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Copyright remains with the authors.GIGA Research Unit: Institute of Middle East Studies___________________________Political Change in the Middle East:An Atempt to Analyze the Arab SpringMartin Beck and Simone HserNo 203August 2012Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2145853203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapersGIGAWorkingPapers 203/2012EditedbytheGIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudies LeibnizInstitutfrGlobaleundRegionaleStudienThe GIGA Working Papers series serves to disseminate the research results of work inprogress prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academicdebate.An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentationsarelessthanfullypolished.InclusionofapaperintheGIGAWorkingPapersseriesdoesnotconstitutepublicationandshouldnotlimitpublicationinanyothervenue.Copyrightremainswiththeauthors.Whenworkingpapersareeventuallyacceptedbyorpublishedinajournalorbook,thecorrectcitationreferenceand,ifpossible,thecorrespondinglinkwillthenbeincludedontheGIGAWorkingPaperswebsiteat.GIGAresearchunitresponsibleforthisissue:InstituteofMiddleEastStudies Copyrightforthisissue:MartinBeckandSimoneHserWPCoordinationandEnglishlanguageCopyEditing:MelissaNelsonEditorialAssistanceandProduction:SilviaBckeAllGIGAWorkingPapersareavailableonlineandfreeofchargeonthewebsite.Foranyrequestspleasecontact:Email:The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies cannot be held responsible forerrorsoranyconsequencesarisingfromtheuseofinformationcontainedinthisWorkingPaper;theviewsandopinionsexpressedaresolelythoseoftheauthororauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheInstitute.GIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudiesLeibnizInstitutfrGlobaleundRegionaleStudienNeuerJungfernstieg2120354HamburgGermanyEmail:Website:GIGAWorkingPapers 203/2012PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringAbstractThis article deals with theArab Spring as a process of deep political change in theArabworld, previously the only major world area where authoritarianism persisted unchallenged for decades. While in various countries of the Arab world mass protests in 2011forced rulers to resign, other authoritarian regimes have despite political and economicpressuresofarbeenabletoremaininpower,orhaveevenbeenonlyinsignificantlyaffected.Thispaperappliescentralsocialscienceapproachesinordertoanalyzerecentdevelopmentsintheregionamajortaskoftheoreticallyorientedsocialsciencesinthecoming years. In addition to providing an overview of the existing literature on the ArabSpring, the article examines the empirical results of political diversification in the Arabworld. A twobytwo matrix of political rule that differentiates according to the type ofrule and the degree of stability is presented and discussed. Although the analysis drawsheavilyonrenttheory,italsoappliesfindingsfromtransitiontheoryandrevolutiontheorytoilluminatethecurrentpoliticaldynamicsintheMiddleEast.Keywords:ArabSpring,MiddleEast,renttheory,revolutiontheory,transitiontheory,democratization,authoritarianism,politicalandeconomicliberalizationProf.Dr.MartinBeckholdsachairofcontemporarymiddleeaststudiesattheUniversityofSouthern DenmarkinOdense.From2004to2012hewasaseniorresearchfellowattheGIGAInstituteofMiddle East Studies in Hamburg, where he is now an associate research fellow. He has published extensively on Middle Eastern affairs and has taught, researched, and worked as apolitical advisor in Germany (Tbingen, Hamburg and Bremen), the Middle East (Palestine,Jordan,LebanonandIraq),andtheUS(Denver,Colorado).Contact: ,Website: SimoneHser,M.A.hasbeenaresearchfellowandprojectofficerattheKonradAdenauerStiftunginAmmansince August 2011. She holds a B.A. in political science from the University of Bremen,GermanyandgraduatedwithamastersdegreeininternationalsecurityfromtheUniversityofKent,UnitedKingdom,in2011.Contact: ,WP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringMartinBeckandSimoneHserArticleOutline1 Introduction2 ExplanationsfortheArabSpring3 PoliticalDiversificationoftheArabWorldCausedbytheArabSpring4. Conclusion1 IntroductionIndependentlyofitsoutcome,theArabSpring1canberegardedasaneventofglobalhistoricalsignificance.2Fromitsonsetinearly2011,ithasbeenunderstoodasaprocessofpoliticalchange in the Middle East.3 The Arab world was the only major area where authoritarianrulecouldbeestablishedregionwideinthetwentiethcentury,andwhereregimesmanaged 1 Fromapolicyperspective,theuseofthetermrevolutioncouldbeuseful,asitunderlinestheambitionofradicallyturningawayfromArabauthoritarianism.Fromananalyticalpointofview,however,thetermshouldbeavoidedbecausethetheoryladenconceptofrevolutionreferstolongprocessesofprofoundpoliticalandsocialchange.Therehaveonlybeenafewsuccessfulrevolutionsinworldhistory,andatthepresenttimeitcannotbedeterminedwhethertheArabSpringhasactuallyinitiatedrevolutions(see Skocpol1979).Inthefollowing,thetermArabSpringisusedforpragmaticreasons:ithasbecomecommon,andthesearchforatheoreticallymoresophisticatedconceptismeaninglessconsideringthefactthatthesubjectisstillverymuchinflux.2 TheauthorsaregratefultoMarkusAlbertMaierand,particularly,WarrenAltounianaswellasMelissaNelsonfortheirtremendoussupportineditingthepresentarticle.3 In this paper, the term Middle East is used as a synonym for Middle East and NorthAfrica, and Arabworldthatis,stateswithapredominantlyArabpopulation.MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 5GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 to defy global trends beyond the threshold of the twentyfirst century. But in Tunisia andEgyptin2011,internalmassprotestsforcedtheleadershiptoresignwithinweeks.Inspiredby these successes, popular movements throughout the Middle East were bolstered. Theydemanded substantial political reform and, in some cases, regime change.After decades ofauthoritarianruleand politicalstagnation,popularmovementswerefinallyable todestabilizeoroverthrowanumberofauthoritarianregimesintheArabworld.Inthecomingyears,oneofthemaintasksoftheoreticallyorientedsocialscienceswillbetocriticallyfollowandexplaintheArabSpring.Forthispurpose,suchstudiescandrawonawiderfoundationofsocialsciencethanonemightinitiallythink.ThefallofZineelAbidineBenAli, Hosni Mubarak, and other regime leaders was not predicted by social science, unlessthenotoriouslyvagueconclusionsofacademicarticleswhichstatethatduetotheunsustainabledevelopmentoftheArabsystems,changeisinevitableareacceptedasaprognosis. Yet, at the same time, it should be taken into account that making predictions aboutthe nature and timing of social structural change is difficult for objective reasons. The researchsubjectsofthesocialscienceshave,incontrasttothoseofchemistryorphysics,intentionsandchoiceswhoseoccurrenceandeffectsaredifficulttoidentify.Theprimaryroleofthesocialsciencesistoexplaineventsandstructures.Thus,untiltheArab Spring, the task of social scientists was indeed to analyze the causal and intentionalbackgroundofauthoritarianstructuressustainabilityintheMiddleEast.Atthesametime,itcan hardly be ignored that the potential of nonIslamist civic movements in the region wasunderestimatedbysocialscientists.Moreover,itmustbementionedthatinreactiontothedeviant role of theArab world some deterministic approaches and models were establishedthatneglectedorevenignoredtheideathatactorsintheMiddleEasthavechoices.Itwould,however,meanthrowingthebabyoutwiththebathwaterifbecauseoftheapparent failure of deterministic approaches it were concluded that, in general, social scientificapproacheshavenovalueintheanalysisoftheArabSpring.Reliablesocialscienceresearch,includinghumanitiesworkanalyzingtheMiddleEastbeforetheArabSpring,worksonthebasisoftheceterisparibusclause:Statementsthatspecificeventsandstructuresdevelopcertain effects are made with the restriction that it applies only if other things are equal. Thestatementsmokingkillsisnotfalsejustbecausemanysmokersdonotdiefromtheimmediate consequences of smoking, or even because nonsmokers also die. The same applies tosocialscientificapproachestotheMiddleEasttheyarenotinvalidjustbecausetheydidnotanticipatetheArabSpring.Theaimofthispaperistooutlinemethodsthatusecentralsocialscientificapproachestoanalyze theArab Spring. Thus, the paper attempts to contribute to the explanation and descriptionofpoliticalchangeintheMiddleEastwithreferencetorelevantsocialsciencetheories.Asthesubjectoftheessayisverymuchinflux,itmustbeconcededthatthepresentarticlehasastrongexploratorycharacter.6 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers Theempiricalstartingpointsoftheanalysisarethefollowingobservations:First,severalindicators suggest thattheArab Spring is a regional phenomenon.Inmany Middle Easterncountries,ithaschallengedthepoliticalpowerofthecurrentregimesinonewayoranother;it has also dominated the domestic political debate in countries where theArab Spring hasnot gained traction.4 Second, a brief glance at the changes in the political map of the Arabworldmakesitclearthatpoliticaldiversityintheregionhasincreasedsignificantly.UntiltheArabSpring,differencesbetweentheMiddleEasternpoliticalsystemscouldpredominantlybefoundinthedegreeoftheirauthoritariancharacter.Butnowtherearetwocharacteristicsby which they differ substantially: authoritarian systems versus systems in transition, andstablesystemsversusunstablesystems.In Section 2 of the present article, an overview of the existing explanatory literature fortheArabSpringisprovided.InSection3thecoreofthearticletheempiricalresultsofthepoliticaldiversificationoftheArabworldareexaminedingreaterdetail.Theempiricalanalysisisbasedonrenttheory,ortherentierstateapproach.Additionally,findingsfromtransitiontheoryandrevolutiontheoryareappliedtoilluminatethepoliticaldynamicsintheArabworldsparkedbytheArabSpring.Thepaperconcludeswithasummaryandoutlook.2 ExplanationsfortheArabSpring2.1 DemographicChangeAfirstapproachtotheArabSpringarguesthatchangewasinevitablebecauseofthecriticalsocioeconomic development in the authoritarian states of the Middle East. According toVolker Perthes (2011: 24), the most important trigger for this change was the demographicdevelopmentoftheArabworld.From1970to2010,thepopulationnearlytripled,goingfrom128 million to 359 million inhabitants (Hegasy 2011: 41). An estimated 41 percent of thesepeoplelivebelowthepovertyline(UNDP2009:22),andnearly30percentofthepopulationisbetweentheagesof20and35(Perthes2011:30).Althoughthecurrentgenerationisbettereducated and qualified than the previous one due to a strengthened education sector andincreased networking through digital technology many are unable to find employment(ibid.:3031).Theunemploymentrateforthepopulationcohortbetweentheagesof15and24was25.6percentin2003,thehighestintheworld(ILO2004:1,8;UNDP2009:20).Additionally, the labor market offers limited opportunities for university graduates (Perthes2011:31). The consequent lack of prospects, rising costs of living, and anger over obviouslycorruptandrepressiverulerscompelledthisgenerationriseupagainsttheauthoritarianregimes(ibid.:3035). 4 LebanonconstitutesasignificantexceptioninsofarasthedebateontheArabSpringhasbeen,especiallywithregardtoSyria,ofaforeignandregionalpoliticalnature,whiletheissueofdomesticreformshasbeenofsecondaryimportance.MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 7GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 2.2 SocialMediaAnother view, held especially by Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain (2011), attributestheoutbreakoftheArabSpringtotheaccesstodigitalmedia,includingsocialmediasuchasFacebook,Twitter,YouTube,andtextmessages.Advocatesofthisapproachmakeclearthatthe dissent between regimes and populations already existed long before the spread of theInternet. However, virtual communication gave people an instrument that made it possiblefor them to share their resentment with likeminded people and to organize movementsagainstauthoritarianrulers(ibid.:3637,41).Evenbeforetheoutbreakoftheriots,thestrongestcriticismcamefrompoliticalbloggers:investigativejournalismintheMiddleEasthaslongbeenthedomainofprivateactors(ibid.:36, 42). TheInternet showed videos which presented the corrupt rulers luxurious standardof living, thereby substantiating the once abstract criticism of the regimes (ibid.: 36). Furthermore, digital media displayed the freedom and prosperity of people in the West andelsewhereintheworld.EverydaymorepeopleintheArabworldwereexposedtotherestofthe world through international online news or the use ofprograms like Skype to talk withfriends or relatives living abroad (see Howard and Hussain 2011: 36, 42). The increasinglymultilayered access to media gave people the opportunity to question political norms andvaluesoftenleadingtoademocraticorientation. AfterMohammadBouazizislegendaryselfimmolation,peoplecommunicatedthroughout Tunisia in various online forums, expressing their solidarity as well as their dissatisfactionwiththepoliticalsituationinthecountry.Socialmediaofferedaspaceforsolidaritythatwas ultimately transferred from the virtual world to the real one and manifested in massprotestsagainsttheauthoritarianregime(ibid.:3638).MessagesandpostsonFacebookandTwitter or simple text messages immediately informed protestors about the next step of actionandthelocationwhereitwouldtakeplace.Withinafewweeks,guidedinstructionsfororganizingsuccessfulprotestswerecirculatedontheInternet(ibid.:3840).Authenticvideosand pictures taken by protesters with cameras on mobile phones inspired citizens of otherArab states to organize protests some of which were the largest in decades (ibid.: 38, 43).Abroad,socialmediaplatformswereusedaschannelstosupportprotestors,toexpresssolidarity, and to encourage people in their chosen path; for instance, external supporters programmedsoftwarethatenabledactiviststocircumventgovernmentfirewalls(ibid.:37,44).2.3 Karama!As diverse as the uprisings in the Arab countries may have been, all protests were directlylinked to the demands for human dignity (karama), freedom, and social justice (Asseburg2011a:3;Perthes2011:3334).ThefirstmajormassprotestinEgypton25January2011broughtthousandsofpeopletoTahrirSquareinCairocarryingthewordsbread,freedomandhumandignity(HRW2012).Withsloganslikethese,peoplecalledforjuststructuresthatdidnotcon8 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers strainthemfromaccesstojobsbecausetheydidntbelongtoaparticularfamily;politicalandeconomicsystemsnotpermeatedbyomnipresentcorruption;andastatethatwouldnotforcethemtoacceptapoorsocialandeconomicsituation(West2011:16).Thus,theassumptionheldby many in the West that the culture and religion, or the mentality, of people in theArabworld,areincompatiblewithdemocraticvaluescanberefuted(Beck2011b).2.4 EconomicLiberalizationwithoutPoliticalReformsFromapoliticaleconomicpointofview,theArabSpringwascausedbyafundamentalcrisisoftheauthoritariansocialcontract.ThecontracthadregulatedrelationsbetweenthepeopleoftheArabworldandthepowersystemsfordecades(Harders2011).Thisauthoritarianbargainimplicitly promised the population a minimum of subsidies. In exchange, people preservedsome degree of political loyalty to the regime. If this minimum economic safety net guaranteedbythestatewerenolongermaintained,theregimewouldsufferfromadeficitoflegitimacyandtheauthoritarianbargainwouldcollapse(Desaietal.2011).However,thetimingofthe Arab Spring still cannot be explained, as the crises that led to the failure of the MiddleEasternauthoritarianbargainin2011hadexistedforyears,ifnotdecades(Beck2010).Oneresultoftheregionaloilboominthe1970swastheestablishmentoftherentbasedsystemofpetrolismintheMiddleEast.Rentsareincomeswhicharenotbalancedbylaborandcapital,andarethusatthefreedisposaloftherecipients.Inthe1970s,notonlydidtheincomes generated by rents of the oilproducing states in the Middle East escalate, but,through politically motivated transfers from the Arab oil states to the oilpoor countries oftheregion,politicalrentierstatesalsoemerged(Beck2009).Becauseoffallingoilprices,thesystemofpetrolismfellintocrisisduringthelasttwodecadesofthetwentiethcentury.Theregimes of the Middle East reacted with a relatively complex, but unsustainable, attempt atcrisis management, adopting limited economic reforms mostly aimed at enforcing foreigntrade(Frtig2007;Richter2011).Atdifferentstagesmostcountriesinitiatedpoliticalliberalization,butthenwithdrewfromitindeliberalizationphases(Kienle2001).Thestructuraldependence on rents, however, was not overcome. Two of the rentier systems typical defectsappeared(althoughthisstilldoesnotexplaintheexacttimingoftheArabSpring):First,thedistributionorientedstrategyoftherentiercountryeventuallymeetsitslimits.Theproductive sectors are neglected and government spending expands (especially with high population growth), while chances to generate compensating income through taxes are limited dueto the neglected productive potential. Second, the primacy of the distributional policy is intendedtodepoliticizesociety.Therefore,thedevelopmentofpoliticalinstitutionsisneglectedin rentier states.Again, this cannot explain the outbreak of theArab Spring, but it makes itplausiblethatoncetheregimesintheMiddleEastwereconfrontedwithapowerfuloppositionmovement,theydidnothavetheappropriatemeanstodrivethosemovementsonsystemcompatiblepaths(Beck2009,2011a).MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 9GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 3 PoliticalDiversificationoftheArabWorldCausedbytheArabSpring3.1 TheNewArabMatrixofRuleTheArab Spring disrupted the high degree of homogeneity among stable authoritarian regimesintheMiddleEast.Thismeans,first,thattherearesomecountrieswhereauthoritarianstructures have been shaken to the point that one can speak of transition states. A centralfinding of transition theory is that transition has to be seen as an open process (Carothers2002).WhilemosttransitionprocessesafterthecollapseofthetotalitarianregimesinEuropewere affected by the global spirit of democracy (Mahatma Gandhi), they did not alwaysresult in the establishment of democratic systems. Rather, in many cases hybrid systems ornewtypesofauthoritariansystemsdeveloped.RegionalexamplesfromtheMiddleEastaretheauthoritarianIslamicRepublicofIran,whichemergedfromthe1979revolution,andthepoliticalsystemofTurkey,whichdevelopedafterthefailureofKemalismin1950andwentthroughaprocessofdemocratizationoverdecades(Diamond2002:31).Second,certainlynotallauthoritarianregimesintheArabworldhavebeendisruptedbythe Arab Spring. Although no country has escaped the regional debate about the ArabSpring,therulinghousesofsomeregimesespeciallyintheGulfstateshavesofarknownhowtokeepthefoundationsoftheirauthoritarianruleintact.Third, there are strong indications that two regime types have been created which havemore than shortterm potential. On the one hand, not all protest movements in the Arabworld have succeeded in forcing the ruling regime into transformation by peaceful means.Someregimesstillcontrolatleasttemporarilytheleversofpowerwiththehelpoftheirrepressive apparatuses, yet they have been unable to force the newly formed oppositionmovementstotheirknees.AprimeexampleisSyria.Ontheotherhand,transitioncountriescandiffer,asthetransitionprocesscanberegardedas stable or unstable. It should be noted that transition processes are sui generis dynamic,and only in exceptional cases come to pass without retarding moments and setbacks. Althoughitmaybecontroversialinaparticularcase,itisstillpossibletodistinguishsystematicallybetweentransitionsshowingatrendawayfromauthoritarianismtowardanewsystemandcaseswheretheoldsystemisstrongenoughtoreintroduceauthoritarianism.Itmayalsobe possible that newly emerged political players favor an authoritarian regime. The consequences of the latter could lead to the perpetuation of the old regime, to an authoritarianpactbetweenoldandnewauthoritarianelites,ortothetakeoverofstatepowerbynewauthoritarianelites.TheresultisanewtwobytwomatrixofpoliticalruleintheMiddleEast(Table1)generated by theArab Spring. SaudiArabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt come close to ideal types,althoughtovaryingdegrees.10 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers Table1:MatrixofPoliticalRuleintheMiddleEastTypeofRuleDegreeofStabilityAuthoritarianRegime TransitionStateConsolidated/stable SaudiArabia TunisiaNotconsolidated/unstable Syria EgyptSource:Authorscompilation.3.2 FourTypesofPoliticalRule3.2.1 StableAuthoritarianSystems:TheCaseofSaudiArabiaOf those states in the Middle East which fall under the category of stable authoritarian, theKingdomofSaudiArabiaisregionallyandgloballythemostimportantregime.Todate,theSaudi regime has succeeded in keeping its authoritarian rule stable without implementingsubstantialliberalizationmeasures.WhentheArabSpringbegan,variousobserversexpectedcertain change in Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2011: 48). This view appeared plausible, as SaudiArabiashowssimilargrievancestothoseArabsystemsthatfacedmassiveprotests:highunemployment, especially among the young; extreme corruption; political repression; and awidesocialgapbetweentheestablishmentandtheyoungpopulation(ibid.).Occasionalprotestsoccurredatthebeginningof2011,particularlyintheShiiteeastofthecountry(Freitag2011:23).Buttheregimesucceededinusingitsextensivematerialresourcestostabilizethecountry(Lacroix2011:53).Therevenuesfromtheoilsectorallowedthemonarchytomaintainapolicyofsticksandcarrots:concessionshelpedtodepoliticizestrategicsectorsofsociety,andatthesametime,rentswereusedtofinanceanallencompassingsecurity and intelligence directorate (see Lacroix 2011: 53). When civil unrest occurred in otherArabstates,thegovernmentimposedanationwidebanondemonstrationsandincreasedthecontingent of security forces. KingAbdullah also announced a subsidy program of 130 billionUSD(Steinberg2011).Furthermore,theroyalfamilyreceivedsupportfromtheinfluential Council of Senior Islamic Scholars (Haiat Kibar alUlama), which said that demonstrationsarenotcompatiblewithIslamandthereforedeclaredabanonproteststobereligiouslylawful(ibid.).3.2.2 UnstableAuthoritarianSystems:TheCaseofSyriaAlthough the Syrian opposition had already expressed its discontent with the authoritariansysteminthepast(forexample,theDamascusDeclarationin2005),theregimeledbyBashar alAssad had succeeded on previous occasions at stifling major protests and maintainingitsstability.InthewakeoftheArabSpring,therewasmassivemobilizationbytheopposition,whichtheregimetriedunsuccessfullytocontainthroughcosmeticreforms andmasMartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 11GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 sive repression.At the same time, however, the regime was able to control the state institutions.Thus,acivilwarlikestandoffhasresulted.Atthetimeofthewriting,itisnotpredictable how long this situation will last, if theAssad regime will maintain stable authoritarianrule,oriftheconflictwillleadtoregimecollapseandaprogressivepoliticaltransformationinSyria(BeckandHser2011).3.2.3 StableSystemsofTransition:TheCaseofTunisiaWithinonemonth,protestorsinTunisiaoverthrewadecadesoldauthoritarianregime.After23 years as president, BenAli was forced to resign in late January 2011. Subsequent developments created a promising political atmosphere for the ConstituentAssembly election inOctober 2011, and the newly elected assembly was tasked with drafting a new constitutionand appointing a new government.Apart from protests in February 2011, which called forthedismissalofBenAlissupportersingovernmentpositions,therehavebeennodestabilizingdemonstrationsorpolicesuppression(SchraederandRedissi2011:1,1417).Comparedto other countries in the region, Tunisia has good prerequisites for democratization (AsseburgandWerenfels2011:8);thusitcanbeconsideredastabletransformationcountry.3.2.4 UnstableTransitionSystems:TheCaseofEgyptSimilarly to Tunisia, Egypt has been in transition since the resignation of President HosniMubarakinFebruary2011.Egyptstransition,however,appearstobelessconsolidatedthanthatofTunisia.Sincethefallof2011,thecountryhasbeenshakenbymassiveriots,andthestatesreactionshaveledtosubstantialpoliticalandeconomicinstability.Theriotshavebeenprimarily directed against the transitional military government, which has delayed orblockedthetransitionofpowertoaciviliangovernment.Themilitaryindustrialcomplex(Davis2011b)hassteadilyexpandeditspoliticalandeconomicroleeversinceitsemergencein 1954. This suggests that despite the resignation of Mubarak, the regimes forces are stillstrong.ManyobserversstatethatthecrucialfactorblockingademocratictransformationispresentlynotthestrengthofIslamistgroupsbutthemilitarysinterference(Davis2011b,c).But there are also other assessments: In the postMubarak parliamentary elections, Islamistpartieswontwothirdsoftheseats,stokingfearsofanundemocraticIslamizationofthepolitical system. The rising popularity of Salafism, and the possibility of a coalition betweenSalafistsandtheMuslimBrotherhood,isperceivedasthreatening(Ashour2012). 3.3 AnAttemptatExplanation:ReasonsfortheDiversification3.3.1 TheoreticalFrameworkThematrixofpoliticalruleoutlinedaboveinitiallyseemstohaveastaticcharacter.Inothercontexts such matrices are used to sharply delineate various types of political rule. Such a12 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers procedurewould,however,notmatchthedynamiccharacteroftheArabSpring.Inthefollowing it will become clear that the matrix can analytically reproduce these dynamics, butonlyifthepremiseisnotedthatthematrixalthoughitreflectssystematicallyclearseparationsdoesnotconsistentlyproduceempiricallyunambiguousclassificationswithregardtotheArabSpring.Bearingthisinmind,thematrixiscapableofenrichingtheanalysisbycapturingthedynamiccharacterofpoliticalchangeintheArabSpring.InthefollowingoutlineofthenewmatrixofpoliticalruleintheMiddleEast,threetheoreticalapproachesareharnessed.Themostimportantoneappearstobetheaforementionedrentier state approach, which was introduced by Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani(1987).Twoothertheoreticalapproachesfromsocialscienceresearchthatshouldbeappliedaretransitiontheoryandrevolutiontheory.Portugals Carnation Revolution in 1974 started the third wave of democratization(Huntington 1991).As aresult, theories of political system change, especially approachestotransition theory, became popular: What causes the collapse of authoritarian regimes thatappearedtobestablefordecades?Whichactorsplayaroleinthetransitionprocesses(Lauthand Wagner 2009: 126127)? Major attention is directed to the quality and efficiency of theemergingpoliticalsystems(Carothers2002:6;LauthandWagner2009:126).Throughoutthehistory of the research, some of the main assumptions of the early approach to transitionhavebeenquestioned,particularlytheteleologicalperspectiveaccordingtowhichdemocratization more or less inevitably leads to the establishment of consolidated democracies(Carothers 2002: 68, 14). In addition, concepts that allow for an analytical view of the reauthoritarization of the political system or the development of hybrid regime types havebeendeveloped(Carothers2002:10;Merkel2004).A key finding of the revolution research is that revolutionary movements can only succeedwhentherulingregimebecomessubstantiallyweakenedbothexternallyandinternally(Skocpol 1979). There are many more cases of broken and failed revolutions in history thansuccessfulones.Eveninsituationsofseverecrisis,rulingregimeshaveopportunitiestocomeoutontopbecausetheyhaveorganizationalcapacitiessuperiortothoseoftheirchallengers.Theseincludemilitaryandcivilianinstitutionsthroughwhichtheycanenactrepressionandgarnerlegitimacy,respectively.Butevenifrevolutionsaresuccessful,theirinitialorganizersare often not those who arise out of them as the victors. Rather, those groups that were excludedfrompoliticalpowerintheancienrgime,whichcanrelyonasuperiororganizationalcapacitytothatoftherevolutionsinitiators,haveagoodchanceofsucceeding.Insituationsofpoliticalupheaval,revolutiontheorythereforeemphasizes,ontheonehand,notunderestimatingtheforcesoftheoldregime;ontheother,thepowerofoppositiongroupsthatdidnotplayamajorroleininitiatingtherevolutionbutmaintainhighlyorganizedbodies(intheMiddleEast,Islamistgroupsfallintothiscategory)aretobetakenintoaccount.MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 13GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 3.3.2 PoliticalSystemsintheMiddleEastbetweenAuthoritarianismandTransition3.3.2.1 ThePersistenceofAuthoritarianRuleintheArabWorld:TheGulfStatesTheArabSpringleftmanypartsoftheArabworldinsustainedawe.Insomecasesparticularly in Libya it even led to the overthrow of the regime. From a social science point ofview,thereisaneedtoexplainthereasonswhyasignificantnumberofregimesenduredtheArabSpringwithoutthedestabilizationofauthoritarianruleatleasttodate.AmongallthesocialscienceapproachesusedtoanalyzetheArabregimesbeforetheArabSpring,therentier state approach has the least difficulty explaining this difference. With the exception ofBahrainandLibya,allcountrieswithhigheconomicrentinflowsinparticularoilstatesintheGulfwereabletokeeptheirpowerstable.AmongtheGulfstates,Qatarsstableauthoritarianstructureswerepossiblytheleastaffected by the Arab Spring. This is mainly due to the immense oil and gas reserves in thecountry,measuredpercapita.TogetherwithIran,Qatarpossessesthelargestnaturalgasreservesintheworldandwastheworldslargestexporterofnaturalgasin2006.Thesubstantial rent inflows combined with a very small population of less than two million (of whichonly 220,000 have Qatari nationality) provide the state with significant freedom ofaction inthedesignofitsforeignanddomesticpolicy(Ulrichsen2011).In2009,percapitaincomewas$82,978(inpurchasingpowerparitytotheUSdollarintheUnitedSates),whichmakesitthestatewiththesecondhighestpercapitaincomeintheworld,rankingevenbeforeLuxembourg(UNDP2011).AccordingtotheGlobalHumanDevelopmentIndex,Qatarranks37(ibid.).Thegrowthrateincreasedfrom17percentin2010to19percentin2011(IMF2012a).Atthesametime,theunemploymentrateisestimatedtobebelow1percent(IMF2012b:3).Thisextremeprosperityhasprotectedthestatefromthesocial,political,andeconomicdiscontentthatledtotheprotestsinmostotherArabcountries(Ulrichsen2011).Massivesocialprivilegefromabovehasweakenedthedemandforpoliticalrightsofparticipationfrombelow(seeUlrichsen 2011). According to a study from the years 20102011, the people of Qatar valueddemocratic structures the least compared to other Arab populations (Asdaa BursonMarsteller2011).Atthesametime,theQatarirulingeliteseekstosecureitslegitimacyregionallyandinternationally by acting as a responsible regional player, a diplomatic broker, and a politicalmediatorastrategythatQatartookupafewyearsagoandattemptedtoreinforceduringtheArabSpring(Steinberg2012:34;Ulrichsen2011).WiththestartoftheArabSpring,thegovernment supported the uprisings in the region with the exception of those in the Gulfstates.InthecaseofLibya,QataradvocatedwithintheArabLeaguefortheorganizationtoapprovethemilitaryinterventionofNATOandtherebydistinguisheditselfasanallyoftheWest.Simultaneously,theLibyanrebelsweresupportedwitharms,trainingandmoney.After initial reluctance, the country also supported the opposition movement in Syria espe14 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers cially the Muslim Brotherhood and used, as in the Libyan case, the influence it gainedthroughitschairmanshipoftheArabLeague(Steinberg2012:46).While the rentier state approach has no problem explaining the stability in Qatar andother Gulf states, at first glance, the explanation is not as obvious for Bahrain. Bahrain hasonlyverylimitedoilreserves.Therefore,fromthepointofviewoftherentierstateapproach,it is not surprising that the largest protests in the Gulf states during the Arab Spring tookplaceinBahrain.InFebruary2011,onethirdofthepopulationbelongingtovariouspoliticalaffiliations took to the streets across the country to stand up for their rights (Niethammer2011). But why was the regime able to relatively easily strike down the mass protests? ThiscanmainlybeattributedtoitsrentierneighborSaudiArabia.SincetheSaudiroyalfamily,asahegemonicactorintheGulfregion,fearedthatapoliticalcrisisinaGulfmonarchycouldcall into question the general monarchical principle in this subregion of the Middle East, itsupported the Bahraini regime in massively quelling the riots and even sent troops to BahraininMarch(seeSteinberg2011).Another reason for the successful repression of the Bahraini protests is the qualitativestrengthandtheconfessionalcharacterofthecountrysmilitary.Itssoldierspossesssophisticated modern weapons, have firstrate training, and receive high compensation for theirservices.As thecountry,duetoitsdiversifiedeconomy,providesvariouscareeropportunities in the civilian sector, the monarchy also employs welltrained soldiers from abroad.Hence, themilitary is not connected withsociety, but rather sees itselfasa Sunni combatunitthathasbeenraisedintheserviceoftheroyalfamilyandthecountrysSunnielite(Barany2011:3132).In the case of Libya, much evidence indicates that Muammar Gaddafis regime wouldnot have been overthrown withoutthe intervention of NATO, as the military capabilities oftheoppositionweretooweaktoprevailagainsttheforcesoftheregime.Whiletheregimesregularmilitarywasfinanciallydeprived,Gaddafiensuredthathissonscommandedexcellently equipped and trained militias. These family bondssecured the reliable backing ofsecurityforcesinthefaceofafivemonthmilitaryoperationbyNATO(ibid.:2931).Theinternational response to Gaddafis brutal crackdown on protests began in February 2011, when theUnitedNationsSecurityCounciladoptedResolution1970.Theresolutioncondemnedtheviolence carried out by the regime and called for sanctions. When Gaddafi was unimpressedandonthevergeofinvadingtherebelstrongholdofBenghazi,theSecurityCounciladoptedResolution1973,authorizingNATOtoestablishanoflyzonetoprotectcivilians.Inaddition,someofthealliesprovidedtherebelswithweaponsandammunition.Theresultinginternationalmilitaryoperationendedon31October,afterGaddafiwaskilledbyLibyanrebelsandhislastfighterscapitulated(WesterandGoldstein2011).Yetwhy,inthefirstplace,didtheprotestmovementinLibyabringMuammarGaddafisregimetothebrinkofcollapsewithoutmassiveassistancefromoutside?AsinthecaseoftheIslamicrevolutioninIran,asimpleexplanationaccordingtotherentierstateapproachdoesMartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 15GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 not hold true: both regimes went through an existential crisis, and ultimately fell, despite asubstantialincreaseinoilrevenues(seeBeck2007b).Inbothcases,theregimecollapsedbecauseofarathercharacteristicdefectofrentierstates:Inanextremeway,Gaddafipromotedthedepoliticizationofsocietybymeansofadistributionpolicyandthedestructionofformalpolitical institutions, which opposition groups could have used to exercise pressure for reform(Vandewalle1991;Vandewalle1998:68).Atthesametime,therulingelitewassoheavilyconsolidated that itactually consisted only of the ruler himself and his closest family members(AsseburgandWerenfels2011:3).Thus,theregimehadonlyoneinstitutionthatwasinstrumental in the confrontation with the opposition: the security apparatus. Its efficacy,however,wasblockedbytheinterventionofNATO.The extreme depoliticization of society in the Libyan rentier state has also left a stronglegacy for the transition process. For a society that did not have any civic culture and statestructuresoverdecades,thetransitiontowardsdemocraticstructuresappearstobeaparticularly difficult and long process in which setbacks are to be expected (Lacher 2011a, 2011b).Fromtodaysperspective,itisanopenquestionwhethersuchatransformationwillleadtoademocracy,anauthoritarianregime,orahybridsystem.3.3.2.2 TheDifferencebetweenStableandUnstableAuthoritarianSystems:SyriaundAlgeriaAsexplainedintheprevioussection,thedifferencebetweenthe(sofar)stableauthoritarianregimesoftheArabMiddleEastandcountriesthatfallintooneoftheotherthreecategoriescan be explained with the help of the rentier state approach. This approach also makes animportant contribution in defining the difference between stable and unstable authoritarianregimes:thelatterhaveamuchlowerrentincomewithwhichtobuyoffambitionsofpolitical participation in times of political crisis. This difference can be empirically explained bycomparing Syria andAlgeria. Furthermore, the findings of revolution theory should be utilizedinordertounderstandwhysomeMiddleEasternregimeshavebeenabletocontrolthecorridorsofpowerdespitecontinuedmassivemobilizationbytheopposition.Asalreadyexplained,inthecontextoftheArabSpring,Syriahasslippedintoastateofauthoritarianinstability.IntheeyesofmanySyrianstheAssadregimehascompletelylostitslegitimacy(BeckandHser2011).Thereasonitisstillabletoholdontopoweristhatitcanrelyalbeittoadwindlingextentonthesupportofelitesandalargelyintactsecurityapparatus. The regimes inability to restore stability can be attributed to the fact that the statedoesnothaveadequaterentincometobuyfulllegitimacyamongthemajorityofthepopulation, and/or to finance a security apparatus that could immediately suppress any insurrection.AlthoughSyriahasmoderateoilreserves,itisestimatedthatthecountrywillbecomeanetimporteroverthenexttenyears(EU2007:8).UnlikeBahrain,Syriaisnotundertheprotectionofanimmediaterentierneighborwhichcouldsupporttheregimemilitarily.Quitetothe contrary, SaudiArabia and the other Gulf states do not have any interest in supportingtherepublican,quasisecularregimeinDamascus.Therefore,theycontributetoaconsider16 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers ableextenttotheArabfrontagainstSyria,therebyreferringtovalueswhichtheysystematicallyviolatethemselves(Cunningham2012;Dugulin2012).Fromtheperspectiveofrevolutiontheory,itisunsurprisingthatstrategicgroupsinSyriastill fear openly opposing the extremely repressive regime because they are afraid of losingtheirprivileges.Moreover,Assadstillhasthefullsupportofthesecurityforces.Itisnottobeexpected that this situation could change in the near future as the regime has managed tocloselybindtheAlawiteelite.ThustheEgyptianscenariowherethemilitaryshiftedawayfromtherulerisratherunlikely.Atthesametime,therearenostrongindicatorsforaLibyansolution, as no external military intervention comparable to the NATO operation in Libyaseemstolieahead.Additionally,despiteincreasingexternalpressurenotonlyfromtheWestbutalsofromTurkeyandtheArabLeague,Assadstillhasthesupportofinfluentialplayersnamely, Russia and China, which have veto power in the UN Security Council; Iran; andHezbollah(BeckandHser2011).IncontrasttoSyria,theAlgerianregimewasabletomaintainitsstableauthoritarianrule.Theprotests,whichbeganinJanuary2011,weredirectedagainstthepoorlivingconditionsand repression by the regime. Seventyfive percent of the population is under 30 years old,andtheunemploymentrateisapproximately10percent(Belakhdar2011:82;Furceri2012:18).With a maximum of approximately 3,000 demonstrators (against a force of 30,000 policemen),politicalmobilizationinAlgeriadidnotreachthecriticalmassthatitdidinTunisiaorEgypt,wheretheleaderswereultimatelyforcedtoresign(Belakhdar2011:8283).Thiswasdue to aside from the horrific memories from the Algerian civil war in the 1990s thestatesimmenseoilrents.In1989AlgeriaappearedtobethefirstArabcountrythatcouldbeonthepathtowardsdemocratization.ButwhentheIslamistoppositionpartyFrontIslamiqueduSalut(FIS)wonthemajorityofvotesinthe1992parliamentaryelections,thegovernmentblockeditfrompower.Inaveryshorttimethepartywasbannedandthousandsofitsmembersimprisonedandpersecuted.ThesubsequentcivilwarbetweensupportersoftheFISandthe states security forces dragged on into the next decade and claimed more than 200,000lives. The military elite and the heads of the security services managed to reimplement authoritarianismintheAlgeriangovernment,thematerialbaseofwhichwashighrentincomesfromtheoilandgassector(ibid.:85).Afundamentalthesisoftherentierstateapproachisthatsocioeconomicsystemsthatareexposed to a high influx of rents have a strong tendency to lack diversification within theireconomies(Beck2011a).ThisphenomenonisalsoevidentinAlgeria:theAlgerianeconomyisdominatedbyhugereservesoffossilfuels,whichaccountforapproximately98percentofexportsandapproximately40to45percentofthegrossdomesticproduct(IMF2011a).ThesenumbersreflecttheweaknessofAlgeriasproductivesectorsasaresultofthedominanceoftheoilsector,somethingthathasbeenaccentuatedbythestatespoliticoeconomicblunders(Achy 2009). Since the oil industry is extremely capital intensive and provides few jobs, theAlgerianyouthpayahighpriceforthissituation:thelabormarkethardlyoffersbetterproMartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 17GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 spectsthantheinformalsector(Belakhdar2011:82).Untilnow,however,theresourcesoftheregimehavebeensufficienttokeepitsauthoritarianrulestable.PresidentAbdelazizBouteflika in office since 1999 responded to the recent protests with a mixture of sticks andcarrots:ontheonehandmassiverepressionandontheotherlimitedpoliticalandfinancialconcessions in the form of wage increases, a reduction in food prices, the dissolution of thestateofemergencyinexistencesince1992andtheannouncementofpoliticalreforms(ibid.:87).3.3.2.3 TheDifferencebetweenStableandUnstableTransitionCountries:Tunisia,Egypt,andYemenThedistinctionbetweentransitioncountriesthatshowpotentialforregimechangeandthosethat are at risk of falling back into old or new patterns of authoritarianism is a subject ofgreatimportance.Transitionprocessesarecomplex,andthereisnoguaranteefortheestablishment of a consolidated democracy (Carothers 2002).At the same time, since the fluctuationsthatoccurduringtransitionsarenotoriouslygreat,theunambiguousassignmentofcertain cases to one of the categories in the above matrix is a difficult task. Taking a politicalsnapshotmorethanayearafterthebeginningoftheArabSpring(thetimeofthewritingofthispaper)TunisiaseemstobetheArabcountrywhichismostlikelytobeonthepathtoward genuine democratization. In contrast, it is likely that Egypts old regime is so strongthat a transition away from authoritarianism could be blocked. Yemen distinguishes itselfwithanevenhigherdegreeofcomplexity.Compared to other Arab states, Tunisia has strong potential for a successful transitiondue to the political, economic, and social structures of the country. In other authoritarianstates in the Middle East, civil society organizations and political institutions are often underdeveloped due to depoliticization policies. Tunisia, however, has had relatively welldevelopedcivilsocietystructuresforalongtime;thelabormovement,stronglyrepresentedbythecountryslabor unionumbrellaorganization,theTunisianGeneralLabor Union(Davis2011a),iswellestablished.Intheperiodfrom1988to2009,thenumberofcivilsocietyorganizationsincreasedfromnearly2,000toover9,000(Henry2011:5).Inparticular,womensorganizations have long been very active and well organized. However, it should be notedthatonlyasmallnumberoftheseorganizationsactedindependentlyfromtheregimeinareassuchashumanandcivilrights.Mostorganizationslimitedtheirworktogovernmentallyacceptedandfundedareas:culture,sports,arts,economicdevelopment,andwomensrights(ibid.).WomeninTunisiaalsoenjoyagoodlevelofeducationand,comparedtootherArabcountries,haveachievedahigherdegreeofequality.BeforetheoutbreakoftheArabSpring,women held nearly a quarter of seats in parliament (Davis 2011a). Critical observers pointout, however, that the majority of women in politics had no decisionmaking power andlargely took positions in areas that were controlled by the government (Matsson 2011: 89).Nevertheless,itcanbearguedthatatleasttheinstitutionalstructuresforthedevelopmentofafreecivilsocietywereestablishedbytheancienrgimeandtherefore,unlikethecaseinLibya,donotneedtobeestablishedanew.Inaddition,Tunisiansocietyismoreinterconnectedthan18 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers otherArabsocieties(Perthes2011:4142).OnethirdoftheTunisianpopulationusestheInternet (Schraeder and Redissi 2011: 11), which, even before theArab Spring, served as a forum for the politically interested to discuss grievances about the political system (Howardand Hussain 2011: 36). After Ben Alis fall, political debate intensified beyond the virtualworld.ProminentexiledTunisiansreturnedtothecountry,andamultitudeofpoliticalparties arose (Schraeder and Redissi 2011: 15). With regard to confessional, ethnic, and tribalstructures, the conditions for a transition process are also relatively favorable in Tunisia asthecountry,unlikeYemen,enjoysahighdegreeofhomogeneity(Plattner2011:7).In the October 2011 elections the Islamist party Ennahda won 89 of 217 seats.Althoughthismadeitthestrongestparty,itstillreliesonnonreligiouscoalitionpartners(Davis2011a).Ennahda has hitherto acted as a moderate Islamist party that does not have the goal of Islamizing Tunisian society according to the Tehran model (see Davis 2011a). Furthermore,thepartyleadershipseemstoalsobeawareofthefactthatmanyTunisianschosetovoteforthemnotbecauseoftheirreligiousaffinities,butduetotheirroleasacounterweighttotheFrenchspeakingeliteofthecountry(ibid.).The military class within a state plays a significant role in transition processes (Barany2011).EvenBenAlispredecessor,HabibBourguiba,largelykeptthemilitaryoutofallpoliticalandeconomicdecisionsduringhisthreedecadesofrule(19571987).BenAlicontinuedthispolicyandfocusedinsteadontheconstructionofastatepolicebasedontheintelligenceservice, the Mukhabarat. Therefore, the relatively underprivileged military had little reasontofightfortheregimeaftertheoutbreakofprotests.Duetoitspoliticalandeconomicinsignificance,theTunisianmilitaryunlikeitsEgyptiancounterpartcontinuestoviewitsroleas deterring external threats and does not hinder democratization (Barany 2011: 27;SchraederandRedissi2011:56).Finally,Tunisiaexportsonlyminoramountsofoil,andhasarelativelyadvancedanddiversifiedeconomicsystem(Plattner2011:7).Themiddleclassis,comparedtoothercountriesin the region, large and well educated (Davis 2011a). Nevertheless, it should be noted thatthesepositivecharacteristicsareanalyzedinthecontextoftheMiddleEastasacrisisregion.If global standards are applied, the Tunisian economy must be viewed critically: the unemployment rate is 15 percent, and the economy suffered heavily during the financial crisis of20082009becauseofitsdependenceontheWest,andastheresultofthepoliticalupheavalsof the past year. Whether Tunisia will make a fast economic recovery appears uncertain.There is, however, a high probability that the chances of successful democratization will benegativelyaffectedifthereisnoeconomicupturn(ibid.).Compared to Tunisia, the prospects for a democratic transition in Egypt appear lesspromising.Asmentionedabove,thereismuchevidencethatthemajorpoliticalthreattotheprogressive political development of the country emanates from the military. Since the SupremeCouncilofArmedForces(SCAF)seizedpoweron11February2011,ithasdelayedthehandover of power to a civilian government. In addition, it has not backed away from vioMartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 19GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 lently repressing demonstrators demanding an end to its rule. As previously mentioned,Egypthasbeenunderthestronginfluenceofthemilitarysincethe1950s.Themilitarysectorhasbuiltabusinessempirethatcontrols,accordingtovariousestimates,15to35percentofEgypts gross domestic product. This militaryindustrial complex includes a wide range ofbusinessesfrombakeriesandgasstationstofactoriesandtollroads(Davis2011c;Jacobs2011).In addition, the country faces massive socioeconomic challenges: in 2008, 22 percent ofthe population lived below the poverty line (World Bank 2012); in 2011 the unemploymentrateroseto12percentandisprojectedtorisefurther,andeconomicgrowthfelltoapproximately1percent(IMF2011b:67).Inordertobeabletoabsorballnewentrantstothelabormarket,thecountrywouldneedanannualgrowthrateof6to7percentaccordingtotheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF2010:19).InYemen,PresidentAliAbdullahSalehresignedattheendofJanuary2012,oneyearafter the outbreak of protests. Shortly thereafter, on 21 February, the former vice president,AbedRabboMansurHadi,waselectedtoatwoyearterminofficeandwastaskedwithinitiating constitutional reform.At first glance, this appears to be a prime example of a transitionprocess.Acloserlookrevealsthatthecountryisindeedundergoingaprocessofpolitical change; however, this process goes hand in hand with significant uncertainties due to amultitudeofconflictingforces.BecauseoftheprecariouspoliticalandeconomicsituationofthecountryYemenisthepoorestcountryintheregionandtherisksposedbyalQaeda,manyregionalandinternationalplayersareskepticalofregimechange.Therulingelite,despitealltheshortcomingsofthesystemofgovernment,hassofaratleastsucceededinpreventingatotalcollapseofgovernmentauthority,andYemensdevolutionintoafailedstate(Heibach2011:130131).Thepossibleconsequencesoffurtherdestabilizationaredire:separatisminthesouth,civilwar,orafurtherincreaseinthepowerofalQaeda(Steinberg2010).Conflict between the countrys patronage networks, which are polarized between the elitesof the north and the south, the influence of extremist Islamist groups, and tribal structuresarethemainreasonsfortheprecarioussituation.JensHeibach(2011:132142),however,arguesthatduetoYemensexperiencewithpoliticalinstitutions,apoliticizedcivilsociety,andtheexistenceofacultureofdialogue,hopeforasuccessfultransitionexists.However,itiscrucialthatpoliticalchangeisaccompaniedbyaneconomicboom.Inthecontextoftheoreticalconsiderations,therevolutionarysituationintheArabworldhas often been compared with the situation in Eastern Europe in 1989 (Howard 2011; Way2011:17).Althoughtherearesimilarities,itshouldbenotedthattheconditionsoftransitionaremuchmoredifficultintheMiddleEast.Thisis,first,becausetheincentivesfordemocratizationarelow:NoArabcountryhastheprospectoffullmembershipintheEuropeanUnion. Second, it should be noted that the regions nationalist regimes (with some socialistpaint),establishedinthe1950s,wereanindigenousreactiontoWesternimperialismandcolonialism, while socialism in Eastern Europe was externally imposed by the Soviet Union.After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eastern European states were able to return to their20 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers economicandpoliticalheritage,whichtheysharedwithWesternEurope,buttheArabworldfaces the challenge of having to redefine itself politically and economically. Third, the expected economic gains at the end of the Cold War encouraged economic actors to invest inEasternEuropeancountriesandtoadvancethereformprocess.TherelativelyuncertaindividendsthatareexpectedasaresultoftheArabSpring,andconcernsaboutthefutureroleofIslamist groups in the Middle East, however, are limiting the confidence of investors(Marktanner2012:1314).3.3.2.4 TheDifferencebetweenStableAuthoritarianSystemsandTransitionCountries:MoroccoandJordanTheeffectsoftheArabSpringarenotlimitedtothosecountrieswhoserulershavebeenoverthrownorbroughttothebrinkofcollapse.Infact,allArabcountriescameunderpressuretoreform. The only two remaining monarchies in theArab world outside the Gulf region areunder constant pressure to reform: Morocco and Jordan. In both countries theArab Springresulted in recurring protests that were less spectacular than those in Tunisia, Egypt, andSyria. However, if the political situation in the two monarchies before the Arab Spring iscompared with the situation in 2011, it becomes clear that there has been an unmistakablequalitativeleapinthepoliticalmobilizationofsociety.Whatneedstobecriticallyexaminedis whether the reforms that have been implemented provide sufficient evidence that themonarchies are really in a transition process. The rulers could also have chosen strategies withreasonablygoodchancesofsuccesstostabilizetheauthoritarianregimethroughlimited,reversibleliberalizationorevensimplecosmeticreforms.ThedevelopmentsinJordanandMoroccoindicatetheimportanceofthecentraltheoreticaldistinctionbetweenliberalizationanddemocratization.Liberalizationisunderstoodasanopeningupofthepoliticalsysteminordertostabilizetheauthoritariansystemunderpressure. In specific empirical cases it may be difficult to clearly identify whether processes ofpoliticalchangefitintothepatternofliberalizationorthatofdemocratization;however,the two terms systematically refer to opposite processes. While liberalization is a survivalstrategy of authoritarian systems, and measures undertaken in this context can be reversedintimesofdiminishingpressure,democratizationcannotbecontrolledfromabove.Thedistinction between the two processes is becoming even more complex because liberalizationcanleadtowardsdemocratization,contrarytotheintentionsofitsinitiators,aswasthecasewithperestroikaintheSovietUnion(Beck2007a).ShortlyafterprotestsagainstthegovernmenteruptedinMoroccoinFebruary2011,KingMohammed VI addressed his people and promised farreaching constitutional reforms thatwere supposed to strengthen representative institutions. For the Moroccans, these promisesofreformdidnotgofarenough;insteadtheydemandedanewconstitution.Theroleofthepopular king public criticism of whom is taboo is enshrined in the constitution and isbasedonbothextensivesecularandreligiousauthority(Hoffman2011:9294).AlthoughtheMartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 21GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 regimehadpropagateddemocratictransitiontotheoutsideworldforyears,thepoliticalsystem had remained mainly authoritarian (ibid.: 9698). Yet after the regime had initially respondedtotheprotestswithincreasedrepression,MohammedVIannouncedareferendumonanewconstitution(Benchemsi2012:58).Alreadybeforetheoutbreakofprotests,theyouthandthemedia,inparticular,criticizedtheregimeandvocalizedtheirgrievancesinthecountry(ibid.:9798).YetonlywiththeArabSpringhasadiscoursedevelopedthatdoesnotbackawayfromcontestingthemonarchyandthereligiouslegitimacyoftheking(ibid.:102103).Someobserversregardthismobilization,frombelow,asanindicatorforthepossibletransitionofMoroccointoaconstitutionalmonarchyintheEuropeansense(ibid.:103).Atthesametime,criticalobservers haveraiseddoubtsaboutthegovernmentscommitmenttomakingasubstantialtransition.ThiscriticismcanbetracedbacktothereferenduminJuly2011,inwhichthenewconstitutionwasadoptedbyanoverwhelmingmajority.Likemany of the kings speeches, the revised constitution appears to be a masterpiece of democratic rhetoric. In parts, the new constitution may actually be read as a response to the demand for the substantial limitation of royal power in favor of a democratic separation ofpowers.Acloserlook,however,revealsthatmajorautocraticelementsarestillenshrinedinthe document (Benchemsi 2012: 5759). The following discussion provides examples in theareasoftheexecutive,legislative,andjudicialbranchesthatraisedoubtsaboutwhethertheroyalfamilyhasactuallydecidedtoinduceademocratictransition.The new constitution still grants the king the right to convene and preside over theCouncilofMinisters,andtodetermineitsagenda.Thiscouncilsapprovalisrequiredtoensurethatparliamentcanbringinabill(ibid.:62);thekingappointsthegovernmentssecretary general, who is able to block any of the parliaments legislation. In addition,Article 42givesthekingtherighttoissuelawsbyroyaldecree(ibid.).Moroccoselectorallawanditshighlyfragmentedpoliticallandscapetherearecurrently34politicalpartieshasensuredthatnopartycanwinmorethanaquarterofallseatsinparliament, a situation which limits the prospect that the party system could challenge theroyal palace. Indeed, the king is obliged to appoint the prime minister (Chief of Government),whothenhastherighttorecommendthenominationofministersortoclaimdeductions,fromthestrongestpartyinparliament(Benchemsi2012:6364).However,theseinitiatives on the part of the prime minister are not binding for the king since the constitutionaltextonlyrequeststhathemustconsulttheprimeminister(ibid.:64).Inthewakeofthedemonstrations,thedemandforanindependentjudiciarygrewloud.TheregimerespondedbyabsolvingtheministerofjusticefromhissupervisoryroleovertheSuperiorCouncilofMagistrates,whichholdstheabsoluteauthorityontheappointmentanddismissalofjudges.Article115ofthenewconstitution,however,grantsthekingtherighttonamehalfofthemembersofthecouncilanincreaseof10percentcomparedtotheoldconstitution(ibid.:65).22 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers Jordaniansdissatisfactionwithhighunemployment,risingfoodprices,andinstitutionalcorruptionweremajorfactorsintheoutbreakofprotestsintheHashemiteKingdominJanuary 2011. The largest protests consisted of roughly 6,000 demonstrators, paling in comparisonwiththedemocraticmovementsinotherArabstates.Inaddition,violentriotsinJordanwere nearly nonexistent. During a protest in March 2011, one protestor died during clashesbetweengovernmentsupportersandtheopposition;theexactcauseofdeathisstillasourceof controversy (Hattar 2011). Measured by regional standards, Jordans participation in theArab Spring appears limited. However, compared to 2010, there has been a substantial increaseinpoliticalprotestandactivismin2011and2012.The highly controversial parliamentary elections in November 2010, in addition to theregional protests, contributed to the demonstrations (Bank 2011: 30). After Prime MinisterRifaiss measures to increase government subsidies failed to appease demonstrators, KingAbdullah II dissolved the government on1 February 2011and appointed MaroufAlBakhitprime minister.In October 2011 the king replaced Prime Minister Bakhit with Awn AlKhasawneh in order to demonstrate his will for political change, entrusting him with theformationofareformorientedgovernment(HamidandFreer2011:3).Khasawnehwasnotonly a consultant of King Husseins but also a judge at the United Nations InternationalCourt of Justice and enjoys international recognition. The majority of Jordanians supportedhisappointment,atleastinitially,andappreciatedthathewasnotpronetocorruption(Carlstrom 2011). While there are 16 new entries in Khasawnehs 29member cabinet, 13 of theministers have already held positions in previous governments (Jordan Times 2011; HamidandFreer2011:3).InMarch2011AbdullahrespondedtotheongoingprotestsbyconveningaNationalDialogueCommitteetaskedwithproposingconstitutionalamendmentsandreformingthehighlycontroversialelectionlaw,aswellasthelawsfortheformationofpoliticalparties(HamidandFreer2011:3).Thecurrentelectorallawofthesinglenontransferablevotewasintroduced in 1993 and primarily served to reduce the number of oppositional Islamists in parliament.Theelectorallawfavorsindividualindependentcandidateswhoarechosennotbecause of their party affiliation but because of their tribal connections. With respect to electoral districts, urban areas in which the population of Palestinian origin agglomerates aredisadvantaged,whilecandidatesfromruralareaswherethetraditionalpowerbaseofthemonarchyprimarilyresidesarefavored(BeckandCollet2010:34).Itisnotsurprisingthatobservers are skeptical about the announced reform program: Since 1989 four reform programs have been announced three of them by King Abdullah but little has changed inhowthegovernmentoperates. In2005thereformcommittee,NationalAgenda,presentedanewlyrevisedelectionlawtothegovernmentthatwouldhaveeliminatedtheshortcomingsofthepreviouselectorallaw,buttheproposal wasignored(Muasher2011:1115).Furthermore,itmustbenotedthatanewelectorallawandthepromotionofpoliticalpartiesalonewouldnotchangethefactthattheparliamentisaweakinstitutioninJordanspoliticalsysMartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 23GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 tem.TheseparationofpowersisheavilyweightedinfavorofunelectedinstitutionssuchastheRoyalCourtandtheexecutivebranchingeneral(HamidandFreer2011:34;ICG2012).Thereformprogramcontainsnomeasurestolimitthepoweroftheking,whoappointstheprime minister, the ministers, and the deputies of the Senate (Majlis alAyan). The king canalsoblockthelawsoftheHouseofDeputiesandhasthepowertodissolveparliamentunilaterally.KingAbdullahIIhasusedthisprivilegetwicealready:In2001headopted210provisional laws, and in 2009 he ruled virtually on his own for almost a year before new electionswereheld(HamidandFreer2011:4).OnemoresubstantialdevelopmentforJordanisananticorruptioncampaignlaunchedinthe second half of 2011 that led to the arrest and indictment of individuals who once heldpowerful positions. One such individual was Mohammad Dahabi, the former head of theDairat alMukhabarat alAmmah, the Jordanian intelligence agency. He was charged withmoney laundering and abuse of power. In addition, the parliament is considering indictingformerprimeministerMaroufAlBakhitforcorruptioninthecaseofthefinancingofacasino.OnereasonforthiscampaignagainstcorruptionisthatitisthetransJordanianpowerbaseofthe monarchy, rather than the Palestinian opposition, that has been intensively criticizing theregimefortheshortfallsoftheJordaniansystem,particularlyintermsofcorruption.InSeptember2011,however,theHouseofDeputies(MajlisalNuwwab)agreedtoadraftlaw making it a punishable offense to publish corruption allegations against individuals orinstitutionsthatarenotbasedontoughfacts.Whatexactlyismeantbysuchfactswasnotfurtherdefined.Thedraftwaspassedontothesenate,whichcameunderpressurefromrespectablejournaliststorejectthelaw.ThevotewaspostponedindefinitelyonSeptember29.Criticsviewthislawnotonlyasaglaringviolationofthefreedomofpress;intheabsenceofstronginstitutionsbasedontheruleoflaw,suchalawwouldvirtuallymakeobsoleteallefforts to curb corruption (Agence FrancePresse 2011; Committee to Protect Journalists 2011;Hazaimeh2011).ThiscriticismisconsistentwiththeestimationsofsomeobserversthatJordanisunderthemassiveinfluenceofanentrenchedeliteblocthatisobstructingreformprocessesinordertoprotectitsownprivileges(Muasher2011:1).Todate,Jordanhasremainedinastablestateofauthoritarianism.Theregimehascreated the impression of taking steps towards democratization and becoming a constitutionalmonarchy,butsubstantivepoliticalreformhasyettobeseen.Intheaboveanalysis,wehavequestionedwhetherMoroccoisundergoingagenuineprocessofdemocratizationorsimplyliberalization.InJordan,however,therearestrongindicatorsthatpoliticalchangehassofarbeenlimitedtopurelycosmeticreforms.3.3.2.5 TheDifferencebetweenUnstableAuthoritarianSystemsandUnstableTransitionCountries:EgyptandLibyaAsnotedabove,itisdebatablewhetherEgyptisundergoingaprogressivetransitionornot.At the time of completion of this paper there are already skeptics who go one step further24 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers andalreadyconsiderEgypttobemakingitswaybacktowardanArabWinter.Thus,itisassumedthatEgyptisinthestateofanunstableauthoritariansystem(Byman2011).ThisassumptionisprimarilybasedontheroleoftheEgyptianmilitary,whichrevealslittleornowillingnesstosupportatransitiontowardsdemocracy.However,todatetherehasnotbeenmuchevidenceforacompletemilitarytakeoverintheformofacoup,whichwouldlead to a confrontation with major parts of the mobilized society and the further economicdestabilizationofthecountryandwouldjeopardizethefinancialsupportoftheUSandtheEU. Since the military neverthelessseems to bereluctant togive up its political influence, apact between the military and the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood whichforms,withapproximately47percentoftheseatsintheNationalAssembly,byfarthestrongest party of the country might develop. An alliance with the military would alsohave advantages for the Muslim Brotherhood: a compromise between the two camps couldcontributetopoliticalandeconomicstabilization,andsocioeconomicreformsthatarecrucialto preventing an economic collapse could be pushed forward.Additionally, unpopular foreign policy decisions especially with regard to relations with Israel could be left to themilitary(Roll2012).Libyas political system remains highly fragmented after the fall of the Gaddafi regime(Lacher2011b:11).TheNationalTransitionalCouncilincludesformerofficialsoftheregimeandthepreviousopposition.Hence,thereareformerconfidantsofGaddafi,pastmembersofthesecurityapparatus,reformers,andtechnocratsamongthenewpoliticalleadership(ibid.:1112). The former oppositionists include Libyans from established notable families thatwereexiled,aswellasrepresentativesoftheacademicelite.Themembersofthehighlysegmentednewelitearestronglycommittedtotribalstructures.Controversialquestionssuchasthemodelofthefuturegovernment,thepoliticalandlegalroleofIslam,andthequestionofthe legal processing of crimes committed by the regime are likely to exacerbate rivalrieswithinthecountry(ibid.:1213).GiventhehighcomplexityoftheLibyanpoliticalsceneaftertheoverthrowofGaddafi,thepossibilitythatLibyawilltransformfromanunstabletransition country to an unstable authoritarian system cannot be ruled out. Should one of thegroups or alliances succeed in controlling the oil sector, Libya could also return to a stableauthoritariansystem.4 ConclusionTheorybasedsocialscienceresearchontheMiddleEasthasastrongincentivetoanalyzetheArab Spring and the changing empirical realities of Middle Eastern politics. This paper hasattemptedtocontributetothisobjectivebypresentinganddiscussingpoliticalchangeintheMiddleEastonthebasisofatwobytwomatrixofpoliticalrulethatdifferentiatesaccordingtothetypeofruleandthedegreeofstability.Basedonadiscussionofseveralcasestudies,thepaperhasshownontheonehandthatthismatrixhelpstoarrangetheobserveddiversiMartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring 25GIGAWorkingPapers WP203/2012 ficationofArabregimes.Ontheotherhand,ithasshownthatthematrixcontributestocomprehendingthedynamicsofpoliticalchangeintheMiddleEast,aresearchtopicthatisstillinflux.AfteranexploratorysummaryofexplanationsfortheArabSpringingeneral,thepaperhas used three theoretical strands of the social sciences rent theory, transition theory, andrevolution theory to make an explanatory contribution as to why the regimes in theArabworld have diversified, and to discuss the implications. Thereby, the rent theory approachhasproventobeparticularlyfruitful,especiallybecauseitcanexplainthefundamentaldifference between the regimes shaken by theArab Spring and the persistently stable regimesintheArabworld.Transitiontheoryandrevolutiontheoryhelptodescribethecomplex,andsometimes contradictory, developments in the Middle Eastern countries particularly inthosethathavebeenstronglyaffectedbytheArabSpring.ResearchontheArabSpringisbyitsnaturestillintheearlystages.Itfacesthecomplextask of linking general explanations of theArab Spring with the development of individualcases. It should also critically observe further developments in the Arab region. Forecastsshould be made on the basis of scenarios upon which statements of probable incidence canbe made considering a theoretical background. TheArab Spring may produce four results:(consolidated)democracies,hybridregimes,(restored)authoritarianrule,andnewformsofauthoritarian systems. Here it should be noted that the situation in the variousArab countries could develop quite differently. The diversification of the Arab regimes observed oneyear after theArab Spring may only represent a preview.Additionally, it is also likely thatdevelopments in key countries and subregions will have repercussions for other countriesand subregions. The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia, inspired civic movementsthroughouttheregionandhassinceshapedthepoliticaldebateacrosstheregion.It is very unlikely that the Arab Spring will lead to consolidated democracies throughsmoothdemocratization.Ifwetakeintoaccountthethreelinesofresearchinthispaper,weseethatadevelopmentsimilartothatinEasternEuropeinthe1990sisunlikelytotakeplace.Economic and political rents are likely to continue to play a crucial role in the Middle East.AsthecaseofNorwayshows,rentbaseddemocraciesarepossible;however,rentsrepresenta major obstacle in theArab world because they were available before the establishment ofdemocraticstructures.Fromtheperspectiveoftransitiontheory,thesuccessofdemocratizationprocessesdependsonmanyfactorswhosefulfillmentisquestionableintheMiddleEast,eveninthemorepromisingcases.Thecomprehensive,decadeslongsocioeconomiccrisisintheregionhascreatedasituationinwhichconsumptionisverydistantfromtheproductionandproductivitylevelsintheArabworld,whileatthesametime,socialinequalityishighlypronounced.TheArabworldwillthereforefacemajordifficultiesinachievingdemocratization processes that generate many winners and few losers. Thus, it is to be expected thatthere are major gateways for undemocratic groups within the state apparatuses as well aswithin society. Findings from revolution theory suggest that sections of the former regimes26 MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpringWP203/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers may be able to persist because they have not collapsed unlike the case in Eastern EuropeaftertheimplosionoftheSovietUnion.It is much more likely that at least some countries will pass through lengthy transitionprocesses;thesewillbeinconsistentandtheresultswillbeopen.Thiscouldalsoleadtotheemergenceofhybridregimesthatcannotbeclearlydistinguishedasconsolidateddemocraciesor autocracies for an extended period. With Tunisia, however, there is at least one countrywheresomeessentialconditionsthatdeterminesuccessfuldemocratizationexist.The ruling houses of the Gulf states may not entirely escape the effects of the ArabSpring.Still,theyhavethepotentialtokeeptheirauthoritarianrulestableandtoavoidtransitionaslongastheycanmanagetokeepupthecashflowgeneratedbyrentsandtouseitforthedepoliticizationofsociety.SincetheauthoritarianrulersoftheGulfstatesgainedvaluable experience in dealing with the systemthreatening challenges of Nasserism in the1950s,theirchancesofsurvivalremainhigh,pendingfurtherdevelopments.In those countries where the Arab Spring triggered political change, it is also possiblethatnewauthoritarianregimeswillbecreated.Whetherthiswillhappeninsomeorevenallcountriesdependslargelyonwhethernewauthoritarianelitessucceedinmonopolizingeconomic and political rents. From the point of view of transition theory, however, there aresignificanthurdlesforthisnegativescenario:JustasdemocraticforcesarelikelytohavedifficultiescopingwiththesocioeconomiccrisisintheMiddleEast,soareauthoritarianactors.TheresourcesinLibyaappearsufficienttoestablishalastingandstablegovernmentfornewauthoritarianrulers,whichcouldrelegatetheArabSpringtoabriefepisodeinthecountryshistory.Inallothercases,however,giventhepoliticalpowerthatwasgeneratedbytheArabSpring, it is expected that potential new authoritarian rulers would have to create a muchwiderbaseoflegitimacythanHosniMubarakorMuammarGaddafimanagedtobuild.ThelongtermimpactoftheArabSpringasanempiricalregionalphenomenondependson whether a critical mass is reached and moderately successful democratization occurs. Inthis scenario for the third time in the postcolonial history of the Middle East regionalcompetition among incompatible political systems could lead to entirely new dynamics ofpolitical development in theArab world.As Maridi Nahas (1985) shows, systemic competitionbetweenrepublicanandmonarchicalregimesoccurredaftertheEgyptianRevolutionin1952.Then,theIranianRevolutionin1979replaceditwithcompetitionbetweenIslamistandantiIslamistactors.ShouldEgyptexperiencesubstantialdemocratization,thiscouldleadtosystemiccompetitionbetweendemocraticandauthoritarianregimes,withCairoandRiyadhas antagonizing poles. 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