political economy analysis of kenya

8/22/2019 Political Economy Analysis of Kenya

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Political Economy Analysis of Kenya

Norad Report 19/2009 Discussion


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Responsibility for the contents and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the study team.The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond with those of Norad.

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

P.O. Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 OSLO

Ruselkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Phone: +47 22 24 20 30

Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

ISBN 978-82-7548-415-2

ISSN 1502-2528


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Political Economy Analysis of Kenya

Prepared by Geir Sundet, Scanteam, and Eli Moen, Norad

Dar es Salaam and Oslo, 17 June 2009


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ii

Project: PoliticalEconomyAnalysisofKenya

Client: NorwegianAgencyforDevelopmentCooperation

Period: April June2009

TaskTeam:

Mr.GeirSundet(TeamLeader),Scanteam

Ms.EliMoen,NoradMr.TiberiusBarasa,InstituteofPolicyAnalysisandResearch


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TableofContentsListofacronymsandabbreviations.......................................................................................................... ivAcknowledgements..................................................................................................................................... v

ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................................................. 11. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 42. APoliticalEconomyAnalysisofKenya.................................................................................................... 4ThecolonialfoundationoftheKenyanstate................................................................................................ 5IncreasingconcentrationofpowersintheExecutive.................................................................................. 6Thepoliticaltraumaoftheaftermathofthe2007election....................................................................... 10Concludingremarks...................................................................................................................................... 13

3. ChallengesofDevelopmentAssistanceinaCountryinaFragileSituation......................................144. Challengesfordevelopmentassistanceinanoverlycentralisedstatesufferingfromelitecapture........................................................................................................................................................................ 16StateSocietyRelationsattheLocalLevel................................................................................................... 17

5. TheApproachofNorwayandotherDevelopmentPartnersintheFieldofGovernance...............21Strategicthinkingongovernance................................................................................................................ 21Developmentpartnercooperation,coordinationandconcentration...................................................24

6. StrategicRecommendationsforFutureNorwegianAssistance.......................................................... 25Proposedprinciplesforassistance............................................................................................................... 25Recommendationsfortheshortterm.......................................................................................................... 26Recommendationsforthelongerterm........................................................................................................ 27

7. Conclusion................................................................................................................................................... 31Annex1: References.................................................................................................................................. 34Annex2:Listofinterviews........................................................................................................................ 36Annex3:BriefOverviewofNorwaysGovernancePortfolio.............................................................. 38Annex4:SummaryReviewofIssuesRelatingtoLocalGovernmentinKenya................................40Annex5:SummaryReviewonTradeUnionsinKenya....................................................................... 46Annex6: InterviewwithLocalGovernmentofficials.......................................................................... 49


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Listofacronymsandabbreviations

AKF Aga Kahn Foundation

AU AfricanUnionCBO Community Based Organisation

CDF Constituency Development FundCIDA Canadian International Development AgencyCMD Centre for Multiparty DemocracyCSDGF Civil Society Democratic Governance FacilityCSO Civil Society OrganisationDFID Department for International Development (UK)DP Democratic PartyFIDA Federation of Women LawyersFORD Forum for Restoration of DemocracyGEMA Gikuyu, Embu and Meru AssociationGGP Gender and Governance ProgrammeGJLOS Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (Reform Programme)

IDM Institute for Multiparty DemocracyIDP Internally Displaced PersonsIED Institute for Education in Democracy

IIEC InterimIndependentElectoralCommissionIMLU Independent Medico Legal UnitIOM International Organisation for MigrationIREC Independent Review Commission on the 2007 ElectionsKADU Kenya African Democratic UnionKANU Kenya African National UnionKNUT Kenya National Union of TeachersLA Local AuthorityLATF Local Authority Transfer Fund

LDP Liberal Democratic PartyNARC National Alliance of Rainbow CoalitionNDI National Democratic Institute

NDP NationalDevelopmentPartyNGO Non-governmental OrganisationNOK Norwegian KronerNorad Norwegian Agency for Development CooperationNPK National Party of KenyaODM-K Orange Democratic Movement KenyaOECD/DAC Organisatoin for Economic Cooperation and Development /Development

Assistance CommitteePFM Public Financial Management

PNU Party of National UnityPSR Public Sector ReformSida Swedish International Development Agency

SLDF SabaotLandDefenceForceTI Transparency InternationalTOR Terms of Reference

TRJC Truth,JusticeandReconciliationCommissionUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUSAID United States Agency for International Development


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Acknowledgements

ThisreporthasbenefitedfromthesubstantialinputfromTiberiusBarasa,whoalsotookpartinthe

fieldworkinNairobi.EvaJacobsen,Norad,madetheinterestinginterviewwithlocalgovernmentofficials.WethankthetwoofthemandJanneAndresen,IvarEvensmoandArveOfstadinNoradfor

theirvaluablecommentsandsuggestions,aswellasArneTostensen(CMI),BrdAndersAndreassen

(SMR)andBjarteTr(IDEA).Finally,wethanktheNorwegianEmbassyinNairobifortheir

commentsonpreviousdraftsofthereportandfortheirlogisticalsupportforthefieldwork.


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ExecutiveSummaryNoradcommissionedScanteamtoprepareaPoliticalEconomyAnalysisofKenyatoinformthe

developmentofitsnextstrategyforgovernanceinKenya.Thereporthasbeenpreparedjointlyby

GeirSundetofScanteamandEliMoenofNorad.TiberiusBarasa,oftheNairobibasedInstituteof

PolicyAnalysisandResearch,hasassistedwiththefieldworkandanalyticalinput.Thisreport

presentstheoutputoftheassignment.

Thereisanincreasingrealisationthatgovernancereformisfirstandforemostapoliticalchallenge.

Traditionaltechnicalinterventionsofcapacitystrengtheningandinstitutionbuildinghavenotproved

tobeeffectiveanddevelopmentpartnersarenowgraduallyturningtopoliticaleconomyanalysisin

theirplanning.

ThisreportpresentsapoliticaleconomyanalysisofKenya,whichisinformedbyananalytical

approachrecentlydevelopedbyOECD/DACthatproposesthatthefocusincountriesinfragile

situationsshouldbeonstatelegitimacyandstatesocietyrelations.

Theviolence

that

broke

out

after

the

2007

elections

made

parts

of

the

country

ungovernable

for

several

weeks.Ittooktheinterventionofinternationalmediators,ledbyKofiAnnan,tonegotiatean

agreementbetweenthetwoleadingprotagonists,whoseemedmoreconcernedwiththebattlefor

powerthanwiththeplightofthecitizen.Morethan1,000peoplewerekilledduringthisperiodandat

least350,000wereinternallydisplaced.Thecountryremainsinafragilesituation.Thecoalition

governmentthatwasformedafterthemediationhasprovedtobeveryineffectiveandthecitizens

confidenceintheirleadershasreachedalowpoint.

Thereportprovidesapoliticaleconomyanalysisthatissetinahistoriccontext.Itshowshowthe

statesocietyrelationshavebeenunderstrainsinceindependenceduetoawideninggapbetweenthe

rulingelitesandthepopulationatlarge.Inequalitieshaveoftenledtopoliticalresentmentbeing

expressedalongtriballines,particularlyoverperceivedinjusticesoverthedistributionofland

ownership.

StatesocietyrelationsdeterioratedfurthersincethestartoftheMoiera,whenstatepredation

intensifiedandtheaccountabilitystructuresofthestateweredeliberatelyweakenedtoallow

uncheckeduseofstateresourcesbytheexecutive.

AnotherproblemthataroseintheMoiera,istheuseofviolenceforpoliticalmeans.Thiswas

particularlyfeltduringthefirstmultipartyelectionsin1992,whenviolencewassystematicallyusedto

influencetheelections,particularlyintheRiftValley.Itisnotedthatthedeathtollin1992wassimilar

towhatwasexperiencedafterthe2007elections.Electionrelatedviolencewasalsosignificantinthe

1997elections,whiletherewasatemporaryrespitein2002.

Theproblemsnotedregardingcorruptionandthepoliticaluseofviolencearecompoundedbythe

issueofimpunity.Therehavebeenalargenumberofofficialreportsofenquiry,andalsolarge

amountsofindependentevidencegathered,thatdocumenttheinvolvementofpoliticalleadersin

corruptionandviolence.Still,todate,noseniorleadershavebeenbroughttocourttoanswerforwhat

theyhavedone.Thishasfurtherunderminedthelegitimacyofthepoliticalleadership.

ThereportgoesontopresenttheanalyticalapproachdevelopedbyOECD/DACtoinform

developmentassistanceincountriesinfragilesituations.Thisapproacharguesthatstatebuilding

needstobethecentralobjectiveandthatthisisbestachievedthroughfocusingonstatelegitimacy

andstatesocietyrelations.

Threedimensionsofstatelegitimacyareidentified:

How

the

state

functions,

which

refers

to

the

decision

making

and

democratic

process

(elections

aswellasthestatesresponsetothepopulationthroughtransparencyandaccountabilityin


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publicadministration,thefunctioningofchecksandbalancesoncentresofpower,

publicationsofauditsofpublicfunds,mediacoverageandopenpoliticaldebate,etc.);

Whatthestatedoes,whichreferstothestatesabilitytoprovideessentialservices,suchaseducation,health,marketinfrastructureandsecurity,etc.;and

Thebeliefsofpeople,whichincludespeoplesperceptionsofcommunity,includingperceptionsofidentityinrelationtoethnicity,religionandlanguage,andtheextenttowhich

itisfeltthatthesedifferencesareaccommodatedunderacommonacceptanceofthestate.

ThereportthenreturnstoadiscussionofstatesocietyrelationsinKenyatoseewhatlightthis

analyticalapproachthrowsonthedevelopmentchallengesinKenya.Itisarguedthatsupporttothe

Government,inthepresentKenyancontext,isnotlikelytoimprovestatelegitimacyasthereisareal

riskofassistanceaidingthefurtherentrenchmentofthecurrentelites,ratherthanimprovingstate

societyrelations.Assistancetocivilsocietyisalsonotwithoutrisk,asmuchofthepresentcivilsociety

isurbanbasedandcontrolledbymembersofthesamenationalelites.

Therewasaconsistentmessagefromrespondentsthatchangeismostlikelytobebroughtaboutasa

resultof

demand

from

below.

It

is

further

argued

that

in

order

to

tap

into

and

support

this

demand

in

asystematicmanner,itisnecessarytoengageinpeoplesparticipationinpublicaffairsatthelocal

level.EngagementatthelocallevelinKenya,however,presentsproblemsastherehasbeena

continuousprocessofcentralisationofpowersinceindependenceandconcentrationofpowersinthe

Presidency.Findingwaystosupportpeoplesparticipationinpublicaffairsatthelocallevel,inthe

absenceofadecentralisationreform,isakeychallengefordevelopmentpartners.

AnoverviewisprovidedofthegovernanceapproachofNorwayandotherleaddevelopment

partners.Thedevelopmentpartnersfullyrecognisetheproblemofthegovernmenthavelimited

legitimacyinthepopulation.PriorityintheshorttermisaccordedtheimplementationoftheNational

Accord,whichistheprogramdevelopedbytheinternationalconflictmediatorsincollaborationwith

Government,toaddressthechallengesofnationalreconciliationafterthetraumaofthepostelection

violence.

Forthelongtermprograms,Norwayandotherdevelopmentpartnersareconcernedwiththelimited

resultsinthegovernancesectorprograms,includingtheGovernance,Justice,LawandOrderSector

ReformProgramme(GJLOS),thePublicFinancialManagementProgramme(PFM)andthePublic

SectorReformProgramme(PSR).

ThedonorsaregenerallysatisfiedwiththeirsupporttoCSOs.Thedevelopmentpartnersdo

recognise,ontheotherhand,thattheCSOstheysupporttendtobeNairobibased,andledby

membersofthenationalelite.TherearereasonstoquestiontheextenttowhichCSOsaretruly

representativeofthepeoplethattheyoftenclaimtorepresent.

Building

on

the

above

review

and

analysis,

the

report

makes

the

following

recommendations.

Fortheshortterm,itisrecommendedthatthepresentsupporttothereconciliationprocess

continues.ThisincludessupporttoIDPs,reconciliation,andworktoaddressgenderbasedviolence.

SupportshouldalsocontinuefortheAnnanprocess.ItisalsorecommendedthatNorwayjoinsthe

multidevelopmentpartnersupportofthepreparationsforthenextelections.

Forthelongerterm,thefollowingrecommendationsaremadeforsupporttoGovernmentand

NonStateActors:

SupporttotheGovernmentofKenyashouldbescaleddownuntilthereisevidenceofastronger

commitmenttoreform.ThesupporttoGJLOSshouldnotgobeyondthecurrentphase.Inorderto

maintainsomelevelofengagementwiththeGovernment,continuationofsupporttoPFMshouldbe

consideredpending

the

outcome

of

the

Mid

Term

Review.

The

Embassy

is

also

recommended

to

positionitselftosupportadecentralisationreformifandwhenitappearsontheagenda.


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SupporttoCSOsshouldasfaraspossiblebechannelledthroughthemultidonorsupportedCivil

SocietyDemocraticGovernanceFacility(CSDGF)andtheGenderandGovernanceProgramme(GGP).

ConsiderationshouldalsobegiventocontinuedsupportoftheNationalCivicEducationProgramme

IIinviewoftheredirectiontowardsmoresupporttorepresentativeorganisations.Directsupportto

CSOsoutsidetheseprogramsshouldbeavoidedtoreducetransactioncosts.

Theexceptiontothisruleissupporttothelargerstrategicorganisations,TransparencyInternational

KenyaandKenyaHumanRightsCommission.Supporttotheseisrecommended,particularlyinview

ofthestrategicimportanceoftheiractivitiesatthelocallevel.

ThesupporttopoliticalpartiesthroughNDIisrecommendedtobecontinued.TheEmbassyshould

encourageaparticularfocusonthedemocraticprocessatthelocallevel.

Limitedsupporttomediaisrecommendedinasfarasitlinkswithandreinforcesothersupported

activities.Mediaispotentiallyanimportantmeansofsupportingsocialdialogueatboththenational

andlocallevel.

ItisrecommendedthattheEmbassyexplorespossibilitiesofsupportingrepresentativeorganisations.

Theseinclude

in

particular

trade

unions

and

farmers

associations.

These

organisations

play

a

potentiallyimportantroleinbuildingdemocraticinstitutionsandlendinglegitimacytonational

democraticprocessesatthenationalandlocallevelandhaveapotentialtocountertheethnicdivide.

Finally,itisrecommendedthattheEmbassysupportseffortsbypartnersinKenyatoengageina

continuousprocessofpoliticaleconomyanalysisofparticularissueswhenknowledgeislacking,in

ordertoinformtheirownandothersplanningandprogramming.

Thegistoftherecommendations,therefore,istofollowbroadlythesamestrategyaspresent,butto

putamoreexplicitfocusonstatesocietyrelations,particularlyatthelocalgovernmentlevel,andto

placemoreemphasisonsystematiclearning,analysisandsocialdialogue.


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PoliticalEconomyAnalysisKenyaNoradcommissionedScanteamtoprepareaPoliticalEconomyAnalysisofKenyatoinformthe

developmentofitsnextstrategyforgovernanceinKenya.Thereporthasbeenpreparedjointlyby

GeirSundetofScanteamandEliMoenofNorad.TiberiusBarasa,oftheNairobibasedInstituteof

PolicyAnalysisandResearch,hasassistedwiththefieldworkandanalyticalinput.Thereportwas

preparedintheperiodAprilJune2009andincludedfieldworkinNairobiinApril.Thisreport

presentstheoutputoftheassignment.

1. IntroductionPractitionersindevelopmentassistancehaveincreasinglycometorealiseinrecentyearsthat

developmentassistance,inparticularassistanceintheareaofdemocraticgovernance,islargelya

politicalchallenge.Asthetechnicalinterventionsofcapacitystrengtheningandmoreorless

mechanisticbuildingofdemocraticstructureshavefailedtoproducethedesiredeffects,attentionis

nowgraduallyturningtopoliticaleconomyanalysisandthinkingabouthowdevelopmentpartners

canbestassistinthepoliticaldevelopmentoftheirpartnercountries.

Theobjectiveofthisreportistoutiliseapoliticaleconomyanalysiswithafocusonthelegitimacyof

thestatetooutlinethecontextforNorwegiansupporttoKenyawithintheareaofgovernanceandto

providerecommendationsforfurthersupport.

ThesecondsectionofthisreportprovidesapoliticaleconomyanalysisofKenyasrecenthistory.It

showshowthestructuresandpubliclegitimacyoftheKenyanstatehaveweakened,particularlyin

thepostKenyattayears1.ThefragilityoftheKenyansituationbecameparticularlyclearinthe

aftermathofthe2007elections,whichsawwidespreadviolence.Thesubsequentcoalitiongovernment

andthereformandreconciliationagendaaregivenspecialattention.

Thethird

section

of

the

report

provides

adiscussion

of

the

challenges

of

development

assistance

in

countriesthatareinfragilesituations.ItsummarisesthemostrecentthinkinginOECD/DACthat

proposesthatthefocusinstatesinfragilesituationsshouldbestatelegitimacyandstatesociety

relations.

ThefourthsectionrelatesthisapproachtotheKenyansituationanddiscussesthechallengesof

developmentassistanceinacountrythatsuffersfromelitecaptures.Italsoincludesabriefanalysisof

statesocietyrelationsatthelocallevel.

ThefifthsectionprovidesanoverviewoftheprogramsandapproachesofNorwayandotherleading

developmentpartnersinKenya,andattemptstodistillessonsfromtheirexperiences.Theirshortand

longtermstrategiesareoutlinedandattemptsaremadetoreviewtheminthecontextofstate

legitimacy.

ThesixthsectionprovidesrecommendationsforfutureNorwegianassistance,suggestingguiding

principlesforassistanceintheareaofgovernanceandoutlinesrecommendationsfortheshortand

longterm.

Thefinalsectionsummarisesandconcludes.

2.APoliticalEconomyAnalysisofKenyaThelevelofviolenceandcounterviolencethatbrokeoutinKenyaaftertheDecember2007elections

tookmanyifnotmostbysurprise.Kenyahadlikedtoseeitselfasabeaconofstabilityinaconflict

1InKenyaitisthelegitimacyoftherulingelitethatislow.PeoplebelieveinafutureforthestateofKenyabutwantanewkind

ofleaders.Seeforexamplewww.Afrobarometer.org


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riddenregion,andmanyobserversagreed.Thecountryboastsastrongmiddleclass,vibrantmedia,

vocalandwellorganisedcivilsocietyorganisations,arelativelylargeandorganisedbusiness

community(formalprivatesector),andagrowingexperiencewithcompetitivepolitics.Kenya

thereforeseemedanunlikelycandidateforafailedstate.

Theeventsthatfollowedtheseriouslyflawedelectionschangedthatperception.Shortlyafterthe

ElectoralCommissionofKenyaannouncedMwaiKibakiasthevictorofthePresidentialpolls,gangs

wentontherampageandviolencealongethniclinesresultedinmorethan1,000peopledeadand

350,000ormoreinternallydisplaced.Manyofthegangswereseeminglywellorganisedand

subsequentinvestigationsproducedevidencethatseveralofthegangshadbeensponsoredbysenior

politiciansandthatthepoliceweresometimesturningablindeyeorevenfuellingtheviolence,

allegedlyincollusionwithpoliticians.

Whiletheviolenceraged,thenationalleadersseemedmorepreoccupiedwithsecuringthebest

politicaloutcomeforthemselves,thanwithusingtheirinfluencetostoptheviolence.Aresolutionto

thepoliticalcrisiswasachievedonlythroughinternationalmediationledbyKofiAnnan.Acoalition

governmentwasestablishedofthepresidentspartyandthemainoppositionpartyunderthe

leadershipof

Raila

Odinga,

who

became

prime

minister,

anew

position

that

was

part

of

the

agreement.

StabilityisnolongertakenforgrantedinKenya.Oneyearafterthecoalitiongovernmenttookoffice

thegeneralperceptionisthatlittlehasbeenachievedbythecoalitiongovernmentontheurgently

neededreformsthatwerepartoftheagreement.Internalconflictsbothwithinthecoalitionandinthe

partiesthatmakeupthecoalitionareapparent.Alackofcollectivevisionandcommitmenttoreform

isdiscernible.Thishasgivenroomforantireformandnonreformforcesatalllevelstooperate.The

publicisbeginningtoquestionwhetherthepartnersinthecoalitiongovernmentactinthepublic

interest.2

Inconversation,manyKenyaninformedanalystssaythepossibilityofstatecollapseisarealone.

Somepeople

draw

parallels

to

Ivory

Coast,

another

Sub

Saharan

country

that

used

to

be

cited

as

one

oftheraresuccessstories.Thereareobviousrisksassociatedwithprovidingdevelopmentpartner

supportinsuchcircumstances,andperhapsthemostriskyfieldofallisgovernance.Anyintervention

inthegovernancearenaisboundtohavebothintendedandunintendedimpactonthecontinuous

powerstrugglesinKenyanpoliticallife,anditisthereforeprudentfordevelopmentpartnerstoseek,

achieveandmaintainaninformedunderstandingofpoliticalrealitiesinthecountry.

ThissectionprovidesanoverviewoverkeycharacteristicsoftheKenyanstatethatarerelevantto

Norwaysworkintheareaofgovernance.First,abriefhistoricalanalysisisprovidedoftheevolution

oftheKenyanstate.Second,furtherelaborationisprovidedonthechallengesinherentinthe

concentrationofpowersintheExecutiveandtheelitecaptureofthepoliticalandeconomicagendain

Kenya.Third,abriefassessmentisgivenofthepoliticalsituationafterthe2007electionsandthe

NationalAccordthatbroughtthecoalitiongovernmentintobeing.

ThecolonialfoundationoftheKenyanstateAtindependence,Kenyainheritedacolonialmodelwithastronglycentralisedstateandadominant

executive.KenyahadbeenaEuropeansettlerstate,withplantationagricultureasthedominant

occupationofthesettlers.Theirdominantpositionemergedthroughappropriationoflandfromlocal

populations,includingtheKikuyu,theKalenjin,theMaasaiandothers.TheAfricanpopulation

remainedsmallholderswhilealargeshareoftheruralpopulationbecamelabourersforthesettlersin

asemifeudalsystem.Theunequaldistributionofland,landlessnessandthelegalrestrictionson

2 TheKenyaNationalDialogue and ReconciliationMonitoring Project,January 2009, Resolving the PoliticalCrisis (Power

Sharing).


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indigenousKenyansinsomeareastoownlandandengageincommercialagriculturewereamongthe

majorgrievancesintheindependencestruggle.3

Earlypoliticalorganisationwasrestrictedbythecolonialadministrationtoethnicallydefinedregions,

andtheypreventedtheformationofnationwidemovements.Thisgaveanearlyimpetustothe

ethnicisationofKenyanpolitics.

TheKenyancampaignforindependencewasmarkedbyviolencefromearlyon.TheKikuyuMauMau

movementforindependencedevelopedmilitarytacticsandlaunchedaprotractedwaragainstthe

colonialadministration.TheMauMaurevoltledtoaStateofEmergencybeingdeclaredin1952,which

lasteduntil1960.ThecasualtiesduringtheMauMaurevoltareestimatedtohavebeen100Europeans

and10,000Africans.

Thecolonialadministrationintroducedlandreform,partlytoaddressthegrievancesofthe

independencemovement,butitdidnotcontainanysignificantcomponentofredistribution.Tothe

extentthattherewastransferoflandintheplantationeconomyintheearly1960s,thiswasmainly

fromEuropeanstothenew,mainlyAfrican,politicalelite.IntheRiftValley,theallocationoflandto

Kikuyusettlersduringboththelatecolonialandearlyindependenceyears,causedresentmentbythe

residentKalenjin,wholookedupontheKikuyusasoutsiders(BranchandCheeseman2008).

Thus,whenpowerwashandedoverfromthecolonialadministrationtotheKenyansin1963,someof

thekeycharacteristicsoftodayspoliticalsituationwerealreadyinplace:acentralisedstatewitha

powerfulexecutive,politicalconflictaroundtheissueofinequality,particularlywithreferenceto

land,andatraditionofviolentconfrontationbetweenthestateandpopularmovementsinopposition.

IncreasingconcentrationofpowersintheExecutiveKenyattaestablishedapatrimonialstatefromthebeginning.Bythisismeantthatheoversawthe

informalestablishmentofpatronclientnetworks,whereclientswererewardedwithland,state

contractsandotherpreferentialtreatment.AnAfricanbusinesselite,predominantlyKikuyus,

emergedalongside

businessmen

of

Indian

origin.

Some

resentment

appeared,

particularly

from

the

Luo,thatthenonKikuyuwerenotgivenashareofpositionsintheleadershipcommensuratewith

theirshareofthepopulation.ButKenyattadidhaveameasureofsuccessinportrayinghimselfasthe

fatherofthenationandtheleaderofallethnicgroupings.Kenyattaalsohadtheadvantageofhaving

accesstoconsiderablesourcesofpatronage,mostsignificantlythroughthereallocationoflargetracts

oflandvacatedbyEuropeansettlers.

Inthefirstyearsofindependence,thereweretwomajorpoliticalparties.TheKenyaAfrican

NautionalUnion(KANU)wasthepartyofKenyattaandthedominantKikuyuinitiallyinalliance

withtheLuounderOgingaOdingasleadership.TheKenyanAfricanDemocraticUnion(KADU)was

thepartyoftheKalenjinandothermoremarginalethnicgroupsintheRiftValley,butitalsohad

supportintheCoastProvinceandamongthewhitepopulation.KADUadvocatedtheadoptionofa

systemofregionalfederalism,whichbecameknownasMajimboism.Thiscausesoonfadedfromthenationalagenda,however,andKenyattaluredKADUleadersintocrossingthefloor,inreturnfor

lucrativeappointments,ingovernmentorparastatals,orallocationofvaluablelandintheRiftValley.

KADUmergedwithKANUin1964,onlyayearafterindependence,andKenyabecameadefactoone

partystate(Mueller2008).

AgainstthebackdropoftheColdWaranideologicalriftemergedinKANUbetweenKenyattaand

Odinga.WhereasKenyattafavouredaWesternorientedforeignpolicyandliberalisteconomic

policies,OdingamaintainedlinkswiththeSovietblocandespousedredistributionistpolicies.

EventuallyOdingaleftKANUtoformtheKenyaPeoplesUnion(KPU).TheerstwhileKANUMPs

whohadcrossedthefloorwerecompelledtofacetheelectorateagaininaseriesofbielectionsin

3TheinformationinthisandthefollowingparagraphsisdrawnmainlyfromMarguetteet.al.2008


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7

1966.Manyofthemlost.AlthoughsomeprominentKikuyuleadershadjoinedOdingaintheKPUon

ideologicalratherthanethnicgrounds,theKPUwasportrayedasaLuoparty.ThesplitinKANUin

the1960sforeshadowedthesameethnicandideologicalsentimentsthattranspiredin2007/2008.

AfterthedeathofKenyattain1978,thePresidencywenttoDanielarapMoi,thenVicePrecident.A

memberofthesmallerKalenjinethnicgroupfromtheRiftValley,onemighthaveexpectedhimto

revivetheMajimboismandredistributionpoliciesoftheearlyKADU.Thisdidnothappen.Whilethe

Kenyanlocalauthoritiesatindependencewererelativelywellfunctioning,thecentralgovernment

startedchippingawayattheirpowersandresourcebasesoonafterindependence.Inthe1970sthe

responsibilityfordeliveringthebasicsocialservicesofhealthandeducationweremovedfromthe

LocalAuthoritiestothelineministriesandtheLocalAuthoritieslostitsmostimportanttaxbase.This

developmentcontinuedunabatedlyunderMoi,withthestrengtheningoftheProvincial

Administration,whichisunderthePresidentsOfficeandinfactanextendedarmofthePresidency,

attheexpenseofthelocalauthorities.Moialsocreatedmanynewdistrictsbysubdividingexisting

ones.Thiswasdonetocreatenewofficestobestowtohisallies.Thenewdistrictswereoftennot

viable,whichledtoafurtherdeteriorationofthestateoflocalgovernmentinKenya(see,e.g.,Ghai

2008,222).

Moisadaptionoftheslogannyayofootstepssignalledthatheintendedtofollowthetracklaid

outbyKenyatta.MoifacedtougheroddsthanKenyatta,however,inkeepingtogethertheelite

allianceforgedbythefirstpresident.Hedidnothaveasizeableethnicbaseandhedidnothavethe

samekindofaccesstothespoilsofindependenceasKenyatta.Mostsignificantly,therewasnolonger

anyvacantsettlerlandtoallocatetoalliesorwouldbeallies.Italsodidnthelpthatthebeginningof

theMoieracoincidedwithaglobaleconomicdownturnfollowingthe1979oilcrises(Branchand

Cheeseman2008)andtheendofacoffeeboomforKenyanproducersintheglobalcoffeemarket.

Inordertoconsolidatehispoliticalcontrolintheseadversecircumstances,Moiemployedthetwin

tacticsofbuyingsupportthroughpredationonthestatesresourcesandtheweakeningofhisenemies

throughdeliberatepolicesoffurthercentralisationofpower.Followingthe1982failedcoupattemptit

becameabundantlyclearthatpowercouldnotbetakenforgranted.Aconstitutionalamendmentwas

hastilypassedtointroduceadejureonepartystateandMoisgovernmentoutlawedethnicwelfare

organisations,themostpowerfulofwhichhadbeentheGikuyu,EmbuandMeruAssociation

(GEMA),whichwasseentobehostiletotheMoiregime.

MoisstrategyofexpandingthesystemintroducedbyKenyattaofusingthestatesresourcesto

maintainhisnetworkofpatronagewaspartlymadepossiblethroughwhatBranchandCheeseman

hastermedtheinformalisationofthestate(2008).Thisincludedthedeliberateweakeningofcontrol

institutions,suchasthejudiciaryandtheauditorgeneral,andofsystemsoffinancialmanagement.

Increasingly,thePresidencytookonextrapowers,whilethecheckswereweakened.Thiswasa

deliberatestrategytomaintaincontrolandtoensurethatthePresidentcouldmanoeuvreashe

wished,unencumbered

by

external

controls.

This

led

to

aweakening

of

state

institutions,

which

were

increasinglyseenasservingthecountryseliteratherthanthepeople.Thesourceofpolitical

patronagewasfoundinallocatingpublicland,ofteninprotectedforestsandpublicareaslikeurban

parksandreservedland,thesaleofparastatals,andincreasinglylargeschemesofgrandcorruptionin

publicprocurementandfinancialmanagement.Towhatextentthisexploitationofstateinstitutions

forprivategainsbyPresidentMoiledtothedeclininglegitimacyofthestateisdifficulttoassess,but

itisprobablethatthelegitimacyofthestatewashigherunderKenyatta,interaliaowingtotheviewof

thegeneralperceptionofKenyattaasthefoundingfatherofthenationbutalsobecausepolitical

awarenesswasrisingandpeoplebecamemoreinformed.

AsawaveofdemocracysweptacrosstheworldwiththefalloftheSovietUnionandtheendofthe

ColdWar,thepressureforchangewasmountingsteadilyinKenyabytheendofthe1980s.Moiwas

stronglyagainsttheintroductionofmultipartyism,arguingthatitwouldfueltribalism,causeconflictandunderminenationaldevelopment.Aspressuremounted,alsofromdevelopmentpartnerswho


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8

withheldsupportastheydemandedtheintroductionofcompetitivepartydemocracy,Moiwasforced

togivethepopulationtheirfirstrealtasteofmultipartyelectionssincetheearlydaysofthe

independentrepublic.

Theintroductionofmultipartydemocracyfuelledafurtherincreaseinanalreadyhighlevelof

corruption.Sittingleadersacceleratedaccumulation,astheywerenowlesscertainofbeingableto

stayinpower.Also,itquicklybecameapparentthatsecuringvictoryinmultipartyelectionsare

expensive,whichinturn,providedfurthermotivationforaccumulation,oftenthroughhighly

organisedschemeswiththebackingofpoliticalparties.

Asecondimpactoftheintroductionofpoliticalcompetitionwastheincreasinguseofviolence.This

arguablystartedwithsomeseniorpoliticianskeepingpersonalmilitiasofbodyguardsalreadyinthe

early1980s,whichtheyusedtometeoutprivatejustice(Mueller2008).Suchprivatemilitias

increasedwithtimeanduse,andpoliticianswouldalsohirelocalgangsofyouthtointimidate

politicalopponents.Intherunuptothefirstmultipartyelectionsin1992,therewassystematicuseof

violence.TheviolencewasparticularlysevereintheRiftValley,whereKANUwasworriedabout

losingvotestolargesectionsofrelativelyrecentsettlersfromtheKikuyu,theLuhyaandtheLuo

ethnicgroups.

This

presented

aparticular

risk

under

the

new

electoral

rules,

as

Moi

was

likely

to

be

dependentofgettingatleast25%ofthevotesintheRiftValley,inordertosatisfytherequirementof

gettingatleast25%ofthevotein5ofthe8provincesinordertobeelectedPresident.

Toaddressthisproblem,seniorpoliticiansunleashedgangsofyoung,armedmenofcertainsections

ofthepopulation,todrivepeopleawayfromtheirhomes,thuspreventingthemfromcastingtheir

votes.Intherunuptothe1992elections,morethan300,000people,mostlyKikuyu,weredisplaced

andmorethan1,500peoplewerekilled.Thenumberofpeoplekilled,wasthereforepossiblyeven

higherthanafterthe2007elections.Thenamesofseveraloftheleadersandofficialsresponsiblefor

organisingtheviolenceweremadeknowninseveralpublishedreports,includingthoseof

Governmentcommissions.Still,todatenobodyhasbeenheldaccountablefortheirsponsorshipofthe

1992.Therelevanceofthishistoriccaseofimpunitytothemorerecenteventsisobvious.

Moiemergedvictoriousfromthe1992elections,andsecuredhiselectiontothepositionofPresident,

althoughhewononlyabout1/3ofthevote.Theerstwhileunifiedoppositionunderthebannerofthe

ForumfortheRestorationofDemocracy(Ford),hadquicklyfragmentedintoseveralopposition

partiesandconsequentlyfailedtobecomearealchallengetoKANU,duetotheirfailuretoenterintoa

strategicalliance.Kibakiwastheclosestcontenderforthepresidency,ontheticketoftheDemocratic

Party.

Historyrepeateditselfinthe1997elections.Theelectioncampaignwasmarredbyorganisedviolence

aimedatethnicgroupsseentobeopposedtoKANU.Casualtieswereinthehundredsandmorethan

100,000peopleweredisplaced.Again,theoppositionfailedtoforgeastrategiccoalition,andagain

KANUandMoiwontheelectionandsecuredthePresidency.

Inthisperiod,statepredationledtothelevelofcorruptionreachingnewheights.Themostinfamous

caseistheGoldenbergscandal,throughwhichanestimatedUSD600mhadbeenpaidoutinexport

compensationforfictitiousexportsofgoldandpreciousstones.Aconsultancycommissionedbythe

GovernmenttowardstheendofKANUsrule,tolookintotheproblemofcorruptiondeliveredthe

followingconclusiontotheGovernmentofKenya: ourconclusionisthatthelevelofcorruptionin

KenyaisbecomingsoendemicthatitisbeginningtothreatenthebasicstructuresoftheState (Risk

AdvisoryGroupLtd.2002).

TowardstheendofMoislastterminoffice,theNationalDevelopmentParty(NDP),ledbyRaila

Odinga,sonofOgingaOdinga,wentintoanalliancewithKANU,andOdingawasgiventhekey

LocalGovernmentMinistry.ThiswasaclassicalMoistrategyofkeepinghisfriendscloseandhis

enemiescloser,andonewhichhehadusedalsointheyearsbeforemultipartyism.Thistime,however,itdidnotwork,andRailaOdingaandNDPpulledoutofthegovernmentbeforethe2002


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9

elections,andjoinedaunitedopposition,theNationalAllianceofKenya,undertheNationalRainbow

Alliance(NARC).OdingaforgedanalliancewithKibaki.AccordingtoasignedMemorandumof

Understanding,itwasunderstoodthatafteraconstitutionalreview,Odingawouldbethefirst

candidateforanewpositionasanexecutivePrimeMinister.Thiswasintendedtoaddacheckonthe

executivepowersofthePresident.

Acommitmentwasmadethatanewconstitutionwouldbeinplacewithinhalfayearoftheelections.

AconstitutionalreviewcommissionhadbeenestablishedundertheKANUgovernmentalreadyin

1998,buttheprocesshadbeendraggingonandithadbecomeclearthatKANUdidnotwantanew

constitutioninplacebeforethe2002elections.Thenewconstitutionhadbeenexpectedtoprovidefor

somekindofdecentralisation,devolvingpowersandresourcesfromthePresidencyandthecentral

governmenttolocalauthorities.

The2002electionssawtwoKikuyucontendersforpresidency.KibakiwasthecandidateforNARC

(thecoalitionthatincludedthepartythenheadedbyOdinga,theLiberalDemocraticParty)and

UhuruKenyattawasthecandidateofKANUasMoicouldnotstandagainbecausehehadservedthe

maximumtermsallowedundertheconstitution.UhuruKenyattawasthesonofthelateJomo

Kenyatta.The

elections

resulted

in

alandslide

victory

for

NARC

and

the

end

of

the

KANU

era.

The

2002electionswerealsonotableforthenearabsenceofviolence.Therewasnoneoftheorganised

violencethathadmarredthe1992and1997elections.

ThemultiethniccoalitionledbyKibakiwascampaigningonapromiseofzerotoleranceon

corruption,anditsvictory,afterelectionsthatweredeemedfree,fairandpeaceful,brought

unprecedentedhopeandoptimismtoKenya.InthedaysaftertheswearinginofKibaki,passengers

ofthecapitalsmatatuminibusesphysicallyrebuffedpolicemenwhotriedtocontinuetheroutine

collectionofbribesfromthematatudriversforrealorimaginaryoffenses.Thiswasaspontaneous

demonstrationofthepowerofaccountabilityfrombelow,whenthereisasenseofacommonpurpose

andconfidencethatactionwillreceivesupport,whetherfromthecitizenry,theauthoritiesorboth.

Thenew

administrations

commitment

to

fight

corruption

was

demonstrated

by

the

appointment

of

thewellknownanticorruptionactivistJohnGithongo,fromTransparencyInternationalKenya,tothe

newpositionofPermanentSecretaryofAntiCorruptioninthePresidentsOffice.Theeuphoriawas

notlonglived,however.Notbeforelong,anewgrandcorruptionscandalbroke.ThiswastheAnglo

Leasingscandal,whichwasthelargestofastringofcorruptionscandalsrelatingtonationalsecurity.

Githongosinvestigationsfoundevidenceofthecomplicityofanumberofseniorpoliticians.Atone

stagetwoministersandthreePermanentSecretariesresigned,andthelatterwerearraignedincourt.

Noprosecutionsfollowed,however,andthepoliticiansweresoonreappointedtoministerial

positions.

InJanuary2005,Githongoresignedandwentintoexile,citingthreatstohislifeashisreason.Bythis

timeithadbecomeobviousthathedidnothavethesupportofKibakiorthegovernment.Areport

thatGithongofirstpresentedtoKibakiandthenmadepublicthroughtheBBCwebsiteprovidedirrefutableevidenceoftheextenttowhichgrandcorruptioninKenyaistiedupwithpoliticalparty

financing(Githongo2006).HecitesdiscussionswithseniorMinisterswhereheistoldpointblankthat

themoniespaidforfakecontractsisneededforthefinancingofpartyelectionsandheistoldtolayoff

inhisinvestigations.Theuseofpublicfundsforpartycampaignshasbeenacommonpracticein

governmentcircles.TherulingpartiesincludingKANUandthedefunctNARChaveenjoyedbenefits

ofelectioncampaignsfundedbythepubliccoffersastherehasbeenlittledistinctionbetweenthe

rulingpartyandthegovernment.

Thehopesinitiallypinnedontheconstitutionalreviewalsoquicklyfaded.In2003,thedraft

constitutionproducedbytheConstitutionalReviewCommitteewasagreedatBomasinNairobi.The

socalled

Bomas

draft

provided

for

astrong

executive

Prime

Minister

post

and

aquasi

federal

system

ofgovernment(commonlyreferredtoasMajimbo).ThisdraftcausedasplitbetweentheGovernment


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10

andOdinga.However,thegovernmentwentaheadandsignificantlyalteredtheBomasdraft,andput

itsownamendedproposal(thesocalledWakodraft)toareferenduminNovember2005.The

campaignovertheWakodraftledtoconfrontationbetweenthebananasoftheyessideforthe

Governmentsproposalandtheorangesofthenoside(namedafterthesymbolsontheballot

papers).Thereferendumturnedintoaplebisciteonthegovernment.Theorangeswonaresounding

victory,whichwasseenasanexpressionofthepublicsdisappointmentwiththeGovernmentsfailuretotacklecorruptionandtotackletheprivilegesenjoyedbytheelites.

Thepoliticaltraumaoftheaftermathofthe2007electionTheorangesbuiltonthemomentumofthe2005referendumtoformtheOrangeDemocratic

MovementtochallengeKibakiinthe2007elections.ButwhiletheODMlatersplitintotheODM,lead

byRailaOdinga,andODMKenya,ledbyKalonzoMusyoka,KibakiformedthenewPartyof

NationalUnity,andmanagedtogetthesupportofKANUamongothers.Goingintotheelections,

opinionpollsshowedthatitwastooclosetocall.WhilePNUobviouslyhadlostsomepopularity

becauseoftheGovernmentsfailuretotacklecorruptionandinequalities,economicreformshad

resultedinsignificanteconomicgrowth. Intheperiod20022007Kenyaenjoyedrobusteconomic

growthwith

areal

GDP

average

of

5.4%.

In

2007

the

real

GDP

reached

7.1%.

The

service

sector,

led

bythetourismandtelecommunicationsindustry,wasoneofthemaindriversofgrowth,indicating

increasedemployment.However,strongeconomicgrowthhaddonelittletoreducethecountrys

widespreadpovertybecausedistributionwasskewedinfavourofthealreadyaffluent.In19982002

thepoorest20%ofthepopulationreceivedonly6%ofthenationalincome,whiletherichest20%took

49%.Inaddition,thepopulationsufferedfromagenerallyhighconsumerpriceinflation,averaging

around11%in200307.4

While the run up to the elections were, like the 2002 elections, mostly free from organised violence, theviolence after the elections was equal to the pre-election violence of 1992 in terms of casualties5. Therewere reports, however, of female candidates being exposed to serious violence and threats of violenceintended to prevent them from standing for elections and many women also experienced sexual and

gender based violence and threats thereof to prevent them from voting. TheimmediatecauseofthepostelectionviolencewastheflawedelectionadministrationwiththeElectionCommissionofKenya

(ECK)atitscentre,inparticularthescandalousmismanagementofthefinalcountingandtallying

processbytheECKandtheannouncementofKibakiasthewinnerofthepresidentialcontest.This

spurredintergrouphatredandangerthatsoontookanethnicturn.Yet,thisethnicisationofpolitical

unrestwasrelatedtounderlyingconflictsoflongstandingsocialinjustice,regionalinequalityand,

especiallyinpartsoftheRiftValley,ofaccesstoandownershipofland.

Theviolenceinearly2008tookdifferentforms.Itwasspontaneousinsomeregionsbutplannedin

others.Illegallyarmedgroups,mostofwhichassociatedwithparticularethnicgroupsoperatedin

theirrespectivehomeprovinces,butalsoinurbanareas.Themostprominentillegallyarmedgroups

weretheMungiki,mostlyassociatedwiththeKikuyu,butalsooperatinginpocketscountrywide,and

theSabaotLandDefenceForce(SLDF),associatedwiththeSabaotandoperatingintheMt.Elgon

area.6Somepoliticiansmobilisedandfinancedyouthtoactagainsttheirrivalsforpoliticalgain.Butit

isalsosaidthatgroupswereformedquicklytoprotecttheirrespectivecommunitiesandlocalitiesand

thatyouthorganisedthemselvesalongethniclinestofightrivalcommunities.Toolsusedfortilling

4EconomistIntelligenceUnit:www.eiu.com5TheinformationontheelectioninthefollowingparagraphsisdrawnmainlyfromAndreassen,BrdA.,T.Barasa,T.Kibua

andA.Tostensen.2008.Iactedunder a lotofpressureThedisputed2007Kenyangeneralelection in context,NORDEM

Report,NorwegianCentreforHumanRights,UniversityofOslo.6 The outlawedMungiki group originated as an extremeKikuyu nationalistmovementwith a program to reviveKikuyu

customsand traditions.Itgraduallydegenerated intoamafialikecriminalorganisationinvolved inrobberyandextortionof

matatu drivers and shop owners.Mungikis operations in local communities have created fear and anger, and led to theformationof vigilantegroupsbecause thepolicehaveprovedunableorunwilling toprovideprotection to thevillagers. It

allegedlyhasconnectionswithkeypoliticians.


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11

landwerealsousedasweapons. Peoplewereevictedfromtheirhomesteadsandcruelmurdersof

innocentpeoplewerecommitted.Inurbancentres,looting,burninganddestructionofshopsand

propertiesreachedmassiveproportions.Barricadesandroadblocksweresetuptointimidateandrob

travellersanddestroytheirvehiclesiftheybelongedtothewrongethniccommunity.Thelooters

knewthatthelikelihoodofanyjudicialactionbeingtakenagainstthemwasminimal.Inshort,the

postelectioncrisiscreatedasituationoflawlessnessandimpunityforcrimescarriedoutintheviolenceaffectedareas.7

Violencewascommittedbymilitia,armedcriminals,andorganizedcrimegangsandbythepolice

andthemilitary.Theformercommittedthegravestofoffencesandterrorisedthecitizens.However,

overwhelmingtestimonyisgivenofsystematic,widespread,andcarefullyplannedextrajudicial

executionsundertakenbytheKenyanpolice.Anumberofkillingsbypolicewouldundoubtedlyhave

occurredincircumstanceswheretheuseofforcewaslawfulbyinternationalstandards.Butinthe

currentcircumstancesitisdoubtfulwhetheranaccurateandimpartialassessmentoftheviolencecan

bemade,andthereisnoindependentaccountabilitymechanism.ItisarguedthattheKenyanpolice

arealawuntothemselves,oftenkillingwithimpunity.Ajustificationoftengivenisthatthefailuresof

thejusticesystemleavethepolicewithnoalternativebuttoadministerjusticethemselves.Onthe

otherhandthepolicearemajorbeneficiariesoftheinadequaciesoftheKenyanlegalsystem.

TheWakireportontheinquiryintothepostelectionviolencetheclosestonecangettoanimpartial

account statesthatthecommissionreceivedharrowingevidenceduringitsinvestigationsdetailing

howthepoliceofficersbrutallyrapedthewomenintheirhousesinfrontoftheirchildrenand

husbands,othersonthewayastheirfledandeventhoseinrefugeecamps.Thereportalsocriticises

thepoliceforlackofwilltopoliceitselfandtakeactionagainstofficerssuspectedtobeinvolvedin

sexualcrimesduringthisperiod. Thisis,however,notacompletelynewcharacteristicofKenyan

policeasthemediaforyearshavereportedonaccusationsleveledagainstpoliceofficerswhohave

rapedwomenwhileonduty.Thesecaseshaveinmostinstancesnotbeenfullyprosecutedandthey

rarelyreachcourt.Thisisindicativeofafundamentallackofrightsandprotectionofwomenin

Kenya.

Apartfromthepolice,shortcomingsarereportedintwootherpartsofthecriminaljusticesystem,i.e.

theOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneralandtheJudiciary.Thejudiciaryisastumblingblockinachieving

justicebothinrelationtoaccusedcriminalsandtopoliceaccusedofkillingunlawfully.Asindicated

above,thisisnotanewphenomenonandonemaywondertowhatextentimpunityforcrimesis

increasinglybecomingacceptedandcounteduponbypeopleingeneral.

Themilitary,enjoyingagenerallyfavourablereputationinKenya,alsobecametaintedbytheconflict.

AmilitaryoperationinMt.ElgonDistricttodisbandanddisarmSLDFwasexecutedinaheavy

handedwayandgeneratedclaimsoftortureofcivilians.

Therapidescalationofthecrisisprovokedswiftreactionsfromtheinternationalcommunity.The

AfricanUnionmandatedKofiAnnanastheheadofamediationteamofEminentAfricanPersonstofindapeacefulresolutiontothecrisis.AttheconclusionofthemediationphaseinJuly2008,apower

sharingagreement,subsequentlyadoptedastheNationalAccordandReconciliationActhadbeen

brokeredwherebyKibakiremainedpresidentwhilethepostofprimeministerwiththeauthorityto

coordinateandsupervisetheexecutionofgovernmentfunctionwascreatedforOdinga.Duringthe

negotiationsthepartiesalsoagreedtoestablishthreeimportantcommissions:TheIndependent

ReviewCommissiononthe2007elections(IREC)andtheCommissionofInquiryintothePost

ElectionViolence(CIPEV),bothofwhichhadcompletedtheirworkbyearly2009andtheTruth,

JusticeandReconciliationCommission(TJRC)whichwillinquireinto,humanrightsviolation,

7The information on violence isbased onPress StatementbyProf.PhilipAlston,UN SpecialRapporteur on extrajudicial,arbitrary or summary executions, Mission to Kenya, 1625.02.2009 and The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation

MonitoringProject,January2009,ImmediateActiontoTopviolenceandRestoreFundamentalRightsandLiberties.


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12

historicalinjustices,illegalorirregularacquisitionoflandandthemisuseofpoliticalpowerfrom

independencein1963tothepresent.

Theseinitiativesprovideampleopportunitytoaddressingreatdetailtherootcausesoftheviolence

ofthe2002election.However,theprocesstoimplementtherecommendationshasbeenslow.The

coalitiongovernmenthasestablishedanInterimIndependentElectoralCommission(IIEC)tocleanup

thevotersroll.ItisdeeplydividedaboutimplementingtherecommendationsoftheWaki

Commissionintopostelectionviolence.8Nothinghashappenedontheurgentlyneededreformofthe

securityforces.TheTJRCisnotyetestablishedalthoughsomereconciliationinitiativeshavebeen

taken.Negotiationsoveranew,longawaitedconstitutionarelikelytopresentthecoalitionwithone

ofitsbiggestchallenges.Thecoalitionalsofaceschallengesoftacklinginequitablelanddistribution

andendemiccorruption.

Atthetimeofthefieldworkthegoverningcoalitionwasunderstressbecauseofsplitsbetweenthe

twomainparties.Attheheartoftheissuewereandstillaredisagreementsoverthepower

relationshipbetweenPNUandODM,ledbytheirleaders,andthepace,scopeanddepthsofreforms.

ODMhasincreasinglycomplainedaboutbeingtreatedasjuniorpartner,whereasthepeaceaccordis

basedon

the

concept

of

an

equal

partnership.

Part

of

the

problem

is

that

the

post

of

prime

minister

wascreatedtoenticeODMintothecoalitionwithoutacleardivisionofpowerwiththePresidency.In

recentmonthsinitiativeshavebeentakentoresolvethedifferenceswithoutresults.Itappearsthat

ODMwantsdetaileddiscussionsaboutthefullimplementationoflastyearsaccord,whilePNU,it

seems,iswillingtodiscussonlygeneralities.

Thegrandcoalitionisscheduledtolastuntil2012,butgiventheongoingbattleforinfluencethereis

nocertaintythatitwilllastthatlong.However,thepowersharingagreementmakesnoprovisionfor

anotherelection.Thecoalitionwillcollapseifeithersideformallypullsout;realistically,thisapplies

onlytoODM.Butsuchamovewouldbeadangerousdevelopment,asitwouldleadtocallsforan

earlyelectionwiththeriskofanewroundofviolence.Itcanbearguedthatthecoalitionwillhold

togetherbecauseneitherpartywantstorelinquishpower.Onepossibleoutcomeistheemergenceofa

restructuredcoalitionasfactionsswitchsides,formnewalliancesormoveintoopposition,aprocess

thatislikelytointensifyintherunuptothenextelection.

Thewranglingforpowerishotlydebatedinthemedia,exposingthelackofinterestsinthewellbeing

ofthenation.Arguablyoneofthemostdamagingimagesofthe2007/08postelectionviolenceisthe

oneofthenationalleadersfightingforpower,seeminglyoblivioustothecarnageontheground.The

messageconveyedwasthattheleaderswereinsulatedfromthelifeanddeathproblemsthatthe

peoplefacedontheground,andthattheyweremoreconcernedaboutjostlingforpositionand

privileges,thanaboutthewellbeingofthepeople.Thedamagedonetothelegitimacyofthestatein

Kenyamusthavebeenverysignificant.

Insocialandeconomicterms,theeffectsofthepostelectiontraumaarestilltobedetermined.The

humancostsoftheviolenceweredramaticandwillhavealongtermimpactonsocialrelationsandtrustamongethniccommunities. TociteKenyaNationalDialogueandReconciliationMonitoring

Project:

Consolidatingnationalcohesionandunityisessentialinguaranteeingstabilityandprosperityof

theKenyannation.Thishingesontheextenttowhichperceptionsofmarginalisationand

exclusionareeliminatedandasenseofbelongingandtogethernesscultivatedamongthe

citizenry.Thisentailsaddressingtherootcausesofsuchperceptionsasinequalityandinequity,

regionaldevelopmentimbalancesandengagementindecisionmaking(January2009,Long

standingissuesandsolutions).

8

The

Waki

Commission

(on

Inquiry

into

Post

Election

Violence)

recommended

the

establishment

of

a

special

tribunal

to

undertaketrialsatthenationallevel,andfailingthatarrangementsweremade,toinvolvetheInternationalCriminalCourt

(ICC).Nothinghasyethappened.


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13

ConcludingremarksThisbriefhistoryofpoliticaldevelopmentinKenyasinceindependenceandthesituationafterthe

2007electionhavebeenpresentedtoprovideacontextforthepresentchallengesfacedby

developmentpartnerswhenlookingforwaystocontributepositivelytobuildingstrongerstructures

andprocessesofdemocracyandgoodgovernanceinKenya.Althoughthehistoricaldevelopmenthas

beenfarfromlinear,weseeasteadytrendalonganumberofissues:

Thereremainsaseriousgapbetweentherulingelitesandthepopulationatlarge,betweenthehavesandthehavenots.Thestatehasbecomeincreasinglypredatory,andhistorical

grievancesaroundinequalitiesandperceivedwrongsinlandownershiparenotbeing

addressed.

Theraiseofprivatemilitiasandthediffusionofviolence,touseSusanneMuellersevocativephrase,hasseriouslychallengedthestatesmonopolyoflegitimateviolence.Theuseof

violencebypoliticalcontendersduringelectionshas,withtheexceptionofarespitein2002,

becomesystematic.Thestatesfailuretodealdecisivelywithviolentgangsandmafialike

networksofextortionandprotectionhasalsodenteditslegitimacyamongthecitizenryasitis

seentofailinitsprimaryroleofprovidingsecurity.

Boththeproblemsofsocialandeconomicinequalityandlackofsecurityarecompoundedbyimpunity.Therearecountlessreports,manyofwhichofficial,andpublicinvestigation

commissionedbytheGovernmentofthedaythatnamesseniorleadersasaccomplicesin

largescaletheftofpublicresourcesorviolenceagainstKenyancitizens,butnoseniorleader

hasyetbeentriedandconvictedincourt.Thishasanobviouslynegativeimpactonthe

credibilityoftheruleoflawandoftheregulatoryfunctionsofthestate.

TakentogetherthesecharacteristicsofKenyanpoliticallifehavecontributednotonlytoundermining

thelegitimacyofthestate,buthasalsonegativelyimpactedonitscapacityandabilitytomanageits

resourcesinanefficientandresponsiblemannerandtodeliverqualityservicestothepublic.The

increasinglycentralisedsystemofgovernmentandtheemaciationoflocalgovernmenthavealsofailedtoprovideforeffectivepublicparticipationindecisionmaking.

AlthoughKenyacanboastthestrongestandmostselfsufficienteconomyandthebesteducated

populationintheregion,thepoliticalanalysisintheprevioussectionprovidesanadmittedlybleak

renditionofthestateofKenyaanditssystemofgovernmentandgovernance.Theverystrengthsof

theKenyansocietypointtosomeofthegapsinmuchofthedevelopmenttheoriesaroundgovernance

andinternationalassistance.Notleast,itpointstothelimitationoftraditionalcapacitybuilding

programs.Takingtheexampleofanticorruption,conventionaldevelopmentpartneranalysis

suggeststhatthereareatleastfourfactorsthatarepresentinstateswithgoodgovernance:

Astrongandvibrantcivilsociety; Strongandindependentmedia; Asizeableandinfluentialmiddleclass;and Competitivepoliticswherenopartydominatesoverthelongterm.

ThepuzzlewithKenyaisthatintheEasternAfricaregion,sheisbyfarthestrongestinallthesefour

dimensions,yetKenyaisconsistentlyrankedasthemostcorruptcountryintheregion.Although

corruptionwasconsideredbysometobejustaparticularlyweakdimensionofanotherwisestrong

state,recenteventshavehighlightedthatthehighlevelofcorruptioninKenyamaybeonlyone

dimensionofsystematicallypoorgovernance.

ThechallengeinKenyaistobuildontheimpressivestrengthsthatthecountrydoespossess,while

overcomingthestatessystematicweaknesses.Inthenextsectionwewilltakeacloserlookatthemost


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14

recentthinkingontheissuesrelatedtodevelopmentassistantincountriesinfragilesituationsandthe

importanceofstatesocietyrelationsandlegitimacy.

3. ChallengesofDevelopmentAssistanceinaCountryinaFragileSituation

Theinternationaldevelopmentpartnercommunityhasforsometimevoicedtheopinionthata

developmentpartnerstrategyshouldbeunderstoodinananalyticalapproachofpoliticaleconomy.A

politicaleconomyanalysiswoulduncovertheopportunitiesandobstaclesforanexternalactorand

possiblyidentifypotentialdomesticagentsofchange.Weagree.Itiscertainlyessentialtounderstand

localpowerrelationswithinsociety,andbetweenthestateandvarioussocialgroups.

However,foradevelopmentpartnertotakeastrategicapproachtogovernanceinastateinfragile

situations,themostrecentthinkinginOECD/DACconveysthatthefocusshouldbeonstate

legitimacy(Bellinaetal.2009).Inthisapproachstatebuildingisthecentralobjective.Butratherthan

beingcenteredonthestateperse,thefocusisontherelationsbetweenstateandsociety.Becausea

stateslegitimacy

is,

by

definition,

aquestion

of

the

extent

to

which

the

state

is

able

to

meet

peoples

expectations.Statelegitimacyisthenformedinamutualrelationshipbetweenstateandsociety.In

otherwords,statebuildingandstatelegitimacyconcernsstatesocietyrelationsthroughwhichthe

stateandsocietyarelinkedandbywhichstateauthorityisjustified.

InordertodevelopastrategyongovernanceinKenya,developmentpartnersmustunderstandhow

legitimacyrelatestostatebuildinginafragilesituation.Inthisperspective,fragilityreferstolackof

capacity,definednotonlyasorganisational,institutionalandfinancialcapacity,butalsoasthe

capacitytoproduceorsupporttheexistenceofcommonnorms,rulesandregulationsthatare

recognisedandsharedbyboththestateandthegeneralpopulation.Aswillbeexplainedbelowthese

factorsidentifylegitimacy.Infact,statefragilitycanstembothfromlackoffinancial,technicaland

humancapacityandfromlackoflegitimacy,andbothcanhinderthemakingofthestateasarobust

institution.

Facedwithaparticularcontext,wemusttakeanempiricalapproachtolegitimacyandmakeouta

strategynotaccordingtointernationallyestablishedstandardsofrights,fairnessorjustice,buttowhat

peoplearelikelytoconsiderlegitimate.Statelegitimacydrawsonachangingmixofdifferentsources

ordimensions.Effortstohelpbolsterstatelegitimacyinfragilesituationsmustbecognizantofallthe

dimensionsofstatelegitimacysimultaneously.Noneofthesourcesofstatelegitimacyexistsinisolation

andnostatereliessolelyononeofthem.Forexample,astatewhosefragilitystemsinpartfromits

lackofcapacitytodeliverserviceswillnotnecessarilybeseenaslegitimateifthequalityofitsservices

isimproved.Thatwilldependontheextenttowhichcitizensconsiderthestateasawholeas

legitimate,includinghowitisseentoembodyandrepresentasenseofcommunity(beliefs)andhow

itoperatesandperforms.Moreover,thesourcesofthelegitimacyofastateareeffectivesourcesof

legitimacyonlytotheextentthatthepopulationconsidersthemtobeso.Centralherearethe

dynamicsbywhichvariousgroupsseekeithertoenhanceorweakenthelegitimacyofthepolitical

orderandthesenseofcommunity.


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15

Onecandistinguishthreegeneraltypesanddimensions:

i) Howthestatefunctions:Thelegitimacyofthestateistiedtotherulesandproceduresthroughwhichitmakesbindingdecisions(participatoryprocesses,bureaucraticmanagement,justice).In

asovereignstate,thestateisseenasexpressingthewillofthepeople,althoughstatelegitimacy

through

participation

is

closely

linked

with

democratic

elections.

Moreover,

legitimacy

through

participationextendsbeyondelectionsandincludestransparency,checksandbalancesoncentres

ofpower,proceduralnorms,auditingofpublicfunds,appropriatemediacoverageandpublic

politicaldebate.Suchmechanismsofaccountabilityconstituteasourceoflegitimacysincethey

provideachannelforcitizenstobeengagedinhowthestategoverns,beyondtheperiodic

electionofrulers.Inasystemofpatronage,legitimacyrestsontherewardsthataccruefrom

exchange,andthefactthatthisexchangepervadeslargepartsofsociety.Ifaninstitutionis

consideredlegitimate,itwillbefollowedorobeyed,evenwhenitgoesagainstonesselfinterest

andevenifthereisanabsenceofcrediblesanctions.

ii) Whatthestatedoes:Legitimacyisdefinedinrelationtotheservices(security,welfare,education,health,infrastructure,regulationandfacilitationofeconomicactivities,etc.)thatthestatedelivers

andtheperceivedeffectivenessandqualityoftheseservices.Thestateisexpectedtoprovidesecuritybutwhethertheprovisionofsecuritywillbolsterthestateslegitimacydependson

peoplesexperiencewiththestate(whetherithasbeenrepressive,violent,etc.),andonthe

legitimacyandcapacityofothergroups(rebelgroups,etc.)toprovidesecurity.Moreover,

withoutsecurityitmaybedifficulttoprovideotherservicessuchashealthandeducationandthe

ruleoflaw.Theprovisionofsocialservicesandregulationofeconomicactivitiesarecentralto

statehood,buttheirsignificanceforstatelegitimacymustbeunderstoodinthecontextofthe

prevailingideasinasocietyabouttheproperroleofthestate.

iii) Thebeliefsthatmakepeopleacceptthestateastherightfulauthorityandmakethemshareasenseofcommunityandidentity:Thecollectiveidentityofanationisacentralsourceofstate

legitimacy.

A

strong

sense

of

community

attached

to

the

state

may

act

as

a

bridge

between

variousotherandconflictingsourcesoflegitimacysuchastradition,religion,languageor

ethnicity.Thiscollectiveidentityiscentraltothemakingofapoliticallyunitedpeoplearounda

commonacceptanceofastateandtotheirmutualrecognitionascitizensdespitetheirdifferences.

Religiousbeliefsandreligiousinstitutionsplayacentralroleindefiningwhatisconsidered

morallyright,appropriate,sinful,wrong,etc.inasocietyandinshapingpeoplespolitical

expectationsandconceptionsofauthority.Traditionsaredefinedbothbyritualsandsymbols

whoseinvocationremindspeopleoftheiridentity,theirsenseofbelongingandloyalty,theirrole

andplaceinaparticularcommunity.However,traditionsarenotstatic;peoplecontinuetoadjust

theirbehaviourandpracticestonewsituations,andthestateisinstrumentalinidentifyingand

definingsomeinstitutionsandcustoms,butnotothersastradition.

Whilesuchabroadandempiricallyfocusedunderstandingoflegitimacyisbeginningtotakeholdamongdevelopmentpartnersthereisstillacleartendencytopresentahierarchyamongdifferent

sourcesoflegitimacy.Thereisnoapriorireason,however,whyanyonesourceoflegitimacyshould

beconsideredmoreimportantthanothersinageneralsense.Moretothepoint:astatewhose

legitimacyreststoomuchononeorafewsourcesoflegitimacyisinherentlyunstable.Development

partnershavearguablybeencomplicitinplacingtheirbetsononeorafewsourcesoflegitimacy,such

asservicedelivery,democraticelectionsandhumanrightsnorms.Moreover,theyhavetypically

defineddemocracyandhumanrightsasprepoliticalandahistorical,andnotasshapedbyand

linkedtosocial,historicalandpoliticalprocesses. Ifstatesaretobeabletoextricatethemselvesfrom

fragilesituations,theirlegitimacymustnotonlybedeepened,butalsobroadenedtoformaresilient

webofmanydifferentsources,someofwhichsuchasnationalismorreligionmaybeatoddswith

liberaldemocraticsourcesoflegitimacy.


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16

Anotherchallengeforthedevelopmentpartnersisthattheirpredominantmodeofworkingandthe

focusoftheirinterventionsdonotputtheminagoodpositiontoobserveandaddressissuesof

legitimacy.Thereareatleasttworeasonsforthis.Firstly,developmentpartnerstendtofocusonthe

formalstructuresofgovernance,suchasthelegalsystem,thepublicfinancialmanagementsystem

andtheoperationsofparliament.Secondly,andconnectedtothefirstpoint,developmentpartners

tendtoworkpredominantlyatthecentralgovernmentlevel,inthecapital.Thisplacesthemfarawayfromwherethecitizensinteractwiththestate,whichismainlyatthelocalgovernmentorcommunity

level.Thesetwopointscombinedillustratehowdevelopmentpartnerstendnottobewellplacedto

gagehowthestatesocietyinteractionsimpactonthelegitimacyofthestatethrougheachofthethree

dimensionsindicatedabove.

Thestrategicapproachofdevelopmentpartnersinthefollowingwillbepresentedtowardsthe

backgroundofstatelegitimacyasindicatedabove.

4. Challengesfordevelopmentassistanceinanoverlycentralisedstate

suffering

from

elite

capture

Theabovediscussiononstatesinfragilesituationsandtheimportanceofstatelegitimacy,bringsto

theforetheimportanceofconsideringstatesocietyrelations.Thisunderlinestheneedfor

developmentpartnerstobecognizantofthepoliticsandthesocialandpersonalinterfacesineveryday

life,whichissomedistanceremovedfromthetechnicalsystemsandcapacitybuildingthatiscloserto

thedevelopmentpartnerscomfortzone.TherelevanceoftheseissuesisevidentintheKenyan

contextofelitecaptureandcentralisationofuncheckedpower.Thereareobviouschallengesfor

developmentpartnerstoengagewithgovernanceissuesinthiscontext.Twoproblemsthatwillbe

consideredinthissectionarewithwhomtoengageandwhichentrypointstoselect.

Supportingdemocratisationandgoodgovernanceinasystemcharacterisedbyelitecaptureposes

obviousproblemsfordevelopmentpartners,notleastinchoosingonespartners.Thepolitical

leadershipinKenyaisinaconstantstateofflux.Allianceschangecontinuously,andpartiesmergeandnewonesarecreatedatanalmostbewilderingpace.Therearefewseniorpoliticalleaders,ifany,

inKenyanpoliticswhohavenotatsomestagebeenbothalliesandopponents.Itisalsoworthgiving

somethoughtofwherecivilsocietyfitsintothispicture.Thebordersbetweencivilsocietyandpolitics

isveryfluidattimes,andthereislittledoubtthatmanyofthedevelopmentpartnersfavouriteCSOs

aredominatedbyNairobibasedelitesandwithweak,ifany,explicitlinkswithmembersor

constituentsatthelocallevel.AlthoughwewillnotunderestimatethevalueofCSOsaschampionsof

humanrightsanddemocracy,oneshouldnotautomaticallyassumethatsupportingcivilsocietyisa

moreeffectivemethodofcounteractingelitecontrolthansupportingstateinstitutions.Itis

questionablewhethersupportofgovernanceanddemocratisationinitspresentform,whether

throughgovernmentorCSOs,contributessignificantlytoincreasingthelegitimacyofthestate.An

exceptionmaybetheCSOsthathaverecentlystartedchangingtheirstrategiestowardstheinterestsofpeopleatlarge.

Forcitizens,participationisakeyprincipleofdemocracyandalikelysourceofstatelegitimacy.

Althoughweak,politicalpartiesandparliamentsareoftenmoredemocraticallyrepresentativethan

muchofthecivilsocietywhichisregularlyinvolvedinparticipatoryprocesseswithintheaid

architecture.ForKenyancitizens,however,achievingincreasedinfluenceonthedecisionstakenon

theirbehalfthroughparliamentsandpartiesisnoteasygiventhepersonalisedcharacterofthe

politicalpartiesandthepoliticianspreoccupationwithusingtheirpositionsfortheirowninterests.

Whensearchingforentrypointsforchange,itmakessensetoturntothenextgeneration.TheKenyan

youtharearguablythekeydemographicgroupinthepopulation.Theyareparticularlyeffectedby

thehighlevelofunemploymentandthepostelectionviolencedemonstratewhatcanhappenwhentheirenergyandresentmentischannelledintomilitantaction.Theyoutharethereforecommonly


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17

referredtoasaproblemandadangerinthepoliticallifeofKenya.Thereisanothersideofthiscoin,

however,asmanyoftheyoutharecomparativelywelleducated,technologicallysavvyandgoodat

communicating.Itisnotunlikelygivensubstantialconsciousraisingefforts thatyouthmayunite

onthebasisofclassorpovertyacrossethnicity.9Moreover,withintheapproachofbehavioural

change,youthisalsoperceivedtobemoreinclinedtoadoptnewnormsandvalues,keybothinterms

ofsupportinganewcultureofpoliticsaswellasgenderrolesandrelations.TheythereforerepresentanimportantpressuregroupforpositivechangeinKenya.

InourinterviewsduringthefieldworkinNairobi,oneofthemostconsistentmessagesfrom

developmentpartnersaswellasresourcepersonswasthatpositivechangeismuchmorelikelyto

comefrombelow.Arecurringcommentbyrespondentswasthatthereisaneedforanewbreedof

politicians.However,newpoliticiansneedorganisationalsupportanditisunclearhowthatcould

happen.Theoldpoliticiansareunlikelytogiveuptheirpositionswithoutafight.Mostpeople

belongingtotheelitehavelittleinterestintakingriskstochangethestatusquo.Thepoorand

disenfranchised,ontheotherhand,haveverylittletoloseandhistoryelsewherehasshownthatin

politicschangescanhappensuddenly.

State-Society

Relations

at

the

Local

Level10

Inordertotapintoandsupportthedemandforchangefrombelow,itisnecessarytoengageatthe

locallevel,andoutsidetheNairobibubble.Thereisadisconnectbetweenthestateandsocietyin

Kenya,andthisfractureiscloselyrelatedtothecentralisednatureoftheKenyanstateandofKenyan

politics,andoftheweakprovisionsforparticipationandcogovernancepresentedbyKenyas

enfeebledlocalgovernmentsector.TheConstitutionofKenyaReviewCommission(CKRC)described

theimpactofthissituationinthefollowingmanner:

Thewholenationfeelsalienatedfromthegovernmentand[its]structuresofauthority.

Thepeopleconsidertheyhavenocontrolovertheirdestinyand,outsidethegeneral

elections,participationisalmostnonexistent.(KenyaConstitutionReview

Commission,cited

in

JICA

2007).

ThechairoftheConstitutionReviewCommission,YashGhai,hascontinuedtoemphasisethe

importanceofputtinginplaceastrongerandmoredemocraticsystemoflocalgovernmentinorderto

strengthenstatesocietyrelationsinKenya(see,e.g.Ghai2008).Inapresentationhegavejustbefore

the2007elections,herecountedthefollowingobservationfromtheconsultationsoftheCommission:

Therewasawidespreadperception,whichstatisticssupport,thatthecentralisedstate

has,forthelastpast50years,singularlyfailedtopromoteeconomicandpolitical

development,andthatonlyafewareasandasmallelite,hadbenefitedfromthe

policiesofgovernment...WherevertheCKRCwent,itnotedwidespreadfeelingamong

thepeopleofalienationfromcentralgovernmentbecauseoftheconcentrationofpower

inthe

national

government,

and

to

aremarkable

extent,

in

the

president.

They

felt

marginalisedandneglected,deprivedoftheirresources;andvictimisedfortheir

politicalorethnicaffiliations.(Ghai2008,214215)

LocalgovernmentinKenyasuffersfromanumberofcommonweaknesses.Itisunderresourcedand

dominatedbyastrongexecutive,notablythepresidentsofficebutalsothelineministriesretain

controlovertheirareasofinfluenceatthelocallevel.Localauthoritiesarealsodominatedbythe

stronginfluence,bothformalandinformalofnationalpoliticiansoverlocaldecisionmaking

9AswasagreedbyKHRCinaninterviewwiththeteam.10ThissectiondrawsheavilyonabriefreviewoftheKenyanlocalgovernmentsystemthatTiberiusBarasapreparedforthis

report.ThefulltextofthereviewisprovidedinAnnex3.


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18

processes,includingtheuseofdevelopmentfundsandthemanagementofnaturalresources,notably

landallocation.11

OneofthemoststrikingcharacteristicsoftheKenyanlocalgovernmentsystemisitscomplexity.

Therearethreepartiallyoverlappingstructuresoflocalgovernment.Thedominantstructure,interms

ofpowerandinfluence,istheProvincialAdministration,whichfallsunderthePresidentsOffice.

TheProvincecontrolsallthemajororgansassociatedwithsecurity,suchasthepolice,intelligenceand

thearmy,andsincethecolonialeraithasbeenusedtocontrolthepoliticalopposition;itretainsa

poorimageforitshumanrightsrecord.Thereareeightprovincesinthecountry,anditsleaders,

headedbytheProvincialCommissioner,arepresidentialappointees.Therearenoelectedbodiesat

theprovinciallevelormechanismsforpopularparticipation.BelowtheProvince,theCentral

Governmentsystemworksthroughtwoparallelandoverlappinglinesofcommand,theDistrict,

whichisheadedbyaDistrictCommissioner,andthelineministries,whichhavetheirown

deconcentratedsectorministryfieldoffices(JICA2008,11).

ThesecondsetofstructuresistheLocalAuthorities(LAs).Thisisthelocalgovernmentproper,and

consistsofelectedcouncilsandthelocalexecutive.Thecouncilsaredividedintocountycouncils,

whichare

predominantly

in

rural

areas,

town

councils,

municipalities

and

Nairobi

City

Council.

There

areatotalof175LAsinthecountry.MostoftheLAsandDistrictssharecommonboundaries,butnot

always.Thelawmakingorganatthecouncillevelisthefullcouncil,whichconsistsofelectedand

nominatedcouncillors.Theadministrationandtheexecutiveincludeatreasuryandlinedepartments

forpublicservicesandutilities,suchashealth,education,water,roads,agriculture,etc.Thedelivery

oftheseservices,however,istheresponsibilitiesofthelineministries,andnotofthelocalauthorities,

asintheneighbouringcountriesofUgandaandTanzania.Additionally,thelocalauthoritiesneedthe

approvaloftheMinistryofLocalGovernmentonanymajordecisions,suchasbudgetsandbylaws.

Theyalsodependonthecentralgovernmentformostoftheirbudget,astheydonothaveanytax

levyingpowers,assuch,beyondmarketleviesandotherchargesforuseoflocalauthorityservices.

ThemostimportantsourceofCentralGovernmentfundingfortheLAsistheLocalAuthorityTransfer

Fund(LATF),

which

is

anon

earmarked

fund.12

Although

the

intention

is

for

the

LATF

to

be

used

to

strengthenservicedelivery,thebulkofthefundsisspentonadministrationandtheLAsdonotmake

asignificantcontributiontoservicedelivery(JICA2008,14).

ThethirdsetofstructuresistheConstituencyortheelectoralareafromwhichMPsareelected.The

constituencyhasbecomeimportantinrecentyears,withanumberoffundingmechanismsbeing

allocatedtotheconstituencyasaunit.ThisstartedwiththeConstituencyHIV/AIDSFundandthe

ConstituencySchoolBursaryFundintheearly2000s,butthemostsignificantbyfaristhe

ConstituencyDevelopmentFund(CDF),whichisanonearmarkedfundthatismadeavailablebythe

centralgovernmentfordevelopmentprojectsattheconstituencylevel.Itwasestablishedinthe

FinancialYear2003/04andconsistsofafairlysubstantial2.5%ofthenationalbudget.Inmanyways,

theCDFhasprovedverypopularwithlocalpopulations,asthismechanismhasbeenfarmore

efficientingettingtheresourcesouttothepublic.TheLAshaveverylittlecredibilityandareseenby

thepublicascorrupt,selfservingandinefficient.TheadministrationoftheCDFiscomparatively

moreparticipatory,andduetothehighlevelofattentionithasreceived,publicoversightoftheuseof

fundshasbeenmuchbetter.ThedrawbackoftheCDF,however,isthatitisverymuchseenasthe

MPsfund,whichobviouslypoliticisestheuseofthemoney.Thesignalsentisverymuchthatthisis

moneythatisbroughttotheconstituencybytheMP,asopposedtoitsbeingownedbythe

community.ThemanagementoftheCDFisprovidedbyaConstituencyDevelopmentCommittee

chairedbytheMP.Thisduplicatesandarguablyunderminestherolethatissupposedtobeplayedby

theelectedcouncilsandtheLAadministration.Recently,Parliamentpassedamotiontotriplethe

11Ontheimpactofthecentralizednatureofthelocaladministrationandtheimpactthatthishasonlandallocations,see

Kanyinga2000.

12FormoredetailsontheLATF,seehttp://www.kippra.org/local.asp.


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19

allocationtotheCDFs,byadjustingtheallocationtotheequivalentof7.5%ofgovernmentrevenue

(JICA2008,14).Itisallbutcertainthatthiswillfurtherpoliticisetheuseofdevelopmentfundsatthe

locallevel,andfurtherweakenthealreadymarginalroleoftheelectedcouncilsintheLAs.

ThecombinedperformanceoftheProvinceAdministration/Districts,theLocalAuthoritiesandthe

Constituenciesisweak.Theoverlappingandduplicatingfunctionsaddconfusionandcomplicate

mosteffortsofpublicparticipationandoversight.Thebestfunctioningmechanism,theCDF,isalso

arguablythemostdamagingtothesustainedstrengtheningoflocaldemocracyandstatelegitimacyin

thelongterm.Moreover,muchoftheslackinserviceprovisionatthelocallevelispickedupbyCSOs,

whicharethemajorrecipientsofdevelopmentpartnerfundsforservicedeliveryatthelocallevel.

FewdevelopmentpartnersworkthroughtheLAs,andmanyofthemcitethecomplexityofthelocal

governmentservicedeliveryasareasonwhytheyhesitatetotryandengagewithlocalgovernmentin

amoresystematicmanner.Themultiplicityofactors,thepoliticisationoftheuseofthesteadily

increasingshareofgovernmentfundingthroughtheCDFsandthelackofaneasilyrecognisablearena

andfocalpointforlocaldemocracyandparticipationallworktoerodethelegitimacyofthestate.

ThereislittledoubtthatthereisanurgentneedforcomprehensivereformoftheKenyanlocal

governmentsystem.AsarguedbyGhai:

Devolutionwillcertainlyopenupopportunitiesforpublicparticipationinstateaffairs.

Therewillbemoredebatesaboutthepurposesforwhichpowershouldbeexercisedat

thelocallevel.Peopleinruralandurbanareaswillbeabletodecideforthemselves(or

influencedecisions)onnumerousmattersoflocalconcernandtoparticipateingreater

numberofdebatesandelections.Governmentsandofficialsatcloserproximitytothem

willprobablybecomemoreresponsiveandbecompelledtobemoreaccountable.Only

inthiswaycanweinculcatethepracticesandhabitsofdemocracyandparticipation

(Ghai2008,218).

Thereis,however,alimittotheinfluencethatdevelopmentpartnerscanhaveonmakingthishappen.

Decentralisation,orMajimboism,isanintenselypoliticalissue,andonewhichwillbedecidedby

Kenyans.Inaddition,itcanbearguedthatlocalpoliticiansengageinpoliticsforthepurposeof

privategainsinthesamemannerasnationalpoliticiansdo,whichmayalsoreducethemotivationof

developmentpartnerstosupportthedevolutionofmorepowertolocalpoliticians.Thisdoesnot

meanthatthedevelopmentpartnersshouldnotengageinthepoliticaldiscussion.Also,ifthe

developmentpartnersaretotapintothedemandforchangefrombelow,theywillneedtoengage

withwhatdemocraticstructuresthatexistatthelocallevel,whichistheprimaryarenaforinteraction

betweencitizensandthestate.Byaddressingtheinterfacebetweenthepopulationandthestateatthe

locallevel,theremaybeopportunitiestosupportconstructiveprocessesofincreasingthelegitimacy

ofthestateandtosupporttheorganicgrowthofdemocraticandadministrativesystemsfromthe

bottomup.

Suchanapproachwouldnotbelimitedtotechnicalsupportintheformoftraditionallocal

governmentreformprograms,butalsoincludeconsiderationofexistingandpotentiallinkageswith

localauthoritiesinotherprogramsofsupporttononstateactors,suchasCSOswithlinkstothelocal

community(CBOsorothers),farmersassociations,andprofessionalassociationsandmedia.Support

toexpendituretrackingexercisesatlocallevels,e.g.inrelationtothedevolvedfundsmaybea

concretelocallevelanticorruptionmeasure.Thiswouldleadtobothincreasedlocalawarenessofthe

amountsthatshouldreachthelocalpopulationandknowledgeofwhetherthemoneyspentis

actuallybenefitingdifferentgroupsofsociety,whichmaymakethelocalpopulationabletoholdtheir

politiciansmoreaccountable. Supportofpoliticalpartiesalsohasobviouslocalgovernment

dimensions,especiallyiftheirbuildupattheconstituencylevelisincluded.


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20

Engagementwiththestatesocietyinterfaceatthelocallevelwouldalsobenefitfromagender

perspectivethatwouldtakeintoaccounttheparticularobstaclesandopportunitiesfacedbythe

majorityofKenyanwomen,i.e.notonlybythewomenintheNairobielite.

Thistypeofapproachwouldbeanimportantcounterweighttosupporttocentralgovernment

institutionsbutalsotonationalcivilsociety,whoserepresentativesareoftenmembersofthesame

eliteasthepoliticalleadership.Although,asmentionedabove,developmentpartnersgetting

involvedinsupporttoimprovetherelationsbetweenthestateandthepeopleatthelocallevel,should

considerintendedandunintendedeffectsatthecentrallevel,andrecognisethatapprovalandsupport

bythecentralgovernmenttolocalinitiativesisnecessary.

Theapproachofaddressingtheinterfacebetweenthepeopleandthestateatthelocallevelis

obviouslyalongtermendeavour.However,itisalsoaverysensibleapproachfortheshortterm.

SomerespondentsinNairobimentionedtheimportanceofreconciliationamongpeopleofdifferent

ethnicgroups.Reconciliationeffortsare,ofcourse,importantforpeaceandconflictpreventioninthe

timerunninguptotheelectionin2012andduringandaftertheelections.Reconciliationis,however,

alsoimportantbecauseitfacilitatesjointdecisionmakingatthelocallevelacrossethnicdivisionsat

thecommunity

level.

Groups

who

trust

each

other

can

more

easily

reach

agreement

on

decisions

for

a

commonfuture.Conversely,jointdecisionmakingmaycontributetotrustandreconciliationbecause

whenpeopleareinvolvedinexchangingviewsandareforcedtolistentoeachothertheymayover

timelearntoknoweachotherandtrusteachother.Thus,developmentpartnersupportintheshort

termofreconciliationinitiativesisimportant.Governmentinitiativessuchasthepeacecommitteesat

thedistrictlevelunderthePresidentsOffice,theTJRC,aswellascivilsocietyinitiativesshouldbe

considered.TheInterPartyPeaceCommitteesestablishedbytheNorwegiansupportedNDIprogram

arealsorelevantinthiscontext.Itshouldberecognisedthatifthecoalitiongovernmentshowsthe

populationthattheyareseriousaboutreformsuchasimpunityandinequalitytheimpactof

reconciliationeffortsbythecivilsocietywouldbeenhanced.Butreconciliationeffortsmay

neverthelesshavesomeeffectatthepeopleslevel.Reconciliationmayleadtoimprovedstate

legitimacythrough

increased

trust

and

belief

in

ashared

sense

of

community

among

people.

Thereisalsoagoodcasetobemadeforlookingfornewpartnersthathaveaparticularpotentialfor

tappingintodemandforchangeandcontributetoincreasedstatelegitimacythroughincreased

interactionwiththeauthorities.Thesewouldtypicallybeorganisationsrepresentingtheinterestsofa

particularmembershipgrouporconstituency.OneobviouscandidateisKenyaslargestmembership

organisation,theKenyaNationalUnionofTeachers(KNUT),whichhas235,000members.KNUThas

branchesattheprovincialanddistrictlevels.Althoughitspriorityisteacherssalariesandworking

conditions,KNUThasexperiencefromlobbyingatboththenationalandlocallevelsanditisformally

engagedindevelopmentcommitteeswithlocalauthorities.Withmembershipdowntotheindividual

schools,itspotentialreachisunrivalledintheKenyanpoliticalcontext.AsstatedbyMr.Majali,the

SecretaryGeneralofKNUTinaninterviewwiththeteam:KNUThasverygoodrepresentationatthe

locallevel.Teachersarerespectedbythesocietyandcaninfluencenationalpolicyagreatdealatthe

locallevel.Althoughithasexperiencedethnicchallengesithasapotentialtobridgetheethnicdivide.

Anothertypeofrepresentativebodiesthathasspecialpromiseisfarmersassociations.Farmersused

tobewellrepresentedthroughfarmerscooperativesbutthecooperativemovementinthepastand

especiallyunderMoibecamepoliticisedandcorrupt.Anewmovementthatisdetachedfromstate

patronageandpoliticisationhasnowemerged.Becauseofitshistory,ithasatendencytostayaway

fromanythingthattastesofpolitics(Nguni,2007).Thereareeffortsinplacetorevitalisethepolitical

influenceofthisimportantsector,asforexamplethesupporttolivestockfarmersassociations

providedbyHeiferInternational,aUScharity,whichwasinterviewedbytheteam.Thisinitiative

aimsatpreparinglivestockfarmersforparticipationindecisionmakingatbothlocalandthecentral

governmentlevels.

There

are

also

other

active

farmers

associations,

such

as

the

Tea

and

Coffee

FarmersAssociations.Therewouldseemtobeconsiderablescopeforexploringpossibilitiesfor


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supportingsuchorganisations,andalsotoassisttheminteractingwithgovernmentatlocaland

nationallevelsalike.

5.TheApproachofNorwayandotherDevelopmentPartnersintheField

of

Governance

Thissectionpresentsanoverviewofthestrategicthinkingongovernanceinthedevelopmentpartner

communityasreflectedininterviewsinNairobiandapresentationandcomparisonoftheNorwegian

governanceportfoliointhatrespect.Wealsomakeabriefreferencetodevelopmentpartnerco

operationandtheiralignmentwithKenya.

StrategicthinkingongovernanceTheleadingdevelopmentpartnersintheareaofgovernanceinKenyaperceivethestate(i.e.all

branchesofgovernment)ashavinglimitedlegitimacyinthepopulation.Theythinkthatpeoplehave

morefaithinCSOsandthemedia.Actorsthatcanbeconsideredaschangeagents,becausetheyhave

somepoliticalinfluenceincludelocalchiefs(representativesofthepresidencythroughtheprovincial

administration),retiredcivilservants,retiredteachersandelders,traditionalleaders,andreligiousleaders.Foryoungpeople,musicians,TVpersonalities,etc.maybeimportantopinionleaders.

Shorttermstrategy

ThedevelopmentpartnersincludingNorwaywetalkedtoduringthefieldworkaresatisfiedwith

theirachievementwithrespecttotheNationalAccord.(AbriefoverviewofNorwaysgovernance

portfolioisincludedintheattachments.)Theystoodunited,andincooperationwiththeAfrican

Unionandwithsupportfromprivatebusinessleaders,theymotivatedthetwoantagonisticpolitical

leaderstoacceptformingacoalitiongovernment.Theyrecognisethatinordertostoptheethnicity

basedpostelectionviolence,theyhadtoacceptaNationalAccordthatwasnotperfect.Ithasturned

outthatitisinparticularproblematicthattheNationalAccorddidnotdefinepowersharingin

governmentmorepreciselyandthatitincludesnodisputeresolutionmechanism. Theyfurtherrecognisethatinequalityinthepopulation,thedifferencebetweenthehavesandthehavenots,and

unresolvedethnicanimosityarelikelytoresultinviolentelectionsin2012andcouldeventrigger

seriouscrisesbeforetheelectionunlessprogressismadeonthereformagenda.

Intermsofimprovingthelegitimacyofthestateinthepopulationintheshortterm,themost

importantmeasurestobetakenbytheKenyanstateisintheviewofthedevelopmentpartnersare:

Improvinglegitimacy:

throughwhatthestatedoesintermsofrestoringthesecurityofthepopulation,

throughhow

the

state

functions

in

terms

of

the

reintroduction

of

the

state

monopoly

political economy analysis of kenya

Documents