc wer~s Regime: A pe~ole~ Industry perspective, ’ OTA contractor report, November 1988.


capacity to establish subsidiaries with substantialand genuine links to foreign states, the extent towhich the risk of an adverse decision on this pointshould give rise to serious underlying economicconcerns is unclear.

Guidelines

The Regulatory Committee is required to adoptguidelines identifying the general requirements forexploration and development in the area of itscompetence. These will cover the detailed itemsnormally associated with mining regulations.

The adoption of such guidelines requires, inaddition to a two-thirds majority, the votes of halfthe claimants and half the nonclaimants present andvoting. Blocking power is thereby increased. Aterritorial claimant, including the state with aterritorial claim in the area in question, would needto persuade only two other claimants of its point ofview in order to block a decision, even if there are noabstentions. Under this formula, the United States oranother nonclaimant would need to persuade at leastthree other states to vote ‘‘no’ in order to block adecision in the absence of abstentions.

An impact of this formula is to increase the powerof the claimants in general, and of the claimantsmaking claims within the area in question inparticular. It could therefore strengthen their abilityto extract practical or legal concessions to theterritorial claims. An extreme but unlikely examplewould be a demand that the guidelines conform insignificant respects to the mining laws of the statethat claims sovereignty in the area.

The Application for an Exploration Permit

Subsequent to the preparatory work undertakenby the Regulatory Committee, the Sponsoring State,on behalf of the Operator, may submit an applicationfor an exploration permit. The application must beaccompanied by the fees established by the Regula-tory Committee and, according to article 44, contain:

. A detailed description of the Operator, itsstructure, financial composition, and resourcesand technical expertise. If the Operator consistsof a group of countries, i.e., a joint venture, theapplication must include a detailed descriptionof the degree (including equity composition) towhich the parties are involved in the venture.

●

●

●

●

A detailed description of the proposed explora-tion activities and, to the extent possible, adetailed description of the proposed develop-ment plan.A detailed assessment of environmental andother impacts of the proposed activities, and adescription of the Operator’s capacity to re-spond to accidents, especially those with po-tential environmental effects.Certification by the Sponsor of the capacity ofthe Operator to comply with the guidelinesestablished by the Regulatory Committee; ofthe technical competence and financial ca-pacity of the Operator; and that the relationshipof the Operator to the Sponsor is substantial andgenuine.A description of any proposed joint venture orother participation terms.

Approval of Exploration Permit andManagement Scheme

The Regulatory Committee has the authority toapprove an exploration permit and ManagementScheme (contract). The approval of an explorationpermit and Management Scheme for a specific blockaccords an Operator exclusive rights to explore forthe resources identified and the exclusive right todevelop those resources, subject to subsequentissuance of a development permit. The ManagementScheme sets out the specific terms and conditions forboth exploration and development. Those governingdevelopment will only be as detailed as the informa-tion available at this stage and are subject to reviewat the development stage. Terms and conditionsmust be consistent with the Convention and applica-ble regulations and guidelines adopted either by theCommission or the Regulatory Committee, andwould include procedures for settlement of disputesbetween the Operator and the Regulatory Commit-tee.

When considering the application and Manage-ment Scheme, the Regulatory Committee is requiredto “have recourse’ to certain of its members: theSponsoring State, any state making claims in thearea with respect to which the Regulatory Com-mittee is competent, and, as may be required, one ortwo additional members of the Committee (art. 46).The meaning of this requirement is not specified. Aprocedural right to be deeply involved in the process,

Figure 34-Exploration: Articles 4 and 43-51I 1

Area opened for exploration anddevelopment for a particular resource. I+

Commission establishes RegulatoryCommittee for area.

Chapter 3—

The C

onvention on the Regulation of A

ntarctic Mineral R

esource Activities . 77

I

\●

●●

$!o

1I

/ Has it been judged that:

The activity would not cause significant environmental impacts,

technology and procedures are available for safe operations,

monitoring of the environment can be done,and

• effective response to accident can be made?

No _

SOURCE: ffice of 18C og Assessment. 989

I Application declined: Op4:Jrator may app4:Jal.

1

Regulatory Committee drafts Management SchE~me. specifying specific terms and conditions, for exploration.

Exploration permit granted.

Advisory panel provides advice.

I

Exploration continues as is.

No

Management Scheme modified. suspended. or canceled:

Operator may appeal.

i Regulatory Committee considers changes in Management Scheme.

Exploration proceeds.


Table 3-4-Exploration

Definition: Activities, including logistic support, aimed at evalu-ating specific mineral occurrences or deposits, including explora-tory drilling, dredging, and other surface or subsurface excava-tions required to determine the nature and size of mineralresource deposits and the feasibility of their development, butexcluding pilot projects or commercial production. Art. 1(9).General provisions:

Exploration prohibited unless specifically authorized. Art. 4.The decision to authorize exploration and possible develop-ment in a particular area must be based on informationadequate to enable informed judgments, including a descrip-tion of the physical and environmental characteristics of thearea, an environmental impact assessment, and likely scale ofdevelopment, methods used, and types of resources sought.Arts. 4 and 47.Any authorized activities subject to the specific terms andconditions prescribed by Regulatory Committees in Manage-ment Schemes. Art. 47.An exploration permit accords exclusive rights to the Operator—subject to consideration of needs for modifications to theManagement Scheme prior to development-to explore and todevelop mineral resources in accordance with the Manage-ment Scheme. Arts. 48, 53, and 54.Management Schemes subject to modification if new infor-mation suggests greater than anticipated impacts or if anOperator has failed to comply with the Convention. Art. 51.

Institutional oversight●

●

●

●

●

A consensus decision must be made by the Commissionmembers to allow exploration and development in a particulararea. Art. 41.The Special Meeting of Parties advises the Commission onwhether allowing exploration in an area is consistent with theprinciples of the Convention. Art. 41.The Advisory Committee reviews information submitted to theCommission and Regulatory Committee and gives advice. Arts.40,45, 51, and 52.If exploration and development are considered to be consistentwith the Convention, a Regulatory Committee is constituted forthe area. The Committee is responsible for subdividing the areainto blocks, adopting procedures for handling applications, andadopting general guidelines for exploration and development inthe area. Arts. 29 and 43.The Regulatory Committee examines each application, issuesan exploration permit or denies exploration, and devisesManagement Schemes which prescribe specific terms andconditions under which exploration and development mayproceed. Arts. 45-48.

SOURCE: - of Technology Assessment, 19S9.

rather than any decisionmaking power as such, issuggested. The provision may imply a core negotiat-ing or drafting group, or some less structured formof consultation. The reference to ‘‘one or two’additional members may imply that the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union are to be included in allcases, although there appears to be no formaldecision in the Convention or Final Act to this effect.

The approval of a Management Scheme by theRegulatory Committee constitutes authorization for

The Regulatory Committee may suspend, cancel, or modify aManagement Scheme if unanticipated unacceptable impactscould result or if the Operator has failed to comply with theConvention. Art. 51.Any member of the Regulatory Committee or any six membersof the Commission may request a review by the Commission ofthe Regulatory Committee’s decision to approve a Manage-ment Scheme or issue a development permit, and the Commis-sion may request that the Regulatory Committee reconsider itsdecision. Art. 49,

Key sponsor obligations:● On behalf of an Operator, to submit an application for an

exploration permit. The application must be accompanied byappropriate fees and by detailed information about the Opera-tor and about proposed exploration activities, including adetailed assessment of environmental and other impacts of theproposed development. (Most likely, the Operator will supplymuch of this information to the Sponsor. Sponsors will need toestablish domestic procedures for accepting and reviewing thisinformation.) Art. 44.

. To certify the capacity of the Operator to conform to thestandards of the Convention and to certify the Operator’stechnical competence and financial capacity, Art. 44(c-d).

Operator obligations:‘In concert with the Sponsor, to provide the data and information

●

required for the Commission to consider identifying an area forexploration and development and for the Regulatory Commit-tee to consider issuing an exploration permit. Arts. 39 and 44.Exercise its rights with due regard to the rights of otherOperators. Art. 50.To live up to the specific terms and conditions of the Manage-ment Scheme, which relate, inter alia, to duration of exploration,measures and procedures for protection of the environment,response action to environmental mishaps, performance re-quirements, technical and safety specifications, monitoring andinspection, liability, resource conservation, financial obliga-tions, provision of data and information, and removal ofinstallations and equipment at the end of exploration and/ordevelopment. Art. 47. Suspension, modification, or cancellationof a Management Scheme may occur if an Operator fails tocomply with the Management Scheme. Art. 51.Subject to procedures to be established by the Commission,Operators may request the Arbitral Tribunal andl/or other bodyto review a denial of an exploration or development permit,cancellation of a Management Scheme, etc. Art. 59.

the issuance without delay of an exploration permit.The decision to approve the Management Schemerequires a two-thirds vote of the Regulatory Com-mittee, including a majority of the votes of claimantsand a majority of the votes of nonclaimants. Absentabstentions, this means that either two claimants orthree nonclaimants could block the decision (table3-5).

This formula increases the ability of the UnitedStates to block an adverse decision. Absent ab-


Table 3-&Blocking Power on a Regulatory Committee

A. Votes Requiring a 2/3 MajorityPresent and voting Absent or abstention Negative votes to block

1098765432

012345678

443332221

B. Additional Blocking Options Where 2/3 Vote Must IncludeHalf the Claimants and Half the Non-Claimants

Claimants Claimants Claimantspresent and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

4 0 33 1 22 2 21 3 1

Non-Claimants Non-Claimants Non-Claimantspresent and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

5 1 33 3 22 4 21 5 1

C. Additional Blocking Options Where 2/3 Vote Must IncludeMajority of Claimants and Majority of Non-Claimants

Claimants Claimants Claimantspresent and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

4 0 23 1 22 2 11 3 1

Non-Claimants Non-Claimants Non-Claimantspresent and voting absent or abstention negative votes to block

6 0 35 1 34 2 23 3 22 4 11 5 1

SOURCE: B.H. Oxman, “Evaluating the Antarctic Minerals ConventIon: The Decwon-Makmg System,” OTAcontractor report, Jan. 9, 19S9.

stentions, the United States would need to persuadeeither two other nonclaimants, or two claimants, tovote ‘ ‘ n o . It also increases the difficulty ofachieving affirmative decisions because only twoclaimants would be needed to block the decision. Onthe other hand, since the Management Schemefashioned by the Regulatory Committee or a subsetthereof must be consistent with guidelines adoptedby the Regulatory Committee, many if not mostpotential objections may already have been re-Solved.

Development

The holder of an exploration permit pursuant to anapproved Management Scheme may apply to theRegulatory Committee at any time through itsSponsor for a development permit for the block andresources covered. The application must be accom-panied by the established fees, and, among theseveral requirements, must contain an updateddescription of planned development activities, adetailed assessment of the environmental impacts of

80 ● Polor Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica


Victoria Valley, Dry Valley area near McMurdo.

the planned development, and a recertification bythe Sponsor of the technical competence and finan-cial capacity of the Operator to undertake theplanned development (table 3-6).

In considering an application for a developmentpermit, the Regulatory Committee must determinewhether modifications are necessary in the Manage-

ment Scheme. The Convention sets forth only tworeasons for such modifications:

1. if the application reveals modifications by theOperator to the development planned in theoriginal Management Scheme, and

2. if as a result either of changes in the planneddevelopment or in light of increased knowl-edge, the development would cause impacts onthe environment that were previously unfore-seen.

The process for obtaining a development permit(figure 3-4) is described in article 54. Paragraph 5 ofarticle 54 has drawn special attention from potentialinvestors and environmentalists alike due to itsambiguity. At issue is whether a specific vote isrequired to block development if there has been noagreement on modifications to the ManagementScheme.

The paragraph provides that ‘‘if the RegulatoryCommittee in accordance with Article 32 approvesmodifications [to the Management Scheme], or if itdoes not consider that such modifications arenecessary, the Regulatory Committee shall issuewithout delay a development permit. Article 32,paragraph 1, of the Convention provides that deci-

Table 3-6-Developrnent

Definition: Activities, including logistic support, which takeplace following exploration and are aimed at or associated withexploitation of specific mineral resource deposits, including pilotprojects, processing, storage, and transport activities. Art. 1(1 O).General provisions:. A development permit is required. Art. 53.. Additional data-updating that required for exploration—must

accompany the permit, including an updated description ofplanned development, any modifications requested to theapproved Management Scheme, and a detailed assessment ofenvironmental and other impacts of the planned development.Art. 53.

● If exploration is authorized and a Management Scheme is inforce, an Operator may develop deposits it finds, subject tomodifications which may be required to the ManagementScheme in light of changes to the planned development orpreviously unforeseen impacts on the environment. Art. 54.

Institutional oversight● Regulatory Committee must approve the development plan.

Art. 54.. Under certain circumstances, the Commission may review the

Regulatory Committees’ decision to approve an application fordevelopment and may request that the Committee reconsiderits decision. Art. 49.

. The views of the Advisory Committee to be considered. Art. 54.

Key Sponsor obligations:. At any time during the period in which an approved Manage-

ment Scheme and exploration permit are in force, the Sponsormay submit an application for a development permit to theRegulatory Committee on behalf of the Operator it sponsors.Art. 53(1 ).

. Sponsor must recertify the Operator it sponsors regardingtechnical competence, financial capacity, ability to comply withgeneral requirements related to exploration and development,and maintenance of the link with the Sponsor. Art. 53.

Operator obligations:● To provide its Sponsor with: a) an updated description of

planned development, specifically noting any proposed changes,b) the information required to assess the environmental andother impacts of planned development, and c) the informationrequired for recertification of technical competence, financialcapacity, and capacity to comply with the general guidelines forexploration and development in the area.

. To live up to the specific terms and conditions of the Manage-ment Scheme, including changes made in the ManagementScheme by the Regulatory Committee.

. To maintain a substantial and genuine link with its SponsoringState.

SOURCE: ~ of Technology Assessment, 19S9.


sions by a Regulatory Committee “pursuant to’article 54(5) shall be taken by a two-thirds majorityvote, including a majority of the votes of claimantsand a majority of the votes of nonclaimants This isthe same majority required for original approval ofthe Management Scheme, Absent abstentions, eithertwo claimants or three nonclaimants could block thedecision.

The approval of modifications to the ManagementScheme would be a decision “pursuant to” article54(5) requiring the concurrent majorities specifiedin article 32, paragraph 1. It would be relatively easyto block such a decision (table 3-5). It is clear thatonce modifications are approved, the developmentpermit must be issued. However, states might seekto block modifications either because they opposedthem or because they favored a package of moreextensive modifications.

What happens if the requisite majority does notvote in favor of any modifications to the Man-agement Scheme? If there is not enough support formodifications (i.e., if the concurrent majoritiesnecessary for modifications cannot be obtained),does this mean that the development permit isautomatically issued without delay? Is an additionalaffirmative vote required that modifications are notnecessary? Is there a point when the negotiatingprocess over modifications is deemed completedand no further negotiation permitted?

Potential investors are concerned about the ambi-guity of this article because they are opposed to theseparation of the exploration and developmentstages.15 They would prefer an interpretation ofarticle 54(5) that does not require reapproval.Investors argue that exploration in Antarctica will betoo costly to undertake unless they are certain thatthey will be able to proceed from exploration todevelopment. Another vote could derail planneddevelopment activities after substantial investmentshave been made. They also note that the initialexploration permit must discuss proposed develop-ment activities in as much detail as possible, theRegulatory Committee will already have a fairlygood idea of what impacts to expect from develop-ment.

Some environmental groups, on the other hand,argue that there must be the possibility of a negativedecision at the development stage. 16 These groupspoint out that development could have a muchgreater impact on the environment than exploration,Therefore, the Regulatory Committee and the Com-mission should have the authority to deny a full-scale commercial development permit, They there-fore prefer that article 54(5) is interpreted to meanthat an affirmative decision to issue or to decline toissue a development permit is intended and also thatif an affirmative decision to approve modificationscannot be reached, this does not mean that thedevelopment permit is automatically approved orthat modifications are not necessary.

Supporters of the argument that article 54(5) isintended as a modification procedure rather than areapproval procedure can argue that while it is truethat investors run the risk that a two-thirds majoritymight alter the Management Scheme for statedenvironmental reasons under article 5 l—whichrefers to general circumstances under which aManagement Scheme may be suspended, modified,or canceled-that is far less onerous than runningthe risk that two or three states, by blocking theissuance of a development permit, could render theinvestment in exploration useless. Their positionwould be that the stringent requirements for consen-sus in the Commission to open an area, and forconcurrent majorities in the Regulatory Committeeto approve the Management Scheme, represent theappropriate time for according a minority the powerto block economic activity, namely before substan-tial investments have been made.

In this connection they might also note that evenwhere a two-thirds majority modifies a ManagementScheme under article 51, the text contemplates thepossibility of compensation to the investor (art.51(6)). No such provision appears in article 54. Itwould be anomalous to argue that a small minorityis empowered to impair investments without com-pensation, while a two-thirds majority is not.

The potential disagreements posed by theambiguity in article 54 may not be as great as theyappear. It is reasonably clear that the onlyrelevant issue under article 54 relates to previ-

lsIbid., p. 31.16AnWCW md So@rn Ocean Coalition, op. Cll,, footnok 9, P. 5


Figure -Development: Articles 53 and 54

As a result of exploration,Operator finds resource andwishes to develop.

b

Operator assembles required Sponsor certifies data; appliesinfo, including info on for development permit onenvironmental impacts of + behalf of Operator; submitsdevelopment detailed data and fees to Regulatorydescription of plans. Committee.

I I ,

IAdvisory Committee

4 Regulatory Committeeprovides advice. evaluates application.*

Further information No4

sought fromSponsoring State.

f Yes

I Now

application containmodifications to the plan

unforeseen environmental

Yes

Scheme necessary to assureAdvisory Committeeprovides advice. evaluates modifications and/

or environmental impacts

approved by a two-thirds Yes

/f no agreement on modifications,additional vote may be requiredto block development: ambiguous b


Figure 34-Development: Articles 53 and 54-Continued

Advisory Committee 4 Regulatory Committee Development plan altered,provides advice. considers changes in +

Management Scheme. suspended, or canceled.,

I

I 1I I Yes

vCommission Yes Development continues No

0 - - reviews Committee memberpermit under unaltered plan.

J

Development permit issued;o @ development under approved

plan proceeds.

/’/

No

‘ \\

SOURCE Offlc8 of Technology Assessment 1989


ously unforeseen impacts on the environment,either as a result of modifications to the planneddevelopment previously envisioned or in light ofincreased knowledge. Politically difficult issues,such as participation, will already have been settledat the time the Management Scheme was originallyapproved. Thus, it does not seem very likely thatpotential problems will involve more than an accom-modation of new environmental concerns. From thisperspective, the investor may be better off resolvingnew environmental problems before proceedingwith additional significant investments associatedwith actual development. The alternative, should theenvironmental critics turn out to be correct inpredicting new environmental risks, could be a farmore costly suspension of operations or modifica-tion of a management scheme under article 51 at alater stage.

Given the fact that article 54 is not a model ofclarity, and that differing interpretations may beproffered not only by different states but by differentgroups in the United States, it might be prudent toattach a specific statement of interpretation on thispoint, approved by the Senate, to any instrument ofratification. Such a statement is, however, no guar-antee that other states or, if the matter is brought toarbitration, a tribunal, will agree.

SUSPENSION, MODIFICATION,CANCELLATION, AND

PENALTIESRegulatory Committees have the power to sus-

pend, modify, or cancel a Management Scheme as aresult of impacts on the environment beyond thosejudged acceptable at the time relevant decisionsregarding the opening of the area and the Manage-ment Scheme were taken. Committees can also takesuch action, or to impose a monetary penalty, in theevent an Operator (miner) violates the Convention,measures adopted under the Convention, or theManagement Scheme. The response must be propor-tional to the seriousness of the violation.

The power of the Regulatory Committees issubject to general measures previously adopted bythe Commission. Those measures could includeprovision for compensation to the miner, presum-ably for certain losses incurred as a result of action

taken by a Regulatory Committee. The power of theRegulatory Committees in these respects will also besubject to arbitration. If the Arbitral Tribunal findsthat a Regulatory Committee acted unlawfully, itwould presumably have the authority to awarddamages to the Operator, determine that the Com-mittee may not take the action contemplated, or both(art. 59).

Decisions of the Regulatory Committee on thesematters require a two-thirds vote. There is norequirement of concurrent majorities. Thus, withoutabstentions, the United States or any other Partywould have to obtain three other negative votes toblock a decision. Given the availability of arbitra-tion, the size and likely composition of the Regula-tory Committees, and the possibility that the Commis-sion’s general measures will add protections for theinvestor, it is unlikely that Regulatory Committeeswill arbitrarily y or unreasonably exercise their power.

BUDGET AND REVENUECONSIDERATIONS

The Parties established several mechanisms forgenerating revenues from resource developmentactivities to support the Convention’s institutions.However, in the period before revenues are suffi-cient to cover all or part of the regime’s operatingcosts each Commission member will contribute toits operation. Initially, each of the 22 members willcontribute equal shares to the budget, but as soon aspossible a more equitable formula will be estab-lished, by consensus, that will take into account eachmember’s ability to pay (art. 35). It is unlikely thatrevenues will significantly offset expenses for theforeseeable future.

In the event that resource activities do commence,revenues will begin to offset some of the regime’sexpenses. At some point revenues may be able tocover all of the Minerals Convention’s operatingcosts, and surpluses may be generated. What to dowith possible revenue surpluses was one of the moredifficult problems in the negotiations. Claimantstates hoped that a portion of excess revenuesautomatically would be allocated to the relevantclaimant in recognition of its ‘special interest. Thefinal text specified that excess revenues would beused in three ways:

Chapter 3—The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 8.5

1.

2.

3.

This

to reimburse operational expenses paid byCommission members in years before reve-nues begin to offset some or all of the regime’sexpenses (art. 35(lb));to promote scientific research in Antarctica byall Parties (especially by developing countryParties), particularly research related to theenvironment and resources of Antarctica (art.35(la); andto ensure that ‘‘the interests of the members ofRegulatory Committees having the most directinterest in the matter in relation to the areas inquestion are respected in any disposition ofthat surplus” (art. 35(7b)).

last vague statement could be interpreted toapply primarily to claimant states. Given the otherclaims on excess revenues and the fact that allbudgetary decisions—including allocation of excessrevenues—require a consensus vote, it is far short ofthe guaranteed share of revenues that claimant stateshoped to acquire.

The Convention specifies three methods forgenerating revenue:

1.

2.

3.

Operators will be required to pay fees to coverthe handling costs of notifications for pros-pecting and identification of an area and forapplications for exploration and development;Operators will be responsible for levies onexploration and development activities, wherethe principal purpose is to offset the operatingexpenses of the Convention; andOperators will be obligated to make payments‘‘in the nature of and similar to taxes ,royalties,or payments in kind (art. 47(k)).

The amount Operators would be required to payis not specified in the Convention. The Commissionis to adopt general rules governing revenue at a laterdate. The relevant Regulatory Committee will spec-ify the specific financial obligations of each Opera-tor as part of each Operator’s Management Scheme.Fees covering the administrative costs of notifica-tions and applications are unlikely to be a burden toOperators. However, levies to finance the costs ofthe institutions and taxes, royalties, and otherfinancial payments could be significant. Thesemight be important factors for an Operator indetermining whether to proceed with a project.Regulatory Committees may have difficulty speci-

fying the amounts or percentages of Operatorobligations. An Operator is unlikely to proceedunless there is a financial incentive to do so, that is,unless it can be assured of an adequate rate of returnafter these obligations are met. (Apps. A and Bcontain more information about development costs.)

OPERATORS AND SPONSORSTATES

The relationship between an Operator and itsSponsor in the Convention is important. On the onehand, Sponsors are to evaluate Operators andoversee their activities. For instance. they mustensure at each stage in the process that theirOperators are qualified to undertake resource devel-opment activities without violating provisions of theMinerals Convention. In particular, they must ensurethat Operators have the financial capacity andtechnical competence to respond to threats or harmto the environment. Sponsors must also ensure thatOperators maintain a substantial and genuine linkwith them; that data and information supplied byOperators is acceptable; and that activities of theirOperators do not infringe on the rights of otherOperators.

On the other hand, Sponsors will need to supportand defend the interests of their Operators. On behalfof Operators, Sponsors must notify the Commissionin advance of prospecting, promote Operator inter-ests in identifying areas for exploration and develop-ment, and submit applications for exploration anddevelopment permits to the Regulatory Committees.In helping to develop Management Schemes toguide Operator activities, the oversight and supportroles of Sponsors intermingle and could potentiallyconflict.

Significantly, an Operator-at least one based ina free market economy like the United States—isfree to choose its own Sponsor. The presumptionthat a multinational company with headquarters inthe United States will want or need to select theUnited States as its Sponsor may not be correct, Theselection of a Sponsor will depend in part on howwilling the Sponsor is to defend Operator interests.One important factor in establishing industry confi-dence in the Minerals Convention is the degree towhich the Sponsoring State will expedite proceduralmatters for the applicant and defend his position in


the controversial situations that may arise from timeto time.17 If an Operator does not perceive that theUnited States can provide this help and support, itmay seek a Sponsor elsewhere. Without a supportiveSponsor, Operators may find it too difficult toparticipate in Antarctic minerals activities.

Operators are also likely to consider a prospectiveSponsor’s procedural requirements. Sponsors withcomplicated or time-consuming procedures wouldbe less appealing than Sponsors with easier ones, allother things being equal. Operators also might seesome advantage in choosing as Sponsor the countryclaiming the area of interest. A claimant state, forinstance, might be more inclined to cast its vote infavor of opening an area if an Operator selected thatclaimant to sponsor its activities and/or perhapsmade other concessions that facilitated develop-ment.

The United States could establish elaborate regu-lations for potential Operators only to find noOperators interested in being sponsored by it. Thiswill occur if standards in other countries are lessstringent and if the United States does not offeroffsetting advantages, However, if the United Statesstands behind its Operators, its support, given itslongstanding leadership role in Antarctica, could bevaluable. Conversely, its lack of support could hurt:the United States can always veto development at anearly stage, and it has substantial influence at allstages to affect the outcome of decisions. Operatorscould find the United States to be a valuable ally.

LIABILITY AND RESPONSEACTION

One of the most difficult issues the Partiesfaced was the issue of liability and responseaction for activities that result or threaten toresult in damage to the Antarctic environment.The underlying difficulty involved ensuring thatdamages and injuries would be adequately compen-sated without making activities prohibitively diffi-cult or expensive to undertake. Article 8 of theConvention establishes general provisions for liabil-ity and response action, but negotiators were unableto reach agreement on several important liabilityconcerns. They decided that once negotiations on the

Minerals Convention were complete, they wouldbegin negotiating a separate Liability Protocol to theConvention. The Protocol is to be adopted byconsensus and ratified by the same procedure as theConvention. Pending its entry into force, no explora-tion or development will be allowed.

The framework established in article 8 requiresthat Operators take “necessary and timely” re-sponse action for all activities that damage orthreaten Antarctica’s environment. Operators are‘‘strictly liable’ for all environmental damagearising from mineral resource activities, includingbut not limited to clean-up and restoration costs.Strictly liable is defined as meaning an Operator isliable for damages whether it is later found at faultor not. Thus, for example, the Operator must pay ifthere is no restoration to the status quo antefollowing damage to the environment. How much isnot specified. It is unclear who is entitled to paymentwhen there is no personal injury or damage to privateproperty. Presumably, damage payments would becollected and expended by the Commission. It isalso presumed that claims by territorial claimants forenvironmental damage to claimed areas as suchwould not be permitted.

A contentious subject of the negotiations con-cerned the defenses or limits on liability that wouldbe available to Operators. Two defenses are speci-fied

●

●

in the Convention (art. 8(4)):

the Operator is not liable to the extent damagewas caused directly by a natural disaster ofexceptional character that could not reasonablyhave been foreseen, and

by armed conflict, or by an act of terrorismagainst which no reasonable precautionarymeasures could have been taken.

The Operator’s right to seek contribution orindemnity from another party that caused or con-tributed to the damage is unaffected, but this doesnot limit the Operator’s liability to a plaintiff. Evena negligent plaintiff may collect damages from theOperator, Only if the plaintiff caused the damage byan intentional or grossly negligent act is the Operatorrelieved in whole or in part of the duty to pay fordamages (art. 8(6)). Pursuant to this system, an

17GMRu, 0p. cit., foomote 14


Operator might well be liable for environmentaldamage if, for example, a ship crashes into theOperator’s offshore drilling rig.

In addition, to the extent the Operator or someother source does not satisfy all claims, the Sponsor-ing State is liable for damage caused by the Operatorthat would not have occurred had the SponsoringState adequately supervised the Operator (art. 8(3)).The Sponsoring State is also responsible for en-suring that its Operators maintain the necessaryfinancial and technical capacity to undertake anyrequired response and to meet any potential liability.Any Sponsor that was lax in this regard could beliable for a large proportion of damages in the eventof an accident. However, Parties could not agree thatthe Sponsoring State would be required to satisfyunmet claims on its Operator if the Sponsoring Statecarried out its duties in a responsible manner.

Permits for exploration and development may notbe issued until the Liability Protocol enters intoforce. Prospecting, on the other hand, may goforward after the Minerals Convention is ratified.Pending the entry into force of the Protocol, claimsagainst prospectors may be brought in nationalcourts pursuant to provisions of the Convention andnational law implementing those provisions (art.8(10)).

The Minerals Convention specifically states thatthe Protocol include rules and procedures on liabilityto protect the Antarctic environment, includingappropriate limits on liability, where such limits canbe justified; ensuring that means are available forimmediate response action where the Operator isincapable of doing so; and ensuring that all liabilityis satisfied (e.g., in those cases where the Operatoris not financially able to meet its obligations in fullor where damages exceed limits on liability) (art.8(7)). A fund or funds for covering outstandingclaims may be established, to be financed byOperators or on an industry-wide basis. Presumably,the Protocol will also have to interpret the defensesto liability noted above.

The Minerals Convention and accompanyingProtocol aim to establish a very stringent liabilityregime that reflects underlying environmental val-ues. However, mining companies and their Sponsorsand insurers may be reluctant to accept suchpotential liability if it is open-ended. Thus, the

economic acceptability of these provisions dependson the Protocol that remains to be negotiated and, inparticular, on any liability limits fixed in theProtocol and associated fund arrangements. TheConvention also leaves open the possibility ofestablishing an international claims tribunal in theProtocol by which claims against Operators may beassessed and adjudicated.

The liability provisions of the Convention dealalmost exclusively with environmental considera-tions. All that is said about liability for personalinjury to or death of a human being or injury toproperty not involving environmental or relateddamage is that it is regulated by ‘ ‘applicable law andprocedures” (art. 8(5)). The Protocol may be anappropriate place in which to define these issuesmore fully.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONAND THE MINERALS

CONVENTIONThe environmental requirements and sanc-

tions of the Minerals Convention establish apotentially strong environmental regime. At thisstage, it would appear that the main uncertaintywith the framework established by the Conven-tion is how compliance and enforcement wouldwork and how strong the regime would be inpractice. No mineral resource activities are to takeplace unless information adequate to enable in-formed judgments is available; unless it is judged,based on assessment of possible impacts, that theactivity would not cause significant effects on airand water quality or significant changes in atmos-pheric, terrestrial, or marine environments or signifi-cant changes in the distribution, abundance, orproductivity of populations of species of fauna orflora; unless technology and procedures are avail-able for safe operations; or unless there exists thecapacity to respond effectively to accidents (art. 4).Moreover, Regulatory Committees may suspend,modify, or cancel Management Schemes and explo-ration and development permits, and they mayimpose monetary penalties for failure to complywith the provisions of the Convention (art. 51).

The environmental provisions of the MineralsConvention appear to be as strong as+or stron-ger than-similar provisions in other interna-


tional agreements. However, although the textforms the basis for a strong environmental regime,many points are not defined, such as what constitutesa ‘‘significant’ environmental impact and howmuch information about a prospective area is“adequate” or “sufficient.” The definitions o fthese terms vary and may in the end be determinedon the basis of political considerations. Even appar-ently clear parts of the text may be subject todifferent interpretations, so a strong environmentalregime is hardly ‘‘writ in stone. ”18

Also, environmental concerns, mostly abstract bynecessity at this stage, may be brushed aside if andwhen resource development becomes a reality.Thus, when environmental regulation becomes apractical rather than anticipatory necessity, a grow-ing number of states may regard strict environmentalrequirements as an impediment to their investors—both directly and because the state that sponsorsmining may itself become liable for inadequatesupervision of its Operators. 19 Some states mayargue that a strict environmental regime favors themost advanced companies from the wealthieststates. On this basis, less developed countries maybe inclined to pass less strict rules to attractOperators. However, the unusually strong environ-mental requirements of the Convention itself, cou-pled with compulsory dispute settlement and astrong Liability Protocol, may be sufficient insur-ance against the possibility that some states may besignificantly less concerned about the environmentthan others.

Even where environmental regulations are strict,ensuring compliance with them is difficult andrequires political will. The Convention has generalprovisions concerning compliance in article 7 andalso provides for inspection, monitoring, reportingon Operator activities, and for observers in Commis-sion and Advisory Committee meetings. However,‘‘enforcement issues are difficult to agree on in theAntarctic context, because they relate so directly tothe rights of a sovereign state in its territory. Bothclaimants and nonclaimants wish to avoid anyprovisions in the Convention that prejudice theirposition on sovereignty in Antarctica. ’ ’20 Each Party

is asked to take appropriate measures ‘‘within itscompetence’ (this term is used to avoid prejudicingpositions on sovereignty) to ensure compliance withthe Convention. Specific rights are not assigned,also to avoid implications of sovereignty.

The Convention thus presumes a system of “flagstate enforcement’ for environmental protection,which may be less effective than other systems. Butother systems of enforcement are impractical be-cause of the sovereignty issue. At present, Parties arelargely responsible for policing themselves withrespect to scientific and other activities carried outunder the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty. TheTreaty System has no centralized review mechanismor regulatory authority to oversee national activitiesin Antarctica, and at present the ATCPs are reluctantto criticize each other’s activities. Criticism mighteasily lead to uneasy discussions about who isentitled to what rights and who may enforceobligations. For example, environmental groupshave criticized French construction of an airstrip inan environmentally sensitive area near the DumontD’Urville research base. But other Treaty states donot have the authority to review the French plans.The Convention improves on this situation by moreclearly defining binding legal rights and obligationsand subjecting Parties to binding dispute settlementin most cases.

Some have suggested that an international envi-ronmental protection agency be established forAntarctica. The difficulty with this proposal, again,is that an agency with sufficient independent author-ity would be virtually impossible to establish in themultilateral context of Antarctica and given thereality of the dispute over sovereignty. Given theseconstraints, an Antarctic EPA would not necessarilyhave any advantages over the system established inthe Minerals Convention.

The power of Regulatory Committees to suspend,modify, or cancel Management Schemes is impor-tant. Support for outright cancellation of projectsperceived to be causing unforeseen damage to theenvironment may be difficult to achieve onceactivities have started; however, support for modifica-tions to Management Schemes if problems arise

16B. H, m, ‘‘Ev~uating the Antarctic Minerals Convention: The Decision-Making System, ’ OTA contractor report, November 1988, p. 7.

l%id., p. 13.WCimbd, op. cit., footnote 4, P. 18.


ought to be much easier. Ultimately, the effectivenessof environmental protection under the MineralsConvention rests largely with the political will of theParties.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENTThe Convention specifies that the Parties shall

submit to compulsory arbitration or adjudica-tion of certain disputes (table 3-7). This systemcould prove useful when a state is accused ofviolating the Convention (e.g., by failure to fulfill itsduty to supervise compliance by its Operators withenvironmental requirements). In addition, the Con-vention contemplates the establishment of an arbi-tral mechanism pursuant to which Operators canchallenge certain decisions by a Regulatory Com-mittee regarding their Management Schemes andpermits.

However, the Convention text places significantconstraints on the jurisdiction of any tribunal toreview ‘‘the exercise by an institution of its discre-tionary powers in accordance with this Convention’(art. 57(5)). It is unclear how broadly these con-straints will be construed by a tribunal, They couldbe construed in a manner that is consistent with thetraditions of many countries regarding judicialreview of administrative agencies, namely that it isup to the reviewing tribunal to decide whether theagency had the discretion to act as it did under theConvention, but that it is not the function of thetribunal to substitute its judgments for those of theagency. It is also possible for the constraints to beconstrued to require almost complete deference toany decision by the Commission or a RegulatoryCommittee that can be characterized as ‘‘discretion-ary. ”

The United States may wish to include aninterpretive statement on this topic in connectionwith any instrument of ratification. Such a statementcould note that the constraints on the jurisdiction ofa tribunal to review the exercise of discretion by aninstitution established by the Convention do notpreclude it from determining whether that institutionhad the power to decide as it did under theConvention, whether the decision violated a sub-stantive or procedural provision of the Convention,or whether that organ otherwise exceeded or abusedits powers.

Table 3-7-Dispute Settlement

General provisions:●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Either’ the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the ArbitralTribunal established by the Convention may be used to settledisputes arising from the interpretation or application of theConvention, Art. 56.Parties to the dispute are requested, first, to try to settledisputes among themselves by any agreed means, Art, 57(1).Disputes are automatically referred to one of t he above disputesettlement bodies if agreement cannot be reached. Art. 56 and57.Neither the ICJ nor the Arbitral Tribunal shall have authority tosettle disputes related to claims. Art, 57(4).

Neither the ICJ nor the Arbitral Tribunal shall have authority tosettle disputes between Parties with regard to the exercise byan institution of its discretionary powers. Art. 57(5).Any Party may exclude some types of disputes from beingreferred to a dispute settlement body without its consent, butmay not do so regarding disputes about provisions of theConvention: a) on protection of the environment, b) oncompliance with the Convention, c) on response action andliability, d) on inspection, e) on non-discrimination, f) on otheruses of Antarctica, and g) on prospecting. Art. 58 (1a-g).Additional dispute settlement procedures for Operators will beestablished by the Commission, for example, providing ameans by which an Operator may dispute a decision to declinea Management Scheme. Art. 59.

Institutional oversight● The Arbitral Panel is responsible for settling all disputes

submitted to it. Annex Art. 10.. A dispute may be referred for discussion to the Institution which

adopted the instrument in question if the dispute is stillunresolved after 6 months of consultation by the disputingparties. Art. 57(3a).

Obligations of disputing parties:. To consult among themselves as soon as possible, using any

agreed means to resolve the dispute, Art. 57(1),● If unable to resolve the dispute among themselves, to comply

with the decision of the Arbritral Tribunal (Annex Art, 11 ) or ICJ,. To provide the Arbitral Tribunall where relevant, with all

applicable documents and information, and enable it, whennecessary, to call witnesses or experts and receive theirevidence. Annex Art. 8.

SOURCE” OffIoe of Technology Assessment, 1989

* * *

The Minerals Convention establishes the frame-work for deciding what, if any, resource activitieswill be allowed to take place in Antarctica and forregulating any activities that are allowed. What dowe currently know about what mineral resourcesmay at some time be worthwhile to develop andwhat effect development could have on the environ-ment? These are the subjects of the next twochapters.

Chapter 4

Potential Mineral Resourcesin Antarctica

Photo credit: U.S. Geological Survey

Byrd Glacier

CONTENTSPage

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .GEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Relationship to Adjacent Continents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Offshore Shelf Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANTARCTICA IN THE CONTEXT OF FUTURE MINERALS SUPPLY . . . . . . . . . . .Prospecting and Exploration in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Probabilities of Discovering Antarctic Mineral Deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SELECTED MINERAL RESOURCES ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Chromium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Copper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Iron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Molybdenum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Platinum-Group Metals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rare-Earth Metals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

93939699

102103105110111111114114115116117118119119120122

BoxesBox Page4-A. Mineral Resources and Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954-B. Geologic Time Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984-C. Icebergs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

FiguresF i g u r e Page4-1. Antarctic Mineral Occurrences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974-2. Geologic Provinces of Antarctica and Their Relationship to

Adjacent Gondwana Continents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004-3. Reconstruction of Gondwana in Early Cretaceus Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034-4. Exposed Rock Outcrop in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064-5. What Antarctica Would Look Like If the Ice Were Removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074-6. Multichannel Seismic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084-7. Sedimentary Basins in Antarctica

. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,.. , 112

TablesTable Page4-1. Desirable Research for Evaluating Resource Potential of Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104-2. Research Required To Ensure That Petroleum Resources Are Safely and

Efficiently Recovered With Minimum Environmental Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104-3. Estimated Number of Major Mineral Deposits in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Chapter 4

Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica

SUMMARYScientists have discovered occurrences (small

amounts) of several minerals in Antarctica, butthere are no known mineral deposits of commer-cial interest. Mineral deposits are likely to haveformed in Antarctica, just as they have on adjacentcontinents once connected to Antarctica, but be-cause nearly 98 percent of the continent is coveredby ice, few mineral deposits are likely to be exposed.

Development of any resources found in Antarc-tica will be expensive. At current prices, a metallicmineral deposit found in Antarctica would not beeconomic to develop unless of world class size orgrade with an in-place value of $200 to $400 per ton,depending on location. An oil field would have tocontain at least several billion barrels of recoverableoil. Even at this size, world oil prices would at leasthave to double before the field could be economic-ally developed. Mineral development in Antarcticacould be driven by political or strategic motivesrather than by a quest for profit. Some believe thesemotives may become important; OTA does not viewthem as being as significant as market incentives.

The probability of finding mineral deposits ishighest on the Antarctic Peninsula, in part becausemore rock is exposed there. Outside the AntarcticPeninsula the probability of finding mineral depositsin exposed areas is small. Based on the geology ofthe Peninsula region, the deposits most likely to befound are base metals (copper, lead, and zinc) andprecious metals (gold and silver). The hard mineraldeposits with the best prospects for economicrecovery in Antarctica are low-volume, high-valuedeposits, such as gold, particularly if such depositscan be found in accessible locations. The Dufekintrusion in the northern Pensacola Mountains couldhost platinum-group metals, chromium, copper,cobalt, and nickel. However, discovery of a mineraldeposit in a relatively inaccessible inland area, suchas the Pensacola Mountains, would greatly diminishits prospects for economic recovery. Virtually all ofthe potentially economic minerals known to occur inAntarctica are currently abundant in other, moreaccessible areas of the world.

The offshore sedimentary basins surroundingAntarctica offer the best prospects for petroleumexploration. The Weddell and Ross embayments inWest Antarctica, and Prydz Bay and the WilkesBasin in East Antarctica are among the basins mostlikely to contain petroleum, based on what is knownabout the thickness, organic content, age, andthermal history of the sedimentary rock. However,until these basin areas are more fully explored,particularly by drilling, meaningful estimates ofpetroleum potential cannot be made. For the mostpart, the sedimentary basins on the surroundingcontinents that have analogs in Antarctica are notmajor petroleum producing provinces.

INTRODUCTIONThe resource potential of Antarctica is receiving

increased global attention as a result of technologi-cal developments, continued scientific research, andthe drive to develop additional sources of energy andminerals supply. At present there are no knowneconomic mineral deposits in Antarctica. However,scientists postulate that high grade mineral depositsexist there, as they do in all large land masses. Suchmineral deposits would be difficult to locate: theextensive ice cover and limited opportunity forexploration are likely to preclude discovery of all buta tiny fraction of any potential ore bodies. Further-more, the mineral deposits most likely to be eco-nomic, which would be high concentrations ofmetals in ore bodies, tend to be localized featureshidden by overburden or otherwise difficult to locateeven under more hospitable conditions. In addition,since the onset of glaciation, enrichment processesrelated to near-surface weathering and water move-ment, such as occur in more temperate regions,would not have occurred in Antarctica. Despite thesecaveats, it is entirely possible that some mineraldeposits might be found in Antarctica which couldat some future time be of sufficient economic valuethat their extraction might be considered.

A great variety of mineral occurrences have beenfound in Antarctica, but no mineral occurs insufficient concentration or grade to be commerciallyminable. The term ‘‘mineral occurrence’ is used torefer to small amounts of a mineral that in larger

-93-


volumes in other parts of the world has been minedor is an indicator of a minable deposit. The term‘‘mineral deposit” is used to refer to a large amountof some mineral without reference to its economicvalue. The term ‘‘mineral commodity’ is used hereto refer to the mineral itself or the refined productmade from it. Other than ice, only two mineralcommodities, a sedimentary iron ore formation inthe Prince Charles Mountains of East Antarctica andcoal beds in the Transantarctic Mountains, areknown to be of sufficient size even to be classifiedas “deposits.” Because of their inaccessibility inAntarctica and abundance elsewhere, neither isconsidered a commercial deposit.

Mineral deposits can be divided into severalcategories based on a combination of geologic andeconomic criteria according to a system developedjointly by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S.Bureau of Mines. ] Known deposits are either dem-onstrated or inferred and can range from sube-conomic resources to reserves (box 4-A). Reservesare identified mineral deposits that are economicallyrecoverable with current technology. Subeconomicresources are those that have been identified but arenot recoverable under current economic conditionsand technology. In Antarctica, identified fresh water(ice), coal, and iron ore deposits would be classifiedas subeconomic. Speculative resources are un-known or undiscovered deposits outside districtswhere economically extractable mineralization isknown to have occurred. With few exceptions, themineral resources of Antarctica would be classi-fied as speculative at this time.

While the classification of mineral resources willchange with time, most experts would agree thatclassification of Antarctic minerals is not likely tochange before the end of this century and probablynot for several more decades. Any change woulddepend on what, if anything, is found, where it isfound, and the supply and demand situation at thetime of discovery. To be economically viable atcurrent prices, a metallic mineral deposit in Antarc-tica would likely have to be world class in size orgrade and have an ore value of $200 to $400 per tondepending on its location. For a gold deposit, thiswould be approximately 10 times the grade of

● ’. ,

- ,.

* .‘%

Photo credit. Am Hawthorne

Transantarctic Mountains en route to theSouth Pole from McMurdo.

deposits currently being developed in the westernUnited States. In the case of petroleum, afield wouldhave to contain several billion barrels of recoverableoil or about three orders of magnitude larger thanwould be economic onshore in the United States.

The following sections discuss the geologicalinferences regarding the formation and location ofmineral deposits in Antarctica, assess the probabili-ties of discovering Antarctic mineral deposits, andoffer some perspective on a selection of mineralcommodities that might exist in Antarctica. Theindividual commodities discussed are not intendedto represent all minerals likely to be found inAntarctica, but were chosen to provide a selection of

1 I ‘~ciples of a Reso~ce/Re~Nc Classification for Minerals, from Geological Survey Circular 831, 1980, Mineraf Commodity Summu ries 1988,U.S. Bureau of hfiXICS, pp. 184-187.

Chapter 4--Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 95

Box 4-A—Mineral Resources and Reserves

A general classification for describing the status of mineral occurrences was developed by the U.S. Geo-logical Survey and the U.S. Bureau of Mines in 1976. The so-called ‘‘McKelvey Box” named after the then-director of the USGS, Vincent McKelvey, further simplified the understanding of the of the economic relationshipsof the mineral-resource classification system:

Cumulativeproduction

ECONOMIC

MARGIN-ALLY

ECONOMIC

IDENTIFIED RESOURCES

DemonstratedInferred

Measured ] Indicated

Reserves I Inferred reserves

Marginal reserves I Inferredmarginal reserves

InferredDemonstrated subeconomic

subeconomic resources resourcesI

UNDISCOVERED RESOURCES

Probability range

Hypothetical (or) Speculative

1

plausibe examples covering a range of geological other publications and papers in press by U.S.environments. Data on mineral occurrences in ‘Ant- Geological Survey personnel. Data on world mar-arctica in the following sections are largely taken kets were abstracted from the U.S. Bureau of Mines,from publications of the U.S. Geological Survey and Mineral Commodity Summaries. Data on coal and


uranium are from publications of the Energy Infor-mation Administration of the U.S. Department ofEnergy and the Organization for Economic Coop-eration and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency.

The ratio of reserve base (see box 4-A) to currentproduction was used in the sections devoted tospecific mineral commodities to gain perspective onthe future supply and market potential. These ratiosare presented only for comparative purposes. Evenin cases where the reserve base is large relative tocurrent production (long term supply), this does notnecessarily imply that if a high grade opportunitycan be found in Antarctica, it would not attractinterest. The reserve base rather than reserves waschosen because it includes not only reserves, whichare currently economic, but also resources that aremarginally economic and, to an undefined extent,some of the subeconomic resources. The reservebase is a broader term than reserves and, thus, for thepurpose of defining future supplies, perhaps a betterindicator. The broader category of “resources”could also have been used, resulting in a larger ratio.This might be more appropriate because, with fewexceptions, the mineral resources of Antarcticawould be classified no higher than speculative at thistime. However, since for the purpose of projecting afuture market it must be assumed that a deposit inAntarctica has been found, it would seem morerealistic to project it in competition with knownmineral resources reasonably likely to be developedin the future.

Current production is the other aspect of thereserve base to production ratio. Considering thevariables in past minerals production, no attemptwas made to project future production or to assessfuture needs based on changes in technology.Beyond short term fluctuations, decreases in annualproduction rates are generally less likely thanincreases. Obviously, higher annual production rateswould reduce reserve base to production ratios,assuming there were no additions to the reserve base.Historical trends would suggest, however, that therewill be additions to the reserve base. Projecting theextent to which this may offset increased futureminerals production would depend, to some extent,on one’s level of optimism.

Mineral development in Antarctica, if it were tooccur, could also be driven by political or strategicconcerns rather than by economic viability. Somebelieve that these concerns may become important.Therefore, strategic and critical materials concernsof the United States, if any, are also brieflysummarized for the commodities discussed.

GEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONSAntarctica can be divided into two parts on the

basis of geology and topography, East Antarcticaand West Antarctica. These areas are separated bythe long mountain belt of the Transantarctic Moun-tains (figure 4-l). The line of division correspondsroughly to the division between the Eastern andWestern Hemispheres or more closely to the 30°W.150oE. meridian. East Antarctica is roughly twice aslarge as West Antarctica and is geologically older. Itis a vast ice-covered plain with mountain peaks andice-free areas only around the edges. Completelyice-covered mountain chains lie under the ice cap.

East Antarctica is mostly a shield2 area consistingof very old (Precambrian) igneous, metamorphic,and deformed sedimentary rocks locally overlain byyounger (Paleozoic through lower Mesozoic) sedi-mentary and igneous rocks of the Beacon Super-group and their equivalents (box 4-B). The youngerrocks are generally flat-lying and are especiallywidespread in the Transantarctic Mountains, whichborder the East Antarctic shield and provide a link tothe younger sedimentary and volcanic rocks of WestAntarctica. The geological picture, in general, is oneof progressive addition through West Antarctica ofyounger belts of rock to the East Antarctic shield.

The rocks of East Antarctica are rarely exposedexcept along the coast and in the TransantarcticMountains. In a few places near the coast, ice-freeareas are found as ‘‘dry valley s,’ where recedingglaciers and arid climate have left moraines andbrackish lakes on the valley floor. The shield of EastAntarctica contains a wide variety of mineraloccurrences of a wide variety, as do shield areas ofother continents. In contrast to the East Antarcticshield, relatively few mineral occurrences of interesthave been found in the Transantarctic Mountains—

2’MYIIS hat appear in the glossary (app. G) are in bold the first time they appw.

Chapter 4-Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica ● 97

Figure 4-l-Antarctic Mineral Occurrences

Antarctic Mineral Occurrences

, NunataksW

SOURCE. U.S. Geological Survey, 19SS,

PrinceCharles

Mts

SOUTH POLE

Shelf Edge

Queen MaryCoast

o Kilometers 2000

with the exception of the Dufek Massif in the Mineral deposits of moderate size and grade couldnorthern Pensacola Mountains near the Weddell be present in the Transantarctic Mountains. AmongSea. 3 The Dufek intrusion is one of the world’s the most likely host rocks for ore mineralizationlargest layered mafic igneous complexes and is would be:similar in certain respects to the mineral-rich Bush- • layered mafic intrusions such as the Dufekveld complex of South Africa. (platinum-group metals, chromium, cobalt, nickel);

3petcr D, Rowley, pau] L, Williams, and Douglm E fide; ‘‘Mineral Occurrences of Anhwctwa, ’ pt’tWICW and Mined Resources of Atiarctica,John C. Behrendt (cd.), U.S. Geological Survey Circular 909, 1983, p. 27,


Box 4-B-Geologic Time Scale

Began Duration in(millions of millions of

Time interval Major event years ago) yearsCenozoic Era

Quaternary PeriodHolocene EpochPleistocene Epoch

Tertiary PeriodPliocene EpochMiocene Epoch

Oligocene EpochEocene EpochPaleocene Epoch

Mesozoic EraCretaceus Period

Jurassic PeriodTriassic Period

Paleozoic EraPermian PeriodPennsylvanian PeriodMississippian PeriodDevonian PeriodSilurian Period

Ordovician PeriodCambrian Period

Precambrian EraSOURCE: Geologmal !k-mety of Armzica, 1983.

Man abundant 0.01 0.01Man appears 1,6 1.59

5.3 3.7Mammals diversify 23.7 18,4Grasses spread

36.6 12.9Mammals develop rapidly 57.8 21,2

66.4 8.6

Dinosaurs become extinct, 144 77.6Flowering plants appearBirds appear 208 64Primative mammals appear, 245 37Dinosaurs appear

Reptiles appear 286 41Insects abundant 320 34

360 40Fish abundant 408 48Amphibians appear 438 30Land plants andanimals appearFish appear 505 67Marine invertebrates appear 570 65Simple marine plants 3,800? 3,230?

. sequences of marine sediments that incorporatesubstantial proportions of intermediate to sili-cic volcanic materials (copper, lead, zinc,silver); and

● porphyritic intrusions of intermediate t. sili.cic composition (copper, molybdenum, silver,gold). 4

West Antarctica contains mountain ranges and

of scattered islands or group of islands surroundingthe submerged Byrd Basin, which would connectwith the Ross Sea, the Amundsen Sea, and theWeddell Sea.

The exposed rocks of West Antarctica in theEllsworth orogen, between the Ross and WeddellSeas, are Paleozoic sediments and Mesozoic intru-sions generally devoid of known metallic minerali-

isolated peaks, called nunataks, that extend through zation. The probability that significant mineralthe ice and snow cover. Overall, the West Antarctic deposits are present in this zone appears to be poor.ice surface is much lower topographically than that The thick sequences of sedimentary rocks like thoseof East Antarctica. If the present ice cover were exposed in the Ellsworth Mountains do not appearremoved, West Antarctica would appear as a series likely to host metallic ores, although the presence of

4fq, A. wright @ p, L. wil]i~s, Miwrd Resources of Antamica, U.S. Gtx3iogic2d SWey CifCUi~ 705, 1974, p. 22.



Collecting samples on Mt. Oliver in Upper Wright Valley.

Mesozoic intrusive rocks in the Whitmore Moun-tains suggests somewhat more favorable conditionsthere.5

A substantial part of the Antarctic Peninsulaconsists of igneous intrusions of Mesozoic andTertiary age that form a composite magmatic arc;arc-related volcanic and sedimentary rocks of simi-lar age also occur. The volcanic and intrusive rocksof the Antarctic Peninsula belong to the calc-alkaline magmatic suite, rocks which in other partsof the world are associated with copper-lead-zincores. Consequently, the peninsula is a favorablegeologic environment for copper, molybdenum,lead, zinc, tin, tungsten, silver, gold, and othermineral deposits.

Relationship to Adjacent Continents

One way of assessing the mineral potential ofAntarctica is by analogy with mineral deposits foundin similar geologic settings on surrounding conti-

nents, Antarctica’s relationship to the surroundingcontinents can be explained by the process of platetectonics. According to the theory of plate tectonics,the Earth’s rigid outer layer, called the lithosphere,is a mosaic of slablike plates that move with respectto one another at rates averaging a few centimetersper year. The plates ride on a hot, plastic layer of theEarth’s mantle called the asthenosphere. Platemovements are thought to be driven by convectioncurrents or density changes in the mantle and causea seafloor-spreading process, in which molten mate-rial from the asthenosphere rises through the litho-sphere to form new ocean crust at ridges on the oceanfloor. Newly created oceanic crust moves outwardfrom the mid-ocean ridge spreading centers. if theoceanic crust meets a continent on another plate, itmay sink under the continent and be drawn downinto the mantle in a process called subduction, (Thisprocess occurs along the Pacific coast of SouthAmerica where Pacific crust plunges beneath thewestern margin of the continent. ) Alternatively, if acontinent is on the same plate as the new seafloor, itis carried along as though on a raft. (New ocean floorgenerated in the Atlantic Ocean carries the Americancontinent westward toward the Pacific. ) In general,the continents are carried passively by the lithosphe-ric plates, which grow by seafloor spreading andoccasionally collide to form mountain belts such asthe Himalayas.

Reconstructing the former locations of continentsbased on the geologic record of plate movementindicates that approximately 200 million years agothe major land masses of the Southern Hemisphere,including what is now Antarctica. were joinedtogether into a giant continent called Gondwana orGondwanaland. In particular, the geological recordshows that the western two-thirds of Australia, India,and part of southern Africa were close to EastAntarctica at least during the Late Paleozoic andEarly Mesozoic Eras.

The core areas of the continents are the oldPrecambrian shields. In the reconstruction of Gond-wana, the Brazilian shield, African shield, Indianshield, Australian shield, and East Antarctic shieldare all brought into close juxtaposition like pieces ofa puzzle (figure 4-2). South America, though not

‘[bId., p. 23.


Figure 4-2--Geologic Provinces of Antarctica and Their Relationship to Adjacent Gondwana Continents

</ A >

SHIELD

/-/ EAST

SOURCE: J.C. Behrendt, “Are There Petroleum Resourc=m m Antarctica?’< Petroleum and Mineraf f?esomxs of Antarchea, J.C. Behrendt (cd.), U.S.Geologml Survey Circular 909, 1983, p 6.

contiguous with East Antarctica, was close to deposits of Mount Isa and Broken Hill, Australia;Africa.6 Numerous mineral occurrences are found in and diamond-bearing pipes of South Africa, India,the shield of East Antarctica. Many of these occur- and Australia.7 The Brazilian shield also containsrences are similar to the mineralization of major important deposits of these types. Thus, since theeconomic deposits in comparable shield areas f the shield areas of the adjacent continents in theadjacent continents, These major deposits include Gondwana reconstruction have major mineral de-

iron-formations and bedded manganese in Austra- posits similar to the types of mineralization found in

lia, India, and Africa; conglomeratic placer gold- the East Antarctic shield, it would seem reasonable

uranium deposits of the Witwatersrand in South to expect that similar deposits were formed in

Africa; chromite, nickel-copper, platinum, and mag- Antarctica,

netite-vanadium deposits of the stratiform Not only are the shield areas related, but analogsBushveld intrusion of South Africa; copper-cobalt can also be found among the other geologic prov-deposits of Zambia and Zaire; nickel deposits in inces of Antarctica. The Ross deformational belt ofintrusions in Australia; gold deposits in mafic the Transantarctic Mountains extends into centralvolcanic rocks in Australia; lead-zinc-copper-silver Australia. The Flinders Ranges north of the city of

61bid., pp. 18-19.Tpeter D. Rowley, paul L. Williams, and Douglas E. pride, ‘ ‘Metallic and Nonmetallic Mineral Resources of Antarctica, ” The Geology of Antarctica,

R,J, Tingey (wI,), Oxford University Ress (in press).


Adelaide lie within the Adelaide orogen and appearto correlate with parts of the Transantarctic Moun-tains. Numerous deposits of copper with associatedgold, lead, zinc, silver, barium, manganese, anti-mony, and other metals are found in the FlindersRanges in rocks of Late Precambrian and EarlyPaleozoic age. The deposit types include veins,stockworks, and replacement bodies generally re-lated to Early Paleozoic igneous activity. Porphyrycopper deposits and stratiform lead-zinc deposits arealso found in the area. In the same general area is therecently discovered ore body at Roxby Downs,which is rich in copper, gold, silver, uranium, andrare-earth minerals. Further to the east, a beltreferred to as the East Australian erogenic province(also called the Tasman orogen) consists of progres-sively younger sediments, volcanic rocks, and intru-sions extending into the Early Mesozoic. Thisprovince, a portion of which geologically resemblespart of north Victoria Land (the Borchgrevinkorogen) in Antarctica, contains deposits of copper,lead, and zinc associated with submarine volcanismand tin, tungsten, molybdenum, bismuth, gold, andother metals apparently associated with subsequentgranitic intrusions.

The extension of the Ross orogen toward Africais less clear, but radiometric dating suggests thatmetamorphic activity occurred in eastern Africa atroughly the same time as the Ross orogeny, but noore deposits have been found that can be associatedwith this event. The younger Cape orogeny ofsouthernmost Africa strongly folded Late Paleozoicrocks but did not produce any metamorphism,intrusion, or ore mineralization. This event could becorrelated with the Ellsworth orogen of Antarctica,which has also been found to be lacking significantmineral occurrences. In South America, the regioncomparable to the Ellsworth orogen lies between theshield and the Andes and has relatively few oredeposits, particularly in the Paleozoic to LowerMesozoic stratigraphic section.

In general, it may be useful to think of theTransantarctic Mountains and West Antarctica asrepresenting a set of Paleozoic to Early Mesozoicorogens that are progressively younger away fromthe East Antarctic shield toward the Pacific, Miner-alization generally decreases in intensity eastward inAustralia (this would be toward the Pacific Ocean inAntarctica; see figure 4-1) and is even weaker in


Helicopter leaving Mt. Feather after ferrying geology fieldpart to site. Helicopters are indispensable in Antarctica.

New Zealand. Thus, by analogy, mineralization maydecrease westward in West Antarctica exclusive ofthe younger Andean orogen. Consequently, theprobability that significant mineral deposits arepresent in Antarctica in the zone between theTransantarctic Mountains and the Andean orogenwould seem to be poor.

The youngest geologic province of Antarctica isthe Andean orogen. The Andean magmatic anddeformational belt extends northward from theAntarctic Peninsula through the Andes of SouthAmerica, and in the opposite direction from Ells-worth Land and Marie Byrd Land through NewZealand to form the southern margin of the currentlygeologically active circum-Pacific volcanic belt. Inthe northern and central Andes, this belt is one of therichest metal-producing areas of the world. How-ever, the southern Andes are not as rich in mineraldeposits as the northern and central Andes. Thegeologic break seems to be where the Chile Ridge issubducted beneath South America at the boundary ofthe Nazca and Antarctic plates. Subduction of theoceanic plate is still active to the north but hasslowed or stopped to the south where the Antarcticplate has moved at an acute angle to South America.Compared to the mineral-rich northern and centralAndes, where ores tend to be localized near the topsof intrusive masses, the southern Andes and Antarct-ic Peninsula have a different geological history. Inthe peninsula, glaciation may have more deeplyeroded the intrusive bodies, removing the tops where


ore deposits may have been located.8 The differentgeological history and environmental conditionssuggest that the Antarctic Peninsula, EllsworthLand, and Marie Byrd Land may be less richlymineralized than the north and central Andes.Nevertheless, by analogy with the Andes, theAntarctic Peninsula appears to be one of the morelikely places in Antarctica for significant base-metal deposits and possible associated gold andsilver.

Offshore Shelf Areas

Marine sedimentary basins are of primary interestto petroleum geologists. The fragmentation of Gond-wana, which began about 175 million years ago,with the final split beginning about 28 million yearsago, led to the deposition of thick sequences ofCretaceus and Tertiary sediments in mid-continentrift basins and on the newly created continentalshelves where formerly the continents had beenjoined. Sediments of these ages also accumulated inbasins that were later uplifted to become parts of thecontinents. Seismic surveys and exploratory drillingfor petroleum have now been carried out on almostall the land and continental shelves of those areasthat once touched Antarctica. Several relativelymodest oil and gas fields have been discovered insouthern South America, southern Africa, Australia,and New Zealand. Through the Gondwana recon-struction, these producing areas can be related tospecific regions of Antarctica. However, this doesnot assure that petroleum will be found in theanalogous areas in Antarctica due to differences intime of formation, sediment thickness, history ofdeformation, migration of any hydrocarbons, andother factors. For example, if oil producing sedi-ments accumulated off Australia along time after thebreakup of Gondwana, this would not necessarily beevidence of oil in an adjacent area of Antarctica.

Several petroleum producing areas on the adja-cent continents may have analogs in Antarctica. TheSan Jorge and Magallanes Basins are petroleumproducing regions in Argentina that can be related ina number of ways to the Larsen Basin of theAntarctic Peninsula (figure 4-3).9 The San Jorge

Basin contained proven reserves of 1.6 billionbarrels in rocks of Jurassic or Early Cretaceus age.Sedimentary rocks of the same age are found in theLarsen Basin, but this in itself does not indicatehydrocarbon potential.

Mossel Bay off southern Africa is a minorpetroleum producer. This basin bears a paleogeogra-phic relationship to the Falkland Plateau, but maynot be indicative of the hydrocarbon potential of theWeddell embayment.

Minor hydrocarbon accumulations have beenfound off the east coast of India in the Bay of Bengaland in Upper Cretaceus rocks in the Palk Bay area,which, through reconstruction, could correspond tothe Prydz Bay area of Antarctica (Amery Basin) inwhich Cretaceus sediments have also been identi-fied. The Prydz Bay area may also bear a relation-ship to the West Australian continental marginwhere producing fields are found near Perth.

The Cooper Basin in central Australia lies in abroad geologic province that possibly extendedsouthward into Wilkes Land prior to their separationaround 80 million years ago. 10 The Cooper Basin isan oil and gas producing province in Permianthrough Cretaceus rocks. No commercial petro-leum discoveries have yet been made in the GreatAustralian Bight, Eucla, or Duntroon Basins (figure4-3), which may, in part, be the conjugate margin tothe Aurora Basin in the Wilkes Land region ofAntarctica. The Otway and Bass Basins of Australia,which in the Gondwana reconstruction extend off-shore toward Wilkes Land, are only minor produc-ers.

The Gippsland Basin, in the Bass Strait betweenTasmania and Victoria, is a major petroleum-producing province. However, the tectonism thatformed the petroleum-bearing structures in thisbasin is not part of the southern Australian marginalrift system. Because Antarctica and Australia werealready separated at the time of formation of thehydrocarbon-bearing structures in the GippslandBasin, the basin has no analog on the Antarcticmargin. 11

8~1d.

9D.H. E]ll@, “~~ctlca: IS mcm AIIy CM] and Natural Gas’?” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2. Summer 1988, p. 38.

IOlbid.11’ ‘~ ~~ pe~olem Re~ sin Antarctica?’ Petroleum and MineraJ Resource$ of Anwccica, John C. Behrendt (cd.), U.S. Geological Sumey

Circular 909, 1983, p. 20.

Chapter 4--Potential Mineral Resources in Antarctica • 103

Figure 4-3-Reconstruction of Gondwana in Early Cretaceus Time(120 Million Years Ago)

Early Cretaceus

Godavari R.Mahanadi R.

Larsen “

-,. .

Edge of continental shelf

~ S e d i m e n t a r y b a s i n sCampbellPlate a u

● P r o d u c i n g f i e l d s

A S a p r o p e l i c b e d s Taranaki ‘ ‘- .K C r e t a c e u s

J- Jurassic N e w Zealand - “-– “The proximity of Antarctic sedimentary basins is shown in relation to basins in formerly adjacentcontinents and to producing 011 and gas fields.

SOURCE D H Elhot, “Antarctica. Is There Any 011 and Natural Gas?” Ocxwws, VOI 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p 37

The Campbell Plateau is the conjugate margin tothe Ross Sea region, The Taranaki Basin off theNorth Island of New Zealand is primarily a gas-producing region and probably has no relationship tothe Ross Sea continental shelf. Thus, for the mostpart, the sedimentary basins on surroundingcontinents that have analogs in Antarctica are notmajor petroleum producing provinces.

ANTARCTICA IN THE CONTEXTOF FUTURE MINERALS SUPPLY

The long-term availability of raw materials hasbeen a recurring concern over much of the pastcentury. This concern attained a new measure ofpublic awareness in the 1970s when the price of oiland other commodities increased sharply. The pub-lic quickly realized that certain essential materialsmay be in finite supply and, hence, would become

more costly and difficult to obtain. As a result ofthese concerns, exploration and exploitation ofAntarctic minerals began to be seriously discussed.

Ore deposits form by relatively unusual combina-tions of natural processes, and, consequently, large,economic deposits are not common in the Earth’scrust. For metallic minerals, these processes can bedescribed as falling into three general classes, Thetwo most important are magmatic differentiationand deposition from hydrothermal solutions. Sur-face or near-surface enrichment is the third. Magma-tic differentiation is the process whereby the variouselements are distributed into the rocks formedduring cooling and crystallization of a magma;locally concentrated deposits of certain mineralsmay be formed, Hydrothermal solutions or hot salinefluids pass through fractures or pore spaces in rock,dissolving or dislodging metals that are subse-quently redeposited as sulfides, oxides, or evennative metal, as the fluids cool or other conditions


change. Surface or near-surface enrichment is sim-ply the further concentration of metals by weather-ing or leaching by groundwater.

An ore deposit represents a special set of geologiccircumstances and only becomes an economic propo-sition if a number of factors are favorable. 12 The firstis discovery of the deposit itself. A vigorousexploration program does not automatically lead tothe discovery of a new mineral deposit rich enoughto mine. In Antarctica, a continent mostly coveredby ice, the probability of discovery is greatlydiminished.

Finding an ore deposit of sufficiently high gradeis not enough. Accessibility is also very important.Deposits found near existing infrastructure will bemined before more remote deposits, other considera-tions being equal. In Antarctica, there is essentiallyno infrastructure.

A third factor controlling the development ofmineral resources is the size of the deposit. Not onlymust the deposit be rich, but it must also be largeenough to warrant the investment needed to developit. In general, as the remoteness of the locationincreases, so must the size of the deposit necessaryto offset the costs of the new infrastructure that willbe required to develop it. Antarctica is the mostremote continent in the world, Consequently, onlylarge deposits, if any, will likely be developed. Iffirst generation development were to occur and aninfrastructure created, then costs of development ofsmaller deposits nearby, if any, may be lowered.

The largest deposits of a specific mineral orminerals are the easiest to find and tend to bediscovered first. For any specific metallic resource,the few largest-tonnage deposits contain the major-ity of the total metal mined. For example, out of 165porphyry copper deposits, the 16 largest depositscontain 64 percent of the metal content (pastproduction plus resources), and the 82 largestdeposits contain 94 percent of the metal. 13 Fornickel, only 7 deposits account for more than 50percent of the metal in a total of 156 nickel deposits;for tungsten, 3 deposits among 32 account for 59percent of the tungsten; and for molybdenum, 3 of 34

porphyry molybdenum deposits account for 65percent of the metal. Thus, based on past experience,if a very large ore deposit were found in Antarc-tica, it would likely be found in the earlier stagesof serious exploration and could, if developed,make a significant contribution to the worldinventory of that mineral commodity.

Much the same case can be made for largepetroleum accumulations. A suitable environmenthad to have been present to have produced organic-rich source sediment. The source beds must havebeen buried and over time the temperature raised bythe flux of geothermal heat (the internal heat of theEarth) to a degree sufficient to maturate the organicmaterial and produce oil. The depth of this time-temperature range in which maximum oil generationoccurs is known as the “oil window. ’ The oilwindow generally occurs at depths between 2,500and 16,000 feet and at temperatures between 150 and300 “F. Natural gas is formed below the oil window.In areas of higher than normal geothermal heating,the oil window exists at shallower depths, isnarrower, and encompasses younger sediments.

Petroleum must be retained in a structural orstratigraphic trap in order to produce a reservoirand prevent migration to the surface as probablyoccurred for much of the petroleum that has formedduring the Earth’s history. In Antarctica, not onlymust all of these conditions be met, but also anyreservoir will have to be located in an area whereproduction is physically possible, and the fieldwill likely have to be very large to be commer-cially viable.

The same two principles that apply to ore bodiesapply to world oil distribution as well. First, most oilis contained in a few large fields, but most fields aresmall. Second, in any region the large fields areusually discovered first. Since exploration for oilbegan in the early 1860s, some 40,000 oil fields havebeen discovered worldwide. The two largest classesof fields are the supergiants (fields larger than 5billion barrels of recoverable oil) and the world-classgiants (fields with 500 million to 5 billion barrels ofrecoverable oil). Only 38 supergiant oil fields havebeen found worldwide, and these few fields origi-

12s=, for example, F.E. ‘Trfiert “Potentially Recoverable Resources—How Recoverable’?” Resources Policy, March 1982, pp. 41-52.13Job H. Byowg Jr, and Donald A. singer, ‘‘Physical Factors That Could Rcsrnct Mineral Supply, ’ Econom/c Geology, 75th hnivers~ volume,

1981, pp. 942-943.


nally contained more than half of all of the oildiscovered thus far. Twenty-six of these supergiantsare in the Persian Gulf region, Three are in the SovietUnion; the United States, Mexico, and Libya eachhave two supergiants; and Algeria, Venezuela, andChina have one each. The nearly 300 knownworld-class giant fields plus the 38 supergiantstogether account for about 80 percent of the world’sdiscovered recoverable oil. Petroleum experts esti-mate that there are probably less than ten supergiantsremaining to be discovered. It is probable thatnothing smaller than world-class giants or super-giants would be economic in the harsh Antarcticenvironment. 14 Because large fields are usuallyfound early (the biggest structures are more easilylocated and, therefore, are drilled first), it is likelythat if any large fields exist in Antarctica, they willbe discovered relatively early during explorationdrilling.

In Antarctica, even a large field may not in itselfbe enough. The character of the reservoir is alsoimportant. For example, a reservoir will have to berelatively thick so that it can be drained by aminimum number of strategically placed wells. Thisis because the high cost of drilling and operating inpolar regions limits the number of wells andproduction facilities that a field can support. Conse-quently, a large field with a relatively thin pay zonespread over a great area, may not be economicallyproducible. Past experience has shown that a rela-tively small percentage change in world petroleumsupply can have a substantially greater effect on theprice of oil. Consequently, a relatively small short-age in available petroleum supply can have amagnifying effect on the price of oil and change theeconomics of field development.

Prospecting and Exploration in Antarctica

Prospecting and exploration in Antarctica wouldbe extremely difficult. Mean air temperatures aremuch lower than those of any other large area of theEarth’s surface, and winds generally are stronger andmore constant than elsewhere. prospecting andexploration would likely be conducted only duringthe summer months. Transportation to most interiorlocations would likely be by air. This can behazardous because weather forecasting is not highly

developed in Antarctica and adverse weather condi-tions en route or at the destination may not be knownwhen a flight begins. The logistics of transportationand supply commonly dominate decisions on wherefield work can be conducted, and areas that mightdeserve detailed study may not be accessible at timesor have to be studied hastily,

Most geologic investigations conducted thus farhave been purely scientific and not designed toexplore for and identify mineral deposits. No min-eral occurrences have been explored by drilling. Thegeochemical patterns that result from alteration andmineralization in various areas of Antarctica arevirtually unknown. In addition. glaciation couldhave removed near-surface deposits formed byweathering, and since the onset of glaciation, the icecover has prevented enrichment processes related tonear-surface weathering from occurring. Moreover,there has been little surface drainage during the past30 million years, thus, the erosion and sortingnecessary to form alluvial placer deposits would nothave occurred. Older placer deposits, if any exist,would be in stream channels or basins now coveredby ice.

Because nearly 98 percent of the continent iscovered by ice, few mineral deposits are likely tobe exposed (figures 4-4 and 4-5). The total area ofexposed rock is comparable in size to the State ofColorado, but it is spread over an area larger thanthat of the United States and Mexico combined.Therefore, the logistics for any prospecting orexploration program are immense. Most of theexposed areas have been so little studied that theyremain among the least geologically and geophysi-cally explored areas of the world. Some large rockoutcrops have never been visited.

Offshore, the situation is little better. Althoughover 54,000 nautical miles of marine multichannelseismic reflection survey lines have been collectedaround Antarctica since 1976, most of this informat-ion has not been published or otherwise madeavailable (figure 4-6). The United States is the onlycountry that has published and made freely availableall of its seismic data as required under the AntarcticTreaty. This, however, represents less than 4 percentof the total collected by those conducting research inAntarctica. Very little is openly known about the

14’ &e mere pe~oleum Resources in Antarctica? op. Cit., IOOtIVJtC I I, p. s.


Figure 4-4-Exposed Rock Outcrop In Antarctica

Antarctic Peninsula

Weddell Sea

.

0 South Pole

WILKES LAND

$06

w,

.

.

●

X$t+ Ice-free areas

Only 2 percent of Antarctica is exposed. Ninety-eight percent of the continent IS covered by a thick ice sheet.

SOURCE: U.S. Gee@@ Survey, 1989


Figure 4-5-What Antarctica Would Look Like If the Ice Ware Removed

SOURCE. Generahzed from U.S. Geological Survey, 1989

detailed subsurface structure and petroleum poten-tial of the continental shelf areas. The failure torelease data and the fact that many surveys have beenrun by groups owned in large part by oil companieshas led to speculation that much of the offshoregeophysical data gathered thus far has been focusedon assessing petroleum resource potential ratherthan acquired for scientific purposes. In any event,the seismic lines run thus far are too widely spacedto be of more than reconnaissance value. Ex-ploration for oil would be conducted on a muchtighter grid. However, geological interpretations ofthe geophysical data can only be verified by drillinginto the deeper sediments of each basin.

Five different types of reconnaissance surveyswould be desirable to evaluate Antarctica’s resourcepotential. The surveys described below would alsoprovide additional data to supplement ongoing

geologic and geophysical research. All the technol-ogy required to conduct these surveys is presentlyavailable.

Offshore Geophysical Surveys

There are more than 20 major sedimentary basinsand sub-basins on the continental margin aroundAntarctica. A typical offshore geophysical surveywould involve collecting multichannel seismic-reflection data, high resolution seismic-reflectiondata, bathymetric data, magnetic data, gravity data,and sonobuoy wide-angle seismic data. To date, thesmall number of U.S. geophysical surveys havefocused primarily on the Ross Sea.

Scientific Drilling

Until pre-glacial rock samples are collected fromdeep within some of the basins surrounding Antarc-tica, all estimates of hydrocarbon potential must be


Figure 4-6-Multichannel Seismic Data

+ +-

-+

SOURCE J C Behrendt, U S Geologlcd Survey, 1989


viewed as highly speculative. According to theMinerals Convention, scientific drilling can becarried to any depth. Since 1972, the United Stateshas been involved in 6 major scientific programs,which have drilled holes at more than 50 siteslocated in and around Antarctica. The greatestadvances in our understanding of Antarctic geologyover the next decade are likely to come fromscientific drilling, if such projects are funded.

Offshore Geohazard Survey

Geohazard studies are critical to understandinggeologic processes on the seafloor that could be ahazard to oil recovery structures. Such hazardsmight include faults, slumps, and significant topo-graphic features. Geohazard surveys typically in-volve the collection of single channel seismic-reflection data, high resolution seismic-reflectiondata, precision bathymetric data, multibeam sonardata, seafloor cores and dredge material, and meas-urements of various sediment characteristics.

Onshore Aerosurveys

Aerosurveys in selected onshore areas of Antarc-tica have provided the principal information on icethickness and sub-ice geologic structure. Thesesurveys collect imagery data, such as photographsand radar information, and geophysical data such asmagnetic, gravity, and radio echo sounding informa-tion. Logistics difficulties, poor navigation, and highcosts have limited the quality of past aerosurveys.

Onshore Geophysical Transects

These transects would probably involve the col-lection of seismic reflection/refraction data andmeasurements of magnetism and gravity. Newlydeveloped seismic equipment can be rapidly towedacross the ice, thereby increasing the amount of datathat can be collected over a given period of time.

If the United States decides to fund a comprehen-sive reconnaissance effort, the United States Geo-logical Survey (USGS) estimates that it would costabout $250 million over a 10-year period (see table4-1).15 Some surveys would require all 10 seasons tocomplete; others only 3 to 5 seasons. Rather than

Photo credit: Bill Westermeyer

Don Juan Pond in Wright Valley, one of the “Dry Valleys”near McMurdo.

surveying the entire continent, limited areas of thecontinent (e.g., only the ice-free areas) could beindividually surveyed at a lower cost. However, thecumulative cost of many separate and smallersurveys conducted over a longer time period wouldlikely be significantly higher than indicated in table4-1,

A similar comprehensive survey is being con-ducted within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ), the offshore area within 200 nautical miles ofthe U.S. coastline. The EEZ was formally estab-lished by Presidential proclamation in 1983, therebygiving the United States resource jurisdiction overapproximately 2.3 million square nautical miles oflargely unexplored territory. This action led to anational effort-jointly conducted by the USGS andthe National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-stration (NOAA) with additional effort from aca-demic institutions and private industry-to learnmore about the geologic framework, seafloor proc-esses, and nonliving resources of the EEZ. 16

15Alm K, (Impr, Eval~~n8 A~uchca’~ H@ro~~bon (uti &finer~l,) po[e~~~eos~lence DUU Requiremetis and costs, U.S. GeologicalSurvey, Menlo Park, CA. Special report for U.S. Congrew, Office of Technology Assessment, Feb. 21, 1989 (unpublished).

16U4S, cmwc~~, of~cc of W~oIoN ~Wsaent, Marine ~inerds E,@oring Our New Ocean Frmtier, OTA-O-M2 (w~h~~m, DC: U’SGovernment Printing Office, July 1987), p. 3.


Table 4-1-Desirable Research for Evaluating Resource Potential of Antarctica

Relative importance for: Estimated 10-yrType of research Oil Minerals cost (millions)

Offshore seismic surveys . . . . . . . . . . . .Onshore/offshore drilling . . . . . . . . . . . .Offshore geohazards surveys . . . . . . . .Onshore aerosurveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Onshore geophysical surveys . . . . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., , .Aircraft support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

High Medium $ 3 0High high 50

Medium Low 20Medium Medium 25

Low Medium 251 5 0

100$250

SOURCE: A. Cooper, U.S. Geolog~al Survey, February 1989

There are important differences between theU.S. EEZ and Antarctica’s offshore environment.First, the United States has exclusive rights todevelop any resources in its EEZ, whereas U. S.-sponsored Operators would have to compete withothers for resource rights in Antarctica. Second, theproximity of the EEZ to the United States simplifiesits exploration. Antarctica is more than 10,000 milesfrom the United States. Finally, the exploitation ofat least some of our EEZ resources (e.g., sand andgravel) is likely to be possible in the near future.Exploitation of Antarctica’s resources will probablynot be seriously considered for a few decades, if atall.

Consequently, a major effort to undertake adetailed reconnaissance of our own EEZ is moreeasily justified than a similar effort for Antarc-tica. However, for the purpose of promotingpotential, long-term U.S. commercial interests inAntarctica, a modest reconnaissance program inselected promising areas might be appropriate. Infact, a fairly good indication of Antarctica’s mineralpotential could probably be obtained for about halfthe cost of the comprehensive survey described intable 4-1. Since activity in Antarctica is generallyincreasing, it may be even more important in thenear-term to devote relatively more attention toacquiring baseline environmental data than resourceassessment data. Before the recovery of any petro-leum resources is attempted, research will be re-quired to ensure that development can be conductedsafely and efficiently with a minimum of environ-mental impacts. Several tens of millions of dollarswould probably be required to address the researchtopics listed in table 4-2 adequately, although arigorous cost evaluation was not conducted,

Table 4-2-Research Required To Ensure ThatPetroleum Resources Are Safely and EfficientlyRecovered With Minimum Environmental impact

Basic research and information requirements:● geotechnical studies of continental shelf sediments. oil spill tracking and cleanup techniques. improved techniques for forecasting weather, sea state, and

pack ice conditionsResearch requiring extended time-series measurements:. circulation patterns and sea ice drift over the continental shelf. iceberg size, frequency, movement, and scouring of the

continental shelf● adverse short-and long-term effects (e.g., toxicity) of oil disper-

sants on Antarctic phytoplankton, krill, seals, and benthiccommunities

SOURCE: Office of Technology Aasesement, 1989,

Providing a firm scientific basis on which toestimate Antarctica’s mineral resource potential willbe a costly venture. These high costs could bereduced considerably through a cooperative interna-tional research program sponsored by all parties tothe Minerals Convention. Alternatively, differentparts of an agreed-upon research program could beconducted by different countries. Industry involve-ment, although potentially desirable, could compli-cate the situation somewhat. If such a program wereinstituted and paid for by private industry, itsconduct would then fall under the purview of theMinerals Convention. Industry data could then beconsidered proprietary for at least 10 years.

Probabilities of DiscoveringAntarctic Mineral Deposits

A statistical exercise conducted by the U.S.Geological Survey in the early 1970s attempted toestimate the total number of mineral deposits likelyto have formed in onshore areas of Antarctica andthe number of those deposits likely to be discovered.


This exercise apparently has been the only attemptat such a projection.

17It should be emphasized,however, that it is a paper exercise only and is nottied to an exploration effort.

The USGS began by reconstructing Gondwanaand correlating Antarctica’s major tectonic beltswith the corresponding tectonic belts on the adjacentcontinents (refer to figure 4-2). Known mineraloccurrences in each of the tectonic belts on Gond-wana continents adjacent to Antarctica were dividedinto four categories: ( 1 ) ferrous metals, (2) basemetals, (3) precious metals, and (4) other deposits(uranium, aluminum, tungsten, asbestos, rare earths,etc.). The density of each type of mineral occurrencein each tectonic belt was calculated. The results wereextrapolated to Antarctica to estimate its resourcepotential in each of the continent’s four majorgeologic provinces (Andean, Ellsworth, Ross, andAntarctic shield). The number of deposits expectedin exposed areas in Antarctica was calculated basedon the ratio of exposed area to total land area in eachprovince. This number was then further reduced byan assumed success ratio in discovering deposits.These results (without reduction for success indiscovery) are given in table 4-3.

Success in discovering mineral deposits in Ant-arctica is not only a function of the number ofdeposits expected to exist but also of the intensity ofsearch. For example, the number of precious metaldeposits estimated to exist in exposed areas of theAndean erogenic belt in Antarctica is 3.5. Assuminga one percent chance of discovery, the expectednumber of deposits found on any single explorationattempt would be 0.035 or about three chances in ahundred. Even this may be high for this region.

Again, this exercise is purely an abstract statisti-cal approach and is not based on actual explorationefforts. In addition, what might constitute a commer-cial deposit elsewhere may not be economicallyviable in Antarctica. In any event, table 4-3 illus-trates that, other than in the Antarctic Peninsula(Andean Province), the chances of finding min-eral deposits in exposed areas are small, and thatbase metal and precious metal deposits are thebest prospects for discovery in the AntarcticPeninsula.

SELECTED MINERALRESOURCES

Oil and Gas

Prospects for Antarctica

Sedimentary basins are located on the continentalmargin of Antarctica and in the interior of WestAntarctica. Sediments also probably occur inland ofthe East Antarctic ice margin (figure 4-7).18 Themajor Antarctic basins of interest to petroleumexploration are in the Weddell embayment, Rossembayment, Prydz Bay, and Wilkes Land margin.Other sedimentary basins exist along the EastAntarctic margin, the west coast of the AntarcticPeninsula, and probably on the broad continentalshelves of the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seasoff West Antarctica. Offshore sedimentary basinshold the best prospects for petroleum explorationbecause of the character and thickness of sedi-ments and access for seismic exploration.

Based on seismic evidence and the results of theOcean Drilling Program’s (ODP) Leg 113, theWeddell embayment contains possibly as much as46,000 feet of sediment. Other than for the margin ofthe Larsen Basin and off Queen Maud Land,virtually nothing is known of the age and nature ofthe sediments. The older strata probably date back tothe early stages of formation of the basin in the LateJurassic period (around 150 million years ago), andconsist of terrestrial and marine sediments. Thesedeposits might have contained organic material thatcould have provided potential hydrocarbon sourcerocks. These beds are overlain by as much as 10,000feet of glacially derived sediment, laid down overthe last 30 million years, with no source rockpotential. The thermal history is unknown, but theoil window has been estimated to lie within thedeeper parts of the basins. The Larsen Basin, inparticular. on the western side of the Weddellembayment, is estimated to have a moderate poten-tial for hydrocarbon formation. To the east, offQueen Maud Land, the oil window is estimated to liebelow the organic-rich beds on the continental shelf.

~~wri@t ad WI]l I~s, op. cit., foomote 4, pp. 24-27.

18)31110[, op. Clt,, footnote 9, p. 33.


Table 4-3-Estimated Number of Major Mineral Deposits in Antarctica

Type of deposit

Geologic province Base metal Ferrous Precious Other

Andean:Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 60 82 63In exposed areas . . . . . . . 7.5 2.5 3.5 2.5

Ellsworth:Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 90 8 16In exposed areas . . . . . . . 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.2

Ross:Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10 5 8In exposed areas . . . . . . . 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5

Shield:Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 138 66 73In exposed areas . . . . . . . 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1

SOURCE: N.A. Wright and P.L. Williams, “Mineral Resources of Antarctica,” US. Geologcal Survey Circular 705,1974, pp. 24-27.

Figure 4-7-Sedimentary Basins in Antarctica

●●

1I ‘k +4 ‘-a

I

---“ - I

The major Antarctic basins of interest to petroleum exploration are in the Weddell embayment, Rossembayment, Prydz Bay, and Wilkes Land margin.

SOURCE: D.H. Elliot, “Antarctwx is There Any 011 and Natural Gas?” Ocearws, VOI 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 33.

If this is the case, there would be little potential for The Ross embayment contains three identifiedpetroleum formation in the Queen Maud Land basins of which the Victoria Land Basin off Rossmargin. Island would appear to have the best prospects for


petroleum formation. This basin contains as much as46,000 feet of sediment in a rift zone that hasrelatively high heat flow. Heavy hydrocarbon resi-dues were recovered from a scientific drill site on thewestern margin of the Victoria Land Basin in 1986.The asphaltic residue indicates that hydrocarbonsformed in the area but have migrated, possiblymillions of years ago. Of the other two basins, theCentral Trough and Eastern Basin off Marie ByrdLand, only the deepest portions would lie within theoil window. Drill cores from both of these basinshave shown traces of gaseous hydrocarbons, butthese are from glacial marine sediments and mostlikely represent local decomposition of organicmaterial not related to the formation of petroleum.

Another rift zone in Prydz Bay, called the AmeryBasin, also contains as much as 46,000 feet ofsedimentary rock. Cores taken in this area havelikewise shown traces of gas. Of more significancegeologically is the recovery of Cretaceus sediment,indicating a long history of deposition in preglacialtimes and, consequently, the possibility of suitablesource rock.

The Wilkes Basin is a marine basin extendinginland under the ice and offshore onto the continen-tal shelf. This basin contains as much as 20,000 feetof sediment on the shelf including organic-richmaterial of Early Cretaceus age with source rockpotential.

The other sedimentary basins are less prospectivefor hydrocarbon accumulation. This includes theBrartsfield Trough off the western tip of the Antarc-tic Peninsula, where hydrocarbons were found inrelatively shallow cores from a young (2 millionyears) and thin sedimentary sequence. While thethermal gradient is sufficiently high in this area tomaturate organic material at shallow depth, the thinsedimentary section argues against the likelihood ofsignificant hydrocarbon accumulations. Consequently,it might be presumed that the hydrocarbons beingformed in this basin are probably seeping onto thesea floor where they are being degraded by naturalprocesses.

World Resources

Current annual world crude oil production isaround 21 billion barrels and has been fairly stableat about that amount for several years. Oil isproduced by many countries. The three largestproducers, the Soviet Union, the United States, andSaudi Arabia, account for nearly half of annualworld production. Until 1987 world proven recover-able reserves were calculated at about 657 billionbarrels. Since then, revised estimates, largely ofMiddle East reserves, have raised this figure to 956billion barrels. 19 Based on the 956 billion barrelfigure the average world reserves to production ratiois 46. Undiscovered recoverable reserves of conven-tional crude oil are estimated at around 400 billionbarrels.

If the remaining recoverable, conventional oil inthe world were distributed evenly and explorationand development proceeded at past rates, world oilproduction could be sustained for nearly 50 yearsbefore being constrained by a declining resourcebase. A steep drop in world oil production of morethan 50 percent in 10 years would then be likely.20

At that time, if not before for other reasons (anddemand were still high), oil prices could be expectedto rise sharply. If a commercial oil field is discoveredin Antarctica in the future, OTA’s analysis (app. A)indicates that it will only be developed profitably ifoil prices are much higher than today. However,higher oil prices tend to decrease demand and toencourage additional conservation and the use ofalternative fuels, Environmental concerns about theburning of fossil fuels, such as ozone depletion andclimate change, may also reduce petroleum con-sumption and hold prices lower.

Discussion of declining conventional petroleumreserves invariably raises the question of the poten-tial for developing unconventional sources of crudeoil, namely by developing heavy oil, tar sands, andshale oil, and by using enhanced oil recoverytechniques. While some unconventional deposits arebeing produced today, the annual amount of petro-leum derived from them is currently relativelyinsignificant compared to world consumption: high

19s1nw ~rOv~ ~e=mcs MC ~~ of tie ~ua[lon ~~ by OpEC In dc[crmmmg produ~llon quo:as (~ con[en~ous matter), them IS s o m e quest ion as

to the techmcal basis for some of the new estimates.~Jowph p, R,va Jr,, T& ~~)rld’,y Convenhoml oil produ< ~lon copubl[l~ proje(ted /nfo [/LC Fu&re @ country, Congressional Research StXVIU?,

Report for Congress, No. 87-414 SPR, May 1987, p, 15.


rates of production cannot yet be achieved. I naddition, current production from unconventionalsources is largely from sites with the most favorablecharacteristics, as would be expected. Projectingsignificantly greater production from unconven-tional sources through future technological develop-ments is much easier to envision than accomplish.Consequently, as long as the world is dependenton petroleum there will be an incentive to locateand produce conventional deposits.

A decision to develop a promising Antarcticdiscovery could be made even if development wouldnot be profitable. In particular, it is sometimessuggested that energy-poor countries, such as Japan,may wish to undertake unprofitable development toobtain an assured source of supply. OTA does notthink that this motivation is as strong as the profitmotive, in part because energy-poor countries haveless expensive or less technologically challengingalternatives available to them (e.g., Brazil’s sugarcane to ethanol program), and these alternatives arelikely to become more diverse and more available inthe future as the price of oil rises. Also, Antarcticawould not likely be the most secure source of supplyin times of emergency.

Energy security is of sufficient concern to theUnited States that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve(SPR) was created to provide an emergency supplyof petroleum in the event of a disruption in imports.At present the SPR contains about 550 millionbarrels of oil held in caverns leached from salt domesin the Gulf Coast.

As for the possibility that an Antarctic claimantcountry might try to develop an unprofitable oil fieldto solidify a claim, neither the Antarctic Treaty northe Minerals Convention would support this. Even ifthese agreements were disregarded, a claimant couldundertake other, less expensive activities to have thesame practical effect.

Although petroleum development in Antarctica isconsidered unlikely in the near term, OTA hasdeveloped a hypothetical scenario for oil fielddevelopment there. This scenario (found in app. A)explores technology capabilities and needs, ad-dresses economic considerations, and presents sev-eral alternative approaches to development.

Coal


Coal is found principally in Permian and Triassicrocks around the perimeter of East Antarctica. Thickbeds are most notably in the Beacon Supergroup ofthe Transantarctic Mountains and in the Beaver Lakearea of the Prince Charles Mountains. The depositsall seem to have formed on flood plains in shallowswamps that were rapidly being filled with sandymaterial. Most of the coal deposits are in a Permiansandstone sequence that is more than 1,600 feet thickand found in both the Prince Charles and Transan-tarctic Mountains. Although individual coal beds asmuch as 20 feet thick have been reported, most of thebeds are less than 12 feet thick and tend to be lensshaped and have a limited horizontal extent. Whilesome coal seams have been traced over a consider-able distance, the horizontal extent of most of theindividual beds that have been reported is less thanhalf a mile,

The coal is commonly of a high rank, rangingfrom medium-volatile bituminous to anthracite andgenerally having a high ash and low sulfur content.Most of the coal occurs in mountainous areas at aconsiderable distance from the coast. None of theknown deposits are economically minable. Depositsnear coastal areas would have the greatest potentialfor export. The conventional wisdom has generallybeen that while Antarctic coal may not be economicto export, it could possibly be used for local heatingor power production. However, even the Sovietstation at Beaver Lake, adjacent to exposed coal inthe Prince Charles Mountains, finds it more eco-nomical to meet energy needs with imported oil.

World Resources

World hard coal (anthracite and bituminous)production in 1987 was nearly 3,6 billion short tons.Although coal is mined in a large number ofcountries, the three largest producers are China, theUnited States, and the Soviet Union. Recoverablereserves total 719 billion short tons. The reserves toproduction ratio is 200. In addition, there are 300billion tons of recoverable reserves of lignite. It ishighly unlikely that an export market for Antarc-tic coal would develop in the foreseeable future.


Uranium


Uranium occurs in many geologic settings. Amongthe more important categories are quartz-pebbleconglomerate deposits, deposits related to erosionalsurfaces in Precambrian rocks, disseminated andcontact deposits in igneous and metamorphic rocks,vein deposits, and sandstone deposits of variousages. Again, some insight can be gained by compari-ng Antarctica with the surrounding Gondwanacontinents. South Africa contains an abundance ofuranium and is a major uranium producer. However,most of the uranium produced in South Africa is abyproduct of gold mining, principally from thePrecambrian quartz-pebble gold conglomerates ofthe Witwatersrand region. Australia is also a majoruranium producer. In Australia, most of the knownuranium resources are contained in deposits spa-tially related to erosional surfaces in Precambrianrocks. The South African and Australian depositssuggest that uranium might be present in thePrecambrian rocks of East Antarctica.

Uranium minerals, or anomalous levels of radio-activity, have been found in several locations inAntarctica, particularly in Enderby Land, the AdelieCoast, and the Transantarctic Mountains of VictoriaLand in East Antarctica. No known occurrences ofradioactive minerals in Antarctica contain com-mercial quantities. However, larger deposits mightbe present in sedimentary basins that existed prior tothe break up of Gondwana.

World Resources

Reported world uranium production in 1986totaled 40,900 short tons. Reactor requirements were43,200 short tons with the difference being made upfrom stocks. Exclusive of China, Eastern Europe,and the Soviet Union for which data are notavailable, the four largest producers were Canada,the United States, South Africa, and Australiafollowed by Namibia, Niger, and France. Totalknown resources, which include the reasonablyassured resources and the estimated additionalresources based on direct geological evidence, total3.9 million tons. The ratio of known resources toreactor requirements currently stands at 91 or nearlya century of supply. In addition, undiscovered

resources are estimated at over 1.8 million tons.Even with the projected moderate growth innuclear power production, supplies of uraniumshould be adequate for the foreseeable future. Inthe long term, advances in nuclear power generationand enrichment technologies are expected to reducethe requirements for natural uranium. Even thoughthe cost of uranium in current prices may be higherin the long term, the cost of finding and producinguranium from Antarctica would likely be muchhigher still.

Chromium


Of the many minerals that contain chromium, theonly ore mineral is chromite, an oxide of chromiumand iron. Primary chromite deposits occur as strati-form or podiform bodies in certain types of ul-tramafic rocks composed primarily of olivine andpyroxene minerals, or rocks derived from them.Chromite is also found in placer deposits derivedfrom the weathering of primary deposits. Stratiformchromite deposits are found in layers of up to severalfeet thick of fairly uniform composition extendingover large areas. The Bushveld Complex in theRepublic of South Africa and the Stillwater Com-plex in Montana are deposits of this type. Most of theworld’s identified chromium resources are in strati-form deposits. Podiform deposits are generallysmaller and, as implied by the name. the ore is inirregular pods or lenses within the host rock.

The Dufek intrusion in the northern PensacolaMountains of the Transantarctic Mountain chain isa very large stratiform body with a compositionsimilar to that of the Bushveld and StillwaterComplexes. While concentrations of minerals con-taining chromium have not been found in the Dufek,anomalous trace amounts of chromium, nickel, andcobalt have been reported in some of the rockanalyses. Consequently, there is speculation basedon geochemical comparisons and interpretation thatthe Dufek intrusion may contain significant amountsof chromium, nickel, and platinum-group metals inthe lower unexposed portions. Chromite has alsobeen found disseminated and in thin layers in a smallultramafic intrusion on Gibbs Island in the SouthShetland Islands. In addition to chromium, the


intrusion may also contain nickel and cobalt miner-als, However, the chromite occurrence does notappear to have commercial potential.21

World Resources

Chromium has important uses in the metallurgicalindustry to enhance such properties as hardenability,impact strength, and resistance to corrosion, oxida-tion, and wear. Ferrous alloy production, mainlystainless steels, accounts for most of the chromiumconsumed. Chromium also has uses in refractorymaterials and chemical products. Chromium isconsidered a strategic and critical material forNational Defense Stockpile purposes; several formsof chromium-bearing materials are contained withinthe stockpile.

World mine production of chromite in 1988 was12.4 million short tons. The Republic of SouthAfrica and the Soviet Union each produced nearlyone-third of the total. The world reserve base ofchromite is 7.5 billion tons of which 84 percent is inSouth Africa and 11 percent is in Zimbabwe. Thereserve base to production ratio is 658. Worldresources total about 36 billion tons of chromite, ofwhich over 99 percent is in southern Africa. Insummary, there is enough chromium in knowndeposits to last for centuries, although the fact thatmost of it is concentrated in one region may be ofconcern. At current prices in South Africa ofabout $56 per ton, it would hardly be economic todevelop a chromite deposit anywhere exceptunder special circumstances. However, if thecircumstances included a complete cut off in supplyfrom South Africa over a long term, the economicsof the world market would certainly change. Theeconomics of a chromite mining operation in Ant-arctica could also improve if there were associatedcoproducts of higher value such as platinum orcobalt. In addition, a strategic rather than aneconomic incentive could drive interest in prospect-ing for chromium in Antarctica.

The difficulties of hard rock mining in Antarcticaare discussed in appendix B with regard to both aninland location such as the Dufek Mass if and at amore accessible coastal location. Because the ore,type, and location of any hypothetical mine site areso completely speculative, and because there are too

many other variables, at present, it was not consid-ered possible to develop a specific scenario for hardrock mining that would provide any additionalinsight. However, by comparison with selected hardminerals mines in the Arctic, some speculativeestimates can be made of technological problemsand ore values needed for a commercial Antarcticmine.

Copper


Although copper is found in several types ofdeposits including porphyry, sedimentary, and vol-canic, porphyry copper deposits include the largestknown deposits and make up 52 percent of the worldresources of the metal. Many of the more importantporphyry copper deposits also contain commerciallyimportant quantities of molybdenum, while otherscontain gold and silver. Most copper occurrences inAntarctica have been found in the Antarctic Penin-sula and on islands off the coast of the Peninsula.The most promising copper occurrences are onislands off the west coast of the Peninsula and areassociated with the youngest intrusions of theAndean belt. Economically promising deposits, ifany are found in this region, would likely be of thetype found in porphyritic igneous rock and may beassociated with possible vein deposits. Veins con-taining a variety of metals are found throughout theAntarctic Peninsula.

Extensive products of mineralization on KingGeorge Island, including pyrite, hydrothermallyaltered rock, and large veins have led some investi-gators to speculate that there maybe a porphyry-typecopper deposit at depth on King George Island. Thehydrothermally altered rocks containing mineraliza-tion are interpreted as representing the upper ornear-surface portion of a large intrusive body. Inaddition, the pyrite contains anomalously highcopper and cobalt values, suggesting that the intru-sive body may be rich in copper. Others, however, donot find the evidence for an underlying porphyrycopper deposit compelling, and they suggest that theobserved minerals represent normal separation dur-ing solidification of an intrusive body of this sort.

21Row@ et al., op. Cit,, fOOUIOte 3, p. @


Other copper occurrences have been reported inthe South Shetland Islands. Two localities onLivingston Island contain copper associated withigneous intrusive bodies. In one place, the copperminerals may represent the remains of a deeplyeroded copper-molybdenum porphyry deposit, Veinand porphyry-type alteration and mineralizationtook place on a number of other islands and coastallocations throughout the region. Copper occurrencesare found in about 30 places along the east coast ofthe Antarctic Peninsula. Low grade porphyry copperand vein deposits also are found in the southern partof the Peninsula. Three locations, in particular,contain porphyry copper mineralization. One is alow grade copper-molybdenum deposit in the Cop-per Nunataks of the central Lassiter Coast. Anotheris in the Sky-Hi Nunataks, and the third is in theMerrick Mountains of eastern Ellsworth Land.Minor amounts of copper minerals have also beenfound in some of the metamorphic and intrusiverocks of East Antarctica and the TransantarcticMountains. Sedimentary rock units of the Transan-tarctic Mountains could also be prospective hosts forstratiform copper deposits.

World Resources

Copper has been one of the more importantmaterials in the advance of industry, technology, andthe arts. The largest use of copper is in electricalapplications such as motors, generators, powerdistribution facilities, industrial controls, communi-cations equipment, and wiring. The U.S. Govern-ment Stockpile goal for copper is 1 million tons,whereas the inventory is 22,000 tons.

World mine production of copper in 1988 totaled9.4 million short tons of recoverable copper metal.Chile and the United States were the two majorproducing countries, with other major producersincluding Canada, the Soviet Union, Zaire, Zambia,Poland, and Peru. The world reserve base of copperis about 620 million short tons of recoverablecopper, of which Chile and the United Statestogether have nearly 40 percent. The ratio of worldreserve base to production is 66. Land-based worldresources are estimated at 1.8 billion tons of copper,and resources in deep sea nodules are estimated at0.8 billion tons, In view of the relative abundanceof copper resources, there would appear to belittle economic incentive to extract copper from

Antarctica, given the added costs of operating insuch an environment, unless it were an exceed-ingly rich and accessible deposit. Porphyry copperdeposits are typically low grade, high volume orebodies. Any associated coproducts such as preciousmetals (gold, silver, and platinum), molybdenum orother base metals (lead and zinc), or cobalt couldimprove the economics.

Gold


Gold is found as a trace mineral in certain coursesediments, and in a series of deposits of deep-seatedorigin that are somewhat difficult to classify. Goldoccurs widely in gravels as a placer deposit.Typically, these are fluviatile deposits near theheadwaters of fast-flowing rivers where gold parti-cles are trapped between pebbles or in bedrockirregularities. In Antarctica, placer deposits couldonly have occurred before the onset of glaciation andwould now probably be buried under ice. The golddeposits of the Witwatersrand in South Africa occurin Precambrian conglomerate. This may suggest thatsimilar deposits could exist in the Precambrianshield of East Antarctica, although they wouldprobably need to be of higher grade to be economicin Antarctica.

Other types of gold deposits are associated withmagmatic, hydrothermal, or metamorphic activity.For example, gold is commonly found in quartzveins and related deposits cutting through a varietyof host rocks. In continental tectonic belts, golddeposits are found that are broadly related to thehydrothermal phases of calc-alkaline and alkalineigneous rocks. In hydrothermal deposits, metallicminerals are precipitated from high-temperatureaqueous solutions, either by changes in temperatureand pressure or by evaporation of the liquid.Minerals are deposited in the cavities, cracks, orinterstices of the host rock. Many porphyry copperdeposits contain important amounts of gold, andmany have an alluvial dispersion of gold aroundtheir outcrops. While gold could occur throughoutmany regions of Antarctica, perhaps the mostpromising region for its discovery and possibledevelopment might be the Antarctic extension of theAndean magmatic and reformational belt. Thisregion includes the Antarctic Peninsula and the

118 . Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

coastal regions of Ellsworth and Marie Byrd Land.Although the Antarctic Peninsula may be less metalrich, this belt in the northern and central Andes is oneof the richest metal-producing areas in the world.The volcanic and intrusive rocks of the AntarcticPeninsula belong to the calc-alkaline magmatic suitewith which many of the world’s copper-lead-zincand similar ores, often containing silver and gold,are associated. In addition, the Antarctic Peninsulaand nearby islands are the most ice-free and accessi-ble region in Antarctica, thus, making both mineraldiscovery and potential development more feasible.

No significant concentrations of gold have beenrecorded in Antarctica. Minor gold and silver havebeen reported in assays of sulfide minerals fromseveral locations in the Antarctic Peninsula region,Traces of gold and silver have also been found in theCape Denisen area of the Adelie Coast and inVictoria Land,

World Resources

In 1988, world mine production of gold reached55 million troy ounces valued at about $24 billion.About 35 percent of this production came from theRepublic of South Africa. The next largest producersin decreasing order were the Soviet Union, theUnited States, Australia, and Canada. The worldreserve base is over 1.5 billion ounces of which morethan half is in the Republic of South Africa. Thereserve base to production ratio is over 28. Theworld’s gold stocks, excluding gold in industrialusage, total about 2.7 billion ounces, of which 1.23billion ounces are official monetary stocks and 1.44billion ounces are privately held as coin, bullion, orjewelry. Total world resources of gold are estimatedat 2.4 billion ounces, of which 15 to 20 percent arebyproduct resources. The Republic of South Africahas about one-half of the world resources, and theSoviet Union, Brazil, and the United States about 12percent each. At current world market prices, if arich gold deposit were discovered in Antarctica,particularly in the region of the Antarctic Penin-sula, there would likely be economic interest inconsidering its extraction.

Iron


Iron is the fourth most abundant rock-formingelement, chemically making up about 5 percent ofthe Earth’s crust. The largest concentrations of ironare found in banded sedimentary iron formations ofPrecambrian age. These formations supply most ofthe world’s iron ore and comprise the bulk of theworld’s iron resources. The most extensive irondeposits in Antarctica are in East Antarctica, wherea Precambrian banded iron-formation (jaspilite),similar to the Lake Superior-type ores, is found. Thelargest of these deposits is in the Prince CharlesMountains, notably at Mount Rucker, where indi-vidual jaspilite beds up to 230 feet thick alternatewith slate, siltstone, ferruginous quartzite, schist,and metamorphosed igneous rocks. In addition,although not exposed in outcrop, large magneticanomalies, some extending for over 100 miles underthe ice, almost certainly indicate additional irondeposits. In general, scattered exposures of bedrockand glacially transported boulders indicate that ironformations occur between western Wilkes Land andwestern Enderby Land, covering a large area of EastAntarctica.

Based on their limited exposure, the MountRucker deposits appear to be of lesser grade thancommercial banded iron-formation elsewhere in theworld, except for deposits near industrialized areas.The average iron content is 34 percent whereas, forexample, the Hammersley Basin deposits of north-western Australia contain huge reserves averagingaround 55 percent iron. For this reason and becausethe Mount Rucker deposits are nearly 400 milesfrom the coast, it is highly unlikely that they willbecome economically developed.

An iron oxide vein subprovince occurs in westernand central Queen Maud Land where quartz-magnetite and garnet-magnetite veins from 2 to 15feet wide are found in gneissic country rock at thecontacts with mafic intrusions. Numerous ironoccurrences are found throughout the region in veinsand stockworks of various ages, some associatedwith copper and other metals.22

up.D. Rowley, A,B. Ford, P.L. Williams, and D.E. tide, ‘‘Metatlogenic provinces of Antarctica, ’ Anmrctic Earth Science, R,L, Oliver, P.R. James,and J,B. Jago (cds.j (Carnbndge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 416.


World Resources

World mine production of iron ore in 1988 was918 million long tons. The two countries producingthe largest amount were Brazil and the Soviet Union.The world reserve base of iron ore is estimated at213billion long tons, of which approximately one-fourthis located in the Soviet Union and one-fifth inAustralia. Large amounts are also found in Brazil,Canada, India, South Africa, and the United States.The reserve base to production ratio is 245. Conse-quently, at the current annual rate of production, thereserve base would last nearly two and one-halfcenturies. Furthermore, world resources are esti-mated to exceed 800 billion long tons. Thus, it isreasonable to conclude that there will be nomarket for Antarctic iron ore in the foreseeablefuture.

MolybdenumProspects for Antarctica

Most molybdenum deposits are of three majortypes:

. porphyry or disseminated deposits, includingstockworks and breccia pipes, in which metall-ic sulfides are dispersed through relativelylarge volumes of altered and fractured rock,

. contact-metamorphic zones and bodies of silici-fied limestone adjacent to intrusive graniticrocks, and

● quartz veins.

All three of these types are hydrothermal in originand represent nearly all of the molybdenum mined inthe world. In addition to the porphyry deposits inwhich molybdenum occurs as the principal metalsulfide, many porphyry copper deposits containsmaller amounts of molybdenum as an importantbyproduct. In Antarctica, molybdenum is foundassociated with copper mineralization in the Antarc-tic Peninsula region. In addition, molybdenumminerals are widespread in dikes and pegmatites inWilkes Land in East Antarctica and at a number oflocalities along the Adelie Coast. None of theseoccurrences is of economic significance. The bestprospect for locating a significant molybdenumdeposit in Antarctica would likely be in associationwith a copper porphyry in the Antarctic Peninsularegion.

World Resources

Molybdenum is a refractory metallic element usedprimarily as an alloying agent in steels, cast irons,and superalloys to enhance hardenability, strength,toughness, and resistance to wear and corrosion.Mine production was 189 million pounds of recover-able molybdenum metal in 1988 of which the UnitedStates produced over 39 percent. Other majorproducers were Chile, Canada, Mexico, and Peru.The reserve base to production ratio for molybde-num is 145 or enough to maintain production atcurrent levels well into the 22nd century. Over 45percent of the world’s reserve base is located in theUnited States. Identified resources amount to about46 billion pounds worldwide. Molybdenum re-sources are adequate to supply world needs for theforeseeable future. It is difficult to envision asituation wherein a molybdenum mining opera-tion in Antarctica could compete in the worldmarket for quite some time without additionalrevenues from associated coproducts.

Platinum-Group Metals


The platinum-group metals are geochemicallyassociated with mafic or ultramafic rocks and occuras segregations in layers or pods, Because of theirrelatively high specific gravity, platinum-groupmetals also are found in placer deposits sometimesassociated with gold. The world’s premier platinumdeposit is the layered lode deposit in the MerenskyReef of the Bushveld complex in the Republic ofSouth Africa. Although much younger than theBushveld complex, the Dufek intrusion in thenorthern Pensacola Mountains of Antarctica is asimilar layered mafic igneous complex of consider-able extent. It approaches the Bushveld complex insize and is an order of magnitude larger than anyother known body of this type. The great size of theDufek intrusion and its similarity to other maficigneous intrusions, nearly all major examples ofwhich contain economically significant resources ofone or more metals, has prompted considerablespeculation regarding its mineral potential.23

Comparison to the Bushveld and other similarintrusions suggests that if the Dufek containssignificant quantities of platinum-group metals, they

Zwcn & Wit, Minera& ad Mining in Antarctica (Oxford: Clarcndon Pros, 19~5).


likely would be within the unexposed basal parts. Todate, no platinum-group minerals have been identi-fied in the Dufek intrusion, although some rockanalyses have shown trace amounts of these ele-ments. The extent to which age is a factor inassessing the mineral potential of the Dufek intru-sion is unknown. Most other stratiform maficintrusions containing economically significant re-sources are Precambrian in age, whereas the Dufekintrusion is Jurassic. Another consideration thatwould affect the economics of developing a mineraldeposit in the Dufek intrusion is the fact that theexposed portions, which represent only a fewpercent of the intrusion, are more than 300 milesfrom the ocean. Based on geophysical evidence, theintrusion itself is believed to extend out under theFilchner and Ronne Ice Shelves.

World Resources

The uses of the platinum-group metals are relatedto their chemical inertness over wide temperatureranges, excellent catalytic qualities, and high melt-ing points. Three of the group, platinum, palladium,and iridium, are considered strategic and critical forpurposes of the National Defense Stockpile. Thestockpile inventory of each, however, is less thanhalf the desired goal.

World mine production of platinum, palladium,iridium, osmium, rhodium, and ruthenium togethertotalled over 8.9 million troy ounces in 1988. Themajor producer countries are the Republic of SouthAfrica and the Soviet Union. The world reserve baseof platinum-group metals is estimated to be 2.14billion troy ounces of which 1.9 billion ounces (89percent) are in South Africa. The ratio of worldreserve base to production is 268 or enough to lastover two and one-half centuries at current produc-tion rates. World resources of platinum-group met-als are estimated to be 3.3 billion ounces of whichthe United States holds about 300 million ounces.Considering the difficulties of mining in theinterior of Antarctica, unless there were a majordisruption of supplies from South Africa therewould probably be little economic incentive todevelop a platinum deposit in Antarctica if onewere found. The deposit would have to be exceed-ingly rich to provide an economic incentive.

Strategic and critical mineral concerns couldprovide sufficient incentive to develop a platinum-group metals deposit in Antarctica, even if it werenot commercially viable. On the other hand, newdevelopments in catalysts that could replace platinum-group metals could reduce critical mineral con-cerns. 24

Rare-Earth Metals


The rare-earth elements, sometimes called thelanthnides, are a group of 15 chemically similarelements with atomic numbers 57 through 71,inclusive. Although not a lanthanide, yttrium, atom-ic number 39, is often included with the rare-earthmetals because it commonly occurs with them innature, having similar chemical properties. Somemembers of the rare-earth group of metals arerelatively abundant in the Earth’s crust, such ascerium, neodymium, lanthanum, and yttrium, whereasothers are considered rare. The rare-earth elementsand yttrium are minor constituents in over 100minerals, but in only a few are they sufficientlyconcentrated to be considered ore minerals. The twominerals that are the primary sources of rare-earthelements are bastnasite and monazite of whichbastnasite is the major source. These mineralsgenerally occur in granitic rocks more commonlythan in basic rocks, Monazite is general1y recoveredfrom beach sand deposits as a byproduct of otherheavy minerals recovery such as ilmenite, rutile,zircon, and gold. Xenotime is a yttrium phosphatemineral found in the same environment as monazite,and is a major source of yttrium.

In Antarctica, airborne radiometric surveys havefound radioactivity anomalies that have been shown,on field inspection, to be related to thorium- anduranium-bearing minerals as well as to rare-earthand tin-bearing minerals within sandstone of thebasal (Devonian) parts of the Beacon Supergroup inthe Darwin Glacier area of the TransantarcticMountains.25 Upper Permian or Triassic nephelinesyenite plutons in western Queen Maud Land of EastAntarctica contain zirconium and the rare-earthelements, lanthanum and cerium,

~R~n~y Ford Motor CO. annoumxxl that it has discovered a potential substitute for plathm used in Catidyt.iC converters.

~Rowley et al., op. cit, footnote 7.


Box 4-C—Icebergs (Fresh Water)

Although, technically, ice is a mineral resource therewas agreement among the Consultative Parties that thedefinition of mineral resources in article 1 (6) of theConvention (defined as nonliving, natural, nonrenewa-ble resources) does not include ice. During thenegotiation of the Minerals Convention, there was aspecific decision to exclude ice from coverage of theminerals regime. The Final Act of the Special Consul-tative Meeting notes that harvesting ice from thecoastal region of Antarctica, particularly if land-basedfacilities were required, could raise some of theenvironmental and other issues addressed in theConvention. Consequently, representatives at the meet-ing agreed that the question of harvesting Antarctic iceshould be further considered by the ConsultativeParties at the next regular meeting.

It is estimated that Antarctica contains over 90percent of the world’s fresh water in the form of ice andsnow that accumulated over millions of years. ] Precipi-tation in most of Antarctica is very light. Annualsnowfall at the South Pole is less than an inch waterequivalent, making it drier than some desert areaselsewhere in the world. Although difficult to estimate,the overall water budget of the continent is thought tobe roughly in balance with most of the gain fromannual precipitation offset by the loss to the sea in theform of icebergs and melting glaciers. If all the iceshould melt, the oceans would rise between 200 and300 feet.

The possibility that fresh water from Antarcticamight become available in the form of capturedicebergs towed to areas of need is of recurring interestto arid or drought-stricken coastal areas of the world.The volume of ice annually entering the oceans fromAntarctica is estimated at 1.5 trillion short tons, of

which 900 billion tons is from ice shelves, 500 billiontons is from glaciers and ice streams, and 50 billiontons is from the edges of ice sheets. Because a greatamount of energy is required to move icebergs, it is noteconomically feasible at present. Snow and ice areconverted to potable water for local use in Antarctica.Desalination is also used in coastal locations includingthe U.S. stations, McMurdo and Palmer.


Seaward edge of the Ross Ice Shelf, source ofnumerous tabular icebergs, the shelf is 80 feet above

the water at this point.

World Resources

The unusual properties of the rare-earth elementsare responsible for their important uses in catalysts(especially for petroleum refining), as iron and steelalloying agents, glass and ceramics additives, per-manent magnets, and phosphors for television andlighting. Although 504 short tons of rare-earthoxides remain within the National Defense Stock-pile, they are no longer classified as strategic and

critical for the purposes of the stockpile, and the goalhas been reduced to zero, There is also no stockpilegoal for yttrium.

World mine production of the rare-earth metals in1988 was over 55,000 short tons of rare-earth oxide,of which the United States and China each producednearly one-third of the total. Other major producingcountries are Australia, Malaysia, India, and Brazilin order of output. The world reserve base is 52

122 ● Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treat-y for Antarctica

million tons, of which over 75 per cent is containedin a huge bastnasite deposit in China; most of the restof the reserve base is in the United States. The ratioof reserve base to production is over 1,340. Totalworld resources are believed to be very large relativeto expected demand. With prices for high purityoxides ranging from $9 per pound for lanthanum toover $2,200 per pound for lutetium, there is somelikelihood that if a high grade deposit of bastnasitewere found in an accessible area of Antarctica, itmight well be economic to develop. However, interms of strategic or resource scarcity concerns,there would be little incentiverare-earth deposit in Antarctica.

Diamonds


Diamonds have not been found in

to develop a

Antarctica, butultramafic rocks similar to the diamond-bearingrocks of Africa and Australia have been mapped inthe Prince Charles Mountains and other locations inEast Antarctica. In comparing Antarctica with thesurrounding continents in the Gondwana reconstruc-tion, the rich diamond deposits of southern Africaand Australia suggest that Antarctica may alsocontain such deposits. Many of the diamond-bearingpipes of Africa are Cretaceus in age; hence, ifdiamond-bearing pipes of the same age are presentin Antarctica they most likely would be intrusionsin areas of older rock. Thus, based on age, prospec-tive areas would include exposed rocks in theTransantarctic Mountains and other parts of EastAntarctica rather than in geologically younger areasof West Antarctica. However, individual pipes havecross sections of only a few tens or hundreds ofmeters, and only a small percentage of the pipescontain diamonds in economic quantities.

Most of the diamonds initially discovered inAfrica and more recently in Australia were locatedin alluvium (placer deposits). Placers are still majorsources of diamonds in Australia, Angola, Namibia,South Africa, and Zaire. Because of extensive icecover and consequent lack of water transport andsorting, placer deposits would be extremely rare inAntarctica. Any placer deposits that may haveformed prior to the extensive glaciation would likely

be in former stream channels or basins now buriedunder ice cover. The best available places toprospect would be beaches and shallow shelf areasof East Antarctica.

In Africa and western Australia, diamond placerswere traced to the lode sources in kimberlite pipes.Kimberlite is an altered, dark-green basic rock ofigneous origin and is the main source of primarydiamonds. Although approximately 1,000 occur-rences of kimberlite have been reported throughoutthe world, diamond has not been observed in most ofthem. The odds against finding a diamond-bearingpipe in Antarctica, essentially by blind drilling,would be astronomical. Detecting a valuable mineralin which the ratio is from 15 to 30 million parts ofwaste to 1 part of value, as is the case for diamonds,is exceedingly difficult even in areas where bedrockis accessible. Massive kimberlite may be detected bymagnetic means.

World Resources

Diamonds that are unsuitable as gem stones areused for industrial purposes, such as cutting, grind-ing, and drilling, and are considered strategic andcritical materials for the National Defense Stockpile.The inventory of industrial stones is currently inexcess of the stockpile goal.

World mine production of gem and industrialdiamonds was approximately 86 million carats in1988. The major producing countries are Australia,Botswana, Zaire, South Africa, and the SovietUnion. The world reserve base of industrial dia-monds is 1.9 billion carats. World gem diamondreserves are estimated to be about 300 million carats,including near-gem grade, and the reserve base issubstantially larger but difficult to estimate becauseof changing economic evaluations. Most of thereserves are in southern Africa, the Soviet Union(Siberia), and western Australia. The reserve base toproduction ratio for industrial diamonds is 35 andthe ratio is either comparable or lower for gemdiamonds. If good gem quality diamonds werediscovered in Antarctica, they would likely find aworld market. Although, as stated above, theodds of discovering such a deposit are small.

Chapter 5

The Antarctic Environment andPotential Impacts From Oiland Minerals Development—. —

. . . . . ..A -

---- I


Mt. Erebus, killer whales, penguins

CONTENTSPage

SUMMARY ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Environmental Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Biological Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Ongoing Research Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

POTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM MAN’S ACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTICA . . . . . . . . . . 135Prospecting Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136Oil Exploration and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136Probability of Oil Spills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137Potential Impacts From Oil Spills in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138Oil Spill Cleanup Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139Mineral Exploration and Mining Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141Dredging With Open-Water Disposal of the Dredged Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142Development of Support Facilities and Transportation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

IMPACTS FROM MAN’S PAST ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Scientific Research Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144Harvesting of Fish, Seals, and Whales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146Avoiding Sensitive Areas and Rehabilitating Impacted Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

REG1ONAL AND GLOBAL IMPACTS FROM ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENT . . . 148Research Required to Better Predict Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

BoxesBox Page5-A. An Oil Spill Off the Antarctic Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1385-B. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1405-C. Oil Spilled in the Marine Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

FiguresFigure Page5-1. The Comparative Size of Antarctica and the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275-2. Extent of Pack Ice Around Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1285-3. The Antarctic Marine Ecosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1315-4. Krill Distribution Around Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1325-5. Distribution of Seals Around Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1345-6. Research Stations on Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1455-7. Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest on Antarctica . . . 150

TablesTable Page5-1. NSF-Supported Scientific Research in Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1365-2. Oil Spill Probabilities for the Navarin Basin, Bering Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1415-3. Presence of Scientists and Tourists on Antarctica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1475-4. Worldwide Populations of Whales Commonly Found in the Southern Ocean . . +. . 1485-5. Basic Research Required to Evaluate Possible Environmental Impacts Prior to

Resource Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Chapter 5

The Antarctic Environment and Potential ImpactsFrom Oil and Minerals Development

SUMMARYAny serious consideration of mineral develop-

ment in Antarctica requires abetter understanding oflikely ecosystem impacts. Primitive terrestrial floraand fauna sparsely populate Antarctica’s ice-freecoastal areas. The waters surrounding the continentare nutrient-rich and contain an abundance ofplankton, benthic organisms, fish, squid, seals,whales, and sea birds. The ice cap, which covers 98percent of Antarctica, has virtually no life forms.

Of the potential impacts from development activi-ties that might occur in Antarctica, oil spills fromtanker accidents or blowouts would probably pro-duce the most significant short- and long-termenvironmental impacts. Due to the extremely coldtemperatures found around Antarctica, the totalrecovery of coastal areas impacted by oil spillswould probably require several decades, or perhapslonger. Far offshore, spills would tend to break upnaturally and disperse, causing much less damagethan coastal spills.

Mining operations and land-based activities re-quired to support onshore and offshore developmentwould permanently destroy or significantly impactlocal terrestrial flora and microfauna. Ice-free coas-tal areas would probably be most prone to impacts,both because of their relatively easy accessibilityand because they would be the only practicallocations for most facilities. It would probably not bepossible or practical to restore most areas impactedby minerals activities to their original condition, sofuture human activities will need to be planned tominimize impacts from the beginning. Local terres-trial impacts are not expected to have a significantregional effect on the marine ecosystem. Of someconcern, however, is the potential of onshore activi-ties to compete with wildlife and research bases forscarce ice-free sites.

Prospecting prior to resource exploration anddevelopment would generally produce environ-mental impacts similar to those caused by onshore,offshore, or airborne scientific research. Thus, im-pacts are expected to be insignificant.

Despite continuing research, there are still signifi-cant uncertainties about the environment of Antarc-tica. For example, baseline data on the marineecosystem are still incomplete. Environmental re-search required before and during offshore petro-leum development could amount to several hundredmillion dollars.

To date, the most significant environmental im-pacts to the terrestrial and nearshore marine environ-ments have occurred near the few dozen year-roundscientific research bases in Antarctica. These im-pacts, generally involving small, accidental releasesof fuel and other chemicals and the disposal ofwastes are considered by many to be insignificant. Anotable exception is the oil spill from the 1989sinking of the Bahia Paraiso off the AntarcticPeninsula, an incident which will provide insightinto the environmental impacts of future spills.

INTRODUCTIONThe continent of Antarctica, which covers an area

almost 1.5 times the size of the United States, is avast, largely untouched frozen wilderness domin-ated by majestic views and bleak, but beautifullandscapes. In fact, about 90 percent of the world’sice is locked up in Antarctica’s mile-thick ice sheet.Although the mineral resource potential of Antarc-tica has been a subject of much speculation over theyears, exploration and development has only re-cently been seriously considered.

As indicated in chapter 3, the Antarctic MineralsConvention provides many general standards andprocedures that are designed to ensure that anyfuture minerals development would occur in anenvironmentally sound manner. For example, nomineral exploration or development is allowedwithout adequate information about possible envi-ronmental impacts that such activities might gener-ate. Opening an area for exploration and develop-ment by the Commission requires the consensus ofall voting parties. Technical advice about decisionsis provided by a Scientific, Technical, and Environ-mental Advisory Committee.

-125-


Protecting Antarctica’s environment may con-flict with issues of sovereignty, politics, logisticalconvenience, financial considerations, and the facilita-tion of scientific research.1 Environmental groupsare, therefore, concerned about the scope of proce-dural and informational requirements for reviewingproposed projects and regulating development ac-tivities, especially in light of potentially largefinancial and political incentives associated withminerals development.234 Liability for environ-mental impacts from serious accidents is also anissue. The detailed procedures for addressing theseissues will be worked out only after the Conventionhas been ratified.

If minerals development proceeds within theframework of the Minerals Convention, futuredebates will likely focus not on decisionmakingprocedures, but on the definitions of the Conven-tion’s many qualitative terms such as “adequate,’“effective,” “ acceptable,” “significant,” “safe,”etc. These terms can only be defined within theframework of scientific knowledge and uncertaintiesabout Antarctica’s environment. Therefore, thischapter provides general background material on themarine and terrestrial ecosystems of Antarctica andevaluates what is known about potential impactsfrom minerals activities.

EnvironmetilSe#”n#67 8

Antarctica covers almost 10 percent of the Earth’sland surface, or about 5.4 million square miles (14million km2). (See figure 5-1.) Most of the continentis buried beneath an ice cap that depresses theunderlying land mass and averages about 6,000 feet(2 km) thick. Fed by falling snow, the ice slowlymigrates north at rates that vary from about 10 feet

(3 m) to a few thousand feet (1,000 m) per year. Thesurface of most of the icecap lies between 6,500 feet(2,000 m) and 13,000 feet (4,000 m) above sea level,making the mean elevation of Antarctica three timeshigher than other continents. The depth of thecontinental shelf ranges from about 1,200 feet (400m) to 2,600 feet (800 m), much greater than theglobal mean.

Of the seven continents, Antarctica is the leasthospitable to human activities. Summer tempera-tures average about O ‘C (+32 ‘F) along the coast and-30 “C (-22 “F) in the interior winter temperaturesaverage about -20 “C (-4 ‘F) along the coast and-65 “C (-85 “F) in the interior. The most moderateclimate is found on the Antarctic Peninsula whereaverage temperatures generally range from aboutO “C (32 “F) to -15 “C (-5 “F). During the wintermonths (i.e., mid-June to mid-September) the Sunnever rises over the continent’s interior and much ofits coastal areas. During the summer months (i.e.,mid-December to mid-March) it remains up all day.Days and nights are of more equal length during thespring and fall.

Antarctica’s interior is essentially a frozen desert.Snowfall is about 10 inches (25 cm) per year.Coastal areas annually receive about 80 to 300inches (200 to 800 cm) of snow. Coastal areas alsotend to be cloudy, but rarely foggy. Blizzards andhurricane force winds with velocities of over 100miles per hour (50 m/see) occur frequently along thecoast of Antarctica. In fact, the Southern Oceanbetween 40° S. latitude and the Antarctic Circle (i.e.,66° S. latitude), commonly referred to as the‘‘roaring forties, ’ has the strongest sustained winds

IF.M. Auburn, Anfa7ctjc LUW andpoljtics (Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 274-277.2J.1 ~cy (~.), 1‘Fu~e s~~e~= for ~ AntMctic Minerals Resource Regime.-Can the Environment Be htccted?’ T~ Ntw Natio~km

and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Polhuwn and the Exploitation of Antarctica (Totowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun Publishers,1982), pp. 216-217.

SL$A. Kimbd], ‘ ‘me ~~ctic Minerals Convention, ’ ‘ Special Report, World Resources Institute, July 1988, p. 36.4L+A+ ~m~l, 1‘~vir~en~ ISSUC,S in the &tarctic Minerals Negotiations, ’ L.M. Alexander and L.C. Hanson (eds.), Antarctic Pofirics and

Marine Resources Critical Choicesfor tk 1980s (Kingston, RI: Center for Ocean Management Studies, 1985), pp. 204-214.5&m~ ~wlliWnce Agency, N~~ Foreign ~ssments Center, Po/ar Regio~ /lr/~, GC 78-10040, my 1978, pp. 35-39.

6D.H. Elllot, 1‘A Fr~e~o~ fm ~~ss~g fivlronmcnt~ ~p~ts of possible Antarctic hfi~r~ Development, ’ The hlstitute Of POhM Stll&CS, me

Ohio State University, January 1977, Part 1, NTIS PB-262 750, pp. vii, xvi, 11-10, V-15.

7R.H. Rutford, “Reports of the SCAR Group of Specialists on Antarctic Environmental Implications of Possible Mineral Exploration andExploitation (AEIMEE), ” Scientific Canmittee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions, 1986, pp. 18-19.

8J.H. zm~ge (cd.), “Possible Env ironmental Effects of Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in Antarctica, ’ Scientific Committee on AntarcticaResearch, March 1979, pp. 17, 18,59,

Chapter S--The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 127

Figure 5-1-The Comparative Size of Antarctica and the United States

8

\

SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey, 19S9

found anywhere on Earth. High winds and large grows a maximum of 900 miles out from thewaves make navigation in this part of the world continent during the winter and covers about 8especially dangerous. million square miles (20 million km2), an area larger

than the continent itself. Since about 85 percent ofAs shown in figure 5-2, the icepack around the sea ice melts during the summer, the new ice

Antarctica (excluding the permanent ice shelves) formed during the winter has a relatively uniform


thickness of about 3 to 6 feet (1 to 2 m). In the March minimum, the sea ice covers about 1 millionsummer, the icepack breaks up as it melts and is square miles (2.5 million km2) of the Southerndispersed northward by strong winds that can move Ocean. Due to wide temperature ranges, sea icebroken ice up to 40 miles (65 km) per day. At its coverage varies substantially from year to year.

—

Chapter 5--The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development • 129

Photo credit: Earth Observation Satellite Company

The iceberg B-9 with a number of smaller tabular bergs.The Ross Ice Shelf is to the right. B-9 is about twice the size

of Rhode Island.

Huge tabular icebergs break off the Ross,Ronne, and other floating ice shelves and driftaround Antarctica at speeds of up to 10 mph. At anyone time a dozen such icebergs exceeding 15 miles(25 km) in length may be floating around thecontinent. Some have dimensions of more than 60miles (100 km) by 35 miles (60 km). Tabularicebergs can rise some 250 feet (75 m) above the seasurface, and extend to water depths of up to 1,500feet (450 m). Movement of grounded icebergs canproduce gouges on the seafloor measuring 100 feet(30 m) wide, up to 15 feet (5 m) deep, and 2 miles (3

km) long. Small icebergs that break off the manyglaciers at the edge of Antarctica are also foundalong the coast of Antarctica throughout the year.

Biological Communities

The biological environment of Antarctica iscomposed of two distinct and very different ecosys-tems: a terrestrial ecosystem (including freshwaterlakes and streams) and a marine ecosystem. Land-based plants and microorganisms are distributedprimarily along ice-free coastal regions of Antarc-tica in discontinuous patches characterized by typi-cally low population densities. Marine organisms,on the other hand, are widely distributed aroundAntarctica, often in patches with high populationdensities. Some marine mammals, such as seals andsea birds, spend some time both on land and at sea.Sea birds also supply land-based plants with vitalnutrients, 9 but terrestrial organisms provide nonutrients for marine flora or food for marine fauna.

Due to higher population densities, greater com-plexity, and greater continuity, the marine ecosys-tem of Antarctica is probably somewhat moreresilient to impacts than is the land-based ecosys-tem.10 The impacts of man’s harvesting activities onfish, seals, and whales from the Southern Ocean arediscussed in a later section of this chapter.

The Terrestrial Ecosystem

A total of about 200 mostly microscopic speciesof terrestrial fauna permanently inhabit the conti-nent. These species include protozoans, rotifers(i.e., microscopic multicelled aquatic invertebrates),nematodes (i.e., round worms), tardigrades (i.e.,microscopic arthropods with four pairs of legs thatusually live in water or in damp moss), insects, andmites; there are no land-based vertebrates. Withseveral hundred different kinds of lichen andmosses, plant species outnumber animal species byabout 4 to 1. Some grasses are found on the

9M.w. Holdgate and J. Tinker, “Oil and Other Minerals in the Antarctic: ‘Ile Environmental Implications of Poss]ble Mineral Exploration orExplomttion in Antartmca, ” results of a Rockefeller Foundation workshop held in Bellagio, Italy, March 1979, p. 20.

l~u~ord, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 24.~~E]]io~ op. cit., footnote 6, pp. ix, U-3 ~ 5.

lzzw~rr, op. cit., fcotnote 8, pp. 434$.

1 J&nU~ In~lligence Agency, op. cit., fOOtnote 5, p, 5~.

14 J.H. W. Hain, “A Reader’s Guide to the Antarctic, ’ Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 34.


Antarctic Peninsula, but there are no trees, shrubs, orvines. Poorly developed soils also contain bacteria,algae, yeast, and other fungi.11 121314

The majority of land-based and freshwater organ-isms of Antarctica are found on or near its ice-freecoastal areas, which cover a combined area about thesize of Colorado. Antarctica’s coastline is aboutthree times longer than that of the United States, butthere is probably less ice-free shoreline during thesummer than exists between Boston and Washing-ton.15 Potential resource development raises con-cerns about competition between developmentactivities and wildlife for ice-free terrestrialenvironments. Avery few terrestrial species are alsofound in ice-free areas of the Transantarctic Moun-tains.

The Marine Ecosystem16

The nutrient rich and highly productive waterssurrounding Antarctica are characterized by anabundance of phytoplankton, zooplankton, fish,squid, benthic (i.e., bottom-dwelling) organisms,seals, whales, and birds. There are more marine thanterrestrial species, but fewer marine species than aretypically found in most temperate or tropical marineenvironments. A simplified diagram of the Antarcticmarine ecosystem is shown in figure 5-3.

The base of the marine food chain is supported byabout 100 species of phytoplankton-mostly diatoms--and zooplankton. But the marine ecosystem in areasof the ocean covered by seasonal ice is dominated byAntarctic krill, a small shrimp-like crustacean. Asshown in figure 5-4, patchy swarms of krill provide

the principal source of food for many Antarcticvertebrates, including whales, seals, fish, squid,penguins, and other sea birds.17

Although small amounts of krill have beenharvested from Antarctic waters for human con-sumption since 1973, the long-term potential of krillas a food and/or protein source for man is not clear.More than 20 species of squid also provide animportant component of the diet of seals, sea birds,and sperm whales in the open ocean.18 Benthicorganisms, such as sponges, starfish, and clams arevery common in shallow, nearshore waters. 19

Of the approximately 20,000 species of finfishfound worldwide, about 100 species inhabit theSouthern Ocean around Antarctica; most of thesespecies are found only in this area of the world. Withcommercial fisheries from over a half dozen coun-tries, the potential for overfishing has grown signifi-cantly over the last two decades .20

Six species of seals live in Antarctic waters; fourspecies live and breed on the pack ice aroundAntarctica, as shown in figure 5-5. Crabeater seals,with a population of about 15 to 30 million, are themost abundant of these seal species. The southernfur seals are commonly found not only on Antarc-tica, but also on many islands in the Southern Oceannorth of Antarctica.21 22

Seven species of whales are found in Antarcticwaters during the summer. Of these seven species,blue, fin, humpback, sei, and minke whales feedexclusively on the rich supplies of plankton andkrill. Sperm and right whales are found both inAntarctic waters and in other temperate waters of theworld’s oceans.

1 IEllio(, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. ix, 11-3 & 5.

lzzm~rge, op, cit., footnote 8, pp. 43-44.IJCen~~ Intelligence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5* P. 50.

14 J.H.W. Hain, ‘‘A Reader’s Guide to the Antarctic, ’ Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, S ummer 1988, pp. 34.15Holdg~, op. cit., footnote 9, P. 31.

16J.L. Bengtsort, ‘Review of Antarctic Marine Fauna, Selected Papers Presented to the Scientific Committee of the Cornmissionfor the Conservationof Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1982-1984, Part 1, pp. 1-219.

17Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, p. ix.ISR.M. Laws, ‘ ‘The Ecology of the SOuthem Ocean, ’ Arnertcan Scientist, vol. 73, January -Februq 1985, pp. 26-40,lyEHiot, op. cit., footnote 6, P. H-16.mJ,R. ~dm~on and I. Everson, “The Assewment of Explolted Antarctic Fish Stocks, ’ Selected Papers Presented to the Scient$ic Committee of

the coremission for the Conservaoon of Antarcac Marine Llvmg Resources 1982-1984, Part 1, pp. 385-394.ZID,B. Slniff, ‘ ‘Living Resources: StdS, Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 71-74.

%entral Intelligence Agency, op cit,, footnote 5, p. 51.

Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 131

Figure 5-3-The Antarctic Marine Ecosystem

I .H

Crabeater seals 1

1

Sperm whales and killer whales

Seals

Weddell —ElephantLecFur

dRoss

Minke & SeiFin & BlueHumpback

SOURCE: Offkx of Technology A8eownent, 19S9


Figure 54-KriIl Distribution Around Antarctica— ———.—. ! ——

30 ,. 0‘, ,‘\ /.,”’

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~<-JiJ ,J --, s,-,.,-,‘“% T+-&l _ \, l-\T;Y.. ,.-,. -,,,

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0 1000 kllometam Macquaf4e i. ‘,, / /——

, ./’7o Soo t 000 nauticel nrI!4s ,W Cam@ell I .-

;50 /’”/———.———.—

30URCE: U.S. Government, 1978.

About 50 species of sea birds, with a total principally Adelie penguins, comprise close to 90population that may approach 200 million, are found percent of the biomass of all bird populations. Otherat least seasonally around Antarctica. Penguins, Antarctic birds include albatrosses, petrels, shags,

Chapter S---The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 133


Weddell Seal, Hutton Cliffs, Ross Island.

prions, shearwaters, skuas, gulls, fulmars, and terns.Krill account for almost 80 percent of bird diets. Allpenguins and many other sea birds are dependent onpack ice and exposed, ice-free shorelines for breed-ing. 2324

Ongoing Research Activities

Scientific research has long been the most impor-tant activity occurring in Antarctica. In fact, researchis the primary means by which countries maintain apresence in Antarctica for political purposes. Cur-rently, there are about four dozen year-round scien-tific research bases in Antarctica, plus many othertemporarys ummer camps.25Most research bases arelocated in coastal regions; only three permanentbases---one United States, one Japanese, and one

Soviet—are located in inland areas. The UnitedStates base at McMurdo Sound is the continent’slargest scientific base and logistical facility with 150buildings, plus 200 year-round and up to 1,300summertime personnel.

The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research(SCAR) was formally established in 1958 by theinternational scientific community following the1957-58 International Geophysical Year. Althoughnot a formal part of the Antarctic Treaty system,SCAR initiates, promotes, coordinates, and reviewsongoing scientific activity in Antarctica. The 18 fullmembers and 7 associate members of SCAR meetevery other year to discuss ongoing research and

~Laws, op. cit., foomote 18, PP. 2W.mzmbr~, ~. cit., foomotc & P. 22.

~The nuder of research stations varies somewhat from year to year. Eight of these research stations are located north of 60” S.


/

South

120’

I

/

I n d i a nO c e a n

SOURCE: U.S. Qove-nment, 1978.

other issues related to waste disposal, environmental consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty toimpacts, and the exploitation of Antarctic living and provide advice on scientific, technical, and environ-mineral resources.26 SCAR is often requested by the mental matters, or to undertake special studies.

~David J, Drcwry, ‘‘The Chalkngc of Antarctic !kienw, ” Oceanu.s, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 5-10.

Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development • 135

Photo credit: Steve Zimmer

Lone skua over open water near McMurdo.

Through the Division of Polar Programs, theUnited States’ National Science Foundation (NSF)annually supports about 75 research projects inAntarctica involving about 330 scientists and techni-cal staff. (See table 5-1.) These projects cost about$15 million per year. An additional $20 million ofNSF funding goes toward direct support of scientificresearch (e.g., ship and aircraft time). Another $90million of NSF funding and about 1,200 peopleprovide operational and logistical support for UnitedStates research activities. 27 Although there is littlecomprehensive data on other nation’s researchbudgets, a few Antarctic experts estimated that theUnited States probably supports about 20 to 30percent of all research on Antarctica.

The United States, through its National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration, supports another$2 million of fisheries research in the SouthernOcean each year. This is at most about 10 percent ofthe total international budget for this type offisheries research.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM MAN’SACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTICA

Future minerals exploration and development inAntarctica, if it occurs, would most likely involveexploring for and recovery of oil from offshoredeposits, and/or the mining of minerals from ice-freecoastal regions. Such activities would unavoidablygenerate some significant local environmental im-pacts (i.e., within a few square miles), and perhapssome minor regional impacts (i.e., extending overtens of square miles). Ice-free coastal areas, andbenthic nearshore areas are the habitats mostlikely to be significantly impacted by onshore oroffshore resource development and any supportactivities. 28

The impacts of resource development activitieson the Antarctic environment could be either moreor less severe than these activities would generate inother parts of the world. Impacts from developmentactivities are naturally site-specific, and should beevaluated on a case-by-case basis relative to thepotential benefits from the proposed developmentactivities. Monitoring of ongoing development ac-tivities is essential. Impacts from Antarctic develop-ment would be easier to detect due to the relativelypristine nature of the surrounding environment;however, it will be difficult and expensive toimplement effective monitoring programs becauseof Antarctica’s remoteness and adverse workingconditions. Cumulative impacts are very difficult toaccurately predict.

The impacts that could be expected from differenttypes of activities in Antarctica are discussed below,based on information from similar activities in otherparts of the world. These activities include: pros-pecting, oil exploration and development, land-based minerals exploration and development, anddredging with open-water disposal of the dredgedmaterial. All of these activities would requiresupport facilities and transportation systems. Theseare addressed in a separate section. This discussionis followed by additional material on: impacts fromman’s past activities in Antarctica, the potential forrehabilitating locally impacted areas, regional and

mNationaI Saence Foundar.mn, ‘ ‘The Role of the National Science Foundation in Polw Reg]ons: A Report to the Nauonal Science Board, ’NSB-87-128, June 1987, pp. 45-48.

~Rutfod, Op. CIL, fOO~E 7, pp. 24,35.


Table 5-1-NSF-Supported Scientific Research in Antarctica

Percentage ofUnited States

Research categories: typical research areas research

Meteorology/climate: atmospheric processes and chemistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Oceanography: ooean circulation and ice/sea/air interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Earth sciences: tectonics, paleoclimates, and geophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Glaciology: ice sheet dynamics and sea ice/iceberg formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17A8tronomy/upper atmosphere: aurora and magnetic field dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Biology/ecology: biological processes and ecosystem dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Medicine/health: human physiology and immune system disorders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Engineering: facility and transportation system construction,

waste disposal, and oil spill cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . 1

SOURCE: NSF, “The Role of the National Ekxenm Foundation in Polar Regions: A Report to the National ScienoeBoard,” NSB-S7-12S, June 19S7, p. 57; figures for annual funding from NSF.

global impacts from Antarctic development, andresearch required to better predict environmentalimpacts.

Prospecting Activities29

Prospecting for mineral resources is conductedprior to commercial exploration and developmentusing onshore, offshore, and airborne techniquessimilar to those used for basic research. A prospect-ing party might consist of several geologists andtechnicians and several dozen additional supportstaff. 30 Like scientific research, prospecting activi-ties would generally occur during the summermonths. Although some geophysical research re-sembling prospecting has been conducted in Antarc-tica, there has been no prospecting, at least as it isdefined by the Antarctic Minerals Convention.Chapter 3 explains the Convention’s definition ofand provisions for prospecting.

Prospecting for offshore petroleum might in-clude the collection of sediment cores and other dataon seabed conditions in offshore areas; seismicreflection profiling; bathymetric, magnetic, andgravimetric surveys; and the mapping of geologicformations. Prospecting for land-based mineralsmight include the collection of rock samples from

surface outcrops; magnetic, gravimetric, and elec-trical conductivity surveys; mapping of geologicformations; collection and interpretation of aerialphotographs; and surface drilling with portable rigs,As defined by the Minerals Convention, prospectingactivities would not include dredging, excavation,and drilling into rock or sediment to depths greaterthan 82 feet (25 m).

Since prospector often use the same techniquesused by geologists and geophysicists for basicresearch, it will be very difficult to distinguishbetween scientific research and prospecting activi-ties. In addition, the impacts to Antarctica’s terres-trial and marine environments from the vast majorityof prospecting activities will be very similar, exceptperhaps in scale, to those generated by ongoingland-based and offshore geologic research.31 Inmost cases, the impacts generated by prospectingwould be insignificant relative to the impactsfrom full-scale development activities.32

Oil Exploration and Development

The development of offshore oil deposits inAntarctica, if allowed, would produce numerousenvironmental impacts. The sea floor will be signifi-cantly, but locally disrupted by the drilling of wells

zg~id., pp. 14,43-58, 63.s~l]lot, op. cit., fm~ 6* P. IV-2.

31~id., pp. XV, W1-8.

321+oidgatc, op. cit., fOOtIIOte 9, p. 24.33u,s, ~ww ~lw of ~~oloW &~mt, Oi/ ~ G~ Techrwfogies for the Arctic and Deepwater, OTA-O-270 (Washington, ~: U.S.

Government Printing Office, May 1985), pp. 163-201,

Chapter S-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 137

and the laying of pipelines. Some benthic marineorganisms will be smothered by discharges ofdrilling muds.34 The construction of land-basedsupport facilities will generate impacts in coastalareas. However, the accidental spillage of oil,especially in coastal waters, would probablyproduce the greatest short- and long-term im-pacts of any resource development activities,especially oil development.35 36 The recent sinkingof the Bahia Paraiso off the Antarctic Peninsula andthe grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska,highlight the significance of impacts associated withoil spills. (See box 5-A, box 5-B, and box 5-C.)

Major oil spills often result from a damagedand/or sinking oil tanker, or from a well blowout.Antarctic tanker spills would, by definition, occur inremote locations, and could involve the rapid releaseof large amounts of oil. Although there are severalmeasures that can be taken to help prevent tankeraccidents (e.g., double-hulled ship construction,weather forecasting, iceberg tracking, and sophisti-cated navigation equipment), even with tight regula-tions, human error can still occur. If shipping isconfined to summer months, any tanker accidentwould occur when the resident seals and penguinsand other birds are clustering and breeding alongAntarctica’s coast.

A blowout is a sudden, uncontrolled escape ofhydrocarbons from an exploratory or productionwell. Oil discharge rates will probably be slower forleaking wells than for tankers, but releases fromwells may continue for longer periods of time,especially if the well cannot be quickly controlled.Blowouts that occur on the sea floor in water depthsof a few thousand feet or beneath ice-covered seaswould be extremely difficult to control, especiallyduring the winter months, Oil produced during thewinter months in Antarctica may need to be stored

for transport during the summer. If so, theseland-based or offshore storage facilities could be anadditional source of oil spills.

The following discussion briefly addresses thelikelihood of oil spills, their potential impacts on themarine environment, and the effectiveness of differ-ent technologies for dispersing oil spills and/orcleaning them up.

Probability of Oil Spills37

It is possible to project scenarios for explorationand development of offshore oil deposits in Antarc-tica, as shown in appendix A. The likelihood of oilspills from future oil development has been esti-mated for the relatively shallow water (450 feet) ofthe Bering Sea, based on current production activi-ties in the Gulf of Mexico. These figures, which aresummarized in table 5-2, suggest that for eachbillion barrels of oil produced, four spills of 1,000 to10,000 barrels in size, and two spills larger than10,000 barrels can be expected. The probabilities ofspills from oil development off Antarctica wouldlikely be higher due to 1) water depths of a fewthousand feet, 2) ice islands and numerous largeicebergs that could threaten sea surface and seabedoperations, and 3) extreme working and navigationconditions.

Perhaps the most likely oil spills around Antarc-tica may result from accidents involving shipsresupplying bases or used for tourism. In the last 4years four ships have sunk in Antarctica: one supplyship, one tourist ship, one tourist/supply ship, andone research vessel. Only the Bahia Paraiso, atourist/supply ship that ran aground off the AntarcticPeninsula in January 1989, spilled a considerableamount of fuel oil. (See box 5-A).

Mm= have ~n ~ver~ s~~cs of & ~~nti~ lrnp~ts ~ &ctic marine environment producd by tk discharge of filling muds contaminatedwith heavy metals and other potentially toxic substances. These studies indicate that major impacts on the marine cnvuonmcnt are unlikely, except inrestricted areas such as shallow coastal waters or protected bays (Rutford, op. cit., focxnote 7, p. 17; Elliot, op. cit., foomote 6, p. VI14).

35 RUtford, op. cit., fOOmO~ 7! P. 8.

~Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. XVI, VII-26.

371J,S. tigress, op. cit., footnote 33, pp 185-186.


1

Box 5-A—An Oil Spill Off the Antarctic PeninsulaOn January 28, 1989, the Bahia Paraiso, a 435-foot, double-hulled transport/tourist ship operated by the

Argentine navy, ran aground in clear weather off the northern tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, The 81 tourists andcrew of 235 safely abandoned the ship before it rolled over on its side 4 days later in 50 feet of water. It had a 30-footgash in its side.

About 250,000 gallons of diesel fuel were stored on board, in bulk and in 55-gallon drums; about 170,000gallons of fuel were lost. Within a few days after the accident a 15-mile-long slick covered an area of about 10 squaremiles and had reached the beaches and rookeries surrounding the United States’ Palmer Station research center,killing krill and oiling seals, penguins, cormorants, skuas, and giant petrels, The entire brood of skua chicks in thePalmer area was lost.

The NSF responded within 36 hours by sending 52 tons of U.S. Navy cleanup equipment along with 15 oilspill experts from the United States, Argentina, and Chile. NSF has spent about $2.5 million to date on its responseefforts. Removing the fuel remaining on board will cost about $3 to $5 million, Another $50 to $60 million mightbe required to remove the ship and to sink it in the open ocean,

The accident highlights the following points:. Antarctica’s environment is vulnerable to accidental oil spills, even without petroleum development.● Most countries conducting research in Antarctica are ill-prepared to deal with oil spills. Even if cleanup

equipment is available, much valuable response time can be lost shipping the equipment to the spill site.. The impacts associated with a spill of crude oil will likely be longer lasting than the impacts from the Bahia

Paraiso spill due to the greater abundance in crude oil of organic compounds with low volatility.. Since the early 1960s, NSF has spent about $80 million on the Palmer Station and its biological research.

This research will provide excellent baseline data for evaluating the effects of the spill, but many ongoingprojects at Palmer and other U.S. stations have been significantly impacted.

● Studies of the fate and effects of the Bahia Paraiso spill will help scientists predict likely impacts from largeroil spills in Antarctica, should oil exploitation occur in the future.

. Appropriate response action and liability for accidents-dealt with in articles 4 and 8 of the MineralsConvention, respectively-are essential elements of arty plan for future resource development.

SOURCE: Informtati on gticd from vsrious sources, including the Nntionsl Sciemx FoundAti~ April 1989 newslet- from The Antasctican SOciq; NewScwnsf, Feb. 11, 1989, p. 31; and B. Renskgcr, Washington Posf, Jan. 31, 1989, Feb. 1, 1989, Feb. 3, 1989, and Feb. 4, 1989.

Potential Impacts From Oil Spills in and onto coastal beaches and rookeries. Organisms(e.g., plankton, birds, and fur seals) that come intodirect contact with floating oil would likely be

Although a major oil spill in Antarctica wouldlikely be a rare event, the impacts from such a coated and killed. Benthic organisms would also be

spill would probably be damaging and long- smothered by sinking oil.

lasting. Marine organisms in Antarctica wouldexperience the greatest short-term impacts from oil Many organisms living in the water columnspills, especially if they drifted into nearshore areas would suffer lethal or sublethal impacts by directly

3Szu~@, ~. cit., footnote 8, pp. 17,22, 26.32136138

WRutiord, ~. cit., footnote 7, pp. 22, 35.36.

@Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. xiv xv, VU-l, 5,6,28, IX-2, 3.

41J.H. Zumbergc, “Potcndat Mineral Resource Availability and Possible Environment Problems in Antarctica, ” J.I. CharnCy (cd.), The NewNahonali.rtn and tk Use of Common Spaces: [ssues ifl Marine Pollutwn and Exploitatwn of Antarctica (1’btowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, OsmunPublishers, 1982), pp. 143-144.

42u.s. Depment of State, ‘‘Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Negotiation of an International Regime for Antarctic Mineral Resources,’August 1982, pp. 6-18 to 6-26.


Photo credit: Ted DeLaca, National Science Foundation

The Bahia Paraiso.

ingesting oil or eating oil-contaminated organ-isms.43 However, there seems to be very littleevidence of increased accumulation of oil in higherlevels of the food chain.44 Marine organisms and seabirds are numerous enough and widely enoughdispersed around Antarctica that mortalities from asmall spill would probably not permanently impactoverall populations of marine organisms. Manysmall spills or a few large spills, however, couldhave significant and long-lasting adverse impacts.

Long-term impacts on marine organisms from oilspills in Antarctica are not well-understood. It isknown, however, that crude oil takes 20 to 50 timeslonger to degrade at 5 “C (41 oF) than it does at 25oC (77 oF).45 Oil would require art even longer timeto degrade in Antarctica. Many biological processes(e.g., growth, sexual maturation, etc.) affectingindividual organisms and entire populations alsoseem to occur at slower rates in cold environments.

Some scientists have therefore hypothesized that theresponses of the Antarctic marine ecosystem to an

oil spill will be similar in type and magnitude toimpacts from oil spills in other temperate marineenvironments.

Due to the cold temperatures of Antarctica, thesubsequent recovery of impacted areas is likely torequire an extended period of time46-perhapsseveral decades-rather than the several years re-quired for warmer regions.47 Ongoing studies of theshort- and long-term impacts of the recent oil spilloff the Antarctic Peninsula will help to resolve manyof the current uncertainties about the impacts of oilspills from the potential development of petroleumresources.

Oil Spill Cleanup Techniques48

The limited experience with oil spills in theArctic suggests that significant amounts of oilcould not be recovered from a major spill inAntarctica, even with the most up-to-date equip-ment and well-formulated cleanup plans. Theeffectiveness of most cleanup technologies in Ant-arctica would be adversely affected by extremelycold temperatures, significant concentrations ofbroken and unbroken ice,49 long periods of darknessduring the Antarctic winter, and typically high windsand large waves. However, technologies and proce-dures could be improved over the next two or threedecades to address some of these problems.

Three approaches for dealing with oil spills inAntarctica are discussed below. The usefulness ofeach technique depends largely on the nature andlocation of the spill; no single technique is ideallysuited for all situations.

1) Oil Dispersion: Chemical dispersants can beused in some situations to enhance the breakdown ofoil into smaller droplets more easily dispersed bywinds and waves and more readily broken down by

43 S@uds ando~cr marine rnamm~s CarI ingest oil directly or indirectly during ftxciingor when they clean their furor feathers. Although the @eStiOn

of oil may not lead to fatalities, it can produce abnormal behavior which can in turn lead to abnormally tugh mortalities. For example, afler ingestingoil from the rexxnt spill in Antarctica, adult skuas began behaving abnormally and even attacked their own young. Within a week, about 60 percent ofthe skuaa had disappeared from their nesting areas.

44N~~ R~~h Couci], Oj/ in the Sea lnpuu, Fates, and Effects (Washington, DC: National Academy Pres 1985). p. 6.ds~~~ ~~lh=nce Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 28.

W3.A. Robilliard and M. Busdosh, ‘*Need for Real World Assessment of the Environmental Effects of Oil SpillsEnvironments, Proceedings of the Sixth Interrumonal Conference on Port and Ocean Engineering under Arctic Conditiom,vol. 11, pp. 937-944.

qTNsIj~~ R&arch council, op. cit., footnote 44, p. 487..MU,S. con-, op. cit., footnote 33, PP. 188-197.

49Ru~ord, op. cit., fOOtX30~ 7, P. 20.

In Ice-infested MarineQuebec, Canada, 1981,

20-604 0 - 89 - 4 : (JL 3


Box 5-B—The Exxon Valdez Oil SpillOn March 24, 1989 the 987-foot, single-hulled tanker Exxon Valdez struck a reef in clear weather in Prince

William Sound about 25 miles from the oil loading terminal at Valdez, Alaska. Soon, 10 million gallons of oil spilledfrom several 20-foot gashes in the tanker’s bottom, overwhelming efforts at control. The result was the largest oilspill in U.S. history. Driven by heavy seas and 70-mph winds, the slick covered more than 1,000 square miles ofocean and hundreds of miles of beaches.

Despite the existence of several industry and government contingency plans, the Exxon response to the spillwas hampered by an insufficient amount of operating cleanup equipment, by a lack of trained people, by unclearlines of responsibility and authority, and by confusion over appropriate courses of action. Oil booms, skimmers,dispersants, and burning were all tried at various times during the cleanup effort, but with very limited success. Thisdisaster contrasts with the success over the last 12 years of tanker operations between Alaska and the west coastof the United States. During this time more than 8,700 tankers with oil from Valdez had spilled only about 200,000gallons of oil near Valdez and another 2 million gallons along the tanker route. The impacts of the Exxon Valdezspill on the fish and wildlife of Alaska are still being studied, but will undoubtedly involve the loss of thousandsof birds, otters, and other types of wildlife.

This spill highlights the following points related to the potential development of petroleum resources inAntarctica:

. Even under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to clean up significant amounts of oil from large spillsgiven the current state-of-the-art of cleanup technologies; improvements could result from further research.

● Although the chances of accidents can be minimized through the use of advanced technologies (e. g., fornavigation), good planning, worker training, etc., it is difficult to avoid all human error.

. Written plans must clearly designate responsibilities for all parties involved in oil spill cleanup operations.● The Exxon Valdez spill, although linger and more widespread than the Bahia Paraiso spill, will probably

not have as long-lasting effects, since it occurred in warmer waters where recovery rates are faster.SOURCES: E. Marshtt, “W(k: ‘rhO kdiCtCd Oil Spill,” and L. Roberts, ‘‘Long, Slow Recovery Predicted for Alaska, ” Science, vol. 244, Apr. 7, 1989, pp.

X)-M; Tk National Response Tcun, “W tkron W&z 011 Spdl: A Repat to the Congrcs, “ May 1989, p. 37; c. MIXXXl and J. hhh3WS, “spiltRa.iBcs Doubts cm Oil Indusuy,” WmhingIO/I ~OSf, Apr. 2, 1989.

photochemical oxidation, metabolic transformation weather is stormy and the seas are exceptionallywithin organisms, microbial degradation, and othernatural processes.50 Dispersants in current use areless toxic than oil; however, dispersing oil inshallow coastal areas may also cause some harm. Insuch situations, one would have to consider whethereven more harm would occur by not using dispers-ants and allowing the oil to reach shore. Currentlyavailable dispersants are only effective in a limitednumber of situations; they are most effective whenapplied within about 5 hours after a spill occurs. Thecurrent potential for using dispersants in Antarcticais probably not very high due to the cold tempera-tures, the presence of broken ice, high chemicalcosts, and logistical problems involved in rapidlyapplying large volumes of dispersants to sizablespills.

Natural dispersion may be appropriate in the openocean, and perhaps the only alternative, when the

rough and/or when the spill is large or remote. Thelighter components of oil are often eliminated fromthe water by evaporation.

2) In Situ Burning: Burning spilled oil may bethe best method available for oil spill cleanup incertain situations. Cold Antarctic temperatures wouldtend to increase the viscosity of oil and reduce itsability to spread, thereby increasing its amenabilityto burning. At the same time, cold temperaturesmake ignition more difficult. Combustion efficien-cies generally range from 20 to 80 percent byvolume. Greater efficiencies can often be achievedif the oil can be naturally or artificially contained.Burning works best on lighter oil fractions whichtend to evaporate within several days.

One drawback of burning could be the possibleloss of the ship or platform in the process; but the

%Iational Research Council, op. cit., footnote 44, pp. 10-11.

——.—


Box 5-C-Oil Spilled in the MarineEnvironment

Of the approximately 22 million barrels ofpetroleum hydrocarbons entering the marine envi-ronment, about 37 percent comes from industrial,municipal, urban, and river runoff; about 34 percentfrom tanker operations and accidents; about 12percent from other shipping accidents and sources;about 8 percent from natural sources; and about 2percent from offshore petroleum production.

To date, the world’s largest spill occurred in 1978when the Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the coast ofFrance and spilled 68 million gallons of crude oilalong about 250 miles of shoreline. The largestrecent blowout occurred near the Mexican coastduring a 10-month period in 1979-80, dischargingover 125 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulfof Mexico.

so~~: otl IA h Sea. l+uds, Fa&s, and Effects (lhhngton, DC:Naticd t%tiy Press, 1985), pp. 82,561.

Table 5-2-(Oil Spill Probabilities for theNavarin Main, Bering Sea (per billion barrels

of oil produced)

Number of oil spills (by size)

Source of spill (>1 ,000 barrels) (>10,000 barrels)

Platform . . . . . . . . 1.0 0.4Pipelines . . . . . . . . 1.6 0.7Tankers at sea . . . 0.9 0.5Tankers in port . . . 0.4 0.2

Total . . . . . . . . . 3 . 9 1.8

80URCE: Mmarals Management Service, Navarin Basin Leaae Offering.Final Environmental Impact Statement, November 1983.

cost to replace equipment destroyed by fire mayultimately be less than the cost to clean up theenvironment. Burning also produces air pollutionand a bum residue and thus could have negativeimpacts on, for example, birds and seal rookeries

during the summer breeding season. Considering thealternative of letting the oil reach sensitive areas,burning may still be appropriate in some circum-stances.

3) Mechanical Recovery: Over the last twodecades considerable effort has gone into develop-ing surface booms and water jets to limit the spreadof oil spills, and surface craft to mechanically skimand collect oil from floating slicks.51 Such equip-ment, however, has its limitations even under thebest of circumstances. Most currently availableskimmers are incapable of cleaning up large amountsof spilled oil. Historically, skimmers have rarelybeen able to recover more than 10 percent of the oilfrom any large spill. In Antarctica, the performanceof most oil recovery equipment would be adverselyimpacted by high winds, large waves, strong cur-rents, cold temperatures, and ice. Any recovered oilwould also have to be disposed of, possibly bylandfilling or by incineration in air-transportableunits.

Mineral Exploration and MiningA c t i v i t i e s5 2 5 3 5 4 5 5 5 6 5 7

Chapter 4 indicates that the potential for recover-ing hard minerals from Antarctica is for the most partunknown. However, the mining of high-grade min-eral deposits in ice-free areas of the Arctic has beenunderway for the past two decades. (See app. B.) Forexample, COMINCO operates a year-round, lead-zinc mining operation on Canada’s Little CornwallisIsland about 600 miles north of the Arctic Circle.Open pit or underground mining operations of thissort typically involve considerable drilling, blasting,and the generation of rock waste, dust, and noise.Ore processing (e.g., crushing, grinding, and flota-tion) typically requires substantial amounts of en-ergy and water, and generates large volumes of mill

51~ lwgc~t her ~ & ~tic is a &.foot S]rtgle-purpose, catamaran that use-s continuously movtig, ~so~nt$ polypropylene rope to SOP uPoil; under actual operating conditions recovery rates could range from about 5 barrels (e.g., about 150 gallons) to about 30 barrels (i.e., almost 1,000galhs) per hour.

52M. me, $ ‘ A - m e r i t o f Mintig ad ~~ ‘Rd.noiogy for Antarctic Mineral Development-Volume I,” OTA contract report, January 1988,p. 114.

53Ru~ofi, op. cit., footnote 7, pp. 33, 58, 45, 46.%EUi~L ~p. ~it., ftio~ 6, pp. xiii, xv-xvi, [v-7, 12, ]7, 18, V-1 to 19, VII- I to 4, 8,9.11 to 16, IX-~* 2

55zmk&, ~. cit., foomote 8, pp. 23-25, 36! 44~5

%%mberge, op. cit., foomote 41, pp. 143-144.STU.S. mp~cnt of State, op. cit., footnote 42, PP. 6-11 to 6-18.


tailings and other wastes. Any ores mined inAntarctica would probably be shipped off-site forsmelting.

Impacts on terrestrial flora and microfauna in theimmediate vicinity of these mining and ore process-ing activities should probably be considered perma-nent total natural recovery of adjacent areas wouldrequire many decades to a few centuries. Thephysical disturbance (e.g., modification of terrain,destruction of soil and wet permafrost) and/orchemical pollution (e.g., accidental spills of fuel oiland other chemicals, etc.) from mining, ore process-ing, and associated construction activities in Antarc-tica will likely impact soils, ice-rich permafrost, andthe terrestrial ecosystem (e.g., mosses and lichens)in the vicinity of mining operations. However,mining operations are unlikely to occur on a largeenough scale to pose a significant threat to theoverall terrestrial ecosystem of Antarctica.

The most significant potential impacts frommining operations in Antarctica would probablybe associated with the disposal of mill tailingsfrom ore processing and any subsequent leachingof heavy metals from such tailings.58 Mill tailingscould conceivably be disposed in the ocean, ininland lakes, in abandoned parts of the mine, inspecially designed dammed or diked containmentareas in ice-free regions, or perhaps on the ice. Landdisposal of tailings and the subsequent treatment ofany discharged water to meet stringent environ-mental standards is technically feasible, but oftenquite expensive.

The potential for mining Antarctic mineraldeposits raises concerns about competition be-tween mining activities scientific research, tour-ism, and wildlife for ice-free terrestrial environ-ments. Seals and sea birds using the coastal environ-ments surrounding Antarctica would be disturbed by

noise from mining and associated kind-based devel-opment activities located near breeding grounds,congregating areas, or migratory corridors. Marineorganisms would also be adversely impacted byaccidental spills of chemicals and oil. Any areas ofthe marine ecosystem that might be locally impactedby mining activities would probably recover natu-rally; total recovery, however, could require severaldecades.

Scientists have speculated that the production andsettling of dust from large-scale mining and con-struction activities in Antarctica could decrease thehighly reflective character of its snow-coveredareas.59 However, volcanic ash that has been widelydispersed over large areas of Antarctica by pasteruptions apparently had no such effect. Instead,these layers are apparently quickly buried by subse-quent snowfalls.60

Dredging With Open-Water Disposal of theDredged Material616263

The construction of docking facilities alongAntarctica’s coast may require the dredging ofnearshore areas and the subsequent disposal of thedredged material, presumably in open-water areas.Some dredging may also be required to burypipelines from underwater wellheads, or perhaps tomine offshore placer deposits.@ It is also conceiv-able that mill tailings from land-based miningoperations could be disposed in nearshore marineenvironments, thereby generating impacts similar tothose produced when dredged material is disposed inopen-water environments.

Turbid plumes of fine-grained suspended materialare usually found within a few hundred to severalhundred feet of most dredging and open-waterdisposal operations. Such turbidity will decreasephytoplankton photosynthesis and may adversely

SSM. b, op. cit., footnote 52, p. 114.59’ ‘~~’ * is & fiwtion of ~c~g Il@t or r~~on mat is refl~(~, Snow<oveti areas have a high al~o; dark surfaces that absorb in~ming

radiation have low albedos.

%hnberge, op. cit., foomote 41, pp. 134-136.61U.S, ConWss, ~tu of ~~olW ~Wssment, w~tes in Marim Enviro~n~, OTA-()-334 (Washin@on, DC: U.S. Government printing

Office, Apd 1987), pp. 243-246.&US. Cm=s, ~fi= of ~~ology As=ssment, Mari~ Minerals: E~~ring our New Ocean Frontier, OTA-342 (Washington, ~: U.S.

Governm ent printing Ofiice, July 1987), pp. 215-223, 233-236.@Elliot, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. VLI~, 5, 13, ~4.64pl_ WC de~si~ of m~w~l~er di~r~ or ]oc~]y concen~at~ in ]en~s--fo~d wi(.hin unconsolidated sands ~d gravels.

Chapter 5---The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development ● 143

affect growth and reproduction of some pelagicorganisms. However, field studies of dredging anddisposal operations around the United States indi-cate few detectable physical impacts from watercolumn turbidity; any chemical releases (i.e., man-ganese, iron, ammonia, and phosphorus) are rapidlydiluted. Turbidity plumes typically dissipate withinseveral hours after dredging and/or disposal opera-tions cease.

Benthic organisms in dredged areas around Ant-arctica will likely be destroyed by most types ofdredging equipment. In addition, at open-waterdisposal sites, most benthic organisms that arecovered by more than a foot or so of dredgedmaterial will be suffocated. At disposal sites in a fewtens of feet of water, such accumulations of dredgedmaterial are usually resticted to bottom areas withinseveral hundred feet of the point from which thedredged material is discharged into the water col-umn. In deeper water, the bottom area covered bydredged material will increase, but the thickness ofaccumulating material will decrease.

Recolonization of dredging and disposal sites bybenthic organisms in temperate marine environ-ments usually begins within a period of weeks aftercessation of the disposal operation; extensive re-colonization can take from several months to a fewyears in temperate climates. However, recoloniza-tion of Antarctic benthic environments may requireconsiderably more time due to the colder tempera-tures. 65

Development ofSuppotiFacil&”e@667 andTransportation Systems68

The development of support facilities and trans-portation systems would lead to the destruction ormodification of Antarctic flora and fauna on a localscale, similar to those described in the previoussection on mining activities. These types of activi-ties will also compete with wildlife for ice-freeterrestrial environments.

Oil and/or minerals development in Antarcticawould involve constructing living quarters, oil

storage tanks, mineral processing units, powergenerating stations, water and sewage treatmentplants, fuel storage facilities, buildings for storage ofequipment and supplies, etc. Developing and operat-ing an average-sized mine or an oil field wouldrequire a few hundred personnel and support staffworking at least 200 days per year over the life of theactivity. Construction activities would involve quarry-ing rock and/or dredging sand and gravel forconcrete and roads, modifying terrain, and installingsurface and subsurface drainage. Accidental spills offuel and other chemicals are also inevitable. Supportactivities will also generate wastes in the form ofobsolete equipment, sewage and wastewater, biode-gradable food, and other litter.

If oil or mineral resources in Antarctica areeventually developed, the existing transportationsystem (e.g., roads, air fields, docks and harbors,etc. ) used to supply scientific research bases wouldhave to be expanded. Additional ships, roads,railroads, vehicles, and/or pipelines would also berequired to remove any resources. For example, anoil recovery operation for a 4-billion-barrel fieldprobably would require special storage facilities anda few dozen specially built ships and dockingfacilities to remove the oil during the summermonths. Some scientists also believe that oil dis-charges from routine tanker loading and from tankeraccidents could have significant cumulative impactson the Antarctic marine environment at a local andperhaps regional level.

IMPACTS FROM MAN’S PASTACTIVITIES

Scientific Research Bases

During the 1800s and early 1900s, two dozenexploratory expeditions from various countries vis-ited Antarctica. Since the early 1900s, about 80temporary and/or permanent research bases havebeen established there. The first modern, intern-ationally coordinated scientific effort to study theregion occurred during the 1957-58 InternationalGeophysical Year, during which 50 research stations

65zw&&, op. cit., foomote St P. 38

66 f7~io[, Op, Cl[,, foomote 6, pp. xvii, Vii-2 to 11. 19.20

b~z~~r~, ~. cit., footnote 8, pp. 28, 31-32.6SRu~o~, op. cit., fcmt.note 7) P. 52.


were maintained by 12 countries,69 The 48 year-round and 19 summer research bases operated byabout 18 nations are shown in figure 5-6.70 Threeyear-round bases are American.

Waste disposal practices in Antarctica during the1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s were characterized bya lack of state-of-the-art disposal alternatives (e.g.,incinerators, sewage treatment plants, etc.) and by a“frontier” attitude toward the environment. Sincethe mid-1970s most countries have become moreaware of environmental impacts. With the exceptionof the oil spill from the Bahia Paraiso sinking, mostimpacts can be traced to accidental releases of smallamounts of oil and other chemicals, the constructionand operation of research bases and field camps, andthe disposal of wastes. Some environmental groupscontend that waste disposal practices (e.g., open

burning and landfilling) could be improved signifi-cantly with the use of different technologies. Suchtechnologies are often more costly.

Pollution in the immediate vicinity of mostyear-round research bases has probably killed orsignificantly impacted some or all benthic marineorganisms. For example, oil in the sediments ofWinter Quarters Bay, McMurdo Sound has largelyeliminated all benthic organisms. However, benthicpopulations a few hundred meters beyond theselocalities do not appear to have been significantlyimpacted. 71 Considering Antarctica’s vast size,the impacts generated by past scientific researchactivities would be considered by most people tobe insignificant; some environmentalists, how-ever, view them as more serious.

In recent years many countries have beguncleaning up their research bases in Antarctica. Forexample, in the 1986-87 season, the cargo ship M/VGreen Wave took 1,700 tons of waste back to theUnited States for recycling and/or disposal. In 1988


Adelie penguins near McMurdo.

NSF outlined a $30 million, 4-year cleanup programfor American bases in Antarctica, and established anEnvironmental Protection Agenda for all futurefederally supported activities in Antarctica.72

Since the late 1950s, about two dozen coastalbases have been abandoned or used only occasion-ally, often by expeditions from several differentcountries. In many cases, equipment, buildings,food, fuel drums, and much litter have been leftbehind. Assuming responsibility for cleaning upthese abandoned bases could be difficult, especiallythose bases used by more than one country .73

T o u r i s m7 4 7 5 7 6 7 7

Small air charters and expedition-type cruises onships carrying up to 150 tourists have becomeincreasingly popular over the last 25 years. Mosttourists visit the Antarctic Peninsula. There is a100-bed guest house and a bank for visitors toChile’s Teniente Marsh research base on KingGeorge Island off the Antarctic Peninsula. Over thenext few years it is anticipated that two to three

@~~ Intelligence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, P. 40.

W3.R, Fletcher, ‘‘Antarctica: I%vironmcntal Prohxtion Issues, Congressional Research Sewicc RcporI for Congress, 89-272 ENR, Apr. 10, 1989,p. 11.

TIRobi~~d, op. cit., footnote 46, pp. 937-944.72Ntid Scl- F-tio~ Divisim of Pola pfo8r~s~ “U.S. Antarctic Program: Environmental Protection Agenda,” Aug. 31, 1988, p. 45.

73G=W== “1987-88 G~ Antarctic Expedition Report,’ Stichting Greenpeace Council, United Kingdom, p. 80.74p.D. Hm, ~S~ Gm~ of -tic ~fism,” Ocem, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 93-100.

~3N~@ ~iam F~~~ &#efy h Ati~ctica, NSF 88-78, 1988, pp. 9-1 m 9-10.

T6F.~ Au- AW~ti~ ~ ~Po~tics (B]~m~@on, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 277-283.

~Flc@h~, op. cit., footnote 70, P. 57.

.

Chapter 5-The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development . 145

Figure 5-6-Research Stations on Antarctica

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SOURCE: U.S. Governrnent, 1989.


dozen tours-bringing about 3,500 people annually—will visit Antarctica. Many tour groups are well-informed and well-supervised; some are not.

Table 5-3 provides data on the approximatenumber of person-days spent in Antarctica bytourists and scientists. These figures indicate thatscientists and their support staff account for about 95percent of the person-days logged in Antarctica. Therelative impact of tourist-related activities is prob-ably much less than these figures indicate, sinceland-based facilities are usually not required tosupport tourist groups. In other words, the environ-mental impacts associated with normal tourist ac-tivities are at present minor compared to the impactsgenerated by research activities. The recent sinkingof the Bahia Paraiso is an important exception tothis generalization. However, if tourism increasesand remains largely unregulated, the potential foradverse impacts will increase.

Harvesting of Fish, Seals, and Whales

The most significant impacts to the marineecosystem of the Southern Ocean surroundingAntarctica have been generated by overhar-vesting of fish, fur seals, and five species ofwhales.

Antarctic Fishing

Major interest in Antarctic fishing developedinitially during the 1960s, and expanded signifi-cantly during the 1970s. For example, fish catchesincreased from about 4,000 metric tons in the early1970s to a peak of about 500,000 metric tons in the1979-80 season, relative to almost 100 millionmetric tons worldwide. The Antarctic cod was theinitial target of commercial fisheries in the early1970s, but because of declining catches the focusshifted to ice fish toward the end of the 1970s. Both

species are now depleted. Krill harvests increasedfrom about 2,000 metric tons in 1973 to about446,000 metric tons in 1986.78

The Convention on the Conservation of Ant-arctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) wasnegotiated in response to heavy fishing, the conse-quent depletion of fish stocks in the 1970s, andconcerns about the possible development of a krillfishery. It entered into force in 1982 and applies tooffshore areas within about 1,000 miles (1,600 km)of Antarctica.79808182 The United States imple-mented this convention in 1984 through passage ofthe Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conven-tion Act (Public Law 98-623). The Conventionencourages the study, management, and conserva-tion of the living resources within Antarctica’soverall marine ecosystem, rather than focusing onindividual species of commercial importance.

Seal Harvesting

In the late 1700s and the early 1800s sealers fromthe United States, Russia, and other Europeancountries began harvesting seals around the islandsin the Southern Ocean near Antarctica. Over 1million seals were killed around South Georgia (inthe South Atlantic) alone between 1820 and 1822.83

Uncontrolled slaughter of fur seals for their thick furbrought this species close to extinction by 1830. Theharvest of elephant seals for blubber oil began in theearly 1800s and continued until the 1960s. The fourspecies of seals (i.e., crabeater, Weddell, leopard,and Ross) that only inhabit Antarctica have re-mained largely untouched by sealers due to theirinaccessibility or poor fur quality. w

After some limited harvesting of seals in 1964, thethen 14 parties to the Antarctic Treaty drew up theConvention for the Conservation of AntarcticSeals, which was signed in 1972 and entered into

TSK. Skmm and A.F. Ryan, “Antarctic Marine Living Resources, ” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 59-63.

7%id., pp. 59-63.

%.J. Hofman, ‘‘Conservation of Marine Living Resources in Antarctica, unpublished paper for Seminar on the Polar Regions, Center for OceansLaw and Policy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, March 1987, p. 14,

81J.N. Barnes, “The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to Meet the New Realities ofResource Exploitahon in the Southern Ocean, ’ J.I. Charney (d.), The New Natwnalism and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Pollutionand Expbi@on of Antarctica (’htowa, New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun publishers, 1982), pp. 239-286.

sZSiW@V ~im~ t. ccw imlu~ tie ~lnclpal fishing countries of the world including Japan with 13 percent of the world’s catch, tie Soviet

Union with 12 percent, China wifb 8 percent, and Chile and the United States with 6 percent each.MH,J, Sutmn ~d p.K, p~k, ‘c~~ ad ~~ctlca” (~~), unit~ Nations EnVUOnment pro~~c, Nairobi, Kenya, August 1988, p. 20.

Wenmd Intelligence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 51.


Table 5-3-Presence of Scientists and Tourists on Antarctica

Approximate Duration of Percentpopulations stay in days Person-days of total

Scientists andsupport personnel(UNEP):

Summer (@ 67 bases) . . . . . 3,500 120 420,000Remaining 8 months

(@ 48 bases) . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 240 240,000(subtotal) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660,000 95%

Tourists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,500 10 35,000 5 %

Total ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695,000

SOURCE S.R Fletcher. “Antarctica. Environmental Proteetlon Issues.” Congressional Research Sewca Reoort forCongress, 89-272 ENR, Apr. 10, 1989, p, 57.

force in 1978. The Convention totally protects thefur, elephant, and Ross seals from exploitation;prohibits the taking of seals that are in the water(except in limited numbers for scientific purposes);and sets annual quotas, seasons, and capture zonesfor crabeaters, leopards, and Weddell seals.85 86 Theenforcement of the agreed-upon conservation meas-ures depends entirely on the self-policing policies ofthe signatory nations.

Whaling

Whaling around Antarctica began around the turnof the century, From the late 1920s and early 1960s,the world’s principal whaling grounds were locatedin the Southern Ocean within about 600 to 1,200miles of Antarctica. Particularly because of theintroduction of explosive harpoons, harpoon can-nons, motorized catcher boats, and large factoryships in the late 1920s, Antarctic whalers causedcritical declines in the populations of right, blue,humpback, fin, and sei whales. Since the early 1960smore than 1 million whales have been killed inAntarctic waters.87 (See table 5-4.88)

Voluntary limits on whaling were established bythe International Convention for the Regulation ofWhaling during the 1930s.89 90 91 These limits had

little effect. In 1946 the International WhalingCommission (IWC) was established to regulate thewhaling industry worldwide; its recommendationsdid not carry much weight until the late 1960s. In1986 the IWC instituted a temporary moratorium onall commercial whaling; this moratorium is sched-uled for review in the near future. As might beexpected, there are differing views within the IWCabout the exploitation of whales and how whalingshould be managed.92

Avoiding Sensitive Areas and RehabilitatingImpacted Areas

Unique and/or especially sensitive areas shouldbe avoided, to the extent possible, in any futureAntarctic minerals exploration and development.For example, highly stratified saline lakes found inEast Antarctica are especially susceptible to impactsin the summer when streams flow along adjacentice-free valleys into them.93 The Treaty Parties haveset aside 28 Specially Protected Areas (SPAS) whereresearch, plant and animal collection, and vehicularaccess are denied without entry permits. Due to theirimportance for scientific research, 17 other siteshave been designated Sites of Special ScientificInterest (SSSIs). These areas are off-limits to visitors

q~fi, op. cit., footnote 21, pp. 71-74.

~H&man, op. cit., footnote 80, p. 14.

N71bid., p. 14.

88D.C. Chapmsn, “Living Resources: Whales, ” Occanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Sumner 1988, pp. 64-70.

a%id., pp. 64-70.

%ntral lntel}igence Agency, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 52-53.91J. G~lMd, 1‘me End of -g?’ New ScientMt, VO1. 120, No. 1636, CM. 29, 1988, pp 42A$7.92Ho~m, op. Cit-, fOOmOte W! p. 14

~z~~rge, op. clt,, foomote 8, pp. 24-25.


Table 5-4-Worldwide Populations of Whales Commonly FoundIn the Southern Ocean

Average adult Population (in thousands)a

species size (in m) Original world Current world Antarctic

Southern Right . . . . . 12 100 3 3Blue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 228 14 11Humpback . . . . . . . . . 11 115 10 3Fin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 120 100Sei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 256 54 37Sperm . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2,400 1,950 950Minke . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 140 725 380%11 eetimatos are highty epeculatwe.

SOURCE: Most data from the International Whaling Commission, OcwanUs, vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 1989, pp. 12-13.Data on Antarctic stocks from P.G.H. Evans, The Natural HistcvY of Whales and Do4Mins (London:Chnetopher Helm, 19S7), p. 343.

and access must conform to a management plan foreach SSSI. The locations of SPAS and SSSIs areshown in figure 5-7.

Much can be done to clean up previously usedscientific research bases or resource developmentsites in Antarctica by removing garbage, unusedfuel, chemicals, and other potentially toxic waste.However, it is not possible or practical to acceleratethe natural recovery of impacted upland areas ormarine environments to their original conditions.Future human activities should therefore be plannedand designed to minimize potential impacts in thefirst place.

REGIONAL AND GLOBALIMPACTS FROM

ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENT9495The larger the scale of mineral development in

Antarctica, the greater will be likely long-termregional impacts on terrestrial and marine ecosys-tems. Some of these would undoubtedly take theform of ill-defined sublethal and chronic effects onthe terrestrial and marine ecosystems from lowlevels of contamination. Furthermore, the moreAntarctica is polluted by regional sources, the

less useful the continent becomes for evaluatingthe effects of global pollution on the world'soceans and atmosphere.% However, availableinformation suggests that resource developmentin Antarctica, even if pursued on a large scale,would probably not generate significant globalimpacts to the world’s oceans and atmosphererelative to other activities of man,97

Scientists would probably be especially con-cerned about the potential impacts of resourcedevelopment occurring within or near designatedresearch areas. As illustrated by the recent sinking ofthe Bahia Paraiso, oil spills probably represent thegreatest risks to Antarctic research, especially bio-logical and ecological research. The majority ofnonbiological research in Antarctica would prob-ably not be directly impacted by developmentactivities; however, there would be indirect impactsfrom added logistics activities, land-based construc-tion, and possible disruptions caused by accidents.

Research Required to Better PredictImpacts9899 100101102

Scientific exploration of Antarctica began in theearly 1800s with several biological investigations.

SWu.s. ~pmcnt of SW, OP. cit., fcmmote 42, pp. 6-26 to 6-28.

95zw.u&xgc, 0p. cit., foomotc 41, pp. 115-154.%Ru~~, op. cit., footnote 7! PP. 34-35.

~zm~~, ~. cit., foomotc 8, PP. 33* ~~.

g~u~od, op. Cit., f~o~ 7, pp. 10, 36-3’7, 43. 53-55S 6’7.‘WElllo~ op. cl[., f~mo~ 6, pp. xviii, VIII-1 to 4.

Iw.s. ~pmat of Stak, ~. cit., foomote 42, PP. 6-28 to 6-31.

IOIHoldga&, op. cit., fOOmO~ 91 PP. 3848.

l~y, op. cit., footnote 2, pp. 214-215.

.

Chapter S---The Antarctic Environment and Potential Impacts From Oil and Minerals Development • 149

Photo credit: - Ted DeLaca, National Science Foundation

Palmer station, Anvers Island, off the Antarctic Peninsula.Areas in the vicinity of Palmer station were impacted by the

Bahia Paraiso spill.

Geologic exploration of the continent began in thelate 1800s. Numerous scientific expeditions duringthe 1900s continued to increase our knowledgeabout the Antarctic environment. The establishmentof 50 bases by 12 countries during the InternationalGeophysical Year in 1957 and 1958 transformedAntarctica into an international scientific laboratory.

Despite continuing research there are stillsignificant uncertainties about the environmentof Antarctica. As described in chapter 4, thegeologic data is meager for accurately estimatingAntarctica’s mineral potential. The response of thecontinental ice sheet and surrounding seasonal seaice to changing climatic conditions is poorly under-stood. More quantitative data is required to betterunderstand the ocean circulation around Antarctica,especially during the winter and in coastal waters.Weather forecasting is still difficult. Floral andfaunal distributions on the ice-free coastal areas arefairly well documented, although the ecosystem

relationships are not well understood. Baseline dataon the marine ecosystem are still incomplete,including information on biomass distributions,productivity, and food web relationships.

It is generally believed by both industry represen-tatives and environmentalists that minimizing thepossible impacts of resource development activitieswill be difficult without first collecting additionalenvironmental information on the topics listed intable 5-5. Furthermore, a better understanding ofAntarctica’s environment, particularly the marineecosystem, is necessary in order to evaluate thesignificance of impacts generated by developmentactivities relative to natural variability and otherindependent trends, such as fishing. In fact, Article4 of the Convention stipulates that no mineralexploration or development will be allowed withoutadequate information about the potential impactsthat such activities might generate.

The Federal Government has spent about $200million over the past 15 years to evaluate potentialimpacts of oil and gas development on the continen-tal shelf of the United States. The environmentalresearch required before and during offshore petro-leum development in Antarctica could cost as muchas a few hundred million dollars.103 An additional$200 to $300 million could also be required for anice-strengthened research ship for marine research.The research required to evaluate the impactsassociated with minerals development and otherland-based activities could be less costly thanmarine research. As in other expensive, large-scalescientific endeavors, the United States could seek todefray some of these costs through an internationalcooperative effort.

The Convention describes the general require-ments and procedures for evaluating potential envi-ronmental impacts that will be associated withexploration and development activities. However, itis not clear in the Convention text whether theresearch in table 5-5 would be conducted and paidfor by the Operator or by the Sponsor.

103R esearch in Antarctica might cmstmore or leas than this amount. On the one hand, research would probably not have to include the continem entirecoastline and continen MI shelf. On the other hand, research in Antarctica probably costs about two or three times more than comparable research on theU.S. continental shelf due to the cxmtincnt’s remote location, greater logistical requirements, and adverse working conditions. Also, impact assessmentscould be mme costly if the study areas are more variable or complex than assumed. Based on NSF’s funding figures for scientific research in Antarctica(nottxl at the end of this chapter’s introduction), the international community has probably sp.msored several tens of millions of dollars of research ontbe topics listed in table 5-5 over the last two decades.

150 ●

Polar P

rospects: A M

inerals Treaty for A

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pecial S

cientific In

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/ Inset B I

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-w

Antarctica-Continued

Sites of Special Scientific Interest

Specially Protected Areas.

SOURCE: US. Government, 1989.


T a b l e 5 - 5 - B a s i c Research Required to Evaluate Chapter 4 contains a discussion of researchPossible Environmental Impacts Prior to

Resource Developmentrequired to evaluate the mineral resources of Antarc-tica. Appendix A presents an oil development

Research and Information requirements scenario and discusses research needed on geologic●

●

more detailed data on terrestrial, Iacustrine, and marineecosystems, especially those areas that are most likely to beconsidered for resource development, and those areas that arejudged to be most sensitive to impactscontent and composition of hydrocarbons and other contami-nants In Antarctic waters. sediment. and marine organisms

hazards, weather, and ice movement prior to thedevelopment of petroleum resources in Antarctica.

Monitoring and environmental baseline studieswill become increasingly important if minerals

Research requiring extended time-series measurements activities commence in Antarctica. The United(e.g., over a decade) States could be at a disadvantage in Minerals● marine and terrestrial ecosystem dynamics in response to

pollution and other impacts from potential resource develop- Convention meetings if it does not devote morement attention to this type of work.

. fate of oil and its degradation in open and ice-filled seas aroundAntarctica,, and under-shelf ice

. adverse short- and long-term effects (e.g., toxicity) of oil onAntarctic phytoplankton, krill, seals, and benthic communities

SOURCE: OffkxI of Technology As8e8snwnt, 1909.

P

Appendixes

Photo credit: U.S. Geological Survey

Appendix A

Development of an Antarctic Oil Field

INTRODUCTIONThis appendix was prepared to illustrate the most likely

hypothetical scenario that would be employed if anAntarctic oil field were developed under the terms of thenew Minerals Convention, It explores the technologicalcapabilities and economic incentives that would deter-mine the viability of a hypothetical Antarctic oil field andpresents some possible approaches to development. Ifcommercial quantities of oil are discovered in Antarcticain the future, companies experienced in developingoffshore fields in harsh, Arctic environments todaywould, in some situations, have the capability and mayalso have the incentive to develop an Antarctic field,Whether they would have the capability depends on bothspecific environmental conditions where the field islocated and the future status of needed technologies.Whether companies would have the incentive depends onprofitability and risk-both financial and political.

The scenario presented in this appendix is based onadmittedly optimistic assumptions about several deter-mining factors. Three are key to the discussion:

-first, that a world-class giant field is discovered;

—second, that the parties to the Minerals Conventionallow oil development in the area in which the fieldis located and assure the developer of rights toproduce the field; and

—third, that the world price of oil is and remains highenough to make Antarctic production economicsattractive,

Some of the needed technology for selected Antarctic oildevelopment has been built and is now successfullyemployed in other areas; other technology must beassumed to be available in the future as a consequence ofoil field ventures in other harsh environments. Theseassumptions may or may not be realized in the future. Ifany condition is not met, an Antarctic oil prospect wouldprobably not be developed. If the assumptions hold,however, it is not unreasonable to project that over time,the needed technology will be available and certainprospects will be profitable to develop.

An Antarctic oil venture could not be undertakenbefore the turn of the century. Substantial lead times willbe needed to do further scientific resource assessmentwork, environmental baseline work, and surveys ofphysical environmental constraints. Following this work,substantial time must be devoted to reconnaissancesurveys. At the same time the regulatory system will

require preparation of exploration and development plansand evaluation of environmental impacts. Finally, longlead times will be needed to identify any oil field throughexploratory drilling, to delineate that field throughadditional drilling, and to design and construct a produc-tion and transportation system. OTA concludes that theminimum total time elapsed before any major Antarcticfield could be expected to produce oil would be 30 ormore years from today.

The technology needed for Antarctic oil developmentin certain offshore regions is not substantially differentfrom that under development or available to major firmsfor the Arctic and deep water temperate regions. ForAntarctic regions with more severe conditions, it is notunreasonable to expect new technology to be availableover the next few decades. Much of the needed researchand development work is now underway. It is alsoreasonable to expect that the world oil price will risesufficient y to make Antarctic oil production profitable inthe next three to five decades, even though the currentplentiful world supply may continue. Technology appearsto be one of the lesser important constraints to futureAntarctic petroleum development. Political, institutional,and environmental constraints appear more significant.

The following sections discuss a purely hypotheticaldevelopment that might take place at a time at least 30years in the future. Such a long range projection mustcontain a large amount of uncertainty, but it is necessaryto look this far in the future in order to consider whatdevelopment might be like under the new MineralsConvention. At the present state of knowledge andinstitutional maturity it would be unreasonable to expectcommercial oil development to occur much sooner.

The following sections present:

. the design environment for Antarctic offshore oildevelopment

. a discussion about technologies that may be used forAntarctic production; and

. a hypothetical scenario for Antarctic development.

THE DESIGN ENVIRONMENT FORANTARCTIC OIL DEVELOPMENT

The discussion in chapter 4 shows that the greatestpotential for Antarctic oil development exists in one of theoffshore sedimentary basins, such as that in the Ross Sea,that OTA selected for its hypothetical scenario. Theenvironmental conditions that determine the major designcriteria for development systems are quite severe in any

–155–


Antarctic offshore region, and the Ross Sea is noexception. The significant factors include:

glacier ice (the origin of icebergs);sea ice (single-year ice 3 to 6 feet thick);icebergs (some very large-to tens of miles square); 1

extreme cold (annual mean temperature 0oF alongcoastline);heavy seas (frequent, severe storms);deep water (2,000 to 3,000 feet in Ross Sea);long periods of winter darkness;possible frozen gas hydrate present subsea;deep water iceberg scour (up to 1,500 feet);active faulting; andsea-bottom permm.frost

While the available data are sufficient to make theabove list and identify the importance of these factorsoverall, much more data will be needed to set designcriteria for any future oil production system. If oildevelopment is expected to take place in the next century,it will also be necessary to spend considerable time andeffort collecting information and analyzing environ-mental design conditions. Some of these data require-ments are shown in box A-1. One of the most importantareas where existing information is lacking is that of sizeand frequency of icebergs. Icebergs could be a majordesign constraint for specific production platforms. Otherinformation, such as of deep currents, sea ice anomalies,etc., could also be potentially important but very few dataare available to make a judgment.

Based on current knowledge of the Antarctic environ-ment, ice appears to be the most significant factor in theabove list both because very severe iceberg conditionsare known to exist in Antarctica and because offshore oiloperators have designed successful systems to operateunder conditions suggested by many of the other factors.Ice is a significant design factor for any offshore systembecause the structural loads imposed by moving ice canbe huge. Moving glaciers will not be resisted by anynormal structure—nor will very large icebergs. The largerof the icebergs can also scour deep trenches in the seafloor(as deep as 1,500 feet in some reports) and thus evendetermine the depth to which pipelines must be buried.2

In the last 10 years two ships have been sunk by ice in theRoss Sea.

The glacier ice that covers almost all of the Antarcticcontinent with an average thickness of almost 2 miles alsoextends offshore in many areas. The Ross Ice Shelf ismore than 200,000 square miles in size. OTA’s hypotheti-

Box A-1—Antarctic Environmental InformationNeeds To Design Major Offshore Oil Production

Systems

Ocean Environment Knowledge of wind, waves, oceancurrents, and seafloor conditionsare needed to establish designcriteria.

Glacial Ice Physical properties of glacial iceare needed to develop systemsthat can operate on top, through,and below the ice. This includessuch properties strength, tempera-ture, plasticity, movement, etc.,which can provide a basis forestablishing design criteria.

Sea Ice Thickness, coverage, strength andother physical properties of theice are needed to develop designcriteria for fixed and moored plat-forms, ice breakers, and shuttletankers.

Icebergs Size, distribution, frequency, ve-locities, and scour depth of ice-bergs are needed to design off-shore structures and pipelines.

Field Description A general knowledge of the prob-able location, size, depth, andformation characteristics is neededto define the most likely drillingand production means that mightbe used at specific reservoir 1oca-tions.

Note: The above data needs are general ad relate to eithtx tie possibilityof developtnmt in opm water w beneath the ice shelf.

SOURCE: OffI.ce of Technology Asseaarnent, 1989.

ca1 oil field is located in water seaward of the northernedge of this shelf. Huge icebergs continually break off andare discharged into the ocean from the many ice shelvesaround the Antarctic coast.3

During the winter, the Southern Ocean surroundingAntarctica freezes and more than doubles the apparentsize of the continent. This sea ice is generally annual ice(i.e., it melts and refreezes each year) and has a thicknessof 3 to 6 feet. Such ice probably can be transitedyear-round with icebreakers or icebreaking tankers or,during the summer months, with only ice-reinforcedships. Annual sea ice does not appear to be a formidableproblem, but more research is needed before reliable,

1A few l~rgs arc of czlormous si~ne recently released m the Ross Sea was about twice h size of the State of Rhode Mad.

2Deep Oil Technology, Inc., Technology and Cost~or O#More 011 Deveiopmeti m An/arctua, OTA umuactor report, Noveanba 1988.3L.F, lv~w, ‘f~~ctica+al~ Cortdiwns and Peuoleum prospects,’ Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 78, No, 52, Dec. 29, 1980, pp. 212-220,

Appendix A-Development of an Antarctic Oil Field ● 157

year-round ice transit systems could be designed. Forexample, some are concerned that if regular daily transitsare made by icebreaking tankers, large mounds of icerubble could build up and restrict normal passages.

Icebergs, on the other hand, appear to be formidable insome regions.4 Antarctic icebergs can be very large(several square miles is not unusual) and thick. It wouldbe impossible in some cases to design structures towithstand their impact forces. However, there may besome offshore regions where large icebergs are infrequentor where they can be tracked and predicted. It is notknown whether iceberg-free regions would correspond tothe location of a commercial oil field. Since there is sucha vast territory to explore in Antarctica, it would makesense to initiate exploration efforts in those regions whereproduction would be most feasible. However, until moreresearch on iceberg occurrence is done, it will not bepossible to design a specific oil production system for anyregion in Antarctica.

Other severe environmental factors include stormyseas, extreme wind chill factors, and very low tempera-tures. The greater depth of Antarctica’s continental shelf(e.g., the seaward edge of the geologically interestingRoss Sea shelf5 lies in about 2,600 feet of water) adds tothe technical complexity of offshore drilling and produc-tion. In combination with severe storms and problemsrelated to ice (such as quick moving pack ice and tabularicebergs that have been observed grounded at depths ofmore than 1,600 fee@), the difficulty of exploring for andproducing oil in some regions of Antarctica could beformidable even compared to nearshore Arctic waters.

In general, the rigorous environment of Antarcticais such that oil and gas production there (if, indeed,exploitable quantities are discovered) is likely to bemore difficult than existing production anywhere elsein the world. Some of the biggest challenges to date forthe oil industry have been exploration for oil and gasresources in the Canadian Arctic and in the Beaufort andBering Seas offshore Alaska. Antarctica is colder, morestormy, and more isolated than these areas, and has acontinental shelf three to six times deeper than the globalmean.7 But it is the iceberg problem that sets Antarcticaapart from most Arctic offshore regions. Each of theseenvironmental constraints adds to the difficulty of explor-ing for and producing oil in Antarctica.

For a future Antarctic development, structures could bedesigned and built to withstand the cold temperatures and

to protect people from the worst effects of extreme cold;however, careful designs would be required to keepequipment running smoothly and people working effi-ciently. Offshore structures and ships would need to bebuilt to withstand hazards caused by a variety of ice forms.These hazards include moving sea ice, pressure ridges,icebergs, ice buildup on platforms and ships, permafrost,and ice scour of the seabed. Innovative engineeringsolutions to some Arctic problems could be a usefulguide. However, in areas such as the Beaufort Sea whereice conditions are severe, industry has not yet discoveredfields that require production systems very far offshore,into very deep water, or into the dynamic multiyear icezone. If such Arctic development does advance in thefuture, it could offer useful engineering lessons forAntarctica.

Antarctica is one of the most isolated places on Earth.The Ross Sea in Antarctica is about 2,000 miles from NewZealand. In contrast the remote Navarin Basin in theBering Sea off Alaska is about 600 miles from a potentialsupport base and itself poses extreme logistics problemsthat would significantly affect the economics of oilexploration and production there. Oil may be produced (ifdiscovered) in the Bering Sea but even here a largeamount would have to be recoverable to make operationsprofitable. One characteristic of frontier areas like theNavarin Basin and any area in Antarctica is that there islittle or no existing infrastructure. The only existinginfrasturcture in Antarctica supports the scientific pro-gram. This means that everything-men, equipment,supplies, housing, entertainment, etc.—must be broughtfrom someplace else, and at considerable expense.Conversely, produced oil must be transported longdistances to markets. Moreover, the currently feasibleoptions for transporting Antarctic oil (e.g., icebreakingtankers) will be expensive and will require some techno-logical development. It is worth noting that Alaska’sNorth Slope oil is transported overland by an 800-milepipeline to an ice-free port to avoid the need foricebreaking tankers.

An additional constraint in Antarctica is that about 98percent of the land is buried beneath a thick continentalice sheet. Not only does this preclude oil drilling withtoday’s technology on all but the 2 percent of Antarcticanot covered by ice, but very few sites are available onwhich advance support bases for offshore explorationcould be located. Ice-free areas may also be sites ofpenguin rookeries, and an oil company that wished to

4H. Keys, “&ber$a ~f South Vlctona Lax@ kUIUCtiCii,’ ‘ New haland Anlarc(u Record, vol. 6, No. 2, 198S, pp. 1-7.

5j.c. BChCI@ (d.), “k b Pemlcusn Rtmurces m -tica, ” Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Ankzrclica, U.S. Geological Suwey Cucular 909, 1983,p. 22.

@mral lntelltgence Agency, Polar Regwns At&a$, 1978, p. 38.

7ftnd., p. 35.


Photo credit: Bill Westermeyer

The Maumee, the oil tanker that resupplies McMurdo, after it hit an iceberg in 1976.The iceberg put a 35-foot gash in the tanker’s bow, but no oil was spilled.

locate a support base at such a site could expect strongopposition from environmental groups. Moreover, thereis no guarantee that a suitable location for a support basewill be found near an offshore oil prospect.

Even so, a supergiant oil field of high-grade produci-bility could be a powerful incentive for industry to investin Antarctica. The offshore petroleum industry is nowworking in some harsh environments that also pose largechallenges to design engineers. Major exploration activi-ties are currently underway in a number of hostile regions,such as in the severe ice conditions of the Beaufort andChukchi Seas offshore Alaska and Canada, in icebergareas along Greenland and eastern Canada, and in theNorth Sea, North Atlantic, and Norwegian Sea. The mostsignificant oil production experience in harsh environ-ments to date is in the North Sea, but very deep waterproduction (2,000 feet) has begun in such areas as the Gulfof Mexico and offshore Brazil; and, in a few years,

production will probably commence from fields offshoreLabrador.

In addition, recent leases were sold and plans areunderway to drill exploratory wells in the Chukchi Seanorth of Alaska, where thick, moving, multiyear sea ice isprevalent. Some of these ice conditions maybe even moresevere than those in Antarctica, even though the depth ofwater in the Chukchi Sea seldom exceeds 150 feet. Othercompanies are accomplishing exploration drilling in theNorth Atlantic west of the Shetland Islands in regions ofdeep water and very rough seas. Still other companies areplanning exploration in areas of the Gulf of Mexico andelsewhere where water depths are as great as 10,000 feet.8

One company is proceeding with development of an oilfield just 500 miles north of the Antarctic Peninsula, offArgentina’s Tierra del Fuego.9 Another has begun engi-neering on the production facilities for the Hibemia oilfield in “Iceberg Alley’ on the Grand Banks of Newfound-land. 10 Harsh environments requiring unique and costly

8Kq~, op. cit., fOOtXlO@ 4“

9+ 4Ffi[ ~ffiae Argentine Od Being Developed by To@l, ” Oceun Irtdwfry, vol. 23, No. 9, .%qxember 1988, pp. 115-116.

lo’’Mobd NMXMS FjrXIS Eligible To Bld on HkrIusi hj~t, ’ Od and Gas JotuMl, vol. 86, No, 52, Dec. 26, 1988, p. 28.

Appendix A---Development of an Antarctic Oil Field ● 159


The Maumeenear McMurdo in 1988 escorted by the CoastGuard icebreaker, Polar Star. If oil is ever developed in

Antarctica, ice-strengthened or, more likely, icebreaking,tankers will be needed.

technical approaches have not deterred petroleum explo-ration and development ventures.

OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES FORHARSH POLAR ENVIRONMENTS

Current offshore oil and gas operations and plannedsystems for harsh environments around the world formthe basis of any projections of technologies that may beused in future Antarctic petroleum development. Tech-nologies employed by the offshore petroleum industryhave changed dramatically over the past 20 yearsallowing exploration and production in environments thatwere considered almost prohibitive two decades ago.These technology changes can be expected to continue,but the nature and extent of advances three to five decadesin the future are hard to predict, Industry has moved intohostile environments in discrete incremental steps, pro-gressively resolving the problems encountered, adaptingexisting systems or techniques, and designing new onesas needed. That technology base today is available foradaptation to Antarctica by the major, experiencedoperators in the same manner-in discrete, incrementalSteps.11

Offshore petroleum activities are commonly dividedinto three phases: exploration, development, and produc-tion. Exploration includes geological and geophysicalsurveys as well as exploratory drilling. In the MineralConvention’s terms, this includes both “prospecting”

and ‘‘exploration. Development begins after an oildiscovery is determined to be economic and includesdrilling of production wells and the design and construc-tion of all platforms and facilities for producing the field.Production begins with the flow of oil to the market andcontinues until the field is depleted. In offshore hostileregions, exploration has taken on the order of 10 years ormore, development work has taken about 10 years, andproduction continues for 20 years or more. After initialoperations commence, some of these phases can beaccomplished concurrently.

Adequate exploration technology (both geophysicalsurvey ships and mobile exploratory drilling vessels) isavailable today to work in many of the offshore Antarcticregions, In fact, some seismic surveys have already beendone by the U.S. Geological Survey and several nationsworking in Antarctica. Also, U.S.-based geophysicalsurvey firms have proposed, to a number of oil compa-nies, to conduct further seismic operations in Antarctica.These operations are conducted during the summermonths in ice-free waters. Scientific drilling operationshave also taken place at a number of sites surroundingAntarctica the most notable of which were under theauspices of the Deep Sea Drilling Program in the 1970s.These and other scientific drilling operations were con-ducted during the summer months in ice-free waters.None of this scientific drilling was to adequate depth orat the proper locations to be considered part of an oilexploration program.

A number of mobile drilling platforms operating in theworld today have the capability of drilling explorationwells offshore Antarctica (such as in the Ross Sea) duringthe summer months and in up to 50 percent ice coverage.The most suitable drilling rig would probably be aheavy-duty semi-submersible exploratory drilling vesselsimilar to that used in the North Atlantic or the Bering Seaoffshore Alaska. Exploratory drilling could be accom-plished over a number of summer seasons, much as isdone off Alaska and no major extension of existingtechnology would be needed.

The present technology for production systems willhave to be developed further to make offshore Antarcticoil production feasible. Systems are currently available inareas of minimum ice encroachment. Where ice is present,parts of deepwater systems would have to be combinedwith systems designed for Arctic conditions. Suchcombinations could include floating terminals and/orsubsea wells like those used in the North Sea; tankershuttle operations like those used in the Labrador Sea; andice-reinforced structures like those used in the Cook Inlet.

1 IU S, CmPS, Offim of Tw~Ology Assess~n~ 011 and Gas Technologies for [he Arc!~ and Dee~tier, OTA-O-270 OWshuWon, ~: U.S. cong~ss, ~ficc ofTdnology Assessment, May 1985).

160 • Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica

Ongoing industry R&D programs could develop addi-tional components needed for Antarctic production. Forexample, considerable research is underway on remotecontrol systems for subsea wells. Two-phase pumpingsystems are also being developed so that produced gas andoil can be moved long distances before it is necessary toprovide a large separation facility. It is reasonable toassume that many of these technologies will advance inthe next few decades and be available for any oilproduction allowed in Antarctica.

A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO FORANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENT

Technology Assumptions

OTA’s hypothetical scenario contains a number oftechnology assumptions. It assumes that technology foroperating in ice-covered continental shelves will advanceon all fronts. This could bring the cost of oil extractedfrom frontier areas down, closer to the cost of today’scheaper oil. For example, oil is profitably produced inPrudhoe Bay on the North Slope of Alaska, moved toValdez by pipeline, shipped to the Panama Canal bytanker, moved by pipeline across the Canal, and shippedby tanker to the Gulf of Mexico. It seems reasonable that30 years hence, technology will be readily available toship oil from offshore Antarctica to New Zealand orArgentina by ice-strengthened or icebreaking tankers andthen to any location in the world in conventional tankers.

Developments in technology could also affect OTA’sassumptions about Antarctic exploration and development. For example, 30 years hence, improved geophysicaltechniques could significantly decrease the cost of findingoil. This could result in lower delineation drilling costs,because fewer wells will be needed to find and delineatefields. Improved drilling techniques such as use ofdown-hole motors and surface control and monitoring,could lower drilling costs as well. Improvements inproduction techniques such as use of multiphase pumps,flexible pipelines, compliant platforms, ice-strengthenedplatforms, etc., all tend to reduce the relative cost of harshenvironment field developments. Transportation technol-ogy could also reduce costs through use of improvedice-operating tankers, deep-water pipeline systems, betterloading techniques, etc. Box A-2 summarizes key techno-logical advancements beyond current technology thatOTA concludes are needed for developing an Antarcticoilfield.

If the above technical developments occur, therewould seem to be no insurmountable technical barri-ers to oil exploration and development of Antarctica’s

Box A-2-Summary of Key TechnologyAdvancements Needed To Design Antarctic

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Offshore Oil Production SystemsHigh-capacity mooring systems to keep floatingdrilling and production platforms on location duringheavy ice coverage.Seafloor storage tanks for holding oil on the seafloorin iceberg-infested waters.Long-range subsea control systems that will allowwells to be located long distances from productionfacilities.Two-phase flow pumps that will allow oil and gas tobe transferred long distances without separation.Remote operated vehicles that will provide a meansof installing and servicing seafloor equipment indeep water and Mow the ice shelf.Mini-submarin es or remotely operated vehicles thatcan provide direct access to seafloor equipment.Icebreaking tankers for transporting oil year roundfrom Antarctica to an ice-free transfer terminal.Flexible pipelines that can accommodate relativemovement between the seafloor and a floatingplatform.A means for keeping an access hole open throughglacier ice to allow wellheads to be located on theseafloor or ground.

SOURCE: Offlcc of Technology Ascsmcnt, 1989.

offshore sedimentary basins. The relative technicaldifficulty in developing oil in Antarctica today is probablyless than it was for developing fields in the Beaufort Sea30 years ago. other fields (e.g., in the Chukchi Sea) willprobably be developed and be operating over the next 30years, advancing the technology needed for Antarctica.

An Oil Consortium for Antarctica

Major international oil companies, in partnership witheach other and/or with state oil enterprises, would be thelikely “Operators” of any Antarctic oil exploration anddevelopment if the Minerals Convention enters intoforce. 12

A consortium of major oil companies and national oilcompanies would be the most likely organizationalapproach because of the finances that will be required andbecause individual companies probably will be averse to‘‘going it alone.” Most major, high-risk oil developmentventures, such as those in Arctic and deepwater offshoreareas, are undertaken by such consortia.

12J,N, (jmtl, The AR&UCtiC Ajkrals RquM: A Pelrokun Ituiwry Perspective, OTA wtIR’8ctoI EFL Novmk 1988.


For the purposes of this scenario, OTA has assumedthat:

●

●

●

●

●

The consortium chooses the United States to be itssponsor.Seismic prospecting in the Ross Sea identifiesfactors that suggest significant oil accumulations.The same area also would be recognized as highlyprospective by other operators and that there wouldbe competing applications for the area of interest.Subsequent to receiving an exploration permit for thedesired blocks, a wildcat well and follow-up delinea-tion wells indicated the existence of an oil fieldcontaining 4 billion barrels of recoverable oil withvery good reservoir and producing characteristics.The field ultimately was developed to a peakproducing capacity of 700,000 barrels per day ofcrude oil.

OTA chose the Ross Sea as a possible location for ahypothetical oil field development because some evi-dence points to favorable conditions for oil accumulationin the sedimentary rocks there and because reconnais-sance seismic surveys have been conducted in some of theprospective basins there. Based on preliminary evidence,a number of geologists believe the Ross Sea to have thebest basins for petroleum formation of any of theAntarctic prospects identified to date (see ch. 4).

The hypothetical consortium is assumed to be theoperating unit of the oil venture and to consist of fourmajor international oil companies headquartered in theUnited States, The joint operation would cover activitiesranging from prospecting through exploration and devel-opment stages to the construction of a transportationsystem. Consortium members each would provide mana-gerial, professional, technical, and support personnelrequired to staff the Antarctic operation,

If convinced that an initial investment in an Antarcticventure could be justified, the consortium would ap-preach the appropriate agency of the U.S. Governmentabout prospecting (i.e., in the Ross Sea using seismicsurvey techniques). Subsequent to supplying the appro-priate agency with the information prescribed in Article3713 of the Minerals Convention, the United States, as theSponsoring State, would notice the Commission of theproposed prospecting plan. If the Commission did notraise any objections, the survey would be conducted. Thedetails pertaining to a hypothetical reconnaissance seis-mic survey are shown in box A-3.

Assuming the results of the reconnaissance seismicwork indicated favorable areas, the most prospectivesector would be selected. The consortium would thenrequest its Sponsoring State to ask the Commission tohave the subject area identified for possible explorationand development activities.

If the area identification request is approved, theconsortium would tender an application for an explorationpermit through its sponsor, to the Regulatory Committeeformed for the area. At this point the consortium couldalso include a participation agreement with state oilcompanies of several developing countries. Such anapproach may be desirable, given that a decision on anapplication is to be based on a measure of wideparticipation-especially if the area is of interest to anumber of competitors.

Under the terms of the Convention, the RegulatoryCommittee will divide a given area into a grid pattern of‘‘blocks, ’ that is, leasable tracts, and accept applicationsfor permits for Operators to work within those blocks. TheCommittee would also put limits on the number of blocksthat would be allocated to any Operator and then resolvecompeting applications for the same blocks. The methodof resolving competition for the same blocks is not spelledout in the Convention but would be for the RegulatoryCommittees to work out. (The “bonus bid” methodcommon to offshore lease sales in the United States couldbe one option.)

Since the convention does not specify a method forestablishing the blocks, OTA has developed a method thatappears to be practical and within the intent of theConvention terms. That method is described in box A-4.

A Hypothetical Exploration Program

Once blocks have been established and allocated,exploration commences. Reconnaissance seismic surveysindicate the areas of interest and reveal the mostpromising. For the purposes of this example, OTAassumes the most promising area to be the Terror Rift ofthe Victoria Land Basin. This region has been identifiedin a number of studies as having potential for hydrocarbonaccumulation. *4 Assuming the consortium is awarded anexploration permit by the Regulatory Committee for threeblocks of 3,600 square miles each (see figure A-2), itwould then conduct a more detailed seismic survey of thethree-block area.

lss~h ~~~~ IXICIU&S identi!lcdon of the ~% tie mso~ subj~[ to prospecting, the prospxting methods and work program, and the monimring and prevenfiooplactlm, an amesmem of ezlv uwnmemal impacts; and orgamzauonal and fmanclal qualifications.

14FoT C+le, ~ A.K. CoopeT, F.I. Davcy, ad K. Hinz, ‘‘Rms SCa_iOgy, HY~~ pokamal,” Odand Gas Jouf?ud, VO1. 86, No. 45, Nw, 7, 1988, pp. 54-58.


Box A-3—A Hypothetical Reconnaissance Seismic Survey

Within the Ross Sea, three prospective structural basins are indicated that warrant investigation by seismic methods. Thesebasins and some of their physical characteristics are:

Basinal area with sediments Maximum indicated thickness Nautical MilesBasin >16,000’ thick in square nautical miles thickness of sediments in feet Seismic LineVictoria Land Basin . . . . . 8,650 nm2 46,000 (14,000 meters) 1,400Central Trough . . . . . . . . . 2,500 nm2 20,000 (6,000 meters) 1,500Eastern Basin . . . . . . . . . . 11,000 nm2 20,000 (6,000 meters) 2,700

Total = 5,600

Reconnaissance seismic surveying is conducted over the entirety of the Victoria Land Basin and the Central Trough. However,in the Eastern Basin (45,000 square nautical miles total area) much of the basin has a comparatively thin sedimentary cover;accordingly, only the deeper, potentially oil-bearing portions of the basin are investigated. All seismic surveying is carried outin open water. The lines are shot over a 20-nautical-mile grid. A map showing the approximate positions of the seismic linesis attached (figure A-l).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989.

Figure A-l—The Ross Sea, Antarctica: Reconnaissance Seismic Survey Lines

. 740S

~,-’- McMurdo Stn.,’

Ross Ice Shelf

-.

The reconnaissance lines will be shot Reconnaissance seismic

over a 20 nautical-mile grid across Basin line males

indicated structural basins Victoria Land Basin 1,400 nm

#

Central Trough 1,500 nm

Seismic lines Eastern Basin 2,700 nm

Total 5,600 nm

SOURCE: J.N. Garrett, “The Antarctic Minerals Regime: A Petroleum Industry Perspective,” OTA contractor report, January 1989, Adapted from D.H. Elliot,“Antarctica: Is There Any 011 and Natural Gas?” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 35.


Box A-4-A Possible Approach To DelimitingBlocks for Petroleum Operations in Antarctic

Walers

The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Min-eral Resource Activities does not specify the size of, or themethods of determining, the blocks within which mineralextractive activities may be undertaken in Antarctica.Block size and designation in the Convention are notspecified. Reference to such blocks is made in Article 43only to the extent that the Antarctic Mineral ResourcesCommission will ‘‘adopt measures with respect tomaximum block sizes’ and that the relevant RegulatoryCommittee will ‘‘make provision for a limit in appropri-ate circumstances on the number of blocks to be accordedto any party. ”

A practical approach to the delimitation of blockspertinent to offshore petroleum operations is suggestedhere. The blocks would be vastly larger than thoseassociated with the Gulf of Mexico or North Sea tractsbecause they must be large enough to facilitate opera-tional flexibility and maximize the chances of discoveryof billion-barrel plus oil fields. If the blocks are not verylarge, the petroleum industry would be unwilling toundertake Antarctic operations.

‘The plan subdivides areas into blocks, each of whichis 60 nautical miles on a side (i.e., each block sidecorresponds to one degree of longitude as measured at theequator). The dimensions of each block are:Unit Area

Square nautical miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,600Square statute miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,774Square kilometers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,364Acres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............3,055,259Hectares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..........1,236,430

The blocks apply, in this example, to the Ross Sea;wherever a block crosses a land/sea interface, only theseaward block portion constitutes explodable/exploitableacreage. The block grid system begins immediately northof the Ross Ice Shelf. The block mumbering system startsin the southwest, near McMurdo Station, with Blocks 1A,IB, IC . . . progressing eastward; block grid numbersincrease progressively northward. See map in figure A-2.


If results of the detailed seismic work indicate thepresence of many structural features, several would bedrilled and tested, These are known as wildcat wells. OTAassumes the first four wildcat wells are either dry or did

not penetrate a commercial discovery but that the fifthwell indicates a significant oil discovery. This is agenerally optimistic assumption for exploration successin a new frontier area, but it could be realistic ifsubstantial y more scientific assessment of resourcepotential is accomplished.

Following intensive testing of the initial discoverywell, OTA assumes that 11 additional wells are drilled toascertain the extent of the discovery, the vertical height ofthe oil column, and whether or not a primary gas cap ispresent. Table A-1 illustrates the assumed field character-istics of this discovery.

The assumptions made here about wildcat well num-bers, the extent of delineation drilling, and the size andcharacteristics of the oil field are very optimistic, andrepresent a “best case’ scenario. It is not necessarily themost likely scenario, but it illustrates what a developmentmight look like, what technologies are needed, what itmight cost, and how long it would take to develop, Bymaking favorable assumptions, OTA has established abaseline scenario that could be modified with a number ofless favorable assumptions.

A Hypothetical Development Program

OTA assumes that, on the completion of delineationwells, the consortium, through the sponsoring state,would apply to the Regulatory Committee for a development permit. This application would be accompanied byan updated and more detailed description of the development plan, including the well spacing scheme, platformand gathering facility design, drilling and platforminstallation schedule, and the estimated field productionprofile. It would detail the transportation methods andwould include a detailed, updated environmental impactstatement for the planned development. The Sponsorwould recertify the technical competence and the finan-

Table A-1-Characteristics of Hypothetical Discovery

Field Average net oil Recoverableclassification Field area oil reserves

Super-giantfield . . . . . . . 31,500 acres 200 feet 4 billion bbls.

NOTE: In the assumed discovery, no primary gas cap is penetrated, the oilpool is determined to be undersaturated and the reservoir drivemechanism is a partial water drive in conjunction with solution gasexpansion.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989


Figure A-2—A Hypothetical Plan for Dellmiting Blocks Dedicated to Offshore Petroleum Operation

. 740S

f ,C--.-.

\\

\\

Edward VllPeninsula

I #- - - - - ~ :. a)- - - /’I

. \ -4’

Each square block measures Area dimensions of each block60 nautical miles on eachside (i. e., each block side

Unit Acres

corresponds to one degree of Square nautical miles 3.600longitude at the equator) Acres 3,055,255

SOURCE: J.N. Garrett, “The Antarctic Minerals Regime: A Petroleum Industry Perspective,” OTA contractor report, January 1989. Adapted from D.H. Elliot,“Antarctica: Is There Any Oil and Natural Gas?” Oceanus, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1988, p. 35.

cial capability of the consortium to carry out the updated discovery would have been unclear when the initial plandevelopment plan. was drawn up,)

If the Regulatory Committee approved the updated In the OTA scenario, the approved development plan

development plan,15 a development permit would beprovides for drilling 258 producing wells and 48 water

issued. (Note that the development plan that was submit-injectors from 6 production platforms. Peak production

ted as part of the original application for the explorationcapacity is 700,000 barrels of oil per day, and the expectedfield life is in excess of 30 years, during which approxi-

permit would have been more general because the size and mately 4 billion barrels of oil would be produced (see boxproducing characteristics of the anticipated oil field A-5).

Appendix A--4evelopment of an Antarctic Oil Field • 165

BOX A-5—Summary of Physical and TechnicalAspects of the Hypothetical Oil Field

The Oil Field

. Field dimensions: 10 miles long x 5 miles wide

. Reservoir depth: 8,900 feet to 9,300 feet subsea• Average net oil sand thickness: 200 feet. Crude oil gravity: 32 degrees American Petroleum

Institute. Crude oil type: sweet● Water depth: 2,500 feet

Recoverable Oil Reserves. Reservoir volume: 6,300,000 acre feet. Oil initially in place: 10 billion barrels. Recoverable oil reserves: 4 billion barrels

Producing Characteristics● Type of platform: floating drilling/production/

storage vessel; high-capacity mooring system; sub-sea wells with production risers to floating vessel

● Well spacing = 120 acres/well. Total of 258 wells to drain the 31,500-acre field.. Six platforms: 43 production wells and 8 water

injection wells each.. Maximum producing rate: 700,000 barrels per day. First production platform yield 125,000 barrels per

day for 8 years.

Transportation. Icebreaking shuttle tankers to ice-flee terminal

Support. All facilities on platform. Crew/resupply with shuttle tankers

Development Schedule. Commercial exploration: 2,000-2,010. Initial discovery: 2,010-2,020. Develop initial field: 2,020-2,030. Start production: 2,030-2,040

Note: The production rate for this hypothetical field IS low compared withother world class fields. A high production rate would improvethe resulting economics.


Hypothetical Development TechnologiesThree basic development systems could be used in this

scenario. The actual system used would depend mainly on

the prevailing ice conditions at the field site. System Awould be used if the field were located where only sea iceis present and large icebergs are rare. System B would beused in an area where large icebergs were more frequent,thus requiring disconnection of the surface platform fromthe wellheads. System C would be used on an ice shelf oron the ice capon land. In general, then, *‘A’ would be anappropriate system farthest out to sea (or where icebergsare a rare occurrence), “B” closer to the shoreline (orwhere large icebergs are more frequent), and “C’ onpermanent ice. The following briefly describes thefeatures of the three possible systems.

System A

This would incorporate large floating systems and beused in deep water where very large icebergs wereextremely rare. It would have disconnect features thatwould allow it to be located in areas where icebergs mightbe unusual. Further, such systems could be designed towithstand icebergs as large as 1 mile square and 300 feetthick. A number of such systems have been tested orp r o p o s e d . 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 O n e i s s h o w n in f igure A - 3 .

System B

This approach incorporates substantial subsea systems,including seafloor well heads with advanced controlsystems and two phase pumps that allow oil to betransferred long distances. The production and storagesystem would be located remotely in a floating vessel, onthe seafloor, or on land. Figure A-4 shows a floatingvessel with emergency disconnect features.

Seafloor oil storage systems would allow fields to bedeveloped in regions where icebergs are abundant andwould make unnecessary the use of permanent surfacefacilities above well heads, From storage, oil could betransferred to surface facilities located up to severalhundred miles away in an iceberg-tie area. Access towell heads could be achieved during ice-free months fromthe surface above. Recent industry designs, proposals, andR&D on components needed to develop this system

160,D. Wa@~ S.P. Kah, md J.J. Every, ‘Model Testing of a DecpwaLer SAL~*r SYSUXIL’ Bntuh hfariwne Technology, Offshore Twhnology Conference paper5672, 1988, p. 505.

1’7R. Wl]mm Cw=m ~ Wmb L~, “A Re~ew of & ~velpt of tie SWOpS Subma EOdUCtiOII SyStCIII, ’ ‘ Offshore Technology Conferencep~ 5724, 1988,p. 373.

i8J.E, fi~md ~d T.L, Job, ~M ~~hm c~; s. H- pl~id 01~ CO.; and L.c. Kwok. /-k& ~fShOM COT; ‘‘A Summary of a Multi-Faceted phySiCd ModelTest Program of a Floating Drdhng and RaJuction Systerm” Offshore Tedmolo~ COrlf15t311CC PSPC? 5674, 1988, p. 523.

19R.J, AU4 ReaduIg and Bates Drilling CO., ‘‘Integratd Motion, Stabihty, and Mnable Load Des]gn of the Trendseuer Class .%nisubmcrsible Zane Barns,” OffahOrekdmdog)’ ~mnce pSpCT %~, 1988, p. 87.


Figure A-3-Antarctica Development System “A” (lceberg-Free Region)

Floating sparfor drilling, production Shuttle tankerfacilities & storage (dynamically positioned

(ice-strengthened hull) ice-strengthened hull)

High strengthmooring linesor tubulars(ice resistant)

\

Anchor-:, --‘“es / Subsea wells ~ 1111

SOURCE: Deep Oil Technology, Inc., “Technology and Coet for Offshore Oil Development in Antarctica,” OTA contractor report, November 1988.

Figure A-4-Antarctica Development System “B” (Iceberg Region)

}5 to 50 miles

{

Drilling/workover vessel a

(Ice-strengthened hull)Remote production/storage vesselb Shuttle tanker(Ice-strengthened hull, (dynamically positioned

m ice-resistant mooring) . Ice-strengthened hull)

Multiwell seafloortemplate andtwo-phase flowpump

\

High-strength

Anchorpile

/~- - y - / — - - < a - - - y-.~- - - - - 7 4+,-

‘ Vessel is on Iocation only during drilling operationsb Other storage options Include seafloor storage or land storage

SOURCE: Deep Oil Technology, Inc., “Technology and Cost for Offshore Oil Development in Antarctica,” OTA contractor report, November 1988.

Appendix A-Development of an Antarctic Oil Field 167

provide a basis for projecting the availability of thistechnology. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 If gas/oil mixtures couldbe pumped long distances and production complexescould operate effectively on the seafloor, a total produc-tion system could be built. The general problem ofmoving oil/gas mixtures long distances before processingis one the industry has been working on for a long time.

System C

From the ice shelf or on glacier ice covering the landmass (figure A-5), oil could be extracted through an openhole filled with heated water or another nonfreezingliquid. The well head would be located on the seafloor (orland) and connect by risers to the surface facility. Theconcept presumes that, where the ice is moving, the holecould be advanced by continuously melting the icesurrounding the risers to keep the surface facility posi-tioned over the wellhead. The concept would use anapproach similar to deepwater floating production plat-forms that are operating in many locations today.

System A would use mostly existing technology;system B would use existing technology and that cur-rently under development. Its key components (subSeawells, multiphase pumps, seafloor separators, and reliablecontrol systems and disconnect features) would be in useelsewhere before the year 2020. System C is the mostspeculative, but appears feasible and could be investi-gated more closely once the characteristics of thick ice arebetter understood. Some R&D on this technology hasalready been done.29

The transportation portion of each of the above systemsprobably requires only a modification of existing technol-ogy or past designs. 3031 Oil could be moved by tankerfrom Antarctica to ice-free land locations for shipment tomarkets in the Northern Hemisphere, Distances to ice-tie

Photo Credit: Exxon

In 1969 the S.S. Manhatten tested the feasibility oftransporting oil by ice-strengthened tanker through the

Northwest Passage.

locations could range from 1,000 to 2,000 miles. Specialicebreaking or ice-strengthened tankers and icebreakerswould be used to transport oil to transfer terminals. Fromhere the oil could be shipped to any location in the world.Pipelines could also be used to transfer oil from variouspoints within Antarctica to loading points only along veryselective routes. Hazards such as ice scouring andpermafrost would have to be taken into consideration. Ifthe hazards appeared substantial enough, new technolo-gies might have to be developed.

An oil field in relatively deep, iceberg-free water, usingSystem A, appears at present the most likely type ofAntarctic oil field to be developed. Subsequent develop-ment, if any, might then move closer to the shorelinewhere icebergs would be more of a problem. Later,

~. Darde ssxi A. hfailJe, Total<P; and P. Dursndo, Inst. Frsncais du Petrole, “Gne-Megawatt Subsea Matable EIxtric Ccnnector: Key to MuJuphase Pump ~ve~bly—Now FMd Proven,” Offshore Tedtnology Conference paper %47, 1988, p. 263.

2tM.P. Amaudcau, Inst. Prancais du Peuole, “Developrrtent of a Two-phase Oil Pumping System for Evacuating Subsoa Production Without Processing Over a kngDstance: PoaeIdon project,” Gffshme Twhrmlogy Conference paper 5648, 1988, p. 271.

~H.A Herwig @ J.M. cattanach, Ferranti Subsea SYS@TIS I-d., ‘‘S~zatlon of North Sea Multiplexed Control Systems for Ilvm-Assisted Developments, ’Offshore Technology Conference papcs 5670, 1988, p, 489.

23R.J. Empt.age, Cameron ISOXI W* L~, 1‘A Review of the Satellite Production System (SPS) Ness Development,” Gffshore Tdmology Conference papez 5723, 1988,p. 367.

UK. HO@n& ABB.ALOITI A&anced SysLCms, and E. Nesse, StatoIl ~, ‘‘A New Approach to Subsea Intervention,’ Offshore Tedmology Confcrertcepsper 5728, 1988,p. 407.

2S. .~s~ ~tim wl~out pla~m?” ~~~re /MoTora:wg T& OI/~, btanatimd ~lt]~ vol. 48, No. 12, Dcc=k 1988.

“’%pasadng Separat.km From the Platfornu” O@wre lncorporutmg The Ohm, International Edition, vol. 48, No. 12, tlecemtm 1988.m, IM~tip~ ~ps fkhvCRd tO Researc h Particqxmts,” ~shore !ncorporohg the Ohan, htematiortd Edition, VOI. 48, No. 12, December 1988.

~K.J. Fardy, @l.f CMMdS R=OWXS Ltd., and S.P. Singeetharn, FMC Crop., PeBoleurrt Equipment Group, ‘ ‘Application of a Moddied SubSea Wellhead S@enr onMohkpaq, a Mobile Arctic Caisson Rig m the Canadian Beaufort Sea, Offshore Technology Conkrencepa per5790, 1988, p. 403.

%.C. Kuwinen, Polar Ice Conttg Office, University of Nebrssiu-Lincdn, ‘ ‘Ice Dnlhng Technology,’ paper presented at Polar Drilling Workshop, Byrd Polar Researchcenter, The Oluo State Univerwty, Columbus, OH, Nov. 6-9, 1988.

~S. G- ~ D Sue-, , ‘Field ~d M*1 Tes~ for ~ct~ tie Ixbr- Rmuti of the ARC(I ASCUC TticT, ’ ‘ k-ctic Oil Technology Conference, 1985.3 1 1 4 ~ v e l _ O f SIl IC~TankeJ Trartsporration System for North slope Alaskan Gss,’ ‘ LNG Conference, Ims Angelea, CA, 1986.


Figure A-5-Antarctica Development System “C” (Ice Shelf or Ice Cap)

Drilling workover rig Mobile production

surface trees\

facility

n Flexible / Pipeline loading\

/ terminal -

r 1

—

Heated water

Multiwell template

Ice

SURCE: Deep Oil Technology, Inc., “Technology end Cost for Offshore Oil Development in Antarctica,” OTA contractor report, November 1988.

drilling on the ice shelf or ice itself could be tested. Someexperts, however, argue that a system mounted on the iceshelf, System C, could be the easiest to develop; moreengineering studies are needed to verify this contention.

Though OTA’S most likely scenario presumes that oildevelopment would start from seaward locations andmove toward land, costs probably would change radicallyas developments move landward. Since it is also muchmore difficult to estimate costs for a hypotheticaldevelopment with technologies yet-to-be tested, OTA hasprepared cost estimates only for System A.

Obviously, accurate cost estimates for development ofan Antarctic oil field cannot be made at present. Neverthe-less, a general look at Antarctic oil production costs cartbe instructive. The assumptions and resulting figuresbased on the System A approach can be supported byanalogy to existing operations. Expert participants in anOTA workshop on oil and gas development potentialconsidered the following cost estimates for System Areasonable. Some even considered the following esti-mates too high compared to present, similar operations.

Experts consider the likely costs of production usingSystems B or C to be much higher, but this may not be thecase if more appropriate technologies are developed in thefuture.

System A (figure A-3) would produce the hypothetical4-billion-barrel field in the Ross Sea, as described. Suchan operation is comparable to the recently announcedplans of Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. for the Hibernia field onthe Grand Banks off Newfoundland. This harsh-environment field in iceberg-filled waters is planned to bebuilt over the next few years. A large concrete gravitystructure will hold the main production facilities. Threeice-strengthened shuttle tankers will transport oil to shore.

Hypothetical Development Economics

OTA prepared a brief analysis of costs and profitabilityof a System A operation using the above assumptions.The estimated cost of exploration, development, andtransportation is given in table A-2. The analysis esti-mates the profitability of oil field development undervarious economic scenarios that might prevail in the

AppendixA--4evelopment of an Antarctic Oil Field . 169

Table A-2--Cost Summary for HypotheticalDevelopment of a 4-Billion-Barrei Field-

(System A) (1886 Dollars)

Expenditures $Billions

NOTE: The above costs mchde delivery of produced oil to an cc-freetermmal m southern South Amerut. Added transportation costs toa major refinery would be comparable to that for transport from thePersmn Gulf to U.S. refineries<

SOURCE: Office of Technology heessment, 19S9.

future. The results and findings are illustrative rather thandefinitive. Many unverifiable assumptions about thepresence of hydrocarbons and the cost of developing themhad to be made, A conventional discounted cash flowmodel (employing a discount rate of 10 percent) was usedto measure the profitability of hypothetical projects thatmight arise in Antarctica. It provides for an annualaccounting of exploration, development, and productionactivities; and all associated expenditures, productionflows, revenues, and tax payments for each year of aproject’s life.

Each project evaluated consists of an individual oilfield. Project accounting allows for several dry holes priorto the discovery of a substantial oil deposit, extendsthroughout the field delineation, development and pro-duction stages, and ends when annual production hasfallen to the point where continued extraction is unprofit-able for the Operator (the economic limit). At that pointthe wells are plugged and the project is abandoned. Thelength of the project (in years) can vary depending on thesize of the hypothetical deposit and the assumed level ofoil prices.

In order to evaluate the possible effect of field size oneconomics, three hypothetical oil deposits were evalu-ated, containing 250, 1,000, and 4,000 million barrels ofrecoverable oil reserves respectively. The delineation anddevelopment programs reflect assumed individual physi-cal characteristics of each field.

In addition to the above, model inputs include parame-ters that define the economic environment: world oil

price, the Operator’s discount rate (cost of capital), andtax rules that might pertain to future income andexpenditures from Antarctic operations. The tax regimeused is similar to that for offshore oil operations in theUnited States. The entire analysis uses constant 1988dollars, so costs and oil prices are quoted in today’sdollars, and the discount rate is measured in real terms.Subsequent inflation would affect the nominal levels ofall these variables, but the net effects of these changes onprofitability would largely cancel out.

The results of this modeling exercise indicate that largeoil deposits (of world-class giant or larger size) could bedeveloped in Antarctica if oil prices rise to at least double1988 prices. Figure A-6 illustrates these results byplotting net present value (after tax) for the three fieldsizes in the scenarios modeled. Only the 4-biliion-barrelsupergiant field is profitable with an oil price aboutdouble the current price. The smaller fields requirethree to eight times current prices.

The financial uncertainties are substantial. Will oilprices rise high enough and remain high enough to permitprivate operators to earn an adequate return on theirinvestments? Box A-6 discusses four important caveatsthat could modify the results of this analysis,

Figure A-6--Oil Field Profitability

Net present value is plotted against a range of prices for threehypothetical oil fields. An oil field can be developed profitably if itsnet present value is greater than zero. Only the 4-billion-barrelsupergiant field is profitable with an oil price about double thecurrent price. Smaller fields would require much higher prices.

SOURCE J,L. Smith, “Profdabdlty of Antarct~ Oil Exploration and Devel-opment,” OTA contractor report, December 1988.


Box A-6--Caveats

The following four caveats should be considered. Theyhave important implications regarding the likelihood ofpetroleum development in Antarctica.1. The presumed real discount rate in the analysis of 10

percent may be too low for companies contemplatinglarge investments in highly speculative and riskyprojects. Although the 10 percent figure seems appro-priate for investments being made in offshore petr-oleum provinces today, the hurdle rare for Antarcticinvestments could be significantly higher. The impactof higher discount rates would be to raise minimumeconomic prices and minimum economic field sizes,to lengthen the payback period, and to reduce theprobability of substantial investments.

2. The analysis excludes the cost of most geological andseismic research that must be incurred prior to thediscovery of a significant oil field. It is understood thatthe prospective profitability of ultimate discoveriesmust offset these front-end costs before sizableinvestments will be made in the Antarctic. Due to thelong lead times that separate these early explorationcosts from ultimate revenues, and the high carryingcosts associated with these capital expenditures, it issafe to assume that the expectation of highly profitableoil fields will be necessary to stimulate any explora-tion in the Antarctic.

3. All timing assumptions (see table 2) are highlyspeculative, but very influential in the calculation ofthe profitability of individual fields. The prospect oflengthy certification or environmental permit proce-dures at each step will discourage private operatorsfrom attempting the process at all. Since certificationand permitting procedures pertaining to Antarctica arenot yet in place, it is difficult to judge the reasonable-ness of the time lags assumed, However, actual timelines could easily be longer.

4. The estimated cost of infrastucture in the modelassumes that a single field must bear the full cost ofgathering lines, transshipment terminals, and speciallyequipped tankers. In reality, some of these costs couldbe shared among several fields that might be discov-ered in the same area. Satellite fields, therefore, mighthave a lower hurdle to clear if initial discoveries causethe industry to put some common infrastructure inplace.

OTA’s analysis indicates that the potential ofAntarctic oil versus other alternatives cannot bedetermined with current knowledge. Oil from Antarc-tica might be more or less expensive to develop than thatfrom the Chukchi Sea or tar sands, heavy oil or oil shale,and other options. The costs to develop a particularAntarctic field will of course depend on its size, quality,and location. Some fields might be relatively inexpensiveto develop, whereas others may be prohibitively expen-sive; the same is true for the unconventional depositselsewhere in the world. Predictions of the costs to developalternatives have often errored on the low side, becausedevelopment costs themselves are tied to the price of oiland because proponents have portrayed their proposals inthe best light.

In view of these arguments, what is the likely future forAntarctic oil development? OTA’s best guess-and it isonly a guess-is that supergiant fields of 4 billionbarrels or more could be developed in Antarctica by2020 or thereabouts if such fields exist and can befound and if the constraints in the Minerals Conven-tion can be overcome by a major internationalOperator assisted by a supportive Sponsor.

SUMMARYCommercial development of Antarctic oil reserves

could be feasible in the next century but only if severaloptimistic assumptions prove out, These include techno-logical advances; sustained, relatively high oil prices; anda reduction in excess OPEC production capacity thatcurrently depresses the world oil market. It will alsorequire the presence and discovery of large oil deposits,an expeditious process for resolving environmental andoperating policies, and sensible and measured taxation ofAntarctic oil revenues.

OTA concludes that if any one of these assumptions donot hold, oil development in Antarctica will not occur.Under the most favorable assumptions, commercial oildevelopment appears unlikely before three decadeshence. Early success in a concerted exploration campaigncould also be critical to viable, later development.

Appendix B

Metal Mining in Antarctica

INTRODUCTIONCommercial mining in Antarctica, if ever allowed,

would face not only the continent’s harsh climate andremoteness, but also uncertainties about the geology,environment technology, legal regime, and commoditymarkets. The high costs of mining under these conditionswould limit commercial interest to ‘‘world class’ depos-its containing large amounts of very high grade ore andmineable with proven technologies. They would alsoprobably have to be in the more accessible and/orhospitable areas of the continent.

The geology of Antarctica suggests that viable orebodies may exist, although none have been discovered sofar. So it will be some time before mining occurs, Ittypically takes nearly a decade or longer to find, delineate,and develop mineral deposits and meet permitting re-quirements. Even if exploration were to begin immedi-ately, mining is unlikely before the next century. Giveneconomic and political constraints, production is notexpected to occur for at least two to three decades.

This appendix examines the technical and economicconsiderations for future Antarctic mines. 1 It assumes thatthe Convention will allow mining and that metalscommodity prices will remain within their historic ranges.It also assumes that innovation in mining and processingtechnologies will continue to be evolutionary, not revolu-tionary. The analysis begins with a review of miningtechnologies now used in the Arctic, and then looks at thepossibility of adapting these to Antarctica.

THE ARCTICMines have been operated in severe winter climates

near or north of the Arctic Circle for more than 30 years.Copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, iron, coal, and otherminerals are currently produced in the northern regions ofNorth America, Greenland, Scandinavia, and the SovietUnion (see table B-l).

The conditions at each site differ, but all Arctic minesface low temperatures and high winds. Some mines mustalso contend with ice conditions that make production andtransportation difficult. The weather can be so severe thatroads and ports become impassable and mines andprocessing facilities are occasionally inoperable. Ex-

tended shut down periods (i.e., partial year operatingschedules) are common. None but the richest deposits areeconomically attractive under these conditions. Theseclimatic conditions require special approaches to design,operation, and maintenance in mining, processing, tail-ings disposal, and infrastructure support.

MiningOpen pit and underground mines, both of which exist

in the Arctic, use similar approaches to the problems ofcold, wind, and ice. For example, where the ground ispermafrost buildings and other surface facilities areelevated or kept at subfreezing temperatures to preventmelting the ice.

Technologies used at Arctic mines have evolved tooperate at -40” F and lower and in winds of 80 miles anhour and more.2 Machinery is constructed of special steelalloys and rubber compounds, and uses special lubricantsdesigned for cold weather use. Mobile equipment such asdrills, trucks, shovels, loaders, bulldozers, and scrapers,are all furnished with heating systems and kept runningcontinuously to prevent freezing during the severe periodsof the winter. Equipment is shut down only for mainte-nance. Diesel fuel contains additives to permit continuousflow at low temperatures and to prevent waxing inengines. Hydraulic and electrical lines employ speciallydesigned tubing or coatings that maintain their flexibilityat low temperatures. Drilling, if necessary, is generallydone dry or with a brine solution. Explosives must bedesigned to perform at low temperatures.

Underground Mines

Underground mining methods have been used in theArctic for the past 100 years. Finland, Norway, andSweden were the first to use these methods; Canada hasfollowed in the last 10 to 15 years. Notable examples ofunderground mines are the Black Angel mine in Green-land and the Polaris (see box B-1 ), Lupin, and Nanisivikmines in the Northwest Territories of Canada. 3

Underground mining methods generally are used fordeep ore bodies where the costs of overburden removalwould exceed those of developing and maintaining therequired below ground facilities. In the Arctic, anadditional consideration is that underground mines are forthe most part protected from the wind and blowing snow.

IW ~=logl~] fx~ tit tiwt Anwctlc msnersIs potentd were chscussed m ch. 4. The ~vlr onmental unpacts that could occur from nurung operatmts are discussedm ch. 5. PohtIcal factors related to the adoption of the rmnerals convention, and the rights and assurances It affords to commercial operators and mves[ors, are chscussed usch 3.

2M@gW G~log]~] Gxssulmg, ‘ ‘Assessment of Mtnmg and Process Technology for Amarmc Mineral Development, ’ OTA contractor report, November 1988.3COMINC0, 1 IpoIU1s we. ProductSon Success m the Rugged Arctic, ’ Mmmg i%gmeermg, October 1984, pp 1401-1406. J.K. Gowans, “Producing kid and Zinc

m Canada’s H@t Arctsc,” AIME Preprtnl 84-W (Ins Angeles, CA: March 1984).

-171-


Table B=l-Arctic Nonfuel Mineral Facilities

Name Location Commodity Company Operation Latitude Status

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Wnes, PC-ADIT data system.

Drilling, blasting, loading, hauling, shaft or ramp haulageto surface, and ventilation systems are usually all enclosedand operate at temperatures from -20°F to near freezing.Support facilities may also be located underground forprotection from the weather. Transportation permitting,yealr-round operations are usually possible.

Permafrost in the Arctic can be up to 2,000 feet thick,and ice layers can be found in the rock. However, minershave developed techniques to cope with these problems.Two examples of underground mining in which ice andmixed ice-rock is encountered are the Nanisivik andPolaris lead-zinc mines.4

Shaft sinking technology has improved such that it canbe performed in subfreezing conditions in the Arctic withthe same efficiency as elsewhere. However, special

approaches may be required where ground thawing is athreat (see box B-l).

Open Pit MinesThere are few open pit mines in the Arctic. Examples

are Cyprus Anvil (Fare) in the Yukon, Aitik in Sweden,and Red Dog (see box B-2), currently under developmentin Alaska,5 Most open pit mines operate through thesevere winter conditions. A few operations, however, areseasonal and may shut down for 3 to 4 months of thewinter. This is done more because of the workers’ limitedability to function at the sustained low temperatures thanthe equipments’ performance under these conditions.

Open pit mines are, by definition, exposed to theweather, so they must contend with very low temperaturesin the Arctic. Of major importance is the ability of

‘%. Daytom ‘‘Bolidcn Takes a Qua-tying Corxcpt Underground at one of Europe’s Larger bad Mmcs,’ E&M./, February 1981, pp. 67-73. R. Fish, ‘The Place W&mPeople Find Things- Nsnmvik Mines in Canada’s High Arctic,’ Ca&n Mmuig Journal, Septanbex 1978, pp. 344 Shaf

5J.C. HO@UIB, “Gakmizing he Anvil,” CanaduM Mining Journal, August 1986, pp. 17-18. L. Wln[e, “Copper from the Swdsh Arctic,” E&IUJ, February 19S4, pp.29-33. H.M. ~egerich. “Pmgrcss Repot-I oaCOMINCO’s Red Dog Projec[ m Alaska, Second Largest Zmc Deposit Ever Dmcovcxed,’ Mining Engineenng, Decernlxr 1986,pp. 1097-1101.

Appendix B-Metal Mining in Antarctica ● 173

Box B-1—Polaris: An Arctic Underground Mine1

The Polaris lead-zinc mine (75° N. latitude) is located on Little Cornwallis Island, Northwest Territories, Canada near thesettlement of Resolute Bay. It is owned and operated by Vancouver-based COMINCO, Ltd. and is the western world’s mostnortherly base metal-mine.

had-zinc mineralization was discovered on Little Cornwallis Island in 1960. In 1972, following 10 years of explorationand several years of core drilling, the sizable ore body was confirmed. The ore assays at 12 percent zinc and 3 percent lead(compared with an average of 5.9 percent zinc and 2.4 percent lead at zinc mines worldwide).2 In 1979, after 5 years of engineeringand environmental feasibility studies, COMINCO announced it would proceed with development of the mine. Constructionbegan in 1980 and was completed by 1982 at a cost of about $125 million and roughly $35 million in working capital.3 It hasoperated continuously and profitably since.

Temperature extremes range from a winter low of -58° F to a high of 59°F in August. Continuous darkness prevails fromNovember through February, and continuous daylight exists from April to August. Freeze-up begins in September. Offshore,ice thickness increases from 1 foot in October to 7 feet in May. The permafrost extends to a depth of approximately 1,400 feet.Only the top few inches thaw in the summer.

The major feature of mining at Polaris is the absolute necessity of preventing thawing. Because the entire ore body is locatedin permafrost, the ore is porous and the voids contain ice. If allowed to thaw, the stability of the mine openings would severelydeteriorate. To ensure freezing conditions, four refrigeration units are used in the summer to cool the ventilation air. In the winter,the natural -25°F ventilation compensates for the heat generated by the mining equipment. Inhibiting thawing also extends tothe backfilling operation. In many underground mines, the backfill material is mill tailings combined with cement, Mill tailingswould add too much heat to the Polaris mine, so shale mined at the surface is used instead. A small amount of fresh water is addedto this fill to freeze it in place for stability.

Polaris is located on the coast, so the need for roads was limited to those at the mine site. The mill was constructed on abarge in southern Canada and towed to the mine site. At high tide, the barge was floated into a prepared lagoon and berthed. Thelagoon was then backilled. The 100 foot by 400 foot multilevel barge houses the concentrator, power generator, maintenanceshops, offices, assay lab, warehouse, and fuel oil storage.

The concentrates are stored in an unheated building with a capacity for 220,000 tons of concentrates. The shipping seasonat Polaris is normally 6 weeks long, from mid-August to the end of September. During this period, the year’s production ofconcentrates must be shipped out, and all supplies except perishable foods must be received. The concentrates are shippedprimarily to Europe for smelting and refining. Air service via Resolute Bay is available for personnel and food.

Mill tailings are disposed in Garron Lake. They are pumped 1.6 miles to the lake, where they are thickened and pumpeddeep below the lake surface. Garron Lake provides an acceptable environment for depositing the tailings due to its meromicticcharacter (no vertical circulation of the water). Below 66 feet, there exists a zone with three times the salinity of seawater thatcontains naturally occurring hydrogen sulfide. This precipitates any soluble heavy metals in the tailings slurry.

COMINCO has engineered a system which captures 93 percent of the energy value of the fuel oil burned to generate power.Waste heat from the electric generator is used to dry the concentrates and provide space heating. The accommodations for the200 workers are designed to provide as attractive an environment as possible. There are four living modules plus modules foradministration, dining, recreation, and service. The modules are positioned 5 feet off the ground to prevent thawing of permafrost.The recreation facility includes numerous indoor sports facilities, including a swimming pool. The southern (non- Inuit) personnelwork continuously for 10 weeks and then have 2 or 3 weeks off. Most are flown to their homes in Montreal, Toronto, Edmonton,Yellowknife, or elsewhere across Canada.

IT&cn ~fiIy hm 6‘ASSaSXIIa[ of Mining snd Precess Technology for Antucuc Mmerat Development, ’ November 1988, concr~c[m report preparedfor OTA by Msgcc Gccdo@cal Consuh.mg.

2An Appr~al ofhfmerab Avadabduyfor 34 Corrunodioes, Bulleun 692, Bureau of MURS, U.S. Departmen[ of tie ~L~lm (Wabgton, ~ 19g7).

3M~m J, & wit, ~lur~ ~~ M~g 01 An@rC[&a, ,$Cwtce and 7echAu10gy, &OfW??UCS d f’OfIfICJ (0~0~: cl~ndon ~cs~. 1985)

personnel to function efficiently at the sustained low Dredgingtemperatures that are encountered. Many operations, such Dredging is another mining technology used occasion-al drilling, loading explosives, and blasting must be allv in the Arctic. Alluvial deposits in shaIlow water areperformed with personnel exposed to severe cold. Survey- dredged during the summer in Alaska and the Yukon. Oneing, sample handling, secondary blasting, and other large gold dredge operates off the coast of arctic Alaskafunctions typically have to be performed outdoors. near Nome for about 5 months of the year,


Photo erdt; GOAWCQ Lfd.

The Polaris Mine at 75” N. latitude in the Canadian Arctic.

Processing

After an ore is mined, various processing steps are usedto extract the valuable metals or minerals it contains.Depending on the mineral, some combination of crushing,grinding, beneficiation, smelting, refining, or hydromet-allurgical processing are needed. Part of the processing isnormally done at the mine site, the remainder is doneelsewhere. The extent of mine-site processing depends onthe costs of transporting products and raw materials andthose of constructing and operating a processing facility.For an easily processed ore, such as gold, all processingmay be performed at the mine site. Arctic gold minescommonly have small furnaces and make gold bars. Basemetal mines in the Arctic, however, include only a mill(crushing, grinding, classification, and concentration).The concentrates are shipped elsewhere for smelting,refining, or hydrometallurgical processing. This particu-lar configuration is chosen because:

transporting ore that is of low value per ton to distantmills is prohibitively expensive;smelting economies-of-scale are such that few minesare large enough to support a competitive smeltertransporting processing fuel oil, fluxes, and othersupplies to the mine site is costly and further strainsthe already short shipping season; andthere are no proven hydrometallurgical processes fornonferrous metals which are economically viable ona small scale.

Common forms of beneficiation have been used in theArctic for copper, zinc, lead, and platinum group metals.6

The important feature in designing crushing circuits is tokeep ore from thawing and refreezing. For example, at thePolaris mine, primary crushing takes place undergroundat below freezing temperatures. Most Arctic grindingcircuits are located in a heated building. Flotation andother concentration circuits are always located in heatedbuildings.

Tailings Disposal and Water Treatment7

The selection of a disposal method for mill tailings isa very site-specific decision. All Arctic mills have had tomeet stringent environmental limitations, and in the caseof newer operations ‘‘zero discharge’ is the goal. RedDog uses a tailings dam and discharged water is treated toremove heavy metals. Mill tailings at the Polaris mine aredischarged into a lake where the high salinity coupledwith the naturally occurring hydrogen sulfide precipitatesthe soluble heavy metals contained in the tailings pulp. AtBlack Angel, where the tailings are discharged to thebottom of a fjord, the original disposal system resulted inlead contamination of the local marine life to the extentthat certain mussels were not suitable for consumption.Black Angel has since adjusted its milling process toreduce the heavy metal content (dissolution) of its millwaste, and increased the thoroughness of its tailingstreatment operations. The technical aspects of land-basedtailings disposal can be resolved, as shown by themethods used at Lupin and proposed for Red Dog.However, because of the need for earthen darns andadditional water treatment capacity, disposal on land isexpected to become more expensive than ocean disposal.

Infrastructure SupportMining requires a great deal of supporting infra-

structure, including power, water, roads, and sometimesrailroad and shipping facilities. In addition, airfields andpersonnel accommodations are required at remote mines.Most of the mining camps developed in the Arctic ofNorway, Sweden, and Finland had some nearby man-power, roads, port facilities, and power available within100 miles. Because North American Arctic mines aremore remote, more infrastructure had to be constructedspecifically for them. In general, governments have beensupportive of mine development in the far north, and haveat times assisted with infrastructure financing (e.g.,Nanisivik in Canada).

Power at most Arctic mines is generated by diesel fuel.This requires large amounts of fuel (on the order 4 million

dpla~m -p metals include phuinum, pdhdmrn, rhorhum. mtkuum, mdmrn, ~d OSmI~.?Mw@ @-@K@ tid~, op. cl~.! ‘Oomae 2’

.

Appendix B--Metal Mining in Antarctica ● 175

Box B-2—Red Dog: An Arctic Open Pit Minel

The Red Dog deposit (68° N latitude) is located in northwest Alaska near the Kotzebue Sound and the Chukchi Sea. Thedeposit contains 85 million tons of ore assaying 17.1 percent zinc, 5 percent lead, and 2.4 troy oz./ton silver. COMINCO, Ltd.is developing the mine, which will be the world’s largest zinc producer when it starts production. The 6,000 short ton/day projectis being built at a cost of $300 million, plus an additional $175 million for a port and the access road from the port to the mine.2

Production is scheduled to begin in late 1989.

The operation will consist of an open pit mine, a mill, concentrate storage buildings, tailings disposal facilities, maintenanceshop, a power facility, road and port facilities, and accommodations and recreation facilities for 300 people.

The mine will be a conventional open pit mine with 10-cubic-yard loaders and 50-to 85-ton haul trucks. Due to the minimumamount of waste which overlays the deposit, preproduction stripping is limited to several million tons; the life-of-mme strip ratioshould be very low (1.0 or less).3 A key element in the design of the pit is the placement of the waste rock. Weathering of thedeposit outcrop has caused heavy metals to enter Red Dog Creek. The mine plan calls for positioning the waste dumps tominimize the potential for additional natural leaching of heavy metals from this weathered outcrop material, which will not beprocessed initially.

The mill will incorporate the latest technology in order to minimize space requirements, maximize energy efficiency, andimprove recovery. The basic unit operations of the mill will be primary crushers; semi-autogenous (SAG), ball, and tower mills;Maxwell and column flotation cells; and pressure filters. The SAG mills are used to eliminate fine crushing with its inherentmaterial-handling problems for wet or frozen ore. The concentrates will be filtered using pressure filters, thus making itunnecessary to further dry the concentrates.

The mill tailings will be disposed behind a tailings dam constructed from material excavated from the mill site. The damwill be raised in stages over the life of the mine. Excess water and run-off water will be treated for removal of heavy metals priorto discharge to Red Dog Creek.

Power will be generated onsite, and the waste heat will be used to heat the process buildings, accommodation building, andincoming water. Those surface facilities which do not house process equipment will be pre-engineered buildings erected on site.The main mill facility and the accommodation building will be constructed of modules that have been preassembled in the UnitedStates or Asia. These modules, weighing up to 1,500 tons will then be transported by barge to the Red Dog port and hauled tothe mine site.

The Red Dog mine is inland, so ground transportation has to be available. A 52-mile all-weather road (including 10 bridges)from the port to the mine is being built at a cost of $2 million per mile. Concentrates out of, and supplies into, the mine will betransported with 150-ton trucks.

The Red Dog shipping season is estimated to be 100 days. The port facilities are limited by shallow water. Self-unloadingbarges will be required to transport the concentrates to offshore ships. The concentrates will be shipped to North America. Japan,South Korea and Europe for smelting and refining.

IT&m primarily from ‘‘Aaseaamcmt of Mining and Process Technology for Antarctic Mineral Dovclopmcm, ’ November 1988, report prcpamd for OTAby Mag= &Ob@Cid cimsuhmg.

2W ~ ~d road ~c ~ ~ f

usancd by the State of Alaska. COMINCO will pay a [olt fee of $17 per ton to tmmspon the concentrates3S~iprauo,~ ~ t~agc of w~~r~k -t -t be rCXTWV~ for every ton of ore extractd Since waste rCXYIOVld is C08LlY, ~OW s~p ra~ios edUIKX he v~ablhtY

of mlncs.

gallons per year at Polaris) to be transported north. The supplies for the next 9 months are transported. The Redfuel is brought by truck or ship. Fuel transport by ship isseasonally limited at the coastal Polaris and Black Angelmines and can require the use of ice breakers or reinforcedcargo vessels.

Road construction has been a major cost in some Arcticareas. The Lupin mine in the Northwest Territories has awinter road built on snow and lake ice. Supplies can movealong this road only during the winter months. This roadis 360 miles long, including 330 miles of ice roads acrossfrozen lakes. The road can be used for about 3 months ofthe year, during which time essentially all fuel and

Dog mine in Alaska is presently under construction, anda 52-mile access road to a port facility has been builtacross permafrost at a cost of $2 million per mile.

Materials handling at the mine, mill, storage, and portfacilities is another important consideration in Arcticmining operations. Special consideration during coldweather is required to prevent inappropriate freezing ofores, waste, tailings, slurry lines, conveyors, and concen-trates.

Air transport is essential for rapid movement ofpersonnel and related perishable food and emergency


supplies. It is also essential during the construction phaseto reduce construction time and costs. Each site must havea maintained airfield. Year-round operations must have anairfield designed for severe weather conditions.

Building construction in the Arctic is most oftenmodular. Building and equipment modules are built inmore temperate regions and transported to the mine sitefor final assembly. Module construction for infrastructurewas done at Polaris and Lupin and is underway for the RedDog mine in Alaska. In a unique design for Polaris, theentire processing plant was built on a barge, towed to adredged basin at the site, and permanently moored inplace.8

Accommodations for personnel are required at theremote Arctic mines. These quarters include recreationaland communications facilities for the workers. Waste heatfrom the generator systems is used for surface facility andplant heating in the Arctic.

EconomicsThe technology developed by the mining industry has

proved functional in severe Arctic conditions. The costsassociated with the special approaches to mining, process-ing, tailings disposal, and infrastructure support aregreater than in lower latitudes, but the mines have beeneconomic because of their higher grade ores. The ore atPolaris averages 12 percent zinc, whereas ore grades atzinc mines worldwide average 5.9 pecent.9 Coproductvalues may also be important. For example, the ore in theRed Dog deposit not only assays 17.1 percent zinc, butalso contains 5 percent lead and 2.4 troy oz./ton silver.

Table B-2 shows the difference in ore grade andoperating costs for selected Arctic and southern mines.For the mines listed in the table, the average operatingcosts of both underground and open pit mines in theArctic are more than twice as high as comparable minesfurther south. Ore grades are also significantly higher thanfor southern mines. Arctic deposits typically contain insitu ore valued at more than $200 per ton. 10 The risksinherent in Arctic mining lead companies to require areturn on their Arctic investments of 20 percent or more,compared with a 15 percent hurdle rate elsewhere.

Another consideration affecting the economics ofArctic mines is the size of the deposits. Because of thelarge capital costs involved, a deposit must be very large

and have suitable production to recover the investment.For example, the Red Dog mine, with 85 million tons ofore, will be the largest zinc mining operation in the worldwhen it reaches production. The capital cost is estimatedat $300 million not including the port and 52-mile accessroad to the mine, which are being built by the State ofAlaska for $175 million. At full capacity, the mine isdesigned to operate at a rate of 6,000 tons of ore per day.

Location is another economic consideration, par-ticularly with regard to transportation infrastructure.Occasionally, a deposit which may not be quite richenough or large enough to be developed independentlymay, through fortuitous location, become more economi-cally attractive by utilizing nearby infrastructure devel-oped for another deposit. For example, the Lik deposit, 12miles northwest of the Red Dog deposit may not havebeen as economically attractive on its own as it is with thenearby Red Dog deposit being developed. Thus far, theLik deposit has drilled reserves of approximately 24million tons assaying 9 percent zinc, 3 percent lead, and1.4 troy oz./ton silver.

ANTARCTICA

EnvironmentThe Antarctic environment is perhaps the first factor

that would affect the viability of a mining venture.Antarctica is the coldest, highest, windiest, and mostisolated continent on Earth. In addition, it has a cover ofice that limits rock exposure to about 100,000 squaremiles, or one-fiftieth of the total area of the continent. TheAntarctic Peninsula reaches within 500 miles of the tip ofSouth America, but in other sectors the closest land issome 1,400 miles distant.11

The isolation and ice cover create an environment moresevere than that in the Arctic, and mines would need to bedesigned to withstand low temperatures, high winds, andharsh storms. The mean temperatures in the coastal areasrange from about +32°F (in the warm months) to 0°F to-20°F (in the cold months). The interior, high polarplateau, is much colder, with mean temperatures of about-40°F in the warm months and as low as -90°F in the coldmonths. The northwestern part of the Antarctic Peninsulais milder because of its maritime climate; winter meantemperatures are +15 “F, and winds over its central part arepersistent but not fierce.—

EJ.K. @win, 1l’IIK POIti proczsa Barge, ’ CIhf Bulktin, April 1983, pp. 93-97.

9An Appr&al qfMlnerals Av~”labillIY for 34 CO mmoditia, Bulletin 692, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Dep arunent of tie Intior (Washington, DC: 1987).l% ~ltu ~ “due (m=~ ~ $~on) ~Ul~ &e -u of me~l(s) CCMmiSItd in a ton of ore muhiplmd by Ihe price of tic McM(s). T’b.is value mmt ~ $Wlcid ~ cover

all the operating costs and deprcmated capllal wsts of reunwring the metal(s) and getting II to market.1 ID,H Ellla, D*W, A Fr~ ork jor Assessing Enwronmentai lmpacu of Possible An&rctac Mmural Development (lnst.itute of Polar Studies, The Ohio StaLC

Univaraity, 1987).

Appendix Metal Mining in Antarctica ● 177

Table B-2—Lead/Zinc Producer Comparisons

Estimated

Storms are frequent, even in the milder coastal areas.Stormy conditions result from either surface flow of airfrom the continental interior (katabatic winds that areexceptionally violent in some coastal areas) or the passageof low pressure systems. Depressions are generatedfrequently in a circum-Antarctic belt between 70° and 60°latitude South, and strong westerly winds occur on thenorthern flank of this belt. Individual depressions mayform in less than a day and as many as six depressions invarious stages of growth and decay may occur at any onetime around the continent. These centers may follow oneanother with greater frequency than is experienced in theNorthern Hemisphere belt of westerlies, and there is littleassurance of calm conditions between successive centers.The southern parts of the depressions frequently penetratethe coastal regions of Antarctica and bring strong winds,blizzards, and heavy snowfall.

An Antarctic mine may have more difficulty accommo-dating the moving glacier ice than coping with theweather. The ice sheet presents a formidable challenge todesigning a mining system. It forms a slow-movingcarapace whose thickness in places exceeds 13,000 feet. 12

The ice cover restricts rock exposures to coastal regionsand to the summits of isolated peaks (e.g., in theTransantarctic and Ellsworth Mountains). At present nosystem to mine through this ice is considered economi-cally feasible, It will also be prudent to avoid building aport and road system on moving ice. Resupply may alsobe a serious problem in Antarctica-many thousands oftons of fuel and other supplies must be brought to amining operation. Interior areas would be the mostdifficult to resupply.

Logistical support for an Antarctic mine would behampered by the coastal ice shelves. Moreover, Antarc-tica is physically isolated by a pack ice belt that seasonallyextends 900 miles from the continent in some locations.The minimum sea ice cover occurs in March, but bySeptember sea ice cover has grown to nearly 8 millionsquare miles. The sea ice consists of individual floes 30to 300 feet across and up to 10 feet thick. In spring andsummer, however, the sea ice drifts northward and melts,and open water is encountered along many coastal areas.

MineralizationModerate climate, accessibility, and available knowl-

edge about mineral deposits suggest that the mostpromising area for mining is the Antarctic Peninsula. ThePeninsula has received the most attention from geologists,in part because theories point to possible deposits thereand because sampling is easier there than elsewhere.Because parts of the Peninsula are accessible and moremoderate in climate, they may be promising enough forinitial minerals prospecting. 13

Mining

A mine in Antarctica’s interior (for instance on theDufek Massif) would face much greater isolation andprobably a harsher climate than is experienced at Arcticmines. Such conditions would probably require substan-tial improvements in existing technologies, if not com-pletely new technologies, and would likely requireextraordinarily high valued ore. In the coastal regions,however—especially the Antarctic Peninsula—environmental conditions are similar to those of existingmining operations in the Arctic. An Antarctic mine in

12w 1= fIows out IoW~ tie co~t, UIW8 ES gl~l~ uuo the ~ IX txxmmmg par-r of the floating Ice shelves such as the ROSS Ice Shelf. The ice shelves me ~ so-of the large tabular uxbergs.

130’TA w~hop (XI AII@UC kimitlg kchtloiogy d &UllOtItlCS, k. 13, 19~.


these areas would probably use similar technology andoperating techniques.

The Antarctic Continent offers some special conditionsnot found in areas near mines of the Arctic. About 98percent of the continent is covered by ice (which makesit similar to northern Greenland), so mines must belocated in exposed or nearly exposed areas. Mineconstruction would have to start in an exposed area butmay extend under ice cover. It would be impracticalinitially to locate mine shafts on ice and to sink shafts anddeclines through the ice to a deposit below. Shafts, rampdeclines, or other underground mine access points,including ventilation raises, initially would have to belocated on solid ground. Similarly all plant sites andsupport facilities would have to be located on the groundor underground. A plan for dealing with ice and for sitingthe surface plant and infrastructure must be addressed atthe time of mine design. Temporary buildings may belocated on ice, but if the ice is moving, even this is notpractical. Land areas suitable for mine locations will bedifficult to find. It will be necessary to drill and blast toestablish level surface areas for mine access and plant andinfrastructure construction in rugged areas such as theDufek Massif and the Copper Nunatak in the AntarcticPeninsula. Alternatively, some of these facilities could belocated in underground excavations.

Underground MiningThe conditions for underground mining in Antarctica

may be similar to those in the Arctic. However, rocktemperatures and permafrost depths may differ. Nonethe-less, several underground mining methods that have beenused in the Arctic might be applicable in Antarctica. Forexample, a room and pillar method might be used for a flatlying platinum deposit (a possibility in the Dufek igneouscomplex).

Open Pit MiningThe open pit mining method may be suitable in selected

areas of Antarctica, the most likely being the northernAntarctic Peninsula and the Dry Valleys near McMurdoStation. It may be used in select areas where ice cover isless than 500 to 600 feet thick. Mining an ore depositthrough thicker ice cannot be done by conventionalmethods, and open pit mining of a deposit below the iceis highly unlikely. There are no examples in the northernlatitudes of open pit mining through a glacier or ice field.Ice accumulations have been mined in Canada in andaround open pit mines, but nothing comparable to miningextensive ice areas. More research and investigation willbe needed before any system to undertake open pit miningbeneath the Antarctic ice cap can be contemplated.

However, it does appear possible to remove some ice overan ore deposit by open pit mining methods.

DredgingDredging operations would be infeasible in much of

Antarctica because of ice conditions. Some areas, though,have conditions suitable for at least seasonal dredging.One such area is the northern part of the AntarcticPeninsula. However, it is not certain what mineralresources exist there.

Processing

Processing in Antarctica would probably face the sameproblems and constraints as those encountered in theArctic. Most likely, milling would be performed at themine site, and the concentrates would be shipped to anorthern smelter or hydrometallurgy plant. Energy effi-ciency in the milling process would take on addedimportance, because of costliness of bringing in fuel oil.Solar energy may have application because of 24-hourdaylight in summer.

Tailings DisposalTailings from mill processing of ores would likely be

contained on land surface areas, but if land surface is inshort supply, tailings may be disposed on the ice. Thismaterial would freeze and, assuming no thawing of theice, should present no future problem, Excess water couldbe recycled from the tailings. This is only one of a varietyof possible methods for tailing disposal. All have somedrawbacks, either technical or economic, and the disposalof tailings probably poses one of the most seriousenvironmental problems in a mining operation (see ch. 5).

Infrastructure SupportConstructing the infrastructure for Antarctic mining

would be more difficult and costly than in the Arctic giventhe longer distances from major staging areas and themoving ice. Transportation of fuel and concentrates aswell as personnel and supplies would be perhaps the mostdifficult and costly task. New or modified transporttechnologies may have to be developed. Mining andprocessing initially may be seasonal operations for lack ofyear-round infrastructure,

The transportation of fuel and concentrates for a basemetal operation would probably require ships. A port thatis at least seasonally ice-free would be needed,14 but portfacilities would be expensive and difficult to locate.Arctic mining projects have used ice-reinforced ships andbarges as well as newly built, dedicated port facilities.Ice-free periods are one to a few months’ duration so

14wa= ~tm may not be quid for I@ value, low volume products such IIS gold and phmnum These producta may posiubly bc shipped by air,

Appendix B--Metal Mining in Antarctica Ž 179

product stockpiles need to be built up for use during thewinter season, Port conditions in Antarctica may besimilar to those in the Arctic but with the added difficultyof longer transits to a supply base, much stormier weather,and locally higher occurrences of icebergs in the openwater.

Overland transportation of fuel, supplies, and productwould be one of the major costs of an inland miningoperation. A site at the Dufek Massif may require about330 miles of ice ‘‘road’ across the Ronne Ice Shelf to thesite. Any discovery in Antarctica inland from the coastwould require the construction of an ice road for access,except perhaps in the islands near the Northern AntarcticPeninsula and the Northern Peninsula itself. Such con-struction and maintenance may well be a major and costlytask. Maintaining winter access along such a road may beimpossible where high winds and blowing snow couldmake passage unsafe.

Fuel may be transported by pipeline, but with sub-freezing temperatures prevailing, a pipeline would have tobe suspended and heated. Since a road would have to bemaintained for other supplies, a pipeline for fuel may notbe a justifiable added cost.

Air transportation would be required for personnel,small supplies, and possibly product shipment in the caseof gold or platinum. Environmental conditions affectingair service to Antarctic regions near the coast may besimilar to the Arctic, but inland, they may be much moresevere. Extreme cold temperatures, high winds, andblowing snow in inland Antarctic regions could severelyrestrict aircraft operations, and this could affect the abilityof a mine to operate year-round. Large, wheeled aircrafthave made numerous landings on unprepared blue-icepatches in interior parts of the continent, suggesting thatuse of such aircraft may be viable in some areas during theaustral summer.

Accommodations for personnel can be designed in amanner similar to those in the Arctic examples cited andshould be satisfactory, but should be designed to with-stand the high winds anticipated. If a year-round operationis planned, crew transfers from the site by air during muchof the year will be needed. Air service in all conditions isprobably not possible. This means that an airfield must beconstructed that can function during almost all weatherconditions, a very difficult task in most areas of Antarc-tica.

Economics

Several studies and a number of speculations havefocused on the feasibility of mining platinum from theDufek Massif.15 The many technical problems encoun-tered at this site in Antarctica’s interior appear insur-mountable to some experts, The studies speculate thatmining may occur in this and other Antarctic sites ifagreements are reached to encourage such developmentand if high-grade deposits are located. OTA finds that paststudies that concluded mining platinum from the DufekMassif was practical underestimated the costs and diffi-culties involved.16

OTA investigated the relative levels of difficulty ofmining in the Arctic and Antarctic. Mining in Antarcticawould not only be more expensive than that in theArctic, but the enhanced risks would require evengreater financial returns to the investors. Antarcticmining might require an estimated 30 percent return,compared with 20 percent in the Arctic, and 15percent elsewhere. The in situ value of the Arctic RedDog and Polaris ores are $290 and $200 per ton,respectively. 17 Deposits in Antarctica must have at least

this value for mining to be economic. OTA concludes thatto cover these costs, ore values would need to be about$200 to $400 per ton for a commercial AntarcticPeninsula mine, and about $300 to $600 per ton for aDufek Massif mine. These values (at today prices) meanthat a Peninsula gold deposit would need to contain an orewith between 1/2 and 1 ounce of gold per ton and a Dufekplatinum deposit would need to contain the same gradesof platinum per ton.

18 Ores of these high grades are rareand any lesser grade ores would probably not bedeveloped. Though this conclusion is highly speculative,it appears reasonable given the limited state of currentknowledge.

S U M M A R YOTA has not developed a separate, complete scenario

for a hypothetical Antarctic mine because large numbersof variables make any detailed technical or economicapproach impractical. Instead, the foregoing discussionpresents possible general approaches. It indicates thatcertain high-grade mineral deposits could probably bemined economically in Antarctica if they were located inreasonably accessible areas. Mining on the coast or on thePeninsula might be done with the technologies currentlyused in the Arctic. Technology would not be a significant

)5s=, for ~xmple, M,J, & Wll, ~LMra~ ~ &jlnLng ,n AW~~Cf&~ .$clgme ~~ 7~c/uKJ/ogy, Ecomm~s ad pO/IrICS (Odord: Clmendon press, 1985), SIX also, me

I.nsutuw of Polar Stuches, A Framm ork for Assessing Environmental impacts of Pos@le A~arctic kfmeral Development, Otuo State Uruversity, 1977.16Mag& Geological Consulting, op. cil., ftio~ 2.

17supra note IS18A ~~ of ~ppro~akly fm tm~ the grade of the example m tie de Wlt s[udy


deterrent to minerals development in these ice-free,accessible locations with ‘‘Arctic-like’ environments.Economics, however, could be a major deterrent. Thedeposit would have to be of “world class” value to coverthe high costs of the facility and its infrastructure and thelarge financial returns needed to compensate the investorsfor the additional risks.

The situation is different for a mine in the Antarcticinterior (including the Dufek Massif). Here, the climate,ice, and remoteness may require substantial improve-ments in existing technologies, if not completely newtechnologies. Considering the other risks in developing anAntarctic mine, mining firms and their financial backerswould be hesitant to adopt unconventional mining and

metallurgical processes. Initially only proven processesare likely to be acceptable. Therefore, mining in Antarc-tica’s interior is not expected soon, if ever.

Most U.S. mining industry representatives have notgiven much, if any, attention to Antarctic minerals. Thosethat have paid some attention consider the political andinstitutional risks to be the principal deterrent to futureAntarctic minerals development.19 They are pessimisticabout operating under the regulatory framework of theMinerals Convention and the uncertainties of jurisdiction,taxation, permitting procedures, environmental rules,etc. 20 Further discussion of industry views on theacceptability and workability of the Convention arecovered in chapter 3.

190TA W~kS@, ~. 13, 1988; Keith R. Km&dock, vice Prcslderu, American Mu@ CIXILPZZW, -n~ c~ umcamm, Dec. 15, 1988,

~SiIII~ D. SmNM,S, GXUJUItant on Metal Markas, personal cmtumuuciuion, Apr. 13, 1989.

Appendix C

The Antarctic TreatyAdopted at Washington 1 December 1959

The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium,Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-way, the Union of South Africa, the Union of SovietSocialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind thatAntarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusivelyfor peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene orobject of international discord;

Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scien-tific knowledge resulting from international cooperationin scientific investigation in Antarctica;

Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundationfor the continuation and development of such cooperationon the basis of freedom of scientific investigation inAntarctica as applied during the International Geophysi-cal Year accords with the interests of science and theprogress of all mankind;

Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use ofAntarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuanceof international harmony in Antarctica will further thepurposes and principles embodied in the Charter of theUnited Nations;

Have agreed as follows:Article 1

1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of amilitary nature, such as the establishment of militarybases and fortifications, the carrying out of militarymanoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.

2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use ofmilitary personnel or equipment for scientific research orfor any other peaceful purpose.Article 2

Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica andcooperation toward that end, as applied during theInternational Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject tothe provisions of the present Treaty.Article 3

1. In order to promote international cooperation inscientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for inArticle 2 of the present Treaty, the Contracting Partiesagree that to the greatest extent feasible and practicable:

(a) information regarding plans for scientific programsin Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maxi-mum economy and efficiency of operations;

(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarc-tica between expeditions and stations;

(c) scientific observations and results from Antarcticashall be exchanged and made freely available.

2. In implementing this Article, every encouragementshall be given to the establishment of cooperative workingrelations with those Specialized Agencies of the UnitedNations and other international organizations having ascientific or technical interest in Antarctica.

Article 4

1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall beinterpreted as:

(a)

b )

(c)

a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previ-ously asserted rights of or claims to territorialsovereignty in Antarctica;

a renunciation or diminution by any ContractingParty of any basis of claim to territorial sovereigntyin Antarctica which it may have whether as a resultof its activities or those of its nationals inAntarctica or otherwise;

prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party asregards its recognition or non-recognition of anyother State’s right of or claim or basis of claim toterritorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

2. No acts or activities taking place while the presentTreaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting,supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty inAntarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existingclaim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall beasserted while the present Treaty is in force.

Article 5

1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and thedisposal there of radioactive waste material shall beprohibited.

2. In the event of the conclusion of internationalagreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, includ-ing nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactivewaste material, to which all of the Contracting Partieswhose representatives are entitled to participate in themeetings provided for under Article 9 are parties, the rulesestablished under such agreements shall apply in Antarc-tica.

-181-


Article 6The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the

area south of 60 degrees South Latitude, including all iceshelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudiceor in any way affect the right, or the exercise of the rights,of any State under international law with regard to thehigh seas within that area.

Article 7

1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure theobservance of the provisions of the present Treaty, eachContracting Party whose representatives are entitled toparticipate in the meetings referred to in Article 9 of theTreaty shall have the right to designate observers to carryout any inspection provided for by the present Article.Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Partieswhich designate them. The names of observers shall becommunicated to every other Contracting Party havingthe right to designate observers, and like notice shall begiven of the termination of their appointment.

2. Each observer designated in accordance with theprovisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall havecomplete freedom of access at any time to any or all areasof Antarctica.

3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations,installations and equipment within those areas, and allships and aircraft at point of discharging or embarkingcargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at alltimes to inspection by any observers designated inaccordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any timeover any or all areas of Antarctica by any of theContracting Parties having the right to designate observ-ers.

5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when thepresent Treaty enters into force for it, inform the otherContracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them noticein advance, of

(a)

(b)

(c)

all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the partof its ships or nationals, and all expeditions toAntarctica organized in or proceeding from itsterritory;all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals;andany military personnel or equipment intended to beintroduced by it into Antarctica subject to theconditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article 1 ofthe present Treaty.

Article 81. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions

under the present Treaty, and without prejudice to therespective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to

jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observersdesignated under paragraph 1 of Article 7 and scientificpersonnel exchanged under sub-paragraph l(b) of Article3 of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanyingany such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdictionof the Contracting Party of which they are nationals inrespect of all acts or omissions occurring while they arein Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures inpursuance of sub-paragraph l(e) of Article 9, the Con-tracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute withregard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shallimmediately consult together with a view to reaching amutually acceptable solution.

Article 91. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in

the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the Cityof Canberra within two months after the date of entry intoforce of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals andplaces, for the purpose of exchanging information,consulting together on matters of common interestpertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and consider-ing, and recommending to their Governments, measuresin furtherance of the principles and objectives of theTreaty, including measures regarding:

(a)(b)(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;facilitation of international scientific cooperationin Antarctica;facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspec-tion provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty;questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction inAntarctica;preservation and conservation of living resources inAntarctica,

2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party tothe present Treaty by accession under Article 13 shall beentitled to appoint representatives to participate in themeetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article,during such time as that Contracting Party demonstratesits interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scien-tific research activity there, such as the establishment ofa scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedi-tion.

3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article 7 ofthe present Treaty shall be transmitted to the representa-tives of the Contracting Parties participating in themeetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article.

4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of thisArticle shall become effective when approved by all the

Appendix C—The Antarctic Treaty ● 183

Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled toparticipate in the meetings held to consider those meas-ures.

5. Any or all of the rights established in the presentTreaty may be exercised as from the date of entry intoforce of the Treaty whether or not any measures facilitat-ing the exercise of such rights have been proposed,considered or approved as provided in this Article.

Article 10Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert

appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of theUnited Nations, to the end that no one engages in anyactivity in Antarctica contrary to the principles orpurposes of the present Treaty.

Article 11

1. If any dispute arises between two or more of theContracting Parties concerning the interpretation orapplication of the present Treaty, those ContractingParties shall consult among themselves with a view tohaving the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry,mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement orother peaceful means of their own choice.

2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall,with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute,be referred to the International Court of Justice forsettlement; but failure to reach agreement on reference tothe International Court shall not absolve parties to thedispute from the responsibility for continuing to seek toresolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred toin paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 121. (a) The present Treaty maybe modified or amended

at any time by unanimous agreement of the ContractingParties whose representatives are entitled to participate inthe meetings provided for under Article 9. Any suchmodification or amendment shall enter into force whenthe depositary Government has received notice from allsuch Contracting Parties that they have ratified it.

(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafterenter into force as to any other Contracting Party whennotice of ratification by it has been received by thedepositary Government. Any such Contracting Partyfrom which no notice of ratification is received within aperiod of two years from the date of entry into force of themodification or amendment in accordance with theprovisions of sub-paragraph l(a) of this Article shall bedeemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on thedate of the expiration of such period.

2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the dateof entry into force of the present Treaty, any of theContracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to

participate in the meetings provided for under Article 9 sorequests by a communication addressed to the depositaryGovernment, a Conference of all the Contracting Partiesshall be held as soon as practicable to review the operationof the Treaty.

(b) Any modification or amendment to the presentTreaty which is approved as such a Conference by amajority of the Contracting Parties there represented,including a majority of those whose representatives areentitle to participate in the meetings provided for underArticle 9, shall be communicated by the depositaryGovernment to all the Contracting Parties immediatelyafter the termination of the Conference and shall enter intoforce in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 ofthe present Article.

(c) If any such modification or amendment has notentered into force in accordance with the provisions ofsub-paragraph l(a) of this Article within a period of twoyears after the date of its communication to all theContracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at anytime after the expiration of that period give notice to thedepositary Government of its withdrawal from the presentTreaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two yearsafter the receipt of the notice by the depositary Govern-ment.

Article 13

1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification bythe signatory States. It shall be open for accession by artyState which is a Member of the United Nations, or by artyother State which may be invited to accede to the Treatywith the consent of all the Contracting Parties whoserepresentatives are entitled to participate in the meetingsprovided for under Article 9 of the Treaty.

2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treatyshall be effected by each State in accordance with itsconstitutional processes.

3. Instruments of ratification and instruments ofaccession shall be deposited with the Government of theUnited States of America, hereby designated as thedepositary Government.

4. The depositary Government shall inform all signa-tory and acceding States of the date of each deposit of anyinstrument of ratification or accession, and the date ofentry into force of the Treaty and of any modification oramendment thereto.

5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by allthe signatory States, the present Treaty shall enter intoforce for those States and for States which have depositedinstruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enterinto force for any acceding State upon the deposit of itsinstrument of accession.


6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of thedepositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Government of the United States of America, which shallCharter of the United Nations. transmit duly certified copies thereof to the GovernmentsArticle 14 of the signatory and acceding States.

The present Treaty, done in the English, French,Russian and Spanish languages, each version being

Appendix D

The Convention on the Regulation ofAntarctic Mineral Resource Activities

PREAMBLEThe States Parties to this Convention, hereinafter

referred to as the Parties,Recalling the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty;

Convinced that the Antarctic Treaty system has provedeffective in promoting international harmony in further-ance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of theUnited Nations, in ensuring the absence of any measuresof a military nature and the protection of the Antarcticenvironment and in promoting freedom of scientificresearch in Antarctica

Reaffirming that it is in the interest of all mankind thatthe Antarctic Treaty area shall continue forever to be usedexclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not becomethe scene or object of international discord;

Noting the possibility that exploitable mineral re-sources may exist in Antarctica;

Bearing in mind the special legal and political status ofAntarctica and the special responsibility of the AntarcticTreaty Consultative Parties to ensure that all activities inAntarctica are consistent with the purposes and principlesof the Antarctic Treaty;

Bearing in mind also that a regime for Antarcticmineral resources must be consistent with Article IV ofthe Antarctic Treaty and in accordance therewith bewithout prejudice and acceptable to those States whichassert rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty inAntarctica, and those States which neither recognize norassert such rights or claims, including those States whichassert a basis of claim to territorial sovereignty inAntarctica;

Noting the unique ecological, scientific and wildernessvalue of Antarctica and the importance of Antarctica tothe global environment;

Recognizing that Antarctic mineral resource activitiescould adversely affect the Antarctic environment ordependent or associated ecosystems;

Believing that the protection of the Antarctic environ-ment and dependent and associated ecosystems must bea basic consideration in decisions taken on possibleAntarctic mineral resource activities;

Concerned to ensure that Antarctic mineral resourceactivities, should they occur, are compatible with scien-tific investigation in Antarctica and other legitimate usesof Antarctica;

Believing that a regime governing Antarctic mineralresource activities will further strengthen the Antarctic

Treaty system;

Convinced that participation in Antarctic mineralresource activities should be open to all States which havean interest in such activities and subscribe to a regimegoverning them and that the special situation of developing country Parties to the regime should be taken intoaccount;

Believing that the effective regulation of Antarcticmineral resource activities is in the interest of theinternational community as a whole;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

CHAPTER I: GENERALPROVISIONS

Article 1Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:1 “Antarctic Treaty” means the Antarctic Treaty

done at Washington on 1 December 1959.2 “Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties” means the

Contacting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty entitled toappoint representatives to participate in the meetingsreferred to in Article IX of that Treaty.

3 “Antarctic Treaty area” means the area to which theprovisions of the Antarctic Treaty apply in accordancewith Article VI of that Treaty.

4 “Convention for the Conservation of AntarcticSeals” means the Convention done at London on 1 June1972,

5 “Convention on the Conservation of AntarcticMarine Living Resources means the Convention done atCanberra on 20 May 1980.

6 “Mineral resources” means all non-living naturalnon-renewable resources, including fossil fuels, metallicand non-metallic minerals.

7 “Antarctic mineral resource activities” meansprospecting, exploration or development, but does notinclude scientific research activities within the meaningof Article III of the Antarctic Treaty.

8 “Prospecting” means activities, including logisticsupport aimed at identifying areas of mineral r e s o u r c epotential for possible exploration and development,including geological, geochemical and geophysical in-vestigations and field observations, the use of remotesensing techniques and collection of surface, sea floor andsub-ice samples. Such activities do not include dredging

-185-


and excavations, except for the purpose of obtainingsmall-scale samples, or drilling, except shallow drillinginto rock and sediment to depths not exceeding 25 metersor such other depth as the Commission may determine forparticular circumstances.

9 “Exploration” means activities, including logisticsupport aimed at identifying and evaluating specificmineral resource occurrences or deposits, includingexploratory drilling, dredging and other surface or subsur-face excavations required to determine the nature and sizeof mineral resource deposits and the feasibility of theirdevelopment but excluding pilot projects or commercialproduction.

10 ‘Development’ means activities, including logisticsupport which take place following exploration and areaimed at or associated with exploitation of specificmineral resource deposits, including pilot projects, proc-essing, storage and transport activities.

1 i “Operator” means:

(a) a Party; or(b) an agency or instrumentality of a Party; or(c) a juridical person established under the law of a

Party; or (d) a joint venture consisting exclusively of any

combination of any of the foregoing,which is undertaking Antarctic mineral resource activitiesand for which there is a Sponsoring State.

12 ‘Sponsoring State” means the Party with which anOperatorbeing:

(a)(b)

(c)

(d)

has a substantial and genuine link, through

in the case of a Party, that Party;in the case of an agency or instrumentality of aParty, that Party;in the case of a juridical person other than anagency or instrumentality of a Party, the Party:(i) under whose law that juridical person is

established and to whose law it is subject,without prejudice to any other law whichmight be applicable, and

(ii) in whose territory the management of thatjuridical person is located, and

(iii) to whose effective control that juridicalperson is subject;

in the case of a joint venture not constituting ajuridical person:(i)

(ii)

where the managing member of the jointventure is a Party or an agency or instrumental-ity of a Party, that Party; orin any other case, where in relation to aParty the managing member of the jointventure satisfies the requirements of sub-paragraph (c) above, that Party.

13 “Managing member of the joint venture” meansthat member which the participating members in the jointventure have by agreement designated as having respon-sibility for central management of the joint venture,including the functions of organizing and supervising theactivities to be undertaken, and controlling the financialresources involved.

14 “Effective control” means the ability of theSponsoring State to ensure the availability of substantialresources of the Operator for purposes connected with theimplementation of this Convention, through the locationof such resources in the territory of the Sponsoring Stateor otherwise.

15 “Damage to the Antarctic environment or depend-ent or associated ecosystems’ means any impact on theliving or non-living components of that environment orthose ecosystems, including harm to atmospheric, marineor terrestrial. life, beyond that which is negligible orwhich has been assessed and judged to be acceptablepursuant to this Convention.

16 “Commission” means the Antarctic Mineral Re-sources Commission established pursuant to Article 18.

17 “Regulatory Committee” means an AntarcticMineral Resources Regulatory Committee establishedpursuant to Article 29.

18 “Advisory Committee” means the Scientific,Technical and Environmental Advisory Committee estab-lished pursuant to Article 23.

19 “Special Meeting of Parties” means the Meetingreferred to in Article 28.

20 “Arbitral Tribunal” means an Arbitral Tribunalconstituted as provided for in the Annex, which forms anintegral part of this Convention.

Article 2Objectives and General Principles

1 This Convention is an integral part of the AntarcticTreaty system, comprising the Antarctic Treaty, themeasures in effect under that Treaty, and its associatedseparate legal instruments, the prime purpose of which isto ensure that Antarctica shall continue forever to be usedexclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not becomethe scene or object of international discord. The Partiesprovide through this Convention, the principles it estab-lishes, the rules it prescribes, the institutions it creates andthe decisions adopted pursuant to it, a means for:

(a) assessing the possible impact on the environ-ment of Antarctic mineral resource activities;

(b) determining whether Antarctic mineral resourceactivities are acceptable;

(c) goveming the conduct of such Antarctic mineralresource activities as may be found acceptable;

Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 187

and(d) ensuring that any Antarctic mineral resource

activities are undertaken in strict conformitywith this Convention.

2 In implementing this Convention, the Parties shallensure that Antarctic mineral resource activities, shouldthey occur, take place in a manner consistent with all thecomponents of the Antarctic Treaty system and theobligations flowing therefrom.

3 In relation to Antarctic mineral resource activities,should they occur, the Parties acknowledge the specialresponsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Partiesfor the protection of the environment and the need to:

(a) protect the Antarctic environment and depend-ent and associated ecosystems;

(b) respect Antarctica’s significance for, and influ-ence on, the global environment;

(c) respect other legitimate uses of Antarctica;(d) respect Antarctica’s scientific value and aes-

thetic and wilderness qualities;(e) ensure the safety of operations in Antarctica;(f) promote opportunities for fair and effective

participation of all Parties; and(g) take into account the interests of the interna-

tional community as a whole.

Article 3

Prohibition of Antarctic Mineral ResourceActivities Outside this Convention

No Antarctic mineral resource activities shall beconducted except in accordance with this Convention andmeasures in effect pursuant to it and, in the case ofexploration or development, with a Management Schemeapproved pursuant to Article 48 or 54.

Article 4

Principles Concerning Judgments on AntarcticMineral Resource Activities

1 Decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activi-ties shall be based upon information adequate to enableinformed judgments to be made about their possibleimpacts and no such activities shall take place unless thisinformation is available for decisions relevant to thoseactivities.

2 No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall takeplace until it is judged, based upon assessment of itspossible impacts on the Antarctic environment and ondependent and on associated ecosystems, that the activityin question would not cause:

(a) significant adverse effects on air and waterquality;

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial ormarine environments;significant changes in the distribution, abun-dance or productivity of populations of speciesof fauna or flora;further jeopardy to endangered or threatenedspecies or populations of such species; ordegradation of, or substantial risk to, areas ofspecial biological, scientific, historic, aestheticor wilderness significance.

3 No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall takeplace until it is judged, based upon assessment of itspossible impacts, that the activity in question would notcause significant adverse effects on global or regionalclimate or weather patterns.

4 No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall takeplace until it is judged that:

(a)

(b)

(c)

technology and procedures are available toprovide for safe operations and compliance withparagraphs 2 and 3 above;there exists the capacity to monitor key environ-mental parameters and ecosystem componentsso as to identify any adverse effects of suchactivity and to provide for the modification ofoperating procedures as may be necessary in thelight of the results of monitoring or increasedknowledge of the Antarctic environment ordependent or associated ecosystems; andthere exists the capacity to respond effectivelyto accidents, particularly those with potentialenvironmental effects.

5 The judgments referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4above shall take into account the cumulative impacts ofpossible Antarctic mineral resource activities both bythemselves and in combination with other such activitiesand other uses of Antarctica.

Article 5

Area of Application1 This Convention shall, subject to paragraphs 2, 3

and 4 below, apply to the Antarctic Treaty area.2 Without prejudice to the responsibilities of the

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties under the AntarcticTreaty and measures pursuant to it, the Parties agree thatthis Convention shall regulate Antarctic mineral resourceactivities which take place on the continent of Antarcticaand all Antarctic islands, including all ice shelves, southof 60° south latitude and in the seabed and subsoil ofadjacent offshore areas up to the deep sea bed,

3 For the purposes of this Convention ‘‘deep seabed”means the seabed and subsoil beyond the geographic

20-604 0 - 89 – 5 : QL 3


extent of the continental shelf as the term continental shelfis defined in accordance with international law.

4 Nothing in this Article shall be construed as limitingthe application of other Articles of this Convention in sofar as they relate to possible impacts outside the areareferred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, including impactson dependent or on associated ecosystems.

Article 6Cooperation and International Participation

In the implementation of this Convention cooperationwithin its framework shall be promoted and encourage-ment given to international participation in Antarcticmineral resource activities by interested Parties which areAntarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and by otherinterested Parties, in particular, developing countries ineither category. Such participation may be realizedthrough the Parties themselves and their Operators.

Article 7Compliance with this Convention

1 Each Party shall take appropriate measures withinits competence to ensure compliance with this Conven-tion and any measures in effect pursuant to it.

2 If a Party is prevented by the exercise of jurisdictionby another Party from ensuring compliance in accordancewith paragraph 1 above, it shall not to the extent that it isso prevented, bear responsibility for that failure to ensurecompliance.

3 If any jurisdictional dispute related to compliancewith this Convention or any measure in effect pursuant toit arises between two or more Parties, the Partiesconcerned shall immediately consult together with a viewto reaching a mutually acceptable solution.

4 Each Party shall notify the Executive Secretary, forcirculation to all other Parties, of the measures takenpursuant to paragraph 1 above.

5 Each Party shall exert appropriate efforts, consistentwith the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that noone engages in any Antarctic mineral resource activitiescontrary to the objectives and principles of this Conven-tion.

6 Each Party may, whenever it deems it necessary,draw the attention of the Commission to any activitywhich in its opinion affects the implementation of theobjectives and principles of this Convention.

7 The Commission shall draw the attention of allParties to any activity which, in the opinion of theCommission, affects the implementation of the objectivesand principles of this Convention or the compliance byany Party with its obligations under this Convention andany measures in effect pursuant to it.

8 The Commission shall draw the attention of anyState which is not a Party to this Convention to anyactivity undertaken by that State, its agencies or instru-mentalities, natural or juridical persons, ships, aircraft orother means of transportation which, in the opinion of theCommission, affects the implementation of the objectivesand principles of this Convention. The Commission shallinform all Parties accordingly.

9 Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation ofArticle 12(7) of this Convention or Article VIII of theAntarctic Treaty.

Article 8Response Action and Liability

1 An Operator undertaking any Antarctic mineralresource activity shall take necessary and timely responseaction, including prevention, containment, clean up andremoval measures, if the activity results in or threatens toresult in damage to the Antarctic environment or depend-ent or associated ecosystems. The Operator, through itsSponsoring State, shall notify the Executive Secretary, forcirculation to the relevant institutions of this Conventionand to all Parties, of action taken pursuant to thisparagraph.

2An(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

3 (a)

Operator shall be strictly liable for:

damage to the Antarctic environment or de-pendent or associated ecosystems arising fromits Antarctic mineral resource activities, includ-ing payment in the event that there has been norestoration to the status quo ante;loss of or impairment to an established use, asreferred to in Article 15, or loss of or impair-ment to an established use of dependent orassociated ecosystems, arising directly out ofdamage described in subparagraph (a) above;loss of or damage to property of a third party orloss of life or personal injury of a third partyarising directly out of damage described insubparagraph (a) above; andreimbursement of reasonable costs by whomso-ever incurred relating to necessary responseaction, including prevention, containment, cleanup and removal measures, and action taken torestore the status quo ante where Antarcticmineral resource activities undertaken by thatOperator result in or threaten to result in damageto the Antarctic environment or dependent orassociated ecosystems.Damage of the kind referred to in paragraph 2

above which would not have occurred or continued if theSponsoring State had carried out its obligations under thisConvention with respect to its Operator shall, in accor-dance with international law, entail liability of that

. —.

Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 189

Sponsoring State. Such liability shall be limited to thatportion of liability not satisfied by the Operator orotherwise,

(b) Nothing in subparagraph (a) above shall affectthe application of the rules of international lawapplicable in the event that damage not referredto in that subparagraph would not have occurredor continued if the Sponsoring State had carriedout its obligations under this Convention withrespect to its Operator.

4 An Operator shall not be liable pursuant toparagraph 2 above if it proves that the damage has beencaused directly by, and to the extent that it has been causeddirectly by:

(a)

(b)

an event constituting in the circumstances ofAntarctica a natural disaster of an exceptionalcharacter which could not reasonably have beenforeseen; orarmed conflict, should it occur notwithstandingthe Antarctic Treaty, or an act of terrorismdirected against the activities of the Operator,against which no reasonable precautionary meas-ures could have been effective.

5 Liability of an Operator for any loss of life, personalinjury or loss of or damage to property other than thatgoverned by this Article shall be regulated by applicablelaw and procedures.

6 If an Operator proves that damage has been causedtotally or in part by an intentional or grossly negligent actor omission of the party seeking redress, that Operatormay be relieved totally or in part from its obligation to paycompensation in respect of the damage suffered by suchparty.

7 (a) Further rules and procedures in respect of theprovisions on liability set out in this Article shall beelaborated through a separate Protocol which shall beadopted by consensus by the members of the Commissionand shall enter into force according to the procedureprovided for in Article 62 for the entry into force of thisConvention.

(b)

(c)

Such rules and procedures shall be designed toenhance the protection of the Antarctic environ-ment and dependent and associated ecosystems.Such rules and procedures:(i)

(ii)

may contain provisions for appropriatelimits on liability, where such limits can bejustified;without prejudice to Article 57, shallprescribe means and mechanisms such asa claims tribunal or other form by whichclaims against Operators pursuant to thisArticle may be assessed and adjudicated;

(iii) shall ensure that a means is provided toassist with immediate responseaction, andto satisfy liability under paragraph 2 abovein the event inter alia, that an Operatorliable is financially incapable of meetingits obligation in full, that it exceeds anyrelevant limits of liability, that there is adefense to liability or that the loss ordamage is of undetermined origin. Unlessit is determined during the elaboration ofthe Protocol that there are other effectivemeans of meeting these objectives, theProtocol shall establish a Fund or Fundsand make provision in respect of suchFund or Funds, inter alia, for the follow-ing:—financing by Operators or on industrywide bases;--ensuring the permanent liquidity andmandatory supplementation thereof in theevent of insufficiency;-reimbursement of costs of responseaction, by whomsoever incurred.

8 Nothing in paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 above or in theProtocol adopted pursuant to paragraph 7 shall affect inany way the provisions of paragraph 1 above.

9 No application for an exploration or developmentpermit shall be made until the Protocol provided for inparagraph 7 above is in force for the Party lodging suchapplication.

10 Each Party, pending the entry into force for it of theProtocol provided for in paragraph 7 above, shall ensure,consistently with Article 7 and in accordance with its legalsystem, that recourse is available in its national courts foradjudicating liability claims pursuant to paragraphs 2, 4and 6 above against Operators which are engaged inprospecting. Such recourse shall include the adjudicationof claims against any Operator it has sponsored. EachParty shall also ensure, in accordance with its legalsystem, that the Commission has the right to appear as aparty in its national courts to pursue relevant liabilityclaims under paragraph 2(a) above.

11 Nothing in this Article or in the Protocol providedfor in paragraph 7 above shall be construed so as to:

(a)

(b)

preclude the application of existing rules onliability, and the development in accordancewith international law of further such rules,which may have application to either States orOperators; oraffect the right of an Operator incurring liabilitypursuant to this Article to seek redress fromanother party which caused or contributed to thedamage in question.


12 When compensation has been paid other than underthis Convention liability under this Convention shall beoffset by the amount of such payment.

Article 9

Protection of Legal Positions under the AntarcticTreaty

Nothing in this Convention and no acts or activitiestaking place while this Convention is in force shall:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

constitute a basis for asserting, supporting ordenying a claim to territorial sovereignty in theAntarctic Treaty area or create any rights ofsovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area;be interpreted as a renunciation or diminutionby any Party of, or as prejudicing, any right orclaim or basis of claim to territorial sovereigntyin Antarctica or to exercise coastal state juris-diction under international law;be interpreted as prejudicing the position of anyParty as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any such right, claim or basis ofclaim; oraffect the provision of Article IV(2) of theAntarctic Treaty that no new claim, or enlarge-ment of an existing claim, to territorial sover-eignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while theAntarctic Treaty is in force.

Article 10

Consistency with the Other Components of theAntarctic Treaty System

1 Each Party shall ensure that Antarctic mineralresource activities take place in a manner consistent withthe components of the Antarctic Treaty system, includingthe Antarctic Treaty, the Convention for the Conservationof Antarctic Seals and the Convention on the Conserva-tion of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and themeasures in effect pursuant to those instruments.

2 The Commission shall consult and cooperate withthe Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the ContractingParties to the Convention for the Conservation ofAntarctic Seals, and the Commission for the Conservationof Antarctic Marine Living Resources with a view toensuring the achievement of the objectives and principlesof this Convention and avoiding any interference with theachievement of the objectives and principles of theAntarctic Treaty, the Convention for the Conservation ofAntarctic Seals or the Convention on the Conservation ofAntarctic Marine Living Resources, or inconsistencybetween the measures in effect pursuant to those instru-ments, and measures in effect pursuant to this Conven-tion.

Article 11Inspection under the Antarctic Treaty

All stations, installations and equipment, in the Antarc-tic Treaty area, relating to Antarctic mineral resourceactivities, as well as ships and aircraft supporting suchactivities at points of discharging or embarking cargoes orpersonnel at such stations and installations, shall be openat all times to inspection by observers designated underArticle VII of the Antarctic Treaty for the purposes of thatTreaty.

Article 12Inspection under this Convention

1 In order to promote the objectives and principles andto ensure the observance of this Convention and measuresin effect pursuant to it, all stations, installations andequipment relating to Antarctic mineral resource activi-ties in the area in which these activities are regulated bythis Convention, as well as ships and aircraft supportingsuch activities at points of discharging or embarkingcargoes or personnel anywhere in that area shall be openat all times to inspection by:

(a) observers designated by any member of theCommission who shall be nationals of thatmember; and

(b) observers designated by the Commission orrelevant Regulatory Committees.

2 Aerial inspection maybe carried out at any time overthe area in which Antarctic mineral resource activities areregulated by this Convention.

3 The Commission shall maintain an up-to-date list ofobservers designated pursuant to paragraph l(a) and (b)above.

4 Reports from the observers shall be transmitted tothe Commission and to any Regulatory Committeehaving competence in the area where the inspection hasbeen carried out.

5 Observers shall avoid interference with the safe andnormal operations of stations, installations and equipmentvisited and shall respect measures adopted by theCommission to protect confidentiality of data and infor-mation.

6 Inspections undertaken pursuant to paragraph l(a)and (b) above shall be compatible and reinforce each otherand shall not impose an undue burden on the operation ofstations, installations and equipment visited,

7 In order to facilitate the exercise of their functionsunder this Convention, and without prejudice to therespective positions of the Parties relating to jurisdictionover all other persons in the area in which Antarcticmineral resource activities are regulated by this Conven-

Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Ž 191

tion, observers designated under this Article shall besubject only to the jurisdiction of the Party of which theyare nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurringwhile they are in that area for the purpose of exercisingtheir functions.

8 No exploration or development shall take place in anarea identified pursuant to Article 41 until effectiveprovision has been made for inspection in that area.

Article 13

Protected Areas1 Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be prohib-

ited in any area designated as a Specially Protected Areaor a Site of Special Scientific Interest under Article IX (1 )of the Antarctic Treaty. Such activities shall also beprohibited in any other area designated as a protected areain accordance with Article IX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty,except to the extent that the relevant measure providesotherwise. Pending any designation becoming effective inaccordance with Article IX(4) of the Antarctic Treaty, noAntarctic mineral resource activities shall take place inany such area which would prejudice the purpose forwhich it was designated.

2 The Commission shall also prohibit or restrictAntarctic mineral resource activities in any area which,for historic, ecological, environmental, scientific or otherreasons, it has designated as a protected area.

3 In exercising its powers under paragraph 2 above orunder Article 41 the Commission shall consider whetherto restrict or prohibit Antarctic mineral resource activitiesin any area, in addition to those referred to in paragraph1 above, protected or set aside pursuant to provisions ofother components of the Antarctic Treaty system, toensure the purposes for which they are designated.

4 In relation to any area in which Antarctic mineralresource activities are prohibited or restricted in accor-dance with paragraph 1, 2 or 3 above, the Commissionshall consider whether, for the purposes of Article 4 (2) (e)it would be prudent, additionally, to prohibit or restrictAntarctic mineral resource activities in adjacent areas forthe purpose of creating a buffer zone.

5 The Commission shall give effect to Article 10(2) inacting pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

6 The Commission shall, where appropriate, bring anydecisions it takes pursuant to this Article to the attentionof the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the Contract-ing Parties to the Convention for the Conservation ofAntarctic Seals, the Commission for the Conservation ofAntarctic Marine Living Resources and the ScientificCommittee on Antarctic Research.

Aticle 14

Non-DiscriminationIn the implementation of this Convention there shall be

no discrimination against any Party or its Operators,

Article 15

Respect for Other Uses of Antarctica1 Decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activi-

ties shall take into account the need to respect otherestablished uses of Antarctica, including:

(a) the operation of stations and their associatedinstallations, support facilities and equipment inAntarctica;

(b) scientific investigation in Antarctica and coopera-tion therein;

(c) the conservation, including rational use, of Antarc-tic marine living resources;

(d) tourism;(e) the preservation of historic monuments; and(f) navigation and aviation,

that are consistent with the Antarctic Treaty system.2 Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be con-

ducted so as to respect any uses of Antarctica as referredto in paragraph 1 above.

Article 16

Availability and Confidentiality of Data andInformation

Data and information obtained from Antarctic mineralresource activities shall, to the greatest extent practicableand feasible, be made freely available, provided that:

(a)

(b)

as regards data and information of commercialvalue deriving from prospecting, they may beretained by the Operator in accordance withArticle 37;as regards data and information deriving fromexploration or development the Commissionshall adopt measures relating, as appropriate, totheir release and to ensure the confidentiality ofdata and information of commercial value.

Article 17

Notifications and Provisional Exercise ofFunctions of the Executive Secretary

1 Where in this Convention there is a reference to theprovision of information, a notification or a report to anyinstitution provided for in this Convention and thatinstitution has not been established, the information,notification or report shall be provided to the ExecutiveSecretary who shall circulate it as required.


2 Where in this Convention a function is assigned tothe Executive Secretary and no Executive Secretary hasbeen appointed under Article 33, that function shall beperformed by the Depositary.

CHAPTER

Commission

II: INSTITUTIONS

Article 18

1 There is hereby established the Antarctic MineralResources Commission.

2 Membership of the Commission shall be as follows:(a) each Party which was an Antarctic Treaty

Consultative Party on the date when this Con-vention was opened for signature; and

(b) each other Party during such time as it isactively engaged in substantial scientific, tech-nical or environmental research in the area towhich this Convention applies directly relevantto decisions about Antarctic mineral resourceactivities, particularly the assessments and judg-ments called for in Article 4; and

(c) each other Party sponsoring Antarctic mineralresource exploration or development duringsuch time as the relevant Management Schemeis in force.

3 A Party seeking to participate in the work of theCommission pursuant to subparagraph (b) or (c) aboveshall notify the Depositary of the basis upon which itseeks to become a member of the Commission. In the caseof a Party which is not an Antarctic Treaty ConsultativeParty, such notification shall include a declaration ofintent to abide by recommendations pursuant to ArticleIX(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. The Depositary shallcommunicate to each member of the Commission suchnotification and accompanying information.

4 The Commission shall consider the notification atits next meeting. In the event that a Party referred to inparagraph 2(b) above submitting a notification pursuantto paragraph 3 above is an Antarctic Treaty ConsultativeParty, it shall be deemed to have satisfied the require-ments for Commission membership unless more thanone-third of the members of the Commission object at themeeting at which such notification is considered. Anyother Party submitting a notification shall be deemed tohave satisfied the requirements for Commission member-ship if no member of the Commission objects at themeeting at which such notification is considered.

5 Each member of the Commission shall be repre-sented by one representative who maybe accompanied byalternate representatives and advisers.

6 Observer status in the Commission shall be open toany Party and to any Contracting Party to the AntarcticTreaty which is not a Party to this Convention.

Aticle 19Commission Meets

1 (a) The first meeting of the Commission, held for thepurpose of taking organizational, financial and otherdecisions necessary for the effective functioning of thisConvention and Its institutions, shall be convened withinsix months of the entry into force of this Convention.

(b) After the Commission has held the meeting ormeetings necessary to take the decisions re-ferred to in subparagraph (a) above, the Com-mission shall not hold further meetings exceptin accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 below.

2 Meetings of the Commission shall be held withintwo months of:

(a) receipt of a notification pursuant to Article 39;(b) a request by at least six members of the

Commission; or(c) a request by a member of a Regulatory Commit-

tee in accordance with Article 49(l).3 The Commission may establish a regular schedule

of meetings if it determines that it is necessary for theeffective functioning of this Convention.

4 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, itsmeetings shall be convened by the Executive Secretary.

Article 20Commission Procedure

1 The Commission shall elect from among itsmembers a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen, each ofwhom shall be a representative of a different Party,

2 (a) Until such time as the Commission hasestablished a regular schedule of meetings in accordancewith Article 19(3), the Chairman and Vice-Chairmenshall be elected to serve for a period of two years,provided that if no meeting is held during that period they

meetingheld thereafter.(b) When a regular schedule of meetings has been

established, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmenshall be elected to serve for a period of twoyears.

3 The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure.Such rules may include provisions concerning the numberof terms of office which the Chairman and Vice-Chairmenmay serve and for the rotation of such offices.

4 The Commission may establish such subsidiarybodies as are necessary for the performance of its

—.— ——

Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 193

functions.5 The Commission may decide to establish a perma-

nent headquarters which shall be in New Zealand.6 The Commission shall have legal personality and

shall enjoy in the territory of each Party such legalcapacity as may be necessary to perform its functions andachieve the objectives of this Convention.

7 The privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by theCommission, the Secretariat and representatives attend-ing meetings in the territory of a Party shall be determinedby agreement between the Commission and the Partyconcerned.

Article 21Functions of the Commission

1 Functions of the Commission shall be:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(9

(g)

to facilitate and promote the collection andexchange of scientific, technical and otherinformation and research projects necessary topredict, detect and assess the possible environ-mental impact of Antarctic mineral resourceactivities, including the monitoring of keyenvironmental parameters and ecosystem com-ponents;to designate areas in which Antarctic mineralresource activities shall be prohibited or re-stricted in accordance with Article 13, and toperform the related functions assigned to it inthat Article;to adopt measures for the protection of theAntarctic environment and dependent and asso-ciated ecosystems and for the promotion of safeand effective exploration and developmenttechniques and, as it may deem appropriate, tomake available a handbook of such measures;to determine, in accordance with Article 41,whether or not to identify an area for possibleexploration and development, and to performthe related functions assigned to it in Article 42;to adopt measures relating to prospecting applica-ble to all relevant Operators:(i) to determine for particular circumstances

maximum drilling depths in accordancewith article 1(8);

(ii) to restrict or prohibit prospecting consis-tently with Articles 13, 37 and 38;

to ensure the effective application of Articles12(4), 37(7) and (8), 38(2) and 39(2), whichrequire the submission to the Commission ofinformation, notifications and reports;to give advance public notice of matters uponwhich it is requesting the advice of the AdvisoryCommittee;

(h) to adopt measures relating to the availabilityand confidentiality of data and information,including measures pursuant to Article 16;

(i) to elaborate the principle of non-discriminationset forth in Article 14;

(j) to adopt measures with respect to maximumblock sizes;

(k) to perform the functions assigned to it in Article29;

(1) to review action by Regulatory Committees inaccordance with Article 49;

(m) to adopt measures in accordance with Articles

(n)

(o)

(p)

(q)

(r)

(s)

(t)

(u)

(v)

6 and 41(l)(d) related to the promotion ofcooperation and to participation in Antarcticmineral resource activities;

to adopt general measures pursuant to Article51(6);to take decisions on budgetary matters andadopt financial regulations in accordance withArticle 35;to adopt measures regarding fees payable inconnection with notifications submitted pursu-ant to Articles 37 and 39 and applicationslodged pursuant to Articles 44 and 53, thepurpose of which fees shall be to cover theadministrative costs of handling such notifica-tions and applications;to adopt measures regarding levies payable byOperators engaged in exploration and develop-ment, the principal purpose of which leviesshall be to cover the costs of the institutions ofthis Convention;to determine in accordance with Article 35(7)the disposition of revenues, if any, accruing tothe Commission which are surplus to the re-quirements for financing the budget pursuant toArticle 35;to perform the functions assigned to it in Article7(7) and (8);to perform the functions relating to inspectionassigned to it in Article 12;to consider monitoring reports received pursu-ant to Article 52;to perform the functions relating to disputesettlement assigned to it in Article 59; -

(w) to perform the functions relating to consulta-

a(X)

(y)

tion and cooperation assigned to it in Articles10(2) and 34;

to keep under review the conduct of Antarcticmineral resource activities with a view tosafeguarding the protection of the Antarcticenvironment in the interest of all mankind; andto perform such other functions as are providedfor elsewhere in this Convention.


2 In performing its functions the Commission shallseek and take full account of the views of the AdvisoryCommittee provided in accordance with article 26.

3 Each measure adopted by the Commission shallspecify the date on which it comes into effect.

4 The Commission shall, subject to Article 16 andmeasures in effect pursuant to it and paragraph l(h)above, ensure that a publicly available record of itsmeetings and decisions and of information, notificationsand reports submitted to it is maintained.

Article 22

Decision Making in the Commission1 The Commission shall take decisions on matters of

substance by a three-quarters majority of the memberspresent and voting. When a question arises as to whethera matter is one of substance or not, that matter shall betreated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by athree-quarters majority of the members present andvoting.

2 Notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, consensusshall be required for the following:

(a) the adoption of the budget and decisions onbudgetary and related matters pursuant to Arti-cle 21 (1) (p), (q) and (r) and Article 35(l), (2),(3), (4) and (5);

(b) decisions taken pursuant to Article 21 (1) (i)(c) decisions taken pursuant to Article 41(2).

3 Decisions on matters of procedure shall be taken bya simple majority of the members present and voting.

4 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted aspreventing the Commission, in taking decisions onmatters of substance, from endeavoring to reach aconsensus.

5 For the purposes of this Article, consensus meansthe absence of a formal objection. If, with respect to anydecision covered by paragraph 2(c) above, the Chairmanof the Commission determines that there would be suchan objection he shall consult the members of theCommission. If, as a result of these consultations, theChairman determines that an objection would remain, heshall convene those members most directly interested forthe purpose of seeking to reconcile the differences andproducing a generally acceptable proposal.

Article 23

Advisory Committee1 There is hereby established the Scientific, Technical

and Environmental Advisory Committee.2 Membership of the Advisory Committee shall be

open to all Parties.

3 Each member of the Advisory Committee shall berepresented by one representative with suitable scientific,technical or environmental competence who may beaccompanied by alternate representatives and by expertsand advisers.

4 Observer status in the Advisory Committee shall beopen to any Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty orto the Convention on the Conservation of AntarcticMarine Living Resources which is not a Party to theConvention.

Article 24Advisory Committee Meetings

1 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, theAdvisory Committee shall be convened for its firstmeeting within six months of the first meeting of theCommission. It shall meet thereafter as necessary to fulfillits functions on the basis of a schedule established by theCommission.

2 Meetings of the Advisory Committee, in addition tothose scheduled pursuant to paragraph 1 above, shall beconvened at the request of at least six members of theCommission or pursuant to Article 40(1).

3 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, themeetings of the Advisory Committee shall be convenedby the Executive Secretary.

Article 25Advisory Committee Procedure

1 The Advisory Committee shall elect from among itsmembers a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen, each ofwhom shall be representative of a different Party.

2 (a) Until such time as the Commission hasestablished a schedule of meetings in accordance withArticle 24(l), the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen shall beelected to serve for a period of two years, provided that ifno meeting is held during that period they shall continueto seine until the conclusion of the first meeting heldthereafter,

(b) When a schedule of meetings has been estab-lished, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen shallbe elected to serve for a period of two years.

3 The Advisory Committee shall give advance publicnotice of its meetings and of matters to be considered ateach meeting so as to permit the receipt and considerationof views on such matters from international organizationshaving an interest in them. For this purpose the AdvisoryCommittee may, subject to review by the Commission,establish procedures for the transmission of relevantinformation to these organizations.

4 The Advisory Committee shall, by a two-thirdsmajority of the members present and voting, adopt its

Appendix &--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 195

rules of procedure. Such rules may include provisionsconcerning the number of terms of office which theChairman and Vice-Chairmen may serve and for therotation of such offices. The rules of procedure and anyamendments thereto shall be subject to approval by theCommission.

5 The Advisory Committee may establish suchsubcommittees, subject to budgetary approval, as may benecessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 26

Functions of the Advisory Committee1 The Advisory Committee shall advise the Commis-

sion and Regulatory Committees, as required by thisConvention, or as requested by them, on the scientific,technical and environmental aspects of Antarctic mineralresource activities. It shall provide a forum for consulta-tion and cooperation concerning the collection, exchangeand evaluation of information related to the scientific,technical and environmental aspects of Antarctic mineralresource activities.

2 It shall provide advice to:(a) the Commission relating to its functions under

Articles 21(1) (a) to (f), (u) and (x) and 35(7) (a)(in matters relating to scientific research) aswell as on the implementation of Article 4; and

(b) Regulatory Committees with respect to:(i)(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

the implementation of Article 4;scientific, technical and environmental as-pects of Articles 43(3) and (5), 45,47,51,52 and 54;data to be collected and reported in accor-dance with Articles 47 and 52; andthe scientific, technical and environmentalimplications of reports and reported dataprovided in accordance with Articles 47and 52.

3 It shall provide advice to the Commission and toRegulatory Committees on:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

criteria in respect of the judgments requiredunder Article 4(2) and (3) for the purposes ofArticle 4(l);types of data and information required to carryout its functions, and how they should becollected, reported and archived;scientific research which would contribute tothe base of data and information required insubparagraph (b) above;effective procedures and systems for data andinformation analysis, evaluation, presentationand dissemination to facilitate the judgmentsreferred to in Article 4; and

(e) possibilities for scientific, technical and environ-mental cooperation amongst interested Partieswhich are developing countries and other Par-ties.

4 The Advisory Committee, in providing advice ondecisions to be taken in accordance with Articles 41,43,45 and 54 shall, in each case, undertake a comprehensiveenvironmental and technical assessment of the proposedactions. Such assessments shall be based on all informa-tion, and any amplifications thereof, available to theAdvisory Committee, including the information providepursuant to Articles 39(2)(e), 44(2) (b)(iii) and 53(2)(b).The assessments of the Advisory Committee shall, in eachcase, address the nature and scope of the decisions to betaken and shall include consideration, as appropriate, of,inter alia:

(a)

(b)

(c)(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

the adequacy of existing information to enableinformed judgments to be made;the nature, extent, duration and intensity oflikely direct environmental impacts resultingfrom the proposed activity;possible indirect impacts;means and alternatives by which such direct orindirect impacts might be reduced, includingenvironmental consequences of the alternativeof not proceeding;cumulative impacts of the proposed activity inthe light of existing or planned activities;capacity to respond effectively to accidents withpotential environmental effects;the environmental significance of unavoidableimpacts; andthe probabilities of accidents and their environ-mental consequences.

5 In preparing its advice the Advisory Committee mayseek information and advice from other scientists andexperts or scientific organizations as may be required onan ad hoc basis.

6 The Advisory Committee shall, with a view topromoting international participation in Antarctic mineralresource activities as provided for in Article 6, provideadvice concerning the availability to interested develop-ing country Parties and other Parties, of the informationreferred to in paragraph 3 above, of training programsrelated to scientific, technical and environmental mattersbearing on Antarctic mineral resource activities, and ofopportunities for cooperation among Parties in theseprograms.

Article 27Reporting by the Advisory Committee

The Advisory Committee shall present a report on eachof its meetings to the Commission and to any relevant


Regulatory Committee. The report shall cover all mattersconsidered at the meeting and shall reflect the conclusionsreached and all the views expressed by members of theAdvisory Committee. The report shall be circulated by theExecutive Secretary to all Parties, and to observersattending the meeting, and shall thereupon be madepublicly available.

Article 28

Special Meeting of Parties1 A Special Meeting of Parties shall, as required, be

convened in accordance with Article 40(2) and shall havethe functions, in relation to the identification of an area forpossible exploration and development specified in Arti-cle 40(3).

2 Membership of a Special Meeting of Parties shall beopen to all Parties, each of which shall be represented byone representative who may be accompanied by alternaterepresentatives and advisers.

3 Observer status at a Special Meeting of Parties shallbe open to any Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treatywhich is not a Party to this Convention.

4 Each Special Meeting of Parties shall elect fromamong its members a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, eachof whom shall serve for the duration of that meeting. TheChairman and Vice-Chairman shall not be representativesof the same Party.

5 The Special Meeting of Parties shall, by a two-thirdsmajority of the members present and voting, adopt itsrules of procedure. Until such time as this has been donethe Special Meeting of Parties shall apply provisionalrules of procedure drawn up by the Commission.

6 Unless the Commission decides otherwise, a SpecialMeeting of Parties shall be convened by the ExecutiveSecretary and shall be held at the same venue as themeeting of the Commission convened to consider theidentification of an area for possible exploration anddevelopment.

Article 29

Regulatory Committees1 An Antarctic Mineral Resources Regulatory Com-

mittee shall be established for each area identified by theCommission pursuant to Article 41.

2 Subject to paragraph 6 below, each RegulatoryCommittee shall consist of 10 members. Membershipshall be determined by the Commission in accordancewith this Article and, taking into account Article 9, shallinclude:

(a) the member, if any, or if there are more than one,those members of the Commission identified by

(b)

(c)

reference to Article 9(b) which assert rights orclaims in the identified area;the two members of the Commission alsoidentified by reference to Article 9(b) whichassert a basis of claim in Antarcticother members of the Commission determinedin accordance with this Article so that theRegulatory Committee shall, subject to para-graph 6 below, consist, in total, of 10 members:(i)

(ii)

3 Upon the identification of an area in accordance with

four members identified by reference toArticle 9(b) which assert rights or claims,including the member or members, if any,referred to in subparagraph (a) above; andsix members which do not assert rights orclaims as described in Article 9(b), includ-ing the two members referred to in subpar-agraph (b) above.

Article 41(2), the Chairman of the Commission shall, assoon as possible and in any event within 90 days, make arecommendation to the Commission concerning themembership of the Regulatory Committee. To this end theChairman shall consult, as appropriate, with the Chairmanof the Advisory Committee and all members of theCommission. Such recommendation shall comply withthe requirements of paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Article andshall ensure:

(a)

(b)

(c)

4 (a)

the inclusion of members of the Commissionwhich, whether through prospecting, scientificresearch or otherwise, have contributed sub-stantial scientific, technical or environmentalinformation relevant to the identification of thearea by the Commission pursuant to Article 41;adequate and equitable repmsentation of develop-ing country members of the Commission,having regard to the overall balance betweendeveloped and developing country members ofthe Commission, including at least three devel-oping country members of the Commission;that account is taken of the value of a rotation ofmembership of Regulatory Committees as afurther means of ensuring equitable representa-tion of members of the Commission.When there are one or more members of the

Regulatory Committee referred to in paragraph 2(a)above, the Chairman of the Commission shall make therecommendation in respect of paragraph 2(c) (i) aboveupon the nomination, if any, of such member or memberswhich shall take into account paragraph 3 above, inparticular subparagraph (b) of that paragraph.

(b) In making the recommendation in respect ofparagraph 2(c) (ii) above, the Chairman of theCommission shall give full weight to the views

Appendix D--The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 197

(which shall take into account paragraph 3above) which may be presented on behalf ofthose members of the Commission which do notassert rights of or claims to territorial sover-eignty in Antarctica and, with reference to therequirements of paragraph 3(b) above, to theviews which may be presented on behalf of thedeveloping countries among them.

5 The recommendation of the Chairman of theCommission shall be deemed to have been approved bythe Commission if it does not decide otherwise at the samemeeting as the recommendation is submitted. In takingany decision in accordance with this Article the Commis-sion shall ensure that the requirements of paragraphs 2and 3 above are complied with and that the nomination,if any, referred to in paragraph 4(a) above is given effect.

6 (a) If a member of the Commission which hassponsored prospecting in the identified area and submit-ted the notification pursuant to Article 39 upon which theCommission based its identification of the area pursuantto Article 41, is not a member of the RegulatoryCommittee by virtue of paragraphs 2 and 3 above, thatmember of the Commission shall be a member of theRegulatory Committee until such time as an applicationfor an exploration permit is lodged pursuant to Article 44.

(b) If a Party lodging an application for an explora-tion permit pursuant to Article 44 is not amember of the Regulatory Committee by virtueof paragraphs 2 and 3 above, that Party shall bea member of the Regulatory Committee for itsconsideration of that application. Should suchapplication result in approval of a ManagementScheme pursuant to Article 48, the Party inquestion shall remain a member of the Regula-tory Committee during such time as that Man-agement Scheme is in force with the right totake part in decisions on matters affecting thatManagement Scheme.

7 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted asaffecting Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.

Regulatory Committee Procedure1 The first meeting of each Regulatory Committee

shall be convened by the Executive Secretary in accor-dance with Article 43 (1) Each Regulatory Committeeshall meet thereafter when and where necessary to fulfillits functions.

2 Each member of a Regulatory Committee shall berepresented by one representative who may be accompa-nied by alternate representatives and advisers,

3 Each Regulatory Committee shall elect from amongits members a Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The Chair-man and Vice-Chairman shall not be representatives ofthe same Party.

4 Any Party may attend meetings of a RegulatoryCommittee as an observer.

5 Each Regulatory Committee shall adopt its rules ofprocedure. Such rules may include provisions concerningthe period and number of terms of office which theChairman and Vice-Chairman may serve and for therotation of such offices.

Article 31Functions of Regulatory Committees

1 The functions of each Regulatory Committee shallbe:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

to undertake the preparatory work provided forin Article 43;to consider applications for exploration anddevelopment permits in accordance with Arti-cles 45, 46 and 54;to approve Management Schemes and issueexploration and development permits in accor-dance with Articles 47,48 and 54;to monitor exploration and development activi-ties in accordance with Article 52;to perform the functions assigned to it in Article51;to perform the functions relating to inspectionassigned to it in Article 12;to perform the functions relating to disputesettlement assigned to it in Article 47(r); andto perform such other functions as are providedfor elsewhere in this Convention.

2 In performing its functions each Regulatory Commit-tee shall seek and take full account of the views of theAdvisory Committee provided in accordance with Article26.

3 Each Regulatory Committee shall, subject to Article16 and measures in effect pursuant to it and Article 21 (1)(h), ensure that a publicly available record of its decisions,and of Management Schemes in force, is maintained.

Article 32

Decision Making in Regulatory Committees1 Decisions by a Regulatory Committee pursuant to

Articles 48 and 54(5) shall be taken by a two-thirdsmajority of the members present and voting, whichmajority shall include a simple majority of those memberspresent and voting referred to in Article 29(2) (c) (i) andalso a simple majority of those members present andvoting referred to in Article 29(2) (c) (ii)


2 Decisions by a Regulatory Committee pursuant toArticle 43(3) and (5) shall be taken by a two-thirdsmajority of the members present and voting, whichmajority shall include at least half of those memberspresent and voting referred to in Article 29(2) (c) (i) andalso at least half of those members present and votingreferred to in Article 29(2) (c) (ii)

3 Decisions on all other matters of substance shall betaken by a two-thirds majority of the members present andvoting. When a question arises as to whether a matter isone of substance or not, that matter shall be treated as oneof substance unless otherwise decided by a two-thirdsmajority of the members present and voting.

4 Decisions on matters of procedure shall be taken bya simple majority of the members present and voting.

5 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted aspreventing a Regulatory Committee, in taking decisionson matters of substance, from endeavoring to reach aconsensus.

Article 33

Secretariat1 The Commission may establish a Secretariat to

serve the Commission, Regulatory Committees, theAdvisory Committee, the Special Meeting of Parties andany subsidiary bodies established.

2 The Commission may appoint an Executive Secre-tary, who shall be the head of the Secretariat, according tosuch procedures and on such terms and conditions as theCommission may determine. The Executive Secretaryshall serve for a four year term and may be reappointed.

3 The Commission may, with due regard to the needfor efficiency and economy, authorize such staff establish-ment for the Secretariat as may be necessary. TheExecutive Secretary shall appoint, direct and supervisethe staff according to such rules and procedures and onsuch terms and conditions as the Commission maydetermine.

4 The Secretariat shall perform the functions specifiedin this Convention and, subject to the approved budget,the tasks entrusted to it by the Commission, RegulatoryCommittees, the Advisory Committee and the SpecialMeeting of Parties.

Article 34

Cooperation with International Organizations1 The Commission and, as appropriate, the Advisory

Committee shall cooperate with the Antarctic TreatyConsultative Parties, the Contracting Parties to theConvention for the Conservation of Antarctic seals, the

Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic MarineLiving Resources, and the Scientific Committee onAntarctic Research.

2 The Commission shall cooperate with the UnitedNations, its relevant Specialized Agencies, and, asappropriate, any international organization which mayhave competence in respect of mineral resources in areasadjacent to those covered by this Convention.

3 The Commission shall also, as appropriate, cooper-ate with the International Union for the Conservation ofNature and Natural Resources, and with other relevantinternational organizations, including non-governmentalorganizations, having a scientific, technical or environ-mental interest in Antarctica.

4 The Commission may, as appropriate, accordobserver status in the Commission and in the AdvisoryCommittee to such relevant international organizations,including non-governmental organizations, as might as-sist in the work of the institution in question. Observerstatus at a Special Meeting of Parties shall be open to suchorganizations as have been accorded observer status in theCommission or the Advisory Committee.

5 The Commission may enter into agreements withthe organizations referred to in this Article.

Article 35

Financial Provisions1 The Commission shall adopt a budget, on an annual

or other appropriate basis, for:(a) its activities and the activities of Regulatory

Committees, the Advisory Committee, the Spe-cial Meeting of Parties, any subsidiary bodiesestablished and the Secretariat; and

(b) the progressive reimbursement of any contribu-tions paid under paragraphs 5 and 6 belowwhenever revenues under paragraph 4 belowexceed expenditure.

2 The first draft budget shall be submitted by theDepositary at least 90 days before the first meeting of theCommission. At that meeting the Commission shall adoptits first budget and decide upon arrangements for thepreparation of subsequent budgets.

3 The Commission shall adopt financial regulations.4 Subject to paragraph 5 below, the budget shall be

financed, inter alia, by:

(a) fees prescribed pursuant to Articles 21(l) (p) and43 (2) (b)

(b) levies on Operators, subject to any measuresadopted by the Commission in accordance withArticle 21(1) (q), pursuant to Article 47(k) (i);and


(c) such other financial payments by Operatorspursuant to Article 47(k) (ii) as may be requiredto be paid to the institutions of this Convention.

5 If the budget is not fully financed by revenues inaccordance with paragraph 4 above, and subject toreimbursement in accordance with paragraph l(b) above,the budget shall, to the extent of any shortfall and subjectto paragraph 6 below, be financed by contributions fromthe members of the Commission. To this end, theCommission shall adopt as soon as possible a method ofequitable sharing of contributions to the budget. Thebudget shall, in the meantime, to the extent of anyshortfall, be financed by equal contributions from eachmember of the Commission.

6 In adopting the method of contributions referred toin paragraph 5 above the Commission shall consider theextent to which members of and observers at institutionsof this Convention may be called upon to contribute to thecosts of those institutions.

7 The Commission, in determining the disposition ofrevenues accruing to it, which are surplus to the require-ments for financing the budget pursuant to this Article,shall:

(a)

(b)

promote scientific research in Antarctica, particu-larly that related to the Antarctic environmentand Antarctic resources, and a wide spread ofparticipation in such research by all Parties, inparticular developing country Parties;ensure that the interests of the members ofRegulatory Committees having the most directinterest in the matter in relation to the areas inquestion are respected in any disposition of thatsurplus.

8 The finances of the Commission, RegulatoryCommittees, the Advisory Committee, the Special Meet-ing of Parties, any subsidiary bodies established and theSecretariat shall accord with the financial regulationsadopted by the Commission and shall be subject to anannual audit by external auditors selected by the Commis-sion.

9 Each member of the Commission, RegulatoryCommittees, the Advisory Committee, the Special Meet-ing of Parties and any subsidiary bodies established, aswell as any observer at a meeting of any of the institutionsof this Convention, shall meet its own expenses arisingfrom attendance at meetings.

10 A member of the Commission that fails to pay itscontribution for two consecutive years shall not, duringthe period of its continuing subsequent default, have theright to participate in the taking of decisions in any of theinstitutions of this Convention, If it continues to be indefault for a further two consecutive years, the Commis-

sion shall decide what further action should be taken,which may include loss by that member of the right toparticipate in meetings of the institutions of this Conven-tion. Such member shall resume the full enjoyment of itsrights upon payment of the outstanding contributions.

11 Nothing in this Article shall be construed asprejudicing the position of any member of a RegulatoryCommittee on the outcome of consideration by theRegulatory Committee of terms and conditions in aManagement Scheme pursuant to Article 47 (k) (ii)

Article 36

Official and Working LanguagesThe official and working languages of the Commis-

sion, Regulatory Committees, the Advisory Committee,the Special Meeting of Parties and any meeting convenedunder Article 64 shall be English, French, Russian andSpanish.

CHAPTER III: PROSPECTINGArticle 37

Prospecting1 Prospecting shall not confer upon any Operator any

right to Antarctic mineral resources.2 Prospecting shall at all times be conducted in

compliance with this Convention and with measures ineffect pursuant to this Convention, but shall not requireauthorization by the institutions of this Convention.

3 (a) The Sponsoring State shall ensure that itsOperators undertaking prospecting maintain the neces-sary financial and technical means to comply with Article8(1 ), and, to the extent that any such Operator fails to takeresponse action as required in Article 8(1), shall ensurethat this is undertaken.

(b) The Sponsoring State shall also ensure that itsOperators undertaking prospecting maintainfinancial capacity, commensurate with the na-ture and level of the activity undertaken and therisks involved, to comply with Article 8(2).

4 In cases where more than one Operator is engagedin prospecting in the same general area, the Sponsoringstate or States shall ensure that those Operators conducttheir activities with due regard to each others’ rights.

5 Where an Operator wishes to conduct prospecting inan area identified under Article 41 in which anotherOperator has been authorized to undertake exploration Ordevelopment the Sponsoring State shall ensure that suchprospecting is carried out subject to the rights of anyauthorized Operator and any requirements to protect itsrights specified by the relevant Regulatory Committee.


6 Each Operator shall ensure upon cessation ofprospecting the removal of all installations and equipmentand site rehabilitation. On the request of the SponsoringState, the Commission may waive the obligation toremove installations and equipment.

7 The Sponsoring State shall notify the Commissionat least nine months in advance of the commencement ofplanned prospecting. The notification shall be accompa-nied by such fees as may be established by the Commis-sion in accordance with Article 21(1) (p) and shall:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

identify, by reference to coordinates of latitudeand longitude or identifiable geographic fea-tures, the general area in which the prospectingto take place;broadly identify the mineral resource or re-sources which are to be the subject of theprospecting;describe the prospecting, including the methodsto be used, and the general program of work tobe undertaken and its expected duration;provide an assessment of the possible environ-mental and other impacts of the prospecting,taking into account possible cumulative im-pacts as referred to in Article 4(5);describe the measures, including monitoringprograms, to be adopted to avoid harmfulenvironmental consequences or undue interfer-ence with other established uses of Antarctica,and outline the measures to be put into effect inthe event of any accident and contingency plansfor evacuation in an emergency;provide details on the Operator and certify thatit:(i) has a substantial and genuine link with the

Sponsoring State as defined in Article1(12); and

(ii) is financially and technically qualified tocarry out the proposed prospecting inaccordance with this Convention; and

(g) provide such further information as may berequired by measures adopted by the Commis-sion.

8 The Sponsoring State shall subsequently provide tothe Commission:

(a) notification of any changes to the informationreferred to in paragraph 7 above;

(b) notification of the cessation of prospecting,including removal of any installations andequipment as well as site rehabilitation; and

(c) a general annual report on the prospectingundertaken by the Operator.

9 Notifications and reports submitted pursuant to thisArticle shall be circulated by the Executive Secretary

without delay to all Parties and observers attendingCommission meetings.

10 Paragraphs 7,8 and 9 above shall not be interpretedas requiring the disclosure of data and information ofcommercial value.

11 The Sponsoring State shall ensure that basic dataand information of commercial value generated byprospecting are maintained in archives and may at anytime release part of or all such data and information, onconditions which it shall establish, for scientific orenvironmental purposes.

12 The Sponsoring State shall ensure that basic dataand information, other than interpretative data, generatedby prospecting are made readily available when such dataand information are not or are no longer, of commercialvalue and, in any event, no later than 10 years after theyear the data and information were collected, unless itcertifies to the Commission that the data and informationcontinue to have commercial value. It shall review atregular intervals whether such data and information maybe released and shall report the results of such reviews tothe Commission.

13 The Commission may adopt measures consistentwith this Article relating to the release of data andinformation of commercial value including requirementsfor certifications, the frequency of reviews and maximumtime limits for extensions of the protection of such dataand information.

Artic1438

Consideration of Prospecting by the Commission1 If a member of the Commission considers that a

notification submitted in accordance with Article 37(7) or(8), or ongoing prospecting, causes concern as to consis-tency with this Convention or measures in effect pursuantthereto, that member may request the Sponsoring State toprovide a clarification. If that member considers that anadequate response is not forthcoming from the Sponsor-ing State within a reasonable time, the member mayrequest that the Commission be convened in accordancewith Article 19(2) (b) to consider the question and takeappropriate action.

2 If measures applicable to all relevant Operators areadopted by the Commission following a request made inaccordance with paragraph 1 above, Sponsoring Statesthat have submitted notifications in accordance withArticle 37(7) or (8), and Sponsoring States whoseOperators are conducting prospecting, shall ensure thatthe plans and activities of their Operators are modified tothe extent necessary to conform with those measureswithin such time limit as the Commission may prescribe,and shall notify the Commission accordingly,


CHAPTER IV: EXPLORATION

Article 39

Requests for Identification of an Area forPossible Exploration and Development

1 Any Party may submit to the Executive Secretary anotification requesting that the Commission identify anarea for possible exploration and development of aparticular mineral resource or resources.

2 Any such notification shall be accompanied by suchfees as may be established by the Commission inaccordance with Article 21(1) (p) and shall contain:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

3 A

precise delineation, including coordinates, ofthe area proposed for identification;specification of the resource or resources forwhich the area would be identified and anyrelevant data and information, excluding dataand information of commercial value, concern-ing that resource or those resources, includinga geological description of the proposed area;a detailed description of the physical andenvironmental characteristics of the proposedarea;a description of the likely scale of explorationand development for the resource or resourcesinvolved in the proposed area and of themethods which could be employed in suchexploration and development;a detailed assessment of the environmental andother impacts of possible exploration and development for the resource or resources involved,taking into account Articles 15 and 26(4); andsuch other information as may be requiredpursuant to measures adopted by the Commis-sion.notification under paragraph 1 above shall be

referred promptly by the Executive Secretary to all Partiesand shall be circulated to observers attending the meetingof the Commission to be convened pursuant to Article19(2) (a)

Article 40

Action by the Advisory Committee and SpecialMeeting of Parties

1 The Advisory Committee shall meet as soon aspossible after the meeting of the Commission convenedpursuant to Article 19 (2) (a) has commenced. TheAdvisory Committee shall provide advice to the Commis-sion on the notification submitted pursuant to Article39(1 ) The Commission may prescribe a time limit for theprovision of such advice.

2 A Special Meeting of Parties shall meet as soon aspossible after circulation of the report of the AdvisoryCommittee and in any event not later than two monthsafter that report has been circulated.

3 The Special Meeting of Parties shall considerwhether identification of an area by the Commission inaccordance with the request contained in the notificationwould be consistent with this Convention, and shall reportthereon to the Commission as soon as possible and in anyevent not later than 21 days from the commencement ofthe meeting.

4 The report of the Special Meeting of Parties to theCommission shall reflect the conclusions reached and allthe views expressed by Parties participating in themeeting.

Article 41

Action by the Commission1 The Commission shall, as soon as possible after

receipt of the report of the Special Meeting of Parties,consider whether or not it will identify an area asrequested. Taking full account of the views and givingspecial weight to the conclusions of the Special Meetingof Parties, and taking full account of the views and theconclusions of the Advisory Committee, the Commissionshall determine whether such identification would beconsistent with this Convention. For this purpose:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

the Commission shall ensure that an area to beidentified shall be such that, taking into accountall factors relevant to such identification, in-cluding the physical, geological, environmentaland other characteristics of such area, it formsa coherent unit for the purposes of resourcemanagement. The Commission shall thus con-sider whether an area to be identified shouldinclude all or part of that which was requestedin the notification and, subject to the necessaryassessments having been made, adjacent areasnot covered by that notification;the Commission shall consider whether thereare, within an area requested or to be identified,any areas in which exploration and development are or should be prohibited or restricted inaccordance with Article 13;the Commission shall specify the mineral re-source or resources for which the area would beidentified;the Commission shall give effect to Article 6, byelaborating opportunities for joint ventures ordifferent forms of participation, up to a definedlevel, including procedures for offering suchparticipation, in possible exploration and development, within the area, by interested Parties


(e)

(f)

which are Antarctic Treaty Consultative Partiesand by other interested Parties, in particular,developing countries in either category;the Commission shall prescribe any additionalassociated conditions necessary to ensure thatan area to be identified is consistent with otherprovisions of this Convention and may pre-scribe general guidelines relating to the opera-tional requirements for exploration and devel-opment in an area to be identified includingmeasures establishing maximum block sizesand advice concerning related support activi-ties; andthe Commission shall give effect to the require-ment in Article 59 to establish additional proce-dures for the settlement of disputes.

2 After it has completed its consideration in accor-dance with paragraph 1 above, the Commission shallidentify an area for possible exploration and developmentif there is a consensus of Commission members that suchidentification is consistent with this Convention.

Article 42

Revision in the Scope of an Identified Area1 If, after an area has been identified in accordance

with Article 41, a Party requests identification of an area,all or part of which is contained within the boundaries ofthe area already identified but In respect of a mineralresource or resources different from any resource inrespect of which the area has already been identified, therequest shall be dealt within accordance with Articles 39,40 and 41. Should the Commission identify an area inrespect of such different mineral resource or resources, itshall have regard, in addition to the requirements ofArticle 41(1) (a), to the desirability of specifying theboundaries of the area in such away that it can be assignedto the Regulatory Committee with competence for thearea already identified.

2 In the light of increased knowledge bearing on theeffective management of the area, and after seeking theviews of the Advisory Committee and the relevantRegulatory Committee, the Commission may amend theboundaries of any area it has identified. In making anysuch amendment the Commission shall ensure thatauthorized exploration and development in the area arenot adversely affected. Unless there are compellingreasons for doing so, the Commission shall not amend theboundaries of an area it has identified in such a way as toinvolve a change in the composition of the relevantRegulatory Committee.

Article 43

Preparatory Work by Regulatory Committees1 As soon as possible after the identification of an area

pursuant to Article 41, the relevant Regulatory Commit-tee established in accordance with Article 29 shall beconvened.

2 The Regulatory Committee shall:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

subject to any measures adopted by the Commis-sion pursuant to Article 21(1) (j) relating tomaximum block sizes, divide its area of compe-tence into blocks in respect of which applica-tions for exploration and development may besubmitted and make provision for a limit inappropriate circumstances on the number ofblocks to be accorded to any Party;subject to any measures adopted by the Commis-sion pursuant to Article 21(1) (p), establish feesto be paid with any application for an explora-tion or development permit lodged pursuant toArticle 44 or 53;establish periods within which applications forexploration and development may be lodged, allapplications received within each such periodbeing considered as simultaneous;establish procedures for the handling of applica-tions; anddetermine a method of resolving competingapplications which are not resolved in accor-dance with Article 45(4) (a), which methodshall, provided that all other requirements ofthis Convention are satisfied and consistentlywith measures adopted pursuant to Article41 ( 1 )(d), include priority for the application with thebroadest participation among interested Partieswhich are Antarctic Treaty Consultative Partiesand other interested Parties, in particular, devel-oping countries in either category.

3 The Regulatory Committee shall adopt guidelineswhich are consistent with, and which taken together with,the provisions of this Convention and measures of generalapplicability adopted by the Commission, as well asassociated conditions and general guidelines adopted bythe Commission when identifying the area, shall, byaddressing the relevant items in Article 47, identify thegeneral requirements for exploration and development inits area of competence.

4 Upon adoption of guidelines under paragraph 3above the Executive Secretary shall, without delay,inform all members of the Commission of the decisionstaken by the Regulatory Committee pursuant to para-graphs 2 and 3 above and shall make them publicly

Appendix &The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 203

available together with relevant measures, associatedconditions and general guidelines adopted by the Com-mission.

5 The Regulatory Committee may from time to timerevise guidelines adopted under paragraph 3 above, takinginto account any views of the Commission.

6 In performing its functions under paragraphs 3 and5 above, the Regulatory Committee shall seek and takefull account of the views of the Advisory Committeeprovided in accordance with Article 26.

Article 44Application for an Exploration Permit

1 Following completion of the work undertakenpursuant to Article 43, any Party, on behalf of an Operatorfor which it is the Sponsoring State, may lodge with theRegulatory Committee an application for an explorationpermit within the periods established by the RegulatoryCommittee pursuant to Article 43 (2) (c).

2 An application shall be accompanied by the feesestablished by the Regulatory Committee in accordancewith Article 43(2) (b) and shall contain:

(a)

(b)

detailed description of the Operator, includingits managerial structure, financial compositionand resources and technical expertise, and, inthe case of an Operator being a joint venture, theinclusion of a detailed description of the degreeto which Parties are involved in the Operatorthrough, inter alia, juridical persons with whichParties have substantial and genuine links, sothat each component of the joint venture can beeasily attributed to a Party or Parties for thepurposes of identifying the level of Antarctic mineral resource activities thereof, which de-scription of substantial and genuine links shallinclude a description of equity sharing;a detailed description of the proposed explora-tion activities and a description in as muchdetail as possible of proposed development ac-tivities, including:(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

an identification of the mineral resource orresourecs and the block to which the appli-cation applies;a detailed explanation of how the proposedactivities conform with the general re-quirements referred to in Article 43(3);a detailed assessment of the environmentaland other impacts of the proposed activi-ties, taking into account Articles 15 and26(4); anda description of the capacity to respondeffectively to accidents, especially thosewith potential environmental effects;

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

a certification by the Sponsoring State of thecapacity of the Operator to comply with thegeneral requirements referred to in Article43(3);a certification by the Sponsoring State of thetechnical competence and financial capacity ofthe Operator and that the Operator has asubstantial and genuine link with it as definedin Article 1(12);a description of the manner in which theapplication complies with any measures adoptedby the Commission pursuant to Article 41(1)(d); andsuch further information as may be required bythe Regulatory Committee or in measures adoptedby the Commission.

Article 45

Examination of Applications1 The Regulatory Committee shall meet as soon as

possible after an application has been lodged pursuant toArticle 44, for the purpose of elaborating a ManagementScheme. In performing this function it shall:

(a) determine whether the application containssufficient or adequate information pursuant toArticle 44 (2). To this end, it may at any timeseek further information from the SponsoringState consistent with Article 44(2);

(b) consider the exploration and development activi-ties proposed in the application, and suchelaborations, revisions or additions as neces-

(i) to ensure their consistency with this Conven-tion as well as measures in effect pursuantthereto and the general requirements re-ferred to in Article 43(3); and

(ii) to prescribe the specific terms and condi-tions of a Management Scheme in accor-dance with Article 47.

2 At any time during the process of considerationdescribed above, the Regulatory Committee may declinethe application if it considers that the activities proposedtherein cannot be elaborated, revised or adapted to ensureconsistency with this Convention as well as measures ineffect pursuant thereto and the general requirementsreferred to in Article 43(3).

3 In performing its functions under this Article, theRegulatory Committee shall seek and take full account ofthe views of the Advisory Committee. To that end theRegulatory Committee shall refer to the Advisory Com-mittee all parts of the application which are necessary forit to provide advice pursuant to Article 26, together withany other relevant information.


4 If two or more applications meeting the require-ments ofblock:

(a)

(b)

Article 44(2) are lodged in respect of the same

the competing applicants shall be invited by theRegulatory Committee to resolve the competi-tion amongst themselves, by means of their ownchoice within a prescribed period;if the competition is not resolved pursuant tosubparagraph (a) above it shall be resolved bythe Regulatory Committee in accordance withthe method determined by it pursuant to Article43(2) (e),

Article 46

Management SchemeIn performing its functions under Article 45, including

the preparation of a Management Scheme, and underArticle 54, the Regulatory Committee shall have recourseto the Sponsoring State and the member or members, ifany, referred to in Article 29 (2) (a) and, as may berequired one or two additional members of the Regula-tory Committee.

Article 47

Scope of the Management SchemeThe Management Scheme shall prescribe the specific

terms and conditions for exploration and development ofthe mineral resource or resources concerned within therelevant block. Such terms and conditions shall beconsistent with the general requirements referred to inArticle 43(3), and shall cover, inter alia:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)(f)

(g)(h)

duration of exploration and development per-mits;measures and procedures for the protection ofthe Antarctic environment and dependent andassociated ecosystems, including methods, ac-tivities and undertakings by the Operator tominimize environmental risks and damage;provision for necessary and timely responseaction, including prevention, containment andclean up and removal measures, for restorationto the status quo ante, and for contingencyplans, resources and equipment to enable suchaction to be taken;procedures for the implementation of differentstages of exploration and development;performance requirements;technical and safety specifications, includingstandards and procedures to ensure safe opera-tions;monitoring and inspection;liability;

(i) procedures for the development of mineraldeposits which extend outside the area coveredby a permit;

(j) resource conservation requirements;(k) financial obligations of the Operator including:

(i) levies in accordance with measures adoptedpursuant to Article 21(1) (q)

(ii) payments in the nature of and similar totaxes, royalties or payments in kind;

(1) financial guarantees and insurance;(m) assignment and relinquishment;(n)

(o)(p)(q)(r)

(s)

suspension and modification of the Manage-ment Scheme, or cancellation of the Manage-ment Scheme, exploration or development per-mit, and the imposition of monetary penalties,in accordance with Article 51;procedures for agreed modifications;enforcement of the Management Scheme;applicable law to the extent necessary;effective additional procedures for the settle-ment of disputes:provisions to avoid and to resolve conflict withother legitimate uses of Antarctica;

(t) data and information collection, reporting andnotification requirements;

(u) confidentiality; and(v) removal of installations and equipment, as well

as site rehabilitation.

Article 48Approval of the Management Scheme

A Management Scheme prepared in accordance withArticles 45, 46 and 47 shall be subject to approvalpursuant to Article 32. Such approval shall constituteauthorization for the issue without delay of an explorationpermit by the Regulatory Committee. The explorationpermit shall accord exclusive rights to the Operator toexplore and, subject to Articles 53 and 54, to develop themineral resource or resources which are the subject of theManagement Scheme exclusively in accordance with theterms and conditions of the Management Scheme,

Article 49Review

1 Any member of the Commission, or any member ofa Regulatory Committee, may within one month of adecision by that Regulatory Committee to approve aManagement Scheme or issue a development permit,request that the Commission be convened in accordancewith Article 19(2) (b) or(c), as the case may be, to reviewthe decision of the Regulatory Committee for consistencywith the decision taken by the Commission to identify thearea pursuant to Article 41 and any measures in effectrelevant to that decision.


2 The Commission shall complete its considerationwithin three months of a request made pursuant toparagraph 1 above, In performing its functions theCommission shall not assume the functions of theRegulatory Committee, nor shall substitute its discretionfor that of the Regulatory Committee.

3 Should the Commission determine that a decision toapprove a Management Scheme or issue a developmentpermit is inconsistent with the decision taken by theCommission to identify the area pursuant to Article 41and any measures in effect relevant to that Decision, itmay request that Regulatory Committee to reconsider itsdecision.

Article 50Rights of Authorized Operators

1 No Management Scheme shall be suspended ormodified and no Management Scheme, exploration ordevelopment permit shall be canceled without the consentof the Sponsoring State except pursuant to Article 51, orArticle 54 or the Management Scheme itself,

2 Each Operator authorized to conduct activitiespursuant to a Management Scheme shall exercise itsrights with due regard to the rights of other Operatorsundertaking exploration or development in the sameidentified area,

Article 51Suspension, Modification or Cancellation of theManagement Scheme and Monetary Penalties

1 If a Regulatory Committee determines that explora-tion or development authorized pursuant to a Manage-ment Scheme has resulted or is about to result in impactson the Antarctic environment or dependent or associatedecosystems beyond those judged acceptable pursuant tothis Convention, it shall suspend the relevant activitiesand as soon as possible modify the Management Schemeso as to avoid such impacts. If such impacts cannot beavoided by the modification of the Management Scheme,the Regulatory Committee shall suspend it, or cancel itand the exploration or development permit.

2 In performing its functions under paragraph 1 abovea Regulatory Committee shall, unless emergency actionis required, seek and take into account the views of theAdvisory Committee.

3 If a Regulatory Committee determines that anOperator has failed to comply with this Convention orwith measures in effect pursuant to it or a ManagementScheme applicable to that Operator, the RegulatoryCommittee may do all or any of the following:

(a) modify the Management Scheme;(b) suspend the Management Scheme;

(c) cancel the Management Scheme and the explora-tion or development permit; and

(d) impose a monetary penalty.4 Sanctions determined pursuant to paragraph 3(a) to

(d) above shall be proportionate to the seriousness of thefailure to comply.

5 A Regulatory Committee shall cancel a Manage-ment Scheme and the exploration or development permitif an Operator ceases to have a substantial and genuinelink with the Sponsoring State as defined in Article 1(12).

6 The Commission shall adopt general measures,which may include mitigation, relating to action byRegulatory Committees pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3above and, as appropriate, to the consequences of suchaction. No application pursuant to Article 44 may belodged until such measures have come into effect.

Article 52

Monitoring in Relation to Management Schemes1 Each Regulatory Committee shall monitor the

compliance of Operators with Management Schemeswithin its area of competence.

2 Each Regulatory Committee, taking into account theadvice of the Advisory Committee, shall monitor andassess the effects on the Antarctic environment and ondependent and on associated ecosystems of Antarcticmineral resource activities within its area of competence,particularly by reference to key environmental parametersand ecosystem components.

3 Each Regulatory Committee shall, as appropriate,inform the Commission and the Advisory Committee ina timely fashion of monitoring under this Article.

CHAPTER V: DEVELOPMENT

Article 53

Application for a Development Permit1 At any time during the period in which art approved

Management Scheme and exploration permit are in forcefor an Operator, the Sponsoring State may, on behalf ofthat Operator, lodge with the Regulatory Committee anapplication for a development permit.

2 An application shall be accompanied by the feesestablished by the Regulatory Committee in accordancewith Article 43(2) (b) and shall contain:

(a) an updated description of the planned develop-ment identifying any modifications proposed tothe approved Management Scheme and anyadditional measures to be taken, consequentupon such modifications, to ensure consistency


(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

with this convention, including any measures ineffect pursuant thereto and the general require-ments refereed to in Article 43(3);a detailed assessment of the environmental andother impacts of the planned development,taking into account Articles 15 and 26(4);a recertification by the Sponsoring State of thetechnical competence and financial capacity ofthe Operator and that the Operator has asubstantial and genuine link with it as definedin Article 1(12);a recertification by the Sponsoring State of thecapacity of the Operator to comply with thegeneral requirements referred to in Article43(3);updated information in relation to all othermatters specified in Article 44(2); andsuch further information as may be required bythe Regulatory Committee or in measures adoptedby the Commission.

Article 54

Examination of Applications and Issue ofDevelopment Permits

1 The Regulatory Committee shall meet as soon aspossible after an application has been lodged pursuant toArticle 530

2 The Regulatory Committee shall determine whetherthe application contains sufficient or adequate informa-tion pursuant to Article 53 (2), In performing this functionit may at any time seek further information from theSponsoring State consistent with Article 53(2).

3 The Regulatory Committee shall consider whether:

(a)

(b)

the application reveals modifications to theplanned development previously envisaged;the planned development would cause previ-ously unforseen impacts on the Antarcticenvironment or dependent or associated ecosys-tems, either as a result of any modificationsreferred to in sub paragraph (a) above or in thelight of increased knowledge.

4 The Regulatory Committee shall consider anymodifications to the Management Scheme necessary inthe light of paragraph 3 above to ensure that thedevelopment activities proposed would be undertakenconsistently with this Convention as well as measures ineffect pursuant thereto and the general requirementsreferred to in Article 43(3). However, the financialobligations specified in the approved ManagementScheme may not be revised without the consent of theSponsoring State, unless provided for in the ManagementScheme itself.

5 If the Regulatory Committee in accordance withArticle 32 approves modifications under paragraph 4above, or if it does not consider that such modificationsare necessary, the Regulatory Committee shall issuewithout delay a development permit.

6 In performing its functions under this Article, theRegulatory Committee shall seek and take full account ofthe views of the Advisory Committee. To that end theRegulatory Committee shall refer to the Advisory Com-mittee all parts of the application which are necessary forit to provide advice pursuant to Article 26, together withany other relevant information.

CHAPTER VI: DISPUTESSETTLEMENT

Article 55

Disputes Between Two or More PartiesArticles 56, 57 and 58 apply to disputes between two

or more Parties.

Article 56

Choice of Procedure1 Each Party, when signing, ratifying, accepting,

approving or acceding to this Convention, or at any timethereafter, may choose, by written declaration, one or bothof the following means for the settlement of disputesconcerning the interpretation or application of thisConvention:

(a) the International Court of Justice;(b) the Arbitral Tribunal.

2 A declaration made under paragraph 1 above shallnot affect the operation of Article 57(l), (3), (4) and (5).

3 A Party that has not made a declaration underparagraph 1 above or in respect of which a declaration isno longer in force shall be deemed to have accepted thecompetence of the Arbitral Tribunal.

4 If the parties to a dispute have accepted the samemeans for the settlement of a dispute, the dispute may besubmitted only to that procedure, unless the partiesotherwise agree.

5 If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the samemeans for the settlement of a dispute, or if they have bothaccepted both means, the dispute may be submitted onlyto the Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties otherwiseagree.

6 A declaration made under paragraph 1 above shallremain in force until it expires in accordance with itsterms or until 3 months after written notice of revocationhas been deposited with the Depositary.

.——

Appendix D---The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Ž 207

7 A new declaration, a notice of revocation or theexpiry of a declaration shall not in any way affectproceedings pending before the International Court ofJustice or the Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties to thedispute otherwise agree.

8 Declarations and notices referred to in this Articleshall be deposited with the Depositary who shall transmitcopies thereof to all Parties.

Article 57

Procedure for Dispute Settlement1 If a dispute arises concerning the interpretation or

application of this Convention, the parties to the disputeshall, at the request of any one of them, consult amongthemselves as soon as possible with a view to having thedispute resolved by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or otherpeaceful means of their choice.

2 If the parties to a dispute concerning the interpreta-tion or application of this Convention have not agreed ona means for resolving it within 12 months of the requestfor consultation pursuant to paragraph 1 above, thedispute shall be referred, at the request of any party to thedispute, for settlement in accordance with the proceduredetermined by the operation of Article 56(4) and (5).

3 If a dispute concerning the interpretation or applica-tion of this Convention relates to a measure in effectpursuant to this Convention or a Management Schemeand the parties to such a dispute:

(a)

(b)

have not agreed on a means for resolving thedispute within 6 months of the request forconsultation pursuant to paragraph 1 above, thedispute shall be referred, at the request of anyparty to the dispute, for discussion in theinstitution which adopted the instrument inquestion;have not agreed on a means for resolving thedispute within 12 months of the request forconsultation pursuant to paragraph 1 above, thedispute shall be referred for settlement at therequest of any party to the dispute, to theArbitral Tribunal.

4 The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be competent todecide or otherwise rule upon any matter within the scopeof Article 9. In addition, nothing in this Convention shallbe interpreted as conferring competence or jurisdiction onthe Intemational Court of Justice or any other tribunalestablished for the purpose of settling disputes betweenParties to decide or otherwise rule upon any matter withinthe scope of Article 9.

5 The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be competent withregard to the exercise by an institution of its discretionary

powers in accordance with this Convention; in no caseshall the Arbitral Tribunal substitute its discretion for thatof an institution. In addition, nothing in this Conventionshall be interpreted as conferring competence or jurisdic-tion on the International Court of Justice or any othertribunal established for the purpose of settling disputesbetween Parties with regard to the exercise by aninstitution of its discretionary powers or to substitute itsdiscretion for that of an institution.

Article 58

Exclusion of Categories of Disputes1 Any Party, when signing, ratifying, accepting,

approving or acceding to this Convention, or at any timethereafter, may, by written declaration, exclude theoperation of Article 57(2) or (3) without its consent withrespect to a category or categories of disputes specified inthe declaration. Such declaration may not cover disputesconcerning the interpretation or application of:

(a) any provision of this Convention or of anymeasure in effect pursuant to it relating to theprotection of the Antarctic environment ordependent or associated ecosystems;

(b) Article 7(l);(c) Article 8;(d) Article 12;(e) Article 14;(f) Article 15; or(g) Article 37.

2 Nothing in paragraph 1 above or in any declarationmade under it shall affect the operation of Article 57(l),(4) and (5).

3 A declaration made under paragraph 1 above shallremain in force until it expires in accordance with itsterms or until 3 months after written notice of revocationhas been deposited with the Depositary.

4 A new declaration, a notice of revocation or theexpiry of a declaration shall not in any way affectproceedings pending before the International Court ofJustice or the Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties to thedispute otherwise agree.

5 Declarations and notices referred to in this Articleshall be deposited with the Depositary who shall transmitcopies thereof to all Parties.

6 A Party which, by declaration made under paragraph1 above, has excluded a specific category or categories ofdisputes from the operation of Article 57(2) or (3) withoutits consent shall not be entitled to submit any disputefalling within that category or those categories forsettlement pursuant to Article 57(2) or (3), as the case maybe, without the consent of the other party or parties to thedispute.


Article 59Additional Dispute Settlement Procedures

1 The Commission, in conjunction with its responsibil-ities pursuant to Article 41(1), shall establish additionalprocedures for third-party settlement, by the ArbitralTribunal or through other similar procedures, of disputeswhich may arise if it is alleged that a violation of thisConvention has occurred by virtue of:

(a)(b)

(c)

a decision to decline a Management Scheme;a decision to decline the issue of a developmentpermit; ora decision to suspend, modify or cancel aManagement Scheme or to impose monetarypenalties.

2 Such procedures shall:(a) permit, as appropriate, Parties and Operators

under their sponsorship, but not both in respectof any particular dispute, to initiate proceedingsagainst a Regulatory Committee;

(b) require disputes to which they relate to bereferred in the first instance to the relevantRegulatory Committee for consideration;

(c) incorporate the rules in Article 57(4) and (5).

CHAPTER VII: FINAL CLAUSESArticle 60

SignatureThis Convention shall be open for signature at Welling-

ton from 25 November 1988 to 25 November 1989 byStates which participated in the final session of the FourthSpecial Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.

Article 61Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

1 This Convention is subject to ratification, accep-tance or approval by Signatory States.

2 After 25 November 1989 this Convention shall beopen for accession by any State which is a ContractingParty to the Antarctic Treaty.

3 Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval oraccession shall be deposited with the Government of NewZealand, hereby designated as the Depositary.

Article 62Entry Into Force

1 This Convention shall enter into force on thethirtieth day following the date of deposit of instrumentsof ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by 16Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties which participatedas such in the final session of the Fourth Special Antarctic

Treaty Consultative Meeting, provided that numberincludes all the States necessary in order to establish allof the institutions of the Convention in respect of everyarea of Antarctica, including 5 developing countries and11 developed countries.

2 For each State which, subsequent to the date of entryinto force of this Convention, deposits an instrument ofratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Con-vention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day followingsuch deposit.

Article 63Reservations, Declarations and Statements

1 Reservations to this Convention shall not bepermitted. This does not preclude a State, when signing,ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Con-vention, from making declarations or statements, how-ever phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to theharmonization of its laws and regulations with thisConvention, provided that such declarations or statementsdo not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect ofthis Convention in its application to that State.

2 The provisions of this Article are without prejudiceto the right to make written declarations in accordancewith Article 58.

Article 64Amendment

1 This Convention shall not be subject to amendmentuntil after the expiry of 10 years from the date of its entryinto force. Thereafter, any Party may, by written commu-nication addressed to the Depositary, propose a specificamendment to this Convention and request the conveningof a meeting to consider such proposed amendment.

2 The Depositary shall circulate such communicationto all Parties. If within 12 months of the date of circulationof the communication at least one-third of the Partiesreply favorably to the request, the Depositary shallconvene the meeting.

3 The adoption of an amendment considered at sucha meeting shall require the affirmative votes of two-thirdsof the Parties present and voting, including the concurrentvotes of the members of the Commission attending themeeting.

4 The adoption of any amendment relating to theSpecial Meeting of Parties or to the Advisory Committeeshall require the affirmative votes of three-quarters of theParties present and voting, including the concurrent votesof the members of the Commission attending the meeting.

5 An amendment shall enter into force for thoseParties having deposited instruments of ratification,acceptance or approval thereof 30 days after the Deposi-

Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities . 209

tary has received such instruments of ratification, accep-tance or approval from all the members of the Commis-sion.

6 Such amendment shall thereafter enter into force forany other Party 30 days after the Depositary has receivedits instrument of ratification, acceptance or approvalthereof.

7 An amendment that has entered into force pursuantto this Article shall be without prejudice to the provisionsof any Management Scheme approved before the date onwhich the amendment entered into force.

Article 65Withdrawal

1 Any Party may withdraw from this Convention bygiving to the Depositary notice in writing of its intentionto withdraw, Withdrawal shall take effect two years afterthe date of receipt of such notice by the Depositary.

2 Any Party which ceases to be a Contracting Party tothe Antarctic Treaty shall be deemed to have withdrawnfrom this Convention on the date that it ceases to be aContracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty.

3 Where an amendment has entered into forcepursuant to Article 64(5), any Party from which noinstrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of theamendment has been received by the Depositary within aperiod of two years from the date of the entry into forceof the amendment shall be deemed to have withdrawnfrom this Convention on the date of the expiration of afurther two year period.

4 Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 below, the rights andobligations of any Operator pursuant to this Conventionshall cease at the time its Sponsoring State withdraws oris deemed to have withdrawn from this Convention.

5 Such Sponsoring State shall ensure that the obliga-tions of its Operators have been discharged no later thanthe date on which its withdrawal takes effect.

6 Withdrawal from this Convention by any Party shallnot affect its financial or other obligations under thisConvention pending on the date withdrawal takes effect.Any dispute settlement procedure in which that Party isinvolved and which has been commenced prior to thatdate shall continue to its conclusion unless agreedotherwise by the parties to the dispute.

Article 66Notifications by the Depositary

The Depositary shall notify all Contracting Parties tothe Antarctic Treaty of the following:

(a) signatures of this Convention and the deposit ofinstruments of ratification, acceptance, approvalor accession;

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)(f)

the deposit of instruments of ratification, accep-tance or approval of any amendment adoptedpursuant to Article 64;the date of entry into force of this Conventionand of any amendment thereto;the deposit of declarations and notices pursuantto Articles 56 and 58;notifications pursuant to Article 18; andthe withdrawal of a Party pursuant to Article 65.

Article 67

Authentic Texts, Certified Copies AndRegistration With the United Nations

1 This Convention of which the Chinese, English,French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authenticshall be deposited with the Government of New Zealandwhich shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to allSignatory and Acceding States,

2 The Depositary shall also transmit duly certifiedcopies to all Signatory and Acceding States of the text ofthis Convention in any additional language of a Signatoryor Acceding State which submits such text to theDepositary.

3 This Convention shall be registered by the Deposi-tary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the UnitedNations.

Done at Wellington this second day of June 1988.In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized,

have signed this Convention.

ANNEX FOR AN ARBITRALTRIBUNAL

Article 1The Arbitral Tribunal shall be constituted and shall

function in accordance with this Convention, includingthis Annex.

Article 21 Each Party shall be entitled to designate up to three

Arbitrators, at least one of whom shall be designatedwithin three months of the entry into force of thisConvention for that Party. Each Arbitrator shall beexperienced in Antarctic affairs, with knowledge ofinternational law and enjoying the highest reputation forfairness, competence and integrity. The names of thepersons so designated shall constitute the list of Arbitra-tors. Each Party shall at all times maintain the name of atleast one Arbitrator on the list.

2 Subject to paragraph 3 below, an Arbitratordesignated by a Party shall remain on the list for a period


of five years and shall be eligible for redesignation by thatParty for additional five year periods.

3 An Arbitrator may by notice given to the Partywhich designated that person withdraw his name from thelist. If an Arbitrator dies or gives notice of withdrawal ofhis name from the list or if a Party for any reasonwithdraws from the list the name of an Arbitratordesignated by it, the Party which designated the Arbitratorin question shall notify the Executive Secretary promptly.An Arbitrator whose name is withdrawn from the list shallcontinue to serve on any Arbitral Tribunal to which thatArbitrator has been appointed until the completion of

proceedings before that Arbitral Tribunal.

4 The Executive Secretary shall ensure that anup-to-date list is maintained of the Arbitrators designatedpursuant to this Article.

Article 31 The Arbitral Tribunal shall be composed of three

Arbitrators who shall be appointed as follows:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

The party to the dispute commencing theproceedings shall appoint one Arbitrator, whomay be its national, from the list referred to inArticle 2 of this Annex. This appointment shallbe included in the notification referred to inArticle 4 of this Annex.Within 40 days of the receipt of that notifica-tion, the other party to the dispute shall appointthe second Arbitrator, who may be its national,from the list referred to in Article 2 of thisAnnex.Within 60 days of the appointment of the secondArbitrator, the parties to the dispute shallappoint by agreement the third Arbitrator fromthe list referrd to in Article 2 of this Annex. Thethird Arbitrator shall not be either a national of,or a person designated by, a party to the dispute,or of the same nationality as either of the firsttwo Arbitrators. The third Arbitrator shall be theChairman of the Arbitral Tribunal.If the second Arbitrator has not been appointedwithin the prescribed period, or if the parties tothe dispute have not reached agreement withinthe prescribed period on the appointment of thethird Arbitrator, the Arbitrator or Arbitratorsshall be appointed, at the request of any party tothe dispute and within 30 days of the receipt ofsuch request, by the Resident of the Intern-ational Court of Justice from the list referred toin Article 2 of this Amex and subject to theconditions prescribed in subparagraphs (b) and(c) above. In performing the functions accorded

(e)

him in this subparagraph, the Resident of theCourt shall consult the parties to the dispute andthe Chairman of the Commission.If the President of the International Court ofJustice is unable to perform the functionsaccorded him in subparagraph (d) above or is anational of a party to the dispute, the functionsshall be performed by the Vice-President of theCourt, except that if the Vice-President isunable to perform the functions or is a nationalof a party to the dispute the functions shall beperformed by the next most senior member ofthe Court who is available and is not a nationalof a party to the dispute.

2 Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribedfor the initial appointment.

3 In disputes involving more than two Parties, thoseParties having the same interest shall appoint oneArbitrator by agreement within the period specified inparagraph l(b) above.

Article 4The party to the dispute commencing proceedings shall

so notify the other party or parties to the dispute and theExecutive Secretary in writing. Such notification shallinclude a statement of the claim and the grounds on whichit is based, The notification shall be transmitted by theExecutive Secretary to all Parties.

Article 51 Unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise,

arbitration shall take place at the headquarters of theCommission, where the records of the Arbitral Tribunalshall be kept. The Arbitral Tribunal shall adopt its ownrules of procedure. Such rules shall ensure that each partyto the dispute has a full opportunity to be heard and topresent its case and shall also ensure that the proceedingsare conducted expeditiously.

2 The Arbitral Tribunal may hear and decide counter-claims arising out of the dispute.

Article 61 The Arbitral Tribunal, where it considers that prima

facie it has jurisdiction under this Convention, may:(a)

(b)

at the request of any party to a dispute, indicatesuch provisional measures as it considers neces-sary to preserve the respective rights of theparties to the dispute;prescribe any provisional measures which itconsiders appropriate under the circumstancesto prevent serious harm to the Antarctic envi-ronment or dependent or associated ecosystems,

.—.——-— ---

Appendix D-The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ● 211

2 The parties to a dispute shall comply promptly withany provisional measures prescribed under paragraph l(b)above pending an award under Article 9 of this Annex.

3 Notwithstanding Article 57(l), (2) and (3) of thisConvention, a party to any dispute that may arise fallingwithin the categories specified in Article 58(1) (a) to (g)of this Convention may at any time, by notification to theother party or parties to the dispute and to the ExecutiveSecretary in accordance with Article 4 of this Annex,request that the Arbitral Tribunal be constituted as amatter of exceptional urgency to indicate or prescribeemergency provisional measures in accordance with thisArticle. In such case, the Arbitral Tribunal shall beconstituted as soon as possible in accordance with Article3 of this Annex, except that the time periods in Article3(1) (b), (c) and (d) shall be reduced to 14 days in eachcase. The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide upon the requestfor emergency provisional measures within two monthsof the appointment of its Chairman.

4 Following a decision by the Arbitral Tribunal upona request for emergency provisional measures in accor-dance with paragraph 3 above, settlement of the disputeshall proceed in accordance with Articles 56 and 57 of thisConvention.

Article 7Any Party which believes it has a legal interest, whether

general or individual, which maybe substantially affectedby the award of an Arbitral, Tribunal, may, unless theArbitral Tribunal decides otherwise, intervene in theproceedings.

Article 8The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the

Arbitral Tribunal and, in particular, in accordance withtheir law and using all means at their disposal, shallprovide it with all relevant documents and information,and enable it, when necessary, to call witnesses or expertsand receive their evidence.

Article 9If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear

before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to defend its case, any

other party to the dispute may request the ArbitralTribunal to continue the proceedings and make its award.

Article 101 The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide, on the basis of

this Convention and other rules of law not incompatiblewith it, such disputes as are submitted to it.

2 The Arbitral Tribunal may decide, ex aequo et bono,a dispute submitted to it, if the parties to the dispute soagree.

Article 111 Before making its award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall

satisfy itself that it has competence in respect of thedispute and that the claim or counterclaim is well foundedin fact and law.

2 The award shall be accompanied by a statement ofreasons for the decision and shall be communicated to theExecutive Secretary who shall transmit it to all Parties,

3 The award shall be final and binding on the partiesto the dispute and on any Party which intervened in theproceedings and shall be complied with without delay.The Arbitral Tribunal shall interpret the award at therequest of a party to the dispute or of any interveningParty.

4 The award shall have no binding force except inrespect of that particular case.

5 Unless the Arbitral Tribunal decides otherwise, theexpenses of the Arbitral Tribunal, including the remuner-ation of the Arbitrators, shall be borne by the parties to thedispute in equal shares.

Article 12All decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal, including those

referred to in Articles 5, 6 and 11 of this Annex, shall bemade by a majority of the Arbitrators who may not abstainfrom voting.

Appendix E

Selected Bibliography

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12,

13.

14.

15.

16.

Alexander, Uwis M., and Hanson, Lynne C. (eds.),Antarctic Politics and Marine Resources: CriticalChoices for the 1980’s (Kingston, RI: Center forOcean Management Studies, 1985.)Antarctica and Southern Ocean Coalition, “TheWorld Park Option for Antarctica, ” ASOC PaperNo. 4, ANT SCM/8, Apr. 21, 1986.Auburn F. M., Antarctic L.uw and Politics (Bloom-ington, IN: Indiana University Ress, 1982).Beck, P.J., “The United Nations and Antarctica,”Polar Record 23(147), May 1986.Beeby, Christopher, “A Negotiator’s View,” TheAntarctic: Preferred Futures, Corwtraints and Choices,New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1983,pp. 58-62.Behrendt, John C. (cd.), Petroleum and MineralResources of Antarctica, U.S. Geological SurveytiCllh 99, 1983,Beike, Dieter K., An Engineering Economic Evacua-tion of Mining in Antarctica: A Case Study ofPlatinum, masters thesis, University of Texas atAustin, May 1988.Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign As-sessment Center, Polar Regions Atlas, 1978.Charney, Jonathan I., ‘‘Development of Antarcti%”=marks, Proceedings of the American Society ofInternational Law, 1979, pp. 268-271; other remarksby Richard B. Bilder, pp. 265-266; Giulio Ponte-corvo, pp. 266-267; John Dugger, pp. 267-268; JohnD. Negroponte, p. 271.Charney, Jonathan 1. (ML), The New Nationalism andThe Use of Common Spaces: Issues in MarinePollution and Exploitation of Antarctica (New Jer-sey: Allenheld, Osmun Publishers, 1982).Colson, David A., “The Antarctic Treaty System:The Mineral Issue,’ Law and Policy in internationalBusiness, vol. 12, 1980, pp. 841-902.Cooper, Alan K., I)avey, Frederick J., and Hinz, Karl,“Liquid Hydrocarbons Probable Under Ross Sea, ”Oil and Gas Journal, Nov. 14, 1988, pp. 118-128.Cooper, Alan K., Davey, Frederick J., and Hinz, Karl,“Ross Sea-Geology, Hydrocarbon Potential, ” Oiland Gas Journal, Nov. 7, 1988, pp. 54-58.Craddock, Campbell (cd.), Antarctic Geoscience.University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1982.De Wit, Maarten J., Minerals and Mining in Antarc-tica: Science and Technology, Economics and Poli-tics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).Ellioq David H., “Antarctica: Is There Any Oil andNatural Gas?” OceanUs, vol. 31, No. 2, Summer1988, pp. 32-38.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

Garret, John Norton, “The Economics of AntarcticOil,” hwis M. Alexander, Lynne Carter Hanson(eds.), Antarctic Politics and Marine Resources:Critical Choices for the 1980’s (Kingston, RI: Centerfor Ocean Management Studies, 1985), pp. 185-190,Group of Specialists on Antarctic EnvironmentalImplications of Possible Mineral Exploration andExploitation (AIMEE), report No. 2, The Universityof Texas at Dallas, Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1982.Holdgate, M. W., “Environmental Factors in theDevelopment of Antarctica,” Francisco Orrego Vi-cuna (cd.), Antarctic Resources Policy, 1983, pp.77-101.Joyner, Christopher, “Protection of the AntarcticEnvironment: Rethinking the Problems and Pros-pects, ” Cornell ~nternational Luw Journal, vol. 19,No. 2, Summer 1986, pp. 259-273.Joyner, C. C., and Chopra, Sudhir K. (eds.), TheAntarctic Legal Regime (Boston, MA: MartinusNijhoff Publishers, 1988).Kimball, he A., ‘‘Future Directions for the Manage-ment of Antarctic Science, ’ International Xnstitutefor Environment and Development, 1986.Kimball, k A,, “The Antarctic Minerals Conven-tion, ” Special Report, World Resources Institute,July 1988,Luard, Evan, “Who Owns the Antarctic?” Foreign&airs, Summer 1984, pp. 1174-1193.Mitchell, Barbar% “The Management of AntarcticMineral Resources, ’ International Institute for Envi-ronment and Development, 1982.National Academy Press, Antarctic Treaty System:An Assessment (Washington, DC: National AcademyPress, 1986).National Science Foundation, The Role of the Na-tional Science Foundation in Polar Regions, a reportto the National Science Board, NSB-87-128, 1987.Oliver, R. K., James, P. R., and Jago, J.B. (eds.),Antarctic Earth Science (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1983).Orrego Vicuna, Francisco (cd.), Antarctic ResourcesPolicy; Scientific, Legal and Political Issues (NewYork, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983),Pontecorvo, Giulio, “The Economics of the Re-sources of Antarctica,” Jonathan 1. Chamey (cd.),The New Nationalism and the Use of CommonSpaces: Issues in Marine Pollution and Exploitationof Antarctica (New Jersey: Allenheld, Osmun Pub-lishers, 1982), pp. 155-166.Group of Specialists on the Environmental ImpactAssessment of Mineral Exploration/Exploitation in

-212–

Appendix Helected Bibliography ● 213

Antarctica, “A Prelimimuy Assessment of the Envi-ronmental Impact of Minelal ~@o~o@xploi~-tion in Antarctica” (EAMREA), August 1977.

32. Quigg, Philip W., A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issueof Antarctica, A Twentieth Century Fund Report(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983).

33. Roots, E. F., “Resource Development in Polar Re-gions: Comments on Technology,” Francisco Or-rego Vicuna (cd.), Anlarctic Resources Policy, 1983,pp. 297-315.

34, Rowley, Peter D., Williams, Paul L., and Pride,Douglas E., “Metallic and Nonmetallic MineralResources of Antarctica, ” The Geology of Antarc-tica, R.J. Tingey (cd.), Oxford University Press (inpress).

35, Shapley, Deborah, The Seventh Continent: Antarc-tica in a Resource Age (Washington, DC: Resourcesfor the Future, 1985).

36. Splettstoesser, John F., “Antarctic Geology andMineral Resources, ” Geology Today, March/April1985, pp. 41-45.

37. Splettstoesser, John F,, ‘‘Mining in Antarctic: Surveyof Mineral Resources and Possible ExploitationMethods, ’ Third International Co@erence on Portand Ocean Engineering Under Arctic Conditions,Aug. 11-15, 1985, vol. II, pp. 1137-1155, Universityof Alaska.

38. St, John, Bill, “Antarctica--Geoiogy and Hydrocar-bon Potential, ” Future Petroleum Provinces of theWorki, Michel T., Halbouty (cd.), AAPG Memoir 40,1986, pp. 55-100.

39. Tingey, R.J. (cd.), The Geology of Antarctica. OxfordUniversity Press, in press.

40. United Nations: Question of Antarctica, Repofi ofthe Secretary General, Dec. A/39/583 (Part I), 31

October 1984; (Rut II), vol. I, No. 29 October 1984;(Part II) vol. II, No. 2 November 1984; (Part II), Vol.III, No. 9 November 1984.

41. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,Oil and Gw Technologies for the Arctic and Deep-water, OTA-O-270 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, August 1985).

42, U.S. Department of State, Final EnvironmentalImpact Statement on the Negotiation of an interna-tional Regime for Antarctic Mineral Resources,1982.

43. Vicuiia, Francisco (lnego, compiler, Antarctic Bibli-ography (University of Chile, Institute of Intern-ational Studies, 1987).

44, Westerrneyer, William E., “Alternative Regimes forFuture Mineral Resource Development in Antarc-tica, ’ Ocean Management, vol. 8, 1982-83, pp.197-232.

45. Westermeyer, William E., The Politics of MineralResource Development in Antarctica: AlternativeRegimes for the Future (Boul&r, CO: WestviewPress, 1984).

46. Wright, N. A., and Williams, P. L., “Mineral Re-sources of Antarctica, U.S. Geological SurveyCircular 705, 1974, 29p.

47. Zurnberge, J.H, (cd.), Possible Environmental Eflectsof Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in Antarc-tica, SCAR, 1979.

48, Zumberge, James H., “Potential Mineral ResourcesAvailability and Possible Environmental Problems inAntarctica, “ in Jonathan I. Charney (cd.), The NewNationalism and the Use of Common Spaces, 1982,pp. 115-154.

Appendix F

OTA Workshops Participants and Other Contributors

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Antarctic Oil and Gas Development Potential, Washington, D. C.,Jan. 10,1989.

Participants critiqued OTA contractor reports on: a) technology and costs for offshore oil development in Antarctica,b) estimating the profitability of Antarctic oil exploitation, and c) the potential for Antarctic oil in a world liquid fuelscontext.

Don AnthonyStandard Oil Reduction Co.

Melvin ConantConant & Associates, Ltd.

Alan K. CooperU.S. Geologic Survey

John N. GarrettConsultant

Edward E. HortonDeep Oil Technology, Inc.

Virgil KeithECO. Inc.

Joe RivaCongressional Research ServiceLibrary of Congress

Marshall RoseU.S. Department of the Interior

Jim SmithCenter for Public PolicyUniversity of Houston

Michael E. UttUnocal Science and Technology

Irv YanceyMobil Research & Development Corp.

Bernard LettauNational Science Foundation

The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Washington, D. C.,Dec. 15,1988.

Participants critiqued OTA contractor reports a) evaluating the Minerals Convention’s decisionmaking system, andb) evaluating the Minerals Convention from the oil industry’s perspective. Participants also discussed the Antarctic andSouthern Ocean Coalition’s analysis of the Convention.

James BarnesEnvironmental Policy Institute

Jonathan I. CharneySchool of LawVanderbilt University

John DuggerOffice of International AffairsU.S. Department of Energy

Robert FriedheimSchool of International RelationsUniversity of Southern California

John N. GarrettConsultant, International Crude Oil Matters

Christopher JoynerDepartment of Political ScienceThe George Washington University

Lee KimballWorld Resources Institute

Keith R. KnoblockAmerican Mining Congress

Thomas LaughlinNational Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationU.S. Department of Commerce

Bruce ManheimEnvironmental Defense Fund

Bernard OxmanSchool of LawUniversity of Miami

James JacksonAmerican Petroleum Institute

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Appendix F--OTA Workshops Participants and Other Contributors ● 215

John B. RiggTerritorial and International AffairsU.S. Department of the Interior

Wes ScholzMarine and Polar Minerals DivisionDepartment of State

Antarctic Mining

R. Tucker ScullyOffice of Marine Science and Polar AffairsDepartment of State

Technology and Economics, Washington, D. C.,Dec. 13,1988

Participants critiqued an OTA working paper on Antarctic mineral deposits and world markets and an OTAcontractor report on mining and process technology for Antarctic mineral development.

T S Ary Anton InderbitzenU.S. Bureau of Mines Division of Polar programs

National Science FoundationMichael P. FooseU.S. Geological Survey Maurice Magee

H.M. GiegerichMagee Consulting

Anderson, Genssler & Schwab, Inc. Simon StraussConsultant on Metal

Tom GuntherU.S. Bureau of Mines

Markets

Other Contributors

John BehrendtUnited States Geological Survey

Fred BrownsworthUnited States Geological Survey

Georges ChateauElf Aquitaine Petroleum

Waiter CruickshankMinerals Management Service

James CurlinOffice of Technology Assessment

Paul DerocherUnited States Navy

David DrewryBritish Antarctic Survey

Susan FletcherCongressional Research Service

Michel T. HalboutyMichel T. Halbouty Energy Co.

Ann Parks HawthornePhotographer

Evelyn HurwichThe Antarctica Project

Brad LaubachMinerals Management Service

Roger LeickExxon Production Research Co.

John KeithUnited States Geological Survey

Judy KowalskiOffice of Technology Assessment

D’Ann LearUnited States Geological Survey

Bruce MolniaUnited States Geological Survey

Steve PlotkinOffice of Technology Assessment

Jenifer RobisonOffice of Technology Assessment

Peter RowleyUnited States Geological Survey

Robert HofmanMarine Mammal Commission

Susan SabellaGreenpeace


Robert Stockman Edward TennysonNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Minerals Management Service

Nick Sundt Peter WadhamsOffice of Technology Assessment Scott Polar Research Institute

Jack Talmadge Ed WallNational Science Foundation Minerals Management Service

— — -

Appendix G

Glossary

Alkaline: A group of igneous rocks in which the alkalis(Na2O and K2O) occur in high concentration relativeto silica (SiO2).

Asthenosphere: The upper mantle. The layer or shell ofthe Earth below the lithosphere (below about 100 km),which is weak and in which isostatic adjustments cantake place, in which magmas may be generated, and inwhich seismic waves are strongly attenuated.

Base metal: Any of the more common and morechemically active metals, e.g., lead, copper, zinc.

Calc-alkaline: A group of igneous rocks in which silicaoccurs in high concentrations relative to the alkalis.Many of these rocks have the mineral quartz.

Ferrous metal: Iron and the metals commonly alloyedwith iron in steelmaking.

Gondwana: The hypothetical protocontinent of theSouthern Hemisphere, also called Gondwanaland. Thepreponderance of modem evidence indicates that thepresent continents are fragments which have beenseparated from each other by some form of continentaldisplacement with the aid of seafloor spreading.

Granitic: A term used to describe light-colored, mediumto coarse grained crystalline rock containing more than10 percent quartz and richer in alkalies relative tocalcium, iron, and magnesium.

Hydrothermal solutions: Hot saline solutions that passthrough fractures and pore spaces in rocks. Mineraldeposits can form as precipitates from hydrothermalsolutions.

Iron-formation: A sedimentary rock, typically thinbedded or finely laminated, containing at least 15percent iron and commonly but not necessarily con-taining layers of chert. Also called jaspilite or taconite.

Lithosphere: The crust of the Earth and upper mantlehaving a total thickness of approximately 100 km.

Mafic: A term used to describe dark-colored igneousrocks composed chiefly of ferromagnesian minerals.

Magmatic differentiation: The process whereby crys-tallization and separation of early formed mineralsleads to changes in bulk composition of the residualmagmatic liquids. Certain economically important oredeposits may be formed by the process.

Orogen: An erogenic belt or linear region that has beensubjected to folding and other deformation during aperiod of tectonic activity. These regions often becomemountain belts.

Placer: A surficial mineral deposit formed by mechanicalconcentration (usually by water) of heavy mineralparticles from weathered debris.

Podiform: A term used to describe an orebody that has anelongate, lenticular shape.

Porphyritic: A term used to describe an igneous rock inwhich larger crystals are set in a finer groundmasswhich may be crystalline, glassy or both.

Precious metals: A general term for gold, silver, or anyof the platinum-group metals,

Shield: A large area of exposed basement rocks in acontinental land mass surrounded by younger sedimen-tary rocks. The rocks of virtually all shield areas arePrecambrian in age.

Silicic: A general term used to describe an igneous rockor magma in which silica constitutes at least two-thirdsof the rock and usually contains free silica in the formof quartz, Granite is a typical silicic rock.

Stratiform: Having the form of a bed or layer consistingof roughly parallel bands or sheets. Used to describe alayered mineral deposit, such as chromite depositswhich can occur in layers up to several feet thick offairly uniform composition and extend over largeareas.

Stratigraphic trap: The sealing of a reservoir bed as aresult of lithologic changes, such as the gradation ofpermeable sediments into impermeable sediments thusforming a barrier that can trap migrating petroleum.

Structural trap: The containment of oil or gas within areservoir bed as a result of folding to produce a domeor anticline or faulting to bring an impermeable bedinto contact with the reservoir bed creating a barrier tomigration.

Ultramafic: Very dark-colored igneous rock composedchiefly of heavy minerals high in iron and magnesium.

-217-

Appendix H

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ATCPATSBLMBOMCCAMLR

EEZICSUICJIGYIWCMNAPMMSNAMRAP

NCPNESDIS

—Antarctic Policy Group—Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party—Antarctic Treaty System—Bureau of Land Management—Bureau of Mines-Convention on the Conservation of Ant-

arctic Marine Living Resources—Exclusive Economic Zone—International Council of Scientific Unions—International Court of Justice—International Geophysical Year—International Whaling Commission—Managers of National Antarctic programs—Minerals Management Service—National Mineral Resources Assessment

Program—Non-Consultative Party—National Environmental Satellite Data and

Information Service

NOAA

NSCNSFODPOCSOPEC

PGMSCAR

SPASPRSSS1USAA

USGS

—National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-tration

—National Security Council—National Science Foundation-Ocean Drilling program-outer continental shelf-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-

tries—Platinum Group Metals—Scientific Committee on Antarctic Re-

search—Specially Protected Area—Strategic Petroleum Reserve—Site of Special Scientific Interest—United States Antarctic Agency (possible

future agency)—United States Geological Survey

- 2 1 8 -

. — — .

Related OTA Report

● Marine Minerals: Exploring Our New Ocean Frontier.OTA-O-342, 7/87; 356 pages. GPO stock #052-003-01072-l; $15.00,NTIS order #PB 87-217 725/AS.

NOTE: Reports are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402-9325 (202-783-3238);and the National ‘lkchnical Information Semice, 5285 Pon Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161-0001 (7034874650).