“politics of the repeal of the chinese exclusion laws” by l. ling-chi wang

P O L I T I C S O F T H E R E P E A L – 1

Fifty years ago, during the height of WorldWar II, the U.S. Congress voted to repeal thefifteen anti-Chinese laws enacted between1882 and 1913 as a gesture of goodwill to“our” Chinese allies fighting against Japanesemilitarism and imperialism in China.President Franklin D. Roosevelt hailed thepassage of the repeal legislation as “a mani-festation on the part of the American peopleof their affection and regard [toward theChinese people].”

To understand precisely how the Chinese inthe United States perceived these laws andthe legislative process leading to their repeal,we need to hear the voices of at least two ofthe keenest observers of Chinese America:Rose Hum Lee and Gilbert Woo. The formerwas a prolific Chinese American sociologist

and the latter, a journalist in Chinatown forover four decades. In an article published inthe Survey Graphic, a widely circulatednational magazine, not long after the bomb-ing of Pearl Harbor, Rose Hum Lee enthusi-astically reported the phenomenal gains beingmade by Chinese Americans in occupationalcategories from which they were previouslyexcluded for reason of race, and optimistical-ly concluded that the Pearl Harbor crisis wasa blessing in disguise for Chinese Americansbecause they were well on the way “towardcomplete assimilation.” Inhibiting thisinevitable process, according to her, was thefact that Chinese immigrants in the UnitedStates were still ineligible to become citizensthrough naturalization as those who camefrom “other lands.” She wrote:

Every thinking Chinese in this countryand in China hopes that the Americanpeople would advance the social,political, and economic status of theChinese in the United States. To befighting for freedom and democracyin the Far East, at a cost of 7 millionlives in five years of hard long bitterwarfare, and to be denied equalopportunity in the greatest of democ-racies, seems the Height of irony.

POLITICS OF THE REPEAL OFTHE CHINESE EXCLUSIONLAWS

L. Ling-chi Wang


In essence, she wanted Chinese immigrants tobe granted citizenship, but she made no refer-ence to the discriminatory immigration lawsagainst the Chinese. Appealing to theAmerican public conscience, she wrote, “It isup to the American people to effect the eman-cipation by law.”

Recalling the campaign to repeal theExclusion laws, Gilbert Woo, the late pub-lisher and editor of the Chinese PacificWeekly (Taiping yang zhoubao), made thisobservation in his weekly recollection columnshortly before he died in 1979: “As far as Ican remember, the campaign was not initiatedby the Chinese community, neither was itpushed by the community. Our attitude wasas if we were just outside observers.”

As we now reflect upon the remarks by thesetwo Chinese American observers, we cannothelp but wonder why Rose Hum Lee pleadedonly for citizenship, and not for the repeal ofthe laws excluding Chinese from immigrationand why she equated citizenship with assimi-lation, her life-long personal as well as intel-lectual obsession. Likewise, we cannot helpbut wonder also why Chinese Americans didnot initiate and participate in the campaign torepeal the fifteen exclusionary laws directedagainst them. Instead, they, like Rose HumLee, chose to be “just outside observers.” Is itpossible that Chinese Americans simply didnot care about the discriminatory laws andthe denial of citizenship? Did the repealaccomplish what President Roosevelt andmost of the supporters of the repeal claimed?Did it result in equity and fairness in ourimmigration laws? Did the repeal liberateChinese Americans from exclusion and racialoppression? If not, what prompted the repeal

movement and the exclusion of ChineseAmerican involvement in the repeal process?In short, how do we assess the repeal thatoccurred fifty years ago?

It is the intent of the paper to address thesequestions in the context of the politics of raceand of international relations during WorldWar II. The paper begins with a brief outlineof the historical process leading to the repealof the Chinese Exclusion laws. An analysis,including what it meant for ChineseAmericans, of the repeal legislation itself fol-lows. I then examine the national and interna-tional contexts of the politics of race in therepeal process and why Chinese Americanswere systematically kept out of the legislativeprocess. The paper concludes with an analysisof the political consequences of the lobbyingefforts on the emergence of the “ChinaLobby” after the war and of the stereotypicalimage of Chinese Americans fabricated bythe lobby during the repeal drive.

REPEAL OF THE CHINESE EXCLUSIONLAWS

Before the advent of the Chinese Americanera in late 1960s, Chinese Americans can besaid to have been living under a structure ofdual domination. On the one hand they wereracially and legally singled out for exclusionand discrimination. On the other hand, theywere also subject to the extraterritorial domi-nation of the Nationalist government, led byChiang Kai-shek and his Guomindang(Kuomintang) party.

The domination of these two external forceswas total, extending into political, economic,and cultural spheres. For example, Chinese


Americans were systematically excludedfrom the basic rights and protection guaran-teed by the U.S. Constitution. ChineseAmericans were effectively relegated to arigidly defined apartheid system under whichtheir rights, privileges, and sanctuaries in thewhite society were effectively suspended. Itwas an apartheid established by democraticmeans and sustained by repeated judicialdecisions.

Confined to Chinatowns in towns and cities,Chinese Americans also came under theextraterritorial domination of China, its gov-ernment and culture, with the consent of theU.S. government. Key institutions, such asschools and newspapers, were controlled bythe government. Key social and cultural insti-tutions were replicas of China. Political loyal-ty to the government in China, then headedby Chiang Kai-shek, was expected. In effect,colonial relations existed betweenChinatowns and China.

The United States had little or no interest inadvancing the rights and welfare of ChineseAmericans and China was too weak to protectthe rights of Chinese in the United States.Decisions affecting Chinese American liveswere made without their knowledge or con-sent. The mutual interest of the two countrieswas to use them as pawns to advance theirrespective national interests determined fre-quently by their bilateral relations and domes-tic politics. In particular, the changing diplo-matic relations between the two countries had“a direct impact on the status and conditionsof Chinese America. This paper will demon-strate how the two oppressive forces exploit-ed the repeal politics and reinforced theirdomination of Chinese America.

The Chinese Exclusion laws and their repealmust be seen within the structure of dualdomination. Between 1882 and 1913, theU.S. Congress enacted fifteen anti-Chineselaws designed to exclude and if possible,exterminate the Chinese from the UnitedStates. As if these were not enough, theCongress enacted the National Origins QuotaAct of 1924 which rendered the alien Chinesewife of an American citizen inadmissible intothe United States and provided wholesaleexclusion of all Asians. At the time when thisinhumane and exclusionary law was added,W.W. Husband, Commissioner General ofImmigration, appropriately declared that thenew law made the various Chinese Exclusionlaws superfluous and, accordingly, recom-mended their repeal back in 1924, makinghim the first in the United States to call for-mally for their repeal. However, his call wasnot heeded and no further consideration wasgiven until 1943.

The push to repeal the Exclusion laws, there-fore, could not have come from the disenfran-chised Chinese American community.Instead, it was initiated in May 1943 andmanaged exclusively by an ad hoc Citizens’Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion,made up of elite China interest groups, suchbusiness, missionaries, old China hands, andcareer diplomats. The Chiang Kai-shek gov-ernment preoccupied with its own interest inU.S. financial and military aids, gave its tacitand passive support. From the beginning tothe end, Chinese American interests wereignored and Chinese Americans were deliber-ately kept out of the entire political process.

According to Fred Riggs, who has done thedefinitive work on the repeal process, twopersons were instrumental in initiating the


repeal process in 1943: Donald Dunham, adiplomat stationed in Hong Kong, andCharles Nelson Spinks, an authority on EastAsia. Their main reasons were 1) as allies andfellow human beings the Chinese deserved“racial equality” and 2) the future of theUnited States depended more than ever on itsrelations with the Asian races against whomexisting laws and policies were directed. Thusfrom the very beginning, it was the nationalinterests of the United States, as defined bythe elites, not the interests of ChineseAmericans, that motivated the drive to repeal.

Their efforts led to a rapid convergence ofinterest groups in American politics: the oldChina hands (Owen Lattimore, Bruno Lasker,Carl Glick, Pearl S. Buck), the corporateChina traders, the missionaries to China,diplomats, and the media, most notablyHenry Luce. They were quietly supported byrepresentatives and agents of the Chiang Kai-shek, such as C.L. Hsia and Lin Yu-tang.They organized the Citizens’ Committee toRepeal Chinese Exclusion and used it tolaunch a national campaign. In all, over 250representing more than forty states joined thecommittee. How the committee interestgroups worked swiftly and o repeal the exclu-sion laws in 1943 can be found in Riggs’Pressures on Congress, published in 1950.

The Committee’s stated objectives were 1)repeal of the Chinese Exclusion acts, 2) aquota basis for the Chinese, and 3) eligibilityof Chinese for naturalization. In other words,narrowly defined: to repeal the Exclusionlaws, but to still keep the Chinese immigrantsexcluded through a tiny annual quota.Fighting racism was never the intent of thecommittee. In fact, racism was alive and well,

even among the liberals and friends of theChinese. This explains, as we shall see later,why Chinese Americans were excluded fromthe process. Even if Chinese Americans wereto bring their concerns directly into the leg-islative process, they were to be ignored.

The Committee further made three strategicdecisions. The first, echoing China expertOwen Lattimore, was to concentrate onChinese exclusion repeal rather than elimina-tion of the ban against all Asian immigration.The basis for this decision was the convictionthat “because of our present close ties withChina it might be possible to put through therepeal of Chinese exclusion, whereas anattempt to repeal all oriental exclusion lawswould almost surely at that time end indefeat.” The second was to reject all the billspreviously introduced and to stress the threeobjectives of the committee in every way andthrough every channel possible. The thirdpolicy was to limit membership of the com-mittee to U.S. citizens, not to discourageChinese from working for repeal but “toimpress Congress with the fact thatAmericans were demanding the repeal of theantiquated exclusion laws.” The decision tominimize Chinese presence was both deliber-ate and strategic. The impact of the repeal onChinese America, as we shall see later, wasnegligible, if not insulting. In short, both thecommittee and the U. S. government knewthat the proposed legislation would haveabsolutely no impact on the well-being ofChinese Americans and that the United Statesstood to score a major propaganda victory.

On October 7, the Dirkstein Committee sub-mitted a favorable report on HR 3070, clear-ing the way for final approval by the House.


To make sure that Congress was fullyappraised of the significance of the bill on theU.S. war effort in Asia and international rela-tions, President Roosevelt sent a special mes-sage to Congress on October 11 declaring,

I regard this legislation as importantin the cause of winning the war and ofestablishing a secure peace. China isour ally. For many long years shestood alone in the fight againstaggressions: Today we fight at herside. She has continued her gallantstruggles against very great odds...butChina’s resistance does not dependalone on guns and planes and onattacks on land and on sea and fromthe air. It is based as much in the spir-it of her people and her faith in herallies. We owe it to the Chinese tostrengthen that faith. One step in thisdirection is to wipe from the statutebooks those anachronisms in our lawwhich forbid the immigration ofChinese people into this country andwhich bar Chinese residents fromAmerican citizenship.

Nations, like individuals, make mis-takes. We must be big enough toacknowledge our mistakes of the pastand to correct them.

By the repeal of the ChineseExclusion Laws, we can correct a his-toric mistake and silence the distortedJapanese propaganda. The enactmentof legislation now pending before theCongress would put the Chineseimmigrants on a parity with thosefrom other countries. The Chinese

quota would therefore, be only aboutone hundred immigrants a year. Therecan be no reasonable apprehensionthat any such number of immigrantswill cause unemployment or providecompetition in the search for jobs.

The extension of privileges of citizen-ship to the relatively few Chinese resi-dents in our country would operate asanother meaningful display of friend-ship. It would additional proof that weregard China not only as a partner inwaging war but that we shall regardher as a partner in the days of peace.While it would give the Chinese apreferred status over certain other ori-ental people, their great contributionto the cause of decency and freedomentitles them to such preference. I amconfident that Congress is in fullagreement that these measures-longoverdue should be taken to correct aninjustice to our friends. Action by theCongress now will be in angst of ourpurpose to apply the policy of thegood neighbor to our relations withother peoples.

In no uncertain language, President Rooseveltassured the Congress that the passage of thebill would not precipitate a deluge of Chineseimmigrants.

On October 21, the House of Representativespassed HR 3070. This was followed by afavorable report on the same bill by theSenate Judiciary Committee on November 16(Senate Report No. 535) and passed by thefull Senate on November 26. PresidentRoosevelt promptly signed the bill into lawand declared,


It is with particular pride and pleasurethat I have today signed the billrepealing the Chinese ExclusionLaws. The Chinese people, I am sure,will take pleasure in knowing that thisrepresents a manifestation on the partof the American people of their affec-tion and regard. An unfortunate barri-er between allies has been removed.The war effort in the Far East cannow be carried on with a greater vigorand a larger understanding of ourcommon purpose.

But there was neither pleasure nor celebrationin Chinatowns and, as Gilbert Woo rightlyobserved, Chinese Americans were “just out-side observers” in the entire process.

On February 9, 1944, pursuant to the legisla-tion, Presidential Proclamation 2603 fixed theChinese quota at 105 per year (58 Stat. 1125).As expected, the new law did not bring anymore Chinese immigrants into the UnitedStates; nor did it help many to become citi-zens.

MEANINGS OF THE ACT OF DECEMBER17, 1943

The law, as enacted by Congress, consisted ofthree major concerns pushed by the Citizens’Committee: repealing of the laws relating tothe exclusion or deportation of persons of theChinese race, placing Chinese persons enter-ing the United States annually as immigrantson a fixed 105 quota computed under the pro-visions of Section 11 of the Immigration Actof 1924, and making persons of the Chineserace eligible to become naturalized U.S. citi-zens.

The second provision of the Act set forth alegal formula for limiting the number ofChinese admissible into the United Stateseach year. The annual quota was to be com-puted under the provisions of Section 11 ofthe Quota Act of 1924, which turned out tobe 105 a year. According to the 19241aw, aquota of 100 per annum was allocated toChina but only to those persons of races eligi-ble to citizenship born in China, because,under the law, Chinese not eligible for citi-zenship were prohibited from coming to theUnited States.

Thus, two separate quotas, for China and theChinese race, were established as a result ofthe 1943 law. This rendered the Chinesequota to be the only one not based on nativi-ty. Presumably for this reason it provided apreference up to 75 percent of the Chinesequota for those born and residing in China, sothat the Chinese temporarily in the UnitedStates or in any other countries in the worldwould have the opportunity of using up theentire quota of 105 without giving Chinesepersons born and residing in China an oppor-tunity to take advantage of the quota.Furthermore, children of Chinese mixed mar-riages were to be considered legally Chineseregardless of their place of birth. However,there was no provision for the non-quotaimmigration of alien Chinese wives ofAmerican citizens. According to the 1924law, alien Chinese wives of U.S. citizenswere inadmissible because they were aliensineligible for citizenship even though Section4(a) of the Act rendered alien wives of U.S.citizens admissible as non-quota immigrants.No provision for Chinese wives of U.S. citi-zens was enacted until the Act of June 13,1930. Even then, admission was extended to


only those alien Chinese wives of U.S. citi-zens married before May 26, 1924. Noadmission was allowed at all for alienChinese husbands of U.S. citizens nor foralien Chinese wives of U.S. citizens marriedbetween 1925 and 1930. Ironically, beforeMay 24, 1934, a Chinese child born abroad ofa father who was a U.S. citizen acquired U.S.citizenship at birth if the father had resided inthe United States prior to the birth and thuswas eligible for admission. A Chinese childof a U.S. citizen born abroad after May 24,1934, was a citizen if the U.S. citizen fatherhad resided in the United States ten yearsprior to his or her birth. This meant that underthe 1943 law, alien Chinese wives or hus-bands of U.S. citizens had to compete with allother Chinese immigrant applicants for the105 quota each year, as nearly ten thousandChinese American GIs found out to their dis-tress and outrage after the war when theytried to bring their wives into the country forwhich they were willing to die.

Such built-in injustice and inhumanity of therepeal law was, in fact, brought to the atten-tion of the Dirkstein Committee on October10, 1943, in a letter sent by a white Americanwho had just married a Chinese woman over-seas. He wrote, “I fell in love and I married aChinese girl who I cannot bring to the UnitedStates because of her ancestry, something Ifound out after I married.” Riggs, who stud-ied the repeal process, thought the failure toinclude Chinese spouses of U.S. citizensunder non-quota immigration was “due pri-marily to a technicality of drafting.” He alsopointed out that the Citizens’ Committee wasapparently unaware of this hiatus in the pro-posed legislation until October. Last-minuteattempts to amend the bill were met with stiff

opposition from strong proponents of the bill.The bill was therefore passed with no relieffor Chinese spouses of U.S. citizens. A provi-sion for the spouses had to be enacted on theunanimous consent calendar in 1946 to allowChinese American GIs to bring in theirChinese wives.

The third provision of the legislation dealswith citizenship through naturalization. Priorto this law, only white persons or persons ofAfrican-Black race or persons of racesindigenous to the Western Hemisphere wereracially eligible for naturalization. Accordingto the Immigration Committee report on HR3070, the number of Chinese who wouldactually be made eligible for naturalizationwas “negligible”—approximately 45,000alien Chinese in the United States. TheCommittee further clarified this figure bysaying,

…a large number of these Chinesehave never been admitted to the U.S.for lawful permanent residence, whichis a condition precedent to naturaliza-tion and, therefore, many of this num-ber would not be eligible for natural-ization, not because of racial disabili-ty, but because they cannot meetexisting statutory requirements of law.The number of Chinese who will bemade eligible in the future, in additionto those already here, will of necessitybe very small because the quota forChina is limited to 105 per annum, asprovided for in Section 2 of this bill.

In light of the above analysis of the contentof the 1943 law, it is fitting to conclude thissection by quoting the closing remarks of the


House on Immigration Committee. One can-not help but be struck by the wide gapbetween the eloquent egalitarian rhetoric ofthe Committee and the condescending andcruel reality of equality facing the Chinese inthe United States and China under this law.

The original act of exclusion (againstthe Chinese) was not born of ill willtowards the Chinese people. Themotivation was exclusively economic.But profound changes have takenplace in sixty years.

We have time on abandoned occasionto reflect on the extraordinary quali-ties of the Chinese people. Above all,the tenacity and courage of theChinese in their terrible ordeal of thelast 70 years has impelled a respectthat we are proud to acknowledge.

It is clear today that only a few shortyears stand between the Chinese peo-ple and the full use of their vastresources, both human and material,for their own betterment and well-being, free from any outside control.It has always been the policy of theUnited States to help China in herstruggle against encroachment uponher independence and sovereignty andwe are now brothers in arms in thatcause. It is fitting, therefore, that theincongruity of discriminatory legisla-tion, inconsistent with the dignity ofboth our peoples, should be eliminat-ed.

In reporting favorably on a bill for therepeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts,

this Committee is expressing what itbelieves to be the will of theAmerican people. It is expressing,also, the realization of the Americanpeople that freedom depends upon therespect for the integrity of others andthat their own freedom and securitydemand that they accord the others therespect that they ask for themselves.

A cruel hoax was perpetrated against allChinese Americans by a group of well-mean-ing white liberal elites! The 105 quota was aninsult to all Chinese Americans. The debateover the 105 quota in 1943, in fact, promptedGilbert Woo, then a reporter for the ChineseTimes, to write, on September 7, a causticsatire on how weak the Caucasian race mustbe if 105 Chinese a year can lower the livingstandards of millions of Americans or con-taminate the purity of the Caucasian race.Chinese Americans must remain excluded bylaws until 1965 when the racist quota systemwas finally abolished.

POLITICS OF RACE IN THE REPEALPROCESS

From the preceding discussion on the processand the substance of the repeal of the ChineseExclusion laws, it is clear that the advocatesand the supporters of HR 3070 and its variantversions did not have the interests and wel-fare of Chinese in the United States at heart.Race was central to the debate and to theentire repeal legislative process. The loftyideals of racial equality and justice for theChinese so eloquently articulated by the pres-ident and by leaders of our social, political,religious, business, and labor organizations,could not be further removed from the desire


of social, political, and economic advance-ment and hope of complete assimilation ofthe Chinese in the United States expressed byRose Hum Lee in her 1942 article. Thenational agenda was not restoring the civilrights of Chinese Americans but advancingAmerican national interests. The primaryU.S. interest was the use of the Chinese inChina to win the war, to boost the morale ofthe Chinese soldiers fighting the Japanese inChina, and to create the appropriate interna-tional setting for global hegemony for theUnited States after the war. This meant thatthe United States had to prevent Chiang Kai-shek and his soldiers from defecting to theJapanese side by means not costly to theUnited States and ignore what must beregarded as an irritant: justice and equalityfor the “negligible” Chinese in the UnitedStates.

A further illustration of such indifferent atti-tudes toward the human rights of the Chinesein America was the deliberate exclusion ofChinese Americans in the legislative formula-tion and lobbying activities and in the unwill-ingness of the Citizens’ Committee andCongressional advocates to rectify the blatantinjustice inflicted upon the Chinese spousesof American citizens in the pending legisla-tion on grounds of political expediency.

A quick analysis of the long statements ofPresident Roosevelt, spokesmen for theDepartment of Justice and State,Congressional leaders, and the members ofthe Citizens’ Committee will reveal that therepeal had an international political objectiveand a national political imperative. Everysupporter spoke of the importance of this leg-islation vis-à-vis U.S. relations with China

and how its passage would not “cause unem-ployment or competition in the search forjobs” in the United States, as PresidentRoosevelt put it in his special message toCongress. Our first task is to examine theinternational and national context of the bill.We will then identify the roles played by thevarious interest groups, which collectivelybecame the renowned China Lobby in thepost-war era. Throughout the process, as weshall see, race was the central issue.

The major arguments advanced in favor ofrepeal were 1) racial equality and humanrights, 2) justice to our Chinese allies, 3) fair-ness to Chinese Americans, 4) aid to futurecommercial relations with China, and 5) tohelp win the war. Congressional hearings,transcripts of Congressional floor debates,articles in newspapers and magazines, sup-port letters and campaign pamphlets, publicannouncements and briefing papers demon-strated beyond doubt the importance of thefifth argument. When President Roosevelttold Congress, “I regard this legislation asimportant in the cause of winning the war andof establishing a secure peace,” he wasreflecting the international and military objec-tives of the United States. Expressing similarideas, but from a different perspective, theHouse Immigration Committee reported,“The tenacity and courage of the Chinese intheir terrible ordeal of the last 70 years hasimpelled a respect that we are proud toacknowledge.”

Moreover, in light of the constant propagandabombardment of the Japanese against theChinese—pointing to the United States’ dis-crimination against the Chinese and urgingAsia for Asians—the argument went directly

P O L I T I C S O F T H E R E P E A L – 1 0

to the heart of the problem, that is, the UnitedStates could not afford to have the remainingChinese soldiers, then bearing virtually thefull burden of the war in East Asia, defect tothe Japanese side. Already Wang Jing-Weihad gone over to the Japanese “Sphere of FarEastern Co-prosperity” and obtained a nomi-nal sovereignty at Nanjing directly underJapanese supervision, not to mention puppet“Last Emperor” of the Manzhouguo set up bythe Japanese since 1932, the Japanese-spon-sored Federal Government of Mongolia inEastern Mongolia run by Prince De (adescendant of Genghis Khan) since 1937, andthe Beijing government created by theJapanese invaders.

Besides, Chiang Kai-shek had repeatedlythreatened an imminent “collapse” of hisarmy and government and his desire to strikea compromise with Japan if American aids,military and financial, were not forthcoming.Knowing that the United States needed himto eventually defeat Japan, he was blackmail-ing Roosevelt. Congressman Walter Juddsaid, “We cannot win this war alone in thePacific or at least without almost prohibitivecosts. We can succeed only if our allies andparticularly Chinese can hold against Japanuntil we can defeat Germany and set our fullstrength in the Pacific.” Boosting Chinesemorale, counteracting Japanese propaganda,and tying down extensive Japanese militarypersonnel and resources in the China theaterwere the primary reasons behind this fore-most argument for repeal. Riggs appropriate-ly labeled this argument as “a decisive factor”in obtaining the acceptance of certain con-gressmen. He said, “The war argument was agreat strategic value in weakening the opposi-tion and winning at least acceptance if not

support from pressure groups andCongressmen who might otherwise haverejected the proposal.”

The second important and recurring argumentin favor of repeal concerned the potentialChinese market for U.S. products in the post-war period. As Mansfield Freeman, Presidentof the U.S. Life Insurance Company, testifiedbefore the House Immigration Committee:

Trade with China and cooperationwith her 400 million people are goingto be very important factors inAmerica’s post-war prosperity. Thereis no nation which has such potentialopportunities in the Far East for theU.S. Why should we limit thoseopportunities by keeping on ourstatute books legislation which nolonger is serving any very useful pur-pose, and yet which simply tends toirritate and insult what might be ourbest mend?

Similarly, Congressman Charles Dewey ofIllinois testified that the Chinese andAmerican economies were complementaryand that, without the Chinese market, theUnited States would face “over-production”and resulting unemployment. According tohim, repeal would establish the pro-Americansentiment in China necessary for sound com-mercial relations. Echoing Dewey’s point,Congressman Mason of Texas declared, “Ourpotential trade with China after this war isover should furnish jobs to hundreds of thou-sands, if pot millions, of our boys when theyreturn from the war.” During Congressionalfloor debates, Congressman Walter Judd putit bluntly by stating, “To prove our intention


to treat China as an equal is not starry-eyedidealism or sentimental generosity. It is good,hard business sense.” In short, avoiding areturn of the Great Depression at the end ofthe war was foremost on the minds of bothgovernment and big business. Access to anddomination of the postwar China market wascrucial to the United States. Granting equalityand justice to Chinese Americans, in otherwords, was the last thing the politicians andmilitary strategists had in mind.

If we were to place the two primary argu-ments within the broader context of Americanwartime foreign policy, it would help explainwhy they were so central to American globalstrategy. This is the “big picture” or the highstake in international politics. The wartimestrategy of the United States was to defeat theGermans first; defeating the Japanese had tocome second. According to diplomatic histo-rian Herbert Feis, this American foreign poli-cy was formulated tentatively a year beforethe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor but firm-ly adopted in the early months of the war, bytwo policies: the first was to make Europe thearea of primacy concentration; the second, tomake China a great power. In other words, itwas a policy of Europe first and Asia second.To American decision makers, Hider’s threatto Europe and American interests in Europewas regarded as more serious and far-reach-ing than the Japanese threat or the war inChina and Asia.

Assisting China’s resistance to Japaneseaggression was to be given a lower priority.However, slowing down the Japanese expan-sion and occupation throughout Asia andtying up the Japanese military resources wasvital to our national interest. Toward that end,

it was important for President Roosevelt touse China to accomplish that task. The chal-lenge for Roosevelt was how to buy time andprevent Chiang Kai-shek from defecting tothe Japanese side. This was why he came upwith the policy of propping up China’s powerand prestige to a Great Power status andadmitting Chiang Kai-shek into the Big Four,ranking him equal to Churchill, Stalin, andRoosevelt, over Churchill’s objection.

This European orientation explains why, onthe one hand, President Roosevelt steadfastlyrefused to imperil vital military situations inEurope by diverting war resources and man-power to China as repeatedly demanded byChiang Kai-shek. On the other hand, itexplains why he had to keep Chiang Kai-sheksatisfied with several no-cost, morale-boost-ing concessions, most notably, 1) signing atreaty with China on January 11, 1943, relin-quishing American extraterritorial rights inChina, 2) introducing China (over the con-temptuous objections of both Britain andRussia) as one of the Big Four at the Cairoand Moscow summit conferences inDecember 1943, and 3) repealing the ChineseExclusion laws on December 17 in the sameyear.

To elevate the sagging Chiang Kai-shekregime in Chongqing to the status of a majorworld power definitely required a massiveinfusion of American dollars, men, materials,and equipment, something PresidentRoosevelt refused to deliver. Roosevelt,therefore, needed to give Chiang the threeless costly concessions to keep him in line.Giving up extraterritorial rights in Japan-occupied territories in China and accordinghim the prestige of being one of the Big Four


for the price of tying up Japanese war capa-bility was the least President Roosevelt coulddo. Repealing the Exclusion laws was animportant component of this strategy. Afterall, the United States also needed ChiangKai-shek to keep the Soviet Union under con-trol after World War II. As CongressmanMike Mansfield of Montana put it duringCongressional floor debate on the repeal leg-islation:

We must realize just how much weneed China, not how much Chinaneeds us. We must never forget thatwe will have full need of all our ener-gies, abilities and real friends in ourbarbaric struggle with Japan. We mustnot forget our future lies in large partin the Pacific. A friendly and strongChina will be a safeguard for us inthat area. Let us recognize the situa-tion as it really exists and do our shareto keep China growing so thatAmerican lives will be spared and thewar shortened considerably. Not bywords—which means everything andanything—but by action now.

It is only within this international contextduring the height of the war that we canunderstand the primary argument, as comicalas it may sound, about repealing theExclusion laws to help our ally to win thewar in Asia and the secondary argument con-cerning a receptive China market forAmerican products after the war. No wonderarguments regarding racial equality, justice,and fairness to the Chinese and ChineseAmericans during the debate were appropri-ately referred to as “plainly boomerangs.”

In spite of these concessions to Chiang Kai-shek together with occasional affordable ship-ments of limited financial and military aids toChina during the war, the policy of artificiallypropping up the corrupt and deterioratingChiang regime proved misguided and costlyto the United States immediately after thewar. The lobby for China relief and for therepeal during the war eventually became themost politically influential lobby, the ChinaLobby, in Washington, D.C. after the war.

Within the context of domestic racial politics,the major arguments against the repeal were1) wait till the war was over, 2) open a wedgefor further influx of Asian immigrants, 3)protect jobs for American veterans and labor,4) maintain racial purity or white supremacy,and 5) keep America for Americans. At theheart of these objections was the historicChinese Question, over which the nationdebated for three decades before the enact-ment of the first Chinese Exclusion law in1882, and which continued to be the subjectof acrimonious debate for another threedecades.

Of these arguments, the last two—expressedmostly by witnesses from extreme right-wingorganizations such as the United AmericanMechanics, National Blue Star Mothers,American Coalition of Patriotic Societies,Society of Mayflower Descendants,Daughters of the American Revolution, andSons and Daughters of Liberty—were regard-ed as not credible. And, in fact, the Citizens’Committee expended no energy to neutralizeits opposition, and testimonies by thesegroups were largely ignored by the HouseImmigration Committee during its hearings.Since there was a wartime urgency tied to the


timing of the proposed legislation, the timeli-ness argument—a delay tactic—could like-wise be refuted without too much difficulty.This left only the second and third argumentsfor serious consideration, both of which hadto do with the limited number of jobs for toomany job seekers, especially if there werenew immigrants or an impending admissionof the Chinese through a quota allocation.These arguments, of course, were chargedwith racial and political overtones.

Domestic opposition to the repeal came fromtwo major segments of American society: thelabor unions and the veterans’ organizations.While there was strong conservative opposi-tion to the bill led by Congressman LeonardA. Allen of Louisiana, some of the conserva-tives were willing to go along with the repealalone, provided there was no quota forChinese and no right of naturalization. AsCongressman Allen, a member of the HouseImmigration Committee, declared, “I haveindicated to the Committee already that I waswilling to go along and erase or repeal thelaws which named the Chinese and put thefingers upon them,” but he was definitelyopposed to wiping out Asian exclusion ingeneral or providing for a quota. Thus thereal issue was whether Chinese should beadmitted at all after the repeal and, if so, howmany. Louis G. Hines, legislative representa-tive of the American Federation of Labor,articulated the AFL position in this manner:

The American Federation of Laborhas nothing but admiration for theChinese people. I do not think thatany other group of people in thiscountry has done more to help theChinese than the American Federationof Labor…

I want to go back to the inception ofthis thing in the first convention of theAmerican Federation of Labor back in1881 when it was recognized thatsomething had to be done to stop theimmigration of Chinese into thiscountry...the AFL has been maintain-ing all these years for the exclusion ofAsiatics....

We do not think that this is the time toraise this question of letting down thebars. The fact that it has been putforth here by people to represent win-ning the war, that is allpoppycock...we are not opposing thisfrom a racial stand point, we areopposing this from an economicstandpoint.

Hines further questioned the annual quota of105, insisting that arguments would beadvanced in the future for raising the quota:

If England with a population of lessthan 100 million, has a quota of65,000, China with a population of400 million, India with a populationof 400 million, if those countriesshould demand and get quotas in linewith the population of their countries,we will be bringing in over a million ayear.

Similar sentiment was expressed by HomerChaillaux, director of the NationalAmericanism Commission of the AmericanLegion, S.E. Wilkins of the Veterans ofForeign Wars, Victor E. Devereaux, directorof the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and repre-sentatives of the International Brotherhood ofTeamsters.


Removed by thousands of miles from battle-fronts in Europe and Asia, the racist positionof the leadership of the VFW at the height ofWorld War II was completely detached fromthe Chinese American fighting men underenemy fires. Chinese American enlisted men,15,000 strong, probably did not know whatthe leaders of VFW were telling their govern-ment in Washington, D.C., and how that orga-nization’s view was to have an adverseimpact on their rights as citizens when theytried to bring their wives into the UnitedStates after the war.

Lester M. Hunt of the Teamsters argued thatthe repeal was being instigated by theCommunists and that Congress was beingcoerced into passing the bill. He charged thatthe industrialists who now had to pay livingwages wanted to bring in cheap labor, butbeing too “smart” to say so directly, theycalled for racial equality—for everyone tolive in the same house and use the sametoothbrush. The Communists were apparently“suckers” or “nitwits” to fall for this “reac-tionary propaganda.” He advised that if theCommunists thought the Chinese were dis-criminated against, then the solution was notto let them in but to keep everybody out! Theirony of this conspiracy theory or Communistconspiracy theory will become self-evidentwhen we discuss the makeup of the ChinaLobby and its objectives in a later context.

At this point mention must also be made thatthere was no united opposition within labormovement, nor was there a solid support forthe position taken up by the leadership of thenational veterans organizations. In particular,the Congress of Industrial Organizations(CIO) was one of the earliest supporters of

repeal. As for the veterans organizations,again, we find internal dissension. From thevery inception the organizers of the Citizens’Committee to repeal the Chinese Exclusionlaws anticipated the “coolie labor menace”argument of labor unions and veterans organ-izations. The coolie labor menace was a polit-ical code term for race. A compromise formu-la was therefore fashioned which would limitimmigration to only a few Chinese per year atthe same time that it granted formal equalityand presumably prestige to the Chinese. Itwas a costly compromise to the racists andanother indication of the oppressive condi-tions under which Chinese Americans had tolive. Such a paradoxical position was subse-quently incorporated into the organizationalobjectives of the Citizens’ Committee at itsvery first meeting and the racial basis ofassigning the quota was written into theGosset and Magnuson bills.

While the proponents of HR 3070 vigorouslydefended its justice and adequacy, the para-dox did not escape notice and invited sarcasmfrom its opposition. During House debate onthe bill, Congressman Elmer of Missourirhetorically asked, “Do you think the Chinesewill be fooled by this cheap gesture of inter-national comity?” But according to Riggs,“The adoption of the racial quota of 105 metthe main objective of labor organizations,namely, that repeal would bring a flood ofcheap labor.” Likewise he concluded that,“The racial quota compromise...destroyed themain argument of the organizations—veter-ans and labor—which feared a heavy influxof workers.” Although it may have politicallydestroyed the opposition, it also buriedChinese American rights and privileges.


CONSEQUENCES OF THE REPEAL

I began this paper by suggesting that ChineseAmericans were living under a structure ofdual domination: racial oppression and extra-territorial domination of the Chiang Kai-shekgovernment. Both hegemonic forces had verylittle interest in the welfare and rights ofChinese Americans because they were inter-ested in only the big picture, their respectivenational interests and their bilateral relations.From the brief analysis above, it is clear thatthe Chinese American community did notfind itself liberated from the structure of dualdomination after the passage of the 1943 law.In fact, the events leading to and after therepeal confirmed and reinforced the structure.The rights of Chinese Americans were to beignored by both the U.S. government and bythe Chiang government as each pursued itsnational objectives.

The Citizens’ Committee, Congressional pro-ponents of the bill, and President Rooseveltwere interested only in pursuing the U.S.wartime objectives and retaining the racialdiscrimination against the Chinese. All theywanted was to make some cosmetic changesto meet the strategic needs of the UnitedStates and to undermine the Japanese propa-ganda of anti-Chinese laws in the UnitedStates. From the very beginning, they ignoredChinese Americans. Their assessment ofdomestic political situations led them to strikelegislative compromises, to exclude ChineseAmerican participation in the formulation ofthe bill, and to cause the final passage of awatered-down bill that could only be regard-ed by Chinese Americans as “an insult totheir intelligence,” as Congressman Elmercorrectly predicted.

The Chiang government cared only about themilitary and financial aids from the UnitedStates and the prospect of having its interna-tional status elevated. The racial oppressionof Chinese Americans reinforced the extrater-ritorial domination of Chinese America andinsured their loyalty to the regime in China.Throughout the legislative process, theChiang government could not have cared lessabout the rights of Chinese Americans anddid not speak out forcefully on their behalf.Instead, it conspired with the Citizens’Committee to dictate the political agenda andstrategy and followed what it was told to do.

One of the major consequences of the repealmovement was the emergence of a very pow-erful political force made up of interestgroups whose primary concern was the futureof China. This group, later identified as theChina Lobby, came to playa vital role in post-war domestic and international politics in theUnited States and in dictating U.S. policytoward China and Taiwan.

Earlier we mentioned the active but behind-the-scene participation of C.L. Hsia, directorof the Chinese News Service, and his twoadvisors, Earl Leaf and H.J. Timberley, in theinitial exploratory process of the Citizens’Committee. We also indicated that theChinese News Service was an importantpropaganda arm of the Ministry ofInformation of the Guomindang governmentin the United States, with offices in NewYork, San Francisco, Chicago, andWashington, D.C. Hsia contributed supportarticles in Contemporary China and advisedorganizers of the Citizens’ Committee that itwould be unwise for Chinese to figure tooconspicuously in the drive-a familiar tactic


used by Guomindang agents in the UnitedStates. According to Riggs, in 1942 severalChinese in the United States,

. . . particularly officers of the ChineseNews Service, took active, thoughunofficial part in studying the possi-bilities for repeal... when a newsletterwas organized (by the Citizens’Committee), it was prepared and cir-culated by an employee of theChinese News Service and the mailinglist included Chinese News Servicepersonnel, both Chinese andAmericans in leading cities, as well asa representative in the Chineseembassy in Washington. In generalthough, caution was urged and theimportance of using Americans tobuild up opinion on the question wasstressed.

In the fall of 1942 a pamphlet entitled “WhatChinese Exclusion Really Means;’ by Dr.Tso-Chien Shen of the Chinese Ministry forForeign Affairs, was published by the ChinaInstitute in New York, an organization partial-ly supported by the Ministry of Education inChina. Riggs reported that Dr. Shen was“substantially stationed in Washington, D.C.,at the embassy during the course of the repealcampaign.”

When the Citizens’ Committee first met onMay 25, 1943, a non-member, P.C. Hsu, wasreported present, presumably from theChinese News Service. To help highlight therepeal drive, a Tribute to China sponsored bythe United China Relief was held in CarnegieHall in New York with the aid of a commer-cial public relations organization. Among the

speakers at a rally were Pearl Buck; Lin Yu-tang, an apologist of the Guomindang gov-ernment; Bishop Paul Yu-Pin, on the staff ofthe China Monthly (an influential but appar-ently independent magazine regarded as “theofficial mouthpiece of the Chiang govern-ment in Chongqing on matters that could notdiplomatically be published in the officialpropaganda organs of that government”); J.B.Powell, a former American correspondent inChina and, in 1946, a founder of theAmerican China Policy Association, anorganization headed by Alfred Kohlbergdevoted to promote aid to China; and WeiTao-Ming, the Chinese Ambassador to theUnited States.

Prior to the House Immigration Committeehearings in May and June, Cooper (counsel tothe Chinese Embassy) helped to line up wit-nesses for the hearings but, according toRiggs, “did not speak himself because of hisofficial connections.” In addition, the ChineseEmbassy played an active but inconspicuousrole in lobbying members of the ImmigrationCommittee. For example, on the opening dayof the hearings Congressman Allen said, “agentleman representing himself as comingfrom the Chinese Embassy has called on meand told me that he was calling on othermembers of the Committee also.” LikewiseCongressman Mason said, “The Chinese peo-ple, through accredited representatives, havesaid definitely that this is a very importantemergency war measure and authoritativesources from China itself and not from unau-thoritative or ill-informed sources.” He wasprobably referring to Madame Chiang Kai-shek who was touring the United States atthat time. And, in fact, she invited a numberof key Congressmen, among them


Congressmen Mason, Gossett, Magnuson—all sponsors of repeal bills—to a dinner onthe weekend of May 15 and 16, ten daysbefore the hearings. Later during the Housedebate, Mason acknowledged the Magnusonbill was exactly what the Chinese leaders hadasked for and wanted.

After HR 3070 was cleared by the House andheaded for the Senate, the Citizens’Committee decided that public expression ofappreciation by the Chinese governmentwould help speed up the bills through theU.S. Senate. Dutifully, C.L. Hsia of theChinese News Service was asked to telegraphHollington K. Tong, Chinese Vice Minister ofInformation, to get a roundup of reactions inChongqing which could then be publishedthrough the Chinese News Service and usedin Congressional debates. This immediatelyresulted in glowing, appreciative public state-ments from such government spokesmen asSun Fu, president of the Legislative Yuan;Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, former ambassador to theUnited States; and newspaper editorials.None mentioned how Chinese were to beexcluded still. In the meantime, they madetheir point and succeeded in managing infor-mation for American consumption.

The failure of the Chiang government to rep-resent Chinese American interests was round-ly denounced by Wu Xiangying, in his histo-ry of the Chinese in the United States (1954),in which he characterized the repeal as “aninjury” to Chinese Americans who weregiven “false promises.” Like dumb persons,Chinese Americans were forced to swallowbitter pills, according to him, but were unableto complain of their bitterness. He thoughtthe true beneficiary of the repeal was the

United States, not China or the Chinese. Heblamed Song Zhiwen, minister of foreignaffairs, and Wei Daoming, Chinese ambassa-dor to the United States, for their incompe-tence and indifference, and ultimately, ChiangKai-shek for appointing these officials.

It is obvious from this review that, though theGuomindang government remained incon-spicuous throughout the legislative process,it, in fact, worked closely with the politicalelites and the Citizens’ Committee: it helpeddraft a bill, lined up witnesses at the hearings,generated favorable public opinions, helpedmobilize letter campaigns, lobbied keyCongressmen to solicit their support, andfinally even manufactured consent and favor-able comments from government officialsafter the bill passed the House. This wasindeed a prelude or a dress rehearsal for thesophisticated legislative engineering and pub-lic opinion management of what came to beknown as the China Lobby after the war. Onthe other hand, why should this not be, con-sidering there were only minor changes in thecast of characters between the Repeal Act andthe bigger and better productions to be under-taken by the China Lobby after the war?

Since we have described the main charac-ters—the China-oriented groups and theGuomindang agents in the United States—wemust now turn to the minor supporting char-acters, the Chinese in the United States or theChinese Americans. It seems ironic that thegroup that stood to benefit most from anyrelaxation on the repressive laws against theChinese was systematically excluded fromthe legislative process. To be sure, ChineseAmericans were not totally kept out, but theywere permitted only to play a very limited


and prescribed role assigned to them by theCitizens’ Committee. That role, as it turnedout, was to demonstrate to the HouseImmigration Committee that Chinese inAmerica were no longer the coolies, the hea-thens, and the immoral, unassimilable humanbeings of the past. Instead, they were fullyAmericanized and assimilated, posing nothreat to the moral and racial purity of theUnited States.

To orchestrate this narrow stereotypicalimage of Chinese Americans, the committeecarefully lined up two Chinese Americans,Dr. Li Min Hin from Hawaii and Paul Yee, anelectronic engineer working for the WarDepartment at that time, two successful, non-threatening and fully assimilated ChineseAmericans. Dr. Li told the committee that hewas an American citizen, had received hiseducation and medical degree in the UnitedStates, was past Commander of the HawaiianDepartment of the American Legion whichhag a largely Caucasian membership and hadrepresented his department at differentnational conventions of the Legion as chair-man of his delegation. His testimony dealtmostly with the positive role of the Chinesein Hawaii, highlighting the important contri-butions they had made to the advancement ofthe Hawaiian Islands and the responsibilitiesthey had assumed in connection with theprosecution of the war effort. He said,“Hawaii furnishes the best example of theUnited States of the assimilability of theChinese into the American way of life.”

The other Chinese American witness, PaulYee, told the committee about the part playedby many skilled Chinese technicians andexperts in various war industries and in the

Armed Services, obviously an attempt todemonstrate that the Chinese could and didassimilate to American life and could nolonger be considered “coolie laborers.” Whenasked about the potential passage of a repeallaw, he answered that, “It would certainlyincrease the friendship between the Chinese,the American Chinese, and this country.” Hedid not answer the question in light of thegross injustice built into the proposed legisla-tion. Either he did not know the impact of theproposed bills on the Chinese American com-munity or he was not at liberty extensively onboth the positive and negative aspects of it.

If the objective of the Citizens’ Committeewas to put forth before the American publican image of successful, patriotic, hardwork-ing, docile, assimilated Chinese, it very defi-nitely achieved that end. In many ways, thiswas precisely the same image that Rose HumLee tried to project to the American public inher 1942 article published in Survey Graphic.She wanted the American society to knowthat Chinese Americans were productive andloyal members of the American society andwere well on their way to what she calledcomplete assimilation. The only barriertoward achieving that goal for ChineseAmericans was the second-class status thatChinese were placed in and her prescriptionfor elevating Chinese status was in fact theremoval of the discriminatory Exclusion lawsand rendering in the United States eligible forcitizenship. Dr. Li Min Hin and Paul Yeeboth p assimilated image that Rose Hum Leetried to project to the American public. Nodoubt, the depiction that Rose Hum Lee, Dr.Li, and Paul Yee put forth before theAmerican public was one of a successfulassimilated Chinese. Whether or not this


image was consistent with the social realityfacing the Chinese in the United States, itbecame an image to be put in practice and alifestyle to be emulated by all ChineseAmericans in the decades after the war.

However, on the negative side, the new lawhad very little effect on the Chinese commu-nity because of the war and the small quotaallocated to the Chinese. Most Chinese had tocontinue living separated from their wives,husbands, parents, or close relatives.Moreover, the naturalization right, while itwas there, did not necessarily mean thatChinese in the United States were automati-cally awarded citizenship. To acquire citizen-ship one had to pass three tests: the valid doc-umentation of entry into the United States,ability to pass the English language test, andknowledge of American history and theConstitution. All three tests proved to be dif-ficult, if not insurmountable, for mostChinese in the United States. In 1943, theyear before the new law went into effect, thetotal number of persons naturalized was 497,a figure that included whites born in China.The figures for the next four years, 1944-1947, were 730, 739, 599, and 831. Therepeal did nothing to empower the ChineseAmerican community. To this date, ChineseAmericans remain largely disenfranchised.

Lastly, the repeal and the granting of thequota and naturalization right to the Chineseresulted in the emergence of a new image ofthe Chinese in America—an image thatdepicts Chinese as assimilated into the main-stream, or an image which many Chinese,including people like Rose Hum Lee, Dr. LiMin Hing, Paul Yee, and others, began toconvince themselves was the only appropriate

or acceptable image to be cultivated andinternalized, regardless of their class statusand racial, cultural, and linguistic affiliation.This wartime image of being equal to whitesand being accepted into the dominant societysoon turned into a self-fulfilling prophecythat proved to be self-deceiving and detri-mental. The sole enduring stereotypicalimage of Chinese Americans was that theywere docile, hardworking, and successfullyassimilated—an image that was clearly false.

CONCLUSIONS

The repeal of the Chinese Exclusion laws in1943 did little to liberate Chinese Americansfrom racial oppression and extraterritorialdomination of the Chiang regime. In fact, therepeal itself and the deliberate exclusion ofChinese Americans from the legislativeprocess reinforced the structure of dual domi-nation. Both the Chiang regime and the inter-est groups behind the repeal learned impor-tant lessons in political lobbying. Their orga-nizational network became the basis for theemergence of the powerful China Lobby afterthe war.

In the meantime, Chinese Americans had towait for the African American civil rightsmovement to lead the way toward their ownliberation, not only from racial oppression butalso the extraterritorial domination whichintensified greatly during the Cold War. Thecivil rights movements paved the way for the1965 comprehensive immigration law thatfinally abolished the racist quota law andstrengthened the Chinese Americans in theirstruggle against racial oppression. In theirown struggle for liberation from racialoppression, Chinese Americans discovered


how they also needed to be liberated from theextraterritorial domination of Taiwan andChina if they were to achieve full citizenshipin the United States.

L. Ling Chi Wang’s “Politics of the Repeal of theChinese Exclusion Laws” originally appeared in TheRepeal and Its Legacy, Proceedings of the Conferenceon the 50th Anniversary of the 1943 repeal of theChinese Exclusion Acts, hosted by CHSA and SanFrancisco State University’s Asian American StudiesDepartment, edited by Robert Fung, San Francisco:Chinese Historical Society of America, 1993; reprintedwith permission.

©1993, 2007 Chinese Historical Society of America.

view articles, video, and historical documentsonline at www.Remembering1882.org

“politics of the repeal of the chinese exclusion laws” by l. ling-chi wang

Documents