political and constitutional conflict in the west papua region of

in association with the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and Wolfson College, University of Oxford

Political andConstitutional Conflict

in the West PapuaRegion of Indonesia

Overview and Recommendationsfor the UK and the

International Community

The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society

ContemporaryIssues

Policy Brief

www.fljs.org


The Politics of Papua Project

The Politics of Papua Project at the University of Warwick conducts research and providesinformed political analysis to policymakers in order to facilitate a peaceful resolution to theconflict in Papua.

This policy brief has been written and prepared by the Politics of Papua Project in theDepartment of Politics and International Relations at the University of Warwick and theFoundation for Law, Justice and Society at Wolfson College, University of Oxford. It is asummary of a full length report, copies of which can be downloaded from the projectwebsite: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/papua

The report was funded by a grant from the University of Warwick Economic and SocialResearch Council Impact Accelerator Account. The principal author of the report was Dr Marinella Capriati, with contributions from other members of the Politics of PapuaProject. The authors thank Clare Harding, who provided permission to reproduce imagescontained in the report, and all those who provided comments on drafts of the report.

This publication is copyright, but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes ofresearch, education, media reporting, and policymaking, provided that all such use isregistered with the Politics of Papua Project for impact assessment purposes and that thesource is acknowledged in full. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use inother publications, or for translation or adaptation, advance permission of the copyrightholder must be secured. E-mail: [email protected]

Politics of Papua Project, Department of Politics and International Studies, Social SciencesBuilding, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.www.warwick.ac.uk/papua

© Politics of Papua Project, University of Warwick, 2016

n The consultation on whether the West Papua region would become an independent

country or join Indonesia took place in 1969 — the so-called ‘Act of Free Choice’. The

1962 New York Agreement established the ‘eligibility of all adults’ and required a ‘one

man one vote’ system. However, Indonesian military officials selected 1,022

representatives, who were largely coerced into voting in favour of West Papua

becoming part of Indonesia.

n Since West Papua was incorporated into Indonesia, Papuans have been subject to

extremely serious human rights violations. The region is de facto controlled by the

Indonesian military, with an estimated 15,000 troops currently deployed in the West

Papua region. The Indonesian government has pursued a process of so-called

‘Indonesianization’, trying to incorporate Papuans into the Indonesian nation state

through the transfer of thousands of Indonesian families to West Papua.

n Promises made to end restrictions on the access of foreign media made by current

President Widodo have not been followed by official instructions, and several political

prisoners remain behind bars. President Widodo has also initiated a regulation

increasing military operations in the West Papua region.

n Britain has strong economic and political ties with Indonesia. The UK is Indonesia’s fifth

largest foreign investor. In 2015, then Prime Minister David Cameron promised up to

£1bn to help finance infrastructure development. Britain provides training and delivery

of military equipment to Indonesian special forces and police, including units deployed

in West Papua. The UK has also granted asylum to Benny Wenda, current spokesperson

for the United Liberation Movement for West Papua. This puts the UK in a unique

position to take effective leadership to resolve the conflict in West Papua, both for

moral reasons and to protect vital British interests in the region.

n A resolution of the conflict could be achieved through a new approach to Special

Autonomy, Indonesia’s preferred route, or by encouraging dialogue between Jakarta,

Papuan exiles, and civil society groups working in West Papua. International mediation

might help the parties to make progress in agreeing a common agenda for discussion.

n An important element of Papuan grievances concerns the 1969 Act of Free Choice,

which is widely reported not to have been a genuine consultation. Because of this,

several Papuans and supporters of the Papuan independence movement ask for a

second consultation to take place. If Papuan organizations were to set up a referendum

without Indonesia’s approval, the international community would need to work with

both sides from an early stage to secure Indonesian approval for a peaceful and

internationally monitored referendum, in order to avoid potentially widespread

violence and loss of life.

Executive Summary

CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN WEST PAPUA . 1

The area including the Indonesian provinces of‘Papua’ and ‘West Papua’ (referred to collectively as‘the West Papua region’ or ‘West Papua’ in this report)covers the western part of the island of New Guineaand borders Papua New Guinea to the east.1 The areabecame part of the Dutch colonial territory known asthe Netherlands Indies in the nineteenth century.When the Netherlands Indies gained itsindependence as Indonesia in 1945 (internationallyrecognized in 1949), disagreements ensued betweenthe newly formed country and the Netherlands onwhether West Papua should be part of Indonesia.Tension escalated and open conflict broke outbetween the two states.

At the beginning of the sixties, the United Statestook an active role in the management of the crisis.As the Cold War intensified, the US made it a priorityto ensure that Indonesia would not be driventowards the Soviet Union. Under Americansupervision, the Netherlands and Indonesia signedthe New York Agreement, according to which theadministration of the West Papua region would beassigned to the United Nations for a short time, andwould then pass to Indonesia.

In the years between the 1940s and the 1960s,Indonesia’s politics declined from constitutionaldemocracy to an authoritarian regime. After the UNwithdrawal, Indonesia’s President Sukarno banned allpolitical parties and activities, and clashes startedbreaking out between Papuans and Indonesianmilitary units. It is estimated that from the beginningof the UN administration to the consultation thattook place in 1969, the Indonesian military killedthousands of Papuans.2

In 1967, Sukarno stepped down and Suhartobecame Indonesia’s second president. The regimechange was accompanied by brutal anti-communistmassacres organized by the military, and ushered ina period of military-backed rule that brought humanrights abuses to many parts of the country. Beforeany consultation with Papuans about the futurepolitical status of the region had taken place, theIndonesian government signed a concession withmining corporation Freeport, granting them miningrights over 250,000 acres for thirty years.3

The consultation on whether the West Papua regionwould become an independent country or joinIndonesia took place in 1969 — the so-called ‘Act ofFree Choice’. The New York Agreement establishedthe ‘eligibility of all adults’ and required that the voteshould be carried out ‘in accordance withinternational practice’, which, in turn, explicitlyrequired a ‘one man one vote’ system.4 However,Indonesian military officials selected 1,022representatives, who voted in favour of West Papuabecoming part of Indonesia. Several foreignobservers and Papuans reported that Indonesianforces threatened the chosen representatives andthat Papuans did not want their territory to becomepart of Indonesia. British diplomatic officialsreported that ‘[privately] … we recognise that the

2 . CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN WEST PAPUA

Political and Constitutional Conflict inthe West Papua Region of IndonesiaOverview and Recommendations forthe UK and the International Community

Figure 1: Location of West Papua region of Indonesia

people of West [Papua] have no desire to be ruled bythe Indonesians … that that process of consultationdid not allow a genuinely free choice to be made’,and that the vote was a ‘foregone conclusion’.5

Narasimhan, former UN Under Secretary, laterclaimed that the process was a ‘whitewash’.6 Jack W.Lydman, from the American Embassy, stated thatmembers of the UN mission had privately concededthat 95 per cent of the Papuans were in favour ofindependence.7 Despite this, West Papua has sincebeen part of Indonesia.

Under President Suharto, the Indonesian militaryengaged in extremely violent operations, leavingthousands of civilian victims behind. The Indonesiangovernment pursued a process of so-called‘Indonesianization’, trying to incorporate Papuansinto the Indonesian nation state through theeducation system, the media, economicdevelopment, and transmigration.8 The latterconsisted in the transfer of many Indonesian familiesto West Papua. It led to the displacement and deathsof thousands of Papuans. In 1981 the Indonesianmilitary launched Operation Clean Sweep, whichaimed at forcing Papuans out of their lands andrelocating transmigrants in the area.9 It is estimatedthat between 2,500 and 13,000 people lost their livesduring the operations.10

From the nineties, an increasing number of self-financed migrants also started settling in the region.They moved for economic reasons and mainlyarrived from eastern Indonesia. This led to dramaticchanges in the demographics of the region. It isestimated that migrants now make up around 50 percent of the population in West Papua.11 Migrationhas led to structural discrimination in employment:while indigenous Papuans struggle to find work,migrants can easily find occupations.12

In 2001 the Indonesian government approved theSpecial Autonomy Law for Papua. This has givenPapuans a higher degree of fiscal and administrativeautonomy, and increased the number of Papuans inpositions of leadership. However, military control hasremained tight. The funds are not employed on themost urgent goals, such as education, health, andpublic infrastructure, and the policy has favoured thePapuan elites but not the wider population, leadingto an increased gap between wealthy and indigentPapuans.13

Many thought that the election of Joko Widodo asIndonesian President in 2014 would mark a changein the relationship between Jakarta and West Papua.President Widodo promised to visit Papua regularlyin order to gain an understanding of Papuans’ needs,announced the end of restrictions on the access offoreign media, released five Papuan politicalprisoners,14 and planned several new investments ininfrastructures and development projects.15

However, the promises made on media access havenot been followed by official instructions, andseveral political prisoners remain behind bars.Widodo also initiated a regulation increasing militaryoperations in the West Papua region, and appointedRyamizard Ryacudu as Minister of Defence. The latteris a General of the Indonesian army, responsible forseveral civilian victims in Aceh. He also attractedpublic attention in light of controversial statementson West Papua: when members of the Special Forceskilled Papuan separatist leader Theys Eluay, he calledthe perpetrators ‘Indonesian heroes’ and praisedthem for killing a ‘rebel’.16

Human rights and development

Since West Papua was incorporated into Indonesia,Papuans have been subject to extremely serioushuman rights violations. Underlying the humanrights abuses in West Papua is the fact that theregion is de facto controlled by the Indonesianmilitary. It is estimated that around 15,000 troops arecurrently deployed in the West Papua region.17

The number of Papuans killed by Indonesian securityforces since 1969 is not known, since the restrictionson access of international observers make it difficultto collect evidence on the matter. Estimates arehighly uncertain, but victims may be in the tens orhundreds of thousands. The most commonly cited isthe figure of 100,000 people directly killed since1963.18 The International Coalition for Papuadocumented twenty-two extrajudicial killingsbetween April 2013 and December 2014.19 Morethan four hundred cases of torture were counted inthe region from 1963 to 2010.20 Papuans are oftenarrested for peacefully expressing their opinionabout the political status of West Papua. BetweenApril 2013 and December 2014, the human rightsorganization Papuans Behind Bars reported 881political arrests and 370 cases of ill treatment.21


Police officials accused of human rights abuses inPapua are not subject to adequate civilinvestigations, and violations against Papuans areoften left unpunished.22

Until very recently, foreign journalists needed toobtain approval from eighteen government agenciesin order to enter the region. Applications were oftendenied, delayed, or rejected. In 2015, President JokoWidodo claimed that the government would liftrestrictions on access to foreign journalists. However,the promise has not been followed by officialinstructions, and has been repeatedly contradictedby other Indonesian authorities.23 Indonesia has alsoobstructed the activities of several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in theregion and blocked access to UN representatives,including the UN Special Rapporteur on thepromotion and protection of the right to freedom ofopinion and expression and the RegionalRepresentative of the High Commissioner forRefugees.24

West Papua is extremely rich in natural resources,including forest, oil, gas, copper, and gold. Papuanshave traditionally relied on forests for theirlivelihood. However, the forests are increasinglycoming under threat from mining, logging, andplanting oil palms. The Grasberg mining complex inWest Papua is the world’s largest gold reserve. It isrun and mostly owned by American companyFreeport, while British-Australian multinational RioTinto has a joint venture for a share of production.25

The mine has extremely serious environmentalrepercussions for the surrounding area. A New YorkTimes article in 2005 reported Freeport paid theIndonesian military almost $20 million between1998 and 2004.26 British Petroleum (BP) startedoperations in the West Papua region in 2005, at theTangguh Liquefied Natural Gas project. The companyemploys the services of the Indonesian police force,which has also been accused of perpetrating humanrights violations.27

The West Papua region has the highest poverty ratesand the lowest levels of human development in thecountry. While schools and hospitals are built, healthand education services are extremely ineffective, dueto poor management, lack of accountability, andabsenteeism.28

Political and economic context

West Papua remains of concern to the internationalcommunity. Concerns have resonated most loudly inthe immediate Melanesian region. The UnitedLiberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) wasrecently admitted as an observer to the MelanesiaSpearhead Group (MSG), a regional organization thatfocuses on economic growth, sustainabledevelopment, good governance, and security. InOctober 2015, West Papua’s case was brought to theattention of the United Nations General Assembly bythe prime ministers of the Solomon Islands29 andTonga.30 West Papua is also attracting increasingsupport from civil society in the Pacific area,including PNG, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu,New Caledonia,31 and Australia.

West Papua has also attracted attention on a widerinternational level: for instance, in 2008 politiciansfrom around the world formed the InternationalParliamentarians for West Papua group, to supportself-determination for the West Papua region.32

Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Archbishop DesmondTutu has also repeatedly supported Papua’s case.

Investors have started to question the ethicalimplications of supporting the Indonesiangovernment in West Papua. This situation hasaffected British companies based in the region. In2006 and 2007 the Norwegian government pensionfund divested from Rio Tinto on the basis of theenvironmental damage caused by the Grasbergmine.33 In 2012, the New Zealand SuperannuationFund divested from Freeport. The decision was aresult of reports of human rights violations bysecurity forces around the Grasberg mine, andconcerns over payments to government securityforces.34 In 2013, the Swedish national pension funddivested from Freeport. The Ethical Council, whichadvised the fund, reported that Freeport’s miningoperations in Papua had adverse environmentalimpacts that contravened UN standards.35 BP hasalso suffered reputational costs for its activities inWest Papua.36

Britain has strong economic and political ties withIndonesia. The UK is Indonesia’s fifth largest foreigninvestor. During his visit to Indonesia in 2015, thenPrime Minister David Cameron promised up to £1bnto help finance infrastructure development.37 Duringthe same visit, Cameron also agreed to measures tocounter the terrorist threat posed by ISIS.38 Britainprovides training39 and delivery of military


equipment40 to Indonesian forces, including unitsdeployed in West Papua. At the same time, the UKalso has a comparatively strong channel ofcommunication to the United Liberation Movementfor West Papua, having granted asylum to BennyWenda, current spokesperson for the ULMWP.41 Thisputs the UK in a unique position to take effectiveleadership to resolve the conflict in West Papua, bothfor moral reasons and to protect vital British interestsin the region.

Future scenarios

It is possible to envisage different pathways throughwhich a resolution of the conflict could eventually beachieved. Indonesia’s preferred route is throughSpecial Autonomy legislation. Any significantimprovement to existing Special Autonomyarrangements would require the departure of theIndonesian military, active international mediation,recognition of local parties, and the activeinvolvement of the public in West Papua in thedrafting of a new law.

Another route consists in encouraging dialoguebetween Jakarta, Papuan exiles, and civil societygroups working in West Papua. Initiatives such as thePapuan Peace Network and the Papua Road Maphave attempted to establish Papua as a ‘land ofpeace’.42 However, the parties have divergentopinions about the agenda and aims of the process:for instance, several indigenous Papuans want todiscuss the possibility of calling a referendum, whileJakarta sees dialogue as a route to SpecialAutonomy. Once again, international mediationmight help the parties to make progress in agreeinga common agenda for discussion.

An important element of Papuan grievancesconcerns the 1969 Act of Free Choice, which, ashighlighted in Section 1 of the full-length report onwhich this briefing is based,43 is widely reported notto have been a genuine consultation. Because of this,several Papuans and supporters of the Papuanindependence movement ask for a secondconsultation to take place. A possible scenario is thatPapuan organizations will decide to set up areferendum without Indonesia’s approval. If such asituation were to arise, the international communitywould need to work with both sides from an earlystage in order to secure Indonesian approval for apeaceful and internationally monitored referendum,in order to avoid potentially widespread violence

and loss of life. A key question to be addressed inadvance of any referendum, given the large numberof non-Papuans now living in the region, is thequestion, who should be eligible to vote?

The situation might also move forward through theinvolvement of international institutions. Onepossible path consists in seeking a solution throughthe United Nations, and in particular through theSpecial Committee on Decolonization or through theInternational Court of Justice. The case can also bepursued through international institutions workingon indigenous rights, such as the Permanent Forumon Indigenous Issues.

In the event that a referendum led to theestablishment of an independent Papua, this wouldhave the advantage that the Indonesian military,which has been at the centre of the conflict, wouldno longer be present. An independent Papua wouldface several significant challenges related to ethnicdivisions, administrative capacity, infrastructure, andsecurity, and would require the support of theinternational community in order to overcome thesechallenges.

Recommendations

In light of the findings of this policy briefing, werecommend that the UK consider taking thefollowing actions to facilitate a resolution of theongoing conflict and human rights violations in WestPapua.

British Parliamentarians:

1. Ask parliamentary questions on the issues

outlined in this report, especially concerning

human rights and development

Focusing in particular on killings, torture, freedom ofexpression, police impunity, media and civil societyaccess, discrimination, land and indigenous rights,health, and education (as discussed in Section 2 ofthe full report).

2. Join the All Party Parliamentary Group on West

Papua

The group, chaired by Andrew Smith MP, was re-launched in October 2015. It aims to promoteunderstanding of the situation in West Papua andthe human rights of the Papuan people.



3. Support a resolution in parliament asking for the

UK to play a more active role in the solution of the

conflict in West Papua

The status quo in the West Papua region of Indonesiais not only unsustainable from a moral and politicalperspective, but also continues to threaten stabilityin the Pacific region and poses specific risk to UKinterests. Britain has strong economic and politicalties with Indonesia and is in a unique position toencourage Indonesia to engage in constructivedialogue.

4. Organize a parliamentary delegation to be sent

to the West Papua region

Scrutiny by international representatives is crucial toensure that basic human rights are protected in theregion.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office:

5. Call for free access of media, NGOs, foreign

academics, and foreign observers in West Papua

Indonesian President Joko Widodo has recentlystated that the government would lift restrictions onaccess to foreign journalists. While this is a positivesign, the promise has not been followed by officialinstructions, and statements made on the topic byIndonesian authorities since have been ambiguous.

6. Call for the release of political prisoners

Papuans are regularly arrested for peacefullyexpressing their opinion about the political status ofthe West Papua region. Between April 2013 andDecember 2014, the human rights organizationPapuans Behind Bars reported 881 political arrestsand 370 cases of ill treatment. President Widodorecently granted clemency to five political prisoners,but (as of November 2015) thirty-eight remainbehind bars.

7. Press for visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on

freedom of opinion and expression and the UN

Special Rapporteur on torture

In 2013, then UN Special Rapporteur on thepromotion and protection of the right to freedom ofopinion and expression, Frank La Rue, was deniedaccess to Papua. Given the situation in the region, avisit should be arranged promptly. After a visit toWest Papua in 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on

torture gave worrying reports to the UN HumanRights Council. A follow-up visit should be arrangedto ensure that circumstances have improved.

8. Press for the reinstatement of NGOs in Papua

In 2011, the government forced the Peace BrigadesInternational to end its work in West Papua, byrefusing its volunteers the permit to travel in ruralareas.44 In recent years, Amnesty International andHuman Rights Watch have also been routinelydenied visas.45 In 2010, the authorities banned theNGO Cordaid, on the basis that it had supportedPapuan activists. In 2009, the authorities ordered theInternational Committee of the Red Cross to shutdown its offices in Jayapura.46 Non-governmentalorganizations provide important support to theregion and should be allowed to operate there.

9. Support the development of Papuan

administrators and the Papuan exile community

The development of competent administrators inWest Papua is essential to ensure that West Papuacan deal with the pressing problems it faces,including the lack of basic infrastructure andminimal welfare services. Support could be providedthrough training and by sharing expertise with theprovincial and local governments in the West Papuaregion, as well as by establishing scholarships to giveyoung Papuans the opportunity to gain the skillsneeded to effectively administer the region. Inaddition, support for the development of the exilecommunity will facilitate constructive dialoguebetween the parties and governance capacity.

10. Help British companies working in the West

Papua region to implement security strategies that

are not complicit in human rights violations taking

place in the region

The British Embassy has already played a role indefining BP’s security strategy in the West Papuaregion. It should use its influence to ensure Britishbusinesses avoid giving any support to Indonesianpolice or military forces, which are complicit inhuman rights violations.

11. Halt all training and delivery of military

equipment to Indonesian military and police forces

until reliable mechanisms are put in place to verify

their adherence to human rights standards; if in

the future training does take place, include

rigorous human rights training in the programmes

INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO WATER SECURITY . 7


Evidence shows British arms have been employed inWest Papua. Despite evidence of human rightsviolations perpetrated by the Indonesian army in theregion, the government continues to sell arms to theIndonesian government. Britain has also beeninvolved in the training of two Indonesian counter-terrorism units: Kopassus and Detachment 88. Theformer is an elite unit of the Indonesian military, thelatter of the national police. Both forces have beenemployed in the West Papua region and areresponsible for serious human rights violations in thearea.

12. Convene a meeting with NGOs and advocacy

groups to discuss what the government can do to

facilitate a resolution to the situation in West

Papua

It is essential to bring together different stakeholdersto engage in an ongoing and informed conversationabout how to most effectively improve the situationin the West Papua region.

13. Support rigorous academic research on the

current situation in West Papua and possible

pathways to a resolution of the conflict

There remain many significant unknowns about thepolitical and social situation in West Papua,especially concerning the status of the non-Papuanpopulation in the region, different ways in which thesituation can be improved, and the lessons that canbe learned from similar international cases.

14. Encourage key Indonesian political and

economic actors to engage in an open discussion

on the situation in West Papua

It is essential to engage with Indonesian industry,ministries, parliamentarians, and advisors to thePresident to press them to address the Papuan issueand to encourage discussion on the situation in WestPapua both internally and with Papuan advocacygroups.

Notes

1 The area was split into two provinces called ‘Papua’ and ‘West Papua’ in 2003. Before then, the Indonesian government referred to it as Irian Jaya.2 Robinson, Jennifer. ‘Self-Determination and the Limits of Justice: West Papua and East Timor’, Future Justice (2010),

http://www.futureleaders.com.au/book_chapters/pdf/Future_Justice/Jennifer_Robinson.pdf. Last accessed 5 July 2016. All future URLsaccessed this date.

3 Abrash, Abigail. Development Aggression: Observations on Human Rights Conditions in the PT Freeport Indonesia Contract of Work Areas, WithRecommendations 9-10 (July 2002), Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights.

4 1960 UN Resolution 1541, Principle IX of the annex.5 British Embassy to D. le Breton, ‘West Irian’, 17 March 1969, FCO 24/447; Robinson, Jennifer. ‘Self-determination and the Limits of Justice: West

Papua and East Timor’. 6 Robinson, Jennifer. ‘The UN’s chequered record in West Papua’, Al Jazeera, 21 March 2012,

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201232172539145809.html.7 Summary of Jack W. Lydman’s report, 18 July 1969 in NAA. Extracts given to author by Anthony Balmain, From Saltford, John. The United Nations

and the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: the anatomy of betrayal. Routledge, 2003. 8 Gietzelt, Dale. ‘The Indonesianization of West Papua’, Oceania 59.3 (1989): 201–21.9 Human Rights Watch, Out of Sight: Endemic Abuse and Impunity in Papua’s Central Highlands (2007), https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/07/04/out-

sight/endemic-abuse-and-impunity-papuas-central-highlands. 10 The lower estimate was provided by the Papua New Guinea government, while the higher estimate was given by Dutch journalists. Osborne,

Robin. Indonesia’s Secret War (Crow’s Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 87–8.11 Elmslie, Jim. ‘West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: “Slow Motion Genocide” Or Not?’ Centre for Peace and

Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, 2010.12 Wing, John Robert, and Peter King. Genocide in West Papua? The role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan

people (Sydney: Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, 2005).13 Widjojo, Muridan Satrio. Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present, and Securing the Future (Kerja sama LIPI, Yayasan Tifa, dan

Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2009).14 International Coalition for West Papua, Human Rights in West Papua 2015,

http://www.humanrightspapua.org/images/docs/HumanRightsPapua2015-ICP.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Something to Hide? Indonesia’sRestrictions on Media Freedom and Rights Monitoring in Papua (2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/10/something-hide/indonesias-restrictions-media-freedom-and-rights-monitoring-papua.

15 Hill, Stephen, ‘Papuans and Jokowi are hostage to Indonesian politics’, The Conversation, 1 June 2015, https://theconversation.com/papuans-and-jokowi-are-hostage-to-indonesian-politics-42251.

16 International Coalition for West Papua, Human Rights in West Papua 2015. 17 Elmslie, Jim, Camellia Webb-Gannon, and Peter King. ‘Anatomy of an Occupation: The Indonesian Military in West Papua’, August 2011, Centre for

Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, https://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/Anatomy_for_print.pdf. 18 Smith, Claire Q. ‘Two similar civil wars; two different endings’. How Mass Atrocities End: Studies from Guatemala, Burundi, Indonesia, the Sudans,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 83. See, for example, Wing and King. Genocide in West Papua?19 International Coalition for West Papua, Human Rights in West Papua 2015.20 Hernawan, Budi. ‘Torture in Papua: A Spectacle of Dialectics of the Abject and the Sovereign’, in Peter King, Jim Elmslie, and Camellia Webb-

Gannon (eds), Comprehending West Papua (Sydney: Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, 2011), pp. 339–57. 21 International Coalition for West Papua, Human Rights in West Papua 2015. 22 Amnesty International, Papua Digest, 25 April 2013, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/resources/papua-campaign-digest#.Vs3MifmLTIU.23 Human Rights Watch, Something to Hide?24 Human Rights Watch, Something to Hide?, p. 1. 25 ‘Rio Tinto improves policies based on dialogue with GES and investor’, GES newsletter, 12 April 2013, http://www.ges-invest.com/press-

room/news-events/2013/rio-tinto-improves-policies-based-on-dialogue-with-ges-and-investors/. 26 Perlez, Jane and Raymond Bonner. ‘Below a Mountain of Wealth a River of Waste’, The New York Times, 27 December 2005,

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/27/world/asia/below-a-mountain-of-wealth-a-river-of-waste.html. 27 Kirksey, Eben and Jack Grimston, ‘Indonesian Troops for BP Gas Project’, The Sunday Times, 20 July 2003,

http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article223564.ece.28 International Coalition for West Papua, Human Rights in West Papua 2015.29 Solomon Star, ‘Sogavare urges UN to address West Papua’, 4 October 2015, http://www.solomonstarnews.com/news/national/8589-sogavare-

urges-un-to-address-west-papua.30 Civil Society Forum of Tonga, ‘Tonga Prime Minister, Hon. Samiuela ‘Akilisi Pohiva Speech at United Nation’, n.d., http://www.csft.to/?p=1157. 31 Tebay, Neles. ‘Addressing the Papua Issue in the Pacific’, The Jakarta Post, 5 March 2015,

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/05/addressing-papua-issue-pacific.html#sthash.WJdgdpFw.dpuf. 32 International Parliamentarians for West Papua, http://ipwp.org/background/. 33 Taylor, N.A.J. ‘Mining Companies Funded Indonesian Abuses’, Al Jazeera, 19 October 2011,

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011828142858857222.html. 34 NZ Super Fund, ‘New Zealand Superannuation Fund Excludes Four Companies on Responsible Investment Grounds’, 26 September 2012,

https://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/news-media/new-zealand-superannuation-fund-excludes-four-companies-responsible-investment-grounds. 35 Denton, Jenny. ‘Swedish Pension Funds Divest Freeport McMoRan Holdings’, Environment News Service, 18 October 2013, http://ens-

newswire.com/2013/10/18/swedish-pension-funds-divest-freeport-mcmoran-holdings/. 36 Aglionby, John. ‘300 Protesters Remind BP of Indonesia Pledge’, The Guardian, 9 December 2004,

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/dec/09/indonesia.oilandpetrol. 37 Reuters, ‘British Prime Minister David Cameron Starts Asia Trip with Big Loan Offer to Indonesia’, ABC News, 27 July 2015,

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-28/british-pm-starts-asia-trip-with-big-loan-offer-to-indonesia/6652342. 38 BBC News, ‘David Cameron: Measures to Counter IS Agreed with Indonesia’, 27 July 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33670367. 39 TAPOL, ‘UK training of Kopassus: letter to the Foreign Office’, 29 June 2009, http://tapol.org/briefings/uk-training-kopassus/; TAPOL, ‘Britain and

Indonesia: Too close for comfort?’, 30 October 2012, http://tapol.org/press-statements/britain-and-indonesia-too-close-comfort; Baroness Warsiin response to a House of Lords debate, 24 July 2013, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/130724-gc0001.htm;Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, ‘United Kingdom Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) and United Kingdom GovernmentFunded Police Training Courses’, 20 December 2012, http://www.jclec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=270&Itemid=2.

40 TAPOL, ‘UK Defends Indonesia Arms Sales as Military Run Riot in Papua’, 8 June 2012, http://tapol.org/news-and-reports/press-statements/uk-defends-indonesia-arms-sales-military-run-riot-papua.

41 Shaw, Danny. ‘UK West Papuan Tribal Leader Removed from Interpol List’, BBC News, 6 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19149678. 42 The Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future, Jakarta, 2008,

https://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/PAPUA_ROAD_MAP_Short_Eng.pdf. 43 See http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/ierg/westpapua/assessmentreport.pdf.44 Human Rights Watch, Something to Hide?45 Harvey, Gemima. ‘The Price Of Protest In West Papua’, Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity 3.1 (2015).46 Human Rights Watch, Something to Hide?


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