political 1

BAR REVIEW MATERIALS: Political Law Digests 1

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Political Law Digests 1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. Bill of Rights

Procedural Due Process

1. Existence of Violation

Lameyra v. Pangilinan322 SCRA 117FACTS: Petitioner received a letter from the mayor informing him that he is dropped fromthe roll of employees of the local government unit. Petitioner claims that he wasterminated without prior written notice of the charges and without investigation andhearing.

HELD: Although it is clear from the Civil Service Memorandum Circular that no priornotice is required to drop from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absentwithout leave for at least thirty days, petitioner contests the finding that he was absent atall. He claims that he reported for work but was prevented form signing the log book. Inview of the circumstances prevailing in this case, the Civil Service Commission shouldhave considered the new evidence annexed by petitioner to his motion for reconsideration.

Velayo v. Comelec

327 SCRA 713FACTS: The Comelec issued a resolution annulling the proclamation of Velayo as mayor. Velayo claimed that he was denied due process because he was not furnished any noticeof the pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end. All that petitionerreceived from the Comelec was its en banc resolution annulling his proclamation.

HELD: Velayo is a real party-in-interest since he was the proclaimed mayor. His non-inclusion as respondent and his lack of notice of the proceedings in the Comelec whichresulted to the cancellation of his proclamation constitute clear denial of due process.

Uy v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 130685 (March 21, 2000)

FACTS: Governor Paredes dismissed from service more than sixty employees, allegedlyto scale down the operations of the office. The Merit Systems Protection Board rendereda decision that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil servicerules and regulations, and ordered the reinstatement of the workers. The Commission onAudit (COA) rendered a decision ruling that the back salaries of the workers have becomethe personal liability of the Governor because the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith.

HELD: Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of theproceedings before the COA. Fundamental requirement of procedural due process cannotbe violated before administrative agencies like COA.

Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita

G.R. No. 130442 (April 6, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent was charged with 12 administrative complaints which wereconsolidated into one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of a police officer.



The Summary Dismissal Board suspended respondent from service for 20 days, for“simple irregularity in the performance of service”. The Board later found respondent tohave committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while on duty.

HELD: Respondent was entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunkwhile in the performance of duty. Although he was given the opportunity to be heard onthe multiple and broad charges filed against him, the absence of specification of theoffense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of dueprocess.

Villanueva v. MalayaG.R. No. 94617 (April 12, 2000)

HELD: The RTC’s granting of the writ of possession ex parte violates petitioner-lessees’right to due process. A writ of possession may issue against occupants of a propertysubject of execution who derive their right of possession from the judgment debtor uponmotion in the execution proceedings and without need of a separate ejectment action,provided that the occupants are afforded an opportunity to explain the nature of theirpossession, on which basis the writ of possession will be denied or granted.

Gozun v. LlangcoA.M. No. MTJ-97-1136 (August 30, 2000)

FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution declaring the parcel of landoccupied by complainant as the new site of the rural health center. Respondent issued aresolution declaring that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is valid and enforceable andthat the mayor could order the police authorities to evict complainant.

HELD: Complainant was not made a party to the petition nor notified thereof. Respondentviolated the rights of the complainant to due process.

2. Absence of violation

Immam v. Comelec322 SCRA 866FACTS: Petitioner claims that the questioned Comelec order was issued without anymotion for its issuance and without notice and hearing. Thus, he claimed that his right todue process was violated.

HELD: The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The right to be hearddoes not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party can be heardthrough the pleadings he submits. In this case, petitioner was heard through thememorandum he submitted.

Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman322 SCRA 17FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for estafa and falsification. TheOmbudsman issued several orders to petitioner to file his counter-affidavit andcontroverting evidence. Petitioner failed. The Ombudsman issued the assailed resolutiondismissing petitioner from service. Petitioner claimed that he was denied due processbecause he was not given any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right tofile his counter-affidavit.

HELD: The orders of the Ombudsman requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavitcontained a warning that if no counter-affidavit is filed within the given period, a waiverwould be considered. Also, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard. A party whochooses not to avail of the opportunity cannot complain of denial of due process

National Police Commission v. BernabeG.R. No. 129914 (May 12, 2000)

FACTS: The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the National Police Commissionon the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation



of the charges filed against him.

HELD: The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrativeproceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek areconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Due process does not always requirea trial-type proceeding. In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice ofthe complaints and an opportunity to answer. He even submitted an affidavit answeringpoint by point the charges against him.

3. Administrative Due Process

Pefianco v. Moral322 SCRA 439FACTS: Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent fordishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compelpetitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. It wasdenied.

HELD: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findingsand recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filedagainst him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonableopportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of theinvestigation committee. Respondent had been accorded these rights.

4. Impartiality of Judge

Soriano v. AngelesG.R. No. 109920 (August 31, 2000)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul the decision of respondentjudge acquitting the accused in a direct assault case filed against him by the petitioner onthe ground that respondent was biased.

HELD: The fact that respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more thanthat of the prosecution does not indicate that she was biased.

Almendra v. Asis

A.M. RTJ-1590 (April 6, 2000)HELD: The mere fact that respondent judge ruled against complainant in the three casesfiled before him did not amount to partiality against said complainant or warrant theconclusion that respondent rendered an unjust judgment.

People v. Zheng Bai HuiG.R. No. 127580 (August 22, 2000)

HELD: The questioning of the witnesses by the judge is not a sufficient sign of bias. (Seealso People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 125008, October 23, 2000)

Equal Protection

De Guzman v. ComelecG.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 ofthe Voter’s Registration Act. The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in aparticular city or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that the actviolated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by theprohibition.



HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure theimpartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with thepeople of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voterscannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highestrepresentatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

B. Searches and Seizures1. Determination of Probable Cause by Judge

Dizon v. VeneracionA.M. No. RTJ-97-1376 (July 20, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent issued a search warrant for the seizure of 100 cars imported by theoperators of Metro Manila Inc. on the ground that the value of the cars had not been paidto the supplier. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge asked the witness for proof. The witness answered that there was evidence from the shipper.

HELD: The judge failed to comply with the constitutional requirement that before a searchwarrant may be issued, there must first be a complainant and his witness, and that thejudge should determine probable cause through searching questions and answers.

Abdula v. Guiani

326 SCRA 1

HELD: If a judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor when the records arenot before him, he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. Theconstitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The judge does not have to personallyexamine the witnesses. However, there should be a report and necessary documentssupporting the certification of the prosecutor. All these should be before the judge. (Seealso Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000 and Lim v. Felix, G.R. No.940547)

Tolentino v. MalangaonA.M. No. RTJ-99-1444 (August 3, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent judge dismissed the case of child abuse filed by petitioner on theground that the prosecution failed to establish probable cause. Previously, the courtordered petitioner to show cause why the court should order the arrest of the accused. However, petitioner refused to present additional affidavits on the ground that there was noneed to prove the factual basis of the information.

HELD: The judge must be satisfied with the existence of probable cause for the issuanceof a warrant of arrest. The judge may require the prosecutor to present further evidence toprovide a factual basis for the finding of probable cause.

2. Particularity of Description

Uy v. Bureau of Internal RevenueG.R. No. 129651 (October 20, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioners claim that the search warrant issued lacks particularity. The itemsdescribed in the warrant are as follows: multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers,journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional andofficial receipts, production record books, inventory lists, stock cards, unregistered deliveryreceipts, unregistered purchase and sales invoices; sales records, job orders, corporatefinancial records, bank statements, cancelled checks.

HELD: Most of the items listed lacked particularity. The judge could have formed a morespecific description of the documents, since the former employee of the petitionersfurnished photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. With regard to theunregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, they arespecific. No more detailed description could have been given. Items not particularly



described may be cut off, without rendering the entire warrant void.

3. Warrantless Searches and Seizurea. Incident of Arrest

People v. ElamparoG.R. No. 121572 (March 31, 2000)

HELD: Appellant’s subsequent arrest was lawful, coming as it is within the purview of “inflagrante delicto” arrest. The warrantless search and seizure was also lawful since it wasa search incidental to a lawful arrest.

People v. SevillaG.R. No. 124077 (September 5, 2000)

FACTS: A team of police officers went to the house of the accused to enforce a warrant ofarrest. Some members of the Narcotics Command joined the team to look for marijuana. Accused was subsequently charged with illegal possession of marijuana.

HELD: The search is illegal. It is not a search incidental to a valid arrest since theNarcotics Command joined the team of police officers for the specific purpose ofconducting a search.

People v. FigueroaG.R. No. 134056 (July 6, 2000)

FACTS: Accused, together with NBI agents, went to the house of his co-accused andpointed to a pail in the kitchen containing prohibited drugs. NBI agents seized the itemand arrested co-accused. Is the warrantless seizure valid? HELD: No. The search is not incidental to a valid arrest. The arrest of the co-accused didnot precede the search.

People v. Che Chun TingG.R. No. 130568 (March 21, 2000)

FACTS: Standing outside Unit 122, accused handled two transparent bags of drugs toMabel Po, in full view of NARCOM agents. Police officers arrested the surprised man andconducted a search of Unit 122 where they found more bags of shabu.

HELD: The search of Unit 122 and the seizure of drugs found therein are illegal. Awarrantless search should be limited to the premises and surroundings that are under theimmediate control of the accused. Unit 122 is not even the house of the accused but thatof his girlfriend.

b. Moving Vehicle

People v. Escaño323 SCRA 754FACTS: During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused. As aresult, other passengers were searched and all firearms were seized. Are checkpointsillegal?

HELD: As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a bodysearch, and the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot beregarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search.

c. Prohibited Article in Plain View / Custodial Investigation

People v. ValdezG.R. No. 129296 (September 25, 2000)

FACTS: Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the place of the accusedwhere they found marijuana plants being cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from



the house of the accused. They uprooted the plants and arrested the accused. Theyasked the accused who owned the plants and the accused admitted that they belonged tohim. The prosecution offered the plants and the admission of the accused as evidence. The accused claimed that the warrantless search was illegal while the police officersclaimed that the plants were found in plain view.

HELD: The marijuana plants were not in plain view. For the plain view doctrine to apply,the following must be present: (a) there was a valid prior intrusion based on a validwarrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their officialduties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right tobe where they were; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain viewjustified seizure of the evidence without further search. In this case, the police officerslocated the plants before they arrested the accused without a warrant. Also, they weredispatched precisely to look for the marijuana plants. The discovery was not inadvertent. The confession is also inadmissible. In trying to elicit information from the accused, thepolice was investigating him as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodialinvestigation and had a right to counsel.

People v. DeangG.R. No. 128045 (August 24, 2000)

FACTS: The accused was arrested for kidnapping for ransom with homicide. Heaccompanied the police to his house to surrender his share of the ransom. Subsequently,the accused got convicted. He claimed that the warrantless seizure of the money wasillegal.

HELD: The warrantless seizure of the money was legal because it was made with theconsent of the accused.

4. Warrantless Arrestsa. Invalid Arrests

People v. Dela CruzG. R. No. 138516 (October 17, 2000)

HELD: A warrantless arrest after the commission of a crime is illegal. The seizure of theitems he stole is also illegal.

Posadas v. OmbudsmanG.R. No. 131492 (September 29, 2000)

FACTS: Upon the request of the University Chancellor, the NBI sent agents to theuniversity and tried to arrest two members of a fraternity who were identified by twowitnesses as responsible for the killing of a member of another fraternity.

HELD: The NBI agents had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate thatthe two students were probably guilty of the crime. Their attempt to arrest them without awarrant was illegal.

5. Effect of Plea on Illegal Arrest

People v. Gomez

325 SCRA 61HELD: Any objection to the warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by thecourt of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters hisplea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Thus, if he fails to move for the quashingof the information against him before his arraignment, he may be estopped from assailingthe illegality of his arrest. (See also People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476)

D. Freedom of Speech and of the Press1. Libel



Jalandoni v. Drilon327 SCRA 107

FACTS: Private respondents published a full-page advertisement in five major dailynewspapers. These ads contained allegations naming petitioner who was then a PCGGCommissioner of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts. Petitioner filed acomplaint for the crime of libel.

HELD: In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatorystatement must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unlessthe public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice, thatis, with knowledge that it was false or not. Here, petitioner failed to prove actual malice onthe part of the private respondents. The statements embodied in the advertisement arecovered by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. This carries the right tocriticize the action and conduct of a public official.

2. Freedom of expression

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Comelec323 SCRA 811

FACTS: Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls duringelections for the reason that exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion.

HELD: Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom ofspeech and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of suchsubstantive character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comeleccannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in voting centers.

E. Right to Information

Gonzales v. NarvasaG.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information withrespect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of theirappointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau ofCustoms and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition tocompel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. Theletter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization ofpublic property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying ofappointment papers.

F. Eminent Domain

Santos v. Land Bank of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 137431 (September 7, 2000)

HELD: Compensation for land expropriation for agrarian reform is valid, even if made notcompletely in cash.

G. Prohibition Against Impairment of Contracts

Harrison Motors Corporation v. NavarroG.R. No. 132269 (April 27, 2000)

FACTS: Harrison Motors sold two trucks to Navarro. Subsequently, the Bureau of InternalRevenue (BIR), the Land Transportation Office and the Bureau of Customers (BOC)entered in a Memorandum of Agreement which provided that for purposes of registeringvehicles, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from the BIR. Governmentagents seized and detained the two trucks of Navarro after discovering that there were still



unpaid taxes.

HELD: The Memorandum of Agreement does not impose any additional taxes whichwould unduly impair the contract of sale between petitioner and private respondent. Instead, these administrative orders were passed to enforce payment of existing BIR taxesand customs duties at the time of importation. What Sec. 10 Art. III of the Constitutionprohibits is the passage of a law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes theintention of the contracting parties.

H. Rights During Investigation1. Inapplicability

a. Administrative Investigation

Sebastian v. GarchitorenaG.R. No. 114028 (October 18, 2000)

FACTS: Some employees of the post office were investigated by the chief postal serviceofficer in connection with missing postage stamps. During interrogation, they submittedsworn statements. The prosecution presented the sworn statements as evidence. Accused claimed that their sworn statements were not admissible in evidence since theywere not assisted by counsel.

HELD: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because suchinquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinarymeasures against erring public officers.

b. Police Line-Up

People v. PartiareG.R. No. 129970 (April 5, 2000)

HELD: The accused-appellant’s defense that the identification made by the privatecomplainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the line-upwithout the assistance of counsel is inadmissible. The stage of an investigation wherein aperson is asked to stand in a police line-up is outside the mantle of protection of the rightto counsel. (See also People v. Sirad, G.R. No. 130594, July 5, 2000)

c. Photograph

People v. Gallarde325 SCRA 835

FACTS: Accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The trial courtconvicted him of murder only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of theaccused immediately after the incident on the ground that the same were taken when theaccused was already under the mercy of the police.

HELD: The taking of pictures of an accused, even without the assistance of counsel,being purely a mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

G. ApplicabilityGutang v. People

G.R. No. 135406 (July 11, 2000)HELD: Receipt by the accused of prohibited drugs is inadmissible in evidence.

3. Custodial Investigation

People v. BariquitG.R. No. 122733 (October 2, 2000)

HELD: Confession given by the accused without the assistance of counsel, while on theway to the police station, is inadmissible in evidence.



People v. ValdezG.R. No. 129296 (September 25, 2000)

FACTS: The accused was arrested for bank robbery. After four days, the policeinvestigator took down his extrajudicial confession and called a lawyer who conferred withthe accused for ten minutes and executed his confession.

HELD: The confession is inadmissible. The moment the accused was arrested anddetained, he was already under custodial investigation. The lawyer was called only on the4th day of detention when the accused was about to put down his confession in writing.

People v. LegaspiG.R. No. 117802 (April 27, 2000)

FACTS: Legaspi and Franco were charged and convicted of the special complex crime ofrobbery with homicide. They were identified as perpetrators of the crime by someone froma group of eleven residents who were invited for questioning by the police. The accusednow claims that their rights during custodial investigation were violated.

HELD: No rights were transgressed inasmuch as Legaspi and Franco were not yetsingled out as perpetrators of the crime on November 29, 1992. Inviting certain individualsfor questioning and asking them a single question as to their whereabouts on the day ofthe crime do not amount to custodial investigation. When certain persons are alreadysingled out and pinpointed as authors of the crime, they are entitled to the rights ofpersons under custodial investigation.

4. Sufficiency of Warning

People v. SamoldeG.R. No. 128551 (July 31, 2000)

FACTS: The accused was arrested for murder. Before he was interrogated, he wasinformed of his right to remain silent, that any statement he might give could be used asevidence against him, and that he had the right to be assisted by counsel of his ownchoice. During trial, the prosecution offered his confession in evidence.

HELD: The confession is inadmissible. The accused was given only a perfunctoryrecitation of his rights. This is inadequate to transmit meaningful information to thesuspect.

People v. ManriquezG.R. No. 122510 (March 17, 2000)

FACTS: Accused were found guilty of two counts of murder. They executed an extra-judicial confession wherein they narrated their participation in the commission of the crime. They also signed a waiver in the presence of a counsel which contained that they did notwant the assistance of counsel.

HELD: Rights to remain silent and to counsel were violated. The lawyer’s explanation onthe effects of the waiver is unsatisfactory. Also, the extra-judicial confession isinadmissible evidence. It is intrinsically flawed. It was merely attached as page 2 of thewaiver. It was not prepared at the time the waiver was being prepared since anothertypewriter was used in preparing the extra-judicial confession.

People v. ObreroG.R. No. 122142 (May 17, 2000)

FACTS: Appellant was charged with robbery with homicide. His extra-judicial confessionwas presented as evidence.

HELD: Extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence because counsel for accusedwas not independent. At the time he assisted accused-appellant, he was the station



commander of the WPD and a PC captain. As part of the police force, he could not beexpected to have effectively assisted the accused during the investigation.

5. Independence of Counsel

People v. BaseG.R. No. 109773 (March 30, 2000)

HELD: While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigationcannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, theaccused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and askfor another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by theaccused where he never raised any objection against the former’s appointment during thecourse of the investigation. (See also People v. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 318)

6. Admissibility of Evidencea. Admissible Evidence

People v. Lumandong327 SCRA 650

HELD: The four fundamental requirements on the admissibility of the extrajudicialconfession are: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2 ) the confession must be madewith the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must beexpress; and 4) the confession must be in writing. (See also People v. Daeng, G.R. No.128045, August 24, 2000; People v. Llanes, G.R. No. 140268, September 18, 2000; andPeople v. Mameng, G.R. No. 123147, October 13, 2000)

People v. ContinenteG.R. No. 1000801 (August 25, 2000)

FACTS: The trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the trialcourt relied upon were the confession of the accused. The accused argued that theirconfession were inadmissible in evidence, since they were not informed of theirconstitutional right.

HELD: The written warning contained an explanation that the investigation dealt with theparticipation of the accused who chose not to give any statement to the investigator and awarning that any statement obtained from the accused might be used against them incourt. They contained an advice that the accused might engage the service of a lawyer oftheir own choice and that if they could not afford the service of a lawyer, they would beprovided with one for free. Despite the manifestation of the accused that they intended togive their statements, the investigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for theaccused. The lawyers conferred with the accused before their investigation. The accusedwere informed of their constitutional rights in the presence of their counsel. The confessionare admissible in evidence.

b. Inadmissible EvidencePeople v. Naag322 SCRA 710

HELD: Circumstances show that the extrajudicial confession was signed without theassistance of counsel. As such, it is inadmissible. The text of the confession is darkersuggesting that a different typewriter was used from that used to type the name of theaccused. (See also People v. Paglinawan, 324 SCRA 97)

c. WaiverPeople v. Hermoso

G.R. No. 130590 (October 18, 2000)HELD: When the confession of the accused was given without the assistance of counseland the accused did not object, he waives his right to object.

H. Right to BailLardes v. CA



324 SCRA 321FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for bail. The trial court granted it but imposed acondition that the approval of the bail bond would only be made after arraignment to makesure that the accused could not delay his trial by absenting himself.

HELD: Bails should be granted before arraignment. Otherwise, the accused might beprecluded from filing a motion to quash.

I. Right to Counsel1. Absence of Violation

People v. AquinoG.R. No. 129288 (March 30, 2000)

FACTS: Accused were charged with robbery with homicide. Accused claimed that he wasdenied of his constitutional right to counsel.

HELD: Accused should have informed the trial court if he had difficulties with his counsel. He had the opportunity to present his own version of the events but he just kept quiet. Besides, accused was convicted based on the strength of the prosecution and not on theweakness of the defense.

Villanueva v. PeopleG.R. No. 135098 (April 12, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty of the Bouncing Check Law. He appealed to theCourt of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed a motionfor reconsideration but the same was denied because it was filed out of time. Petitionerclaimed that he had a difficulty in finding a new lawyer and that when the CA denied hismotion for reconsideration, he was denied of his right to counsel.

HELD: Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court, and also by acounsel de parte before the CA. There was no violation of his right to counsel when hisnew lawyer committed a procedural blunder.

2. Presence of Violation

People v. Nadera324 SCRA 490

FACTS: The accused was charged for raping his two daughters. He pleaded guilty. Thelawyer of the accused did not cross-examine the first daughter because he was convincedthat she was telling the truth. The cross examination of the second daughter centered onwhat she did when she saw her sister being raped. The lawyer did not present anyevidence, and expressed his conformity for the admission of the evidence of theprosecution.

HELD: The case should be remanded because of the neglect of the lawyer of the accusedin representing his cause.

I. Right to be Informed1. Different Offense

People v. Paglinawan324 SCRA 97

FACTS: The accused was charged with murder. During trial, it was shown that the victimsalso suffered injuries.

HELD: A person cannot be convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged. Accused cannot be held liable for the injuries.

2. Absence of Qualifying Circumstance



People v. Villar322 SCRA 390

HELD: If no qualifiying circumstances were alleged in the information, accused cannot besentenced to death. (See also People v. Bernaldez, 322 SCRA 762).

4. Number of Offense

People v. Pambid,G.R. No. 129164 (March 15, 2000)

HELD: If a person is charged only with one count of rape, even though the victim wasraped more than once, the accused can only be convicted of one count of rape. (See alsoPeople v. Alnero, G.R. No. 134536, April 5, 2000)

5. Date of Commission of Crime

Sumbang v. General Court Martial PRO-Region 6

G.R. No. 140188 (August 3, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner, who is a member of the Philippine Constabulary, was charged withdouble murder before a general court martial. The composition of the court martial waschanged four times. The accused argued that his right to a speedy trial has been violatedsince the case has been going on for years.

HELD: The prosecution had no fault in the delay since the membership of the generalcourt martial underwent changes four times and none of the original members who heardthe prosecution witnesses were reappointed in the succeeding court martial. Besides, thepetitioner failed to assert his right to a speedy trial. It was only after the general courtmartial resumed hearing of the case in 1999 that petitioner invoked his right to a speedytrial. His silence should be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

Arambulo v. LaquiG.R. No. 138596 (October 12, 2000)

FACTS: A libel case was filed against the petitioner-accused. He filed a motion to quashon the ground of prescription which was denied. He filed motion for reconsideration whichwas also denied. Petitioner-accused filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appealswhich was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner-accusedlater on claimed that his right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD: The right to a speedy trial is violated only when there is an unreasonable delaywithout the fault of the accused. Petitioner-accused is not without fault in the delay of theprosecution against her.

M. Right to Confrontation

People v. Crispin327 SCRA 167

HELD: Affidavit of a witness who was not presented as such is not admissible in evidence.

N. Right to Compulsory Process

People v. YambotG.R. No. 120350 (Oct. 13, 2000)

FACTS: The accused were charged with kidnapping for ransom. When it was their turn topresent evidence, the subpoena for the first witness was not served because she wasunknown at her given address, while the subpoena for the other witness was received onlythree days before the hearing. At the next hearing, the two witnesses did not appear. The



subpoena for the first witness remained unserved while the subpoena for the second wasreceived four days before date of hearing. The trial court denied the request of thecounsel of the accused for postponement and considered the case submitted for decisioneven though it issued a warrant for the arrest of the second witness.

HELD: The delay is not entirely attributable to the accused. The trial court should havegranted postponement.

O. Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Dansal v. Fernandez327 SCRA 145

FACTS: Petitioners, who were officers of the National Food Authority, were charged withestafa thru falsification of a public document in the office of the Ombudsman. An additionalcharge for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against thepetitioners. More than one year and four months after the cases were submitted forresolution, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending the filing of acase for estafa thru falsification and a case for violation of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act against the petitioners. Petitioners argued that the delay in the termination ofthe preliminary investigation violated their right to a speedy disposition of their cases.

HELD: The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative and flexible concept. It isconsistent with reasonable delay. The protection under the speedy disposition of casesshould not operate as to deprive the government of the inherent prerogative to prosecutecriminal cases or in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fairopportunity to present their side. It cannot be said that petitioners found themselves in asituation oppressive to their rights simply by reason of delay.

Domingo v. Sandiganbayan322 SCRA 655

FACTS: On May 26, 1987, a complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan against petitionerfor violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July 30, 1992, a case wasfiled against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that the inordinate delayin the preliminary investigation violated right to speedy disposition of his case.

HELD: The delay was not undue since it was brought about by peculiar unforeseencircumstances. The SC nullified the authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor whichnecessitated the issuance of AO #1 by the Ombudsman authorizing the Special Prosecutorto continue with the preliminary investigation. The assigned prosecutor retired in 1989. After the reorganization by the Ombudsman of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, thecase was assigned to a new prosecutor. The subpoena sent to petitioner was returnunserved because he was no longer connected with his previous office. The prosecutorissued another subpoena to give petitioner chance to file counteraffidavits which he filedonly on March 1992.

Castillo v. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 109271 (March 14, 2000)

FACTS: On August 25, 1986, a complaint was filed against petitioners with theTanodbayan. On Oct. 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan recommended filing a case for violationof the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners filed motion for reinvestigation. The Ombudsman filed an information against petitioners on November 5, 1990 without firstresolving the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioners argued that the case should bedismissed for unjustified delay in the filing of the information.

HELD: There was no violation of right to speedy trial. The delay was not capricious noroppressive but was brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws in the initialstages of the case.

Raro v. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 108431 (July 14, 2000)



FACTS: The complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act was referred by the Deputy Ombudsman to the NBI for investigation. TheNBI recommended the prosecution of the petitioners. However, the petitioners argue thatthe four-year delay in the completion of the preliminary investigation violated right tospeedy disposition of cases.

HELD: It took the NBI 2 years to complete its report. The resolution recommending thefiling of the case against petitioner has to be reviewed. The length of time it took beforethe conclusion of the preliminary investigation may only be attributed to the adherence ofthe Ombudsman and NBI to the rudiments of fair play.

P. Prohibition Against Cruel Punishment

People v. Alicante G.R. No. 127026 (May 31, 2000)

HELD: Death penalty is not cruel.

Q. Double Jeopardy

1. Termination

People v. VelascoG.R. No. 127444 (September 13, 2000)

FACTS: Trial court acquitted respondent from a case of murder; two cases of frustratedmurder and a case for illegal possession of firearms outside of his residence. Theprosecution filed a petition for certiorari on the ground that the trial court deliberately andwrongfully interpreted certain facts and evidence.

HELD: On the ground of double jeopardy, an acquittal is final and unappealable. Prosecution cannot accomplish through a writ of certiorari what it could not do so byappeal.

2. Different Offenses

People v. Ong322 SCRA 38

HELD: An illegal recruiter can be charged with estafa and illegal recruitment (See alsoPeople v. Meris, G.R. No. 117145, March 28, 2000)

II. Citizenship

Valles v. ComelecG.R. No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a Filipino father and anAustralian mother. She ran for governor. Petitioner, her opponent, filed a case fordisqualification on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen since she was issued analien certificate of registration; there was an application for an immigrant certificate ofresidence and she was a holder of an Australian passport.

HELD: The respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino. Holding of anAustralian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effectiverenunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. Atmost, she has dual citizenship.

Valles v. ComelecG.R. No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Australia follows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her onthe ground of dual citizenship.



HELD: Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. Thefact that she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running forpublic office. Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenshipbecause in the certificate, the candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and thathe will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration operates as an effectiverenunciation of foreign citizenship.

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Party-List

Veteran Federation Party v. ComelecG.R. No. 136781 (October 6, 2000)

FACTS: The Comelec proclaimed 14 party list representatives from 13 parties whichobtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast as member of the House of Rep.Upon petition by other party-list organization, it proclaimed another 38 additional partyrepresentatives althout they received less than 2% of the votes on the ground that underthe Constitution it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of House of Rep. mustcome from the party list system.

HELD: Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides aceiling for party list seats in the House of Representatives. The Congress is vested withpower to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. Inthe exercise of their Constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary that partiesparticipating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast to be entitled to aparty-list seat. This is to ensure that only parties with sufficient number of constituents areactually represented in Congress.

B. Attendance of Session

People v. Jalosjos324 SCRA 689

FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, aCongressman was confined at the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to hisposition, he argued that he should be allowed to attend the legislative sessions andcommittee hearings, because his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voicein Congress.

HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraintsof general law. Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House ofRep is privileged from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 yearsimprisonment. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by morethan 6 years has constitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the congressionalsessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man. When he was elected intooffice, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of action. Congress cancontinue to function even without all its members being present. Election to the position ofCongressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.

C. Electoral Tribunal

Guerrero v. ComelecG.R. No. 137004 (July 26, 2000)

FACTS: A petition to disqualify respondent as a candidate for Congressman was filed withthe Comelec on the ground that he was campaigning although he had not filed a certificatefor candidacy. Three days before the election, respondent filed his certificate of candidacyas substitute for another candidate who withdrew. The petitioner argued that thesubstitution was fatally defective since the replaced candidate was an independent and therespondent ran as candidate for a political party. Respondent was proclaimed winner andassumed office. Comelec dismissed petition on the ground that the matter is now within



the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

HELD: Once a winning candidate has assumed office as a member of the House of Rep,the jurisdiction of Comelec over his qualification ends and jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunalbegins. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not limited to constitutional qualifications only. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a statutory qualification.

D. Title of the Law

De Guzman v. ComelecG.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officershall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordancewith it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of the law, which is “AnAct Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of ContinuingRegistration, Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation ofFund Thereof”.

HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter ofregistration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing aguideline for the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of election officers.

E. Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court

Villanert v. Desierto326 SCRA 355

HELD: The law making the decision of the Ombudsman appealable to the SC is invalidbecause the concurrence of the SC was not obtained. (See also Tirol v. Commission onAudit, G.R. No. 133594, August 3, 2000)

IV. Executive Department

A. Immunity from Suit

Gloria v. CA G.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: Upon recommendation by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,respondent was reassigned as superintendent in another school. Respondent filed apetition for prohibition against the Secretary on the ground that his indefinite reassignmentviolated his security of tenure. The Secretary argued that the filing of the case violated theimmunity of the President from suit.

HELD: The contention is untenable. The petition is not directed against the President. Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts.

B. Power of Control

Hutchison Ports Philippines, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Metropolitan AuthorityG.R. No. 131367 (August 31, 2000)

FACTS: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority conducted a bidding for the developmentand operation of a modern marine container terminal. It awarded the contract topetitioner. The Office of the President set aside the award and ordered a new bidding. Petitioner filed action for specific performance.

HELD: The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority is under the control of the Office of thePresident. Therefore the President may overturn any of awards granted by it for justifiablereasons.



C. Power to Call Out Armed Forces

IBP v. ZamoraG.R. No. 941284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, thePresident ordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crimeprevention and suppression. IBP questioned validity of the order on the ground that thereis no factual basis for President to exercise his power to call out the Armed Forces toprevent or suppress lawless violence.

HELD: The IBP failed to support its assertion that the President acted without factualbasis. The President has determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armedforces. He asserted that violent crimes like bank and store robberies, holdups,kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur. The court can take judicial notice of therecent bombing perpetrated by lawless elements in public places.

D. State of Rebellion

Lacson v. Perez G.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001)

FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaultingand attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that therewas a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General OrderNo. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police tosuppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of severalalleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,”which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filedbefore the Court assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and thewarrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact andin law.

1. On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state ofrebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered mootand academic.

2. As to petitioners’ claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is being used bythe authorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions tolaw enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38 andobtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminaryinvestigations will be conducted.

3. Moreover, petitioners’ contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrestedwithout warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamusand prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not withoutadequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

4. Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informationsagainst the petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial ofthe case. Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaintsor charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.

5. Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void sincepetitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders intheir petition.

6. Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of beingarrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since



such right to relief must be clear at the time of the award.

7. Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty (PMAP), arguesthat the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of separation ofpowers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to interpret what tookplace on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chiefof all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence.

8. As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest. LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to theCourt. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to bethreatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members andsupporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime ofrebellion.

Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, theSupreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.

PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the requiredjudicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001siege)

E. Legitimacy of the Arroyo Presidency

Estrada v. DesiertoG. R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Estrada V. ArroyoG.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting anyfurther proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after theterm of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a QuoWarranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbentPresident of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties ofhis office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Officeof the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

HELD:FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certainprovisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of ArticleVII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issueslikewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involvethe correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphaticallythe province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA PeoplePower II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrewthe whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech andfreedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which onlyaffected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of thenew government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA IIis intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and thesuccession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I



presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

a. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be acandidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even atthat time.

b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised byReyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name."If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday."The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any moreof this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. Theintent to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayokona” are words of resignation.

c. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact.The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by theparties during and after transition period.

d. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press releasecontaining his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondentas President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) heemphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake ofpeace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he wasleaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume thepresidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to thepeople for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the pastopportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will notshirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of ourcountry. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ thepresident which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in thepromotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, thenational spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give upthe presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell.His presidency is now in the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under theConstitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No.l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENTGLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITSSUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THENATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed SenateResolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ASVICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitionerEstrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim ofinability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfullyclaim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to governtemporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision thatrespondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government



cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted forthe reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Theimpeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors andby the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senatepassed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is FunctusOfficio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitionerto demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can beprosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Thedebates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachmentproceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminaland civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents areimmune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency andtenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachmentprocess against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution beforethe Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commitcriminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is thatunlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally isnot acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coveragedoes not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge andimpaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judgedeveloped actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive mediacoverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the casedoes not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicialpublicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial.Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

V. Judicial Department

A. Judicial Review


FACTS: The president issued EO 43 creating the Preparatory Commission onConstitutional Reform to recommend amendments to the Constitution. Petitioner, in hiscapacity as taxpayer, filed a petition assailing constitutionality of the Commission.

HELD: The Preparatory Commission was created by the President by virtue of EO 43. Anamount was set aside for its operation from the funds of the Office of the President. Therewas no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Petitioner cannot questionthe constitutionality of the Commission in his capacity as taxpayer.


FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition in his capacity as taxpayer questioning theconstitutionality of the creation by the President of seventy positions for presidential



advisers on the ground that the President did not have the power to create these positions.

HELD: Petitioner has not proven that he has sustained any injury as a result of theappointment of presidential advisers.

Bayan v. ZamoraG.R. No. 138570 (Oct. 10, 2000)

FACTS: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was entered into by the Philippines and UnitedStates to regulate conditions of presence of US military personnels in the Philippines. TheSenate concurred with the VFA. Petitioners who are taxpayers and members of Congressquestioned its validity.

HELD: Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or are in danger of sustainingany direct injury as a result of the enforcement of VFA. As taxpayers, they failed to showhow the VFA will involve the exercise of Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Members of Congress’ standing cannot be upheld absent a clear showing of any directinjury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. Further, IBP has nostanding.

IBP v. ZamoraG.R. No. 141284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, thePresident ordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crimeprevention and suppression. The IBP questioned validity of the order invoking itsresponsibility to uphold the rule of law.

HELD: The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is notsufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which isshared by the whole citizenry. The IBP has failed to show any specific injury it hassuffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned order. The presumed possible injury ishighly speculative.

Militante v. CAGR. No. 107040 (April 12, 2000)

FACTS: Pres. Marcos issued PD 1315 in 1975 expropriating 40 hectares in Caloocan fordistribution to their occupants. The lots of petitioners were included in the coverage of thedecree. However, these lots were not among those acquired by government in 1978 and1979. On May 14, 1980, Proclamation No. 1967 indentified 244 sites in MetropolitanManila as areas for priority development and urban land reform zones. In 1981, theHuman Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) declared the lots of petitioner to beoutside the reform area. Because the National Housing Authority (NHA) failed to evict thesquatters on his lots, petitioner questioned the constitutionality of PD 1315.

HELD: The lots of petitioners are not in danger of expropriation. PD. 1315 was issued in1975. It is doubtful that the government will still desire to expropriate the lots of petitioner. Moreover, the HSRC certified that the lots were outside the Urban Land Reform Zone. In1987, petitioner negotiated with the NHA for the price of his lots therefore, he is estoppedfrom asserting that PD 1315 to be unconstitutional.

B. Form of Decision

1. Void DecisionPeople v. Nadera

324 SCRA 490FACTS: The accused was charged with rape. The trial court convicted him. The decisionmerely narrated the evidence of the prosecution and a republic act.

HELD: The trial court failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which it based theconviction of the accused. There is nothing to indicate the reason for the decision. Noreason is given why the trial court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible.



Madrid v. CAGR No. 130683 (May 31, 2000)

FACTS: The accused was convicted of homicide by the trial court. The decisionsummarized the testimonies of witnesses from both sides. It then stated that thetestimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution convinced the court. On the other hand,the demeanor of the defense witnesses were not credible. The decision added that theaggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength werepresent.

HELD: The decision does not indicate what the trial court found in the testimonies of theprosecution witnesses to consider them straightforward when they are in fact contradictoryand confused. Neither does the decision contain any justification for the appreciation ofaggravating circumstances against the accused. The decision failed to comply with theconstitutional requirement that a decision must expressly state the facts and the law onwhich it is based

Yao v. CAGR. No. 132428 (October 24, 2000)

FACTS: The MTC convicted petitioner of unfair competition. Petitioner appealed to RTC. The RTC confirmed his conviction. In its decision, it stated that it found no cogent reasonto disturb the finding of fact of the MTC.

HELD: The decision of the RTC fell short of the constitutional requirement. Parties to alitigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual andlegal reasons that led to the conclusion of the court. The decision in question should bestruck close as a nullity.

People v. DumaguingG.R. No. 135516 (September 20, 2000)

FACTS: The trial court convicted the accused of rape. The decision simply stated that theaccused was guilty of raping his own daughter and that the evidence of the prosecutionwas not controverted by the accused.

HELD: The trial court failed to comply with the requirement that it should state clearly anddistinctly the facts on which it is based.

2. Valid DecisionPeople v. Ordonez

G.R. No. 129593 (July 10, 2000)FACTS: The trial court convicted the accused of illegal recruitment and estafa. Theaccused argued that the decision did not comply with Section 14, Article VIII of theconstitution, because it merely paraphrased the testimonies of the witnesses.

HELD: The trial court went over the testimonies of every witness of both parties. Aftersummarizing the testimonies, the trial court stated in its decision that it found that theaccused informed the complainants that they would be going to Korea to work when in factthey landed in Kuala Lumpur instead; that one of the complainants had no job waiting, andthe other complainant landed in jail at the time he arrived in Kuala Lumpur and had to bereturned to the Philippines. The decision complied with the requirement.

VI. Constitutional Commissions

A. Term of Commissioners

Gaminde v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 140335 (December 13, 2000)

FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President appointed petitioner as Commissioner of theCSC for a term expiring on February 2, 1999. She took her oath of office on June 22,



1993 and was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on September 7, 1993. TheCommission on Audit issued a decision that her term expired on Feb. 2, 1999.

HELD: The constitution adopted a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairmanand Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions. The operation of the rotationalplan requires that the terms of the first Commissioners should start on a common date andany vacancy before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpiredbalance of the term. Consequently, the term of the first Chairman and Commissioners ofthe Constitutional Commissions must start on a common date, irrespective of variations inthe dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees in order that the expirationof the first terms should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between theexpiration of the terms. February 2, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of officeof the first appointees to the Constitutional Commission, as the beginning of the term ofoffice is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.

B. Civil Service Commission

1. Reassignment

Chato v. ZenarosaGR No. 120539 (October 20, 2000)

HELD: A government employee may be transferred.


FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shallhold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it,the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the law violated their security of tenure.

HELD: What the guarantee of security of tenure seeks to prevent is the capriciousexercise of the power to dismiss. Where it is the legislature which furnishes the ground forthe transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long asthe remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purpose of the law.

Gloria v. CAG.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent was appointed School Division Superintendent, Division of CitySchools, Quezon City. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education, Culture andSports, the President reassigned him as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute ofScience and Technology on the ground that he is an expert in vocational and technicaleducation. Respondent questioned the validity of his reassignment on the ground that it isindefinite and it violated his security of tenure.

HELD: There is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary. Theevidence or intention to reassign respondent had no definite period. It is violative of hissecurity of tenure.

Padolino v. FernandezG.R. No. 133511 (October 10, 2000)

FACTS: Respondent was Finance and Management Division Chief. The petitioner, theSecretary of Science and Technology issued an order providing for the reassignment ofbranch, division and section chiefs. The order provided that their return would be thesubject of a separate order. Pursuant to the order, respondent was reassigned to theOffice of the Director of Finance and Management Service in Taguig. Respondent arguedthat this violated her security of tenure.

HELD: The order violated the security of tenure of respondent and hence invalid. Theorder contains no definite duration of the reassignment. The reassignment of respondentreduced her to a mere subordinate without authority to supervise anyone.



2. ReorganizationCanonizado v. Aguirre

323 SCRA 312FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commissionwhen Republic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and ReorganizationAct of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms ofoffice of the incumbent commissioners were deemed expired. Petitioners claimed that thisviolated their security of tenure.

HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did notexpressly abolish the positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National PoliceCommission was under the Department of Interior and Local Government, while underRepublic Act. No. 8551 it is made an agency attached to the Department of Interior andLocal Government. The organizational structure and the composition of the NationalPolice Commission remain essentially the same except for the addition of the Chief of PNPas ex-officio member. The powers and duties of the National Police Commission remainbasically unchanged. No bona fide reorganization of the NPC having been mandated byCongress and insofar as RA 8851 declares the office of the petitioner as expired resultingin their separation from office, it is tantamount to removing civil service employees fromoffice without legal cause therefore, it must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

3. Lack of EligibilityCuevas v. Bacal

G.R. No. 139382 (December 6, 2000)FACTS: Respondent passed the Career Executive Service Examination. She wasappointed Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office. Later, she was designated asacting chief Public Attorney. Upon change of administration, respondent was appointedRegional Director. Respondent argued she was removed without cause.

HELD: The rank level of respondent is Rank level III. The position of Chief PublicAttorney required rank level I. As respondent does not have the required Rank, herappointment to that position cannot be considered permanent and she cannot claim theright to a security of tenure.

C. Commission on Elections

1. Power to Appoint Employees


FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided that no election officer shallhold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it,the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitionerargue that the law undermined the constitutional authority of the Comelec to appoint itsown officials.

HELD: The law merely provides the basis for the transfer of an election officers and doesnot deprive the Comelec of its power to appoint its officials.

2. Judicial ReviewAmbil v. Comelec

G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates for governor. Petitionerwon. Respondent filed election protest with the Commission on Elections. A member of itsfirst division prepared the resolution but he retired before it could be promulgated. A newmember was appointed to replace the retired commissioner. The first division issued aresolution declaring the previously prepared resolution void, because it had not beenpromulgated.



HELD: Petition should be denied because the SC had no power to review interlocutoryorders or final resolutions of a division of Comelec. It must first be reviewed by theComelec en banc before it can be brought to the SC.

ABS-CBN v. Comelec323 SCRA 811

FACTS: Comelec approved Resolution 98-1419 on April 21, 1998 which prohibited theconduct of exit polls. Petitioners questioned the validity of the resolution by filing a petitionfor certiorari in the SC. Solicitor General argued that case should be dismissed for failureto exhaust all available remedies by failure to file a motion for reconsideration before theComelec.

HELD: Considering that the resolution was issued only 20 days before the election andthat the petitioners got a copy of it only on May 4, 1998, there was hardly any opportunityto move for reconsideration and to obtain and swift resolution in time for the May 11elections. The petition also involves transcendental constitutional issues therefore, directresort to SC is justified.

Salva v. MakalintalG.R. No. 132603 (September 8, 2000)

FACTS: The Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca Batangas approved an ordinancemerging Barangay San Rafael with another Barangay. The Sanggunian Panlalawiganpassed a resolution instructing the Comelec to hold a plebiscite. The Comelec passed aresolution calling for a plebiscite. The officials and residents of San Rafael filed a case inRTC to prohibit the plebiscite on the ground that the ordinance and the resolutions wereinvalid. The RTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case because only the SupremeCourt can review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.

HELD: The issuance of the Resolution of the Comelec was a ministerial duty which maybe enjoined by law and is part of its administrative functions. Any question pertaining to itsvalidity may be taken in an ordinary civil action before the RTC.

3. DecisionSoller v. Comelec

G.R. No. 139853 (Sept.5, 2000)FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates for mayor. Petitioner wasproclaimed elected. Respondent filed with Comelec a petition for annulment ofproclamation. A week later, he filed an election protest in the RTC. Petitioner moved todismiss the protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, and failure tostate a cause of action. The RTC denied motion. Respondent also filed certiorari withComelec en banc which was later denied.

HELD: The authority to resolve petitions for certiorari involving incidental issues of electionprotests falls within the jurisdiction of the Division of the Comelec and not with the Comelecen banc. If the principal case is cognizable on appeal by a Division, there is no reasonwhy petitions for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be referredfirst to a Division of the Comelec for resolution.

D. Commission on Audit

Laysa v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 12813 (October 18, 2000)

FACTS: As a result of an audit of the Fishery Sector Program Fund of the Department ofAgriculture, Regional Office No. V was found to not have complied with the rules onbidding, submission of documents to support claim of disbursement. Petitioner, Director ofthe office, argued that since the Fishery Sector Program is a special program for researchand development, bureaucratic adherence to prescribed rules and procedures stiflesresearch and development.



HELD: Verification of whether officials of an agency properly discharged their fiscalresponsibilities and whether an agency complied with internal audit controls in thecollection and disbursement of government funds are part of the functions of theCommission on Audit.

1. Prevention of Unnecessary Expenses

Polloso v. GanganG.R. No. 140563 (July 14, 2000)

FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) hired the legal service ofpetitioner, a private lawyer. The Commission on Audit disallowed the payment of hiscompensation, since he was hired without complying with Circular No. 86-255 whichrequires prior written approval by the Solicitor General as well as the Commission onAudit. Petitioner argued that circular is unconstitutional because it restricted the practice oflaw.

HELD: The claim is bereft of merit. The circular simply sets forth the prerequisite for thegovernment agency in hiring a private lawyer which are reasonable safeguards to preventirregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures of government funds.

Uy v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 130685 (March 21, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioners were permanent employees of the Provincial Engineering Office whowere dismissed by the governor allegedly to scale down the operations of that office. Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement with the Merit Protection System Board. Theboard held that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with the civilservice rules since it was made without comparing the relative fitness, efficiency andlength of service of the employees. It ordered the reinstatement of petitioners andpayment of their back salaries. The decision became final. The Commission on Auditdisallowed the payment of back salaries on the ground that it should be the personalliability of the governor since illegal dismissal was done in bad faith.

HELD: The decision of the Merit System Protection Board has become final andexecutory. The Commission on Audit cannot be allowed to set it aside since paymentcannot be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.

VII. Local Government

Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000)

A. Ombudsman1. Form of Complaint


FACTS: Upon complaint of an employee of a corporation which was authorized by thePhilippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to operate a small town lottery, the Ombudsmanfiled a criminal case against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct. Petitioner argued that the complaint was sworn to before a notary public and theaffidavits of witnesses against him were sworn to before a provincial fiscal not deputizedby the Ombudsman.

HELD: Under Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman is required to acton complaints filed in any form or manner. The charges are valid.

2. Investigation




FACTS: The Deputy Ombudsman referred the complaint against petitioner for violation ofthe Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to the NBI for investigation. The NBIrecommended the prosecution of the case. Petitioner argued that by referring thecomplaint to the NBI, the office of the Ombudsman abdicated its duty to conductpreliminary investigation.

HELD: The Office of the Ombudsman did not delegate the conduct of the preliminaryinvestigation to the NBI. What was delegated was only the fact-finding function,preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman.

3. State immunity from SuitA. Applicability

Calub v. CAG.R. No. 115634 (April 27, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioners, who were officers of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources seized two motor vehicles for transporting illegally cut lumber. The owner andthe driver filed a case against them for the recovery of the possession of the motor vehicle.

HELD: The acts for which petitioners are being called to account were performed by themin the discharge of their official duties. A suit against them is a suit against the state. Itcannot prosper without the consent of the state.

B. Law Enforcement

Armed Forces

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORAG.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine NationalPolice and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restraincrime, violated the prohibition on the appointment of the members of the Armed Forceswho are in active service to civilian positions.

HELD: The SC held that there was actually no appointment of the members of the ArmedForces to civilian positions. The members of the Philippine Marines were not integrated asmembers of the PNP. The participation of the Chief of Staff in civilian law enforcementdoes not mean that he was appointed to a civilian post, since the head of the PNP is theone actually vested with authority in these operations.

Philippine National Police

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORAG.R. NO. 141284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine NationalPolice and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restraincrime, violated the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military and thecivilian character of the police force.

HELD: The participation of the Philippine Marines constitutes a permissible use of militaryassets for civilian law enforcement. The civilian character of the police force is also notaffected by this participation. The members of the PNP are the ones in charge of theoperations. They are the ones who will direct and supervise the deployment of the



Philippine Marines.

Visiting Forces Agreement

Bayan v. ZamoraG.R. NO. 138570 (October 10. 2000)

The Visiting Forces Agreement, for which Senate concurrence was sought andreceived on May 27, 1999, is the subject of a number of Constitutional challenges.

Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, orlegislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?

Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challengingthe Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he hassustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of itsenforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitionershave failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise byCongress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the actcomplained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived fromtaxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove thathe has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxationand that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questionedstatute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to allmembers of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation areinvolved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public fundsare being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standingto assail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess therequisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to theirperson or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legalcapacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governorsauthorizing its National President to commence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutionalsignificance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier andtakes cognizance of the petitions.

Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of theConstitution?

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves thepresence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate ontreaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty orinternational agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:"[a]fter theexpiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and theUnited States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, orfacilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in bythe Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast bythe people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty bythe other contracting State."

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, inwhich case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate isrequired to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays downthe general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, orparticular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be validand effective.



In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treatieswhich involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to rendercompliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding onthe Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities"may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if sorequired by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troopsvisiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of militarypersonnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter ofcriminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment,materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treatiesinvolving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To acertain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability withregard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of theSenate.

It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transientagreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for theestablishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between "transient"and "permanent". We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troopsor facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction ismade by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument thatSection 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merelyforeign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers "foreignmilitary bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to theentry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause doesnot refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" collectively but treats them asseparate and independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated— a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops,or (c) foreign facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage ofSection 25, Article XVIII.

Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII’s requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in thecountry, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty;(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress,ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to thepresence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by theSenate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were atleast 16 Senators that concurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" meansthat the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Torequire the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to itsConstitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle thatthe words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except wheretechnical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to themprevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, hasstated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long asthe US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to complywith its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and theconcurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of ournation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold theobligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be



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an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formalacceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation theprocess of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in thePresident and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senateis limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to theratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on ourpart, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the termsof the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippinesadopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the landand adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity withall nations.

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