politics in 18th century burma

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Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma

Author(s): Victor B. Lieberman

Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1978), pp. 455-482

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312229

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ModernAsianStudies,12, 3 (1978), pp. 455-482. Printed in Great Britain.

EthnicPoliticsn Eighteenth-CenturyurmaVICTOR B. LIEBERMAN

HatfieldPolytechnicWE commonly find in the literature on pre-colonial mainland SoutheastAsia a tendency to treat the principal ethnic groups-Burmese, Mons,Siamese, Cambodians, Vietnamese-as discrete political categories.This tendency is particularly marked in the historiography of theIrrawaddy valley, where the recurrent north-south conflicts of theeleventh to the eighteenth centuries have usually been interpreted as'national' or 'racial' struggles between the Burmese people of the northand the Mon, or Talaing, people of the south. In writing of the lastmajor 'Mon-Burmese' war, that of I740-57, historians have character-ized the 1740 uprising at the southern city of Pegu as an expression of'Mon nationalism'.1 The ensuing conflict reportedly became a strugglebetween Mons and Burmese each 'fighting for the existence of theirrace'; and Alahng-hpaya, said to be a champion of 'Burmese national-ism', allegedly made vigorous efforts to destroy the Mon culture andpeople once he had triumphed.2

I wish to thank Professor C. D. Cowan, ProfessorHugh Tinker, ProfessorH. L.Shorto, Professor Hla Pe, Mr William Koenig, and especially Mr John Okell fortheir assistance. Responsibility for the content of the article remains my own.For explanations of the revolt in terms of 'Mon nationalism', the 'Talaingnational movement', the 'Talaing... nation', etc., see D. G. E. Hall, EarlyEnglishIntercourse ith Burma, 1587-1743, second edn (London, 1968), pp. 12, 236; B. R.

Pearn, A History of Rangoon (Rangoon, 1939; repr., Westmead, England, 1971), p. 41;John F. Cady, SoutheastAsia: Its HistoricalDevelopmentNew York, 1964), pp. 285,288-9; Sir Arthur Phayre, Historyof Burma London, 1883; repr., New York, 1969),pp- 142-3.2 See G. E. Harvey, Historyof Burma(London, 1925; new impression, London,I967), pp. 216, 220, 234-6; Phayre, History of Burma,pp. i50-I; Cady, SoutheastAsia, pp. 288-9; D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-EastAsia, 2nd edn (New York,1966), pp. 365, 381-6; id., EuropeandBurma(London, 1945), p. 6o; British BurmaGazetteer,2 vols (Rangoon, 1879-1880), Vol. 2, pp. i68, 481; Mabel Haynes Bode,The Pali Literatureof Burma (London, 1909; repr. London, I966), pp. 68-9, 83.Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York, 1967), pp. 153-70, 313, is a partial excep-tion to this school of thought in that Htin Aung recognizes the poly-ethnic characterof the initial uprising at Pegu. By 1747, however, he claims that the Mons had begunto massacre Burmese in the south. He characterizes the ensuing wars as a 'racialconflict' (p. 313) and freely uses the terms 'nationalism' and 'patriot' in describingAlaung-hpaya's movement. Nigel Brailey, 'A Re-Investigation of the Gwe of

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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANAlthough they fail to offer a precise definition of the terms 'national'or 'racial', these historians appear to have made three interrelated

assumptions: a) each 'racial' or 'national' group constituted an exclusive,stable, empirically-identifiable population; b) 'racial' identity was theonly significant factor in determining political allegiance; c) as a result,each of the contending forces was essentially of one 'racial' or 'national'type. This paper examines the validity of these assumptions. In sodoing, it provides a theoretical framework for interpreting ethnically-oriented conflicts in other areas of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, and itattempts to offer some new perspectives on ethnic relations in con-temporary Burma.

Theoretical ConsiderationsIt is not difficult to find evidence of Burmese-Mon awareness andantagonism. The Burmese and Mon tongues, which are mutuallyunintelligible, belong to different linguistic families.3 Despite a con-siderable amount of geographic interpenetration, Burmese-speakerswere concentrated in the dry zone north of about I8? N. latitude,while Mon-speakers lived principally in the wet coastal zone of theIrrawaddy delta and the trans-Sit-taung littoral. Burmese and Monsshared many cultural traits, but there were also significant differencesin religious practices, domestic customs, literary traditions, even physi-cal appearance.4 Burmese were said by a European informant in 1759to be of a somewhat darker complexion, and only among the Burmesedid males commonly tattoo their thighs. Whereas Mon men cut theirhair round in front and shaved the backpart of their heads, Burmesemen grew their hair long and coiled it into a topknot.5 The Mons,being the earlier residents of the valley and the first to have adoptedEighteenth Century Burma', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. I, No. 2 (September1970), PP. 33-47, has escaped the traditional Mon-Burmese dichotomy by focusingwith considerable insight on 'Karen' involvement at Pegu. Yet he, too, has tended tothink in terms of discrete politico-ethnic categories, e.g. 'Karens' vs. 'the Mon party',See infra.3 Peter Kunstadter, 'Population and Linguistic Affiliation of Ethnic Groups ofBurma', in Kunstadter (ed.), Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, 2 vols(Princeton, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 78-9I.4 See R. Halliday, The Talaings (Rangoon, 1917).5 A. Dalrymple (comp.), OrientalRepertory, vols (London, I808; repr., Rangoon,1926) [Dal], Vol. I, p. 99. Cf. Halliday, The Talaings, pp. I9-20; and Twin-thin-taik-wun Maha-si-thu, 'Alaung-min-taya-gyi ayei-daw-bon' (Biography of KingAlaung-hpaya) [AA-T], in Alaung-hpaya ayei-daw-bon hnasaung-dwe (Two Biographiesof King Alaung-hpaya), tJ Hla Tin, ed (Rangoon, I96I), pp. I6, I86.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 457Buddhist civilization, felt culturally superior to the Burmese, whomthey tended to disparage as 'upcountry rustics'. Burmese in turn scornedthe 'effeteness' of their southern neighbors, as when one of Alaung-hpaya's commanders boasted, 'One hundred Talaing [warriors]don't equal a single Burman.'6Cultural and physical differences of this sort, however, do notmean that ethnic identity was necessarily static, or that the categories'Burmese' and 'Mon' were mutually exclusive, as some historians haveassumed. Anthropologists of mainland Southeast Asia have demon-strated that ethnic categories can usefully be regarded as roles vis-d-visother groups, and in that sense are only indirectly descriptive of theempirical characteristics of particular groups.7 If a person wishes tochange his ecological or political role within the larger society, he oftenadopts, either temporarily or permanently, cultural attributes ofanother group which have a generally-recognized symbolic significance.Thus a 'Kachin', if he chooses, can 'become a Shan' by adopting Bud-dhism and/or Shan dress and speech, without at the same time abandon-ing all the items of his Kachin cultural heritage. There is reason tobelieve that a similar pattern operated in Burma during the pre-colonial period, and that many people living in bi-lingual districtsof the Irrawaddy basin faced a genuine choice as to whether theywould identify themselves as 'Burmese' or 'Mons'. The choice seems tohave been determined in large measure by political considerations:those people whose communities were politically subordinate to, orallied with, the coast, sometimes cut their hair in Mon fashion or usedMon speech in order to declare publicly their support for the coastalkingdom. On one level at least, these people were deemed to have'become Mons', although they may also have retained numerousBurmese cultural features. In the sixteenth century the Burmese kingTabin-shwei-hti wore a Mon head-dress and cut his hair in Mon fashion,thereby 'becoming a Mon' in the eyes of his subjects, because a pro-phecy had said that only Mon kings could rule over Pegu.8 In the mid-

6 Kbn-baung-zet maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyi (Great Royal Chronicle of the Kon-baungDynasty) [KBZ], 3 vols (Rangoon, 1967), Vol. I, p. I I4.7 F. K. Lehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems',in Kunstadter, Southeast Asian Tribes, pp. 93-124; E. R. Leach, Political Systems ofHighlandBurma (London, I964); Michael Moerman, 'Ethnic Identification in aComplex Civilization: Who Are the Lue?', AmericanAnthropologist,Vol. 67 (1965),pp. 1215-30.8 t Kala, Maha-ya-zawin-gyi(The Great Chronicle), Vol. 2, Hsaya Pwa (ed.)(Rangoon, n.d.), pp. 214-I6; H. L. Shorto, 'A Mon Genealogy of Kings: Observa-tions on "the Nidana Arambhakatha"', in D. G. E. Hall (ed.), Historiansof SouthEast Asia (London, 196 ), p. 68.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANeighteenth century, as we shall see, some Burmese who fell withinPegu's orbit chose (or were forced) to cut their topknots in order todemonstrate loyalty to Pegu. Conversely, under the stabilized Burmesehegemony over the coast of the Kon-baung period (I757-I852), Mon-speakers tended to tattoo their thighs and to acquire Burmese speechbecause this behavior conferred political and economic advantages.As S. J. Tambiah has indicated in his description of'galactic polities',Southeast Asian kingdoms traditionally comprised a 'central planet'surrounded by an attenuated field of satellite communities whosenumber fluctuated according to the military strength of the center.9At a crude level of generalization, the long-term implications of thispolitical pattern for the ethnic composition of the Irrawaddy valleywere as follows: the more powerful the northern kingdom of Ava, thegreater the percentage of people within the Irrawaddy basin whocharacterized themselves as 'Burmese'; and the greater the swayof Pegu, the greater the potential number of 'Mons'.10 The wars be-tween Ava and Pegu, therefore, were not 'racial' or 'national' strugglesper se, but regional and dynastic conflicts in which cultural traits couldbe made to serve as a public badge, a visible emblem, of politicalloyalty.ll To some extent, 'Mon' was a role filled by people loyal toPegu, while 'Burman' was the role accepted by people loyal to Ava.The possibility of role choices clearly tended to promote ethnichomogeneity within the Peguan and Avan polities, and in this sense, thecustomary identification of Pegu as the Mon kingdom, and of Ava as theBurmese kingdom, remains valid. Yet we should recognize that this wasmerely a tendency towards uniformity, not an implacable law. Inpractice, homogeneity was never achieved, because a number ofpowerful traditions militated against a direct correspondence betweenethnic type and political loyalty. Some members of minority groupswithin a given polity assimilated to the culture of the majority; butothers, perhaps in even greater numbers, retained their originalidentity while they supported the host population politically andmilitarily. Thus although Mons dominated Pegu and Burmese domin-

9 S. J. Tambiah, World Conquerorand World Renouncer(Cambridge, I976), Ch. 7.10See Michael Adas, The Burma Delta (Madison, Wise., I974), pp. I7-I9, 57.Similarly, Moerman, 'Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization', p. 1222,has stated that within lowland northern Thailand, all changes among minorityThai communities have been 'toward the language, culture, and identification ofthe politically dominant people which, for the last 50 to Ioo years, has been theSiamese.' Note, however, that people can adopt another group'slanguage and culturewithout adopting that group's ethnic self-identification; indeed, this is often the casein Lower Burma. See Lehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma', p. I I6.11Cf. Moerman, 'Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization', p. 1219.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 459ated Ava, each kingdom was able to incorporate large and strategically-important minority groups.One deeply-ingrained tradition favoring heterogeneity was that ofpatron-client relations. Political loyalties focused on powerful indi-viduals, or patrons, who protected their clients against abuse and/orprovided them with sustenance; in return, their clients rendered per-sonal service. Because authority derived from the power and charismaof the patron, and because each of his clients was tied to him by separatepersonal bonds, there was no need for a common identity among hisfollowers. We see this on the local level in villages whose headmenattracted military followings of diverse backgrounds; but in its mostelaborate form, we see this principle embodied in the structure of theAvan and Peguan monarchies. According to traditional theory, sover-eignty resided entirely in the person of the ruler, who owned the landand water of the realm, and the very lives of his subjects. People sworeallegiance to him as an individual, and in return were patronized withoffices and fiefs. The sacred ideal of royal service was expressed in theBurmese phrase kyei-zi-thit-sa-daw saung-'to remember one's oathof allegiance and one's debt of gratitude for royal patronage'. One couldbetray his oath to the monarch, but there was no articulated conceptof treason to the 'nation' since sovereignty did not reside in the peopleat large.From this political conception flowed several logical consequences.Throughout the Taung-ngu period (c. I539-I752)12 the composition ofthe royal service-people (ahmi-ddns) and of the royal court was surpris-ingly diverse. The crown, chronically in need of manpower, invited tothe capital area, or forcibly deported, large bodies of non-Burmese whowere settled in separate service communities and allowed to retain theirethnic identity. (Indeed in some instances it would seem that thecrown actively encouraged these communities to maintain their originalcharacter as a guarantee of group cohesion, and hence of occupationalefficiency.) At the same time, individual Mons, Shans, Siamese, Lao-tians, Yuans (Yiins), even Europeans who boasted special expertise ornoble blood were welcomed to high ministerial posts at the capitalwithout being obliged to adopt Burmese customs. The following quota-tion from a sixteenth-century source expresses the poly-ethnic idealof personal service at the court of Bayin-naung (1551-81), but itis characteristic of later centuries as well:

12 The period is subdivided into the First Taung-ngu-Dynasty, c. 1539-99, withthe capital at Pegu; and the Restored Taung-ngu Dynasty, c. 1597-1752, when thecapital was usually at Ava.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANWas it not because of his piety, steadfastness,and wisdom that we all, fromministers and captains... down to pages of noble birth-all his chosenmen, in fact, whether Shans, Mons, or Burmans-... would... havedeclared ourselves willing to lay down our lives?13Not only the royal court, but the empire as a whole was viewed as apoly-glot institution. The ruler of any non-Burmese territory could beadmitted to tributary status merely by swearing an oath; and theexpansion of the imperial territories was always motivated by geo-political, rather than ethnic considerations. Finally and most inter-estingly, because sovereignty resided in the person of the ruler, therewas no necessity that he be of the same ethnic type as the majorityof his subjects. Kings of Shan ancestry ruled at Ava in the fourteenthand fifteenth centuries but were accepted in the Burmese chronicles aslegitimate; while in the south the principal dynasties between 1287 and1599 were founded by a Shan (Wa Row) and a Burman (Tabin-shwei-hti) .14This cosmopolitan orientation was reinforced by a second tradition,one of incomparable influence, that of Theravada kingship. Accordingto the Scriptures, kingship had been established at the start of the worldin order to advance the spiritual welfare of all mankind. Like Maha-sammata, the institutional prototype of Theravada monarchs, rulers atAva and Pegu sought to augment their subjects' store of good karma byexhorting people to virtue and by prohibiting behavior inimical to theDoctrine. Furthermore, by their donations to religious institutions,kings themselves accumulated a great quantity of good karma which,in some mystical fashion, advanced the welfare of their subjects atlarge. A king's karmatic attainments in this and previous existenceswere in no sense dependent on his ethnic type. A man of great power(hence ipsofacto great merit) deserved veneration from all Buddhists.And in reciprocal fashion, the spiritual benefits of his rule showereddown upon all creatures under his sway, for all are caught in sarhsara(the cycle of rebirths). The kings of Ava and Pegu explicitly proclaimedthemselves to be both Cakkavattis, i.e. world-rulers, and EmbryoBuddhas.

These principles of Theravada kingship had been transmitted by13Page 82 of a typescript MS which is a translation by H. L. Shorto of the MonNViddnadmddhipatf-katha,hra Candakanto, ed. (Pak Lat, Siam, I912), p. I52.At Ayut'ia during the seventeenth centuryJapanese, Mons and even a Greek adven-turer achieved high office; while in Arakan Portuguese, Japanese, Afghans andIndians served in the royal forces.14 Tabin-shwei-hti 'became a Mon' only towards the end of his reign, and noneof his successors followed suit.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 461the Mons to the Burmese, who in turn transmitted them (directly andindirectly) to Shans, Palaungs, and other peoples. Although the variousethnic groups retained their own ecclesiastical organizations andanimist traditions, by the seventeenth century they were all nominallyBuddhist, and as such shared the same terminology and conceptualframework which allowed them to accept the ideological pretensions ofthe kings at Ava and Pegu. Taung-ngu kings sought to advertise theirpiety in ecumenical fashion by consulting a mixture of Burmese, Mon,and Shan monks on ceremonial occasions. Even when state ceremonieslacked an explicitly inter-ethnic character, their heavy Buddhistcoloring gave them such a character implicitly.15

Finally, we should mention a third tradition which, while failingto support cultural diversity within a given polity, nonetheless servedto fragment both the Burmese-speaking and Mon-speaking com-munities and to inhibit the development of a pan-Mon or pan-Burmese consciousness. We refer to persistent regional loyalties. Thegalactic polity, by definition, held within its orbit a large number ofsatellite centers whose leaders constantly strove to maximize their auton-omy. In the south, predominantly Mon-speaking towns such as Bassein,Martaban, and Yei were subordinate to the paramount Mon center ofPegu between c. 1369 and I595, and again between I740 and 1757.This galactic configuration constituted the so-called Kingdom ofRa-manya (Ramafia), which H. L. Shorto has shown formed thebackground to Mon historical literature.16 Yet the unity of Ra-manyawas singularly loose, for each town cherished a tradition of independentsovereignty, and each continued to function as the sacral, administra-tive, and economic center for a wide hinterland. Local Mon headmenand their followers thus felt strong ties of interest to these regionalcapitals, and tended to distinguish, for example, between PeguanMons and Martaban Mons (in fact, each district may have spokena somewhat different dialect). If Pegu seemed vulnerable, satellitepopulations were only too willing to ally themselves with Burmese orSiamese against their fellow Mons at Pegu. Essentially the samepattern obtained in the Burmese-speaking sector of the Irrawaddy basin,

15See, inter alia, V. B. Lieberman, 'The Burmese Dynastic Pattern, c. 1590-1760'(Univ. of London Ph.D. Thesis, 1976), Ch. 2; M. Aung Thwin, 'The Nature ofState and Society in Pagan' (Univ. of Michigan Ph.D. Thesis, 1976), Chs 2, 4;Shorto, 'Genealogy', p. 68. See, too, Craig J. Reynolds, 'Buddhist Cosmographyin Thai History, with Special Reference to Nineteenth-Century Culture Change',Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (February 1976), p. 210, for a discussion ofBuddhist literature as an instrument of poly-ethnic political integration in Siam.16 Shorto, 'Genealogy', pp. 63-72.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANwhere Pagan, Salin, Prome, and Taung-ngu nurtured independenttraditions which conflicted in varying degrees with their loyalty to Ava.During the so-called Mon-Burmese wars of the fourteenth andfifteenth centuries, satellites of Ava and Pegu switched allegiance withdisconcerting ease. Between I593 and 1714 we find many additionalexamples of intra-Mon and intra-Burmese provincial splits.17 It wasonly to be expected that these regional patterns would influencepolitical developments in the mid-eighteenth century.The course of the wars between I740 and I757 therefore reflected acomplex interaction between these three traditions-personal loyalty,Buddhist universalism, and regionalism-on the one hand, and thetendency towards ethnic uniformity within a given polity, on the other.Polarization between 'Burmese' and 'Mons' was particularly sharpat the outset of the Peguan revolt in I740 and in the early yearsof Alahng-hpaya's resistance, perhaps because these were periods ofmaximum insecurity when people eagerly sought visible symbols ofconformity amongst their neighbors in order to allay their anxieties.Yet at no time, even under Alahng-hpaya, did the adoption of a parti-cular ethnic identity become an indispensable prerequisite for politicalsupport. 18

The Revolt of 1740: Burmese SupportThe Peguan revolt of I740 was the most destructive in a series oftributary and provincial uprisings which fed on the debility of the lateRestored Taung-ngu Dynasty. In the first half of the eighteenth century

17 See Lieberman, 'The Burmese Dynastic Pattern', Chs I, 4.18 We might note that the patterns we are about to describe were by no meanspeculiar to the Irrawaddy valley, but in varying degrees must have characterized agreat many pre-national societies in which quasi-feudal modes of political organiza-tion, a universalist Great Tradition, and strong particularist tendencies were note-worthy features. For example, in medieval Britain 'Welsh' and 'English' constituteddistinct ethnic categories,each with its own language, culture, and political traditions.English and Welsh authors composed scathing attacks on the moral qualities of theiropposite numbers, while a ruler of Snowdonia in the thirteenth century sought tounify the Welsh on the basis of anti-English sentiment. Yet if we examine the courseof the so-called Welsh Wars of the thirteenth century, we find that local rivalries,and family and personaljealousies were always more potent than any 'national sense',and that the English infantry on occasion consisted principally of Welshmen. So, too,the 'Mon' army, on occasion, consisted chiefly of Burmese. See John E. Morris, TheWelshWarsof Edward (Oxford, I901); Austin Lane Poole, FromDomesdayBook toMagna Carta, 1087-1216, 2nd edn (Oxford, I955); Sir Maurice Powicke, TheThirteenthCentury,1216-1307, 2nd edn (Oxford, I962).

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 463the crown suffered a cumulative loss of manpower which led to anupsurge of factionalism at Ava and to an erosion of the capital region'smilitary strength. At the same time, the decline in royal authorityencouraged provincial officials to abuse their powers of taxation withlittle fear of correction by the central government. Not only at Pegu(then subject to Ava), but also at Chiengmai and Ok-hpo, Ava'srepresentatives outraged local opinion with their unrestrained exac-tions, and thus helped to precipitate successful rebellions. In the caseof Pegu, the issue of excessive taxation may have strengthened a morelong-standing resentment felt by southern gentry families over theirloss of patronage opportunities. Following the shift of capitals fromPegu to Ava in the early seventeenth century, the number of southernfamilies who obtained appointments at the royal court declined steadilyuntil by the early eighteenth century few, if any, could be found inleading positions at Ava. Nor did they retain control over importantpositions at the southern provincial courts, which were dominated byBurmese from the dry zone.

Ironically, the first outbreak at Pegu was organized by Ava's owngovernor, a Burman named Tha-aung who imagined that he couldturn Ava's troubles to his own advantage and reign as sovereign overthe Delta. Accordingly, in May of 1740 after a Manipuri raid on UpperBurma had revealed the north's appalling military weakness, hedeclared his independence. But he was soon slain by local leaders whoresented his heavy-handed treatment of dissent, and who, no doubt,remembered his record of tax abuses. Following Tha-aung's murder,Ava succeeded in restoring a measure of control over Pegu. In mid-November, however, a second rebellion erupted which Ava provedhelpless to suppress. The people of Pegu assassinated Ava's latestgubernatorial appointee, and then acclaimed as their king a leader ofthe Gweis (see below for an explanation of this term) who, uponentering Pegu, took for himself the royal title Smin Dhaw (or SminDhaw Buddhakeithi). Within three or four months, Smin Dhaw'sforces had expelled Ava's supporters from every major position inLower Burma and had begun penetrating up the Irrawaddy valleytowards Prome.19

19For contemporary and nearly-contemporary accounts of these events, see theBurmese translation of the Mon history of the monk of Athwa, British Library,London, Oriental MS no. 3464 [BL OR 3464], pp. I39-41; an abridged version ofthe same work on unpaginated palmleaves in the Henry Burney Papers of the RoyalCommonwealth Society, London, Talaingya-zawin (Talaing History) [RCS-TY];Thi-ri-ui-zana, Law-kd-byu-ha yan (Treatise on Customary Usages) [LBHK], tJHpo Lat (ed.) (Rangoon, I968), p. 4; India Office Library, London, Letters o Fort


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANWhat political loyalties motivated the southern rebels? To whatextent were they inspired by anti-Burmese, pro-Mon sentiment? The

history of the monk of Athwa, written some twenty years after the eventby a Mon former resident of Pegu, says that the people of Pegu enduredunspeakable abuses at the hands of Burmese officials who had been sentdown from Ava, until all the people longed for the resurrection of theindependent southern kingdom of Ra-manya, headed by Pegu. Hisuse of the opposition 'Mon'/'Burmese' as a distinction of the 'we'/'they'sort implies that to be a 'Mon' at Pegu in 1740 was to be loyal to Ra-manya and hostile to Ava. In describing the assassination of Tha-aung,the monk of Athwa observed:The Monpeopleof the Ra-manya country... conspired together and con-sulted a brahmin, saying, 'This Thaw-aung [sic] ... is oppressing all thepeople. The Ava king has yet to take action against this lawless rebel...Therefore we will seize and slay this Thaw-aung. Wedon'twantto besubjectsof the Burmese.What do the stars say the future holds for Han-tha-wadi[i.e. Pegu] ?' . . . and he replied, 'The astrological situation of the Burmeseis very poor. But the heavenly signs shine brightly on the country of theMons (mon-to aing-pyei).' italics mine)20A similar picture emerges from contemporary English East IndiaCompany records. In December of I740 Smin Dhaw wrote to theEnglish representative at Syriam explaining that he had been compelledto 'kill all the governing Burmars' because the Burmese governor ofSyriam had planned to immolate all the Peguans, 'Siamers', Tavoyans,and foreign traders who resided there.21 Fort St George (Madras)heard, perhaps with some exaggeration, that '7, or 8,ooo Burmars'perished in the ensuing attack.22 Most of the victims were probablysoldiers, officials, and retainers of officials who had benefited fromthe ruinous taxation and who, like Tha-aung, were natives of UpperBurma.

Nevertheless, the new king of Han-tha-wadi, Smin Dhaw, proudlyclaimed descent from an uncle of the Burmese king, Tanin-ganwei(I714-33), so he could hardly have sponsored an anti-Burmese move-St. George,Vol. 26 (I 74 ) (Madras, 1916), pp. 8-9, 35-7. For somewhat later accounts,see Hman-nan-ya-zawin-daw-gyiGreat Glass Palace Royal Chronicle) [HNY], 3vols (Mandalay, 1909), Vol. 3, pp. 380-4; and the summaries in Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, 1714-1752 (Burma's Condition, I714-1752) (Rangoon, I973),pp. 67ff.

20 BL OR 3464, pp. I39-40. 21 Letters oFort St. George,Vol. 26 (I74I), p. 9.22 India Office Records, London, Abstractof LettersReceivedrom 'Coast'and 'Bay'I734-44, in Correspondence ith India (Examiner's Office), E/4/4, p. 332. See, too, Yi Yi,Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, pp. i65, I79 for evidence that the Burmese identifiedtheir Peguan foes as 'Talaings'.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 465ment on ethnic grounds alone. According to the Hman-nan chronicle,Smin Dhaw claimed to be the offspring of a union between Tanin-ganwei's uncle, who had rebelled unsuccessfully against Ava in I7I4and had then fled to an obscure rural village, and a woman who hadserved as his concubine in that village. Smin Dhaw had been raised bythe local Gwei people (to which tribe his mother apparently belonged)and had now come to Pegu to assume that royal status to which hisnoble blood entitled him.23 This genealogy was almost certainly spuri-ous, like that of many a low-born pretender. Yet it was a major factorin winning support among the local Mons, who boasted to an Avancommander that their ruler was of the same royal family as the kingof Ava.24This claim was also taken at face value by Burmese who thoughtthat in fighting for Smin Dhaw, they were serving a scion of the oldBurmese royal house.

Indeed, after the initial uprisings, growing numbers of Burmesebegan to attach themselves to Smin Dhaw's cause, particularly in thesouth. H. L. Shorto has estimated that only about sixty per cent of theDelta population was Mon, and of the remaining forty per centBurmese were probably the chief element.25 They were found not onlyin towns, where they served as officials, soldiers, and traders, but also inrural districts in the western and northern Delta, where they engagedin agriculture. Like so-called Chin and Karen villages, Burmese com-munities had been an integral part of the Delta landscape for genera-tions.26 Some Burmese gentry leaders, particularly those in rural dis-tricts, probably enjoyed no closer connection with Ava than did theirMon neighbors. Given the strong tradition of poly-ethnic politicalorganization at Pegu and the universal nature of Smin Dhaw's religiousappeals (see below), it is therefore not surprising that these southernBurmese-and later some of their northern counterparts as well-should have pledged allegiance to Ra-manya. The bitter anti-'Burmese'

23 HNY, Vol. 3, pp. 383, 390-I.24 Ibid., pp. 387-8; Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-nganchei-anei, p. I64-6; See, too, ibid.,p. 178.25 H. L. Shorto, personal communication, 1974. A 1759 report in Dal, Vol. I,p. 99 said, 'Even in Pegu their Numbers [i.e. Burmese to Mons] are Ioo to '. Forother evidence of a significant Burmesepopulation south of Prome during the seven-teenth and early eighteenth centuries, see Dal, Vol. I, pp. 133-42 passim; Zam-bu-di-pdok-hsaung yan(Treatise of the Crown ofJambudipa Island), J. S. Furnivall andPe Maung Tin (eds) (Rangoon, 1960), pp. 46, 58; KBZ, Vol. I, p. 105.26 We do not know whether their ethnic distinctivenesswithin southern society wasdue to separate ahmu-dan oles, to a specialized economic function, to continualinfusions of northern migrants, or to some other factor(s). On the determination ofChin communities within Lower Burma to maintain their separate identity, seeLehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma', pp. I 2-13.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANoutbreaks of I740 reflected the fact that many Burmese, particularlynorthern migrants concentrated in the coastal towns, were associatedwith abuses by officials appointed by Ava. 'Burman' could be used as ashort-hand expression for 'pro-Ava man'. But clearly this term wasnot always so restrictive, because Smin Dhaw, a 'Burmese prince'who had no political connection with the current Ava court, wasaccepted by the Mons; and so were a number of lesser figures who alsoproclaimed themselves to be Burmese.27

Among Smin Dhaw's early supporters was (J-taya-thari, identifiedin a 1766 Mon-language document as 'a Burman from Pegu', whomSmin Dhaw made governor of Martaban.28 A noted Peguan infantrycommander Ein-da-bala-kyaw-thu readily acknowledged to hisenemies that he was one of a group of 'Burmese ... from Han-tha-wadi.'29 Smin Dhaw's commander-of-the-right the Let-ya-bo was alsoa Burman, apparently from the south; as one of the two or three mostsenior military figures at Pegu, he became so influential that when SminDhaw abdicated, the leading commanders begged him to succeed(he declined).30 In Middle Burma at both Taung-ngu and Prome-provincial capitals which had strong traditions of independence andwhich had never been particularly loyal to Ava-pro-Peguan factionsoverawed pro-Avan factions and helped to deliver the towns to SminDhaw.31 Since both of these towns had a predominantly Burmesepopulation, in each instance the pro-Peguan faction probably includedmany self-proclaimed Burmese. As Pegu's forces pushed further up theIrrawaddy valley, the number of Burmese who defected to her causecontinued to grow, so that by 1752, three-quarters of the army sentagainst Alaung-hpaya was said by a qualified observer to have beenBurmese.32

27 It is probable that a number of bi-lingual 'Burmese' at this time found it desirableto pass as 'Mons'. Unfortunately, we have no firm evidence of such conversionspriorto 1752.28 1766 Martaban Land Roll MS in the possessionof H. L. Shorto.29KBZ, Vol. I, p. 55; AA-T, p. I99. This is apparently the same individualidentified as Nan-da-bali-kyaw-thu in KBZ, Vol. I, pp. 170, 235; and in Let-we-naw-yahta, 'Alauing-min-taya-gyi ayei-daw-bon' (Biography of King Alaiung-hpaya)[AA-L], Alaung-hpayayei-daw-bonnasaung-dwe,. 93.30 U Tin, Myan-ma-min k-chok-pona-dan (Record of Administration under theBurmese Kings), 5 vols (Rangoon, I931-33), Vol. 2, pp. 242-3; HNY, Vol. 3, pp.

391-2. This is probably the same man as Let-ya-bo-chok Min-nge-kyaw, BL OR3464, p. 141.31 Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-nganchei-anei, p. 76, 8i.32 'The Testimony of an Inhabitant of the City of Ava', Phra Phraison Salarak(trans.), Journal of the Siam Society, Vol. 45, Pt 2 (October 1957), p. 32. See, too,HNY, Vol. 3, p. 405.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 467Mons Who Failed To Support Pegu

At the same time a significant number of 'Mons'-i.e. people whobore Mon titles, who spoke Mon, and/or who were identified in con-temporary sources as being Mons-remained faithful to the northerncourt because of personal ties or local loyalties. They constituted a sortof mirror image to the Burmese supporters of Pegu. The first majorexpedition which the Ava king Maha-dama-ya-za-dl-pati (I733-52)sent against Smin Dhaw was composed largely of Mon troops from theso-called 'nine townships' of the Delta.33 They enjoyed some initialsuccess and performed as well as their Burmese comrades. Even afterthe Delta was overrun, Mons continued to figure quite prominentlyamong Ava's commanders, particularly in the army headed by Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's uncle, Taung-ngu-ya-za.34 It is unclear whetherthese Mon leaders and their men came originally from the Delta, or fromUpper Burma, where since at least the early seventeenth century therewere small communities of Mon deportees with connections to theAva court.

Moreover, within Lower Burma various Mon communities showed adecided aversion to both Ava and Pegu, preferring to support theindependence of their regional capital, much as during the fourteenth-and fifteenth-century wars. Some sources suggest that in early I74ISmin Dhaw had to seize by force the Mon city of Martaban.35 There-after it is certain that he governed Martaban much as Ava had alwaysdone, i.e. by filling all key positions with followers from the capitalrather than with local residents. In I743, people at Martaban rebelledand killed Smin Dhaw's governor; but after quelling this revolt, SminDhaw resumed the appointment of Peguans, even to very subordinateposts. Most significantly, one of these appointees, the aforementionedO-taya-thari, was identified in the 1766 Martaban Land Roll as a'Burman from Pegu'. In other words, a Burman from Pegu was moretrustworthy than a Mon from Martaban.Martaban and adjacent districts contributed forces to the victoriousinvasion of Ava in 752. Nevertheless Peguan commanders soonhad to withdraw the bulk of their forces from Upper Burma, because

33Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-nganchei-anei, p. 74-5.34Mon leaders who remained loyal to Ava between 1744 and I752 includedBanya-ui-pa-ya-za, Banya-kyan-daw, Banya-dama-ya-za, Ya-za-di-ya-za, andprobably Banya-su, Banya-byat-ta, and Banya-thi-ha.35 Cf. HNY, Vol. 3, p. 384, and the 1766 Martaban Land Roll.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANthey feared that districts east of Martaban as well as Yei, Tavoy,and Tenasserim, might be scheming with Siam at Pegu's expense.36The districts east of Martaban, and Yei were inhabited chiefly byMon-speakers; Tavoy and Tenasserim, by speakers of a Burmesedialect. Yet neither population demonstrated any particular allegianceto Pegu. One is led to conclude that the so-called 'Mon nationalmovement' of I740 might more accurately be termed a Peguanregional revolt.

'Karen' InvolvementSpeakers of Karen dialects played a role in the Peguan uprisings. Infact, it seems likely that Smin Dhaw himself and his mysterious Gweifollowers were actually members of a Karen tribal group, which is alsoat variance with the usual 'national' interpretations of the 'Monrevolt'.

The Gweis have been identified with various peoples (Shans, Lawas,Was, etc.), but the most convincing hypothesis has been presented byNigel Brailey, who has argued that they were a people known as Taung-thus who speak a dialect of Karen and are now concentrated in anarea of hill-country on the edge of the Shan States. According to Brailey,who relied on the Siamese version of a Mon chronicle, it was the suddenarrival of three thousand of these people from the eastern hills whichlet Smin Dhaw take power at Pegu.37 Brailey's identification is strength-ened by Burmese sources, unavailable to him, which show that SminDhaw gave five of his first seventeen appointments to officials withrecognizably 'Karen' names.3s Furthermore, Burmese sources identifythe Gwels as 'Gwei-Karens' some of whom were based at a 'Karenvillage' north of Pegu; and they suggest a well-established patternwhereby groups of Karen-speakers, possibly including Taung-thus,migrated from the eastern hills to the southeast lowlands.39

36AA-L, p. 17-37Brailey, Re-investigationf the Gwe',pp. 33-47.38HNY, Vol. 3, p. 383; tJ Pyin-nya, Kayinya-zawin (History of the Karens)(Rangoon, 1929), pp. 145ff.39HNY, Vol. 3, pp. 382-3; Zam-bu-di-pd k-hsaungkydn,pp. 83, 98; tJ Kala,Maha-ya-zawin-gyi,Vol. 3, Hsaya J Hkin So (ed.). (Rangoon, 1961), pp. 332-40passim; R. S. Wilkie (comp.), BurmaGazetteer-The ramethinDistrict,Vol. A (Ran-goon, 1934), pp. 26-33, 45 passim;G. H. Luce, 'Introduction to the ComparativeStudy of Karen Languages',Journalof theBurmaResearch ociety,Vol. 42, Pt I (June1959), pp. I-i8.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 469Brailey has pictured the events of I740 as a virtual 'Karen' coup.

According to him, the hill Karens, in loose alliance with some of theirlowland 'brethren', forced Smin Dhaw's acceptance on the Mons ofPegu, who became 'highly resentful' of their subjection to the primitive'Karens'. While there is some evidence of tension of this sort, it is clearthat different groups of Karen-speakers recognized no commonidentity-indeed, the very category 'Karen' was a derogatory inventionof the Burmese which was only given respectability by Christianmissionaries in the nineteenth century-and that while some groups ofpeople whom the Burmese called 'Karens' supported Smin Dhaw,others were implacably hostile.40 It is equally clear that the Monsthemselves never formed a united front against Smin Dhaw, whosucceeded at an early stage in developing a poly-ethnic followingbased on personal loyalty. All accounts suggest that Smin Dhawonly entered Pegu after large numbers of Mons had joined his originalGwei supporters. Of his first seventeen ministers, five had 'Karen'-type names, one was Shan, but the other eleven had Mon names. Eventhe five 'Karens', if (as is likely) they spoke Mon, may have consideredthemselves to be Mons in certain contexts.

Although most Taung-thus were animist, Smin Dhaw himself wasthoroughly familiar with Buddhist court culture. That the 'Gweiking' could pass for a Burmese prince is only the most obvious indicationof this fact. According to Mon and Siamese histories, he had onceserved as a Buddhist monk and had acquired supernatural powerswhich were a major factor in winning him support in 1740 among theMons of Pegu, and presumably among Burmese and Gweis as well.These histories claim that he was an expert in magic and astrology, andwas invulnerable to weapons.41 After he had taken the throne, he furtherenhanced his charisma by acquiring a revered spotted elephant, andby renewing the practice, abandoned by the last three Ava kings,of making regular donations to the shrines of the Delta. The Monmonk of Athwa, who, it must be emphasized, wrote as a privateindividual outside the control of Smin Dhaw's court, thus praised himas a righteous ruler, imbued with 'great reverence for the affairs ofReligion'.42

40 Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, p. 85 reports that in 1744 an attack by'Karens' forced Smin Dhaw temporarily to abandon Pegu (cf. Brailey, 'Re-investiga-tion of the Gwe', p. 34). See, too, HNY, Vol. 3, p. 383.41 Prince Damrong, 'Our Wars with the Burmese', U Aung Thein (trans.), Journalof the Burma ResearchSociety, Vol. 40, Pt 2(a) (May 1958), pp. 285-6; BL OR 3464,p. 141.42 BL OR 3464, pp. I40-I.


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Events from 1747 to 1752Despite his popularity and his early success, Smin Dhaw never reignedlong enough to defeat Ava, for he was overthrown by a coup in 1747,while hunting elephants east of Sit-tauing. He was succeeded by hisprincipal minister, the Lord of Dala-Banya-dala-whose daughterSmin Dhaw had married and whose support had probably beeninstrumental in securing the throne for Smin Dhaw in 1740. A Shanelephanteer who had originally been appointed by Ava, Banya-dala wasdirector of the Pegu elephant corps in 1740 and was thus well placedto expand his influence in subsequent years. Siamese accounts suggestthat he and Smin Dhaw had become estranged as early as 1745 in theaftermath of Smin Dhaw's marriage alliance with Chiengmai, whichapparently threatened Banya-dala's position at court.43 In all probabil-ity he solicited the military expedition to Sit-taung which forced SminDhaw's abdication.

Htin Aung and Brailey have both portrayed Banya-dala as the cham-pion of Mon interests against Smin Dhaw, whom Htin Aung sees asfavoring fellow Burmese (Htin Aung accepts at face value Smin Dhaw'sroyal genealogy) and whom Brailey sees as representing the 'Karens'.44Htin Aung's interpretation seems quite suspect. As we shall show,Burmese support for Pegu increased, if anything, after I 747. Moreover,Banya-dala was chosen king at a conference of Peguan leaders onlythrough the recommendation of the Burmese general, Let-ya-bo, oneof his principal allies.45 There may be more substance to Brailey'sinterpretation of the coup, in that some Mons may have seen throughSmin Dhaw's genealogical pretensions and resented his early associa-tion with animists. Yet we can see that in 1747, as in 1740, factionalalignments cut across simple ethnic divisions, and loyalties revolvedprimarily around rival patron-client networks. Thus Smin Dhaw inhis subsequent attempts to recapture the throne of Pegu, enjoyedthe support of individual Mons as well as of his father-in-law, the TaiBuddhist ruler of Chiengmai. On the other hand, the man who usuallyranked third at Banya-dala's court after Banya-dala's own brothers

43Brailey, 'Re-investigation of the Gwe', pp. 35-6. On Banya-dala and the coup of1747 (some sources date it to 1746), see, too, Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei anei,PP. 89-95, 99; HNY, Vol. 3, pp. 383, 389-93; LBHK, p. 5; RCS-TY; AA-T, p.209; Hall, English Intercourse,p. 305.44For Htin Aung's views, see his History,pp. 154-5; for Brailey's, see 'Re-investiga-tion of the Gwe', pp. 35-6, 44-5.45Same as note 30.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 47Iwas his son-in-law, the general Saw-bya, one of the five men with'Karen' names who had originally served Smin Dhaw. If ethnicconsiderations were paramount, it is also curious that the so-called'Mon party' should have found it necessary to place their hopes in aman who was generally recognized as a Shan.Once he had ascended the throne, Banya-dala was accepted as'king of the Talaings' like Wa Row, Smin Dhaw, and other non-Monkings before him. As we know from his subsequent correspondence withAlaung-hpaya, he presented himself in traditional fashion as an aspirantBuddha and a Patron of the Faith in whom all men could take refuge.He also claimed that his reign fulfilled a prophecy uttered by GotamaBuddha that in the Buddhist year corresponding to A.D. 1746 or 1747,a 'master of the white elephant' and a king of great glory would arisein Han-tha-wadi.46 According to the monk of Athwa, after his corona-tion he formally addressed his court, recalling the grandeur of formerPeguan kings. He claimed that various Tai rulers had already recog-nized his sovereignty, and vowed to reduce Ava to a similar state ofsubjection.47

Banya-dala succeeded in this boast within five years of his accession.Because of factional in-fighting and the strain of endless campaigns,Ava's loss of manpower became so acute that the administration virtu-ally collapsed of its own weight. Revolts broke out within forty milesof Ava,48 whereupon the southern forces arrived to deliver the coup degrace and to seize the ancient capital of Upper Burma in March of1752.The victorious army-which was identified in contemporary sourcesas 'the Talaing army' but which, according to the same sources,included Burmese in both command and subordinate positions-proceeded to establish its authority over the surrounding countryside.Most Burmese gentry leaders swore allegiance to the king of Pegu andwere confirmed in their hereditary positions. In the provincial capitalsof Middle and Upper Burma, adherents with recognizably Burmesenames and titles received a number of high-ranking appointments, farmore in fact than Ava in recent decades had been willing to confer onMons in the Delta.49 At the same time, the invaders deported to the

46Alaung-min-taya amein-daw-mya (Edicts of King Alaung-hpaya) [AAm], HkinHkin Sein (comp. and ed.) (Rangoon, 1964), pp. 56-7, 83-4. Cf. Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, pp. 99-oo00, 77, 178.47 BL OR 3464, p. 141.48 These were the uprisings at Madaya and Ok-hpo which Harvey, Hall, Cady,and Brailey have erroneouslydated to 1740 rather than 1747.49See BL OR 3464, p. 142, and KBZ, Vol. I, p. 105.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANsouth a very substantial number of Burmese courtiers and soldiers,possibly as many as fifteen thousand altogether, who also took an oathto the southern king. Their leaders were honored with titles and officesat the Peguan court, serving along with Mons, 'Karens', and southernBurmese. At least one former Ava minister, Thi-ri-ui-zana, who wasoffered a post as senior minister in the Peguan Hlut-daw, declined toaccept the appointment; but he acted out of a personal commitment tothe deposed Ava king, rather than from a sense of Burmese ethnicloyalty.50 We find a clear tendency towards ethnic polarization in thefact that shortly after Ava fell, Pegu's garrison commander at Ava wascriticized for taking into his service Burmese who had failed to cuttheir hair in Talaing fashion; it was intended that those who cut theirtopknots should receive preferential treatment.51 Curiously enough,however, this rule was not enforced among pro-Peguan gentry leadersin the north; nor, until I754, did it apply to the numerous Avandeportees at Pegu, who continued to wear topknots and to regardthemselves as Burmese.

Growing Polarization Under Alaung-hpayaIn the five years between Ava's fall in 752 and Pegu's collapse inI757, the we/they distinction between Burmese and Mons becamesomewhat more pronounced, in part through the efforts of Alaung-hpaya, the Upper Burma headman who founded the Kon-baungdynasty.

Alahng-hpaya obviously did not introduce the dichotomy between'Burmese' and 'Mons' as political categories, for as we have seen, thiswas a basic, if at times subdued, theme since the opening days of thePegu revolt. Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's uncle, Taung-ngu-ya-za,once observed that 'Burmese kings' ruling at Ava and 'Talaing kings'ruling at Pegu had frequently been locked in prolonged wars such asthe current conflict.52 Following the collapse of Ava, however, thepopulation of Upper Burma was no longer attached to a single politicalcenter as in Taung-ngu-ya-za's day; so in seeking to re-unify the regionand to crush those local leaders who cooperated with Pegu, Alaung-hpaya found it necessary to appeal with unprecedented vigor to that

50 LBHK, p. 6. As we shall see, these same sentiments of personal loyalty preventedsome Ava officials from swearing allegiance to Alaung-hpaya.51 AA-L, p. 28.52 Letter quoted in Yi Yi, Myan-ma-naing-ngan achei-anei, p. I79.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 473common tradition-i.e. their role of being 'Burmese'-which dis-tinguished the bulk of the northern population from their southernneighbors. His appeals for 'Burmese' unity were strengthened by thefact that the north was at that time suffering from an appalling stateof famine and social dislocation as a result of the southern invasions.The Peguan army, as we have seen, was in fact quite mixed, but Monswere certainly the most visible element; and the misery of these yearsnurtured a xenophobic reaction against the 'Mon invader' whichAlahng-hpaya was quick to exploit. In appealing to the headman ofHkin-h village, Let-ya-pyan-chi, Alahng-hpaya reportedly wrote:'Although you, Let-ya-pyan-chi, are a Burman (myan-ma u-myo) andare a brave man, in planning to remain a subject of the Talaings, youare acting contrary to both your lineage (amyb-anwe) nd your abilities.'53At the battle of Myaung-wun, he issued orders to spare Burmeseopponents, but no consideration was given to Mons.54 At the battleof Ti-daw his basic strategy sought to drive a wedge between Monsand northern Burmese who were fighting in mixed formations.55At the battle of Prome his men unfurled their topknots to show soldierswith whom they could not communicate verbally that they werecomrades.56 We find no precedent before 1752 for systematic appealsand discrimination of this sort.

Alahng-hpaya's military success-which, as we shall see, was dueonly in part to this psychological strategy-heartened those deporteesat Pegu who were still hostile to Banya-dala. They gave undue credenceto reports circulating from the opening phase of Alahng-hpaya'sresistance that he was dedicated to restoring the old Ava house.Accordingly, they formed a conspiracy to place the captive king Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati on the throne of Pegu. This plot does not appearto have been ethnically-oriented: the plotters included numerous localMons, and their goal of establishing a Burmese prince at Pegu was inthe tradition of Smin Dhaw. Yet the frightened Peguan court-reacting perhaps to the explicit ethnic element in Alahng-hpaya'smovement-came to doubt the loyalty of many of its Burmese subjects,particularly those recent deportees from Upper Burma, where Alahng-hpaya's movement was centered. On the discovery of the conspiracy,in October of 1754 the court executed over a thousand leading deporteesimplicated in the plot, including Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati himself,and ordered the remaining Burmese at Pegu to wear in their ears anamulet stamped with the seal of the Pegu-Heir-Apparent and to cut

53AA-L, p. 29. Cf. AA-T, p. I62. 54 AA-L, p. 28; KBZ, Vol. I, p. 44.55 AA-T, pp. 170-71. 56 AA-T, p. I86; KBZ, Vol. I, p. I22.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANtheir hair in Mon fashion as a token of loyalty.57 Like their counter-parts at Ava in 1752, those who cut their hair were probably consideredon some level at least to have 'become Mons'.

This Peguan policy was disastrous in the extreme. On the one hand,ethnic homogeneity was never achieved, because the order on haircutswas not enforced systematically and Burmese continued to be identifiedamong Peguan defenders until I757. On the other hand, the reprisalswere sufficiently severe to force many people, especially Avan deportees,who considered themselves to be Burmese but who had hitherto co-operated with the Peguan court, to throw their support behind Alaung-hpaya. Indeed, with Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati dead, those opposedto Banya-dala had no one else to whom they could turn. After theexecutions started, a former Ava official who had not taken part inthe original conspiracy organized a successful revolt of Burmese leaderswhich opened the way for Alaing-hpaya's entry into the Upper Delta.Over the next two years, from his descent to Prome until his finalseizure of Pegu in May of I757, Alaung-hpaya sought to undermineremaining Burmese support for Pegu, in the knowledge that Monsand 'Karens' alone could never resist his advance.58

Universal Elements in Alaung-hpaya's IdeologyNevertheless, deeply-ingrained universalist traditions still exerciseda sufficiently powerful influence to justify a major revision of thecustomary image of Alaung-hpaya as a 'racial' or 'national' leader.Some of his early appeals to Burmese were in fact directed simultan-eously to Shans and Kadus. These northern peoples had also sufferedat the hands of the southern invaders and Alaung-hpaya needed theirsupport. This was despite the fact that the Peguan king Banya-dala wasa Shan. More importantly, appeals to particular ethnic categories,whether to Burmese or to Burmese and Shans, appeared in only afraction of Alahng-hpaya's letters and edicts, and when they did appear,they were always subordinate to more traditional and universal themesof religious veneration and personal patronage. These concepts, notethnicity, constituted the essential basis of the ideology by which heattracted people to his cause and legitimized his authority. The afore-57 AA-T, pp. I83-4; KBZ, Vol. I, pp. I04-5.58 Thus, for example, he disseminated a chain letter quoting a prophecy which saidthat the Talaings were not destined to found a kingdom because the Burmese were'the principal group' (AAm, p. 28). See, too, AAm, pp. 3-4, 9-10, 28, 129; and KBZ,Vol. I, p. 184.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 475mentioned letter to Let-ya-pyan-chi in which Alahng-hpaya urgedhim to act in accord with his 'lineage and abilities' represents the singlemost explicit appeal to Burmese solidarity. After this introductorysentence, however, the letter continues as follows:Because I am of true royal lineage and because the benevolent deities[thammadei-wd] aid me in accordance with prophecies and omens, I ampromoting the welfare of the Faith and the comfort of the people. Thusnot only my current foes, but all the umbrella-bearing kings on the face ofthe earth will be unable to resist me. You, lord of Hkin-u Let-ya-pyan-chi,are overlooking these facts ... Now, however, if you come over to myallegiance, I shall act as patron to you and your family without bitterness-so I inform you.59

As this and numerous other documents make clear, Alaiung-hpaya,like all sovereigns, viewed himself as something much grander than theleader of a particular ethnic community. He was simultaneously a'lord of karma', an Embryo Buddha, and a universal monarch. Boththe Restored Taung-ngu Dynasty and Banya-dala's kingdom werefated to collapse because the good karma of their rulers was exhausted.Alaing-hpaya, however, had a tremendous amount of good karmawhich was manifest in his incomparable glory and military success.60In some future incarnation, when his spiritual perfections were yet moredeveloped, Alauing-hpaya expected to attain Perfect Buddhahood, ashis royal title 'Alaiing-min-taya-gyi' announced. His military cam-paigns had but one purpose: to proclaim the universal Law of theBuddha. For Alaung-hpaya was no ordinary king, but the very rulerof whom ancient writings had prophesied: 'There shall arise anEmbryo Buddha who shall rule the people of many lands-Shans,Talaings, Manipuris, Chinese, Siamese, Indians, Arakanese-likethe children of his own bosom.'61 In token of his mission, the godSakka had given Alaung-hpaya the magical set-kya weapon of aCakkavatti. These claims were set forth repeatedly in communicationsto Burmese and non-Burmese alike. All were invited to do homage andto recognize that Alaung-hpaya's victories were the result of uniquereligious merit.Some Mons responded favorably. In late I753 and early 1754,Mons as well as Burmese who had served under Taung-ngu-ya-zaentered Alafng-hpaya's camp and were welcomed without dis-crimination.62 Mons fought as part of the northern forces during

59AA-L,p. 29. 60 SeeAAm,pp. 9-10, 12-13, 28-30, 212-13.61 KBZ, Vol. I, p. 237. Cf. AAm, p. 28.62 Mon adherents included Banya-ui-pA-ya-za nd Ya-za-di-ya-za.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANAlaung-hpaya's descent downriver, while others defected along withBurmese troops in the south, albeit less frequently. One southernMon defector, Daw-zwe-ya-set, received a major military commandand was later made governor (myo-zaung) of Martaban in preferenceto Burmese aspirants for the post. (Thus whereas the so-called Monnational champion Smin Dhaw appointed a Burman to head Martaban,the Burmese hero Alaung-hpaya chose a Mon.)63 Nor were Monadherents culled entirely from the ranks of latecomers and opportunists.At least one of Alaung-hpaya's myzn-yei-tet followers was a Mon,Nga-htaw-aing, who apparently came from Madaya in Upper Burma.The myin-yei-tetwere a highly exclusive fraternity of senior relatives andtrusted warriors organized by Alaung-hpaya in 1752 at the very outsetof his resistance. During the first and most perilous engagement ofAlaung-hpaya's career, Nga-htaw-aing singlehandedly burned acollection of straw-filled carts with which the enemy had planned tofire the Mok-hso-bo stockade. Shortly thereafter he and another Monsaved Alaiing-hpaya's life from Peguan attackers who had shot Alaung-hpaya's horse from under him.64 It is important to note that thesefollowers retained their Mon hairstyle and dress, and were recognizedas 'Mons' by friend and foe alike. If anti-Mon sentiment per se had beenthe principal basis of Alahng-hpaya's authority, it would have beenimpossible to obtain their allegiance.The assertion that Alaung-hpaya and his sons sought to destroy theMon 'nationality' also finds little support. Certainly he razed the cityof Pegu, massacred its defenders, and ruthlessly persecuted those monas-tic and lay leaders who continued to foment resistance. Many bi-lingual southerners who had hitherto identified themselves as 'Mons'may suddenly have found it politic to become 'Burmese'. Yet we findno evidence in any of Alaung-hpaya's extent edicts nor in any of thevoluminous chronicles of his reign that he encouraged such changes inethnic identification, much less passed a binding edict on the subject.Alaung-hpaya sponsored resettlement projects within the Delta ofpeople who were explicitly identified as Mons, and revenue records

63 KBZ, Vol. I, pp. I87-9, I9I, 257. Daw-zwe-ya-set's successor at Martabanwas also a Mon. Moreover, Michael Symes, An Accountof an Embassy to the Kingdomof Ava(London, I8oo; repr., Westmead, England, 1969), pp. 38-9, says that Alaung-hpaya gave a 'distinguished station' to the Martaban Mon leader, Talaban. Anedict (AAm, pp. 9-10) which Alaung-hpaya issued at the start of his southerncampaign, although addressed to 'my Burmese subjects...', specifically invitedTalaings to do homage on equal terms.64 This follows BL OR 3464, p. 144. AA-L, pp. 25-6 and KBZ, Vol. I, p. 38also refer to the incident of the carts, but identify the Mon hero as Nga-thaik-sat.KBZ, Vol. I, p. 29 lists Nga-htaw-aing as myin-yei-tetNo. I4.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 477show that Mon headmen familiesenjoyed virtually complete continuityof officethroughouthis reignand those of his sons.65The literary activityof the Mon monk of Athwa in the I760S and I770S, which receivedofficial encouragement from Burmese monks near the capital, seemsto gainsay any sustained effort to suppress Mon culture.66Similarly,Alaung-hpaya and his sons respectedthe customs of captive Tavoyans,Europeans, Indians, Manipuris, Chins, Shans, Lus, etc. whom theyrequired to appear in 'national' costume on ceremonial occasions.Indeed, Alaung-hpaya seems to have gloried in their diversity as avalidation of his universal political pretensions. In practical terms,non-Burmese were of considerable importance, as they usually con-stituted at least a quarter of Alaiing-hpaya's infantry, and a muchlarger proportionof specialized units like artillery.

Burmese Opposition to Alaiung-hpayaAt the same time as pluralist traditions facilitated the entry of non-Burmese into Alauing-hpaya's service, personal loyalties and localties prevented many men who identified themselves as 'Burmese'fromsupportingthe Mok-hso-boheadman.Very large numbers of Burmese, indeed one is tempted to say mostBurmese, supportedAlaung-hpaya out of sheer opportunismin muchthe same way as they had aided Pegu when its star was ascendant.During the first year of his resistance, the armieswhich Alaung-hpayatfaced in the Mu and Chin-dwinvalleys consistedprincipallyof Burmeserecruited by northern headmen and former Ava commanders whohad allied themselves with Pegu. As noted, Alauing-hpayasometimesappealed to their anti-Mon prejudices, but without factors quiteindependent of ethnicity-Alaung-hpaya's sound tactical sense; hisplethora of devoted relatives; methodical training of his troops; hisinsistence on ruthless discipline; above all, the religious themes bywhich he explained his success-he would never have triumphed andhis enemies would have been content to continue under the Peguanregime. Ye-gaung-san-kyaw, whose career Alaung-hpaya sum-marized before executing him in I755, was representative of manysuch individuals:

65 Dal, Vol. I, p. 204; 'Some Historical Documents',J. S. Furnivall (ed. and trans.),Journal of the Burma ResearchSociety, Vol. 6, Pt 3 (I916), pp. 213-23; Vol. 8, Pt I(1918), pp. 40-52; Vol. 9, Pt I (I919), pp. 33-52 passim.66 R. Halliday, 'Immigration of the Mons into Siam', Journal of the Siam Society,Vol. Io, Pt 3 (September I913), pp. 6-7.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANWhen he sees that the foe resists too strongly, he is in the habit of desertingmindless of his oath. While Ava yet flourished, he did service under Taung-ngu-ya-za and enjoyed office as a general because of his abilities. When hesaw that the Talaings' strength was waxing, he went over to them. In turnwhen he saw my glory and might shine forth, he abandoned the Talaings andcame over to me. He is a man who would act like this again in the future[and thus doesn't deserve to live].67

At least four categories of Burmese steadfastly refused to accom-modate themselves to Alaung-hpaya even in the manner of Ye-gaung-san-kyaw.

(a) Motivated by local pride or by jealousy, a number of northerngentry leaders fled to the wilds or joined Pegu rather than acknowledgeAlaung-hpaya. They included the headmen of Kyauk-ka, Yon-ga,and Tha-zi; and the aforementioned Let-ya-pyan-chi, whose village ofHkin-u had long vied with Mok-hso-bo for regional leadership. Let-ya-pyan-chi, rather than the Mon commander at Ava, proved to beAlahng-hpaya's most determined and resourceful opponent in thenorth. In rejecting Alaung-hpaya's demand for surrender, he con-cluded: 'I don't want to do homage to a fellow Burman, only to aTalaing will I bow.'68

(b) Even after Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's execution, some Burmesecontinued to look to remnants of the old Ava court for leadership. Oneof Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's sons (the Shwei-daung prince) doggedlyresisted Alahng-hpaya, and on the latter's death retained sufficientpopularity that one of Alahng-hpaya's generals reportedly asked him tobecome king. Moreover, the poet later known as Sein-da-kyaw-thudeclined to serve at Alahng-hpaya's court until 1756 or I757.69 He wasstill loyal to the memory of his original patron, Taung-ngu-ya-za,Maha-dama-ya-za-di-pati's uncle who until his death had fought torestore the Ava house and had opposed Alahng-hpaya's royal pre-tensions.

(c) The inhabitants of Tavoy in the peninsula, who spoke a dialectof Burmese, never showed any particular enthusiasm for Alahng-hpaya, and used the occasion of a fresh uprising at Pegu in 1758-59to declare their independence. Whether one chooses to classify Tavoy-ans as 'Burmese' is a matter of convention. A letter from Alaung-hpaya's commanders shows, however, that not only 'Tavoyans'

67AA-T, pp. I94-5. There is no evidence to suggest that Ye-gaung-san-kyawchanged his hairstyle to mark these changes in political allegiance.68 AA-L,p. 29. Cf. AA-T,p. 162.69Ba-thaung, Sa-hso-daw-myat-htok-pat-ti Biographies of Royal Authors) (Ran-goon, 1971), pp. 241-52.

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 479(dd-we kyun-daw-myo), but 'Burmese' proper (myan-ma kyun-daw-myo)

joined local Mons fleeing to Siam following the collapse of the 1758-59 Tavoyan revolt.70 Furthermore, according to one report, the revoltitself was organized by a Burmese commander who allied himself withMon refugees from Pegu in an attempt to revive Tavoy's independentsovereignty.71

(d) Most important of all, the tradition of Peguan regionalism con-tinued to captivate many Burmese despite the trend towards ethnicpolarization after October of 1754. Burmese sources identify individualBurmese commanders and sizeable contingents of Burmese soldierswho, alongside Mon contingents, helped defend the southern kingdomuntil its final collapse. One such Burmese force was said to havenumbered between five and six thousand men.72 Avan deporteesmay have served Pegu after I754 under some degree of compulsion,but local Burmese fought enthusiastically. One suspects that in Octoberand November of I754, the Burmese leadership in the south splitbetween, on the one hand, men with long-standing attachments tothe old northern court, and on the other hand, southern Burmese whohad thrown in their lot with Pegu well before 1752. The key organizersof the uprisings in the Upper Delta in late I754 (Kyaw-din-thet-daw-shei, Thad6-kyaw-thu, A-ka-shwei-daung, etc.) were all formerAva servicemen and ministers; while the most prominent Burmesepartisans of Pegu after 1754 (such commanders as Let-ya-bo and Ein-da-bala-kyaw-thu) had never enjoyed Ava's patronage, so far as weknow, and had all fought for Pegu while Ava yet stood. Ein-da-bala-kyaw-thu reportedly declined an invitation from Alaung-hpaya in1752 in these words, which show that in his view, personal loyalty wasa more noble ideal than ethnic solidarity:It is true that we [i.e. my men and I] are Burmese [myan-mau-my6]but weare servicemen who have come from Han-tha-wadi. We have alreadysworn allegiance to the Talaing king, and although we are indeed Burmese,we cannot now do domage to Alaung-min-taya-gyi.73No doubt he was among those Burmese lords still loyal to Banya-dala whom Alahng-hpayai seized shortly before Pegu fell.74

70AAm, p. 149.71 Symes,AnEmbassyotheKingdomfAva,pp. 49-50.72They garrisonedHson-gun ort-see AA-L,p. 12. Foradditional eferencesoBurmese defenders, see AA-L, p. I 6; AA-T, p. 202; KBZ, Vol. I, pp. 128, 141,159, 184; Dal, Vol. I, p. I66; and supra, note 32. The total Peguan army by '757probably did not exceed twenty-five thousand, so Burmese represented a significantelement indeed.

73 KBZ, Vol. I, p. 55. 74 Phayre, Historyof Burma,p. I65.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMAN

Epilogue: Some Contrasts with Modern Ethnic RevoltsIn summary, we find in the mid-eighteenth century a strong tendencyfor populations subject to the same political center to use culturaltraits as a badge of their common identity, particularly in periods oftransition and uncertainty. Yet the correlation between cultural, i.e.ethnic, identity and political loyalty was necessarily very imperfect,because groups enjoying the same language and culture were frag-mented by regional ties, and because the dominant modes of politicalorganization-resting on concepts of religious universalism andpersonal, quasi-'feudal' allegiance-were essentially indifferent tocultural distinctions. We lack space to prove the point, but we can saywith confidence that the basic patterns of the period I740-57 re-occurredduring the ephemeral southern uprisings of I758-59, I773-74, 1783,and 1826-27.These findings are of some relevance to our understanding of colonialand post-colonial Burma. If the southern resistance to Ava and toAlahng-hpaya was, as has generally been assumed, motivated by 'ethnicseparatism', one could logically conclude that the so-called Mon,Karen, Shan and other ethnic rebellions which developed followingthe withdrawal of British power from Burma in the I940S were thelineal descendants of that eighteenth-century resistance. In fact, ourfindings lead us to suspect that the colonial period introduced a basicdiscontinuity into the structure of Burmese ethnic relations. At thispoint we will essay some brief contrasts between the revolt of the mid-eighteenth century and those of the mid-twentieth century, in the hopethat scholars specializing in modern Burma may expand on this theme.

Certainly in both the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, rebellionfed on the discontents of non-Burmese communities on the outskirtsof the Burmese heartland, while the central government was con-trolled predominantly by Burmese. In both periods as well, theinsecurity attendant on the decline of an established regime accentuatedethnic divisions, and helped make cultural traits into powerful symbolsof political identification. However, the universalist traditions whichhad mitigated this tendency towards ethnic exclusiveness in the mid-eighteenth century and which had permitted large numbers of self-proclaimed 'Burmese' to support the Peguan revolt, had largely dis-appeared by 1947. Differences between the two periods of rebellion areapparent in personnel, territorial ambitions, and intellectual orientation.75

75 I am particularly indebted to F. K. Lehman for the perspectives offered in

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ETHNIC POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BURMA 481As we have seen, the revolt of 1740 rivetted popular loyalties to anidealized political entity-the kingdom of Ra-manya or Pegu-as much as to a particular ethnic identity. Smin Dhaw was apparentlya Taung-thu posing as a Burmese prince, and Banya-dala was a Shan.

By contrast, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), theMon National Defense Organization, the Kachin IndependenceArmy, the Shan State Army, and other such post-1947 rebel movementsin each instance tended to be mono-ethnic. It is true that the KNDOincluded a Kachin brigadier in 1949 and Burmese and Indian followersby 1955, but the highest leadership of the KNDO always identifiedthemselves as Karens and their official pronouncements sought toappeal exclusively to the so-called 'Karen nation'. So, too, the MonNational Defense Organization, while cooperating with the KNDO,viewed itself as the sole legitimate expression of the 'Mon nation'.The eighteenth-century revolts sought to extend Pegu's authorityover as many tributary states and provinces as possible, regardless ofthe ethnic composition of the inhabitants. Its essential thrust was ex-pansive and integrative. The same was true of Alaung-hpaya's counter-movement. By contrast, post-1947 dissident groups postulated theexistence of discrete national territories requiring either independenceor a degree of autonomy considerably greater than that permittedunder the federalist constitution of I947. Whereas in the pre-colonialperiod various ethnic groups had always lived in close proximity toone another, the post-I947 rebellions sought to carve out of the Unionof Burma an independent 'Karen country', a fully autonomous orindependent Shan state, a Mon national area (or a Karen-Mon state),and an independent Kachin state with compact well-defined ethnicmajorities.

Finally, both the revolt of 1740 and Alahng-hpaya's movement hadtheir intellectual roots in Buddhist political theories which placedsovereignty in the person of the ruler in the expectation that he, ashis article 'Ethnic Categories in Burma'. Other sources on which I have relied forthe post-colonial period include: four publications by the Ministry of Informationof the Union of Burma entitled A Brief Reviewof Disturbancesn Burma (1949?),KNDO Insurrection(X949), Events Relating to the Karen Rising (1949), and Burma andtheInsurrections1949); Hugh Tinker, The Unionof Burma,4th edn (London, I967);John F. Cady, A Historyof ModernBurma Ithaca, 1958; 4th print. with supp., 1969);Frank N. Trager, Burma:FromKingdomo Republic London, 1966); Dorothy Guyot,'Communal WarfareBetween Burmans and Karens in 1942' (Paper Presented to the29th Congress of Orientalists, Paris, July, 1973); Josef Silverstein, 'Part Two-Burma', in George M. Kahin (ed.), GovernmentsndPoliticsof SoutheastAsia, 2nd edn(Ithaca, I964); various editions of The Nation newspaper, Rangoon, 1952-58;The WashingtonPost, April I I, I976.


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VICTOR B. LIEBERMANPatron of the Faith and defender of the Sahgha,would help make knownthe path to salvation among all creatures under his rule. This soterio-logical goal was the ultimate rationale of eighteenth-century kingship.Buddhist political doctrines were often combined with magical elementswhich, although not necessarily sanctioned by the Scriptures, also hada potentially universal appeal. By contrast, contemporary nationalistmovements have their intellectual roots in post-EnlightenmentEuropean political theories which are entirely secular in inspiration.They place sovereignty in the population at large, and exalt secular andpopular culture as the source of national creativity. In seeking toidentify and preserve 'national' units, contemporary movements havenecessarily stressed the particular at the expense of the universal.European notions about peoples and nations were accepted by mostWestern-educated leaders, Burmese as well as non-Burmese, anddeeply influenced the federalist structure of the 1947 Constitution of theUnion of Burma.76

Historians may wish to determine whether these same pre-colonial/post-colonial dichotomies which we have outlined in the Irrawaddyvalley were also found in Burmo-Siamese, Siamese-Cambodian, andperhaps Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. At first glance, it wouldseem that the pre-nineteenth century wars between Burma and Siam,for example, were not national conflicts in the modern sense, but re-gional and dynastic wars in which ethnic identity was but one of severalfactors determining political loyalty. Only in this way can we explain(particularly during the sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century wars)the lack of guilt with which individuals swore allegiance to kings ofdifferent ethnic type than themselves; the ease with which regionalcenters detached themselves from the capital in the face of externalassault; and the prevalence of universal religious themes in the diplo-matic intercourse between rival monarchies.

76Lehman, 'Ethnic Categories in Burma', p. 103.

482