political progress in iraq during the surge

8/3/2019 Political Progress in Iraq During the Surge

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www.usp.rg

1200 17h Sr NW Wshngn, DC 20036 202.457.1700 x 202.429.6063

Special RepoRt196 DecembeR 2007

UNiteD StateS iNStitUte of PeaCe

SPeCial RePoRt

the vews expressed n hs repor do no necessarlyreflec he vews of he Uned Saes insue of Peace,

whch does no advocae specfc polcy posons .

contentS

Introduction 2

Security in Baghdad 3

National Dialogue and Reconciliation 5The Shia Position 6

The Sunni Position 8

Political Climate 10

Political Alliances 11

State Institutions 13

The Southern Governorates 14

Federation and Regional Autonomies 15

Federalism in the South 15

Federalism in the West? 16

Conclusions and Recommendations 16

aboutthe RepoRtThis report is based on conversations in July 2007 with

a large number of Iraqi political leaders and seniorgovernment officials, members of Parliament from themajor parliamentary groups, and a wide range of Iraqi

citizens from Baghdad and the provinces.

Rend Al-Rahim Francke is a senior fellow in theJennings Randolph Program for International Peace ofthe United States Institute of Peace. A native of Iraq,

she is executive director of the Iraq Foundation. FromNovember 2003 to December 2004 she served as Iraqs

representative to the United States and the Iraqi chief ofmission. She testified about Iraq before the U.S. Senate

in January 2007.

Rend Al-Rahim Francke

Pc Prgrss n irq

Durng h SurgSummry

The military surge that was launched in February 2007 has improved the security

situation in Baghdad and adjacent regions. It has curbed sectarian violence in the

capital and reduced the freedom of action and the support base of insurgents and

terrorists in the central governorates.

The rationale for the surge was to provide an opportunity for political agreements

to be negotiated among Iraqis, but political progress has been stalled and has not

matched the security improvements.

A political settlement is essential for sustaining the security gains and for longer-

term stability. Despite the declaration of a national reconciliation plan by Iraqi Prime

Minister Nouri Al-Maliki in June 2006, by the fall of 2007 only limited progress had

been made toward reconciling the differences between the political groups and forg-

ing a national agenda.

The dominance of sectarian political groups has fueled polarization, and the inabil-

ity of the government and Parliament to adopt crucial legislation is a measure of

continuing distrust between the groups. Serious political dialogue between the sect-

based parties has proved difficult and the results are limited.

At the same time intra-sectarian rivalries are increasing, particularly in the southern

governorates, where the Sadris and the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq vie for politi-

cal and economic control of the region.

Iraqi institutions have lost ground in the past year. Iraqi ministers from Sunni, Shia,

and secular groups have withdrawn from the cabinet, adversely affecting the perfor-

mance of the government.

The sectarian blocs that entered Parliament in December 2005 have lost their

cohesiveness. The Shia United Iraqi Alliance has unraveled, and the Sunni Tawafuq

coalition is strained. The emergence of tribal forces in Anbar governorate presents

opportunities and challenges to the Sunnis and the Shia alike.

As the sectarian blocs weaken and the Anbar tribes seek a political role, new alliances

are beginning to emerge, and some may succeed in crossing sectarian and regional

divides.


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The debate in Washington has been restricted to the level and duration of U.S. troop

presence in Iraq. In the coming months, the debate should turn to means of support-

ing the political process and strengthening governance in Iraq as a path to stability.

Bottom-up approaches to reconciliation and accommodation do not obviate the need

for a broader political settlement. The United States should support a sustained inter-

national mediation effort led by the UN Security Council resulting in an Iraqi compact

endorsed by Iraqs neighbors and the international community. Iraqi efforts to develop cross-sectarian political alliances and national platforms need

to be encouraged. The incorporation of the Anbar tribes into national politics is

important to sustaining security gains.

A competent national government in Baghdad is essential to the long-term stability of

Iraq. A weak government will be unable to ensure the internal and external security of

the country or manage revenues. More effort and resources are needed to strengthen

the competence and effectiveness of the Iraqi government.

inrducn

The military surge under way since February 2007 was prompted by the rationale that

reducing sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and curtailing insurgency and terrorist

attacks would create a breathing space for political and social groups to engage in nation-

al reconciliation and agree on common principles and policies. The U.S. administration

expected to see a binary relationship emerge between military and political achievement

that would lead to stable conditions and permit U.S. troop reduction. Does such a binary

relationship exist? Has the expanded military presence with its new operating strategies

increased security, reduced sectarian violence, and controlled insurgent and terrorist

attacks? If violence has decreased, have government and political forces found a respite

to engage in the necessary trust-building measures and dialogue for reconciliation? What

are Iraqs political prospects as the surge continues?

By the end of summer 2007 the security situation had improved in Baghdad and its

environs but was still in flux: The political process, however, lagged far behind the military

effort. During this period impassioned debate about Iraq took place in Washington, but it

was almost exclusively confined to discussion regarding the timing and pace of U.S. troop

withdrawal. Very little, if any, debate concerned the steps necessary to bring about politi-

cal conditions in Iraq conducive to troop reduction and eventual withdrawal. Although the

consensus in Washingtonis that political stability in Iraq serves the interests of the United

States and constitutes the best exit strategy, policymakers in Washington risk losing sight

of the political dimension of the relationship between military and political achievement.

From now until March 2008, when General David Petraeus is due to give his second report

to Congress, the United States needs to assess the political situation in Iraq and undertake

intensive efforts to promote Iraqs political stability.

This report is based on conversations held with Iraqis in Iraq in July 2007 and in

Beirut, Lebanon, and Amman, Jordan in OctoberNovember 2007. These conversations

included Iraqi political leaders and senior government officials, members of Parliament

from the major parliamentary groups, as well as a wide range of Iraqi citizens from Bagh-

dad and the provinces. The author met in Baghdad with senior political leaders, notably

the president of Iraq, the prime minister, the vice presidents, and several ministers, as well

as members of Parliament from the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Sunni Tawafuq

bloc, and the pan-Iraqi secular Iraqia bloc. In addition, the author spoke with residents of

Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Diwaniya, Anbar, and Salah Eddin governorates. The report is based

on personal accounts and exchanges and private and public reports.

aboutthe inStitute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, non-

partisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its

goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, pro-

mote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict-man-

agement tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide.

The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge,

skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in

conflict zones around the globe.

boaRDof DiRectoRS

J. Rbnsn Ws (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington,

D.C. Mr or (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION Inter-

national, Boston, Mass. Hy J. Burkhr, Vice President,

Government Affairs, International Justice Mission, Wash-

ington, D.C. ann H. Chn, Former Scholar in Residence,

American University, Washington, D.C. Chsr a. Crckr,

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of

Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

lur S. fun, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washing-

ton, D.C. Chrs Hrnr, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute,

Washington, D.C. Khn Mrnz, Executive Director,

World Institute on Disability Grg e. Ms, Adjunct

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Wash-

ington, D.C. Jrmy a. Rbkn, Professor of Law, George

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. Rn Svr, Actor, Producer,

Director, Primparous Productions, Inc. Judy Vn Rs,

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute,

Washington, D.C.

MeMbersexofficio

Cndzz Rc, Secretary of State Rbr M. Gs,

Secretary of Defense Rchrd H. Smn, President, United

States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) frncs C. Wsn,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, National

Defense University.


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Scury n Bghdd

By late July 2007, people who live in the citys red zone reported having mixed experi-

ences of the security situation.1 Residents of some hot neighborhoods said that the

presence of American troops had a deterrent effect on militias, gangs, and snipersand

thus gave comfort to citizens. They complained that Iraqi forces, including the police,

army units, and the Kurdish paramilitary forces calledpesh merga sent down from Kurdis-

tan, did little to confront troublemakers. For example, some neighborhoods in the Amiriya

district have benefited from increased U.S. military presence and patrols, while others,

such as Furat and Jihad, were still in conflict because U.S. forces had not intervened. In

these places Iraqi police and army do a poor job of stopping violence and intimidation.

A decline in the number of suicide bombings and a decrease in mass sectarian killings

and kidnappings in the city are thus attributed to the higher U.S. profile. Another factor

contributing to a sense of greater safety in Baghdad is the success of U.S.-Iraqi initiatives

south of Baghdad (the so-called Triangle of Death), where Sunni tribes have recently

cooperated with U.S. forces. Residents of some neighborhoods said that for the first time

in more than a year they have been able to shop in their area in relative peace and stay

out after dark.

Other residents said that the surge had done little to improve security in their area,

citing continuing sectarian purges, assassinations, and mortar attacks that afflicted theirimmediate neighborhoods. They complained that the clear operations were not followed

by the necessary hold operations because the Iraqi army did not have the capacity

to hold. The build was nowhere in sight.2 The army is not sufficiently capable, is not

motivated, is afraid, or is simply not there. Residents of Baghdad regard the Iraqi police

with extreme suspicion; two Sunnis, one a government official, and the other a citizen,

said that the Ministry of the Interior should be disbanded and restructured.

Many Baghdadis interviewed in July felt that the security situation was marginally

better than it had been at the beginning of the year, but they believed the gains were

precarious and fragile. Many complained that when U.S. forces cleared an area and handed

it over to Iraqi forces to hold, the neighborhood returned to lawlessness. Snipers have

emerged as a relatively new and deadly danger in residential neighborhoods. Sniper mur-

ders are especially unnerving to residents because they can be both targeted and random.Because of fear of snipers, residents of some neighborhoods (particularly women) have

had to give up their jobs and stay at home.

But Baghdad is full of anomalies. A predominantly Sunni area in the northeast has

a sizable Shia population, and the two communities continue to live peacefully, albeit

under the protection of an enlightened group of the Mahdi army militia. The militia not

only provides the residents (Sunni and Shia) with protection but also mans checkpoints

and controls entry into the neighborhood, distributes gas and kerosene, regulates the

supply of electricity from private generators, and offers other services to the population.

Zayyuna, an upper-middle-class neighborhood that houses many former Iraqi army offi-

cers, is still mixed and peaceful. Al-Atayfiya is a predominantly Shia area with a sizable

Sunni population. It has stayed quiet in the shadow of the influential Baratha mosque

and under the wing of the mosques powerful imam, Sheikh Jalal Eddin Al-Saghir, who is

also a member of Parliament (MP) for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly

SCIRI). The militia that protects the mosque also protects the areas inhabitants, both

Sunni and Shia.

The reality of Sunni-Shia fighting that Baghdad and other mixed areas witnessed

in 200607 is far murkier than Western press reports convey. Sectarian fighting is not

restricted to politically motivated militias, and labeling perpetrators of violence as either

Sunni terrorists or insurgents or Jaish Al-Mahdi militias oversimplifies and masks

the complex facts on the ground. The lawless conditions originally triggered by terrorist

attacks (presumed to be Sunni), counterattacks by militias (presumed to be Shia), and

Many Baghdadis interviewed in July

felt that the security situation was

marginally better than it had been

at the beginning of the year, but

they believed the gains were pre-

carious and fragile.


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4

the impotence of Iraqi security forces in effect paved the way to other forms of violence

cloaked in sectarian garb.

Violence in neighborhoods now includes family vendettas avenging former murders

and assassinations or revenge killing of former Baathists accused of criminality under the

previous regime. The skein of violence is further tangled by the proliferation of gangs that

are mini-mafias masquerading as sectarian or political militias. These groups are actually

only interested in profit, and they engage in the lucrative trade of killing or evicting

residents, looting their homes, and renting the houses to new residents. In the absence

of law enforcement, the competition among rival mafias expands the range of targeted

violence.

To the distress of the Sunnis, Baghdad is increasingly a Shia city, either because Sunnis

are being pushed out or are choosing to leave. The geographic area of the capital in which

Sunnis are now a majority and feel safe is shrinking. For example, some Sunni parts of

Saydiya, a fierce battleground between Sunni and Shia militias, are now Shia controlled.

Shia political parties and militias have taken over large sections of the city. Although

this control reduces sectarian killing, it is a source of extreme anxiety to Sunni political

groups, who fear above all the loss of the capital.

In the past year Sunnis who left Baghdad increasingly were escaping to Jordan rather

than moving to safer Sunni areas of Iraq thereby affecting the countrys demographic

profile. Their exodus is causing consternation to the leaders of the community, who seetheir numbers, political position, and leverage shrinking. A major Sunni demand now is

not only to halt sectarian cleansing but to create the conditions in which refugees and

displaced persons can return to their original homes and restore the former demographic

composition of the city.

Increased security in the capital has been bought at a high price. Neighborhoods are

less mixed, although reports of complete sectarian homogeneity in neighborhoods are

exaggerated. Moving between neighborhoods is more difficult because of barriers and

checkpoints. Where U.S. and Iraqi forces are not present, militias of one stripe or another

exercise control. Even where physical barriers are not evident, Baghdadis think of neigh-

borhoods somewhat as cantonments.

Iraqi security officials are concerned that terrorists squeezed out of Anbar, Diyala, and

the area south of Baghdad are moving to Kirkuk, where suicide bombings have risen dra-

matically, and Salaheddin, and worry that Mosul (Naynawah governorate), so far relatively

quiet, will be the next frontier for terrorists. Despite these concerns, Iraqi security officials

are optimistic that security will improve, and they believed in July that the surge had

already shown results. During meetings in July, a senior Iraqi official affirmed that of the

446 neighborhoods in Baghdad only 5 percent were classified as insecure in June, com-

pared to 10 percent earlier in the year. Iraqi officials also cited the increased competence,

readiness, and intelligence capacities of Iraqi military forces, which have led in recent

months to the foiling of terrorist attacks and the capture of terrorists. In July, both Iraqi

officials and citizens expressed their belief that the surge, including the increased U.S.

troop deployment in neighborhoods and the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruc-

tion Teams (PRTs), required more time to be fully effective.In a statement that many respondents considered unfortunate, Iraqi Prime Min-

ister Maliki declared on July 14, 2007, that the Iraqi forces were ready and able to

assume responsibility for the security of the country.3 This statement was patently

unrealistic, as Maliki aides acknowledged, and even Maliki himself had to backtrack.

It is doubtful whether Iraqi forces on their own can professionally and competently

maintain the security of the International Zone (IZ), formerly the green zone, let

alone the entire country.

By late October 2007, Iraqis who spoke with the author in Beirut and Amman con-

firmed that the security in Baghdad had improved significantly. Neighborhoods that had

been shuttered reopened for business, circulation within and across neighborhoods was

In the past year Sunnis who

left Baghdad increasingly were

escaping to Jordan rather than

moving to safer Sunni areas

of Iraq thereby affecting the

countrys demographic profile.

By late October 2007, there was a

new sense of confidence that the

security crisis and the sectarian

fighting were under control.


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easier and safer, and there was a new sense of confidence that the security crisis and the

sectarian fighting were under control. However, most of them were concerned about the

sustainability of this improvement, and the Sunnis still felt vulnerable in Baghdad and

worried about the changed demographics of the capital. Meanwhile, Iraqis from the south-

ern governorates reported that increased tensions between rival militias presented secu-

rity risks for the population and affected the delivery of services and economic recovery.

Many Iraqis do not want to see U.S. forces leave anytime soon. Harith Al-Dhari,

the radical Sunni leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars, declared on July 17 that

the association did not favor an immediate and precipitate withdrawal but only wanteda schedule. The Sadris, the one Shia group that had been vocal against the American

presence, have moderated their position. In private conversations moderate Sadri parlia-

mentarians have strongly opposed any troop drawdown in the near future. Even Muqtada

Al-Sadr (following his long and mysterious absence in spring 2007) declared that his

movement wanted a gradual troop drawdown linked to the increasing capacity of Iraqi

forces. Although in April 2007 the Sadr bloc in Parliament launched a petition calling for

the United States to schedule troop withdrawal and obtained the signatures of 144 MPs,

the Sadris have not highlighted this issue. Their temporary boycott of Parliament in May

was not over the presence of U.S. troops but was prompted instead by the second bomb-

ing of the shrine in Samarra and the failure of the government to protect it, investigate

the bombings, and rebuild it.4

Nn Dgu nd Rcncn

The gravest problem in Iraq now concerns the power relations between Sunni and Shia

political groups. Arab-Kurdish relations, while always sensitive, are on the margin of this

central question, at least for the moment. Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish political leaders have

failed to forge a common vision for the state.5 They have not articulated common national

objectives or reached acceptable power-sharing agreements. Any serious effort at national

reconciliation must address these fundamental questions. In discussing political progress

in Iraq, this report focuses exclusively on Arab-Arab relations in Iraq, and does not address

any of the outstanding issues that involve Iraqi Kurds, such as the status of Kirkuk.

The national reconciliation initiative launched by Prime Minister Maliki in June 2006

as part of his governments program has been stalled by the lack of political will, conflict-

ing interests, and the absence of thoroughgoing, sustained negotiations. The legislative

items in the initiative, such as the de-Baathification law, have languished at different

points along the path to approval. Disarming the militias, another pillar of the reconcili-

ation initiative, is unrealistic, given the absence of political will, economic weakness,

the absence of Iraqi forces able and willing to confront the militias and fill the security

vacuum, and other obstacles.

The national reconciliation conferences held in fall 2006, which included meetings with

tribal figures, former army officers, religious leaders, and civil society organizations, were

about form rather than substance. These fleeting media events did nothing to address

deep-seated fears and distrust regarding sensitive topics such as de-Baathification. Thecommittee charged with reviewing the Constitution submitted its work to Parliament in

June. By late October none of its recommendations had been debated in Parliament, as

many of the issues are of a sensitive political nature and the political parties expect the

debates to be contentious.A number of constitutional issues, including Article 140 of the

Constitution regarding the status of Kirkuk and the powers of the presidency, were left

out of the committees deliberations.6

Both Shia and Sunnis recognize that the difficulties in passing the legislative agenda

related to national reconciliation, including the laws on de-Baathification and amnesty,

are symptoms rather than causes of deeper political divisions among the political groups.

Nevertheless, according to a prominent Sunni politician, no real political dialogue has


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taken place among the political parties in the governing coalition. The Political Council

for National Security, composed of nineteen political party leaders and designed to discuss

and resolve political and strategic issues, is practically moribund. The Council of Minis-

ters (cabinet) is not a suitable forum for dialogue because ministers are rarely decision

makers in their own parties, and the cabinet as a whole does not have authority over

political issues. In Parliament a committee has formed to follow up on national reconcili-

ation issues, but Parliament as a whole is too fragmented, indecisive, and fraught with

personality clashes. According to senior members, debate of politically sensitive topics

among senior officials is usually superficial and inconclusive. Efforts at serious discussionin Parliament degenerate into mutual accusations and verbal fights.

A complicating factor for national dialogue among Sunnis and Shia is the growing

importance of the Sunni tribes in Anbar, Diyala, and south of Baghdad. As late as October

2007these tribes were not formally part of the national political process and were not

represented by any organized party. Although the government welcomes their efforts at

fighting al Qaeda, Shia parties in government perceive themas groups that at best have

had strong links to the insurgency and may have been part of Saddam Husseins Baathist

apparatus.Prime Minister Maliki has held talks with these groups, but neither Maliki nor

other Shia religious parties have a strategy for dealing with them politically or incorporat-

ing them in state institutions.7

At the popular level, among the red zone Iraqis, the squabbles between political

parties acquire reality only insofar as they affect their daily lives and physical security.The withdraw of ministers from the cabinet and the failure to appoint new ministers have

resulted in poor social services; the rivalry between Shia militias in Basra, Karbala, and

other cities in the south has cost the lives of scores of civilians. Thus the political turmoil

contributes to the suffering and deprivation of Iraqi citizens in very tangible ways, and

ordinary people are helpless and feel victimized by politics. They recognize that the power

conflicts are playing out at the highest political levels, which they cannot hope to influ-

ence, in Baghdad, in the provinces, and with Iraqs neighbors. The reactions of Iraqis from

all walks of life to the political stalemate range from bewilderment and incomprehension

to anger, condemnation, and suspicions of deep conspiracy.

th Sh Psn

Shia leaders face the dilemma of reconciling two opposites. On the one hand they are eager to

assert fully their demographic dominance in politics: in this sense, demography is democracy.

On the other hand, they need to engage with the Sunnis to build the state. Shia hardliners

favor what is called the 80 percent optionthat is, a Shia-Kurdish ruling alliancearguing

that such an alliance can run the country without the Sunnis. Even Humam Hammudi, senior

MP from ISCI and head of the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), whom many view as

a moderate and conciliatory figure, can be hawkish. Hammudi did not see the usefulness of

reconciliation: What is there to reconcile? Sunnis are unwilling to acknowledge their minor-

ity status and act accordingly.8 As far as he and many Shia are concerned, democracy entitles

the Shia to rule as the majority, and reconciliation is another word for concessions.

Nevertheless, Shia politicians have told the author thatthey are willing to forgo therewards of strict democracy by making concessions to the Sunnis (and Kurds) in the inter-

est of national coexistence. Since the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003,

the Shia parties have been willing to accept the principle of consensus in decision making

(ijma in Islamic jurisprudence) as the necessary counterbalance to democracy, but this has

meant giving veto power to the Kurds and Sunnis over certain issues (such as the ratifica-

tion of the constitution) and renders decision making cumbersome and often impossible.

The Shia say they are trying to find a middle ground but claim that the Sunnis do not

cooperate and resort to obstructionist tactics, such as boycotting parliamentary sessions

or cabinet meetings.In practice the 80 percent option is not a real choice at present

because of the disarray within the Shia bloc, as described below.

Debate of politically sensitive

topics is usually superficial and

inconclusive. Efforts at serious

discussion in Parliament degen-

erate into mutual accusations.

The political turmoil con-

tributes to the suffering and

deprivation of Iraqi citizens in

very tangible ways, and ordi-

nary people are helpless and

feel victimized by politics.


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7

Several Shia leaders complained that the difficulty in talking to the Sunnis stems from

Sunni reluctance to understand and accept the new political order: They cannot accept

that they are no longer in control and that the Shia have the upper hand in the political

process. Consequently, willfully or subconsciously, they thwart political progress. The Shia

political parties believe that virtually all Sunnis are hidden sectarians who support Sunni

supremacy, and Sunni demands for a nonsectarian state conceal their desire to restore

Sunni power.

At a visceral level Shia leaders affiliated with the religious parties find it hard to disas-

sociate Sunni from Baath,pointing to past oppression by the Baath regime and alleged

Sunni support for an insurgency with strong Baathist roots. Therefore the Shia fear the

return of the Sunnis, who they believe will be a vehicle for the return of the Baath. In

such a scenario, not only would they lose all their gains, but they would be subjected to

renewed persecution. Many Shia suspect a Baathist or terrorist conspiracy to eliminate

Shia leadership and cite the assassinations of Sayed Baqir Al-Hakim, Izzeddin Selim, Ali

Al-Adhadh, and others as validation of their suspicions.

Along with this fear, in conversations with the author Shia party leaders expressed a

sense of entitlement: They believe that after centuries of oppression, it is their turn to

rule. Senior leaders in ISCI and Dawa tend to define democracy as the rule of the (demo-

graphic) majoritytherefore the rule of the Shia. They convey these fears and ambitions

in numerous explicit and implicit ways to the Shia population at large. Although these

Shia leadersconcede that not all Sunnis are Saddamis or Baathis, they maintain that all

Sunnis benefited from Saddams regime.

A contributing factor to Shia anxieties is the reappearance of Baathist groups in Iraq

and their revitalization outside Iraq. After a couple of years of silence, Baathis recovered

after 2005 and began to form cells around the country, including in southern cities.

Baath pamphlets, press releases, and propaganda circulated under new names, such as

the Awdah (Return) party, but eventually explicitly under the Baath banner. To the great

fear and distrust of the Shia, a few Sunni members of Parliament have been arguing for

legalizing the Baath party and allowing it to reenter the political arena in Iraq.9

The Shia in government and Parliament fear the Sunnis they work with every day.

They consider them at best tolerators of the insurgency or at worst collaborators with

it. In March 2007 Nassir Al-Janabi, an MP from the Sunni Tawafuq, was accused by thegovernment of working with Sunni assassination groups. After initial reluctance, the

Sunni Tawafuq expelled him from their parliamentary ranks. Janabi is now a fugitive in

Syria. Shia officials claim to have evidence incriminating other Sunni leaders in insurgent

activities. Shia officials expressed a widely held view that some prominent Sunni MPs

from the Sunni Tawafuq bloc in Parliament were associated with insurgent groups such as

the Twenties Revolution Brigades and the Army of Muhammad. The government has also

accused household staff and guards of Sunni leaders of aiding terrorist groups and pos-

sessing illegal weapons. The suicide bomber who detonated himself in Parliament in April

2007, killing Mohammed Awadh, a Sunni MP, allegedly belonged to the retinue of a Sunni

parliamentarian. As a result of these fears, Shia officials are reluctant to share security

information with their Sunni colleagues. Thus when Salam Al-Zawbai, the deputy prime

minister, complained that he was not informed of security arrangements and strategies, AliAl-Adib, a senior MP with the Shia UIA reportedly confirmed his complaint, saying it was

only natural since Zawbai could not be trusted with security information.10

Members of ISCI and Dawa blame Iraqs neighbors and, more recently, the United States

for aiding and abetting Sunni intransigence. In ranking the causes of problems in Iraq,

the Shia place the meddling of Arab states at the top of their list. Their prime culprits

are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, and Jordan. They believe that these

countries are relentlessly hostile to Shia rule in Iraq, will go a long way to thwart it, and

therefore turn a blind eye to the flow of money, arms, and volunteers to the insurgency.

They also accuse Arab neighbors of encouraging Sunni political groups that have joined

the political process to harden their positions and hold out for unreasonable demands.

Shia believe that after centuries of

oppression, it is their turn to rule.

Members of ISCI and Dawa

blame Iraqs neighbors and,

more recently, the United States

for aiding and abetting Sunni

intransigence.


8/20

According to this interpretation Shia leaders worry that the Sunni Tawafuq bloc is not

interested in reconciliation because it expects to gain a larger share of power in Iraq by

being intransigent and getting support from Iraqs Arab neighbors.

More recently the same Shia groups have started to blame the United Statesfor what

they believe to be excessive support for the Sunnis. They charge that the United States

made unwarranted concessions to bring Sunnis into the political fold through elections

and the constitutional referendum and continues to send signals that it is listening to

Sunni demands and yielding to Sunni pressure. They believe these actions contribute to

Sunni intransigence.

The influence of Saudi Arabia on the United States is a major problem for Shia religious

parties, since the United States shares Saudi (and Iraqi Sunni) fears of Iranian interference

and could use Sunni empowerment to counter Irans influence. Thus the Shia religious

groups see U.S. support for Sunni tribes in Anbar, and the prospect of incorporating ele-

ments from these tribes into the Iraqi army, through the lens of these fears. The Shia

worry that the United States is fostering and backing Sunni militias that can challenge

Shia authority and is building an army that may, at a future date, stage a coup against a

Shia-dominated government.

At its extreme, this fear becomes a paranoid projection of a U.S. conspiracy to bring

Sunni Baathists back to power. Many Shia who spoke to the author, both those active in

politics and ordinary citizens, harbor a fear that the United States is complicit in trying torestore Sunnis to power. The insistence of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq on forming a

federated region south of Baghdad may be partly a precautionary measure against a feared

restoration of the Sunnis to power.

th Sunn Psn

Sunni concerns are the other side of the same coin. The Sunnis have an existential fear

of Shia domination and cannot accept the reality that they are no longer the ruling elite.

In Parliament Adnan Al-Dulaimi, the head of the Sunni Tawafuq bloc, accused the Shia of

killing Sunnis everywhere and demanded that the Shia respect our existence.11 Even

Sunnis who were not associated with Saddam Husseins regime or opposed it because theywere Islamists, communists, or non-Baath Arab nationalists feel their loss of power as the

social elite. Whereas the Shia accuse the Sunnis of hidden sectarianism, the Sunnis accuse

the Shia of overt and avowed sectarianism and of using democracy and democratic tools

to justify a sectarian agenda.

The Shia political position is straightforward and simplemajority Shia rule using

democratic toolsbut the Sunni position is ambiguous. Publicly they reject the model of

a state built on sectarian quotas. Others are resigned to the system of sectarian quotas

but want a larger share and role. Despite these misgivings, some Sunnis are beginning to

regard a sectarian quota system as their insurance policy for participating in the state.

The progressive loss of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad to the Shia is particularly

painful to Sunni politicians, clergy, and professionals. Irrespective of demographics, they

feltthat the capitalnot Fallujah or Tikrit, which are provincial backwaterswas theirdomain. Under Saddam Husseins rule, the intellectual elite concentrated in Baghdad

and relied on the patronage and privileges provided by the Sunni government.In an

undeclared class system, Sadr City (established as Revolution City in the late 1950s and

changed to Saddam City in the 1970s), Shula, and Shaab, all strongholds of the capitals

poor Shia population, were not really part of Baghdad but of the distant slums around

the capital.

The Sunnis fear a Shia hegemony in which they are relegated to second-class status,

dependent on what the Shia agree to grant them. With loss of power there would be a loss

of resources, and less access to jobs, education, and commerce. Sunni parliamentarians

claimedthat Sunni academics were being assassinated in greater numbers than Shia, that

The Sunnis fear a Shia hegemony in

which they are relegated to second-

class status, dependent on what the

Shia agree to grant them.


9/20

Sunni university professors were being thrown out of their jobs or denied promotion, and

that Sunni students were kept out of the top colleges and university programs, even if

their academic performance exceeded that of Shia students. Sunni residents of Baghdad

continue to complain of the role of Shia militias in the police force and the inherent

bias of the police against the Sunnis, while Sunni politicians cite the exclusion of former

army officers from service and the denial of financial resources to the Sunni governorates,

even for projects approved by the government. In sum Sunnis see a pattern of persistent

neglect of Sunni interests and demands by what they characterize as a Shia government

and a Shia power elite.

According to the leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the Sunniswantto be full and

equal partners in government, not 20 percent junior partners. They argue that they are

excluded from policymaking and not consulted on major decisions concerning security

or foreign policy. They believe that the government of Prime Minister Maliki confines its

decision making to a narrow coterie and does not consult with the Sunnis in what is billed

as a government of national unity.

The Sunnis have to play a delicate game with a weak hand. They believe their rhetoric

has to be harsh to extract concessions from the Shia, and they cling to the armed groups

as their defenders. But if they overdo either posture they increase the suspicions of the

dominant Shia. They must also show their constituency that they can deliver benefits.

Thus Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi, head of the IIP, often comes across as a hardlinerbecause he is aware that his constituency is weighing his accomplishments on their

behalf against the achievements of the insurgent groups. The Sunnis find themselves in

a dangerous position: An overreliance on the armed groups makes them hostage to these

groups and reduces their credibility with the government (and with the United States).

Distancing themselves from the armed groups leaves them exposed and diminishes their

credibility within the Sunni community, especially if they do not succeed in delivering

protection and benefits to the Sunni population.

Because of their complex position, the Sunni struggle with disagreements in their

own camp. Within the Sunni Twafuq bloc, members of IIP, the largest component of the

parliamentary bloc, privately regard Adnan Al-Dulaimi (leader of Ahl Al-Iraq) and Khalaf

Al-Ulayan (leader of the Front for National Dialogue), both partners of the IIP in the

Sunni Tawafuq, as impediments to Sunni political progress because of their crude politicalapproach and their willingness to act as a cover for insurgent groups. For example, Ulayan

has repeatedly threatened to resort to armed resistance if Sunni demands are not met.12

According to Sunnis in Parliament, Dulaimi has openly declared that he is sectarian. Out-

side the Sunni Tawafuq and Parliament, Harith Al-Dhari, the head of the Muslim Scholars

Association, represents the radical extreme, and the Sunni Tawafuq openly accuses him of

supporting al Qaeda and extreme factions of the insurgency.13 To everyones relief (espe-

cially the Sunnis), he has left Iraq.

The rising profile of the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, Diyala, and the so-called Triangle

of Death south of Baghdad adds a new factor that is both useful and threatening. The

tribal elders portray themselves as homegrown champions of the populations in these

governorates, delivering real benefits by saving the people from the tyranny of al Qaeda,

bringing in reconstruction funds, and securing thousands of jobs in the police force. 14

They are playing an important role in combating al Qaeda and improving the security

situation in their region, thereby forging close ties with the U.S. military.This places the

tribes in a position of both political and military strength in their own communities and

vis--vis the national government in Baghdad, enabling them to drive harder bargains

with the Shia and forcing other Sunni leaders to be at least equally demanding. The invig-

orated tribes that have allied themselves with the United States may increase the clout

of the Sunnis as a community, but their rise may diminish the importance of the Sunnis

currently in Parliament and government. In addition, the success of the Sunni tribal chiefs

9


10/20

10

in combating al Qaeda may reduce the danger of international terrorism in Iraq but will

make bargaining even tougher over power sharing and other divisive issues.

Recognizing the necessity to engage in serious political dialogue and the fact that

existing efforts and frameworks have reached a stalemate, some Shia and Sunnis favor

international sponsorship and mediation of a national reconciliation process. It should be

noted, however, that the Shia are less inclined to involve outsiders in internal reconcili-

ation efforts and view any external involvement, whether by the United States, regional

countries, or the international community, as detrimental to their current position of

power.

Pc Cm

Four years after liberation, with two elections and a new constitution, the Iraqi political

leaders and the United States have not succeeded in building state institutions that are

viable, functional, or credible to Iraqi citizens.

The political situation is in stalemate. The executive branch is unproductive, with

seventeen of thirty-six ministers either withdrawn from their ministries altogether or

boycotting cabinet meetings (and one minister jailed on a murder charge). Parliament

seldom reaches a quorum and rarely reaches a working majority. When it does it can reach

decisions only about its internal affairs (salaries for MPs, pension plans, recess, and so

on). Services are virtually nonexistent. Oil production is down to 1.95 million barrels per

day, far below the prewar high of 2.4 mbd.15 Political leaders across the board are acutely

aware of the stagnation and failure of state institutions to meet the needs of the country

but seem mired in helplessness. They disagree about the causes of the paralysis and poor

performance and cannot agree on remedies.

A number of factors contribute to the failure of state functions. Although there are

leaders of political groups and factions in Iraq, no credible national leaders with broad

national appeal have emerged in the post-Saddam era. The major political groups and

their leaders are identified with a limited ethnic, sectarian, religious, or even regional

constituency. The fragmentation of politics is exemplified by the most-used word in the

Iraqi political lexicon, mukawwinat, constituent parts, as in the constituent parts of Iraq

society, which has replaced the expression Iraqis. Sectarian groups follow their own

narrow interests and build positions for self-defense. The most senior Shia and Sunni lead-

ers in Iraq acknowledged in conversations that the political groups are driven more by

fear than by any national vision. One of the consequences of the narrow agendas is the

cabinets failure to act cohesively in implementing a unified program for reconstruction

and social and economic revival.

The absence of unified and uncontested leadership in both the Shia and the Sunni

camps (in contrast to the Kurdish bloc) hinders deal making and agreement on important

political issues. Combined with the absence of strong leadership, the disarray within the

Shia UIA and the Sunni Tawafuq parliamentary blocs makes voting on crucial laws dif-

ficult. Many of these laws are political in nature and affect the power relations of the

parties in the country. Thus they require either a negotiated deal, which is unfeasiblewithout strong and unified leadership, or a majority vote in Parliament, which is not

achievable on critical issues because of the divergent interests of these groups, even

within the same bloc.

The most hopeful indicator is the recognition by senior politicians of all parties that

successive Iraqi governments have failed to restore normalcy and stability and to deliver

what the people need, although they differ on the causes of failure. There is universal

frustration and exasperation with the stalemate among the political class and citizens

alike. Although leaders of the different parties acknowledge that political solutions are

needed, they do not agree on what these solutions might be. At the same time intricate

Byzantine political activity goes on in Baghdad. According to many politicians the nego-

In Iraq, no credible national

leaders with broad national

appeal have emerged.


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11

tiations, bargaining, deal making, and deal breaking witnessed in summer 2007 are the

most hectic since the governments formation in spring 2006. Political dramas continue

to occupy the political elite, but so far there is a great deal of motion without obvious

progress.

Pc ancs

Shifts and fractures in political blocs have affected both the Shia UIA and the Sunni

Tawafuq. These fractures affect the national political context in Baghdad as well as condi-

tions in the governates.

The Fadhila was the first party to withdraw from the Shia UIA in March 2007. 16 The

Sadris, who withdrew their ministers from the cabinet in April and temporarily suspended

their participation in Parliament in June 2007, are by no means bound by the Shia UIA,

whether they are in or out of Parliament.17 The Dawa is divided into the Maliki camp, the

Jafari camp, and the Tandhim Al-Iraq, none of which feel particularly bound by Shia UIA

discipline, but they are likely to stick with the Shia UIA mainstream. Some of the twenty-

five independents within the Shia UIA bloc have formed the secular-leaning Arab National

Group, headed by Qassem Daoud. Thus only ISCI and the Dawa to varying degrees, remain

committed to a united Shia UIA platform.Outside Baghdad and the national Parliament the Shia UIA is even more fractured.

In Basra, Diwaniya, Nasriya, Samawa, and Amara, political differences and rivalries have

erupted in armed confrontations and deadly clashes among the groups that comprise

the Shia UIA coalition, resulting in many deaths on all sides, disruption of the provincial

economies and services, and rampant corruption. It is an open question whether lack of

cohesion at the top in Baghdad leads to warfare in the provinces, or whether the com-

petition for power and resources in the provinces is so powerful that it impedes political

agreements at the top. Either way, it is no longer possible to see the Shia UIA as the

united Shia coalition Ayatollah Sistani so adamantly called for before the elections of

January and December 2005.

A similar though less overt divergence of interests has occurred within the Sunni

Tawafuq, creating tensions between its partners. IIP takes political positions to bolsterits status with the Sunni public (partly in anticipation of provincial elections) and in the

political power structure. Although IIP has hawks as well as moderates and often acts

in ways that Shia consider obstructionist, it remains the most flexible party in the Sunni

Tawafuq bloc and the most open to dialogue and deal making. Following the accusation

that Nassir Al-Janabi was involved in insurgency activities,the April suicide bombing in

Parliament, the discovery of weapons caches in the houses of some Sunni leaders, and

the infiltration of their guards by would-be terrorists, pragmatists in IIP are beginning to

view partners like Adnan Al-Dulaimi (Ahl Al-Iraq) and Khalaf Al-Ulayan as a burden whose

only value is to provide voting strength in Parliament and possibly connections with the

more dogmatic elements of the Sunni community.

A new factor in the Sunni political game is the emergence of the tribes in Anbar, andincreasingly in Diyala and south of Baghdad, as a vital and menacing force. The tribes

pose a medium-term political threat to both the Sunni Tawafuq and the Shia UIA. Because

they have provided security, funds, and jobs, they are gaining credibility within their

communities and with the United States, thereby challenging Sunni politicians now in

Parliament, and are eager for provincial elections to take place in Anbar to demonstrate

their strength. The question now confronting the Sunni Tawafuq partners is how to deal

with the new Sunni actors, and specifically how to take advantage of increased Sunni

national visibility and leverage provided by the Anbar tribes in negotiation with the Shia

UIA and Kurds without losing out to them politically.

Shifts and fractures in political

blocs have affected both the Shia

UIA and the Sunni Tawafuq.


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12

With the possibility of provincial elections in 2008and national elections in December

2009, the balance of power between the tribal forces in Anbar, Diyala, and Salaheddin, on

the one hand, and the Sunni Tawafuq group, especially the IIP, on the other, may shift in

favor of the tribes in these regions. The current Sunni alliance could fracture, leading to

fragmentation or the formation of new alliances. The Sunni parties already in the political

process are faced with the difficult choice of becoming the allies of these tribes or their

rivals. Reshuffling to address these new factors may mean the end of the Sunni Tawafuq

and the emergence of new Sunni alliances.

The tribal forces present a different problem for the Shia parties. According to his close

advisers, Prime Minister Maliki met with some of the tribal leaders as early as 2006 but

did not develop a strategy to bring them into the political fold, and the government is

still ambiguous about its support for the tribes. Shia leaders fear that U.S. support for

these groups will create legitimized, U.S.-supported Sunni militias that might eventually

challenge the government. Disputes have arisen between the Anbar tribes and the govern-

ment about the appropriate size and level of funding of a police force in the province. In

the short term, the Shia parties controlling the government may find ways of exploiting

the tribes against their Sunni partners in government, such as Adnan Al-Dulaimi and

Khalaf Al-Ulayan or even the IIP. Indeed the prime ministers office has floated trial

balloons occasionally to test the possibility of appointing ministers nominated by the

Anbar tribes, particularly after the withdrawal of the Tawafuq ministers from government

in early August.

The empowerment of the tribes, through money, arms, and local support, will strength-

en the bargaining power of the Sunnis as a whole. In the long term, the Shia fear that

the inclusion of resurgent Sunni tribal elements in the Iraqi armed forces will bring back

Baathis to the army and to the government. The Shia parties that dominate the govern-

ment therefore have the delicate task of wooing the tribes without turning them into a

threat, balancing the influence of the tribes within the Sunni community against the

influence of the Sunni Tawafuq parties and maneuvering to prevent the emergence of a

unified and powerful Sunni front.

Recognizing that the political process is at a standstill and other state functions

(legislation, services, economic improvement) are paralyzed, since May 2007 the political

parties and blocs have been exploring new political alliances, some to support the govern-ment, others to form a new government. In May 2007 the Fadhila party, the Sadris, the

(secular) Iraqia group, and the small (Sunni) Hewar group headed by Salih Mutlaq met to

discuss the possibility of forming a new front opposed to the Maliki government. Some

favored declaring a formal opposition and withdrawing from government en masse, but

others were reluctant. In the end neither the IIP nor the Sadris, deemed essential compo-

nents of an opposition front, were prepared to join; the project was put on hold.

More significantly, ISCI and the Kurds, whose strategic alliance antedates the war of

2003, have sought to build a broader alliance that can produce a majority in Parliament

and bolster the government. With Fadhilas walkout from the Shia UIA and the strained

relations between ISCI and the Sadr movement, ISCI was left with only Dawa as a reliable

partner within the Shia UIA, in addition to some of the independents within the bloc. The

strategy therefore involved forming an alliance of moderates, comprising ISCI, Dawa,the KDP and PUK, and seeking the inclusion of IIP.18 An agreement between the two

Shia parties and the Kurdish parties was relatively straightforward and was reached in July

2007. Persuading IIP to join the alliance has involved tough and sometimes acrimonious

discussions. Frustrated and hoping to force the issue on the reluctant Sunnis, on August

16, 2007, the two Shia parties and the Kurdish parties formally signed an agreement for

a moderate alliance without the IIP.

The four parties stress than any alliance will be open to all who wish to support the

government and the political process. Nevertheless, an alliance of moderates implies that

those outside it are extreme in some sense or at least excluded. Other groups may be

spurred to join or may intensify their efforts to form a counteralliance.

The empowerment of the tribes,

through money, arms, and local

support, will strengthen the

bargaining power of the Sunnis

as a whole.


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13

S insuns

Nearly half the cabinet seats have been either vacant or nonoperational since August,

with the withdrawal or resignation of Sadri and Iraqia ministers and the boycott of the

Sunni Tawafuq ministers. This shortfall does not seem to make a difference since even

with a full house, the government was unable to discharge its executive responsibilities

and had little control over the tools of governance. According to government officials the

prime minister, who is commander in chief, has only limited authority over the army. The

police in the provinces are under the control of the party that controls each governorate,while the national police are only tenuously controlled by the interior ministry. In areas

like Basra, Amara, and Dhi Qar, where coalition forces have either withdrawn or reduced

their numbers, the government has not been able either to maintain law and order or to

contain internecine fighting between rival Shia militias.

The government has struggled to control oil resources. The militias in the south fight

over control of the oil sector and oil smuggling. Tolls collected by militias at every stage

of the operationfrom fees on overland transport to sale of smuggled crude and import

of refined productsprovide enormous revenues and drive the wars of the militias in cities

like Basra. Indeed control over oil facilities and the oil sector in the south is a major cause

of intra-Shia fighting in the governorate of Basra and the struggle over political control

of the provincial council.19

The governments record of service delivery has been poor. Fuel shortages create long

gas lines that snake around city blocks, as well as a thriving black market in oil products,

largely controlled by militias and mafias. Residents complain that even black-market fuel

is in short supply. The scarcity of fuel for power plants exacerbates the electricity shortage,

and owners of private generators frequently cannot find fuel to operate them. The health

sector suffers from a shortage of supplies and equipment at a time of rising demand as a

result of endemic violence. Physicians, who have been especially targeted by terrorists, are

fleeing the country, creating a crisis that recently prompted the government to try to ban

their travel. Services are only somewhat better in the southern provinces than they are in

Baghdad and the central area, although accurate comparative data on fuel availability and

the health sector are hard to obtain.

The most promising new development, designed to end the deadlock of the executivebranch, was the decision in mid-July to create quartet rule comprising of the prime

minister and the three-man presidential council: Jalal Talabani, Adel Abdel Mahdi, and

Tariq al-Hashimi. This arrangement was to achieve a number of objectives. Members of

the presidential council believed that Prime Minister Maliki was making decisions without

consulting sufficiently with the partners in the national coalition. The quartet would lead

to more consultation in decision making and ensure Shia, Kurdish, and Sunni input and

endorsement. In addition, Hashimi and the Sunnis complained that the government took

strategic and security decisions without consulting the Sunnis, and the Sunnis had little

say in governance. Quartet rule gives Hashimi, on behalf of the Sunni Tawafuq, equal

input. Ideally the quartet will overcome the impediment of a fractured cabinet by provid-

ing consensus among the major political blocs.

Parliament has also been mired in problems. The top party leaders rarely attend meet-ings and the legislative process is often paralyzed by the absence of a quorum. Factional

bickering is intense, and the crisis precipitated by the removal of Mahmoud Mashhadani

as speaker and his subsequent reinstatement is symptomatic of the distrust between the

Shia and Sunni factions. In addition to these problems, Parliament in reality has little

power because the most important legislative issues it faces have political dimensions that

require negotiations between the leaders of the political groups. Parliament can vote on

such legislative matters only after leaders make political agreements and decisions, and

the parliamentary vote is a tool to ratify these agreements. Thus the hydrocarbon law, the

revenue-sharing law, the law on de-Baathification, and the law regulating the authorities

of the provincial councils, among others, are stalled in Parliament for lack of decisions


14/20

14

by the leadership of the parliamentary groups. At times lack of a quorum masks lack of

agreement on sensitive legislation.

th Suhrn Gvrnrs

The withdrawal of coalition troops from southern governorates has led to intensified

confrontations between rival militias, especially Badr, the military arm of ISCI, and Jaish

Al-Mahdi, the military wing of the Sadr movement. Weak government institutions and

law enforcement capability have also given rise to new militias and cults, such as the

Sarkhis and Jund Assamaa, quasi-mystical, armed groups that operate on the periphery of

the political order. Ordinary residents of the south who wish to carry on quiet lives must

negotiate their way through dangerous political crosscurrents.

Elections for provincial councils in the south took place in January 2005, and gover-

nors were elected by the new provincial councils. At the time the Sadr movement formally

boycotted the elections, although individual Sadris did run. Predictably elections did not

spell an end to political problems. In Basra the governor from the Fadhila party is bitterly

opposed by ISCI and Dawa council members, who have tried hard to remove him from

office. The economic stakes are high in Basra, and the city is reportedly overrun by militias

whose primary concern is control of the citys oil economy. According to residents, political

assassinations of rivals and revenge killings of Baathis are rampant and underreported by

local authorities and the national government. The small Sunni community in the gov-

ernorate has come under severe pressure, and Sunni mosques have been systematically

burned down. Residents claim that the political, military, and economic influence of Iran

in Basra is higher than anywhere else in the south.

In Diwaniya, Nasriya, and Simawa, ISCI controls the provincial councils but, as a

resident of Diwaniya asserted, the Mahdi army controls the streets. The police in these

governorates belong to Badr and ISCI, but they are constantly challenged by the Mahdi

army and often threatened in their own homes. Deadly clashes between the Mahdi army

and the ISCI-affiliated police in these governorates have spiked, necessitating interven-

tion by the Iraqi army.

The Karbala provincial council is split among Dawa, ISCI, Sadris, and the Islamic ActionParty. The governorate maintains a precarious political balance, but because it shares a

border with Anbar and is adjacent to the Triangle of Death southwest of Baghdad, the city

of Karbala has been the target of suicide bombers and car explosions. As a result, security

at the entry points to the city and within the city is very tight. Amara (Maysan) and Kut

(Wasit) councils are controlled by Sadris and the Mahdi army, although clashes with the

local police and Iraqi army are frequent. In Amara the Sadris are said to control both the

legal and the illicit traffic of goods from Iran.

Only Najaf appears to be quiet and prospering. ISCI fully controls the city, and despite

the assassination in the summer of an aide to Sistani, there is no serious challenge to

ISCIs authority at present. As a result of the stability, Najafs economy is in better shape

than other governorates in the south. In addition to control of governorate institutions,

Ammar Al-Hakim, the son of ISCI leader Kadir Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, founded and presidesover a huge and expanding charitable organization called Shaheed Al-Mihrab, which has

established private schools and a string of summer schools, helps orphans throughout the

south, delivers assistance to displaced families, runs womens organizations and womens

education programs, and provides countless other social services that neither the state

nor the governorate is providing. Some residents worry that the present calm will not

endure because the Sadris will not cede Najaf so easily and will at some point contest

ISCIs control.

Residents of the southern governorates believed that if elections for provincial councils

took place in their governorates soon, the Sadris would make considerable gains. Because

the Sadr movement boycotted the elections of January 2005, the present provincial coun-

Weak government institutions

and law enforcement capability

have also given rise to new

militias and cults.


15/20

15

cils do not reflect its true strength. The weak performance since the 2005 elections of

the national government and the provincial governments, both dominated by ISCI and

Dawa, has probably increased support for the movement. In conversations in summer

2007, residents of the southern provinces believed that the prospect of provincial elec-

tions would intensify fighting among the Shia militias in their regions. Some southern

residents expressed growing dissatisfaction with all religious parties, which, they felt,

have failed to respond to the needs of citizens, tolerated corruption, and engaged in

violent competition.

fdrn nd Rgn aunms

According to its Constitution, Iraq is currently a federation comprising two regions:

Kurdistan and the rest of the country. The Constitution grants the governorates the right

to form additional federated regions. In March 2007 a law presented by ISCI, regulating

the formation of new federated regions, passed by a slim majority in Parliament with

minimal debate. The law does not address the crucial issues of the relationship between

the regional government and the national government, or the competencies and authority

of the regional government vis--vis the national government. Although the Constitution

touches on these points, they are nevertheless the subject of continuing and intense

debate in Iraq and constitute some of the thorniest questions tackled by the Constitu-

tional Review Committee.

fdrsm n h Suh

ISCI has led the calls to extend federalism to other parts of Iraq, but other Shia groups

do not share its enthusiasm. The Sadr movement opposes federalism as a matter of prin-

ciple, only grudgingly accepting Kurdish federalism; Fadhila and other Shia groups (both

religious and secular) oppose the specific formula proposed by ISCI. Some political leaders

and scholars have suggested alternative ideas for federalism or decentralization. The posi-

tion of the Dawa party is more ambiguous, as it is now inclined to view ISCI as a seniorpartner and go along with the ISCI platform.

ISCI is actively seeking the creation of a single federated state covering all nine gov-

ernorates south of Baghdad, presumably with Najaf as its capitalwhat some detractors

call Shiistan. Because a referendum is required to form a federation, ISCI is expending

considerable financial resources to promote the concept among Iraqis in the south at

every social level and among numerous social groups. The Shahid Al-Mihrab Institute,

an ISCI-affiliated non-governmental organization headed by Ammar Al-Hakim, regularly

holds meetings for women, university students, and other groups to extoll the advantages

of a southern federation. On the assumption that this southern super-federation is achiev-

able and ISCI will control it, ISCI, like the Kurds, will want to see maximum authority

given to the federated regions.

However, the situation in southern Iraq is politically quite different from that in Kurd-istan, where the two major parties, at times violent rivals, have arrived at a power-sharing

agreement that allows for unification of the region. Far from a power-sharing agreement,

ISCI and the Sadr movement are locked in a bloody power struggle in the south. Basra,

Diwaniya, Nasriya, Samawa, and other cities have witnessed armed conflict, assassina-

tions, and bombings attributable to the rivalry between the two factions.

Provincial elections in the south are likely to precipitate more violence and lead to

a stronger showing by the Sadr movement. Other, smaller groups may also merge in the

competition. Under the circumstances, and if its control of the councils is less certain,

ISCI could lose its enthusiasm for a greater Shia federated region, and it might look to

other forms of federation that are more easily managed.

Residents of the southern prov-

inces believed that the prospect

of provincial elections would

intensify fighting among theShia militias in their regions.


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16

In addition, the tribes of southern Iraq are at best divided over the idea of a grand

southern federation. Although ISCI has wooed tribes in the south-central area, its

endorsement is not certain, and the tribes of the far south have agitated against the

idea. In a recent and striking challenge to the grand southern federation, tribal leaders

from Basra, Nasriya, Simawa, Diwaniya, and Amara met in July 2007 and declared the

establishment of a single self-governing (but not federated) region comprising their five

governorates. The declaration explicitly rejected federalism but was otherwise vague about

the relationship of this self-governing region to the national government.

Traditionally, Iraq south of Baghdad has been organized into two distinct cultural andeconomic regions. The mid-Euphrates, centered in Najaf and including Karbala and Hilla, is

a predominantly urban region organized around the Shia holy sites; the population is pre-

dominantly of the clerical and merchant classes. Its economy heavily depends on the pil-

grimage from the entire Muslim world to the holy shrines and on the revenue generated by

the presence of senior Shia marjis (religious authorities who receive religious titles) and the

hawza, seminaries that attract students from around the Muslim world. Najaf and Karbala

have always had a more cosmopolitan Muslim complexion than most cities in Iraq.

The second region is the far south, encompassing Basra, Amara, and Nasriya, and is

tribal and clustered around the historic marshes. Semawa and Diwaniya, with their strong

tribal cultures, share more characteristics with this region than with the mid-Euphrates.

The economy heavily depends on agriculture, animal husbandry, and fisheries. The local

culture tends to be less cosmopolitan and less oriented toward religion than that pre-vailing in the shrine cities. Tribal folklore is prominent and colorful, and the population

continues to be attuned to Arab tribal traditions.

In sum, intense political rivalries that include armed conflict, historical variables, and

cultural and economic differences make the creation of a single super-federation in the

south a considerable challenge.

fdrsm n h Ws?

The Sunnis have accepted the principle of federalism for the Kurds but find it hard to

reconcile themselves to an overall federated Iraq. At the same time several concerns have

driven the Sunnis to think about the merits of self-governance and decentralization. Aprimary issue is the composition of the security forces, encompassing the national police

and the army, both of which are heavily Shia. Efforts by the central government to intro-

duce Iraqi army units in Anbar province have been unsuccessful because of the distrust

between the population and Shia troops. A locally recruited and managed police force

answering to the provincial government is a preferable solution, although its relationship

to the interior ministry is ambiguous (as is the relationship of locally raised police forces

in other governorates, notably in the south).

Allocation of revenue is another item of concern to the Sunnis. Sunni leaders from the

Sunni Tawafuq alliance and the Anbar tribes complain that reliance on national ministries

often dominated by Shia parties to approve projects and allocate and disburse funds

has so far been an unproductive experience. They prefer to control their own finances.

The undercurrent of Sunni thinking is that if Iraqs national government is going to bebased on sectarian quotas, therefore giving the Sunnis minority status, then Sunnis need

autonomous control over certain issues in areas where they are a majority. At present the

precarious security situation and fluctuating balance of political forces in the majority

Sunni governorates, as well as the difficult conditions in Shia governorates, make a unify-

ing policy on this issue difficult for Sunnis to reach.

Cncusns nd RcmmndnsBy October 2007 many Iraqi officials and Baghdad residents were willing to state that

the stepped-up military effort had succeeded in reducing sectarian violence in the capital


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17

and squeezing al Qaeda out of traditional strongholds. Yet despite broad recognition that

the success of the military effort can be sustained only by a political settlement, neither

the United States nor the Iraqis have matched the military escalation with a comparable

political acceleration. Iraqis have not used the opportunity provided by the slowdown

of sectarian killings to engage more effectively in a national dialogue and reach accom-

modations. The United States, despite its demand for the Iraqi government to meet

benchmarks, has not made the political process in Iraq its highest priority. Washington

has not mobilized its considerable political and diplomatic capabilities to confront what

is undoubtedly the most critical problem endangering regional stability.

The next report from General Petraeus is expected in March 2008, and the interven-

ing period should be a time for U.S. policymakers and Iraqis to devote their energies to

addressing political and governance problems. While there are constraints on the ability

to shape political dynamics in Iraq, they should not lead to inaction. With the prospect

of U.S. troop reductions and redeployment, it is crucial over the next year for the United

States and the international community to affirm their political engagement with Iraq

and their commitment to helping Iraqis establish a viable state. Otherwise the intensified

military effort will have been wasted and U.S. troop presence may be prolonged.

Three principal initiatives can benefit from U.S. and international engagement and

support.

1. inrnn Mdn. Prsdn Bush nd Gnr Prus hv bh rrrd

h succss bm-up pprchs rcncn nd scury.20 The security

achievements in Anbar, south Baghdad, and other hotspots will translate into durable

political success once the tribes in these regions integrate into the Iraqi state at a politi-

cal level, not only serve as members of a local police force or national army. Although local

efforts are important as building blocks, they do not preclude or diminish the necessity of

agreements and accommodations at the top political levels, if only because senior politi-

cians can scuttle or sabotage local successes.

Forums, such as the one for Iraq and its neighbors or the International Compact for

Iraq, are useful for engaging the region and the international community, but they do not

address the heart of the matter, that political leaders need to engage in candid, serious

negotiations and accept unpalatable compromises. Sectarian entrenchment, fueled by

killings and purges, has engendered distrust and discouraged candor, making it unlikelythat leaders can undertake this painful process on their own.

Iraq urgently needs international mediation to bring the parties together at the highest

decision-making level to forge a national compact. The negotiations should establish a

sustained, continuous dialogue and reach agreements on power sharing, the nature of the

Iraqi state, and compromises on specific national issues such as the Constitution. Iraqs

neighbors must be brought into the process to endorse and uphold agreements struck

by the Iraqi leadership. Once agreements are in place, compliance must be monitored

by international observers. Although the United States must provide the motivation and

impetus for such mediation, the process itself should be anchored in an international

framework, with a UN Security Council resolution and mediators appointed by the Security

Council. Resolution 1770, which gives the UN a larger role in Iraq, is a starting point for

the Security Council to do more, but it does not go far enough.2. Dvp Nn Pcs. Snc 2003 irq hs surd rm h przn

scrn pcs, wh h nvb rsu h ngns r zr-sum

gms. Policy choices and decisions are measured by the yardstick of factional interest

rather than national interest. The state has been built on a sectarian premise with a men-

tality of cronyism and divvying up the spoils, making compromise and accommodation

among the groups hard to reach. It is essential for Iraq to move away from the cycles

of identity politics and develop national platforms and national institutions. Mechanisms

have to be established within state institutions to reinforce their national mission,

particularly in the armed forces, the national police, the judiciary, and institutions that

handle the countrys revenues.

The United States and Iraqis have

not matched the military escalation

with a comparable political

acceleration.


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1

Recent developments in Iraq provide a better opportunity than earlier to redefine Iraqi

politics in terms of cross-sectarianism and national platforms. The breakdown of the Shia

UIA and the incipient disagreements within Sunni Tawafuq open a path to new cross-

sectarian, cross-ethnic alliances that can develop issues-based rather than sect-based

agendas. The rise of the Sunni tribes in Anbar and elsewhere against al Qaeda provides

an opportunity to reduce distrust and reshape Sunni-Shia dialogue. Countrywide tribal

forums that bring together Shia and Sunni tribal leaders can provide alternative political

structures that transcend sectarianism. Social and professional structures that draw on the

urban middle class can provide the social underpinnings for development of cross-sectar-ian and cross-ethnic common interests. A further important step in directing Iraq away

from sectarianism and encouraging national politics lies in changing the current electoral

law of closed lists and adopting single-candidate, single-district elections.

3. Bud ecv Gvrnnc. ang wh chngng h pc md, h nn

gvrnmn mus cqur h by nd h s gvrn. As discussed earlier,

the problems of government are systemic, caused by favoring quotas instead of compe-

tence, cronyism, lack of accountability, and corruption. If the executive branch hopes to

improve performance, this underlying system must change in favor of better standards of

competence and a professional cabinet structure. More effort is necessary to professional-

ize and train the civil service and ensure the continuity of experience and knowledge in

government agencies.

The argument that the national government can remain weak while provincial govern-

ments should be strengthened is unrealistic. A state that is vulnerable to internal threats

from terrorism, unruly militias, and external challenges from neighbors requires competent

security institutions, and these can only be provided and managed by the national govern-

ment. The national government is still, and will continue to be, responsible for the armed

forces, distribution of revenue, and nationwide infrastructure projects. Outside Kurdistan,

Iraqis still look to the national government to provide basic services and protection. At

present the incapacity of the national government is not compensated for by strong pro-

vincial governments. Quite the opposite. The ills that bedevil the national government in

Baghdad are mirrored in equal, if not greater, measure in the provinces.

Ultimately Iraqis have to make the hard decisions about the shape of the national

compact, a political settlement, and necessary agreements to build a functioning andstable state. Nevertheless, what the United States does (or fails to do) is important in

influencing political directions and outcomes.

The United States can play a significant role as a catalyst by providing support and

assistance strategically and at the operational level and by persuading the international

community to engage more vigorously and meaningfully in facilitating Iraqi dialogue and

settlements. It would be dangerous for the United States to allow the debate in Wash-

ington over the military to obscure the fact that a political solution is the only feasible

endgame in Iraq.


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19

Ns

1. The red zone of Baghdad comprises all the areas of the city outside the green zone (now officially the

International Zone), which is a heavily guarded and walled enclave that houses the U.S. and other embas-

sies, the Iraqi Parliament, and senior government officials.

2. Clear, hold, and build is a policy articulated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her remarks

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 19, 2005. See www.state.gov/secretary/

rm/2005/55303.htm. Clear refers to clearing areas of terrorists and insurgents; hold refers to sustain-

ing control over cleared areas; and build refers to the reconstruction and economic revival of clearedand held areas.

3. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Iraq Chief Says His Forces Are Able to Secure Country, New York Times,July 15,

2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/world/middleeast/15iraq.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.

4. Edward Wong, Shiite Cleric Has Six Quit Cabinet in Iraq Shake-Up, New York Times, April 17, 2007, www.

nytimes.com/2007/04/17/world/middleeast/17iraq.html; Kirk Semple,Majority of Iraq Lawmakers Seek

Timetable of U.S. Exit, New York Times, May 12, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/05/12/world/middleeast/

12iraq.html.

5. The discussion in the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) regarding the preamble to the constitution

reveals the absence of a common national vision among the leaders who drafted the document. The

preamble depicts Iraqi society as a collection of ethnic and religious fragments, recounts the history of

persecution suffered by each community but primarily by the Kurds and the Shia, gives religious leaders a

prominent role in the process of political change, and appeals repeatedly to the (Shia) imams and marjis

for inspiration. Efforts to change the preamble by eliminating some language were unsuccessful. Only

additions to the preamble were accepted and included in the draft sent to Parliament.

6. The committees recommendations do not cover the powers of the presidency, the preamble, or Article 140,

which deals with Kirkuk, de-Baathification, and other constitutional items.

7. References to Shia parties or Shia politicians refer to the Shia religious groups in Parliament, including

ISCI, Dawa, the Sadris, and Fadhila, who in 2005 formed the United Iraqi Alliance bloc. It does not refer

to secular Shia who may belong to other groups, such as Iraqia.

8. Meeting with the author in Baghdad, July 9, 2007.

9. The Baath party has splintered into at least two factions, one led by Izzet al-Douri, reputed to be in

Yemen, and another by Younes Ahmed, in Syria. There were efforts in Damascus in summer 2007 to rec-

oncile the two groups. See Maad Fayad, Return of the Baathists? Asharq Alawsat, February 13, 2007,

www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=7990.

10. Ernesto Londono, For Eminent Sunni, Lessons in Weakness, Washington Post, February 10, 2007,

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/09/AR2007020902344.html.

11. UIA and Tawafuq Exchange Accusations in Parliament of Inciting Sectarianism, Asharq Alawsat, Novem-

ber 22, 2006.12. Maad Fayad, Iraqi Sunni Leaders Threaten Civil War,Asharq Alawsat, December 26, 2005, www.ashar-

qalawsat.com/english/pring.asp?artid=id3184; Leader of Tawafuq Coaliton: We Will Resort to Armed

Resistance if the Government Does Not Obey Our Demands, Asharq Alawsat, July 17, 2007, www.ashar-

qalawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issue=10444&article=426336&state=true.

13. Tawafuq Bloc Attacks Ambiguous Stand of Al-Dhari Towards Al-Qaeda, Asharq Alawsat, October 10,

2007.

14. Bomb Kills a Key Sunni Ally of U.S., washingtonpost.com, September 1, 2007, and Abu Risha in an

Interview Weeks before His Assassination,Asharq Alawsat, September 15, 2007.

15. Peter Grier, Iraqs Oil Production Falls Short of Goals, Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 2007, www.

csmonitor.com/2007/0507/p01s02-wome.html.

16. Ernesto Londono, At Least 146 Shiites Killed Across Iraq, Washington Post, March 8, 2007, www.wash-

ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/07/AR2007030700357_3.html.

17. Sadr Bloc Boycotts Parliament after Shrine Bombing, Khaleej Times, www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayAr-

ticleNew.aspxfile=data/focusoniraq/2--7/June/fpcispmoraq_June54.xml&section=focusoniraq.

18. The United States encouraged formation of an alliance of moderates as early as December 2006; press

conference by

political progress in iraq during the surge

Documents