port privatiz ation: an international perspective executive summary

Policy Study No. 156April 1993

PORT PRIVATIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

byDavid Haarmeyer and Peter Yorke

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By facilitating international trade, U.S. seaports play a significant role in shaping the country'seconomic health. All major U.S. ports are owned by public port authorities; many are also operated bypublic authorities. A 1990 report by the American Association of Port Authorities showed that 30percent of the 66 port authorities surveyed were operating at a loss.

Government-owned and operated ports face many problems. Lacking exposure to full commercialcompetitive pressures, publicly owned and operated ports may have reduced incentive to operateefficiently and are often subject to political interference. These public ports can absorb scarce fundsfrom local governments and drag down local economies. On the other hand, efficiently operated publicports, such as the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, are often targeted by cities that want tosiphon off surplus funds. Overseas, 36 governments including Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,Panama, Singapore, and Venezuela are considering or are in the process of privatizating—throughconcessions or asset sales—some or all of their major shipping ports.

The 1985 divestiture of the container operations at Kelang Port Authority (KPA), Malaysia's principalport, resulted in more than a halving of repair, maintenance, and administrative costs. In 1983, theUnited Kingdom sold the 19 ports that formed the Associated British Ports. Asset-sale privatizationenabled the ports to adopt efficient practices, diversify their assets, and increase capital investment.

The overseas trend in transferring government port operations and assets to the private sector suggeststhat U.S. public ports can benefit from greater private-sector participation. By improving incentives toperform, greater reliance on private management and capital will increase autonomy, efficiency, andcompetitiveness of U.S. ports.

Port Privatization Reason Foundation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 2

II. PORT PRIVATIZATION: A NEW CONSENSUS................................................................ 4

A. Privatization: Theory and Evidence ............................................................................. 4

B. Port Privatization Evidence: The Case of Malaysia .................................................... 5

C. Recent World Trends in Port Privatization .................................................................. 6

III. CASE STUDY: BRITISH PORT PRIVATIZATION............................................................ 9

A. Reasons for Privatization ............................................................................................ 10

B. Background ................................................................................................................ 10

C. The Process of ABP Privatization .......................................................................................... 11

D. Trust Ports: Future Privatization Candidates .............................................................. 13

E. Abolition of The National Dock Labor Scheme.......................................................... 13

F. Conclusion: Was Privatization a Success? .................................................................. 14

IV. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES............................................... 16

ABOUT THE AUTHORS.................................................................................................................. 17

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................................ 17

ENDNOTES AND REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 18

Reason Foundation Port Privatization

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I. INTRODUCTION

As important gateways to trade, seaports play a critical role in determining a country's competitivenessand economic health. In 1990, the 185 U.S. commercial deepdraft ports handled approximately 1.5-billion short tons of domestic and overseas commerce.1 The value of U.S. waterborne foreigncommerce (imports and exports) for 1990 reached $438 billion. The value and magnitude of commercethat passes through the country's ports are determined by how well a port's resources—labor, portterminals, wharves, equipment, real estate, etc.—are managed.

Landside port property and fixtures of the country's major ports are generally owned by state and localgovernments with government port authorities acting as the governing entity. According to ErikStromberg, president of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), “there areapproximately 115 state, local, county or independent public seaport agencies in the United States, 82of which are AAPA members.”2 In addition, because they are navigable waters, deepdraft channels andharbors are owned exclusively by the federal government.

The large number of ports owned and operated by different government and private entities indicatesthat the U.S. port system is relatively competitive. This industry structure contrasts with that in someother countries where ownership and/or operation by a single entity severely restricts competition.However, for U.S. publicly owned ports which have access to subsidies, the incentives for efficientoperation generated under competition are weakened.

There is significant private-sector involvement in the U.S. port industry, which is in part a response tothe industry's competitiveness. In addition to providing many port services, such as the provision ofequipment and labor, pilotage, towage, trucking, and rail, some public ports lease the operation of theirterminals to private companies. To reflect the degree of private-sector participation, port authorities areclassified as landlord, operating, and limited operating. Landlord ports lease cargo-handling facilitiesand property to either ship owners or to commercial cargo-handling companies. Facilities and propertyunder operating ports are managed exclusively by public-sector agencies. Under limited-operatingports, there is a mix of public and private operational responsibilities.

Almost half of the 82 AAPA members are landlord ports. Port authorities can greatly benefit fromtransferring port facility operations to the private sector through a lease or concession to a terminaloperator. Research by University of Washington Professor Thomas Dowd indicates that the top 15U.S. general cargo port authorities currently earn more from lease agreements and concessions thanfrom actual operations.3


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Still, fundamental limitations in government management and ownership of ports prevent U.S. portsfrom operating at their most efficient levels. This is indicated by the weak performance of portsgenerally, and specifically, the poor performance of ports which remain government managed.According to the AAPA's 1990 Finance Survey, 30 percent (20 of the 66 port authorities surveyed)were operating at a loss.4 To cover losses, these ports required subsidies from state and localgovernments, many of which are experiencing financial problems themselves.

In some cases, such as the Ports of Seattle and Houston, a port authority has the power to levyproperty taxes. The use of tax revenue to offset operating and maintenance or capital expensesweakens the incentive to manage port operations efficiently and also distorts competition among ports.As part of multipurpose port authorities, some seaports operate jointly with other transportinfrastructure such as airports and toll facilities. Besides the significant coordination and controlproblems involved in managing these large public enterprises, joint operations also raise the potentialcross-subsidies that impair efficiency.

For U.S. ports generating net revenue, government interference in the form of confiscation of profits isa real threat to long-term port performance. In September 1992, for example, the California StateLegislature passed a law that allows chartered cities to draw on the profits or “discretionary reserves”of their ports.5 Standard & Poors, the municipal bond rating firm, immediately placed the ports ofOakland, Long Beach, Los Angeles, and San Francisco on CreditWatch, explaining that “the loss offund balances for pay-as-you-go financing may limit their ability to provide adequate maritime facilitiesor increase debt load and, in the long term, impair their competitive position versus other west coastports.”6 Similar proposals to siphon off port-authority revenue for use in reducing state-governmentdeficits have surfaced in Massachusetts. The poor financial performance of many U.S. ports, the poor financial condition of state and localgovernments, the likelihood of government interference in port operations, and growing internationalcompetition, suggest that both ports and state and local governments may benefit by transferringgreater operational responsibilities and port assets to the private sector. National security and regionaleconomic development are typically offered as arguments against privatization, particularly asset sales.Yet no persuasive evidence is given for why efficiently run private ports are inconsistent with either ofthese concerns.

Support for greater private-sector involvement can be found in the trend in both developed anddeveloping countries to privatize port operations, and sometimes port assets. Over 36 governmentsworldwide are considering or are in the process of privatizing some or all of their major shipping ports.Among them are Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, andVenezuela.7 In 1983, the United Kingdom sold 19 ports in a public share offering and continues to sellports on an individual basis.


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Driving this trend is the growing realization that government control of port operations and oftentimesownership of port assets is not consistent with efficient, market-responsive port management. Lackingexposure to full competitive pressures (in both the product and capital markets), publicly owned andoperated ports have weaker incentive to efficiently allocate labor and capital resources and are morelikely to be subject to extraneous political influences.

In addition, while governments the world over face growing demands to develop transportationinfrastructure as means of promoting trade and enhancing economic development, they lack thenecessary resources to maintain and modernize these capital-intensive facilities. Increasingly,international competitive pressures encourage shippers and ship operators to direct cargo traffic toports which have the most cost-effective industrial bulk-handling techniques and better intermodalcoordination. These tend to be ports where private managers have greater autonomy and incentive toadopt technological changes and efficient labor practices.

An examination of international port privatization—both the economic arguments for greater private-sector participation and the consequences of greater private-sector involvement—is thus an essentialstep towards understanding how privatization can be a viable policy tool for strengthening thiscountry's ports and improving the nation's competitiveness.

II. PORT PRIVATIZATION: A NEW CONSENSUS

The need for operational and commercial flexibility by port management has thusdictated a progressive reduction of regulation and an increasing participation of theprivate sector and of port users, who often now set the pace for a port's progress. [ZviRa'Anan, World Bank]8

A. Privatization: Theory and Evidence

Consistent with the worldwide trend to privatize the operation and often the ownership of airports,highways, water-supply, and wastewater treatment facilities, governments in developed and developingcountries are turning over port operational responsibility and port assets to private enterprises. In mostcases, the public sector retains responsibility for essential statutory functions such as generalnavigational safety regulations and contract monitoring and enforcement.

In all cases, the theoretical underpinning for privatization remains the same: compared to publiclyowned enterprises, private companies face a fuller set of market disciplines to operate efficiently.Publicly owned and operated enterprises have diffused ownership structures in the form of individualtaxpayers or ratepayers who have little incentive to monitor performance. By contrast, in the privatesector, ownership is generally concentrated and hence control and accountability are clearer.


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In addition, unlike private-sector companies, publicly owned and operated enterprises are not exposedto full competition in the product and capital markets. Similarly, unlike private companies, public-sector enterprises cannot go bankrupt. Finally, compared to private companies, public-sectorenterprises are much more likely to experience both direct political interference in operating decisionsand potential conflict between the government's role as an owner/operator of an enterprise and as aregulator. Consequently, the link between revenues (or rewards) and cost control (efficiency) is oftenweak or absent altogether in public-sector enterprises.

A number of studies and surveys provide evidence that privatization generally leads to improvedperformance over public-sector operations.9 A 1992 report by the World Bank examining 12divestitures of state-owned enterprises in four countries provides persuasive empirical evidence of thebenefits of privatization.10 In 11 of the 12 cases, the report found the net welfare change in terms ofgains and losses to government, buyers, consumers, workers, and others, to be positive. Moreover, themagnitude of the gains were substantial.

As indicated in the World Bank study, whether it is full or partial (less than 100 percent of the sharestransferred to a private firm), privatization generates efficiency improvements. Because it enables anenterprise to take advantage of the stronger incentives associated with private ownership, reduces thepotential for political interference, and exposes the enterprise to the full range of capital marketdisciplines and financing alternatives, full privatization has the potential to yield substantially greaterbenefits than partial privatization.11

In recognition of privatization's important benefits to operational performance, the World Bank isbeginning to condition the loans it makes available through its Public Enterprise Loans program on adeveloping country divesting the public sector of its ports. Loans for Venezuela and Colombiapresently contain such a condition.

B. Port Privatization Evidence: The Case of Malaysia

The above discussion indicates that the weaker institutional incentive structure associated with publiclyowned and operated ports means that they will be less able to control costs, slower to adopt newtechnology and management practices, and thus, will be generally less responsive to port users thanprivate port operators. This conclusion was tested by the World Bank in its analysis of the divestitureof the container operations at Kelang Port Authority (KPA), Malaysia's principal port. The WorldBank's analysis, which is one of the 12 divestitures analyzed in its 1992 study, is important because itsupports the theoretical and empirical evidence for privatization, and it indicates that workers as awhole gain from privatization. In its detailed analysis, the World Bank found that the divestiture of the Kelang Container Terminal(KCT) benefited the government, buyers, consumers, and employees. Indeed, the World Bank called


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the divestiture an “unqualified success”12 and found that of the 12 cases of divestiture it examined,privatization of the KTC led to the second largest net welfare improvement.Kelang, which accounts for two-thirds of Malaysia's containerized trade, was the country's first saleunder the government's privatization program. The privatization process started in 1985 when KPAincorporated KCT as its wholly owned subsidiary and awarded it a 21-year renewable lease andexclusive license to operate the container terminal (including storage terminals and wharf, containerhandling and marine services such as ship piloting). Under the lease/rental agreement, KCT pays KPAan annual rental payment plus a variable payment based on throughput.

In 1986, KPA sold 51 percent of KCT shares to Konnas Terminal Kelang (KTK) for approximately$140 million. Legal problems of transferring title to land and the wharves limited the sale to the port'sequipment. KTK was a joint venture between Kontenas Nasional (a Malaysian transport companyowned by three Malaysian government enterprises) and P&O Australia Ltd. (an Australian containermanagement company).

All 801 public-sector container employees were absorbed by KCT, which guaranteed employment forat least five years and the level of accrued pension benefits earned under KPA. For KCT employees,privatization turned out to be a boon. By 1990, KCT terminal compensation rates were 83 percenthigher than their public-sector counterparts at KPA. Behind this dramatic rise in labor wages was anequally impressive rise in labor productivity.

In terms of total return to fixed factors, the annual average compound rate was 1.9 percent from 1981–1986, but grew to 11.6 percent from 1986–1990. This coincides with the 75-percent growth incontainer traffic measured in total tonnage cleared. As shown in Figure 1, real unit costs undermanagement control fell. Indeed, four years after divestiture, repair, maintenance, and administrationcosts (“Other intermediates”), were more than halved.13


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World Bank discussions with KCT union officials identified seven factors to explain increasedproductivity: 1) more labor input into decisionmaking; 2) improved marketing; 3) new feeling of“belonging” resulting in less loitering and absenteeism; 4) incentive bonuses; 5) new technology; 6)work-force restructuring; and 7) work-force flexibility.14

As a result of this positive experience, the World Bank notes that, “unions at both KCT and KPA havebecome advocates of divestiture, urging privatization of KPA and advising a Thai port union tosupport sale of its own organization.”15 The World Bank study concludes that “the KCT model ofdivestiture is one to be emulated, deserving the attention of proponents and opponents alike.”16

C. Recent World Trends in Port Privatization17

Port privatization is emerging as an international trend, with a number of countries moving ahead withplans to privatize ports despite protests in some instances by unionized port workers.

SOURCE: Leroy Jones and Fadil Azim Abbas, “Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises,”World Bank Country Economics Department, May 15, 1992, p. 21b.


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But as the case of Malaysian port privatization indicates, properly structured, port privatization canbenefit workers and encourage them to become privatization advocates.

Asia's leader in port privatization, Malaysia, in early 1992 sold the second phase of Kelang ContainerTerminal to management consortium Konnas Terminal Klang for $361 million. The divestment wassupported by the port workers of Kelang. In December 1992, KCT's shares were listed on the KualaLumpur Stock Exchange.18

The Malaysian port of Bintulu in Sarawak, which is expected to be corporatized in 1992, will beprivatized next. In keeping with the Malaysian government's plans to have the private sector operateand manage the entire transport system (including ports and airports) by the year 2000, the governmentis targeting the ports of Penang, Johor, Kuantan (the Royal Malaysian naval dockyard in Lumut), andthe Brook shipyard in Kuching to be privatized.

In 1989, Thailand's government signed contracts with CT International Lines for private managementof its new ports at Phuket and Songhla and reached an agreement with striking Bangkok port workersthat only the container-terminal portion will be contracted out and the government's Port Authority willoperate the general cargo terminal. Elsewhere, the Port of Singapore Authority announced in 1991that it will sell shares in its port.

Build-operate-transfer (BOT) methods are giving the private sector a large role in developing andoperating new port capacity. For example, in the Philippines, the Port Authority announced plans in1990 to use the BOT method for a proposed $150-million expansion of the port at Batangas, south ofManila. Also, in 1991, Hong Kong's government has used BOT methods and private funding for themajority of a large-scale, 15-year port expansion beginning with the development of the $500-millionContainer Terminal No. 8.

A Hong Kong affiliate of Japan's giant Kumagai Gumi firm was negotiating in 1991 to develop a $1.2-million deep-water port on China's Hainan Island, under a 70-year lease. In 1992, the Hong Kongfirm Hutchinson Whampoa purchased 50 percent of Shanghai's container port for HK$1.4 billion andpromised to double container capacity by 1995.

By 1992, port privatization had begun to move forward in Mexico, with government plans to auctionconcessions to manage some or all of the 21 ports under the jurisdiction of Puerto Mexicanos (which isto be liquidated). Veracruz, the country's largest port, took the first step towards privatization byfranchising three private stevedoring services in May 1991. Privatization will involve both franchisesfor private firms to own and operate docks and warehouses and long-term leasing of terminals andother facilities.


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Argentina planned to sell franchises to operate all of its ports in 1992. Foreign investors were beingoffered 25-year concessions on six terminals in the port of Buenos Aires, which ships 98 percent of thecountry's container cargo. In late 1992, Argentine company Isaura acquired 70 percent of PuertoRosales' maritime terminal for $90 million.

Brazil's progress in privatization has endured fierce protest by government port workers. But Brazilpressed on in 1991 and permitted private investment in its port of Rio Grande, and the government'sprivatization agency Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econonico e Social (BNDES) is pushing fornew legislation to clear the way for concessions to run ports.

Since the Venezuelan government dissolved the Instituto Nacional de Puertos, and turnedresponsibility of the country's ports to state governments in 1991, the country has made significantprogress in privatizing its ports. According to Miguel Bocardo, president of the Asociacion deNavieras, which represents 30 of the country's leading shipping agents, “privatization has been a realsuccess,” and has “produced a 50 percent to 60 percent increase in productivity.”19 Other LatinAmerican countries including Panama are embarking on major port privatization programs.

In 1986, Sweden privatized the Port of Gothenburg. In 1989, the Ijmuiden Fishing Port Authority inthe Netherlands was sold to a private company, with the province and municipal governments holdingminority shares. And Hungary's government is considering private financing for the river port on theDanube near Gyor.

In Australia, state governments are also inviting private-sector participation. The New South Walesgovernment announced plans in 1989 to sell the Port Kembla Grain Terminal. In May 1992, WesternAustralia issued a list of capital works projects over the next three years, with ports being among thefirst. Premier Carmen Lawrence said that encouraging major private-sector investment in infrastructurewas integral to the state's economic strategy. In South Australia, Shadow Minister for PrivatizationJulian Beale, reinforced calls for privatization and competition of the docks in 1991. An April 1992report by the Melbourne-based Tasman Institute recommended that port competition in the state ofVictoria be stimulated by selling real estate and cargo handling equipment in the state's port and all thebarriers to entry for the provision of port services be removed.20

In New Zealand, after successfully corporatizing the country's ports under the Port Companies Act1988 and implementing new waterfront employment arrangements, a number of the country's majorports are preparing for share offerings. In 1992, a 44-percent share in the Port of Tauranga was soldfor $18 million in a public offer by the Waikato Regional Council, the government shareholder.

Finally, in early 1993, the government of Pakistan advertised for invitations for concrete proposals forthe development of a deep seaport at Gwadar. Development would be on a build- own-operate(BOO); or build-operate-transfer (BOT); or a mixed funding basis.


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III. CASE STUDY: BRITISH PORT PRIVATIZATION

In my view, the argument about state versus private industry in the U.K. is over.Private ownership has won. . . . The reason that political contest over privatizationcame to an end is simply that implementation succeeded. Facts overtook the debate.[John Moore, former Financial Secretary to the Treasury]21

In a share-offering on February 1983, the United Kingdom privatized 19 of the country's government-owned ports. The sale was part of the country's program of denationalization, which began in the early1980s. Although overshadowed by the sales of large enterprises like British Telecom ($6 billion, 1984)and British Gas ($9 billion, 1986), the sale of 19 British government ports was nonetheless aneconomic success.

The sale of the 19 ports which formed the Associated British Ports, yielded the government £80 millionin gross proceeds. Over 10 percent of the shares were taken up by over 90 percent of the work force,and the offer of shares to the general public was oversubscribed on a scale that rivaled that of the largerprivatizations. More important, the transfer of a large group of ports from the public sector to theprivate sector exposed the ports to commercial incentives, increasing accountability and improvingperformance.

A. Reasons for Privatization

Three reasons stand out as being important in the British government's decision to privatize thecountry's ports. One, before 1980, most port services were controlled by public harbor boards andtrusts that restricted competition and increased the cost of port services. Two, to remain competitivewith European ports and other British cargo transport systems, ports had to be able to quickly adapt tomarket conditions and implement new technology such as containerization.

Lastly, under the control of public harbor boards or trusts, the business that ports could enter wasrestricted. This meant that not only could publicly controlled ports not diversify into more profitablecommercial ventures but that the real-estate assets owned by the British ports could not be transferredto more economically valuable uses.22

B. Background

In 1983, Britain had about 70 port authorities of commercial significance. Associated British Ports(ABP) was by far the largest, accounting for about a quarter of total port revenue, while the ten largestauthorities accounted for about 80 percent of the total.23


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Only three of the larger ports—Felixstowe, Liverpool, and Manchester—were then in the privatesector. Many port authorities, such as the Port of London Authority and the Dover Harbour Board,were (and still are) public trusts constituted by Act of Parliament and managed by self-governingbodies. Other ports were owned by local authorities. A number of ports were also operated by state-run undertakings, the principal one being Sealink (a wholly owned subsidiary of British Rail), whichowned seven ports. Sealink has now also been privatized, and these ports come under the managementof a private company called Sealink Stena Line.

Table 1 provides comparative financial information on the 19 ports, which prior to 1983 operated aspublicly owned ports under the direction of the British Transport Docks Board (BTDB) and thereafterbecame the privately owned Associated British Ports. ABP today represents the bulk of the private-sector ports that primarily handle freight traffic.


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When the first block of shares of ABP was sold in 1983, the estimated cumulative value of the assets ofthe 19 ports was over £148 million ($296 million at 1983 exchange rates).24

Table 1UNITED KINGDOMUNITED KINGDOM

Comparative Financial Information for BTDB and Associated BritishComparative Financial Information for BTDB and Associated BritishPortsPorts

Year

OperatingRevenue1

(millions)

OperatingExpenses(millions)

OperatingProfit

(millions)

OperatingRatio2

OperatingProfit/Employee

(Thousands)

1978 $166.9 $124.7 $42.3 0.75 0.06

1979 $211.9 $168.8 $43.2 0.80 0.07

1980 $244.3 $217.8 $26.6 0.89 0.08

1981 $225.5 $221.5 $4.1 0.98 0.10

1982 $241.2 $217.2 $24.0 0.90 0.09

19833 $221.1 $200.2 $21.0 0.91 0.10

1984 $185.3 $194.2 ($8.9) 1.05 0.13

1985 $165.9 $144.3 $21.6 0.87 0.13

1986 $208.7 $147.6 $61.1 0.71 0.11

1987 $231.7 $186.3 $45.4 0.80 0.14

SOURCE: Ouellet, Raynald, “Privatization in the Transportation Sector,” Economic Analysis TransportCanada, December 1988.

1 Monetary unit is U.S. dollars at end of year exchange rate.2 Operating Ratio is defined as Operating Expenses/Operating Revenue.3 In February 1983, British Transport Docks Board (BTDB) was privatized and became Associated British

Ports by Act of Parliament.


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C. The Process of ABP Privatization

A key element of British port privatization was the reorganization of port assets and liabilities alongcommercial lines, which facilitated the valuation and sale process. Under the 1981 Transport Act, theBritish Transport Docks Board, which governed the British publicly owned ports, was restructuredinto a state-owned company named the Associated British Ports. By the end of 1982, the capitalstructure of the BTDB was reorganized with the Secretary of State for Transport holding of all sharecapital in ABP Holdings, the holding company controlling ABP. The United Kingdom government'sstrategy in selling the 19 government-owned ports as a group was to ensure investor interest andhence, greater likelihood of the sale's success.

In February 1983, 21 million ordinary shares (about 51.5 percent of the total shares of the company)were offered at a price of 112p (about $2.25 at 1983 exchange rates). The offer was heavilyoversubscribed, with 45,300 successful applicants. The government retained the remaining 48 percentof the total shares. In addition to the public offer on the stock market, 1 million shares were offeredfree to port workers. All of these were taken up despite instructions by the port workers union not todo so. After the sale, port workers owned 2.5 percent of their own business.

In April 1984, the government sold its remaining 48.5 percent share (19.4 million shares of commonstock) in ABP. This second offer also contained further incentives for employees to invest. In total, theprivatization of the ports raised about £80 million ($150 million at 1984 exchange rates) for theTreasury.


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Employee share ownershipplayed a vital role in securingemployee cooperation inprivatizing the ports andincreasing the incentive to raiseworker productivity. This wasbasically accomplished bystrengthening the link betweenemployee performance andreward. By aligning the interestof employees with that of thecompany, employee ownershipgives workers a direct stake in acompany's performance, andhence encourages employees towork more productively.

Today, two-thirds of ABPemployees own shares, with anaverage holding of nearly 1,000shares each.25 Shares have alsobeen issued as “matching offers,”where one free share is issued for each one purchased. If an employee had taken up all of thesematching offers his or her holding would be as indicated in Table 2.

For employees owning shares of the new port company, the benefits were significant. For example, themarket value of 2,436 shares, the maximum amount of shareholding per person, is around £10,000(September 1991 prices). This is based on an initial outlay of just £1,456. Effectively, employees whoparticipated in all aspects of the sell-off will have increased their initial outlay sixfold.

D. Trust Ports: Future Privatization Candidates

As mentioned earlier, the Trust Ports were essentially self-governing government-owned ports. WhileTrust Ports such as Dover and London are among United Kingdom's busiest ports, and are designed tobe profit-making enterprises, the absence of accountability to shareholders weakens their incentive tooperate cost-effectively. Thus, unlike ABP, which faces strong capital market incentives to perform,control costs, and increase value, the Trust Ports can be expected to perform less efficiently.26

The most important question facing many Trust Ports now is whether to take advantage of thegovernment's 1991 decision to let them become private companies with shares in their own right. ThePort of Ipswich has already shown an interest and seems set to follow the examples of Tees &

Table 2

EMPLOYEE HOLEMPLOYEE HOLDINGSDINGS

Maximum Numberof Free Shares

“Matching”Paid-For Shares

1983 initial offer 106 0

1983 matching offer 400 400




TOTAL 1,271 1,165

GRAND TOTAL 2,436

* All shares adjusted for 1986 script issue which occurred in May 1986when a one for one shares were issued and effectively halved the shareprice.

SOURCE: Mechanics of Privatization, Adam Smith Institute, 1988,p. 31.


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Hartlepool and Bristol, which both self-privatized (1989 and 1990, respectively) and have sincebecome financially successful ports. Tees and Hartlepool (sold for $275 million) have increased theirtonnage handled by 35 percent since privatization and Bristol achieved an increase of 27 percent.27 In1992, the ports of Tilbury, Medway, and Clyde were sold as a group for $135 million during 1992 tomanagement and employees.

E. Abolition of The National Dock Labor Scheme

The ability of the ports to run as profitably as possible after privatization was hampered by the NationalDock Labor Scheme (NDLS). Under the NDLS, unions were given joint control over port operations.Without full control over port operations, owners of the newly privatized ports were severely limited intheir ability to efficiently manage ports.

The post-war-initiated NDLS basically gave the registered dock workers of the Transport and GeneralWorkers' Union exclusive rights (monopoly control) of all dock work. By restricting competition fordock work, the Scheme led to inefficient labor practices, chronic overmanning, and generally highercost of operating the ports. One report estimated that the Dock Labor Scheme cost the UnitedKingdom economy more than $800 million over its 42 year existence.28 In 1988, the National Association of Port Employers requested that the government abolish the NDLS.While threatened by a national strike called by the Transport and General Workers' Union, the Britishgovernment on August 1989 passed the necessary legislation to abolish the NDLS. The national strikenever materialized but the union's monopoly control of Britain's waterfront workers was ended.

As a result of gaining more freedom to manage ports, the ABP was able to better utilize dock workers,streamlining the labor force by about 65 percent, and increasing port productivity. One measure of themagnitude of the productivity gain achieved by abolishing the NDLS is indicated by improvedprofitability with fewer workers: in 1981, the ABP made a profit £1 million with 9,300 workers, in1990, the ABP's profit was £60.2 million with only 3,633 workers.29

At least for the privatized ports which instituted employee share ownership programs, theconfrontational relationship between labor and management, which was fostered by the NDLS, wasreplaced by one which rewarded cooperation and the adoption of efficiency-enhancing employmentpractices.

F. Conclusion: Was Privatization a Success?

Privatization of the Associated British Ports had three beneficial economic impacts. As discussedabove, through employee share ownership, privatization led to a more cooperative and productivework place. Figure 2 shows that ABP was able to achieve rising labor productivity (higher operatingprofit/employee) through the steady downsizing of the labor force. Over the same period (1978-1987),cargo tonnage handled at the 19 ports rose from 78-million metric tons to 90-million metric tons.


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Second, privatization eliminated the restrictions on diversification imposed by the 1962 Transport Actand hence provided opportunities for profitable investment outside core port functions. Third, byaccessing private capital markets and facilitating the disposal of assets, privatization made moreresources available for capital investment. The rise of ABP's share price and market capitalization provides a clear indication that the overallimpact of privatization was positive. From the company's original offer price of 112p in 1983, theshares reached 386p by February 1993. In terms of the market value of the shares, market

SOURCE: Ouellet, Raynald, “Privatization in the Transportation Sector,” and Economic Analysis TransportCanada, December 1988, BTDB & ABP Annual Reports.


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capitalization went from £44.5 million in 1983, to over £720 million 10 years later—an over 16-foldincrease in value.30

This strong performance came despite the 12-month miners' strike in 1984, which severely hurt theports that relied heavily on the shipment of coal. The effect of the strike on profitability was drastic. In1982, ABP's profit was £5 million. After privatization this leapt to £15 million in 1983. However, duein part to the effect of the strike, profits in 1984 fell to only £2 million.31

An increase in capital investment was essential to the continuing success of ABP. In 1990, the currentassets of the company stood at £272.7 million, more than double that at the time of privatization. Thissurge came from a number of places. By far the two largest sectors were investment in the portsthemselves and property development.

The ports have all been upgraded. In 1991, ABP reopened the old 190-acre Alexandra Dock at Hull,which represented the single greatest expansion of port capacity in four years. Future expansions atImmingham, Kings Lynn, and Port Talbot are now also expected because of the 1990 AssociatedBritish Ports Act, which broadens ABP's ability to participate in development. At Southampton, newplans for waterside development have been announced that would involve the building of a new pierand the reclamation of land to construct a marina.

Port asset diversification through property development has been extensive. In the 1970s the Port ofSouthampton was used for the sole purpose of two daily car-ferry journeys to Normandy. Todayprivate development firms have transformed some of the port's real estate into a thriving marina,shopping malls, and new residential areas. At Hull, St. Andrew's Quay has been developed into a retailwarehouse and leisure park with plans to include residential housing and a hotel. Further expansion inretail schemes have occurred at Torquay, Colchester, and Central London. The aggregate level ofinvestment since privatization is £205 million.32 This compares with a figure of less than £60 million inthe ten years preceding privatization.33


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As indicated in Table 3, theperformance of the ABPsince privatization has beenpositive, with profitsdoubling in the period andbeing matched by a similarincreases in earnings pershare and the dividendvalue.

In sum, privatization of theABP has not only resulted inmore profitable andefficiently operated ports,but by enabling port assetsand property to be betterutilized, privatization has helped revitalize the local and regional economies surrounding ports.

IV. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

During the past few years an increasing number of countries have restructured their shipping ports intocommercial companies and begun to transfer operation and ownership responsibilities to the privatesector. The critical role of ports in facilitating trade and economic development means governmentsmust ensure that ports are managed efficiently.

A growing body of theoretical and empirical evidence supports this trend. Studies by the World Bankand others indicates that private firms have stronger incentives to manage resources efficiently thanpublic enterprises because they are exposed to competition in the product and capital markets, can gobankrupt, and are less vulnerable to political interference.

As shown by the detailed study of the partial divestment of the Port of Kelang in Malaysia, portprivatization can benefit governments, buyers, as well as government port workers. By improvingincentives and increasing autonomy, divestment encourages the adoption of better labor managementpractices and technology, enabling workers to be more productive and, in return, earn highercompensation.

The United Kingdom's experience selling the 19 ports that made up the Associated British Ports alsoprovides insight into how, in addition to achieving more competitive and efficient ports, privatizationcan directly benefit workers and surrounding local economies. By giving workers a direct stake in a

Table 3POST-PRIVATIZATION PERFORMANCE OF ABPPOST-PRIVATIZATION PERFORMANCE OF ABP

(£ Millions)(£ Millions)

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Turnover 157.1 196.7 211.8 213.0 211.3

Profit Before Tax* 26.0 38.1 46.5 57.2 60.2

Severance (3.7) (6.0) (5.0) (5.1) (2.2)

Earnings/Share 11.2p 14.8p 18.1p 22.0p 22.5p

Dividends 3.0p 3.8p 5.0p 6.3p 7.3p

* After deducting voluntary severance.SOURCE: ABP Holdings Plc Annual Report 1990, p. 5.


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port's performance, employee share ownership as initiated by the British government secured workercooperation and raised productivity. And port diversification, especially through property development,was successful in reallocating port property to more efficient use, thereby stimulating local economies.

For U.S. ports considering privatization, the above lessons and experience are important especiallygiven that the poor fiscal condition of state and local governments means that they will increasingly bein less of a position to contribute to funding port investment. Indeed, if the California legislature's 1992action to allow cities to draw on the profits of their ports is any indication, ports in other states arelikely to come under increasing pressure to transfer surplus funds to cities. By threatening portinvestment, this trend could have serious negative consequences for the future competitiveness of theU.S. port industry.

Thus, port privatization provides a credible means for U.S. ports to gain both political and financialautonomy, while at the same time providing the necessary incentives for improved port performance.State and local governments could also significantly benefit from privatizing their ports. According toan earlier study by the Reason Foundation, the 45 major shipping ports in the United States that handle10 million tons or more of freight per year are together likely to be worth around $11.4 billion.34

By transforming physical capital into financial capital, cash-strapped cities could gain significantfinancial flexibility and improved port operations. Sale proceeds could be invested and earningsdesignated to address critical needs for education, police, and fire protection, and to pay down bondeddebt (reducing interest expense and restoring borrowing capacity for future municipal projects). Freefrom government interference and financially self-sufficient, new private port owners would facepowerful incentives to manage port resources efficiently.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

David Haarmeyer holds an M.A. in economics from Clemson University and is a Reason FoundationSenior Policy Analyst. He is managing the Foundation's project on utilities and water policy and coversport privatization in the Privatization Watch, the Foundation's monthly newsletter. Peter Yorke is aresearch assistant at the London-based Adam Smith Institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Donna Braunstein for research assistance and Raymond Ng forproduction.

ENDNOTES AND REFERENCES

1. U.S. deepdraft ports include not only those located along the U.S. Atlantic, Gulf, Pacific, andGreat Lakes, but those in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. ErikStromberg, President of American Association of Port Authorities, “A Perspective on PortPrivatization,” a speech delivered at the May 1, 1992 Conference in Kingston, Jamaica, p. 6.

2. Erik Stromberg, President of American Association of Port Authorities, “A Perspective onPort Privatization,” a speech delivered at the May 1, 1992 Conference in Kingston, Jamaica, p.7.

3. Thomas J. Dowd, “U.S. Container Terminal Leasing and Pricing,” Maritime Policy andManagement, Vol. 11/4, 1984.

4. American Association of Port Authorities, “1990 Financial Survey,” Alexandria, Virginia.

5. Calvin Sims, “California Taps its Profitable Ports,” The New York Times, October 13, 1992,C1.

According to S&P CreditWire, New York, September 3, 1992, “The size of the transfer iscalculated as the greater of $4 million or 25% of working capital, but limited to the amount ofthe property tax revenues cut to the cities by this [California budget approved in September]budget.”

6. S&P CreditWire, New York, September 3, 1992.

7. David Haarmeyer and Lynn Scarlett, Privatization 1992: Sixth Annual Report on Privatization(Los Angeles: Reason Foundation, 1992), p. 32.

8. Zvi Ra'Anan, “Port Administration: Should Public Ports be Privatized,” World Bank, March 8,1991, p. 3.

9. Elliot Berg Associates, “Private Provision of Public Services: A Literature Review” (paperprepared for the Public-Sector Management and Private-Sector Development Division,Country Economics Department of the World Bank, April 1989); John Hilke, Competition inGovernment-Financed Services (New York: Quorum Books, 1992); and Steven H. Hanke,“Strategies Employed in Successful Privatization Efforts: Rx for Privatization” (paperpresented at the International Conference on Privatization sponsored by the U.S. Agency forInternational Development, Washington, D.C., February 17-19, 1986.

10. Ahmed Galal, Leroy Jones, Pankaj Tandon, and Ingo Vogelsang, “Welfare Consequences ofSelling Public Enterprises: Case Studies from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and the U.K.,”Proceedings from World Bank Conference, June 11-12, 1992, Washington, D.C.


11. The World Bank has noted, “the performance of state-owned enterprise can be improvedwithout changing ownership, but evidence from both developed and developing countriesshows that, on average, good performance has been difficult to implement—and even harder tosustain.” Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis, and Mary Shirley, “Privatization: Lessons of Experience,”Country Economics Department, The World Bank, 1992.

12. Leroy Jones and Fadil Azim Abbas, “Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises: CaseStudies from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and the U.K.” World Bank Country EconomicsDepartment, May 15, 1992, p. 24.

13. In explaining the apparent contradiction of improved labor productivity (higher wage levels)and the steady decline in the real unit cost of labor as shown in the figure, the study notes:“Labor was diverted from wharf operations to repair, maintenance and administration, so itstrue contribution to efficiency is measured not just in its relation to output, but also itscontribution in substituting for other intermediates.” p. 22

14. Leroy Jones and Fadil Azim Abbas, “Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises: CaseStudies from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and the U.K.” World Bank Country EconomicsDepartment, May 15, 1992, p. 20.

15. Ibid, p. 31.

16. Ibid, p. 32.

17. Information for this section was taken primarily from recent issues of the London-basednewsletter Privatisation International.

18. “After KCT's public issue and share offer, the stakes held by Konnas Terminal Klang and KlangPort Authority were reduced to 40% and 20% respectively. The government agencies took in£113.5 million from the sale, while KCT grossed M$41.5 million.” Stephen Duthie, “Rush forKelang Container Shares Fueled By Rosy Outlook for Malaysia Economy,” Asian Wall StreetJournal, November 9, 1992.

19. Larry Luxner, “Privatization in Venezuela Boosts Productivity at Ports,” Journal ofCommerce, April 29, 1992.

20. Tasman Institute Pty Ltd, “Waterfront Competition: The Restructuring of Victoria's Ports”(prepared for the Waterfront Task Force of Project Victoria 1992) April 6, 1992.


21. John Moore, “British Privatization—Taking Capitalism to the People,” Harvard BusinessReview, January–February 1992, p. 120.

22. Diversification was restricted in two ways. The Treasury imposed controls on spending andborrowing and an act of legislation prevented public ports from using their land for otherpurposes. The 1962 Transport Act, passed by a Conservative government, set down two firmrules for the port industry. They were that the industry could only use its assets to handlepassengers and cargo and that it could employ people for these activities.

23. 1983 Prospectus for the Privatization of Associated British Ports, p. 6.

24. Associated British Ports are made up of the following ports; Ayr, Barrow, Barry, Cardiff,Colchester, Fleetwood, Garston, Goole, Grimsby, Hull, Immingham, King's Lynn, Lowestoft,Newport, Plymouth, Port Talbot, Silloth, Southampton, Swansea, Teignmouth, and Whitbyhave all been added since the original privatization.

25. Mechanics of Privatization, Adam Smith Institute, 1988, p. 30.

26. By creating financially stronger ports, privatization has worked to put competitive pressure onthe Trust Ports and thus encourage them to raise their performance through increased capitalinvestment and imposition of structural changes.

27. Figures are for 1991 and were obtained by Peter Yorke from United Kingdom Department ofTransport.

28. Structural Changes in Ports and the Competitiveness of Latin American and CaribbeanForeign Trade, United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,Santiago, Chile, 1990, p. 10.

29. 1983 Prospectus for the Associated British Ports, and the 1990 Annual Report of theAssociated British Ports.

30. Sir Keith Stuart, Chairman of Associated British Ports, “Making the Ports Private,” in TheMechanics of Privatization, edited by Eamonn Butler, Adam Smith Institute, 1988, p. 45, andFinancial Times (London), February 2, 1993.

31. Although the strike was bad for the newly privatized ports, it was instrumental in bringingabout an important change. During the strike, managers of ABP realized that their dependencyon single products like coal exposed them to high levels of risk and that diversification was


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required. This led to a number of new projects such as ABP's £5 million roll-on, roll-off ferryservice introduced at Hull.

32. Annual Report of Associated British Ports, 1990.

33. Ibid.

34. Robert W. Poole, Jr., David Haarmeyer, and Lynn Scarlett, “Mining the Government BalanceSheet: What Cities and States Have to Sell,” Policy Insight Number 139 (Los Angeles: ReasonFoundation, April 1992), p. 7.

port privatiz ation: an international perspective executive summary

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