political law 1 file no 3

8/11/2019 Political Law 1 File No 3

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POLITICAL LAW 1

File No. 3

4. GOVERNMENT

a) Definition, distinguished from administration

Government- is the agency of instrumentality through which the will

of the State is formulated, expressed and realized.

Administration is distinguished from government, as the aggregatethe aggregate of persons in whose hands the reigns of government are for

the time being (the Chief ministries or heads of departments. But the

terms are often interchanged.

Government of the Republic of the Philippines- is the corporate

governmental entity through which the functions of government are

exercised throughout the Philippines, including the various arms which

political authority is made effective, whether pertaining to the

autonomous regions, the provincial, city or barangay subdivisions or

other forms of local government(Sec. 2 (10, E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code

of 1987).

CASES

We understand, in modern political science... by the term

government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which

an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action

which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or whichare imposed upon the people forming that society by those who

possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is

the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By administration

, we understand... the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the

reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or

heads of departments. But the Court adds that the terms


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government and administration are often used interchangeably

(US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332).

The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its

purpose is akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the

system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in

the military service. Its enabling law further mandates that the

System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through

an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and

organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations

governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the

Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time.

Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by

the Chief of Staff of the AFP with the approval of the Secretary of the

Secretary of the National Defense. While it may be true that therehave been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-

RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the

funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform.

These above considerations indicate that the character and

operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As

such, the Court held that the same is government entity and its

funds are in the nature of public funds(People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR

145951, August 12, 2003).

Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary

functions. The Court held that ACA is a government office or agency

engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions

may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent"

(as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the

maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating

property and property rights, those relating to the administration of

justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those

relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this

traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised bythe State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the

welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter

functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the

part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society,

however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions

of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which


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used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the

government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it

was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any

private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-

defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the

government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet

the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost

everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater

socialization of economic forces(ACCFA vs. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649).

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in

political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and

the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to

the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The

cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation ofpower by the people to the State. In this system, governmental

agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority

conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner

workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims

and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The

postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the

Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of

governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access

to such information of public concern is denied, except under

limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant

to the Constitution. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to

information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further

"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the

State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving

public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed

by law."As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or not a

particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test

which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term

that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum ofsubjects which the public may want to know, either because these

directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally

arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is

for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the

matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects

the public(Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256).


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b) Classification

i) de jure or de facto

De Jure- has a rightful title but no power or control, either because

the same has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually

entered into the exercise thereof.

De Facto - actually exercises power or control but without legal title

(Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, GR No 73748, May 22, 1986).

i.De facto proper government that gets possession and control of,or usurps, by force or by the vice of the majority, the rightful legal

government and maintains itself against the will of the latter,

ii.Government of paramount force established and maintained by

military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in

the course of war; and

iii.Independent government established by the inhabitants of the

country who rise in insurrection against the parent state(Ko Kim

Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113).

ii)unitary or federal

Federal government is formed when a group of political units, such as

states or provinces or together in a federation, surrendering their

individual sovereignty and many powers to the central government.

While retaining or reserving other limited powers. As a result, two or

more levels of government exist within an established geographicterritory. The body of law of the common central government is the

federal law. Federal law is a body of law created by the federal

government of a country.

iii)monarchy, oligarchy, theocracy,

democracy


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Monarchy is a form of government in which supreme power is

absolutely or nominally lodged with an individual, who is the head of

state, often for life or until abdication, and is wholly set apart from all

other members of the state. The person who heads a monarchy is calledMonarch.

Oligarchy is a form of government where power effectively rests with a

small elite segment of society distinguished by royal, wealth, family,

military or religious hegemony. The word oligarchy is from the Greek

words for few and rule. Such states are often controlled by politically

powerful families whose children are heavily conditioned and monitored

to be heirs of the power of the oligarchy. Oligarchies have been

tyrannical throughout history, being completely a public servitude to

exist.

Theocrary is a form of government in which a god or deity is

recognized as the States supreme civil rules, or in a broader sense, a

form of government in which a state is governed by immediate divine

guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided. For

believers, theocracy is a form of government in which divine power

governs a earhy human state, either in a personal incarnation or more

often, via religious institutional representatives (i.e. church), replacing or

dominating civil government. Theocratic government enact theonomiclaws.

Democracy is a form of government in which state power is held by the

majority of citizens within a country or a state. It is derived from the

Greek popular government, which was coined from people and rule,

strength in the middle of the fifth-fourth century BC to denote the

political systems then existing in some Greek City states.

iv) Presidential or Parliamentary

Presidential form of Government

It is first adopted under the 1935 Constitution and borrowed from

American system.


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Its principal identifying feature is what is called the separation of

powers. Legislative power is given to the Legislature; executive

power is given to a separate Executive; and judicial power is held

independent Judiciary.

The system is founded on the belief that, by establishing

equilibrium among the three power holders, harmony will result,

power will not to concentrated, and thus tyranny will be avoided.

Because of the prominent position, however, which the system

gives to the President as chief executive, it is designated as a

presidential form of government.

Parliamentary form of Government

It is the original 1973 Constitution that has adopted a still-born

parliamentary system.

The difference lies in certain essential features which are found in all

varieties of the parliamentary form, such as the following:

1. The members of the government or cabinet or the

executive arm are, simultaneously members of the legislature.

2. The government or cabinet, consisting of the political

leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also members

of the legislature.

3. The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure atthe apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent.

4. The government or cabinet remains in power only for as

long as it enjoy the support of majority of the legislature.

5. Both government and legislature are possessed o

control devices with which each can demand of the other immediate

political responsibility.

In the hands of the legislature is the vote of non-confidence (censure)

whereby the government may be ousted. In hands of the government

is the power to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections.

Briefly, therefore, while the presidential system embodies

interdependence by separation and coordination. Parliamentarism

embodies interdependence by integration.


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v)Others

CASES

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.

It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the

Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;

they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino

which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not

merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure

government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the

legitimacy of the present government(In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160).

It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts

and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial department

of a de facto government are good and valid.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or

government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that

gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of

the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself

against the will of the latter, such government of England under the

Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell asProtector. The second is that which is established and maintained by

military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the

course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount

force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British

possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied

during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And

the third is that established as an independent government of the

Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of

secession(Co Kim Chao vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113).

c) Historical survey of Philippine government

CASES


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Under the American Regime:The Government of the Philippine

Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and

organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of

the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territoriesinto the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is

derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however,

operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the

Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting

through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the

same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the

limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the

orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of

Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from

the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress,instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies back of

American constitutions. The power to legislate upon any subject

relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it

exercises such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines

the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United

States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is

a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, andjudicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to

such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in

most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this

separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the

doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate

exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls

legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor is not a

member of the legislative body, but the veto power enables him to

exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the

head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is amember of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no

veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on

the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven

best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the

protection of individual rights and privileges(US vs. Bull, 15 Phil 259).


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It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities,

that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,

except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been

conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory

provision. (16 C. J.S 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the

principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known

to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in

determining what matters fall within the meaning of political

question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and

precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the

scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle

with the actions of the political departments of the government

(Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1).

Issue[1]:Whether the Court has authority to pass upon thevalidity of Presidential Decree 73.Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73

purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue

on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the

authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has

passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the

Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of

Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly

provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases

involving said issue.

Issue [2]:Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to

submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention.

Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue

Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on

January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional

Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for

the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite

ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should theplebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper

parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.

Issue [3]:Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a

submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for

amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: Said question has not been


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adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would

not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the

most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances(Planas

vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105).

It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute

Presidential Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one

who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the

instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public

funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of

public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an

unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The

interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of

these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that

personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating saidfunds.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a

judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of

the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of

amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is

seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the

power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the

interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,

Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National

Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments

becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly

(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal

course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim

National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the

incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and

submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033

to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,

the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambentwords in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a

contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,

1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and

effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the

validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the

competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the


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functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot

validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose

amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although

peculiar, to its gross legislative power(Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA

333).

Pres. Marcos term was supposed to end on June 30, 1987.

However, he submitted a letter of conditional resignation claiming

that he would vacate his position effective only when elections held &

after winners proclaimed & qualified as Pres by taking his oath of

office 10 days after his proclamation. He claims that he is calling for

the new elections to seek a new mandate to assess his policies &

programs as demanded by the opposition. He further stressed that

his term will be shortened but in the name of public accountability

he believes that the final settlement of these issues can only be donethru a presidential election.

B.P. Blg. 883: enacted by the Batasang Pambansa calling for special

national elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for Pres & VP.

Different sectors were against the special elections. Among the

contentions are:

1. Such is unconstitutional because there was no vacancy in the

presidency thus theres no need to call for a special election. This is

pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which requires an

actual vacancy before an special election can be called and in such

cases, the Speaker of the House will be the Acting Pres until a new

one has been elected.

2. Unconstitutional because it allows the Pres to continue holding

office after calling of the special election. Cutting his term short is

valid but he should actually vacate the office. The Supreme Court

voted 7 to dismiss petitions and deny prayer for issuance ofinjunction restraining respondents from holding election and 5

declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction.

Since there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883

unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs prayed

for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a resolution

was issued.


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The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions & deny prayer for

issuance of injunction restraining respondents from holding election

and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the

injunction. Since there are less than the required 10 votes to declare

BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs

prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a

resolution was issued(PBA vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455).

The lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a

supervening event would have normally rendered this case moot

and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts

were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no

guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued.

The transcendental issues raised by the parties should not beevaded; they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional

aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar

as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or

suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section

18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence

discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving

the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to

direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related

to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President;

and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint

on the press, areultra viresand unconstitutional. The Court also

rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the

President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-

owned public utility and private business affected with public

interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Orderissued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed

to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.

Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and

the police should take only the necessary and appropriate actions

and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. But

the words acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been


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legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be

deemed deleted from the said G.O. While terrorism has been

denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the

military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the

AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5(David vs.

Macapagal Arroyo, GR 171396, May 3, 2006).

d) Democratic and republican government

Republican State it is one wherein all government authority emanates

form the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the people.

Democratic State this merely emphasizes that the Philippines hassome aspect of direct democracy such as initiative and referendum.

i) Nemo est supra

leges No one is above the Law

CASES

The primary question is:Shall the judiciary permit a government

of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the

Philippine Islands? The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban

ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had

been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.

Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept

confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably,

during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements

with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao,as laborers. The women were given no opportunity to collect their

belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were

being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no

knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had

not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had

neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.


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With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question.

By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police

presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to

another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? One can

search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at

the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that

city to force citizens of the Philippine Islandsand these women,

despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not

chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional

guaranties as are other citizensto change their domicile from Manila

to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically

punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by

law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence

(Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778).

ii) Universal suffrage

(right and duty), popular election, rule of

the majority

iii) Bill of rights

Bill of Rights is a set prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civiland political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the

powers of the government as a leans of securing the enjoyment of those

rights.

Classification of Rights:

1.Political rights granted by law to members of community in

relation to their direct or indirect participation in the establishment

or administration of the government.2.Civil rights rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance

of private individuals for the purpose of securing them the enjoyment

of their means of happiness;

3.Social and economic rights; and

4.Human rights.


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iv) Accountability of

Public Officials

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers andemployees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve

them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;

act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,

and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment

for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,

treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayalof public trust. All other public officers and employees may be

removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive

power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a

resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be

included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and

referred to the proper Committee within three session days

thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of

all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty

session days from such referral, together with the corresponding

resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by

the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall

be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles

of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary

resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.


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(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is

filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same

shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the

Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same

official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases

of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall

be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is

on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but

shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence

of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than

removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the

Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall

nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and

punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to

effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan

shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or

hereafter may be provided by law.

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as

Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for

Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the militaryestablishment may likewise be appointed.

Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the

Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the

Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law.


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Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the

Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and

exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law,

except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created

under this Constitution.

Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born

citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at

least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and

members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates

for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The

Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or

engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same

disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of

Article 1X-A of this Constitution.

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by

the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the

Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every

vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no

confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after

they occur.

Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of

Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional

Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not

be decreased during their term of office.

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a termof seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to

run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their

cessation from office.

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the

people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or


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manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or

any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including

government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in

appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and

the result thereof.

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following

powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or

agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,

improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public

official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,

agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-

owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform

and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,

and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of

duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action

against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his

removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,

and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,

and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to

furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or

transactions entered into by his office involving thedisbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any

irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and

information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and

to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.


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(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when

circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and

make recommendations for their elimination and the observance

of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such

other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be

provided by law.

Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal

autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically

and regularly released.

Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully

acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their

nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches,

or estoppel.

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial

accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly

or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or

financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the

Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the

Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or

entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption ofoffice and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a

declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In

the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional

Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the


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armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be

disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this

Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer oremployee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status

of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt

with by law.

v) Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws

vi) Separation ofPowers

Purpose of the separation of powers:to prevent the concentration of

authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to

irreparable error or abuse in the exercise to the detriment of republican

institution.

CASES

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system

of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual

division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has

exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is

supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact

that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the

Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and

independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an

elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in

the workings of the various departments of the government. For

example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a

check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the

enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that

a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President


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to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case

may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to

convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On

the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the

Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on

Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers;

and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to

the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine

what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to

define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support,

the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain

extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying

impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as

the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the

exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The Court held:

1.That the government established by the Constitution follows

fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the legislative,

the executive and the judicial.

2.That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of

functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the

powers granted.

3.That in cases of conflict between the several departments and

among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as

the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally

to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

4.That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in

actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power andduty to see that no one branch or agency of the government

transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

5.That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional

creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,


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closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of

the other two departments of the government.

6.That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the

National Assembly.

7.That under the organic law prevailing before the present

Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was

respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications

of their elective members.

8.That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers

previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, tothe Electoral Commission.

9.That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral

Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex

necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and

regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

10. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral

Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass

upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications

of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or

consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National

Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations

regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

11. That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed

not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the

Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,

returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by

resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election

of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse

party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs

and expenses of contest.


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12. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the

election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is

contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may

discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the

National Assembly.

13. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the

election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior

to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral

Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within

which protest against the election of any member of the National

Assembly should be filed(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139).

Issue: Is Pres. Nixon's right to safeguard certain information,

using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immunefrom judicial review? No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of

separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of

high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute,

unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was

a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs,

but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of

law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president

must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents.

Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes(US vs Nixon, 418

US 683).

Principle of Blending of Powers

Instance when powers are not confined exclusively within one

department but are assigned to or shared by shared by several

departments.

Principle of Checks and Balances

Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives

or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments.

CASES


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Issue: Did President Truman have the constitutional authority to

seize and operate the steel mills? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held

that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order.

The Court found that there was no congressional statute thatauthorized the President to take possession of private property. The

Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in

Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court

argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully

executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker(Youngstown Co,

vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153).

The Congress cannot control the execution of its laws; since it

doesnt possess this power, it cant delegate it to its agents. The CG is

an agent of the Legislature because Congress can remove him by aprocess other than impeachment. The CG exercises executive power.

Thus, the Act is unconstitutional.The CGs function under the Act is

the very essence of execution of the laws since (1) it entails

interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary

calculations are required and (2) the CG commands the President to

carry out, without variation, the CGs directive regarding the budget

resolutions. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress is the very

essence of executions of the laws. Once Congress passes legislation,

it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through

impeachment. The Constitution only explicitly provides Congress the

power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the

Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would

have permitted impeachment for maladministration, with Madison

arguing that so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during

pleasure of the Senate. Thus, Congress can only remove a member of

the executive branch through impeachment(Bowsher vs. Synar, 478 US

714).

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the

executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the

executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is

privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why

it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however,

allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for

information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or


26/36

proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said

provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For what republican

theory did accomplish?was to reverse the old presumption in favor of

secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it

with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of

popular sovereignty. Resort to any means then by which officials of

the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be

presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the

power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government,

but we shall have given up something of much greater value ? our

right as a people to take part in government(Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464),

GR 169777).

vii) Non-delegation of

powers

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he issued

E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment

No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he

was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO.

857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate

pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for

pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to

rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of

uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O.

No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to

the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby

withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, Section 20(a) in the

PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates,

charges or fees... for the services rendered by the Authority or by any

private organization within a Port District(Philippine Interisland Shipping

Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22, 1997).

General Rule: Potestas delegate non potest delegare

Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not

only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate through the


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instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening

mind of another.

Permissible Delegation

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of

probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted

of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act

encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it

constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it

denies the equal protection of the laws.

As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power

exclusively in the Chief Executive. But, probation and pardon are notcoterminous; nor are they the same. In probation, the probationer is

in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and

completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment

which the law inflicts. The Court held that the Probation Act does

not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning

power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,

remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been

enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place

it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and

imprisonment.

The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in a

bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral

National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of

the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly

may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that

power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the

power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle thatpotestas

delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however, which forbids thedelegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits

of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice

permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to

local authorities. In testing whether a statute constitute an undue

delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the

statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the


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hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of

any other appointee or delegate of the legislature(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil

56).

a.Tariff Powers to the President (Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI;

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix

within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and

restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export

quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts

within the framework of the national development program of the

Government.

b. Emergency Powers to the President (Section 23 (2), Art VI)

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress

may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and

subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise

powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national

policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,

such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its

effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its

nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved,

and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution

provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a

limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;

bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in

duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in theConstitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in

duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency

powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an

emergency."


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The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would

not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different

law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the

delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,

indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet

a temporary emergency may become permanent law,"; for Congress

might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not

meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be

able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly

that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it

might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other

words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to

take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the

law.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the

Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its

authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies

operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and

simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the

emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while

Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the

anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could

repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during

congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the

same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the

latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it

materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best

interests of the country as they saw them, a former President

promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had

vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present

Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after

Congress had refused to approve the measure.

What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the

same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer.

He said he issued the call for a special session of the National

Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless

against air attack, and that it wasmost unlikely the Philippine

Legislature would hold its next regular sessionwhich was to open on


30/36

January 1, 1942." It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that

Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met

in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos.

62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In so far

as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive

authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of

his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts

have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the

proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent

or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under

review.

After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if

the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was

desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of theEmergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total

emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to

the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the

enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government,

principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The

state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with

which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The

war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have

necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a

position to operate(First Emergency Powers Cases, 84 Phil 368).

As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision,

it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be

only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet

been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the

emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be

obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the

Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may

wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when thePresident disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency

Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President

or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite

duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? in palpable

repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder

must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself


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and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the

Congress or the President.

Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and

did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be

considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally

declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that

the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would

lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress

might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to

recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be

easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back.

This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."

Insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on agiven matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had

beenpro tantowithdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must

be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice

of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been

approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the

Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the

result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed

to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to

withdraw the same from the President. Shelter may not be sought in

the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise

emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the

interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the

Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of

justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective,

our Government is democratic in form and based on the system of

separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall

have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be

prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in

disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative andexecutive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to

have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic

processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one

man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the

Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing

delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period


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"in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus

entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping

with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it

alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not

create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation

lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their

faithful adherence to the Constitution(2ndEmergency Powers Cases, 92 Phil603).

c. Delegation to the People (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2,

Art. XVII; RA 6735);

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a

system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve

or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or

local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor

signed by at least tenper centumof the total number of registered

voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at

least threeper centumof the registered voters thereof.

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be

created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantiallyaltered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the

local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the

votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of

at least twelveper centumof the total number of registered voters,

of which every legislative district must be represented by at least

threeper centumof the registered voters therein. No amendment

under this section shall be authorized within five years following the

ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five

years thereafter.


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The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of

this right.

d. Delegation to Local Government Units (Art. X; RA 7160);

e. Delegation to the Administrative Bodies

1.1.1 Power of Subordinate Legislation

CASES

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and

regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited

only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative

enactment. The questioned administrative orders are reasonably

directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under

which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount

interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity

and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are

sustained, and their force and effect upheld(Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR

98332, Jan. 16, 1995).

1.1.2 Principle of Sub-delegation of Powers

1.1.3 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego

Principle

Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when performed

and promulgated in the regular course of business or unless

disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive are presumptively

the acts of the Chief Executive(Villena v. Secy of Interior, 67 Phil 451).


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f. Tests for valid delegation

1.1.1Completeness Test

Law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions so that

there is nothing for the delegate to do except to enforce it.

1.1.2Sufficient Standard Test

Maps out the boundaries of the delegates authority by defining the

legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to

be pursued.

CASES

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing

which may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a

safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary

on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich

with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of

law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. This is not to say that

notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there

are a number of admitted exceptions in view of the nature of the

property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general

welfare from a clear and present danger. The protection of the

general welfare is the particular function of the police power which

both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is

simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty

and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of

its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is describedas the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of

the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and

eminent domain(Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659).

1.1.3Legislative standard need not be expressed


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CASES

Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to themilitary authorities discriminate against Americans and resident

aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment which

restrains discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to denial

of due process? The Court found the President's orders and the

implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice

Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great

importance of military installations and weapons production that

occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of

Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that

restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national

interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused

solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary

"protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was

justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with

an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a

different ancestry(Hirabayashi vs US, 320 US 81).

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions

have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him bylaw. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the

division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only

the administration of local governments but also the direction of

executive departments which the law requires should have regional

offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and political

divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are

"mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative

purposes."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative powerin conferring on the President the power to merge administrative

regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient

standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the

power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is

included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. On the

question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It


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may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law

challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same

subject as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions,

the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant

to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the

Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and

efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs

consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic

development and to improve the service in the transaction of the

public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative

regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to

suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by

administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of thewithdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now

constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to

reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative

regions(Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253).

political law 1 file no 3

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