POLITICAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

Notes from Gibbs

Luz v. People

February 29, 2012

(Search and Arrest for Traffic Violation)

Facts: While driving along a highway in Naga City, Rodelo Luz was flagged down by a policeman/traffic

enforcer, who was then assigned in that area, for violation of a traffic ordinance, particularly driving

without a helmet. Luz was invited to the nearby police station. While the policeman prepared for the

citation ticket for the violation, he noticed Luz to be "uneasy and kept on getting something from his

jacket." With this suspicion, he asked Luz to take out all the contents inside of his jacket. Among the

things revealed was a metal container. Policeman asked him to open the same. It contained 2 sachets of

shabu. [to cut the long story short] Luz was convicted by the RTC for violation of RA 9165, particularly for

illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the decision in toto. Hence, this appeal.

Luz's contention: search incidental to a LAWFUL arrest is inapplicable, because he was not

lawfully arrested; thus, search was invalid.

People's contention: there was a lawful arrest because Luz committed a violation of traffic

ordinance right there and then; thus, search was also valid as it is incidental to a lawful arrest,

and Luz consented to the search.

ISSUE 1: Was there a valid arrest? NO. [thus, search incidental to a lawful arrest not valid]

Under RA 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing

with a traffic violation is NOT the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's

license of the latter. In addition thereto, under the PNP Operations Manual, if the cause for the

flagging down of a vehicle is a traffic violation, the officer's duty is only to issue Traffic Citation

Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR), and never to indulge in prolonged, unnecessary

conversation or argument with the driver violator.

The roadside questioning of a motorist does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be

considered a formal arrest.

ISSUE 2: Were Luz's constitutional rights violated? YES.

At the time a person is arrested, the latter shall be informed of their constitutional rights to

remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against

them. In the case at bar, the police officers informed Luz of his aforementioned rights only after

he had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984) Miranda warnings must also be given to a

person apprehended due to a traffic violation.

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Knowles v. Iowa, 525 US 113 (1998) When a police officer stops a person for [traffic

violation] and correspondingly issues a citation, this procedure does not authorized the

officer to conduct a full search of the car.

ISSUE 3: Assuming search incidental to a lawful arrest was invalid, was there a consented search? NO.

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from

the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following

characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent in given: (1)

the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3)

whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and

intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of the coercive police procedures; (6) the

defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police

questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly

vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of

proving that the necessary consent was given freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that

was alleged was that the petitioner was alone at the police station at 3:00 AM, accompanied by

several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against the finding of valid consent to

a warrantless search.

- IN SUM, Luz acquitted of the offense charged.

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et.al. v. Republic, et.al.

January 24, 2012

(Nature of Coconut Levy Funds)

Civil Procedure: "Participation in all stages of a case before the trial court effectively estops a

party from challenging its jurisdiction."

Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial vs. Right to Speedy Disposition: "The right to speedy trail is

available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a

speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies."

Coconut Levy Funds: "Coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest; THEY ARE

PRIMA FACIE PUBLIC FUNDS. They are treated as a SPECIAL FUNDS by the very laws which

created them."

That being the case, they cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive

benefit of private persons. TAXES ARE IMPOSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE.

Hence, subject to examination and audit by COA.

Any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated

as public funds or public property.

Vda. de Ouano v. Republic, et.al.

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February 9, 2011

(Effect if Expropriated Land NOT Used for the Intended Purpose)

Facts: Private properties of herein petitioners were subjected to expropriation by the Republic for

expansion of the then Lahug Airport. The Republic acquired title over the same. However, in 1991 or

soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to Mactan Cebu International airport Authority (MCIAA),

Lahug Airport completely ceased operations. Thus, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the

purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development

prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to

exercise their right to repurchase. Subject of the present case are actions for reconveyance filed against

the Republic.

Primary Issue: Should the expropriated lands be returned to its respective former owners on ground

that the same were not used for the purpose intended?

In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory

requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the State must show, at the

minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to

be specifically alleged or least reasonably deductible from the complaint.

If the genuine public necessity ceases or disappears, then there is NO MORE COGENT POINT

FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF THE EXPROPRIATED LAND (it dishonors the

judgment of expropriation, not in keeping with the idea of fair play.). The same legal situation

should hold if THE GOVERNMENT DEVOTES THE PROPERTY TO ANOTHER PUBLIC USE very much

different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private

person.

[CONTROLLING DOCTRINE] - The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always

conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. Once the purpose is terminated or

peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion

subject of course to the return at the very least of the just compensation received.

[OVERTURNED DOCTRINE] The government via expropriation proceedings acquires

unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land.

There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional

(such as in expropriation.)

Resolutions:

1. MCIAA is ordered to reconvey the subject lots to petitioners.

2. Ouano, et.al. are ordered to return to MCIAA the just compensation they received.

3. MCIAA shall be entitled to retain whatever fruits and income it may have obtained from the

subject expropriated lots without any obligation to refund the same to the lot owners.

4. Ouano, et.al. shall retain whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation

may have earned in the meantime without any obligation to refund the same to MCIAA.

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National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

August 24, 2011

(Inverse Condemnation)

CA's restrictive construal of Sec. 3(i) of RA 9395 as "exclusive of tunnels" was obviously

unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on

the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. When the law does not

distinguish, so must we not.

The term "works" should be construed as embracing ALL kinds of constructions,

facilities, and other developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of

developing hydraulic power.

Inverse Condemnation; Damages: The action to recover just compensation from the State or its

expropriating agency (inverse condemnation) differs from the action for damages.

Inverse Condemnation objective is to recover the value of the property taken in fact

by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of

eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

Action for Damages objective is to vindicate the legal wrong through damages, which

may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.

Just Compensation: It is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the

expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss.

Prescription: The fact that the owner rather that the expropriator brings the action to recover

just compensation does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation,

for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of

property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of

the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for public

use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.

The taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical

taking or appropriation the expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title, physical

possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes

destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common

and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its

value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor

material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner. [just

compensation should still cover the entire land.]

Reckoning Value: It shall be reckoned at the time of the filing of the complaint. xxxx NPC's entry

denied elementary due process of the law to the owners since then until the owners

commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the

necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process

of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore,

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reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse

condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.

The award of interest fixed at 12% per annum on the amount of just compensation

renders the grant of back rentals unwarranted.

Attorney's fees:

Ordinary the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal

services he has rendered to the latter. The basis is the fact of his employment by and his

agreement with the client.

Extraordinary an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing

party in a litigation. The basis is Art. 2208 of NCC, and is payable to the client, unless

there is an agreement that the award shall pertain to the lwyer as additional

compensation or as part therof.

Attorney's fees are not awarded every time a part prevails in a suit, nor should

an adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of the same to the winning party.

xxxx It is subject to review by the SC, even if not specifically raised or assigned as

error by the parties.

Del Castillo v. People

January 30, 2012

(Presence of Barangay Tanod will NOT Validate an Illegal Service of Search Warrant)

Facts: Acting upon a confidential report that Del Castillo is engaged in the illegal sale of drugs, police

officers secured search warrant. On their way to Del Castillo's house, someone shouted for "raid" which

caused for the commotion in the place. Police officers hurriedly went to the house; the latter was able

to escape. The wife was present. In the presence of the barangay tanod, the officers searched the house

but they found nothing. It was a barangay tanod who found 4 plastic packs of a crystalline substance. [to

cut the long story short] Del Castillo was convicted by the RTC, affirmed by CA. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Was the irregularity in the content and service of the search warrant (particularly the requirement

on particularity) validated by the presence of the barangay tanod?

No. A barangay tanod is not a private individual. The Local Government Code contains provision

which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Hence,

constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable as against

government authorities.

Magallona, et.al. v. Sec. Ermita, et.al.

GR No. 187167. August 16, 2011

FACTS:

In March 2009, Congress passed RA 9522 (the present Philippine Baselines Law), as compliance

to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).

RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the

Philippine archipelago and classified the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal,

as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners (as citizens, taxpayers, and/or legislators) assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on

two principal grounds: (1) the law reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach

of the Philippine state's sovereign power in violation of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, and (2)

the law opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels

and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security.

Respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty

regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, i.e. territorial waters (12 nautical

miles from the baselines); contiguous zone (24 na); exclusive economic zone (200 na); and

continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III State parties to delimit

with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.

Far from surrendering the PH's claims over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress'

decision to classify them as "rgime of islands" consistent with Art. 121 of UNCLOS III manifests

the State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Art.

121 thereof states, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above

water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of

islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioner's assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under

RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the

location of basepoints, increased the PH's total maritime space by 145, 216 square nautical

miles.

UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the EEZ - in waters previously part of the high

seas. However, it preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached

to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the PH will find itself

devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and

continental shelf is measured. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the PH in

safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc.

GR Nos. 175769-70. January 19, 2009

FACTS:

ABS-CBN is engaged in television and radio broadcasting through wireless and satellite means

while Philippine Multi-Media Systems Inc. (PMSI for brevity), the operator of Dream

Broadcasting System provides direct-to-home (DTH) television via satellite to its subscribers all

over the Philippines.

PMSI was granted legislative franchise under RA 8630 to install, operate and maintain a

nationwide DTH satellite service and is obligated under by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 4-08-

88, Section 6.2 of which requires all cable television system operators operating in a community

within Grade A or B contours to carry the television signals of the authorized television

broadcast stations (must-carry rule).

ABS-CBN filed a complaint with Intellectual Property Office (IPO) for violation of laws involving

property rights. It alleged that PMSIs unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23

infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright and that the NTC circular only covers cable

television system operators and not DTH satellitetelevision operators. Moreover, NTC Circular 4-

08-88 violates Sec. 9 of Art. III of the Constitution because it allows the taking of property for

public use without payment of just compensation.

PMSI argued that its rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 is sanctioned by Memorandum

Circular No. 04-08-88; that the must-carry rule under the Memorandum Circular is a valid

exercise of police power.

IPO and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of PMSI.

ISSUE: Whether or not ABS-CBN's rights are violated.

RULING:

PMSI was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 8630, Section 4 of which

similarly states that it shall provide adequate public service time to enable the government,

through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public issues;

provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such as in

community programming; assist in the functions of public information and education x x

x. Section 5, paragraph 2 of the same law provides that the radio spectrum is a finite

resource that is a part of the national patrimony and the use thereof is a privilege conferred

upon the grantee by the State and may be withdrawn anytime, after due process.

In Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC the Court held that a franchise is a

mere privilege which may be reasonably burdened with some form of public service. Thus: All

broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave

frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than

there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to

amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that any such

franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the

Congress when the common good so requires.

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own

the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and

images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a

mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance

by the grantee of some form of public service. x x x There is likewise no merit to ABS-CBNs claim

that PMSIs carriage of its signals is for a commercial purpose; that its being the countrys top

broadcasting company, the availability of its signals allegedly enhances PMSIs attractiveness to

potential customers; or that the unauthorized carriage of its signals by PMSI has created

competition between its Metro Manila and regional stations.

The Must-Carry Rule favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It prevents cable

television companies from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not

reached by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in

far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to city viewers. In fact, this Office finds the

rule more burdensome on the part of the cable television companies. The latter carries the

television signals and shoulders the costs without any recourse of charging. On the other hand,

the signals that are carried by cable television companies are dispersed and scattered by the

television stations and anybody with a television set is free to pick them up.

The carriage of ABS-CBNs signals by virtue of the must-carry rule in Memorandum Circular No.

04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the government though the NTC which is vested

with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and control telecommunications and

broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. The imposition of the must-carry rule is within

the NTCs power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require,

to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television

broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities.

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.

GR No. 162994. September 17, 2004

FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of

employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by

the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by

consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and

should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign

from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation

that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking

position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte

area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's

competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of

the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors

informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that

either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition,

Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request

against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and

while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines

Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that

Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE on Equal Protection:

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and

other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal

or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is

reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the

interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interestcannot

be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only

to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long

array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against

merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply

with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed

manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

ISSUE on Constructive Dismissal:

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued

employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or

diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes

unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.

Other Issues/Ruling:

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than

the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect

its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our

laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of

labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law

also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement

in the interest of fair play.

In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee

handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships

between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate

relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to

avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such

relationships.

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Gary Alejano, et.al.

GR No. 160792. August 25, 2005

FACTS:

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,

entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale

apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the

security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The

junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the

resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00

p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several

negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they

had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.

On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major

Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003

Oakwood incident. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior

officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of

ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take

into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood

incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

On August 11, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The Supreme Court

issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and

produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. On the same date, the detainees and their

other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary

Investigation, which the trial court granted.

The Court of appeals dismissed the petition. Nonetheless, the CA ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was

in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the

rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The

appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees

confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do

not even question. The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the

appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a

constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to

have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The appellate court

ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable

under the circumstances. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of

Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not

justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint,

which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can avail of the remedy for petition of habeas corpus.

RULING:

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy

to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP

Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of

detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being

illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders

the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas

corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of

error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

Case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a

persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully

denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,

where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a

deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. However, a mere allegation

of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of

the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a

constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no

jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is

void as to the excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high.

The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.

That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a

guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or

imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as

to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their

detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of

privacy rights.

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted

prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions

in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and

prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford

injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane

conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of

confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or

duration of confinement.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 148560. November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No.

7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten

wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value

of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph

Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, wishes to impress

upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line

which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects

of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"

standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable

under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal

point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:

combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the

validity of the mentioned law.

ISSUE on whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who

are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be

sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/

reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have

committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse

petitioner in his defense.

Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the

terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal

acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for

being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or

because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of

common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such

instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due

process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what

conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions

and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because

of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting

some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected

speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible

inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in

the area of free speech.

ISSUE on whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of

plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it

shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance

of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient

to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall

unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor

the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds

in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled

to an acquittal.

The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of

constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved

beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every

element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense.

Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that

pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-

pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that

without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder. We do not subscribe to petitioners

stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its

definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a

rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural

measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but

only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present

sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE on whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is

within the power of Congress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive

crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is

noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed

willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is

the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the remarks of Senator Taada made

during the deliberation on S.B. No.733. Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is

conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done

to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a

pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far

as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must

be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and

extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder

Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of

responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to

have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among

the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The evil of a crime may take

various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life

was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to

completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.

There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of

the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in

which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and

underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous

offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or

inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a

special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

zowt morf tsegiDruofenoore:

Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections

Facts:

52 party- list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC)

in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them

from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November

and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to

represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a

marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly

representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.

Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the

petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also

lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the said party-list groups were validly disqualified

Held:

The 54 petitions were remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations

covered by the 41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a

chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine

whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13

May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning,

the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining whether

they may be granted accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013

elections.

The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting on the basis of previous

rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-list system. These earlier

rulings enumerated guidelines on who may participate in the party-list system.

There are three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or

organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to

participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties do not need to organize

along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector.

As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list

system and no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional

candidates, however, are not barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do

is register their sectoral wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered

an independent sectoral party linked to a political party through a coalition.

The question is: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented sectors come in?

The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the party-list system.

The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent marginalized and

underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well-defined political constituencies. The high

court went on to enumerate marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant,

fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.

The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women,

and the youth.

The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies only

to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that *a+ majority of the

members of the sectoral parties or organizations must belong to the marginalized and

underrepresented sector they represent. The same is true for those who lack well-defined political

constituencies.

As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that they

must either be members of the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector.

Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations be

disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have at least one

nominee who remains qualified.

The party list system, according to the Decision Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the

party-list system, the high court stated that it is not synonymous with that of the sectoral

representation. The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to

leave out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups.

The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list

system In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively

to sectoral parties.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the

proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly

intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.

To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which

states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty

members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned

among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their

respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided

by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties

or organizations.

WHAT IS THE PROOF THAT THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR SECTORAL PARTIES?

SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH MANDATES THAT, DURING THE FIRST

THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF CONGRESS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,

ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED

BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS

CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW,

EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three

consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats

allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from

the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors

as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the

party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to

non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively

for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of

one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after

the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the

first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any

class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties

only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the

Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,

principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means

of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as

candidates for public office

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated

in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector

Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean

that they are not one and the same.

Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum

As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec

(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm) and BANAT v. Comelec

(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm).

CITY OF MANILA VS. TE

Digested by: Chin Rojas

FACTS: City of Manila instituted a complaint for expropriation against herein respondent. The latter filed

a motion to dismiss on the ground that Ordinance 7951 (an expropriation measure enacted on February

3, 1998 by the city council authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of

real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets) was an invalid expropriation measure

because it violated the rule against taking private property without just compensation and that it did not

comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Furthermore, respondent is qualified as

a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of RA 7279, the subject lot being the

only piece of realty that she owned. Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC. Petitioners appeal to CA but

to no avail. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a motion to dismiss by the respondent is improper.

HELD: Yes, it was improper.

The present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that

required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an

answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides:

If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or

defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons.

The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest,

state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the

taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed

in the answer or any subsequent pleading.

Thus, the trial court in this case should have denied respondents motion to dismiss and required her to

submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period.

Petition was granted. The dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court.

Important notes:

- Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to

exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminates in an

order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property

for the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of

the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated.

- the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified

beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of public use

or purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of eminent domain.

Heirs of lazaro gallardo vs. porferio soliman, vivian valete and antonio soliman (case digest)

When one party enters into a covenant with another, he must perform his obligations with fealty and

good faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been given a grant, such as land, under

the land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the landowner is

entitled to his just compensation for the deprivation of his land.

FACTS:

Lazaro and Prosperidad are the registered owners of a 4.3699-hectare parcel of land in Tarlac. The land

was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 and respondent Porferio

Soliman was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-transferee thereof. In 1995, petitioners (heirs of

Lazaro) filed a Complaint for collection of land amortizations, dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation

of Deed of Transfer and Emancipation Patent against respondent before the Office of the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).

It appears that a Kasunduan in 1985 and a notarized Deed of Transfer were executed by Lazaro and

Porferio. Under said deeds, Porferio (as sole farmer-beneficiary and in consideration for the transfer of

the whole of the land in his favor), obliged himself to pay the petitioners 999 cavans of palay in 15 equal

yearly amortizations under the Direct Payment Scheme of PD 27. An advance payment of 66 cavans and

28 kilos, representing total lease payments made by Porferio to Lazaro since 1973, shall be deducted

from the 999 cavans, leaving an annual amortization to be made by Porferio of 62 cavans or 16 cavans

per hectare per year. But Porferio paid only 121.2 cavans or 480.9 cavans short of the total

amortizations due from 1986 to 1995, into the deed.

Porferio failed/refused to attend mediation with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and

pay amortizations on the land. (The Tarlac PARO issued Emancipation Patents not only in favor of

Porferio but also to his children who were not legally instituted farmer tenant-transferees of the land

under PD 27.) In their Answer, Porferio and his children alleged the title of the subject land was already

transferred registered accordingly to their names. They argued that the PARAD has no jurisdiction over

the case and no authority to cancel such titles as the same pertain to the regular courts. They further

contended that between them and the petitioners, there is no tenancy relationship; and that they have

exceeded payments for the land.

PARAD ruling:

- that It had jurisdiction over the controversy which partakes of an agrarian dispute.

- Despite the Kasunduan and the Deed of Transfer were defective for non-compliance with certain

requirements of PD 27. said deeds were "within the context of PD 27"

- Porferio still owes petitioners 597.8 cavans of palay.

- the failure of Porferio, Vivian and Antonio to pay rentals/amortizations cannot be considered as

deliberate because they "labored under the honest belief that they are now vested with absolute

ownership" of the land

- respondents to pay petitioners the remaining 478.24 cavans of palay

DARAB ruling:

-upheld the validity of the Emancipation Patents following the ratiocination of the PARAD that they have

been regularly issued.

-Affirmed PARADs finding that respondents failure to pay the rentals/amortizations was not deliberate

and willful and that respondents to pay the remaining balance

CA ruling:

-the issuance of the Emancipation Patents in respondents name was irregular, and that Porferios

deliberate failure and refusal to pay the annual amortizations since 1986 despite demand should result

in the cancellation of his title.

-Resolution dismissing petitioners Petition for Review on the ground that the verification and

certification against forum shopping was signed by only four of the six petitioners. Petitioners Mario

Lazaro P. Gallardo and Lazaro P. Gallardo, Jr. did not sign, and no special power of attorney to sign in

their favor accompanied the Petition.

-that the certification against forum shopping must be executed and signed by all of the petitioners, or

else it is insufficient.

ISSUES:

WON CA erred in holding that the signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping by

only 4 of the 6 petitioners is insufficient to meet the requirements of the rule

WON CA erred in outrightly dismissing the petition for review on purely technical ground:

RULING:

Yes; It was an error for the CA to have dismissed the Petition for Review.

despite 2 of the petitioners did not sign on the verification & certification, Petitioners are all heirs of

the deceased Lazaro. As such, they undoubtedly share a common interest in the land, as well as

common claims and defenses, as against respondents

Yes; CA should not have dismissed the petition on purely technical ground

CA to decide the case on the merits considering the vital issues presented in the Petition. There is a

need for the CA to resolve whether the Emancipation Patents issued in the name of Vivian and Antonio

were valid, considering that by the evidence presented, they were never instituted as tenants to the

land.

CA should also settle the issue as to whether Porferio may be said to have deliberately refused to

honor his obligation to pay the amortizations on the land, per the Kasunduan and Deed of Transfer,

considering that on record, written demand has been served upon him, and despite such demand,

Porferio failed to pay the amortizations.

Gamboa v. Chan, et.al.

GR No. 193636. July 24, 2012

Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom

from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, it is to be repository of freedom.

The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right.

This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc (22 S 424) (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on

an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by

plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is

violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:

Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental

restraint; it must include privacy as well, it it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is

indeed the beginning of all freedom. As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.

Justice Brandeis the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The

concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a

unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.

Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from

intrusion or constraint.

- However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks (541 S 456) (2007), this

Court underscored that the right to privacy is NOT ABSOLUTE, viz: With respect to the right of privacy

which the petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute

right. While it is true that Section 21, Art. VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of

persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be

allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of

the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to

privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not

absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship

test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the

requirement to disclosure of information is for valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the

government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who

invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state the this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to

proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.

Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed

to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to

provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and informational privacy.

- The writ of habeas datait seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding

oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in

order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be

granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,

liberty or security on the other.

Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other

armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.

- The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups

not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police

force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national

police commission.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court erred in ruling that the Zenarosa Commission be impleaded as either a

necessary or indispensable party;

2. WON the trial court erred in clearing in declaring that (Gamboa) failed to present sufficient

proof to link respondents as the informant to the Zenarosa Commission;

3. WON the trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;

4. WON the trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zenarosa Commission to the

PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;

WON the trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.

Ouano vs Republic,

February 9, 2011(Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose)

FACTS:

In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its

predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of

expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the

government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug

Airport had been closed and abandoned.

Furthermore, it was established by evidence that the National Airport

Corporation, MCIAAs predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance

to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective

lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the former owners of expropriated lands- not used for the purpose

intended be allowed to recover the same.

HELD:

The SC held that the government only acquires the rights in expropriated parcels

of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This means

that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is

abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of

right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from

the condemnation judgment. In the present case, the above final decree of

expropriation allows the recovery or repurchase, upon abandonment of the Lahug

airport project, as a condition of approving expropriation. In effect, the government

merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose

for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government.

Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the

transfer of the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their

old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should

commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for

expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,

then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the

latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in

any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation.

Republic vs Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc. (GR No. 185124 January 25, 2012) 664 SCRA 233

Facts:

National Irrigation Authority (NIA) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created

under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily responsible for irrigation

development and management in the country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.)

552 on 11 September 1974and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically

authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain.

NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigado

Irrigation Project. On 8 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the

expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14, 497.91 square meters.

On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege properly the area

sought to be expropriated, the exact address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof.

NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing

with the Philippine National Bank the amount of 19, 246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.

On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and

Counterclaim. They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land,

because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties,

because there was an abandoned government property adjacent theirs, where the project could pass

through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their

expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have

placed its value at % million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their

properties for the project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties.

On 11 September 1996, RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fair

market value of the properties. On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it would

issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the determination of the fair arket value of the

properties. The lower court later amended its ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of

Possession in favor of NIA.

On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners Report to the RTC. The report,

however, stated that the committee members could not agree on the market value of the subject

properties and recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners to replace the ones

coming from the parties only.

On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its Commissioners Report to the lower

court. The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land should be 65 per square meter

based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau if Internal Revenue (BIR.)

On 3 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC another report, which had adopted

the first Committee Report, as well as the formers 25 November 1996 report. However, the committee

added to its computation the value of the earthfill excavated from portions of Lot. Nos. 3039 and 3080.

Petitioner objected to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of

the land.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA seriously erred in affirming the trial courts finding of just compensation of the

land and the improvements thereon based on the report of the commissioners.

Held:

Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation --- In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is

defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The

measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of

the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the

property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of just

compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly

defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action

and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to

sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.

In National Power Corporation vs. Diato-Bernal, this Court emphasized that the just-ness of the

compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data a bases for fixing the value of the

condemned property. The reliable and actual data we referred to in that case were the sworn

declarations of realtors in the area, as well as tax declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR. In

disregarding the Committee Report by the National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus: It

is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis.

First, the market values of the subject propertys neighboring lots were mere estimates and

unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area

concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the BIR for the contiguous residential dwellings and

commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the

community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents property. Finally, the

market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto. As

correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land prices which is not based on any

documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. The trial court

adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line and sinker. It did not even bother to

require the submission of the alleged market sales data and price listings. Further, the RTC

overlooked that fact that the recommended just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or

more than two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just

compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the

commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry

into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing pf the

complaint. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in te commissioners report is unacceptable.

We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the

payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from

that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation

proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation

ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value

could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.

Ownership of lands are indivisible, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil

under it.

Note: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with

the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes

entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the

complaint.

Sto. Tomas vs Salac

(G.R. No. 152642 November 13, 2012) 685 SCRA 245

Facts:

On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and

Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995bthat, for among other purpose, sets the Governments policies on

overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of

migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.

Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to

begin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and

migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA.)

On January 8, 2002 respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with

application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners before

RTC of Quezon City, Branch 96.

Salac, et al. sought to: (1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 and POEA Memorandum Circular

15; (2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules

and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers; and (3)

also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of RA

8042.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 8042 is constitutional as a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

Constitutional Law; Police Power --- As the Court held in People vs. Ventura, the State under its police

power may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general

welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of

deception and fraud. Police power is that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to

prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of

OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to

work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.

The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative

Department. Hence, in the absence of clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional,

the Court must uphold its validity.

REPUBLIC V HANS MENZI, GR 183446 NOVEMBER 13, 2012

SYLLABUS

Same; Provisional Remedies; Sequestration; An extraordinary measure in the form of a provisional

remedy, sequestration is merely intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or dissipation of

sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial

determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth ill-gotten.Given the

finality of the lifting of the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG and the long-standing failure of the

Republic to allege and prove the illegality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares and the invalidity of

the transfers thereof, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for ordering the

release of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI. An extraordinary measure in

the form of a provisional remedy, sequestration is merely intended to prevent the destruction,

concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them,

pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth

ill-gotten. While it is true that the lifting of a writ of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the

main case, as it does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property is not ill-gotten, it cannot be

over-emphasized that there has never been a main case against the Liwayway shares as would justify

the Republics continued claim on the subject TDCs and, for that matter, the prolonged withholding of

the proceeds thereof from the Estate and HMHMI. Although jurisprudence recognizes the possibility of a

resort to other ancillary remedies since the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over sequestration cases

demands that it should also have the authority to preserve the subject matter of the cases or put the

same in custodia legis, this is unavailing to the Republic since, by its own admission, the Liwayway shares

were not litigated in Civil Case No. 0022.

Same; Same; Same; Like the remedies of freeze order and provisional takeover with which the

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has been equipped, sequestration is not meant

to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to his property and vest the same in the

sequestering agency, the Government or any other person, as these can be done only for the causes and

by the processes laid down by law.Like the remedies of freeze order and provisional takeover with

which the PCGG has been equipped, sequestration is not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his

title or any right to his property and vest the same in the sequestering agency, the Government or any

other person, as these can be done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by law. These

remedies are severe, radical measures taken against apparent, ostensible owners of property, or

parties against whom, at the worst, there are merely prima facie indications of having amassed ill-

gotten wealth, indications which must still be shown to lead towards actual facts in accordance with the

judicial procedures of the land. Considering that sequestration is not meant to create a permanent

situation as regards the property subject thereof and subsists only until ownership is finally judicially

determined, it stands to reason that, upon its dissolution, the property sequestered should likewise be

returned to its owner/s. Indeed, sequestration cannot be allowed interminably and forever, if it is to

adhere to constitutional due process.

FACTS:

Petitioner assails the resolution issued by Sandiganbayan ordering Philtrusts to pay the estate of Hans

Menzi for the proceeds of time deposits certificate nos. 162828 and 162829.

On 22 April 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a Writ of

Sequestration over the shares of former President Ferdinand Marcos, Emilio Yap (Yap) and Eduardo

Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) in the Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Bulletin), together with those of their

nominees or agents, U.S. Automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive) and its officers in Liwayway Publishing,

Inc. (Liwayway) as well as the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of Hans Menzi

Holdings and Management, Inc. (HMHMI).

On 2 April 1992 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution lifting the writ of sequestration issued by the

PCGG. In a Resolution dated 16 July 1996, the Court reversed and set aside the assailed resolution and

referred the case back to the Sandiganbayan for resolution of the preliminary question of whether

there is prima facie factual basis for PCGGs sequestration order. It was pursuant to the foregoing

resolution that the Sandiganbayan went on to conduct hearings on the matter and, later, to issue the

Resolution dated 13 April 1998, discounting the factual bases for PCGGs sequestration order and

granting the Estates motion to lift the writ of sequestration over the shares of stock, assets, properties,

records and documents of HMHMI. Dissatisfied, the Republic filed a petition for certiorari and the Court

rendered a decision dismissing the Republics petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had the

authority to resolve all incidents relative to cases involving ill-gotten wealth and that the courts

appellate jurisdiction over the graft courts decisions or final orders is limited to questions of law.

On 29 November 2006, the Republic filed its motion for the execution of the Sandiganbayans March 14,

2002 D