policies for south africa's industrialisation by siya biniza

7/22/2019 Policies for South Africa's Industrialisation by Siya Biniza

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Policies for South Africas IndustrialisationWritten by Siyaduma Biniza

1

Historically industrialisation is seen as an important process that both incentivised and

allowed the European expansion and the spread of capitalism (Boahen, 1987). And

economically, structural theories of development view industrialisation as a process that will

enable economic freedom for post-colonial countries, which are seen as underdeveloped

and structurally dependent on industrialised countries because of their integration into

global capital; thus is argued as the only way to transform post-colonial economies to

overcome structural inequalities of global capitalism which keep post-colonial countries

underdeveloped (Hunt, 1989). Therefore the successful implementation of theindustrialisation process is important for South Africa.

The South African economy has been criticised for industrially coherent linkages between its

economic sectors because of what the Mineral Energy Complex which has prohibited

industrial growth and the development of other industries unrelated to energy and minerals

extraction (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996); and in more recent years the economy has been

caught in a prolonged era of low growth, and growth without job creation where there has

been remarkable growth, which has led to deindustrialisation and unemployment

(Mohamed, 2011). Thus, this essay is a response to the complicated question of what set of

policies are necessary for successful industrialisation in South Africa.

Firstly, I would like to explain what I understand by the South African state. I understand the

state in Gramscian way. What that is that the state, or South Africa, is more than just

government and its institutions, agencies and enterprises; therefore the state is the nexus of

power in society and this includes both government and civil society (Gramsci, 2006).

Therefore, my idea of state power is based on a dialectical relationship between civil society

and political society (Gramsci, 2006). Practically, this is observable in the separation of

1 Corporate Strategy and Industrial Development Research Programme, University of the

Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and masters fellow at the Public AffairsResearch Institute and Economic Research South Africa.

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powers between the parliament which is closer to civil society and the judiciary which is

between parliament and government (Gramsci, 2006).

Civil society is the place of ideology, socialisation, and hegemony because civil society is also

an environment of inequality despite the liberal view that civilians are all equal; and political

society is the state institutions and machinery of government (Gramsci, 2006). In this paper,

I take civil society to include what has been characterised as capital or business, i.e.

corporations that are owned by individuals who are part of civil society. So as mentioned,

the state is the nexus of power, which can also be understood as the dominant forces that

result from dialectical relationship between civil society and political society. But of course

this divide is not very distinct as some individuals may straddle across civil and political

society. For example, a firms decision to cut wages could result in collective action by the

workers to resist this through legislation which is then enforced by various state institutions

this is essentially what makes the state.

I use this conception of the state because a Weberian conception sometimes obscures the

reality of what happens in governance. The Weberian conception of the state often leads to

policy recommendations which implicitly assume that economic outcomes depend solely on

political will and policy. This obscures the very complex processes which take place in order

to achieve the goals of a policy. Policy outcomes depend on more than just political will to

pass legislation and policies. All this shows is that successful industrialisation and

development requires a high degree of co-ordination (Zalk, 2013) which exceeds political

will and the right set of policy. Moreover, the Weberian conceptualisation of the state

often leads to selective consideration of what matter and of course what matters is the

result of the dialectic relationship within the state, i.e. state power. Therefore I use the

Gramscian conceptualisation of the state because it offers a rich and neutral analysis. Thus,

in my conceptualisation of the state co-ordination between government and civil society is

co-ordination within the state. This means that recommendations will not be restricted to

policy in the conventional sense, but rather institutionalising new ways to mediate state

power in pursuit of certain economic outcomes. By institutionalise I mean creating new

rules that govern behaviour amongst individuals within society (Goetz, 2006).


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Secondly, the idea that industrialisation requires co-ordination assumes a common goal.

Now, as already introduced, industrialisation is not strictly the endbut also a meansto other

ends. Industrialisation as an end means that the state would target a specific level of

industrial development, for example a percentage share of industrial exports, which is then

pursued as an end goal. Industrialisation as means stems from the understanding that

industrialisation can be a process that leads to economic freedom for post-colonial

countries because many of these countries are seen as underdeveloped and structurally

dependent on industrialised countries since they not industrialised (Ake, 1981; Hunt, 1989).

That means that industrial is associated with growth which is an integral part of

development (Todaro & Smith, 2003).Thirdly, since industrialisation can be instrumentally

useful as argued above, we can now unpack what industrialisation should entail in South

Africa. This will allow us to understand the criteria for successful industrialisation.

Background and Context: Sectorial Biases of the MEC

The South African economy is chaallenged by high unemployment and inequality. Dealing

with these two challenges is an explicit focus of most economic planning by the post-

Apartheid government; from the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)

macroeconomic package to the most recent National Development Plan. Moreover, the

governments perspective is that full employment cannot be attained unless South Africa

can deal with the situation of fewer manufacturing jobs and increasing jobs in services such

as retail, personal services, security, domestic services and office-cleaning which all have

low productivity and slow wage-growth (National Planning Commission, 2011). In sum,

South Africa faces some persistent and structural economic challenges which have locked

the country in a vicious cycle of low employment growth and the worst socioeconomic

inequality globally.

Hence the various attempts to promote pro-poor and employment-creating economic

growth since sustainable economic growth and development are challenged by inequality

and high unemployment in the country (Patel, 2011). Pro-poor economic growth here

simply means economic growth that can benefit the poor by reducing poverty and

inequality. This can be achieved through increased employment opportunities and higher

wages (Mohamed, 2012). But this requires heavy investment. Therefore, various

government ministries have embarked on policies to stimulate investment and create


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labour-absorbing economic growth. However, the South African economy has been

criticised for lacking economic linkages between its sectors due to something called the

Mineral Energy Complex (MEC). The MEC has prohibited the development of other

industries unrelated to energy and minerals extraction (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996); this has

had a lasting impact and in more recent years the economy has been caught in a prolonged

era of low growth, and growth without job creation where there has been remarkable

growth leading to deindustrialisation and unemployment (Mohamed, 2011).

The MEC is a concept coined by Fine and Rustomjee (1996) who argue that this

characterisation best describes the South African economy because the Apartheid regimes

policies supported mining and energy sectors which allowed for the development of heavy

industry, upstream processing of minerals and industries linked to these two sectors at the

expense of industries. As a result of complex struggle between English and Afrikaner capital

South Africas industrial structure was formed bystate support for activities of the mining

and energy whilst excluding black South Africans who were exploited through the system of

migrant labour that maintained steady supply of cheap labour; which is sharp departure

from the state-market dichotomy of liberal economics (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996; Mohamed,

2012; Bonner, et al., 1993). There are two outcomes of this history that I wish to highlight.

Firstly the industrial development of South Africa has become biased against other labour-

intensive economic sectors. And the development of mining and energy were not based on

the efficient use of labour or industrial efficiency, instead the development of mining and

energy was based on the states ability to secure cheap labour throughits system of racist

policies that allowed institutionalisation of cheap migrant labour to support mining;

meanwhile energy was a beneficiary of state support through subsidies as well (Bonner, et

al., 1993; Wolpe, 1972). Its important to understand that the bias here is institutional and

economic. By institutional I mean it has redistributed power in favour of certain segments of

civil society. And, partly as a result of this, the sectoral bias has throttled the development

of skills and learning which are integrally important for industrialisation (Amsden, 2001) and

the development of comparative advantage.

This is the first element that should be taken into account in constructing policies

industrialisation in South Africa. In other words, policies that intend to successful establish


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industrialisation South Africa need to address the sectorial bias, the fact that mining sector

success was based on the sectors exploitation of cheap labour through the system of

migrant labour, and establish self-sufficiency that can allow for economic linkages within the

economy without exclusion of certain sectors and population groups.

The Implications of Liberalisation and Financialisation

The other outcome is related to the impact of neoliberalism and financialisation on

industrialisation. Although South Africa has formally instituted an industrial policy since

2007 (Zalk, 2013) the policy environment has favoured neoliberal policies and market-

orientated economics in South Africa. This has had a negative impact on achieving industrial

policy objective; and in my view this is due to the challenges related to the Weberian

conception on the state and coordination of the state (in a Gramscian sense of the state).

Generally, there are two dealing with issues of policy coherence and state co-ordination

through trade and industrial policy. On the one approach trade policy is seen as sufficient as

industrial policy and often this approach recommends trade liberalisation in order for

countries to gain from their comparative advantage. In other words trade liberalisation is

the only things countries need to do in order to stimulate industrialisation, which will be

determined by the relative factor endowments or comparative advantage of that country

(Leamer, 1995). On the other hand, trade policy is seen as being insufficient on its own and

often this approach recommends a coherent industrial policy that complements or is

support by trade policy (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000). Industrial policy is meant to assist in

developing value-added production and exports in order to benefit labour through

employment and society in general.

The big difficulty in understanding and analysing trade policy in South Africa is that there is a

split between the ideology and policy in practice. This split presents itself in the strong

industrial policy language of the strategic direction of the Department of Trade and Industry

(DTI) and the seemingly irreversible strong commitments towards trade liberalisation that

reached height during era of the GEAR macroeconomic package. Therefore ideologically,

South Africa has taken the latter of the two approaches described above and the strategic

direction has been driven by an understanding that trade policy needs to support or at least

be coherent with the countrys industrial policy, Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). This

stance is clearly expressed in the dti Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2011-2014 which states a


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strategic commitment to establish mutually-beneficial regional and global relations, to

advance South Africas trade, industrial policy and economic development objectives (DTI,

2011, p. 19). However, on the other hand, the policy environment has favoured neoliberal

policies and market-orientated economics in South Africa which is underpinned by the

former of the two approaches described above.

Government has embarked on a piecemeal removal of all regulatory restraints on

international capital flows and trade which was intended to attract foreign investment

(Vickers, 2002). South Africas liberalisation began in the 1970s but really culminated in the

strong liberalisation direction in the 1990s. South Africas trade liberalisation was based on

the premise that increased competition from imports would be an impetus for improved

efficiency which would result in higher exports from domestic producers of competing

industrial or manufactured goods. Therefore the main thrust behind trade liberalisation was

the pursuit of greater manufacturing competitiveness as a means of creating growth and

employment (Rangasamy & Harmse, 2005). But this was not achieved.

Instead, trade liberalisation had the impact of restructuring the composition of labour and

production in the economy (Edwards & Behar, 2006). The South African governments

commitment to trade liberalisation and global competitiveness pressures meant that many

domestic firms had to restructure through right-sizing and downsizing which led to

large-scale job losses (Satgar, 2012, p. 47). More importantly labour-intensive import-

substitution industries suffered the most whilst export-led industries failed to create job due

to a shift towards capital-intensity in order to retain competitiveness (Satgar, 2012). This has

had dire impacts on South Africa in terms of its employment because the country has an

abundance of unskilled labour which would mean its competitiveness is in labour-intensive

production. However, trade liberalisation has had a negative impact since South Africa could

not maintain its competitiveness in labour-intensive production and instead had to succumb

to international pressure and shift towards capital-intensive production to retain

competitiveness (Rangasamy & Harmse, 2005). This inability to compete globally is closely

related to the sector bias the developed through the MEC.

The ability to resist international competition and promote competitiveness of labour-

intensive production requires industrial policy in order to promote the development of


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sectors involved in labour-intensive production and overcome the sector biases resulting

from the MEC. This case shows the clear insufficiency of trade policy as industrial policy

which shows the gap that requires industrial policy and coherent trade policy. In addition

the issue of industrial growth in relation to trade and global integration does not necessitate

blanket liberalisation or protectionism, this is a false dichotomy; instead the question should

be about the degree of liberalisation or protection, within which sectors and for how long.

Moreover, industrial policy should not be treated as separate from trade policy despite their

dubious separate treatment in liberal economics discourse (Deraniyagala & Fine, 2001).

Although financialisation is a complex concept, for the purposes of this essay, it will

sufficient to define it as the phenomenon where increases in financial accumulation do not

result in more real investment because the additional finance is directed towards financial

speculation as opposed to being invested in production (Ashman, et al., 2011b). Moreover,

the short-term profits of financial speculation entice productive capital to speculate with its

surplus earnings instead of reinvesting it (Ashman, et al., 2011b). This change did not simply

occur as a result in the profit-maximisation matrix of firms decision-making. Instead this is

the result of changes in the environmental constraints as embodied by economic policies

governing the rules of domestic and international finance; as well as the behavioural ofcapital as embodied by the corporate governance of firms.

Economic policies governing the rules of domestic and international finance are important

in defining the relation between finance and the real economy. This is because the policies

define what and how finance can be utilised which determines the relation between finance

and the real economy, thus determining the structure of accumulation. For example, the

policies of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),

which promoted the deregulation of trade and finance, were forcibly imposed on debtor

nations which determined the economic reality in those countries to a large extent (Hudson,

1998). Although South Africa was not an IMF debtor nation, domestic examples of this are

macroeconomic policies such as GEAR which also promoted the same kind of policies within

South Africa resulting in jobless economic growth (Mohamed, 2011; Satgar, 2012).

Therefore, finance policies are important in determining what finance is spent on and where

finance can be spent, thus determining the structure of accumulation in the economy.


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Another motivation for the process of liberation was to decrease the cost of investment for

foreign capital, which was assumed to be sufficient to promote investment (Zalk, 2013).

However this was not enough to promote investment, instead the neoliberal policies have

led to the process of financialisation which has strengthened the economic and political

influence of finance in the South Africa economy. Furthermore, although finance has

contributed towards economic growth in South Africa, this growth has not created sufficient

employment opportunities because of the rising dominance of financial capitalism and

financialisation (Mohamed, 2011). Hence there has been a growing preoccupation with

labour-absorbing growth in attempt to redirect the macroeconomic trajectory, which came

as a criticism of GEARs neoliberal policies that promoted finance-led economic growth

(Habbard, 2010).

In addition, these domestic policy reforms have affected corporate governance through the

deregulation of finance which has enabled shareholder-value-type models of corporate

governance that have also contributed towards the dominance of finance capital. Corporate

governance is important because the aggregate financial actions of firms also define the

reality of accumulation in the economy. Firms either invest in physical capital, in favour of

industrial capital, or they invest in financial speculation which favours finance capitalism.Given the importance of corporate governance, South African firms have shifted towards

shareholder-value-type corporate governance which has resulted in rentier-type investment

and less real economic activity.

Shareholder-value-type corporate governance models are underpinned by the idea that, in

order to maximise the efficiency of resource allocation in firms, the interests of managers

and shareholders need to be aligned through remuneration in the form of stocks and share

options (Newman, 2012). Therefore driven by the pursuit of shareholder value, many firms

have focused on specialising in core business, selling off assets and shutting down

operations that do not contribute to shareholder value nor form part of the core business

(McKenzie & Pons-Vignon, 2012). The pursuit of shareholder value has thus led to firms

increasing their financial capital by buying back company shares in order increase stock

prices, reducing real investment and industrial capital in order to distribute financial gains as

dividends and acquiring of other firms that contribute towards narrowed-down operations


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of the core business (Newman, 2012). And South African firms have increasingly pursued

shareholder value which is another characteristic of South Africas financialisation.

The implications of neoliberalism and financialisation in South Africa are that there has been

a decline in real investment and this is an integral part of industrialisation because it

requires investment. In more recent years the economy has been caught in a prolonged era

of low growth, and growth without job creation where there has been remarkable growth,

which has led to deindustrialisation and unemployment. Therefore there is a need to create

policies to require a certain rate of real investment from firms annual turnovers and this

can be done through pooling of funds for rigorously regulated real investment by the state

or in the form of compulsory growth in real capital accumulation and employment targets

for firms realising profits within South Africa.

Also, due to the liberal policy environment following South Africa neoliberalisation, there

was rampant capital flight which saw significant mining interest relist their companies

abroad (Mohamed, 2010; Ashman, et al., 2011b). The foreign listing of domestic firms which

continued to have their South African business as core operations means that significant

mining interests are now characterised as foreign direct investment (FDI). But this mode of

FDI has not contributed to any technological or skills transfer nor have they contributed

towards additional capital accumulation or new employment opportunities (Mohamed,

2010). Coupled with this, market-seeking mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which have

limited and even negligible direct impact on employment have been the dominant mode of

FDI in South Africa (Biniza, 2013). Besides the limited impact that FDI has had in creating

employment in South Africa; FDI has been criticised for crowding out domestic investment

especially in dairy, pharmaceuticals, steel, and electric and electronics sectors (Vickers,

2002). This crowding-out has had a negative impact on employment by forcing domestic

producers to downsize and shed jobs.

Therefore, in order to balance capital flight, South Africa has embarked on neoliberal

policies in attempt to stimulate FDI (Ashman, et al., 2011a; Zalk, 2013). But this has

attracted portfolio investment instead of FDI leading to the further financialisation in the

economy. This represents future possible risks for the South African economy given the

volatility and speculative nature of portfolio investment. Portfolio investment is short-term


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and involves the transfer of capital for securities, stocks and bonds which primarily concerns

financial markets (CUTS, 2003). On the other hand FDI involves acquisition or creation of

real assets in a foreign country, instead of financial assets. Hence FDI is often seen as

conducive towards sustainable economic growth because of its non-liquid nature, as

opposed to portfolio investment which is volatile and highly liquid thus usually referred to

as hot-money (Sidorov, 2011; Mohamed, 2008). However, the implications here have

different nuances to the case of domestic finance, where the challenge is capital flight or

insufficient real investment, the case in international finance is insufficient kind of

investment.

The implication is that, because of the predominant mode of FDI, more volumes of FDI are

insufficient to alleviate unemployment and inequality. This will continually be the case

unless South Africa is able to attract efficiency-seeking FDI. In this regard the Motor Industry

Development Programme (MIDP) is an exemplary case with marketed success in investment

promotion. The MIDP is a system of export incentives designed for domestic car and

components producers which enables substantial employment to about 33 000 workers in

car production and 47 000 in components and tyre production (Vickers, 2002). The MIDPs

success offers invaluable lessons because the MIDP has succeeded in attracting export-

orientated FDI which has had the most significant direct impact on employment by

providing new opportunities and operations that have integrated domestic producers into

global supply chains (Thomas, et al., 2006; Vickers, 2002). However, there are some

challenges which relate to sustainability of the practice of off-setting local content with

exports under a regime of phasing down domestic tariff protection (Black, 2001; Zalk, 2013).

The Need for Coherent Co-ordination of Industrial and Trade Policy

Part of the challenge of the MIDP is related to co-ordination on policy. The outcome of the

import-export complementation was meant to stimulate competitiveness and promote

exports but mainly foreign owned firms with links to vehicle manufacturers instead of

traditional component producers dominated exports; as a result there was low investment

and low domestic market integration (Black, 2001). And those traditional component

producers who could export, a majority of exports was in peripheral components. The

result of state interventions to promote efficiency and exports are seemingly incoherent.

This is because, the set of import-export complementation made it easier for firms to import


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vehicles and export peripheral components instead of investing in local production of

core components and steadily increase vehicle exports (Black, 2001). Therefore, the big

lessoned to be learned is that policy design needs to pay meticulous attention to the

implication of policies in order to ensure coherence of the industrial policy regime with

intended economic outcomes (Zalk, 2013). Moreover, there is a need implement dynamic

reciprocal control mechanisms between the state and recipients of state support in order to

minimise state failure (Amsden, 2001).

In addition the successes of MIDP are challenged by the domestic institutional make-up

which attract M&As and portfolio investment as opposed to the most impactful modes of

FDI. This has resulted in increased foreign ownership (Black, 2001); in an environment with

no capital controls which exposes South Africa to great risk which could be mitigated

through capital controls (Palma, 2000). Therefore I would recommend that South Africa

place certain policies in place in order to restrain financial capital, which would reduce

profitability in the financial sector, making other sectors more profitable in order to

stimulate investment in those sectors. But this is a very precarious route since the impact of

capital controls on FDI depends on external factors which cannot be controlled. This

suggests that this will be something that South Africa will have to learn through experience.

Moreover, capital controls pose an economic conundrum for South Africa. On the one hand,

financial regulation reduces profitability of the financial sector and its competitiveness

which dis-incentivises portfolio investmentand that is a good thing in relation to reducing

speculative capital in South Africa. But on the other this would mean that South Africa

would not be able to mitigate its capital flight and repatriation of profits which could lead to

a deficit of payments which is potentially something harmful. However, with enough will

and experience an efficient balance could be attained. There are valuable lessons to be

learned from the MIDP as discussed above.

In conclusion, I have argued that the set of policies required for successful industrialisation

in South Africaneed to address the sectorial bias resulting the minerals-energy complex and

ensure the establishment of self-sufficiency that can allow for economic linkages within the

economy without exclusion of certain sectors and population groups. This includes coherent

support by the state in labour-intensive sectors to establish competitiveness of our labour-


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intensive industries. But more importantly this includes sensitivity to previously and

currently marginalised groups such as women and children.

The process of neoliberalisation has affected governance by reducing the extent and powers

of the state, thus redefining the bounds of what is private and public without any

consideration of the impact of this economic transformation on gender relations (Brodie,

1994). The institutions of neoclassical economics obscure the gendered aspect of economic

life and wage labour; especially those associated with the experience of economic

transformation such as the class-differentiated experience of women in core countries as

opposed to the men (Brodie, 1994); and the impact of changes in demand for labour on

women developing countries who are often exploited to maintain lower labour costs (Rai,

1996). Under these circumstances role of the state has been to facilitate the exploitation of

women in third world countries by multinational corporations (Brodie, 1994, p. 50).

Therefore, the state should allow the replacement of historically black male migrant labour

with female labour by obscuring the gendered impacts of economic change and not being

sensitive to the struggles of women and children.

In addition, I argued that the state needs an extensive industrial policy that is coherently

supported by trade policy in order to promote labour-intensive production and industrial

growth. This requires an understanding of how liberalisation or protection is needed, and

within which sectors and for how long. In addition, this requires co-ordinated effort by the

state and not just government or business. Moreover, policy regime coherence and

reciprocal control mechanisms are vitally important in order to minimise state failure and

promote developmental market functioning. I have also argued that the state needs to curb

the behavioural tendencies of shareholder value pursuit through a mandatory rate of real

investment based on firms annual turnovers and this can be done through pooling of funds

for rigorously regulated real investment by the state or in the form of compulsory growth in

real capital accumulation and employment targets for firms realising profits within South

Africa.

Lastly, I argued that the state needs to restrain financial capital, which would reduce

profitability in the financial sector, making other sectors more profitable in order to

stimulate investment in those sectors. However this is a highly contentious area of policy


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because of the power of embedded interests within the state. But this is not something that

cannot be negotiated piecemeal and despite the many examples of success and failure there

are things the state will only learn through experience. And I as previously state this is not

the solutionor a complete solution; instead this should be understood as possible response

amongst many possible responses to the question of industrialisation in South Africa. Thus,

South Africa can cross the river of persistent unemployment and inequality by feeling for

stones, such as the right combination of policies, to build strong foundations for the bridge

across.


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