politics of policy: the obama doctrine and arab spring · presidential doctrines and schools of...

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Polit ics of Policy:The Obama Doctr ine and Arab Spring

THE OBAMA DOCTRINE IS A CONTENTIOUS TOPIC in the scholarly world. In the stacks of Fondren Library, books on Obama span an ent ire shelf; many of them are dedicated to the Obama Doctrine and figuring out what it is. In one of these books, Barack Obama?s Post-American Foreign Policy, Robert Singh dedicates an ent ire chapter, t it led ??I?ve Got A Confusion on Obama?: Cosmopolitan, Liberal Internat ionalist , Realist , Reaganite, Left ist??1 to trying to put a label on Obama and his foreign policy. Scholars often compare the Obama Doctrine to other doctrines such as the Bush Doctrine and the Eisenhower Doctrine, and posit that these doctrines were much more clear-cut than the Obama Doctrine is; there is more literature dedicated to figuring out the Obama Doctrine than there are most other presidential doctrines. In my paper, I wil l examine the Obama Doctrine, especially as it applies to the Middle East, and explore some of its intricacies, and then examine the way that the Arab Spring changed the Obama Doctrine. I wil l ut i l ize the arc of disenchantment to examine the way that the Arab Spring changed the Obama Doctrine.

The Obama Doct r ine

WHEN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF THE OBAMA DOCTRINE, we first have to begin by asking the quest ion: is doctrine a real concept? Or are doctrines frameworks that historians, foreign policy makers, and polit icians construct to project the façade that they know what they are doing? Do experts have a specific protocol to apply to every crisis that wil l lead to desired results? This is a valid quest ion, especially in the case of the Obama Doctrine. Obama has always balked at the very idea of doctrine; early on in his campaign, when asked to define the Obama Doctrine, he said that it was ?not going to be as doctrinaire as the Bush doctrine,? and added that he thought ?ideology has overridden facts and reality,?2 regarding it as a trap he did not want to fall into. This is an idea that continued throughout the administrat ion; Obama has emphasized the fact that

This paper defines and examines the Obama Doctrine by contextualizing it through the lens of other presidential doctrines and schools of realism and idealism. In addition, it seeks to establish the doctrine's tenets and contradictions. It then examines Obama?s arc of disenchantment with the Arab Spring and explains how this arc affected the way he made policy regarding the Middle East.

Hannah TylerThis paper was written in Dr. Nathan Citino's history seminar, America in the Middle East (HIST 436).

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?the world is complicated? and the US could not adhere to a doctrine in all cases.3 One aide, when asked what would set government policy, quoted Brit ish Prime Minister Harold Macmillan: ?Events, dear boy, events.?4 This quote sums up Obama?s view of doctrine: adhering to one is dangerous, and he and many others insist that strict adherence to a doctrine caused the Iraq War.

But presidential doctrine is a long and storied tradit ion, and the expectat ion that Obama could challenge such a longstanding custom and refuse to have a doctrine proved to be more difficult than ant icipated. Much of the l iterature I have read regarding doctrine is specifically related to how presidential doctrines have affected the Middle East, which is mostly how I am examining the Obama Doctrine, as well. In Three Kings, Lloyd Gardner evaluates the Truman Doctrine, and comes to the conclusion that the Truman doctrine was ?the ideological foundation for the ?imperial presidency.??5 He argues that ?the American quest was lit t le different in purpose from that of previous powers seeking to dominate the area,?6 saying that the Truman Doctrine was essentially a continuation of Western imperialism in the Middle East that was previously enforced by the United Kingdom or France. Much of the foreign policy in the region during and after the Truman Doctrine was made in regards to the Cold War; according to Salim Yaqub, the Eisenhower Doctrine was dedicated to ?exclud[ing] from the area Soviet influence.?7 A continuity remained within doctrines regarding the Middle East during the Cold War, regardless of which party the president belonged to. The Carter Doctrine, established during Jimmy Carter?s 1980 State of the Union address, stated that ?an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault wil l be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.?8 Essentially, during the Cold War, doctrines regarding the Middle East were dedicated to containing and combating the spread of communism. Douglas Lit t le argues in his book Us vs. Them that once the spread of communism was no longer an issue, the spread of ?radical Islam? supplanted that of communism and became the new threat around which doctrines were made.9 The Bush Doctrine was very clearly made in react ion to the spread of radical Islam, and the Obama Doctrine is in some ways a react ion to radical Islam; ignoring it as a threat in the region is impossible, and many of Obama?s decisions in regards to the Arab Spring were made with the threat of radical Islam in mind. When examining the Obama Doctrine compared to other presidential doctrines, it becomes clear that Obama does not manage to rise above the definit ion of doctrine; he does have a set of values and beliefs that guide his approach to foreign policy, and although it might not be as specific as those set out in the Carter or Bush Doctrines, it is st i l l enough to make up a doctrine.

Addit ionally, it can be argued that skirt ing the tradit ional definit ion of doctrine and insist ing on a looser definit ion is a doctrine in itself, apart from the fact that the Obama Doctrine does contain a specific set of beliefs. Maintaining the importance of examining individual events on their own merit and making decisions based on the differences of every event sets out a very specific expectat ion. Ryan Lizza says that Obama has ?approached foreign policy as if it were case law, deciding his response to every threat or crisis on its own merits.?10 This meticulous approach describes the Obama Doctrine. However, this is not the only tenet of the Obama Doctrine; Obama generally ?does not believe a president should place American soldiers at great risk in order to prevent humanitarian disasters, unless those disasters pose a direct security threat to the United States.?11 This tenet sets up precise parameters for intervention; unless there is a crisis

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that direct ly threatens the lives of American civil ians, such as a terrorist attack on American soil explicit ly endorsed by a foreign government, there wil l be no intervention. Regarding the Arab Spring, the specificity set out in the doctrine begins to get convoluted. In Libya, there was clearly no threat to the nat ional security of the United States; it was a cut-and-dry humanitarian crisis. So, intervention in Libya violated one of the tenets of the Obama Doctrine. However, the intervention was not a unilateral intervention by the United States, and it does not violate another tenet of the Obama Doctrine: examining every conflict on a case-by-case basis. It is also arguable that the nat ional security tenet of the Obama Doctrine was solidified after the disastrous Libyan intervention, when Obama became more insistent that American intervention in the Middle East would not change anything. This exposes one of the inherent conflicts within the Obama Doctrine: refusing to intervene unless nat ional security is direct ly threatened and examining conflicts on a case-by-case basis are not compatible principles. There is another conflict present within the Obama Doctrine, especially regarding the Arab Spring: often, what Obama said about the Arab Spring was not compatible with the realist tenets of his doctrine. His idealist tendencies shone through in his speeches, but his realist tendencies shone through in his act ions, which made determining Obama?s foreign policy moves during the Arab Spring difficult for both his advisors and protestors taking part in the Arab Spring.

However, the conflict between realism and idealism is another place where Obama attempts to buck tradit ion; he believes the split between realism and idealism is a false one, or at least he refuses to accept that the labels apply to his foreign policy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, he said that ?there had long been a tension between those who describe themselves as realists or idealists? a tension that suggests a stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our values around the world,? and said blunt ly that he ?reject[s] these choices.?12 The belief that the dichotomy between realism and idealism is false is echoed by some scholars, but is belied by the team of foreign policy advisors Obama chose, and by the fact that the Obama Doctrine is in large part a react ion to the failures of the Bush Doctrine, which is idealist in nature.

The foreign policy team that Obama assembled was essentially a blend of the foremost thinkers in the fields of idealism and realism. Samantha Power, for example, is a good example of someone at the top of the field of idealism. Her book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide proposes that the United States has a responsibil ity to intervene in humanitarian crises due to the posit ion the US holds in the world; she has been ?caricatured as the Ivy League Joan of Arc.?13 Robert Gates, a ?self-described realist ,?14 is an example of someone at the top of the field of realism. To be clear, I am not saying that Obama?s assembling a team of advisers from the two fields of idealism and realism is a bad thing; I am simply stat ing that it belies his insistence that the dichotomy between the two fields is false. And this dichotomy is easy to see in situat ions regarding the Arab Spring where the fields of realism and idealism clash. In general,

When examining the Obama Doctrine compared to other presidential doctrines, it becomes clear that Obama does not manage to rise above the definit ion of doctrine.

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realists are not necessarily popular because they do not advocate excit ing ideas; Robert Gilpin, a leader in the field, once said that ?no one loves a polit ical realist .?15 Realism is, by its very nature, cautious, and idealists sometimes say of realists that ?Those who describe the world in terms of the ut i l i ty of the use, or even the threat, of force are teaching incorrect and dangerous lessons and that realism is in part a self- fulfi l l ing prophecy.?16 Realists, however, crit icize idealists for ?underest imat[ing] the role of power in internat ional polit ics and overest imat[ing] the role, actual and potent ial, of law, morality, and public opinion.?17 This sort of fundamental difference of approach to world polit ics and disagreement on the limits of power is clear between advisors l ike Power and Gates; for example, in the case of Libya, Power was a strong proponent of intervention, while Gates was ?the most strenuous opponent of establishing a no-fly zone, or any other form of military intervention.?18 In this case, Obama swung towards the side of idealism, believing, l ike Power, that it was the responsibil ity of the United States to intervene. However, generally Obama falls more on the side of realism, especially in terms of intervention. He looks up to the great realist thinkers of the late 80s and early 90s, especially Brent Scowcroft . Jeffrey Goldberg mentions that in Obama?s 2006 book The Audacity of Hope, he praised Scowcroft so extensively that Susan Rice ?felt it necessary to remind him to include at least one line of praise for the foreign policy of President Bil l Clinton.?19 Scowcroft , besides being an integral part of negotiat ing the American response to the end of the Cold War, was a vocal crit ic of American involvement in Iraq. He wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in late 2002, ?Don?t Attack Saddam,? in which he warned that an attack on Iraq would have dire consequences for America, both domestically and internat ionally; he cautioned that it would have a permanent effect on the way that America was viewed in Iraq and in the region in general.20 Obama made his opposit ion to the Iraq War one of his main talking points during the campaign, hammering on the fact that his opponent, Hil lary Clinton, had voted for the war, while he had spoken out against it . In a speech given in November of 2006, Obama said that the war ?has left us distracted from containing the world?s growing threats in North Korea, in Iran, and in Afghanistan? and attacked Bush?s foreign policy as ?policy-by-slogan.?21 Obama?s opposit ion to the way Bush conducted foreign policy, and to the Bush Doctrine in general, became one of the most important building blocks of the Obama Doctrine.

The Bush Doctrine was not a departure from the norm of doctrines; it was a clear doctrine with tenets well known by the public, a doctrine that was generally followed to the letter. Much of the secondary l iterature writ ten on the Obama Doctrine tries to figure out what exact ly the Obama Doctrine is; the same cannot be said for the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was made up of a few important precepts; one was the concept of the freedom agenda; another was the idea of preemptive wars or strikes; another was a general comfort with using American power unilaterally. The freedom agenda was a promise to ?strengthen democracy and promote peace around the world.?22 These core tenets elucidated in the Bush Doctrine and the idea of the freedom agenda led to the demonizat ion of the Muslim world and the religion of Islam, especially when Bush called Iraq and its ?terrorist all ies? an ?axis of evil.?23 When examining these core tenets of the Bush Doctrine and the result ing Islamophobia that it sparked, it is clear that the Obama Doctrine is in large part a react ion to and reject ion of the Bush Doctrine. The Obama Doctrine completely rejects the freedom agenda; in his famous Cairo speech, Obama said ?no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by any other,?24 which is a direct attack on the Iraq War and the agenda. In elect ing Obama, the American

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electorate was also reject ing the Bush Doctrine; they expected that the Obama Doctrine differ great ly from the Bush Doctrine. One of Obama?s main campaign promises was to get troops out of Iraq, and that in itself showed the American people that Obama intended to have a foreign policy much different than Bush?s. By elect ing Obama, the American people endorsed this new approach to foreign policy. The concept of preemptive wars was roundly rejected, as was the idea of unilateral American intervention (as made clear through the coalit ion intervention in Libya). And Obama spent a lot of his t ime in his early speeches to the Muslim world attempting to combat the idea that the United States was Islamophobic or at war with Islam, instead emphasizing the similarit ies between the Muslim world and the United States, a strategy that Douglas Lit t le refers to as ?contagement.?25 The fact that the Obama Doctrine is in large part a reject ion of the Bush Doctrine makes it even more of a doctrine.

One final important aspect of the Obama Doctrine worth not ing is the posit ion that the Middle East occupies within it . Goldberg and many other journalists and scholars talk a great deal about Obama?s pivot to Asia. Obama believes that the future l ies in Asia, and that in order to capitalize on the momentum present within Asia it is necessary to direct much more of America?s foreign policy energy towards building meaningful relat ionships with Asian countries. Obama believes that the Middle East wil l ult imately become an irrelevant region as the United States moves away from oil dependency, which I wil l discuss more in-depth in the sect ion on the arc of disenchantment. Because of these two beliefs, the Middle East does not hold an incredibly important posit ion in the Obama Doctrine, as is clear from Obama?s early moves within the region. One of Obama?s campaign promises was to remove troops from Iraq, which he followed through on; full withdrawal was completed by October 2011. He also began a drawdown of troops in Afghanistan. With these moves, Obama attempted to decrease American involvement in the region. The Arab Spring ended up sucking him back into the Middle East, but the init ial intent ion of the Obama Doctrine was to reduce the role of the Middle East in American polit ics. In order to examine the way the Arab Spring changed the Obama Doctrine and exposed the contradict ions within the Obama Doctrine, we can look at what some call Obama?s arc of disenchantment with the region.

The Arc of Disenchantment

IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE WAY THE OBAMA DOCTRINE CHANGED, I wil l examine the arc of disenchantment in the region, a phrase taken from Goldberg?s piece ?The Obama Doctrine.? Although the phrase is Goldberg?s, he does not examine the arc of disenchantment in any crit ical way, and does not examine this phrase with regards to specific countries. Addit ionally, my methodology is different from Goldberg?s? I wil l be examining the arc of disenchantment mostly using Obama?s speeches and other primary sources, while ?The Obama Doctrine? is effect ively a long-form interview with Obama. This methodology speaks to the difference between my historical approach and the journalist ic approach Goldberg takes. Finally, ?The Obama Doctrine? is a piece that is unabashedly in support of Obama and his foreign policy decisions; I hope to be more crit ical and unbiased in my examination of the Obama Doctrine and the arc of disenchantment.

Obama?s engagement with the Middle East followed an arc of disenchantment with the region. His early speeches in and about the Middle East were full of opt imism and hope, and as the Arab Spring began, he was hopeful that it would bring about meaningful

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democrat ic regime change in some countries. However, as the Arab Spring lost its early promise and countries became embroiled in civil war, Obama became gradually more pessimist ic about the region and grew convinced that it was impossible for the Middle East to change in any sort of meaningful way. This pessimism affected the way that he made policy in the region; as his pessimism deepened, he became less and less wil l ing to intervene in any way, shape, or form. This paper examines three countries in order to bring Obama?s arc of disenchantment with the region into sharper focus: Egypt, Libya, and finally Syria. Before I examine those countries, I wil l analyze some of Obama?s early speeches in and about the region and show that his pessimism and disil lusionment were phenomena brought about by the failure of the Arab Spring.

Obama?s early speeches attempted to strike a concil iatory note with the Muslim world, and showed that he believed the area had potent ial and promise. As I mentioned earlier, he attempted to distance himself from the Bush Doctrine, as his elect ion signaled that the American public was ready for a new era of foreign relat ions. In his inaugural address, given January 21, 2009, Obama reached out to the Muslim world, saying that ?we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.?26 This was meaningful because for years, especially during George Bush?s presidency, much of America?s foreign policy regarding the Middle East had been grounded in a distrust and misunderstanding of the region. Obama?s trying to reach out to a region that felt marginalized and misunderstood was therefore incredibly significant. As he sett led into office, he continued to reach out to the Muslim world. His first trip overseas was to Turkey, and when he addressed the Turkish parliament, he told them that this was intent ional; he intended to open up a new era of relat ions between Turkey and America, and the Middle East as a whole. The most-quoted line of that speech came towards the end, when he assured the parliament that ?the United States is not, and never wil l be, at war with Islam.?27 This was, again, a step forward perception-wise. As mentioned in the previous sect ion on the Obama Doctrine, Bush had sometimes given the appearance of being against the religion of Islam; his ?axis of evil? speech certainly did not give the appearance of being will ing to compromise with Muslim countries. Obama?s attempts to signal a new beginning of American relat ions with the Muslim world culminated in his famous Cairo speech. He himself said that he had ?come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect . . . ,?28 making clear early on in the speech what his theme would be. The speech is similar to the speech given to the Turkish parliament in many respects; he stresses themes of mutual respect and interest, emphasizing that the principles of the Muslim world are not contrary to those of the American world, and in fact have much in common. In this speech, he also laid the groundwork for his early acceptance of the protests in Tahrir Square. He said that the United States was committed to ?governments that reflect the will of the people,? adding that the voices of the people would be heard ?even if we disagree with them? and implying that the United States would even accept governments that they did not agree with ?provided they

Obama became gradually more pessimistic about the region and grew convinced that it was impossible for the Middle East to change in any sort of meaningful way.

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govern with respect for all their people.?24 This speech was immensely well-received in the Middle Eastern world, and led to a improvement in the way the US was viewed in the Middle East, a reflect ion of the new ?global confidence in Barack Obama?30 that some scholars referred to as the Egypt effect. For the first t ime in years, there seemed to be hope that relat ions between the Middle East and the United States could be reset and start to move in a posit ive direct ion. This hope was spurred in part by the implicat ion Obama made in the Cairo speech that the United States was prepared to support governments that they did not necessarily agree with. This implicat ion is confirmed as true by the existence of PDS-11, or ?Polit ical Reform in the Middle East and North Africa,? a document cited by Lizza in his piece The Consequentalist (PDS-11 is not publicly available, but Lizza has seen a copy and quotes from it in his art icle). In this document, Obama asked for a country-by-country report on strategies to implement polit ical reform in the region, and ?told his advisers to challenge the tradit ional idea that stabil ity in the Middle East always served U.S. interests.?31 Obama seemed to be slant ing towards a new age of relat ions with the Middle East, wil l ing to accept new democracies (even ones that ran counter to US interests) in the interest of a more stable Middle East. By encouraging a Middle East that was stable in its own right, and free of autocrats or

Just in Bishop (2017)

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dictators installed by the United States, Obama may have hoped to extricate himself from the Middle East and fulfi l l his desired pivot to Asia.

Although Obama?s early speeches were fi l led with hope and optimism, some scholars voiced frustrat ion with his rhetoric and foreign policy even before the Arab Spring began. Zbigniew Brzezinski, an ardent supporter of Obama on the campaign trail, wrote an art icle in early 2010 t it led ?From Hope to Audacity: Appraising Obama?s Foreign Policy,? in which he essentially said that Obama is all talk and no act ion. He said that ?so far, it [Obama?s foreign policy] has generated more expectat ions than strategic breakthroughs?32 and says that Obama ?has not yet made the transit ion from inspiring orator to compelling statesman.?33 This frustrat ion would remain present throughout the Arab Spring, and is in fact what complicated the Obama Doctrine so thoroughly; Obama would seem to make promises that he then would not keep. Ryan Lizza said, ?Obama?s ult imate posit ion, it seemed, was to talk l ike an idealist while act ing l ike a realist .?34

The Arab Spring forced Obama to change his approach to the Middle East in many ways. Init ially, it was possible for Obama to st ick to his init ial tone in the region? one of concil iat ion, hope, and support from afar. In his 2011 State of the Union address, given a l it t le over a month after Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire and sparked the Tunisian revolut ion, Obama said that ?the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator? and asserted that the US ?stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democrat ic aspirat ions of all people.?35 He struck a tone of hope and optimism, excited at the prospect of democrat ic change that seemed to be gripping the region. As the Arab Spring began to gain speed and protests and demonstrat ions gripped countries across the region, things began to get more complicated. In his speeches, Obama projected an appearance of idealism and support for the revolut ions and protestors, but the Arab Spring inevitably began to take a less clear-cut turn, and the Obama Doctrine grew more complex as Obama?s foreign policy realism began to take hold.

The arc of disenchantment would take hold in Egypt eventually, but at the beginning of the protests Obama was hopeful that the protests in Tahrir Square would lead to meaningful regime change. Egypt was an important American ally, so Obama?s foreign policy advisers counseled that Obama should remain cautious? one misstep could be incredibly cost ly to the relat ionship that American presidents had cult ivated with Egypt over years. However, Obama?s tendency towards idealism gripped him. In her autobiography Hard Choices, Hil lary Clinton says that a ?younger generat ion of White House aides ?swept up in the drama and idealism of the moment??36 convinced Obama to take decisive act ion that would embolden the protestors and change the current of the Egyptian revolut ion. Robert Gates confirmed Hillary?s statement in an interview given in 2013, saying that ?literally the ent ire nat ional security team recommended unanimously handling Mubarak different ly than we did,? but that ult imately Obama ended up taking the advice of ?three junior back-benchers.?37 He added in his memoir that ?Biden, Clinton, and [National Security Advisor] Donilon had urged caution in l ight of the potent ial impact on the region and the consequences of abandoning Mubarak, an ally of thirty years? but that despite these warnings Obama ?was clearly leaning toward an aggressive posture and public statements.?38 The events in Egypt show the first consequential split within the Obama administrat ion regarding events during the Arab Spring; in this case, almost all the major upper- level advisors counseled caution, a warning that Obama ult imately did not heed.

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Mubarak promised that he would not run for re-elect ion and said that he would hand off power peacefully to his successor, but that was not enough for the protestors, who feared that power would automatically go to Mubarak?s son. Obama evidently also thought that Mubarak?s promise was not enough; he called Mubarak and attempted to get him to agree to a more prompt transit ion of power. Mubarak insisted that his country was not ready for such a quick transit ion, cit ing fears that the Muslim Brotherhood would take advantage of his stepping down and grab power. Obama did not accept this as a valid explanation, and on February 1, 2011 made a speech that called for a transit ion that ?must be meaningful . . . must be peaceful and . . . must begin now,?39 despite Gates? plea to use ?the more vague phrase ?sooner rather than later.??40 This call for an immediate transit ion would further complicate things, as the Egyptian people read into the speech a promise that if t ransit ion did not begin immediately, there would be some sort of meaningful consequence imposed by the US on Mubarak, or some kind of US intervention. This never occurred, of course; America never intervened on Egyptian soil. But this speech laid the groundwork for false hope for many of the Egyptian people, which was a direct result of Obama?s idealist ic expectat ion of meaningful democrat ic transit ion and the establishment of free and fair elect ions in a country that had not had any free and fair elect ions in decades. Hil lary Clinton seemed to warn the Egyptian people against Obama?s idealism and counseled them against hoping for a transit ion that was both immediate and meaningful. She said in one interview that America was aware that since we have ?been working at our own democracy for over 230 years, that this takes t ime?41 and in another interview stressed that ?we?re just at the beginning of the transit ion,?42 solidifying the disconnect between Obama?s advisors? belief in a cautious transit ion and Obama?s belief that the situat ion in Egypt was not the t ime for caution. In Obama?s idealist ic speeches on Egypt one can see the inherent contradict ion present within the Obama Doctrine; Obama tended to make promises he could not or was not wil l ing to keep, regardless of whether or not the making of these promises was intent ional. One also see the groundwork being laid for an important event in the arc of disenchantment? the ult imate failure of free and fair elect ions in Egypt, and the return of a dictator to the country in 2013.

NATO?s failed intervention in Libya ended up being the event that cemented Obama?s arc of disenchantment most thoroughly. In February of 2011, soon after Obama called for Mubarak to step down from power, protests engulfed Libya. The situat ion was similar to the one in Egypt, except for one key difference: Muammar Qaddafi, the dictator who led Libya, was ent irely unwill ing to entertain not ions of a transit ion of any kind. As protests continued, Qaddafi became increasingly enraged; he urged loyalists to take to the streets to fight the ?greasy rats? who were incit ing the protests, and assured his followers that he would ?die as a martyr at the end? and remain ?the leader of the revolut ion unt il the end of t ime.?43 These rants could not be writ ten off as laughable lunacy in l ight of the fact that the protests represented a real threat to Qaddafi, and the internat ional community began to make moves against him. One step was UN Resolut ion 1970, in which the Security Council decided to refer the case of Libya to the ICC and imposed a travel ban, arms embargo, and asset freeze.44 In the week or two following Resolut ion 1970, the Security Council began to discuss attempting to establish a no-fly zone and taking addit ional steps to remove Qaddafi from power through another resolut ion. Qaddafi saw the moves that the internat ional community was making against him, and on March 17, 2011 warned dissidents that ?we are coming tonight? and that ?we will find you in your closets.?45 A humanitarian crisis seemed imminent. On the same

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day, UN Resolut ion 1973 was adopted, authorizing an intervention in the crisis.

Behind the scenes, Obama had been struggling to decide whether or not to intervene. His top advisers were split , as they had been in the case of Egypt; some advocated intervention, fearing that if they did not intervene they would have a genocide on their hands. Others warned that intervention could set a dangerous precedent, and pointed out that the situat ion in Libya posed no direct threat to American nat ional security, ostensibly a tenet for intervention according to the Obama Doctrine. The most ardent proponents of intervention were ?UN ambassador Susan Rice and NSS staffers Ben Rhodes and Samantha Power . . . [and] in the final phase of the internal debate, Hil lary.?46 It was clear that Rice and Clinton were supporters of intervention by the public statements they made. Clinton said in an interview that a decision would be made that would ?enable us to protect innocent l ives in Libya,?47 and Rice said that the Security Council was committed to ?swift and meaningful act ion to try to halt the kil l ing on the ground.?48 The proponents of staying out stayed made few public statements, but Gates says that he, ?Biden, Donilon, Daley, Mullen, McDonough, [and] Brennan?49 reminded Obama privately that that, as Brent Scowcroft said, ?of all the countries in the region there, our real interests in Libya are minimal.?50 In fact, Lizza put it best, saying that ?The decision about intervention in Libya was an unusually clear choice between interests and values.?51 Obama had to choose to either endorse an intervention that came dangerously close to resembling one that could have occurred during Bush?s freedom agenda, or stay out of the conflict and risk being accused of standing by and lett ing a genocide occur. He tried to split the difference, refusing to endorse a unilateral intervention by America and instead putt ing together a coalit ion that would intervene on the behalf of mult iple countries. An anonymous source within the administrat ion gave a catchy name to this new policy: ?leading from behind.?52 By endorsing act ion through a coalit ion, Obama was trying to avoid shouldering the burden of failure if it did occur.

On March 28, 2011, 11 days after the intervention began, Obama gave a speech on the act ions that were being taken in Libya. He stressed Libya?s proximity to Tunisia and Egypt and emphasized the brutality of Qaddafi, hammering on the fact that the conflict had disproport ionately affected civil ians. He said, ?Innocent people were targeted for kil l ing,? ?hospitals and ambulances were attacked,? and ?journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and kil led.?53 He said that ?in this part icular country . . . at this part icular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale? and added that ?some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocit ies in other countries? but that ?the United States of America is different.?54 Reading this speech in 2016, when Syria is in the midst of a civil war, is striking. The current conflict in Syria is incredibly similar to the conflict that took place in Libya. In Aleppo, there are no more funct ioning hospitals, as they have been the focuses of targeted attacks by terrorist groups as well as, debatably, internat ional actors such as Russia; civil ians are also dying in huge numbers. Obama?s stance of internat ional police power in the case of Libya, similar to the posit ion posited in the Roosevelt Corollary, strikes a different chord when one remembers the red line promise he made and then reneged on regarding Syria. And it is largely because of

The Arab Spring had lost its promise, and as it lost its promise, Obama lost his will ingness to intervene.

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the spectacular way that the internat ional effort in Libya failed that Obama refused to intervene in Syria.

No one foresaw the chaos that would erupt in Libya after the NATO intervention. For a few months, things seemed to be going well. Obama gave a speech in which hope and idealism seemed alive and well; he said that an ?extraordinary change? had taken place in the Middle East and North Africa and that ?square by square, town by town, country by country, the people have risen up to demand their basic human rights.?55 He stressed that the region remained important to the United States and said that we are ?bound to this region by the forces of economics and security, by history and by faith,?56 while at the same t ime emphasizing that the United States was decreasing involvement by pull ing troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan. This, after all, had been the plan all along: pull away from the Middle East and pivot to Asia. The Libyan intervention seemed like a distract ion along the way, a one-off that would lead to free and fair elect ions and stabil ity for the country. Anyone was better than Qaddafi. In this speech, Obama seemed to tread the same thin l ine he had been treading for most of the Arab Spring? striking a note of hope and idealism, and teetering on the brink of promising intervention (at least, many of his speeches could be read in a way that would imply a promise to intervene), but stopping short of actually doing so. He said that support ing the Arab Spring was a ?top priority that must be translated into concrete act ions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal,?57 which, if read through the eyes of a protestor in Syria, might mean that Obama would somehow use diplomacy or force to make Assad to step down if he refused. In late August, during a Press Corps briefing, Obama seemed to set up a clear expectat ion: if Assad used chemical weapons, a drast ic response would be needed. He said that ?a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being ut i l ized,? saying that it would ?change his calculus? and there would be ?enormous consequences?58 if Assad used chemical weapons.

But when that day, August 21, 2013, finally arrived, things had changed. Elect ions in Libya had taken place, yes, but the GNC was going in a disturbing direct ion. It was allegedly involved with Islamic forces, and was engaged in an effort to suppress women?s rights. Fact ions opposing the GNC were start ing to come together; the country was not content with the government it had elected. It was clear to anyone involved in foreign policy that Libya was on the brink of another civil war. The NATO intervention had proved a failure; an internat ional coalit ion had proved unable to stop a country from slipping back towards the dark abyss of dictatorship. Obama had watched all of this happen, and was left with a bit ter taste in his mouth; he started to believe that American intervention in the region would accomplish l it t le to nothing. His view of the Middle East proved to be bleak; he said that all the United State was doing in the region was ?figuring out how to destroy or cordon off or control the malicious, nihil ist ic, violent parts of humanity,?59 a far cry from his remarks in 2011 where he stated that the ?greatest untapped resource in the Middle East and North Africa is the talent of its people.?60 So when Assad used sarin gas against his own people, Obama refused to step in. His fatalist ic view of the region was sealed by the failure of a soft intervention in Libya. Regardless of the fact that Syria was facing a humanitarian crisis of the same, if not greater proport ion, than the one in Libya, Obama believed that an American intervention would solve nothing. There were also more external factors to consider in Syria; Assad was a much closer friend to Russia than Qaddafi had been, and an American intervention

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NOTES:1. Robert Singh, Barack Obama's Post-

American Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2012), 25.

2. The New York Times, ?Democratic Presi-dential Debate on NPR,? New York Times, last modified December 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/us/politics/04transcript-debate.html.

3. The New York Times, ?Democratic Presi-dential,? New York Times.

4. Ryan Lizza, "The Consequentalist," New Yorker, last modified May 2, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist.

5. Lloyd Gardner, Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East After World War II (New York, NY: The New Press, 2009), 3.

6. Gardner, Three Kings, 49. 7. Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism

(n.p.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 58.

8. Jimmy Carter, ?The State of the Union Ad-dress Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress,? (speech, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1980), The American Presi-dency Project, http://www.presi-dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079.

9. Douglas Little, Us versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the

Green Threat (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 2016).

10. Lizza, ?The Consequentalist.? 11. Jeffrey Goldberg, ?The Obama Doctrine,?

The Atlantic, last modified April 2016, ac-cessed September 28, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.

12. Barack Obama, ?Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize,? (speech, Oslo, December 10, 2009), The White House, last modified December 10, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.

13. Evan Osnos, ?In the Land of the Possible,? New Yorker, last modified December 22, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/maga-zine/ 2014/12/22/land-possible.

14. Sean Kay, ?Gates: A Realist in an Idealist World,? War on the Rocks, last modified January 22, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/gates-a-realist-in-an-idealist-world/.

15. Robert Jervis, ?Realism in the Study of World Politics,? International Organization, 974, http://content.ebsco-host.com.ezproxy.rice.edu/Con-tentServer.asp?EbscoContent=dGJyMN-HX8kSep644wtvhOLCmr06eqLBSsKm4S-

would be sure to spark a conflict with Russia that America could not afford. So Obama stepped back from his promise, despite dire warnings from his advising team that this decision could affect American credibil ity for years to come. Yes, Obama admitted that ?if there had been no Iraq, no Afghanistan, and no Libya . . . he might be more apt to take risks in Syria,?61 but this was simply not the case. The arc of disenchantment had taken its toll. The Arab Spring had lost its promise, and as it lost its promise, Obama lost his wil l ingness to intervene. Obama?s early idealism was firmly replaced by the realism he had preached when the Obama Doctrine had begun to form. Decisions made in Egypt and Libya proved to be mistakes that he was determined to avoid making in Syria. So the conflict in Syria raged on, and Obama turned away, pivot ing instead to ?more important? areas of the world. The Middle East, after all ?is no longer terribly important to American interests,? and even if it were, ?there would st i l l be l it t le an American president could do to make it a better place.?62

Examining the Obama Doctrine and the Arab Spring has proved to be complicated and murky. Exploring two topics that have many different definit ions is challenging, and I had to read a lot of l i terature from both sides of the aisle in an attempt to understand them in a way that is as unbiased as possible. The one thing that is clear to me after perusing the current scholarship on the Obama Doctrine is that the doctrine will cont inue to engender debate far into the future, both on what the Obama Doctrine is and the effect it had on different regions (the Middle East in part icular). It is important to understand the Obama Doctrine and the way policy is made in the region so we can understand the way future presidents make doctrine, and the way their doctrines fit into the history of presidential doctrines.

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raWxWXS& ContentCus-tomer=dGJyMPGvrk-i3pJKuePfgeyx43zx1d%2BI5wAA& T=P& P=AN& S=R& D=mth& K=1414109.

16. Jervis, ?Realism in the Study,? 974. 17. Peter Wilson, ?Idealism in International

Relations,? in Encyclopedia of Power (Thou-sand Oaks, USA: SAGE, 2011), 333, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41929/1/Ideal-ism%20in%20international%20rela-tions%20(LSERO).pdf

18. Lizza, ?The Consequentalist.? 19. Jeffrey Goldberg, ?The Obama Doctrine.? 20. Brent Scowcroft, ?Don't Attack Saddam,?

Wall Street Journal, last modified August 15, 2002, http://www.wsj.com/arti-cles/SB1029371773228069195.

21. Barack Obama, ?A Way Forward in Iraq Re-marks,? (speech, Chicago, November 20, 2006), Obama Speeches, http://obamaspeeches.com/094-A-Way-Forward-in-Iraq-Obama-Speech.htm.

22. The White House, ?Fact Sheet: President Bush's Freedom Agenda Helped Protect The American People,? The White House, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda/.

23. George W. Bush, ?The State of the Union Address,? (speech, Washington, D.C., Janu-ary 29, 2002), NPR, http://www.npr.org/news/spe-cials/sou/2002/020129.bushtext.html.

24. Barack Obama, ?Remarks by the President on a New Beginning,? (speech, Cairo, June 4, 2009), The White House, last modified June 4, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09.

25. Douglas Little, Us versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 2016), 173.

26. Barack Obama, ?President Obama's Inau-gural Address,? (speech, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2009), The White House, last modified January 21, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address.

27. Barack Obama, ?Remarks By President Obama To The Turkish Parliament,? (speech, Ankara, April 6, 2009), The White House, last modified April 6, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-turkish-parliament.

28. Obama, ?Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.?

29. Obama, ?Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.?

30. Pew Research Center, ?Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World,? Pew Research Center, last modified July 23, 2009, http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/07/23/confi

dence-in-obama-lifts-us-image-around-the-world/.

31. Lizza, ?The Consequentalist.? 32. Zbigniew Brzezinski, ?From Hope to Au-

dacity,? Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (Janu-ary/February 2010): 28, http://www.js-tor.org.ezproxy.rice.edu/stable/20699780.

33. Brzezinski, ?From Hope to Audacity,? 29. 34. Lizza, ?The Consequentalist.? 35. Barack Obama, ?Remarks by the President

in State of Union Address,? (speech, Wash-ington, D.C., January 25, 2011), The White House, last modified January 25, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.

36. The Guardian, ?Hillary Clinton: Obama ad-ministration divided over 2011 Arab upris-ings,? The Guardian, last modified June 7, 2014, accessed September 28, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/07/hillary-clinton-obama-administration-split-arab-spring-mubarak.

37. Rachel Dicker, ?Obama Ignored Military's Advice in Egypt, Former Defense Secretary Says,? US News & World Report, last modi-fied March 18, 2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-03-18/robert-gates-obama-ignored-military-advice-on-arab-spring.

38. Robert M. Gates, Duty (n.p.: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 504.

39. CNN, ?Obama says Egypt's transition ?must begin now,?? CNN, last modified February 2, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLI-TICS/02/01/us.egypt.obama/.

40. Gates, Duty, 506. 41. Hillary Rodham Clinton and Mohamed

Kamel Amr, ?Remarks With Egyptian For-eign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr After Their Meeting,? (speech, Washington, D.C., September 28, 2011), U.S. Department of State, last modified September 28, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013-clinton/rm/2011/09/174550.htm.

42. Hillary Rodham Clinton, ?Interview With Abderrahim Foukara of Al Jazeera,? by Ab-derrahim Foukara, U.S. Department of State, last modified February 14, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013-clinton/rm/2011/02/156573.htm.

43. Ian Black, ?Gaddafi urges violent showdown and tells Libya ?I'll die a martyr,?? The Guardian, last modified February 2, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/muammar-gaddafi-urges-violent-showdown.

44. United Nations, ?Resolution 1970 (2011),? United Nations, last modified February 26, 2011, https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/081A9013-B03D-4859-9D61-5D0B0F2F5EFA/0/1970Eng.pdf.

45. David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, ?Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi as U.N. Vote Nears,? New York Times, last modified March 17, 2011, http://www.ny-times.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18libya.

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Cont r ibut ing Art ist : Just in BishopBrown College, Class of 2020

Just in is an artsy premed student so basically he does not know exact ly know what he wants in l ife. But one of his favorite mottos is "Keep Moving Forward," so he just tries to l ive by that!

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? ? ? . "Egyptians Sour on U.S., Eye Closer Ties to Turkey, Iran." Gallup, last modified March 23, 2012. http://www.gallup.com/poll/153401/Egyptians-Sour-Eye-Closer-Ties-Turkey-Iran.aspx?g_source=arab%20spring& g_medium=search& g_campaign=tiles.

HANNAH TYER

Author: Hannah TylerLovett College, Class of 2019

Hannah Tyler is a sophomore st i l l exploring her various interests. She's not quite sure what she's going to do after graduation, but she plans to pursue some of those interests, including government work, act ing and the creat ive arts, and law, among other things.

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