poli-416: r evolution & p olitical v · 1 2 3 today’s agenda pop quiz overview of colombian...
TRANSCRIPT
Poli-416: REVOLUTION & POLITICAL
VIOLENCE
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TODAY’S AGENDAPop quiz
Overview of Colombian conflict
Paramilitaries and parapolitica
Colombia
Early Politics
Liberals Conservatives
All over Latin America, the new republics have elections between:
vs
Commercial
Weak church
Individual liberties
Strong church
Social order, tradition
Land
Elections in Colombia
In Colombia competition between these parties was very violent
Winning party in one election would attack supporters of losing party
Why so violent?
Today (USA):
Elect president
Congress
governors, mayors
Back then (Colombia):
Elect president
Congress
governors, mayors
“Winner-take-all”System
Lots of goodies to be given out
Use violence while in powerPay back for last electionCabinet, executive Cabinet, executive
The land problem
Land theft, land conflicts
rampant during the 20th century
If right party was in power, elites could take with
impunity
Self-defense militiasPeasants organize in enclaves to defend themselves,
most famously in the “Republic of Marquetalia”
Paramilitary groupsDozens of countries have either encouraged or allowed
the formation of paramilitary groups or private militias
Armed groups that receive either direct or indirect support from the state, typically to combat rebels
Paramilitary recruitment
Who typically joins a paramilitary group?
Victims of rebels (e.g., Colombia, Mexico, Peru)
Groups with interests threatened by rebels
Groups formed by state (e.g., Phillipines)
The paras: broad trajectorySmall self-defense groups
going back to 60s
Boost from drug cartels 1980s
Form coalition in 1990s
Demobilize (?) in early 2000sGroups today continue unclear/
mysterious (“Black Eagles”)
Colombian paramilitaries
Base of support?
Victims (e.g., ranchers forced to
pay “war tax”)
Drug traffickers
The military Carlos Castaño, Founder of AUC
Drug-traffickers and paramilitaries
At first, guerrillas extort/“protect” drug-traffickers (why them?)
Eventually go from “guarding” fields —> making coca paste (why?)
Brings them into conflict with cartels M-19 kidnap daughter of the Ochoas
(as seen in Narcos)
Why do this?
Benefits Costs
“deal with the devil” to defeat insurgency
Bodies Domestic costs
Local knowledge
“Monopoly of violence”
Principal-agent
problems
Indiscriminate violence
???
The monopoly of violence
What is a “state”?
Max Weber, Sociologist
“Only entity that lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force. However, this
monopoly is limited to a certain geographical area, and in fact this limitation to a particular area is one of the
things that defines a state."
Can rebel groups be “states" in the areas
they control?
Closing the can of worms
Countries that give up "monopoly of violence” often have to wrestle it back from militias
Competing “states”
Allowing non-state armed actors to govern makes winning over locals more difficult
“shared risk”
Hearts and minds
What if paramilitaries do a better job? States may find themselves competing for
legitimacy
Principal-agent problems
One actor (principal) hires another (agent) to do some task
Agent makes decisions that impact principal, but principal knows less/cannot monitor agent
(informational asymmetry)
What’s the PA problem here?
Involvement in drugs, excessive violence, etc.
Parapolitica
In 2000s, paramilitaries become involved in electoral politics
What’s the quid pro quo here?
Deliver votes (how? And where?)
Common enemy
Demobilization
MoneyCommon enemy
Not just 2000s
Protest against killing of leftist social leaders in Colombia
1988: Colombia begins electing mayors, Wave of violence against left parties
Even if against the interest of the state, individual politicians might strike deals with armed groups
Not just Colombia
Why doesn’t the FARC do this?
Acemoglu et., al: FARC has national ambitions, paras don’t
At some point, group too threatening to state and collusion is not credible
Does this make sense?
The ELN also influences elections in Arauca, where it is powerful
Threaten/kill candidates Collude with officials
Open question: Why do armed groups get involved in
some elections but not others?
Recap
Colombia has a long history of non-state armed actors exerting influence
State faces trade-off in relying on paramilitaries
Even if state doesn’t want to collude, individual politicians can
Parapolitica: trade of votes for support with consequences still visible today