Political Parties and Democracy:

A Comparative Analysis of Party Mobilization Doug Perkins Department of Political Science The Ohio State University perkins.75@osu.edu http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/grads/dperkins/

Prepared for delivery at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place and Sheraton Boston Hotel and Towers, September 3-6, 1998. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.

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Political Parties and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Party Mobilization

Doug Perkins, The Ohio State University Theory: The manner by which politicians attempt to mobilize support helps determine the character and quality of democracy, as well as the possibility for democratic consolidation. Hypotheses: The mobilization strategies politicians pursue as they attempt to win elections are affected by their access to certain resources. Key resources include secondary organizations, patronage, and mass media outlets. Methods: In order to provide the best possible test of the hypotheses under consideration, this research utilizes Mill’s Indirect Method of Agreement and attempts to follow the dictates set forth in King et al.’s Designing Scientific Inquiry with one minor exception: a mechanism is provided in order to provide a more convincing case for causation. The dependent variable under consideration is the mobilization strategy and is measured dichotomously along two dimensions: whether the mobilization efforts are direct or indirect, and the degree to which state patronage is used. The key independent variables are the politicians’ access to secondary organizations, state patronage, and state and private media outlets. The causal mechanism employed involves the use of “soft” rational choice and institutionalism. Results: Politicians’ access to key resources affects their choice of mobilization strategy. In cases where only one of the key resources is available, the model performs as expected. In cases where multiple options are available, the findings suggest that politicians prefer indirect methods of mobilization to direct ones, and would prefer to use state patronage to support their mobilization efforts. The mechanism employed links endogenous theories of party formation such as are found in Aldrich (1985) with structural theories such as Shefter (1984).

Electoral Mobilization and Democracy Political parties have developed alongside democracy, and it is commonly assumed that democracy cannot survive without them. The types of party organizations that compete in a state’s party system profoundly affect the character of democracy. Party organizations determine the manner in which elections are conducted, as well as the nature of the linkage between political elites and the mass public (Burnham 1965, Przeworski 1985, Weber 1946). Recent analysis suggests that political party organizations also play a pivotal role in democratic consolidation and stability (Berman 1997, Huntington 1968). The weakening of political parties is thought to have "hollowed-out" democracy in established regimes by atrophying the linkages between politicians and their constituencies (Diamond 1996, Katz and Mair 1996). The situation is direr in Eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states, where few parties have developed the strength required to consolidate democracy. Although party organizational structure is thus hypothesized to affect the quality and performance of democracy, surprisingly, little attention has beeen given to how and why politicians choose the type of party organizations they do. In this paper, I offer a new model of party formation and test it against a “summary account” (King et al. 1994: 53-54) of European party formation, as well as several Russian observations. The model, which synthesizes assumptions from rational choice and organizational theory, is a predictive typology that seeks to account for the various organizational forms taken by parties

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based on their locations within the political opportunity structure. This study is unique in that it focuses particular attention on two facets of party organization that affect democratic stability and consolidation: mobilization strategies and the derivation of party resources. Parties that do not mobilize voters directly and consistently are largely unable to socialize their supporters to norms conducive to democracy. Parties that are dependent on state resources cannot adequately counter-balance the state and its rulers. This research seeks to build on previous works such as Aldrich (1995), Kalyvas (1996), and Shefter (1994) in an attempt to explain the formation of important equilibrium institutions- political parties. While each builds upon the traditional party literature using the new institutionalism, each of these three authors explain the formation of political parties in different ways. Kalyvas and Shefter argue that politicians choose to organize as they do based largely on their relationship to key resources such as secondary organizations (Kalyvas 1996, also see Przeworski 1985) and state resources (Shefter 1995, also see Perkins 1995), while Aldrich focuses primarily on the pressures democratic governance and elections put on politicians to form political parties (Aldrich 1995). This paper synthesizes these two approaches and provides a systematic test of the theory and hypotheses so generated. Methodology In his book Why Parties?, John Aldrich explains the formation and evolution of political parties using a set of mechanisms endogenous to the politicians and parties. Political parties and their various forms are strategies politicians use in their pursuit of office and policy goals. This book is noteworthy not for its findings- it goes over well-tilled ground- or qualitative analysis -which describes the theories rather than testing them -but rather for the mechanisms Aldrich employs. Mechanisms attempt to “tell the story” of causation in a consistent manner. As such, the idea is similar to Alexander George’s notion of “process tracing,” except that “process-tracing” involves directed historical storytelling, while mechanisms tell the story stripped of proper nouns and reproduced in a more or less formal manner. Both are complementary to one another and a rigorous application of the comparative method or statistical analysis. In this paper, I use the comparative method to find the “causal effect” of several variables on party formation, “soft” rational choice to provide the mechanisms behind the different forms of party formation, and briefly “process-trace” a summary account of European party formation and a few Russian cases. It should be noted that King et al. argue against mechanisms and process-tracing and suggest that the only way to connect the independent and dependent variables is to break the chain between them down into individual links, and treat each link as a new hypothesis. According to them, rational choice and formal modeling are not mechanisms as such, but can be used to help ensure that the theory and associated hypotheses are internally consistent. I respectfully suggest that they underestimate the value of mechanisms and directed story-telling1. In this, I side with Elster and George: a good mechanism, or at least a convincing

1 For more on mechanisms, see Jon Elster’s Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences and Kalyvas (ibid). For the debate over the comparative method, as presented by King et al., see APSA (cite).

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story, is useful as we attempt to move from correlation (or causal effect) to causation2. In the section below, I present endogenous mechanisms that help explain party formation, then show how the environmental variables under consideration affect these mechanisms, and through them, affect the outcome3. I argue that endogenous mechanisms such as those presented in John Aldrich’s Why Parties?, as attractive and elegant as they are, are insufficient and must be supplemented soas to take into account structure in a consistent manner. The Mechanisms of Party Formation and Mobilization Politicians formed the original political parties, called cadre parties (Duverger 1954) or parties of notables (Weber 1946), as their parliamentary or congressional caucuses became temporally stable. Aldrich argues that these coalitions coalesced because politicians needed them to overcome collective action and social choice problems inherent in making policy (1995). While this explanation does not explain when coalitions will become more or less permanent, it does provide a mechanism- an iterated n-person prisoner’s dilemma for its occurrence. Without such coalitions, lawmaking is simply unmanageable. Permanent caucuses make the process more tractable. The next step in the formation of the cadre parties involved the institutionalization of the links between the caucuses and local electoral committees. The parties that resulted were candidate-centered, employed a small number of consultants (Duverger 1954), and were ideally suited to winning elections as long as the relative size of the electorate was small. However, as the size of the electorate grew, and as outsiders sought entrance to the political arena, politicians had to find new ways to overcome the problems associated with mobilizing electoral support. These two pressures led to the development of the first mass parties. While a system comprised wholly of weakly articulated cadre parties could have continued for quite some time, a couple of factors seem to suggest that the penetration of the electorate may well have been inevitable. Politicians in opposition parties, assuming they desire to move into the majority, had an incentive to implement strategies that might give them a competitive edge. Similarly, political outsiders had to find strategies that would allow them and the groups they represented entrance into the political arena. While there were a number of strategies both of these groups could have pursued, the most successful involved direct mobilization of segments of the populace (Shefter 1994). One way to understand the problems associated with mobilization is through the use of the “calculus of voting” (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 1973; Aldrich 1995). The most popular form of this calculus is R = PB + D - C, where R is the expected utility of voting, P is the probability that the individual will affect the outcome, B is the importance of the outcome to the individual, and D and C respectively represent the benefits and costs the

2 Probably the best example of this approach in the parties’ literature is Stathis Kalyvas’ The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe.” John Aldrich’s Why Parties? and Martin Shefter’s Political Parties and the State are two other excellent examples. This work is modeled upon these three works. 3 The endogenous mechanisms employed are largely based upon those presented in John Aldrich’s Why Parties.

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individual receives from the act of voting itself. The aggregation of voters with such a calculus creates a collective action problem known as the “paradox of voting.” The problem arises because the election of a beneficial candidate is a public good, and, as the probability of effecting the outcome is so small, the incentives facing individuals usually suggest abstention. The “paradox” is that anyone votes at all. This problem is compounded by the presence of a second collection problem surrounding the “B” term. In order to determine the differential between the candidates, a potential voter must gather information and intelligence about the candidates. This effort is costly, and few voters will expend the time necessary when, as is usually the case, they do not expect to affect the outcome. Political campaigns are designed to overcome these problems. Politicians who wish to mobilize support must take steps to ensure that R is positive. For instance, politicians try to increase the B term and decrease the costs associated with gathering information and intelligence by presenting their messages in an easily digestible manner and by pointing out the differences, real or imagined, between them and their rival candidates. In order to move out of the minority, politicians must affect the calculus of potential supporters, and as political resources are scarce, they must do so as efficiently as possible. Politicians turn to parties only if the parties are of use to them. There are a couple of reasons why politicians might turn to parties to help them mobilize electoral support. When politicians associate themselves with an established political party, party labels reduce information costs by providing perspective voters an inexpensive “cue” about a candidate’s ideology. More importantly for the present research is the fact that coalitions of politicians can provide “economies of scale” (Aldrich 1995: 49). Politicians can affect voters’ voting calculus, but it is expensive. Groups of politicians can pool their resources and share the costs associated with mobilization. Unfortunately, just because politicians would be better off pooling resources does not mean that they will- such mobilization presents a collective action problem. This approach helps explain why politicians might join parties, but it does not explain why parties would form in the first place. For this, we have to go outside the political arena and look at the structures that make it possible for politicians to solve the collection problems of mass mobilization4. The endogenously generated pressures found above describe why politicians need parties as well as the difficulties associated with their formation. However, they do not describe when or how these difficulties will be overcome. Iteration could account for party formation “spontaneously,” and without outside interference, but parties tend to mobilize around politicians and groups with access to privileged resources- a factor that trumps mere iteration. Politicians with access to privileged resources can use these resources (or the promise of them) to induce cooperation, as is suggested by Olson (1965). Simply put, leaders with access to resources can initiate and sustain cooperation among politicians by rewarding cooperative behavior and punishing defection. While spontaneous cooperation is possible in an iterated game (e.g. Axlerod 1984), it is more likely when a leader is able to link a politicians’ reward 4 Aldrich recognizes that it was the presence of certain “conditions” that allowed ambitious politicians to form strong political parties (1995: 56, chs. 4&5). Unfortunately, as he was only trying to demonstrate how certain mechanisms affect party formation. More rigorous testing would have allowed these “conditions” to be treated as variables in, rather than preconditions for, a model of party formation.

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with her behavior. Bianco and Bates (1990) demonstrate how a leader can sustain cooperation without tapping into resources outside the group, and through this, seem to offer a way to build in leadership effects without bringing in structure.5 Unfortunately, according to Bianco and Bates, even a leader with information about the individual strategies of each group member and the ability to sanction/reward individuals separately cannot initiate cooperation among followers unless this leader has an established reputation (ibid.; 142-144)- a fact which limits the applicability of the (no longer completely exogenous) theory. Bianco and Bates point out that this reputation is part of the political structure, and not necessarily something individuals have control over. Once reputation is included, it seems proper to include other structural features that allow politicians to affect the payoffs of individual politicians (Perkins 1996). Indeed, many structures provide leaders with resources that allow leaders to affect politicians’ incentive structures without drawing from pooled assets. The structures and resources leaders exploit to induce cooperation and develop political parties determine the form of party organization and the party’s relationship to the electorate (ibid., Katz and Mair 1995, Luubbert 1991, Shefter 1994). The types of party organizations that result from given structures are described in the following sections.

The Model (independent variables) Strong parties and party organizations might improve the quality of democracy in the West, and help ensure its survival elsewhere. However, politicians and parties do not make decisions regarding organizational structure with the goal of promoting democracy, but in order to win elections. Politicians wishing to win office choose the most economical and efficient organizational strategy to achieve their goal of election. The politician’s environment, here referred to as the “political opportunity structure,” is made up of several components that influence his choice of strategies vis-à-vis political party organization. The most important components are the relative availability of state and private resources, secondary organizations, and effective media outlets, as well as the type of institutional arrangements in which politicians are obliged to operate. The state resources analyzed in this model include the availability of enough bureaucratic positions to staff a large party organization and the state provision of access to the mass-media for campaigning (see below for the latter)6. Historical examples of secondary organizations co-opted for electoral purposes include trade unions (e.g. Przeworski 1985) and religious associations (e.g. Kalyvas 1996). However, all organizations have the potential to be utilized in this manner. This measure is accordingly used as a measure of the degree to which civil society is developed7. The media variable has two conditions. The first

5 Endogenous leadership is parasitic- groups members would be better of cooperating without leadership than with it. 6 Public provision of campaign funds is important, but is included under the public provision of campaign air-time. Additional research is necessary to determine if this simplification is justifiable. 7 Individual case studies in future studies will treat this variable in a more nuanced manner. In addition to indicating whether or not society can provide organizational assets, the variable “civil society” can also serve as an indicator of the difficulty involved in creating organizations from scratch, where needed.

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condition is whether or not the technology needed to reach a large audience actually exists in a given society. This condition would, for instance, preclude traditional societies where television and/or radio reception is unavailable on a regular and widespread basis. The second condition asks whether or not a given party has access to broadcasting facilities. There are two ways parties can gain access to broadcasting facilities, independently or with the help of the state. All of these components of the political opportunity structure heavily influence the types of party organizations selected by political actors in a specific social and historical context. This is not to say that they “cause” party organization. The politician judges the relative merits of each strategy, given her position in the political opportunity structure, then chooses the one she feels will help him the most. (the dependent variable) There are four distinct strategies politicians can employ. Each strategy varies in terms of the manner in which politicians mobilize the electorate and the primary source of their resources.8 The combination of these two dimensions yields a two-by-two matrix:

Mobilization

Direct Indirect

Derivation State Party Machine Cartel Party

of Resources Private Mass Party Cadre Party

The cadre party was the first party organization, historically, and evolved out of the alliance of parliamentary factions and electoral committees (Duverger 1954). Due to its inability to mobilize large constituencies, it was of little use to politicians once the size of the electorate had increased beyond a certain level. However, the modern technology has increased the utility of the cadre party organization by allowing politicians to reach large segments of the population through such media as television and radio. The cadre party network helps politicians win elections by providing contacts, professional campaign managers, and financiers. The cartel party is quite similar to the cadre party in that politicians use the mass media to reach the electorate. It differs from the cadre party in that the party staff is employed by the state, and the state provides the majority of the party’s campaign resources. Politicians choosing the mass party organizational strategy create or co-opt secondary organizations in order to mobilize electoral support. This strategy involves a substantial sacrifice in terms of autonomy, but once created reduces transaction costs and uncertainty (Kalyvas 1996; Przeworski 1985). The party machine strategy makes extensive use of government resources to staff a highly penetrative party organization (Shefter 1994; Weber 1946 also see Aldrich 1995 p. 56). It is thus similar to the mass party in degree to which it penetrates society, but differs from the mass party in that it also deeply penetrates the government.

8 This is new. The existing literature on party organizations either treats organizational type as a discreet variable (e.g. Perkins 1996) or includes only a subset of possible types (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995).

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These strategies are not chosen in a vacuum. Each requires that certain resources be present. Politicians using the pure cadre strategy must have adequate access to the media in order to be consistently successful, the mass strategy requires the creation or co-optation of secondary organizations, and the patronage requires, among other things, that elected offices have control over appointments and services. The relevant independent variables, then, are the availability of patronage, access to independent and state-sponsored media outlets, and the availability of secondary organizations. Each of the four strategies in the party’s opportunity set has associated long and short-term costs and benefits for the politician. Some are fairly predictable, as in the case of the degree of autonomy each affords to politicians, but all are highly contextual. Politicians choose their strategies based not just on their absolute merits, but on the perceived utility of each strategy, given their particular political opportunity structure. The environment does not necessarily determine the choice of strategy, but it does make some strategies more useful (and possible) than others. The most obvious hypotheses are summarized in the following table9:

In cases such as those described by the above table, the political opportunity structure practically determines the party’s choice of strategy. If a party has no access to existing secondary organizations or to the mass-media, but does have access to enough bureaucratic positions to staff a large, penetrative organization, it will probably choose to do so, forming a machine party. Similarly, if the bureaucracy is closed to the party, and it cannot mobilize sufficient support through available media resources, but it can develop ties with existing secondary organizations, the result is likely to be a strong, independent, mass party organization. If the party has no (or very limited) access to bureaucratic positions or secondary organizations, but does have state-sponsored access to the mass media, the result will likely be a cartel party. If the party has no access to bureaucratic positions, secondary organizations, or state-sponsored access to the media, but does have independent access to the mass media, it will probably form a cadre party. In the worst case scenario, the party will not have access to any

9 All of these assume an electorate of such size that a small organization cannot mobilize sufficient support through direct, face-to-face canvassing. 10 The cartel party does require a porous enough bureaucracy to provide jobs for a very small staff, but this requirement is easily fulfilled.

Simple Hypotheses on the Political Opportunity Structure and Party Organization Bureaucracy Media Available? Secondary Available? (Independent) (State) Organizations? Party Type

Yes No No No Party Machine

No No No Yes Mass Party

No10 No Yes No Cartel Party

No Yes No No Cadre Party

No No No No (Local/Marginal)

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of the above mentioned resources. In such a case the party runs a large risk of becoming marginalized and must create its own resources11. While the hypotheses generated in the table above can be tested, we have made no predictions as to what strategies will be pursued when combinations of resources are made available- that is, when there is more of a “choice” of strategies. In order to make predictions in such cases, we must add more assumptions that will take into account the relative utility of each strategy to the politicians. Rational choice suggests that people make decisions based on their desires and opportunities. For instance, people who desire to win office will select the strategy that gives them the greatest chance of doing so, given their opportunities. The assumption is that politicians weight the costs and benefits associated with each strategy available to them, and select the strategy that has the greatest expected utility. In the cases listed above, the calculations are very straight forward- if only one strategy is available, then it obviously has the highest expected utility12. However, such is not the case when a politician’s opportunity set includes more than one strategy. In such cases, the politician must compare the utility of each strategy. While each of the four strategies: the mass, machine, cadre, and cartel strategies, are potentially more or less equally efficacious, some incur greater costs than others. For instance, the cartel and machine strategies are “cheaper” than mass parties because the state is essentially subsidizing them. In terms of start up and maintenance costs, the smaller organizations are cheaper than larger ones (Kalyvas 1996). The above suggests the following preference ranking:

cartel > cadre > machine > mass

In addition to monetary costs, certain strategies impose other sanctions that will affect their ranking. Some strategies constrain politicians more than others. Politicians value autonomy, and, all other things being equal, choose the strategy that will provide it to them. All other things being equal, politicians wishing to maximize autonomy will rank the cadre and cartel party strategies above the others. Politicians value these strategies above the others because they do not create a new layer of sub-elites or ties with a large membership that might constrain their actions, as do the mass and machine parties (Kalyvas 1996). Accordingly,

cadre = cartel > machine = mass However, party machines and cartel parties are less constraining than mass parties and cadre parties respectively because of the debt members of these organizations owe their patrons. This factor confirms the ranking of preferences described above: 11 Successful politicians in such positions usually create their own secondary organizations. Shefter argues that some oppression is a necessary condition for the formation of strong party organizations (1995: introduction & Part One). While oppression can encourage the creation of secondary organizations, these can also form under less dire circumstances. My argument is less grand than Shefters, but covers it well. 12 I should point out that the examples listed above are only deterministic if we assume that the elite are going to participate in democratic elections. The fact is that there are other options. For example, if the expected utility of revolution (in the case of political outsiders) or oppression (in the case of political insiders) is greater than that of party formation, they will be chosen instead (see Shefter 1994: ch. 1).

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cartel>cadre>machine>mass13

Using the analysis above, we can make predictions in cases that were previously indeterminate, as is indicated in the following table:

The preference ordering also suggests the following decision tree: State Sponsored Media Access?

Yes No

Cartel Party Independent Media Access?

Yes No

CadreParty

Access to the Bureaucracy?

Yes No

Machine Access to 2º Party Organizations?

Yes No

Mass Party Marginalized? Summary Data of European Party Formation A quick look at summary data (King et al. 1994: 53-55) from the general trends in European 13 The argumentation and evidence provided in Kirchheimer (1966) and Katz and Mair (1995) support this ranking, suggesting that politicians prefer the cartel party to both the mass and machine parties. Similarly, Shefter (1994) finds that politicians prefer the machine party to the mass party for reasons of cost and convenience. 14 The yes/no indicates that the result will be obtained with either one. I combined them to save space.

Hypotheses on the Political Opportunity Structure and Party Organization Bureaucracy Media Available? Secondary Available? (Independent) (State) Organizations? Party Type

Yes/No Yes/No Yes Yes/No Cartel Party

Yes/No Yes No Yes/No Cadre Party

Yes No No Yes/No14 Party Machine

No No No Yes Mass Party

No No No No (Marginalized?)

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party formation and development confirms the face validity and appeal of the above preference-ranking and decision tree. The first parties were cadre parties15. The cadre party originated as the parliamentary caucus, which was limited and elitist. The cadre parties consisted of local networks, impermanent in nature, which were active around election time as they worked to get members elected. Politicians wishing to win office needed very few resources because the electorate was both small and local. Organizational requirements were minimal. As suffrage was extended, political elites saw the need to get new voters to support them. The caucus expanded into the cadre party to meet this demand by co-opting and coordinating the activity of local electoral committees. The cadre party network provided contacts, professional campaign managers, and financiers. Max Weber predicted a bleak future for parties of notables (cadre parties) for a variety of reasons, the primary two being the prevailing trend towards bureaucratization, and the organizational requirements for mobilizing sufficient support, given the large size of the electorate. While the first was probably overstated, both must be reexamined in light of modern communications technology. It certainly is the case, however, that this type of organization is not capable of mobilizing enough support to win an election in a large electorate without the help of mass media. Seeking to preserve their status through democratic means, cadre party leaders had to create organizations large and strong enough to mobilize a large constituency. If the bureaucracy was open, these politicians used it to create machine parties. In cases where the bureaucracy was closed, as when civil service reforms preceded the extension of the suffrage, these politicians were forced to create or co-opt secondary organizations (Shefter 1994). Of course the opposition found itself occupying an entirely different position in the political opportunity structure: not only did historical circumstance deny them access to effective media outlets, they were, almost by definition, denied positions in the bureaucracy. This forced them to mobilize support directly through the creation of mass parties. Their structural position did allow them one advantage in this regard- the start-up costs for creating large, penetrative organizations had already been spent by socialist agitators. Trade unions were easily converted into highly efficient vote winners: the first mass parties16. In situations where politicians are denied access to the modern mass media and the bureaucracy and there are no secondary organizations for politicians to co-opt, politicians must become agitators themselves to have a chance at competing in the future. This leads to the sort of “no-pain, no-gain” argument suggested by Shefter (1994: ch. 1). It should come as no surprise that this summary account supports the hypotheses generated above- the theories from which they were culled were originally tested on European cases. King et al. suggest that theories developed around one set of observations be validated on a new set. As a preliminary step towards satisfying this goal, the following section offers several observations from post-communist Russia. Russia provides an ideal setting for testing theories 15 The question of whether or not these first parties, as described by Duverger, are better classified as cartel parties requires further investigation. See also Shefter 1995: Part One. 16 See Duverger 1956 and Przeworski 1985; for the Christian Democratic example see Kalyvas 1996.

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of party development, providing politicians that occupy different positions in the political opportunity structure. The comparison with European party formation also eliminates the problem with some accounts of Russian party formation (e.g. Fish 1995)- namely the lack of variation on the dependent variable.

A Brief Analysis of Several Russian Observations Most of the politicians and parties that got their nominees onto the ballot for the Russian Duma elections of 1993 and 1995 occupy a less than ideal position in the political opportunity structure. Thanks to the communist legacy, there are very few secondary organizations for them to co-opt. Additionally, forming grass-roots organizations from scratch takes time and money- resources that are spread thin in Russia. The lack of money also keeps these politicians from purchasing airtime or creating their own media outlets. In a classic catch-22, these parties could raise campaign money from dues if they had stronger organizations, but need money and exposure to create stronger organizations. Similarly, the start-up costs involved in creating organizations from scratch are probably much lower among developed civil-societies.

Russian parties do have some access to the media in Russia thanks to electoral rules that give television time to all parties on the ballot. Were it not for this, these parties would be forced to band together in hopes of creating a mass party or disappear. State subsidies keep these parties relatively “fit” and actually serve as sort of a disincentive for collective action. Due to their location in the political opportunity structure, these parties chose the cartel party organization. Due to their limited support in society and the state, politicians in this situation are not masters of their own political destiny. Alexander Rutskoi, a popular centrist who found himself at odds with the Yeltsin-controlled state found it next to impossible to get media coverage for his post-1993 political career. His attempt to build a national grass roots “mass party” organization, the only strategy left to him, was largely unsuccessful17. His position in the political opportunity structure led him to choose the mass party strategy, but did not guarantee his success. In general, this is one of the problems with the Russian political opportunity structure- its lack of secondary organizations and the high start of costs of creating them, makes the mass party strategy problematic. The primary alternative at the present is to play sycophant to the state or risk being cut-off.

Some politicians have either the name recognition or access to money that would allow them to win elections without state support. One example is Zhironovsky’s LDPR, which has been given airtime on the national news thanks to Zhironovsky’s outrageous antics and off the cuff remarks. This exposure allowed the party to recruit members and staff electoral committees in some localities. Similar in organization to the major US parties, the LDPR still receives its share

17 However, Rutskoi recently won a gubernatorial position that will give him some national exposure. This points out the importance of the constitution within which politicians operate. The fact that Russia allows popular candidates to run for national seats in local and regional elections, as with the Duma seats allocated by SMDM and the gubernatorial/Federation council elections, allows them to continue their careers indefinitely without developing the ties with other politicians and activists that would lead to stronger less candidate-centered political parties.

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of state subsidies, but relies primarily on private financial support. As such, its party strategy is mostly a cadre. Yabloko occupies a similar place in the political opportunity structure and is roughly similar to the LDPR in terms of organization.

The CPRF inherited many of the resources of its predecessor, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), a mass party without peer. While members left the party in droves through the late 80’s and early 90’s, it still maintains grass root organizations throughout the country. While it has some access to state resources in some regions (in addition to the media coverage and campaign support given to all parties), it came into the game with strong ties to sections of electorate. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin have expended considerable energy denying the CPSU and CPRF access to the state bureaucracy and state assets. The real danger to the CPRF is that its parliamentary faction of electoral-minded politicians will loosen the CPRF’s ties to the electorate in an effort to increase its autonomy and ideological maneuverability. This move, made possible by state campaign subsidies and a semi-independent press, would make the CPRF dependent on the state: a difficult position for the opposition to be in. At present, the CPRF remains the best example in Russia of a mass party, but actually straddles the line between mass and cartel. How long this will last is anyone’s guess. Were the leadership to devoid itself of its organizational roots, the local networks could form a smaller and more ideologically-pure mass party.

In Eastern Europe, as in Western Europe before, external parties were forced by their position in the political opportunity structure to mobilize support directly in their efforts towards gaining inclusion. This led to the creation of mass parties. The East European examples, which went under various labels such as Democratic Russia, Solidarity, the Civic Forum, the New Forum, and Sajudis, were all external movements actively opposed to the existing regime. However, once the regime allowed them entrance, the external parties were unable to translate this success to the electoral arena for very long. Democratic Russia was extremely successful in contesting early elections, but these elections, held in 1989 and 1990, were still rigged in favor of the Communist Party, forcing Democratic Russia to pursue a policy of sponsoring both independent and Communist Party members. This gave voters the necessary cue that the Communist Party label did not offer, as the Communist Party was composed of many factions of varying ideological bent. Democratic Russia also rallied support for Yeltsin in elections and in encounters with hard-liners. However, the group's diverse background, exacerbated by Yeltsin's refusal to commit himself to the group18, the unwieldy nature of its mass support, and the ability of its factions to go it alone, led to Democratic Russia's eventual fragmentation (Fish 1995, Kullberg 1994, Perkins 1996).

Although Democratic Russia was a mass organization or even party while it was in its prime it has all but disappeared and failed to get the necessary signatures for a place on the 1995 ballot. 18 Yeltsin was been quite willing to use Democratic Russia to further his own agenda, but he did not reciprocate by committing himself to the organization in part because he did not want to sacrifice his autonomy of action (Kullberg, 1994: 19). In a situation with some parallel in Poland, this lack of commitment undermined the development of Democratic Russia as a political movement and party.

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Democratic Russia’s new location in the political opportunity structure led many of its constituent politicians to go it alone. While some regard the reluctance of Russian politicians, and especially those in the democratic camp, to band together as “irrational,” the availability of state subsidies and private financial support lowers the costs of independent action, making independence the obvious (and rational) choice for many free-thinking politicians. The remnants of Democratic Russia’s vast network remain in some areas and have been put to use to aid candidates at the local level (Kullberg 1998).

Our Home is Russia, often referred to as the “party of power,” occupies an enviable position in the political opportunity structure, as did Russia’s Choice in the 1993 elections. It has access to the state-owned (and influenced) media, control over large amounts of state resources, and deep pockets thanks to its relationship with many businessmen (who happen to owe Yeltsin and his clients for their business success). Thanks to its position, it could easily have chosen any of three organizational strategies (the cartel, cadre, and machine strategies) and arguable had the resources for the fourth (the mass party). The two most obvious choices, however, were the cartel and machine strategies, and it should come as no surprise that it chose a combination of the two. It combined a strong national media presence with machine-party politics of a new sort in some areas (Kullberg 1997). Organizationally, it is somewhere between a cartel and machine, as its machines can be found only in those parts of Russia where Yeltsin was best able to influence personnel choices at the local level. Several Russian (and other more familiar) party organizations can be summarized by the following table:

In summary, most of the parties in Russia have access to few resources outside of those provided by the state, and thus have chosen the cartel strategy. None of the exceptions have

19 These are summary descriptions. I am not claiming that all such parties conform to one type, only that they do belong to the assigned group “on average.” (King et al. 1994: 53-55) 20 Just to remind the reader, by putting a party in the Cartel quarter, I am not claiming that they necessarily conspire with other parties to monopolize political competition. Rather, I am making the more modest claim that these parties do not penetrate the electorate directly, and that they rely heavily on state subsidies for support.

Examples of Party Organizations Degree of Penetration

High Low

Use of State Resources

High

(Party Machine)

US parties (late 19th century)19

Christian Democrats (IT)

(Cartel Party20)

Our Home is Russia (RU)

Most parties on ballot (RU)

Many European Parties (current)

Low

(Mass Party)

CPRF (RU)

Solidarity (until break-up)

Democratic Russia (until break-up)

Early SD’s and CD’s

(Cadre Party)

Forza Italia (IT)

US Political Parties (current)

LDPR (RU)

Yabloko (RU)

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yet formed strong enough organizations to socialize the masses to democracy (as would machine and mass parties) or to provide a counter-weight to the state (as would mass and cadre parties). As it stands, no parties are able to solve the collective action problem of democratic consolidation. The result is a reassertion of “Dual Russia” (Tucker 1971), and an uncertain future for Russian democracy. While the data is only suggestive, both the summary descriptions and sample of Russian cases seem to support the hypothesis generated by the rational choice model spelled out above. Conclusion: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation In the West, the tendency of politics in the television era to weaken parties, with their attendant networks of patronage and local support organizations, has been noted. In Russia, television electoral politics, with its emphasis on personalization drawing from both Soviet traditions and Western imports, plays to a nation uncertain of its future and lacking the secondary associations that can act as brakes or firewalls. Though it is only one variable in this complex model, television, the most powerful medium and desired political asset, could well retard the development of the very political parties that render the electoral system efficacious. Mickiewicz and Richter 1996, 125

The weakening of political party organizations is thought to have "hollowed-out" democracy in established democracies by atrophying the linkages between politicians and their constituencies (Diamond 1996). In established democracies, many political parties have distanced themselves organizationally from their supporters in favor of developing strong, institutionalized relations with the state (Burnham 1965; Katz and Mair 1995). Such parties are less responsive to their electorate and have alienated large sections of the citizenry. In the view of some scholars, such a situation creates potential for instability and authoritarianism (Berman 1997; Huntington 1968).

The situation is quite probably more dire in Eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states, where few parties have developed the strength required to consolidate democracy. Penetrative party organizations have historically played a fundamental role in socializing new voters to the norms of democracy. However, most parties in the Soviet Successor states have not established ties with society and thus cannot socialize the newly enfranchised electorate to these norms. Due partly to their isolation from society, many of these parties depend on the state and its resources for their survival and viability. While this situation mirrors that of parties in established democracies, it is potentially more dangerous due to the lack of secondary organizations and poorly developed civil society in these countries. Civil society has traditionally helped re-enforce democratic behavior and attitudes (Putnam 1993), and can serve to check the power of the state (Foley and Edwards 1996). It may take time for society to organize itself to the extent necessary to perform these functions on its own. Without a supportive citizenry and something to check state power, democracy stands little chance of surviving, much less consolidating, in many of the states that recently made the transition from post-totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Once again, the more penetrative mass and machine party organizations have historically played a fundamental role in the consolidation of democracy. In fact, democracy seems to require

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such strong parties to ensure its survival. However, these party types did not arise because democracy required them: these party organizations were formed and maintained to the extent politicians found them useful. Given this fact, and the importance of the choices they make, the question which must be answered is what leads choose one strategy over another. This research is designed to answer this question. Preliminary results are not encouraging: it seems as though the contemporary availability of the media and state resources has “stunted the growth” of the majority of the parties in Russia and Eastern Europe, and led to the decline of party organizations in the more established democracies (Perkins 1996). Most East European parties have access to few resources outside of those provided by the state, and thus have chosen the cartel strategy. This is the worst possible choice for democratic consolidation. None of the exceptions have yet formed strong enough organizations to socialize the masses to democracy (as would machine and mass parties) or to provide a counter-weight to the state (as would mass and cadre parties). As it stands, no parties are able to solve the collective-action problem of democratic consolidation. The situation is little better in the West. Western parties have largely disassociated themselves from their constituencies and can no longer channel the needs of the citizenry adequately nor protect them from the creep of authoritarianism. The result is an uncertain future for democracy in both regions.

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Perkins, Doug. 1996. “The Role of Organizations, Patronage and Patronage and the Media in Party Formation” Party Politics 2: 355-375. Przeworski, Adam. 1985. Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge Press. Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting” American Political Science Review 62: 25-42. Shefter, Martin. 1994. Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Weber, Max. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. H.H.Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans and eds). New York: Oxford University Press.