pollution prevention and homeland security michael j. ellenbecker kwangseog ahn
TRANSCRIPT
Homeland Security & Homeland Security & Preventing Pollution from Preventing Pollution from
Attack on Critical Waterside Attack on Critical Waterside InfrastructureInfrastructure
Presented byPresented by
Ed Badolato, Executive VP, Homeland SecurityEd Badolato, Executive VP, Homeland Security The Shaw Group The Shaw Group
New Hampshire Pollution Prevention New Hampshire Pollution Prevention ConferenceConference
University of New HampshireUniversity of New Hampshire
September 21, 2004September 21, 2004
Vulnerability: How to Vulnerability: How to Audit Your FacilityAudit Your Facility
Presented byPresented by
Ed BadolatoEd BadolatoExecutive Vice President for Homeland SecurityExecutive Vice President for Homeland Security
The Shaw GroupThe Shaw Group
University of New HampshireUniversity of New Hampshire
September 21, 2004September 21, 2004
The New Environmental The New Environmental ParadigmParadigm
Certain parts of the infrastructure Certain parts of the infrastructure are attractive targets for terroristsare attractive targets for terrorists Mass casualtiesMass casualties Property damageProperty damage Economic lossesEconomic losses Environmental impactEnvironmental impact
We must reduce risk from indirect We must reduce risk from indirect releases into the environmentreleases into the environment
Osama bin Laden’s Osama bin Laden’s Targeting PhilosophyTargeting Philosophy
““Inflict maximum damage Inflict maximum damage to to
human, economic andhuman, economic andphysical infrastructures” physical infrastructures”
““Attack symbolic, high Attack symbolic, high prestige,prestige,
economic, and strategic economic, and strategic targetstargets””
Four Bad Things That Can Happen Four Bad Things That Can Happen from a Terrorist Attack on Your from a Terrorist Attack on Your
FacilityFacility1.1. Loss of containmentLoss of containment
2.2. Theft or misuse with intent to Theft or misuse with intent to cause harmcause harm
3.3. Worker internal or public harm Worker internal or public harm offsiteoffsite
4.4. Degradation of assets, business Degradation of assets, business functions, or company valuefunctions, or company value
CRITICAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURESINFRASTRUCTURES
Chemicals and Hazardous Chemicals and Hazardous Materials Materials
EnergyEnergy TransportationTransportation WaterWater Telecommunications Telecommunications Agriculture & FoodAgriculture & Food Banking and FinanceBanking and Finance Public HealthPublic Health Emergency ServicesEmergency Services Defense Industrial BaseDefense Industrial Base Postal and Express ShippingPostal and Express Shipping
Vulnerability of Petro-Chem FacilitiesVulnerability of Petro-Chem Facilities
This book was co-authored This book was co-authored by Ed Badolatoby Ed Badolato
It covers:It covers: Industrial disastersIndustrial disasters Process related Process related
incidentsincidents The terrorist threat to The terrorist threat to
populated areaspopulated areas Sabotage of chem Sabotage of chem
facilities and RR tank facilities and RR tank carscars
The cost factorThe cost factor
Terrorism and the Chemical Terrorism and the Chemical Transportation IndustryTransportation Industry
1.1. Plug the security gaps Plug the security gaps noted in industry noted in industry “Lessons Learned” & “Lessons Learned” & “Best Practices”“Best Practices”
2.2. Work across the full Work across the full spectrum of Homeland spectrum of Homeland Security incidents—Security incidents—preparation, response, preparation, response, recoveryrecovery
3.3. Adopt and adapt Adopt and adapt technology fixestechnology fixes
4.4. Organize a layered, Organize a layered, integrated security integrated security systemsystem
What We Can Expect in the What We Can Expect in the Future Future
More mass casualty attacks--More mass casualty attacks--
““few attacks in the US, but they will be few attacks in the US, but they will be closer to the Madrid rail scenario than the closer to the Madrid rail scenario than the WTC 9/11”WTC 9/11”
Terrorist conventional bombings along Terrorist conventional bombings along with WMD attempts--with WMD attempts--
““bombs will be the most predominant form bombs will be the most predominant form of attack”of attack”
More terrorist cells and operatives will More terrorist cells and operatives will be uncovered in the US be uncovered in the US
Laws & Regulations that Laws & Regulations that Impact Facility Impact Facility PreparednessPreparedness
Clean Air Act Clean Air Act Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002Act of 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act of Maritime Transportation Security Act of
20022002 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
19761976 Occupational Safety and Health ActOccupational Safety and Health Act Emergency Planning and Community Right-Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Actto-Know Act
Chemical/Environmental Security Chemical/Environmental Security PlayersPlayers
Key Agencies & OrganizationsKey Agencies & Organizations Department of Homeland Security (DHS)Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Department of JusticeDepartment of Justice Department of DefenseDepartment of Defense State & Local Emergency ResponseState & Local Emergency Response Industry Associations—ACC, SOCMA, and state Industry Associations—ACC, SOCMA, and state
industry organizationsindustry organizations American Institute of Chemical EngineersAmerican Institute of Chemical Engineers
Secondary Agencies & OrganizationsSecondary Agencies & Organizations DOTDOT OSHAOSHA DOEDOE
DHS and the National HS DHS and the National HS StrategyStrategy
The three objectives of the national The three objectives of the national strategy:strategy:
1. Prevent terrorist attacks within 1. Prevent terrorist attacks within the USthe US
2. Reduce Americas vulnerability to 2. Reduce Americas vulnerability to terroriststerrorists
3. Minimize the damage and recover 3. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occurfrom attacks that do occur
DHS Infrastructure Protective DHS Infrastructure Protective Measures PlanMeasures Plan
Technical ApplicationsTechnical Applications WMD PreventionWMD Prevention Protection MeasuresProtection Measures
Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP)Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) 1700 sites this year1700 sites this year Target selectionTarget selection Surveillance OpsSurveillance Ops Planning OpsPlanning Ops RehearsalsRehearsals
TrainingTraining
Industry Safety Management Industry Safety Management CapabilitiesCapabilities
Process Safety Management SystemsProcess Safety Management Systems Hazard Evaluation ProceduresHazard Evaluation Procedures Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Chemical Process Quantitative Risk
AnalysisAnalysis Release MitigationRelease Mitigation Safe Storage & Handling of High Safe Storage & Handling of High
Toxic Hazard MaterialsToxic Hazard Materials Layer of Protection Analysis Layer of Protection Analysis
We Must Work Across the Full We Must Work Across the Full Spectrum Spectrum
of Homeland Security of Homeland Security SituationsSituations
PreparationPreparationThreatThreat
VulnerabilityVulnerability
RiskRisk
CountermeasuresCountermeasures
TrainingTraining
Alert/WarningAlert/Warning
ResponseResponse
PolicePolice
EMSEMS
FireFire
Emergency Emergency CoordinationCoordination
EvacuationEvacuation
RecoveryRecovery
Emergency Emergency ResponseResponse
Incident Incident Mgt Public Mgt Public SafetySafety
Clean upClean up
Resumption Resumption of of OperationsOperations
Suggestions for IndustrySuggestions for Industry
The new industry security strategy The new industry security strategy should:should: Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure
facilities.facilities. Specify security roles and responsibilities.Specify security roles and responsibilities. Describe appropriate threat/alert information Describe appropriate threat/alert information
flows.flows. Set the standards for actionable security plansSet the standards for actionable security plans
Suggestions for Your Suggestions for Your FacilityFacility
Assume you are a targetAssume you are a target Extend your perimeter—”mutual Extend your perimeter—”mutual
support”support” BarriersBarriers SurveillanceSurveillance PlanningPlanning Inform & engage employeesInform & engage employees
The Security Vulnerability The Security Vulnerability Assessment ProcessAssessment Process
1.1. Project Planning Meeting--Project Planning Meeting--Setting the right course with the company/clientSetting the right course with the company/client
2.2. Facility Characterization and Critical Asset Identification--Facility Characterization and Critical Asset Identification--A thorough A thorough characterization of site asset characteristics and hazardscharacterization of site asset characteristics and hazards
3.3. Identify and Prioritize the Threat-Identify and Prioritize the Threat---Complete evaluation of threats; internal, Complete evaluation of threats; internal, external, internally-assistedexternal, internally-assisted
4.4. Vulnerability Analysis--Vulnerability Analysis--Prioritized evaluation of threats against assetsPrioritized evaluation of threats against assets
5.5. Risk Assessment —Risk Assessment —defining the potential for damage to or loss of an asset defining the potential for damage to or loss of an asset
6.6. Countermeasures Identification and Effectiveness Measurement--Countermeasures Identification and Effectiveness Measurement--Prioritized validation and justification of costs for improved security, Prioritized validation and justification of costs for improved security, highlighting process/operations benefitshighlighting process/operations benefits
7.7. Preparing the ReportPreparing the Report
8.8. ImplementationImplementation
Threat MethodologyThreat Methodology
Understand how terrorists target Understand how terrorists target facilitiesfacilities
Build a detailed, focused assessmentBuild a detailed, focused assessment Initial screening of sources of threat Initial screening of sources of threat
info info Contact with local, state, & federal law Contact with local, state, & federal law
enforcement and intelligence agenciesenforcement and intelligence agencies Interviews with facility security Interviews with facility security
managersmanagers
Vulnerability AssessmentVulnerability Assessment
““Identification of the extent of Identification of the extent of susceptibility to exploitation, relative susceptibility to exploitation, relative to the existence of any to the existence of any countermeasures.”countermeasures.”
Two Approaches to Vulnerability Two Approaches to Vulnerability AnalysisAnalysis
1.1. Asset-based analysis: Asset-based analysis: assess assess potential targets (any attack potential targets (any attack scenariosscenarios) )
2.2. Scenario-based analysis: Scenario-based analysis: assess assess attack scenarios (any asset)attack scenarios (any asset)
VAVA Asset-Based Approach Asset-Based ApproachWhere used:Where used:
− ““Basic” sites, i.e. no complex security Basic” sites, i.e. no complex security challengeschallenges
Key ElementsKey Elements− Assess and categorize consequencesAssess and categorize consequences
− Assess target attractivenessAssess target attractiveness
− Identify and assess key assetsIdentify and assess key assets• Based on consequence and Based on consequence and
attractivenessattractiveness
• Identify areas needing further Identify areas needing further protectionprotection
VA Scenario-Based ApproachVA Scenario-Based ApproachWhere Used:Where Used:
− Complex security challengesComplex security challenges
− High inherent threatHigh inherent threat
Key ElementsKey Elements− Identify key assets/targetsIdentify key assets/targets
− Identify applicable threatsIdentify applicable threats
− Identify potential scenariosIdentify potential scenarios
− Drives countermeasures for selected Drives countermeasures for selected scenariosscenarios
RISKRISK
Risk assessmentRisk assessment—”a —”a qualitative and/or quantitative qualitative and/or quantitative determination of the probability determination of the probability of occurrence of an adverse of occurrence of an adverse event and the impact of its event and the impact of its consequences.” consequences.”
Step 6. Countermeasures Identification and Step 6. Countermeasures Identification and Effectiveness Measurement-Effectiveness Measurement-
Physical Security Physical Security Systems Systems
Perimeter ProtectionPerimeter Protection FencesFences LightsLights Gates & Access ControlsGates & Access Controls Entrance/equipment locksEntrance/equipment locks Protection Force Protection Force Electronic security systems--motion Electronic security systems--motion
detectorsdetectors Video surveillance systems, Video surveillance systems, Building alarm systemsBuilding alarm systems
Other CountermeasuresOther Countermeasures
Loss prevention & material controlLoss prevention & material control Control room securityControl room security Distributed Control SystemsDistributed Control Systems Crisis management and emergency Crisis management and emergency
responseresponse Policies & proceduresPolicies & procedures IT/Cyber securityIT/Cyber security IntelligenceIntelligence
SUMMARYSUMMARY
SVAs Perform Important Functions SVAs Perform Important Functions Defines roles & relationshipsDefines roles & relationships Identifies necessary resourcesIdentifies necessary resources Ensures comprehensive security effortEnsures comprehensive security effort Sets plan for implementationSets plan for implementation
MODULE 2: Introduction to theToxics Use Reduction Act
Toxics Use Reduction Institute
978.934.3391
ProcessCharacterization
ProcessCharacterization
Pre-PlanPre-Plan
Identify TUROptions
Identify TUROptions
Develop orUpdate PlanDevelop orUpdate Plan
Certify PlanCertify Plan
Screen & Evaluate TUR
Options
Screen & Evaluate TUR
Options
ImplementPlan
The TUR Planning Cycle
Responsibilities of a TUR Planner
MeasureSuccess
Similarities in the Security and TUR Assessment Processes
The Security Vulnerability Assessment Process
1. Project Planning Meeting
2. Facility Characterization and Critical Asset Identification
3. Identify and Prioritize the Threat
4. Vulnerability Analysis
5. Risk Assessment
6. Countermeasures Identification and Effectiveness Measurement
7. Preparing the Report
8. Implementation
ProcessCharacterization
ProcessCharacterization
Pre-PlanPre-Plan
Identify TUROptions
Identify TUROptions
Develop orUpdate PlanDevelop orUpdate Plan
Certify PlanCertify Plan
Screen & Evaluate TUR
Options
Screen & Evaluate TUR
Options
ImplementPlan
The TUR Planning Cycle
MeasureSuccess
Importance of TUR in HS
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES Chemicals and Hazardous Materials Energy Transportation…
Pollution Prevention and Homeland Security
Can use similar assessment methods PP personnel may be qualified to perform HS
assessment, particularly in industry using hazardous chemicals
PP itself reduces risks in HS– Lower toxicity– Lower volatility/explosion potential– Lower volumes store on site
Opportunities for TURI
Appears there is lack of interaction between TUR/PP and HS
TURI already has the expertise and resources for TUR/PP that can be applied directly to HS
What TURI Can Do?
Advocate TUR to reduce HS risks Extend TURP program to TUR-HSP program Identify and prioritize the HS risks from hazardous
chemicals– Use TURA data and TRI data including use amounts, locations of
plants, etc. – Use chemical info including explosiveness, flammability, toxicity,
etc.– Use other information about presence of symbolic, high prestige,
economic, and strategic targets– Combine all the information to prioritize the HS risks
Use the planning process to reduce HS risks