Stephen Gill argues that the contemporary global politics of development are characterised by ‘new constitutionalism’ and ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. Do you

agree or disagree with this statement, and why?

In 2002, Professor Stephen Gill of York University published an article discussing

the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’, which he described in part, as a

“redefinition of the political on a world scale” (Gill 2002: 47). This was one of

several articles related to ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ and the emergence of what

he called the ‘market civilization’. These concepts refer to transformations in the

understanding of social purpose and ideologies based on market integration and

the neo-liberal oriented accumulation and consumption (Gill 1995: 401).

In the first section of this article, I will discuss the concepts of ‘new

constitutionalism’ and ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, concluding that Gill’s

arguments are supported by strong evidence. In the second section, I will

evaluate to what extent the contemporary global politics of development can be

said to be ‘characterised’ by new constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism

by discussing some of the implications of the neoliberal ‘redefinition of the

political’ as a philosophical and multilateral agenda and some of the ways in

which this agenda is unable to achieve complete hegemony.

New constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism

Gill describes ‘new constitutionalism’ as the “political-juridical counterpart” to

‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. As such, the two concepts are very closely related.

Disciplinary neoliberalism has been defined as “a discourse of political economy

that promotes the power of capital through extension and deepening of market

values and disciplines in social life, under a regime of free enterprise” (Gill 2002:

47).

Without examining the conceptual complexities of how Gill arrives at his

understanding of discipline, we can concentrate on the way in which market

values are extended into social life in what he calls the “socialisation of capital”

(Gill 2002: 63). It essentially refers to the way that neo-liberal conceptions of

identity and relationship are based increasingly on the market and how these

conceptions are increasingly institutionalised. This trend is clearly visible in

several ways, including; the framing of ‘official’ development discourse, the use of

state or institutional power and the ‘common sense’ of market discipline.

Development discourse is replete with references to economic growth as the basis

of success (Higgot & Weber 2005: 437). Onis (2005: 265) identifies market

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liberalism as fundamental for the development model espoused by a neo-liberal

orthodoxy during the period of the Washington consensus. In a review of the

changing politics of the World Bank (WB) Cammack (2002) shows that the tenets

of neo-liberal economic theory have remained a consistent theme in policy. This

has continued regardless of the remodelling of the World Bank’s image from

banking into the business of ‘development’ (Cammack 2002; Higgot & Weber

2005). That neo-liberal capital accumulation forms part of the development

discourse and strategy of the World Bank suggests that neo-liberal thinking is a

strong part of the modern political landscape of institutional development.

Referring to a series of World Bank reports, Cammack says

“Its [WB] stated purpose, then, was to define for all economies

in the global capitalist system – not just those in transition – a

comprehensive set of institutions that would eradicate any

vestige of planning, and implement the logic of capitalist

exploitation, competition and accumulation throughout all

economic, social, political and cultural systems” (Cammack

2002:171)

This framing of development discourse in terms of capitalist accumulation is seen

just as clearly in the particulars of the ‘Millennium Challenge Account’ (MCA). This

fund was designed to give grants to so called ‘failed states’ that implemented

certain economic and governance policies. Soederberg (2004: 294) quotes

President George W Bush tying MCA support to the implementation of ‘economic

freedom’, a pseudonym for neo-liberal market policy.

Gill explains the emergence of market civilization when he says;

“…social institutions were redefined to create an emergent

market civilization – a monoculture of both social development

and the mind that is associated with a new political economy of

disciplinary neoliberalism… The structure of this emerging

civilizational form relies on the disciplinary power of market

forces… to shape social choice and social stratification” (Gill

2002: 50)

Even when the World Bank and similar institutions in Europe adopted the ‘human

face’ of a more socially responsible development, it really only disguised the

ultimate liberal goal of market rationality (Mitchell 2006: 404).

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The institutionalisation of market discipline involves the creation of laws,

regulations and forms of planning on a world scale (Gill 2002: 47). Concepts of

‘good governance’ are used to establish a basis of market liberalisation as the

ideal of government planning and regulation. An example is the changing policies

and programs put in place for the European Union’s integration of migrants and

second generation minorities. Mitchell (2004: 394) chronicles a move in the

policy of the education sector of the European Commission from a focus on

cultural diversity to a focus on lifelong learning. This change in focus prioritises

skills and mobility necessary for economic success. The aim is for the immigrant

to be able to drive their own individual learning to allow them to integrate

successfully, not into the social fabric of Europe, but into the European labour

market. Further, Ayers (2006) and Evans (2007) make good cases for both

democratic reforms and human rights codifications being platforms of support for

the advancement of market discipline. In both these cases, the authors present

the regulations and laws by which democracy and human rights are codified as

intentionally laying the foundation for the successful institution of market

liberalisation and notions of capital accumulation.

Market discipline is presented as a sort of fait accompli or even ‘common sense’

in modern western society. One writer says, “…global action is guided by the

norms defined by ‘market discipline’. These norms have achieved widespread

acceptance as ‘common sense’ within the populations of advanced economies”

(Evans 2007: 118). This acceptance comes partly from the illusion of economic

liberalism as ‘ahistorical’, that is, without any traceable development or

alternative. Higgot and Weber support the point, saying “This strategy can

appear unproblematic from the mainstream perspective because of the ahistorical

nature of the theoretical framework of the trade-development debate anyway”

(Higgot & Weber 2005: 436). Concealing the history and development of

economic liberalism as the dominant perspective creates a sort of stasis in the

framework of understanding development discourse. Cammack traces the

changing fortunes of market liberalisation and neo-liberal development discourse

and establishes the specific struggle by particular economists and academics to

restore the “hegemony of economic liberalism” (Cammack 2002: 163). This

indicates that there are alternatives to economic liberalism and possibilities for

differing political discourse. The ideological basis of market civilisation and the

historical struggles for the discourse of development will be discussed further in

the second section of the article.

This acceptance also comes partly from economics being presented as separate

from politics. Markets are viewed as being somehow independent and neutral

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entities ruled from the grave by Adam Smith’s invisible hand, maintaining a sort

of natural equilibrium that transcend the question of politics. As neutral bodies

maintaining independence from political concerns, they conceal their political

biases and connections. Barry Gills laments the true study of political economy

when he says “What we cannot have (again!) is economics without politics and

politics without economics” (Gills 2001: 236). But it is precisely this separation of

economics from politics in institutional form that Gill describes as ‘new

constitutionalism’.

Gill introduces his article with an abstract that states, “New constitutionalism’

limits democratic control over central elements of economic policy and regulation

by locking in future governments to liberal frameworks of accumulation premised

on freedom of enterprise” (Gill 2002: 47). He further elucidates by explaining

that the separation of economics and politics and the institution of neoliberal

political and legal reforms are designed to commit governments to a future of

neoliberal market economy and limit the political means to change that

commitment (Gill 2002: 47). Simply put, a framework is created which

establishes what sort of political action is possible. Referring to the World Trade

Organisation (WTO), Weber says “The WTO as a multilaterally constituted agency

of global governance with constitutional features limits in politically important

ways the range of environmental policy options from the local to the international

level” (Weber 2001: 93). Organisations such as the WTO are constituted

multilaterally to make decisions which rely on compliance by member states.

These decisions are effectively removed from the arena of representative decision

making because they occur at a level when citizenship provides no opportunity for

representation. More specifically, the WTO provides a conceptual framework for

national decision making (Lang in Higgot & Weber 2005: 443). Similarly, this

constriction of decision making to neo-liberal economic strategy, which Friedman

(1999: 86) ironically refers to as the ‘golden straightjacket’ is seen in situations

that arise from free trade agreements (FTA). The Peru-US FTA contains provision

for a fund manager, Citibank, to sue the nation of Peru at the United Nations or

World Bank tribunal for loss of income, should Peru choose to reverse a

privatisation deal made for managing superannuation. Considering the size of the

claim, Peru would have great difficulty choosing to reinstate government

sponsored superannuation, even if it was in the best interest of the welfare of the

Peruvians (Public Citizen 2007: 3).

Gill suggests that new constitutionalism also consists of those efforts to “contain

challenges to the disciplinary neoliberalism project through co-optation,

domestication, neutralization and depoliticization of opposition.” (Gill 2002: 48)

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He uses an example of the ‘third way’ agenda to show that traditional political

parties based on alternatives to neo-liberalism have been co-opted to support

neo-liberal policy. (Gill 2002: 50) A review of Thomas and Weber’s (1999) article

on the political ramifications of environmental organisations being involved in the

establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) suggests

that organisations with agendas alternative to neoliberal policy are in danger of

being co-opted or subverted into supporting the discourse of neo-liberal market

economy.

Ideology and Agenda

“The new constitutionalism can be defined as the political

project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if

possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future

development. It is therefore intimately related to the rise of

market civilization” (Gill 1995: 412)

New constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism are really ways of analysing

a calculated agenda to establish political hegemony. This agenda is regarded as

being the project of western agencies, international organisation and of neo-

colonial elites (Ayers 2006: 321) and of big corporate capital and dominant social

forces (Gill 2002: 48). This becomes relevant in that establishing a motive and

reasoning for a neo-liberal agenda helps in understanding to what degree motive

driven concepts such as disciplinary neo-liberalism and new constitutionalism can

be said to be ‘characteristic’ of contemporary development politics.

There are a number of perspectives from which to approach the neoliberal

agenda. Firstly, we can consider it from the point of view of an ideological and

philosophical necessity. This is a question based on the premise of what it

means to be civilised. Is civilisation to be based on the concept of the market as

an expression of personal freedoms to trade and own property? Higgot and

Weber answer the question, “the answer to the question of ‘who we are’ is homo

economicus, with its instrumental justification of ‘market-society’” (Higgot &

Weber 2005: 437). This concept is based on the belief that all people are

economically rational (Ayers 2006: 332) and if ‘free’, will always choose to ‘better’

themselves. These concepts conceal power relations and cultural norms which

serve to constrain action. Part of the claim of the ‘rational mind’ is the

assumption that this claim of the free ‘liberal self’ is a universal characteristic.

(Ayers 2006: 332) These assumptions require a self justification of market

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civilisation that naturally resolves into the belief that what is good for us, is good

for everyone (Soederberg 2004: 289).

Secondly, we can view the neo-liberal agenda as an integral part of a multilateral

project on behalf of the United States of America and other western capitalist

nations who have adopted similar projects. Gill suggests this when he says

“In other words, the US government is using access to its vast

market as a lever of power, linked to a reshaping of the

international business climate, by subjecting other nations to

the disciplines of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely

refusing to submit to them itself, partly for strategic reasons”

(Gill 2002: 415).

It is possible to view this spread of market civilisation as part of a multilateral

project to maintain US global supremacy. President Bush’s driving of the MCA

was a challenge to the institutions of world governance, such as the World Trade

Organisation and World Bank to adopt more stringent means of fitting ‘failed

states’ into Friedman’s ‘golden straightjacket’ (Soederberg 2004: 292).

Finally, we can view it as a process initiated on behalf of big business. Gill says

“Disciplinary neo-liberalism is commensurate with interests of big corporate

capital and dominant social forces” (Gill 2002: 48). This would suggest that

market liberalisation is really about supporting the agenda of a class of financial

elite. Market civilisation would simply be a means by which ever expanding

markets could be opened and the social experiences of people increasingly

packaged as a commodity.

But while the neo-liberal agenda enjoys a position of supremacy it is unable to

completely achieve hegemony. There are various forces which threaten neo-

liberal development. Gill (2002: 47) speaks of a ‘clash of globalizations’ which he

puts down to intensified inequalities, social dislocations and human insecurities.

This refers to the obvious disconnect between an agenda of development which

claims to be the solution to poverty but is resulting in an increasing gap between

rich and poor. It is the same disconnect which sees fragmenting society and an

increase in global inequality. (Gill 2002: 399; Onis 2005: 267)

New constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism also suffer from internal

inconsistencies. Foremost among these is a discourse that calls for a minimalist

state (Onis 2005: 263) and the recession of state power increasingly requiring

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institutional and state power to maintain. The concept of new constitutionalism

itself bears witness to this contradiction. Further, the fundamental contradiction

of continual economic growth in the face of limited resources suggests that neo-

liberal market civilisation is facing a sustainability crisis (Gill 2002: 419).

Finally, there is an increasing disquiet and dissatisfaction that is beginning to

manifest itself in alternative movements such as the World Social Forum (WSF).

Movements such as the WSF open up spaces for alternative discourse and a place

to ask the questions of neoliberal economics and institutions that cannot be asked

in conventional politics. Conway says “it provides a space for actors who may

construct democratic projects in different contexts”. (Conway 2004: 624) This

space is just one way in which segments of global populations can begin to

experiment with ideas outside the accepted neo-liberal constraints.

In this essay, I have reflected on the concepts of disciplinary neoliberalism and its

counterpart, new constitutionalism. Discussing related concepts and looking at

some of the support given by Gill and other writers, I would argue that disciplinary

neoliberalism and new constitutionalism are indeed characteristic of the

contemporary global politics of development. This essay briefly considered a

few of the examples that can be marshalled to support this case. It is important,

however, to consider the motivations behind these concepts. Certainly this can

help shed light on how viable support for alternatives might be. It is clear that

there are a number of ways in which neoliberal market economy is contested, not

only from without, but from internal structural weaknesses. These may provide

avenues for opening up opportunities for discourse. It may be that the case I

have given for contesting market civilisation is positive, so it is good to keep in

mind Stephen Gill’s closing words in his article ‘Constitutiionalizing Inequality and

the Clash of Globalizations’.

However, it would be unwise to underestimate the scope and depth of the problem for the forces challenging the G7 nexus

and disciplinary neoliberalism: a wide series of ‘productive constraints’ have been institutionalized.” (Gill 2002: 65)

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References

Ayers, Alison, J. 2006. ‘ Demystyfying democratisation: the global constitution of (neo)liberal polities in Africa’. Third World Quarterly. 27:2. pp. 321-38.

Cammack, Paul. 2002. 'Neoliberalism, the World Bank and the New Politics of Development'. In Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives, eds. U. Kothari and M. Minogue. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Chapter 9, pp. 157-178.

Conway, J. (2004). "Citizenship in a time of empire: the World Social Forum as a new public space." Citizenship Studies 8(4): 367-381.

Evans, Tony. 2007 ‘Disciplining global society’ Studies in Social Justice 1:2 pp.108-121

Friedman, Thomas (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree, HarperCollins, London Gill, Stephen. 1995. 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24(3): 399-423.

Gill, Stephen. 2002. ‘Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations’. International Studies Review 4(2): 47-65.

Gills, Barry K. 2001. FORUM: Perspectives on New Political Economy: Re-orienting the New (International) Political Economy, New Political Economy, 6:2

Higgott, Richard and Weber, Heloise. 2005. ‘GATS in context: development, an evolving lex mercatoria and the Doha Agenda’. Review of International Political Economy. 12:3 pp.434-455.

Mitchell, Katharyne. 2006. ‘Neoliberal governmentality in the European Union: education, training, and technologies of citizenship’. Environment and Planning 24 pp.389-407.

Onis, Senses. F. 2005. ‘Rethinking the emerging post-Washington Consensus’. Development and Change. 36:2 pp. 263-90.

Public Citizen. 2007. Peru-US “Free Trade Agreement” would help lock in failed social security privatization in Peru. Accessed 2 September 2008. Available at www.publiccitizen.org

Soederberg, Susanne. 2004. ‘American Empire and “excluded states”: the Millennium Challenge Account the shift to pre-emptive development’ . Third World Quarterly. 25:2. pp. 279-302.

Thomas, Caroline and Martin Weber. 1999. ‘New Values and International Organizations: Balancing Trade and Environment in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)’. In Global Trade and Global Social Issues, eds. A, Taylor and C. Thomas. London: Routledge. Chapter 7, pp. 133-150.

Weber, Martin. 2001. ‘Competing Political Visions: WTO Governance and Green Politics’. Global Environmental Politics. 1:3 pp.92-113.

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