Publishing an article in The TransformerThe views and opinions expressed in this publication do

not necessarily refl ect those of NATO or its member nations.

All articles are edited for content. To contact The Transformer

staff , call +1(757)747-3600. To obtain electronic copies of

the newsletter, visit us on the web at http://www.act.nato.int.

Deadline for submissions for August 2011 issue is

June 30, 2011.

Email: pao@act.nato.int

Postal : Headquarters Supreme Allied

Commander Transformation,

Public Aff airs Offi ce

7857 Blandy Road, Suite 100

Norfolk, Virginia 23551

Telephone: +1(757)747-3600

The Transformer Staff Captain Jeff Bender

Chief, Strategic Communications

Mr. Roy Thorvaldsen

Chief, Public Aff airs

Mr. Frank Schiller

Chief, Corporate Communications

Chief Petty Offi cer Chris Carrothers

Production Leading Chief Petty Offi cer

Petty Offi cer 1st Class Carla Burdt

Editor

“The Transformer 2011 –

New Look, New Content”

With our fi rst issue of 2011, you will see we

have made a few changes. First, we have a

new look on the outside with a new cover and

design. Second, and most important, is what

we have inside. Instead of a compilation of what

took place over the past three to six months at

ACT, we now are taking a look at the present

and future involving NATO, ACT and our

stakeholders. Transformation is a continuous

process of improvements and we hope you

like the way we transformed one of our main

communication tools. Enjoy!

~Captain Jeff Bender

Modelling And14 Simulation, Enabling NATO Strategy

A View From 16 Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Planning For Non- Military Capabilities

Fostering Collaboration 18 Through Open-Source Software

ACT Begins 19 Cloud Computing Initiatives

Joint Forces Training 20 Centre - At The Heart NATO’s Preoccupations

JWC Certifi es 22 NRF 16 Leadership At Ulsues

Virtual Development 24 Of NATO’s LL Capability: The Outcome Of The 2010 NATO LL Conference

Table of Contents

A Conversation With 2 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Assured Access3 To The Global Commons In The 21st Century

Structuring Partnerships4 For Evolving Ambitions

‘Partnerships’ After 6 The Lisbon Summit: Opportunity, Challenge Or Threat

Transformation 8 Of NATO C-IED

Relationship With 11 Industry And Academia: Increasing Opportunities For Collaboration

2011 SACT Strategic12 Engagement Overview

On the cover:

Global Commons.

Globe photo courtesy of NASA images.

Satellite photo courtesy of NASA images.

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 1

The Lisbon Summit has given the Alliance a reinforced sense of purpose and a renewed momentum across the whole range of its activities – but nowhere more than in the fi eld of Transformation. Never had a Strategic Concept dedicated so much attention to issues that are pivotal to the future of NATO capabilities, such as the analysis of future threats or the

pressing need for cost-effectiveness and reform. This summit has set NATO on a path to becoming, in Secretary General Rasmussen’s words, “more effective, more engaged and more effi cient.” Allied Command Transformation is at the heart of every one of these three challenges, and this issue of The Transformer illustrates the progress it is making and sheds light on the way ahead in fulfi lling that mandate. Being more effective means succeeding in solving the toughest and most relevant issues our nations are facing both in current operations and in future crises. A fi rst example

is given in the following pages with the description of how we are transforming our capabilities dedicated to countering improvised explosive devices – one of the most essential enterprises in preserving the lives as well as the freedom of action of our troops deployed in Afghanistan today, and on other theatres tomorrow. Another instance of confronting an emerging challenge is in safeguarding free and safe access to the Global Commons – the strategic environments comprising the high seas, the international airspace, outer space and cyber space. Our work on this topic is previewed in our cover story. Being more engaged means drawing the consequences of the need for NATO as an organisation, as well as for each one of its member nation militaries, to reach out to other stakeholders. This applies in a number of fi elds, giving rise to several series of collaborations on which this issue elaborates: fi rst and foremost, our partnerships, which come out of the Lisbon Summit reinvigorated; but also our collaboration with partners in industry and academia within the Framework For Collaborative Interaction. Finally, and in keeping with the fi nancial situation we will be living in for many years to come, the effort to make our organisation, our capabilities and our processes more effi cient – more cost-effective – will be a common thread to all our actions. The ideas in the pages this issue dedicates to the review of our defence planning processes or to the use of new technologies to save resources – through modelling and simulation or virtual lessons learned – are but fi rst bites at this apple. ■

A MESSAGE FROM SACT

General Stephane Abrial

Supreme Allied Commander

Transformation

Who’s New At ACT?

Ambassador Ravic R. Huso

SACT Political Advisor

Major General Mark Barrett

Deputy Chief of Staff

Strategic Plans and Policy

Brigadier General Giovanni Fungo

Assistant Chief of Staff

Capability Engineering

Brigadier General Theodosis Dourouklis

Assistant Chief of Staff

Joint Education, Training and Exercise Division

Vice Admiral Carol M. Pottenger

Deputy Chief of Staff

Capability Development

Vice Admiral Antonio Hernandez

Assistant Chief of Staff

Joint Deployment and Sustainment

Major General Ugur Tarcin

Deputy Chief of Staff

Integrated Resource Management

Brigadier General Luis Ruivo

Comprehensive Approach

Team Leader

2 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

September 29, Polish Army General Mieczysław Bieniek assumed the duties of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (DSACT). Now, fi ve months after the handover, The Transformer staff spoke with General Bieniek about his goals and expectations.

What were your expectations before taking the position of DSACT?

I certainly was expecting a demanding environment and being challenged to seek innovative solutions to existing and emerging challenges. In this regard the new assignment brought no surprises. On a daily basis I get to discuss and brainstorm the issues that

will shape the Alliance within the next 10-15 years. I must admit that since I always love being proactive, I feel great in the ACT working environment. Serving in a multinational HQ offers a unique opportunity to not only see things in new ways, but also to learn from others’ experience, which is very useful and stimulating at the same time. I believe that since the adoption of NATO’s New Strategic Concept the HQ’s activities have gained some new momentum in pursuing solutions to ever more complex and compelling demands and challenges of the 21st century. In short – I was hoping for real intellectual challenges and pro-active work towards practical solutions to them. I have not been disappointed on both accounts.

What element do you consider vital to the success of ACT?

I believe that we as a command have achieved quite a lot since September. I am a strong believer of the ‘one mission-one team’ principle – the only way to have work done right is to make sure that everyone feels like a member of the team, knows and understands clearly the leader’s intent. Throughout my career I have been stressing the importance of teamwork for the success of an endeavour. Therefore I felt immediately at home in HQ SACT – the quality of teamwork here is exactly what I was hoping to see. And one can immediately see the result of it. Let me just mention a few – those that I perceive as the most important achievements.

General Mieczysław Bieniek

Deputy Supreme Allied

Commander Transformation

A Conversation With Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Firstly, to support ACT work in the domain of capabilities development, we are constantly improving and enhancing the cooperation with the academia worldwide and with global industry players. Only months or so ago, we signed agreements with IBM, Microsoft and Thales. I believe our last year’s Industry Day, organized in Prague, enjoyed the highest level of interest and participation from science and industry so far. I certainly hope that ID 2011, to be organised in London in the autumn, will be attended by many more people and will see even more vigorous and fruitful discussions. It also creates a perfect opportunity and great venue to work with other key players - industry, academia and European Defense Agency. Secondly, partnership: during my trips to Alliance and partner countries I strive to widen the spectrum of possible non-governmental partners. I cannot help but mention also the Mobile Education and Training Team (METT) session organized in Moscow in September last year. It was not only my fi rst trip in the DSACT capacity, but also a very fruitful event – both our Russian counterparts and us, representing NATO, were very fond of the quality and scope of the discussions in the framework of military-to-military NATO-Russia cooperation. Let me just mention that it was only weeks before the New Strategic Concept reaffi rmed the importance of NATO-Russia cooperation. In this sense the METT was an early bird of the period in the relations between this country and the Alliance. Thirdly, another good example of forward thinking of this HQ is cyberdefence. The New Strategic Concept only reaffi rmed the value of the work that had already been ongoing in ACT. This work, of course, gained some new impetus, and ACT is actively seeking further venues of cooperation with other organisations and nations, but it confi rms that ACT, as an Alliance Strategic Think Tank looks ahead, identifying new challenges and charting new territories of development.

How did the outcome of the Lisbon Summit affect the work that ACT will conduct in 2011?

In ACT, implementation of military aspects of the New Strategic Concept is our paramount task from which stem more detailed ones, such as support to operations (ie. C-IED, COIN, training requirements, countering hybrid threats), partnership and outreach or military transformation. There may be many things that will infl uence the direction of work of the HQ like the study initiated on the so-called ‘Global Commons,’ including cyberdefence. Another area in which we also strive to improve is Comprehen-sive Approach, especially fostering cooperation with the U.N. and E.U. In all these domains and a lot of others, ACT will do its utmost to tackle all the challenges facing the Alliance in the near future. ■

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 3

While the Euro-Atlantic characterisation of the Alliance makes it geographically regional, its perspective and interests are global. For more than 250 years, the more globalised the world’s trade and information systems have become, the more Nations have come to view cooperation as an elixir to increase prosperity and stability. In this same way, the more the Alliance works with the rest of the world, the more the rest of the world wants to work with the Alliance. It is this growing interaction with our partners that allows us the freedom to share and exchange views on ideas, issues, and common values. The domains of air, space, maritime, and cyber space are integral elements of today’s globalised world, serving as a critical enabler of international security and trade. Prosperity, peace, and security rely on the smooth fl ow of goods and information and people through these four domains. Collectively known as the Global Commons, they are the connective tissue that allows the modern world to communicate, interact, trade, and function effectively. These domains are assumed by many to be always accessible and at an ever decreasing cost. In the future, an adversary might change that. Globalisation as we know it is a highly effi cient system of just-in-time deliveries of resources, materials, and manufactured goods to and from every country in the world. These functions require assured access to all four domains of the Commons. As Nations increasingly depend on access to and use of the Commons, they increase their vulnerability to potential adversaries who view our reliance on the Commons as an Achilles heel. As the use of the Commons has evolved, the cost of disrupting access and use of the four domains has declined, primarily because technology has become more readily available, affordable and usable. We can be assured that some actors will work to undermine the tenuous balance between cooperation and competition that characterises globalisation by disrupting use of the Commons. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is modern piracy. Globalisation, inadequate governance, and limited security have allowed modern pirates to exploit the maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Using a hybrid of technologies, such as satellite phones and GPS-enabled navigation, together with low-tech, small-boat swarming

tactics, they plan and execute attacks across a million square miles of open ocean, while avoiding interdiction. To date, commercial shippers have absorbed the costs that piracy imposes on them. It is possible to imagine, however, that in a time of austerity, as those costs

become prohibitive, shippers will either alter commercial routes or restrict global trade and commerce, both to the detriment of the market. The cyber domain has become a dominant fact of our daily lives. Little of our customary activities would be possible without the on-demand information that is now accessible and increasingly relevant across a broad band of social and business relations. Despite its omnipresence, or even because of it, cyberspace is the least regulated domain of all. The infrastructure and information base of cyberspace are almost entirely in the hands of private and commercial actors, while both providers and users have been extremely resistant to regulation and the potential increase in security it could offer. With the ever-increasing numbers and sophistication of cyber-attacks,

strengthening security should be a key undertaking, for commercial entities and governments alike. Until recently, hackers were after the information that constitutes the payload of cyberspace, rather than its infrastructure. This, however, is changing. The 2010 worm called W32. Stuxnet, which invaded the control systems for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear complex, did actual physical damage to the facility. It is nearly impossible to attribute the

attack without doubt, and chances are no one will ever be held accountable for the Stuxnet worm. Of course, not all threats to the Commons are man-made. When Iceland’s volcano erupted in 2010, an event that was both predictable and unstoppable, its ash clouds disrupted air traffi c across the vital trans-Atlantic corridor for two months. It took North American and European authorities a full four weeks to fi gure out how to achieve “almost real-time” procedures, and delegate authority to route trans-Atlantic traffi c in an effi cient and effective manner. Although this is a regional example, it is by no means an isolated one. Even now, Indonesia’s Mt. Merapi,

which erupts sporadically has again entered a “hot” phase and continues to disrupt air travel in the region. This problem of international coordination and cooperation in the air domain is solvable, and it should not have to wait for another crisis to spur action. Finally, space has become increasingly vital to daily life. Space is a central supporting element of security and defence operations. We rely on satellites for world-wide situational awareness, to keep track of the weather and natural environment, and for geo-positioning and communications, to cite just a few examples. The almost instantaneous communications that space-based systems make possible can have a signifi cant impact on the public and private good. In this increasingly interconnected world enabled by space and cyber, leaders and citizens interact more easily and directly, while the transmission of information, both good and bad, increasingly is ubiquitous and near instantaneous. While space is currently considered a relatively stable common with only a few potential spoilers, this could change. The increasing use of space,especially by commercial interests, is leading to (continued on page 4)

Assured Access To The Global Commons

In The 21st Century

Global Commons (continued from page 3)

increased vulnerabilities for both satellites and their supporting terrestrial nodes. Technological advances that can be used to deny and or disrupt the use of space increasingly are accessible to more actors, both state and non-state; and, it is not just adversaries that need to be considered. With greater use and demand, orbits and bandwidth increasingly are congested and the corresponding increase in space debris threatens all assets in space. Accordingly, vigilance, cooperative monitoring, and healthy relations that promote the secure and responsible use of space among all stakeholders are vital to the allocation and management of this delicate common. The future will continue to be the province of the unknown, but that should not deter us from thinking about how the Alliance should plan for what we cannot see. History tells us the why and how of the past, but it also warns us that the adver-sary of the future will not stand still. The evolving globalised economic and security systems of the modern world depend on unrestricted, access to and use of the Commons. Disruptions to the global supply chain of goods, energy resources, and information will have serious effects on the economies of nations and the security of their citizens. If there is a “key to the Commons,” it lies in applying a holistic approach that draws on the knowledge and abilities of all stakeholders, from government to academia, private enterprise to non-profi ts, to help solve the problems of access, use, and security across the four domains. In conclusion, the trends of globalisation and interdependence today will continue, as will their complexities, dangers, and opportunities. As the security environment increasingly refl ects a chaotic world, the Alliance may very well fi nd that the new realities of the Global Commons infer that aligning politically, militarily, and economically with others of like mind may be the only way to establish the solidarity, resilience, and deterrence necessary to meet these challenges. To effect this strategic goal, NATO will have to work in concert with individual powers and international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union, the African Union, and the United Nations. As the world’s oldest military alliance, NATO must not only emphasise but also help coordinate the uses of all aspects of power – political, military, economic and civil – to provide mutual security and assured access to the Global Commons. ■

Strategic Issues and Engagements Branch

The words of Aesop are as relevant today as they were in the fourth Century BC: “union gives strength.” Partnerships are central to NATO’s continued success. Through dialogue and cooperation, partnerships break down barriers, build security and foster stability in the trans-Atlantic community and beyond. The maxim that partnerships are the cornerstone of a strong and well-connected Alliance rings truer today than ever before. Increasingly complex security challenges, coupled with austere defence budget forecasts, present opportunities for the Alliance and its Partners to extend regional security in profound ways. The Alliance can work with interested Nations, international organisations and other actors to promote international security through: • Political consultation, information exchange and practical cooperation; • Support for NATO’s goals and specifi c objectives; and • Contributions to NATO operations. NATO’s post-Lisbon partnership ambition aims to enhance international security, promote democratic values and reforms, build support for missions and operations, and prepare countries for potential membership. It advocates respect for existing partnerships while creating new ones, but aims to widen NATO’s network to include potential partners not usually considered in Alliance dialogue. In short, the Alliance seeks innovative cooperation throughout a broader community. Traditionally, NATO’s partnerships focussed on states or regions because NATO, as a political and military alliance, interacted best with those actors that shared similar political-military structures. These relationships remain fundamental to the Alliance. However, NATO must consider all relevant actors and issues. From political agreements to operations, the Alliance must view its actions and relationships through a comprehensive approach. NATO must develop its ideas more openly, and it must do so with whoever is appropriate, including academia and industry. This will be challenging for NATO - its current organisational structure is designed around political-military level interaction.

Partnership Means More Friends Around The Table

Regardless of the issue, successful partnerships are built - they do not just happen. They requiredeceptively simple enablers, such as using the same language and determining common ground. They are based on some kind of mutually-agreed outcome that is well articulated. Fundamental to partnership success is having the right organisational structures, communications channels and mechanisms to leverage partners’ strengths, while keeping an eye on how to improve collaboration. The strategic environment is deeply affected by both the global information revolution and the corresponding social/political evolution it infl uences in every society around the world. These changes add uncertainty, opportunity and dynamism to NATO’s affairs. Therefore, NATO must become agile and fl exible; its partnership policy should bolster Alliance capacity to navigate threats and challenges effectively. In this environment, simplicity and strategic thinking are increasingly important. Partnership policy should be simple, practical and applicable under varying circumstances and take into account key factors that can

Structuring Partnerships for evolving ambitions

4 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

facilitate success in the trans-Atlantic community. An Eight-Factor Framework is proposed as a way to inform Alliance thinking on building successful and resilient partnerships.

An Eight-Factor Framework

Not all of these factors, with perhaps the exception of ‘integrity,’ which is fundamental at any time, will apply to all partnerships, and the importance of each factor varies. For example, ‘individual strengths’ is signifi cant in a NATO/EU context, but less so in a NATO/‘weak state’ relationship. NATO may be more focussed on the strategic signifi cance and security benefi ts of its investment

in a weak state’s success. The Eight-Factor Frame-work is a coherent means by which to consider the pros and cons, and potential benefi ts and costs, of any relationship prior to moving down the road to partnership. Therefore, in the words of Colin Powell, “the situation dictates which approach best accomplishes the team’s mission.”

Opportunities

For Engagement,

A Call For

Refl ection

Before potential partners are identifi ed, NATO needs to understand its own partnership objectives. This is not a simple task given the complexity of the Alliance

and breadth of its roles. However, the fi rst three factors (strategic signifi cance, individual strengths and interdependence) from the Framework could be used as a starting point. NATO can build a partnership model by fi rst considering how its core roles, as defi ned in the new Strategic Concept, defi ne NATO as a potential partner for others, based an evaluation of its own signifi cance, strength and what it can offer others.

A partnership model must incorporate existing partnership frameworks, and could be built around three nested layers, in which NATO can expect to accomplish its core roles. First, the innermost layer is where NATO works together with others in support of clear operational requirements. Most often, relationships at this level have a military emphasis, and the relationship focuses on coordinating actions amongst partners. For example, NATO works with many different partners in a comprehensive approach to achieve operational requirements. The second, middle layer focuses on relationships to create opportunities for the Alliance to better execute its roles and missions. Relationships at this level focus on stakeholders preparing together for issues that they will face in the areas of peace, stability, humanitarian security and economic well-being. An example of this layer is cooperation amongst international organisations like NATO and the EU to build role complementarity. The third and outermost layer consists of relationships that are typically more goal- or objectives-focussed and have a greater political emphasis. Most often, relationships built at this level are based on broad agreements with infl uential or powerful actors to shape and infl uence ideas, values and events. An example of this layer is NATO’s global outreach and engagement with rising powers to promote mutual understanding. A three-layer model serves as a point of departure to offer new approaches and possible solutions that can “enhance existing partnerships and develop new ones.” It takes into account the lessons learned in ACT’s examination of the future security environment and the corresponding security

and military implications. A single issue could span all of the layers. For example, building a political relationship with an infl uential actor could lead to cooperation to better understand and address potential security challenges and threats, and eventually to conducting military operations together. Successful partnerships are built, they do not just happen. NATO’s partnership ambitions to enhance international security, promote democratic values and reforms, build support for NATO’s missions

and operations, and prepare countries for membership require fi rst that NATO is a good partner. Accordingly, the Alliance must be transparent. This can be achieved through the expression of a clear narrative to help potential partners better understand NATO and its ambitions. The Eight-Factor Framework can help develop NATO’s partnership narrative. Also, NATO needs to identify with whom it should partner. Any relationship should be productive and help NATO to achieve its objectives with regards to its core roles as defi ned in the New Strategic Concept. The three-layer model can be used as a tool to position existing and potential partners. All partnerships, existing and new, could then be evaluated in the context of the Eight-Factor Framework, to identify and prioritise benefi ts for the Alliance, and to support the articulation of a new policy. It must never be forgotten that partnerships are NATO’s greatest success story. It is a truism as valuable today and tomorrow as it has been throughout the Alliance’s history. ■

Strategic Analysis Branch

An Eight-Factor Framework

Underscores Elements Key

To Resilient Partnership Polices:

1

Strategic Signifi cance:

relationships are mutually important.

2

Individual Strengths:

partners bring specifi c excellence.

3

Interdependence:

partners need each other.

4

Commitment:

invest in each other’s successes.

5

Integration:

make vital connections across

all organisational levels.

6

Information:

be transparent and share

with the entire community.

7

Formal Structure:

reinforce institutions and

governance as a means to

bolster objectivity and

partnership interests.

8

Integrity:

be trustworthy.

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 5

6 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

ach of the summits since 1989 has to a greater or lesser degree affected the way that we interact with our Partners. There have been 22 Summits since 1957 and the Lisbon Summit is the 12th since the Brussels Summit in 1994. The latter is generally acknowledged as the start of NATO’s structured partnerships programmes and in particular the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) programmes. Since 1994 12 PfP Nations have joined NATO and one nation (Malta) has left PfP and since rejoined.

An enduring characteristic of the summits is the growing sophistication of the nature of ‘cooperation’ as well as the tools and mechanisms available to it. In this regard it was perhaps the 15th Summit in Washington in 1999 that gave cooperation (and particularly PfP) an operational focus with the Operational Capabilities Concept, a new Strategic Concept and a new focus on Training and Education. It could be argued that much of Allied Command Transformation’s current ‘military coopera-tion’ work can be traced to the Washington Summit. The increasing sophistication of cooperation and expanded toolbox has led to over 30 programmes, plans, mechanisms, 4 main partnership programmes (PfP, MD, ICI and CC) and has been invaluable in engaging with our partners, giving them opportunities to work alongside NATO Nations and to contribute to global security. In cooperation terms the Washington Summit will be more than just a footnote in history. It may record that it was a milestone for refocusing cooperation, the start of a trend towards more sophisticated ‘tools and mechanisms’ and a recognition of the importance of partners in NATO. Since 1994 the growing importance of Partners to NATO has been refl ected in the proportion of the declarations taken up with ‘cooperation.’ The Lisbon Summit is no exception. It is likely that the Lisbon Summit will go down in history as equal in importance to the Washington Summit. The Lisbon Summit recognised the continuing importance of ‘cooperation’ with our existing ‘partners’ but took ‘partnerships’ to a new level. There was no surprise in the declaration seeking to promote International Security through Cooperation and acknowledging the ‘Open Door’. However, it also mentioned ‘A wide network of Partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe.’ It went on ‘NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach.’

What does this mean from a Strategic Command perspective? Regardless of the accession of 12 Nations to NATO membership, Military Cooperation at the Strategic Command (SC) level already supports a far greater number of non-NATO Nations than it did 10 years ago. However, the SC Military Cooperation work does not just ‘support partners’, it contributes to partnerships policy, provides essential specialist advice and support to the SCs on ‘partnership matters’, programme and coordinates non-NATO activities. Partners have become an essential part of the SCs’ work. Transformation and Operations are no longer conceivable without Military Cooperation. Whilst noting that the number of NATO’s ‘partners‘ has continued to grow, with Nations such as Tonga, Mongolia and El Salvador showing an interest in, and being encouraged by NATO, ‘Partners’ now means far more than just non-NATO Nations. It is extended to non-NATO actors such as the UN, EU and the African Union. However additionally, it is clear the role of ‘partners’ in NATO will be far more comprehensive.

‘NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments.

Its effective implementation requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort.’ (Lisbon Summit). The Strategic Commands will work within this changed landscape but the Lisbon Summit Decision is only one, albeit major factor in the future development of ‘partnerships’ at the SC level. Other factors alluded to within the declaration include: limited resources, required effi ciencies and the new NATO Command Structure. Still others are the current cooperation architecture, the plethora of ‘tools and mechanisms’ used by partners on a day to day basis and in some instances a lack of clear defi nitions to support cooperation.

So what will be the Strategic Commands’ role within the context of the Lisbon Summit?Currently, the Military Cooperation Division, formed in

‘Partnerships’ After The Lisbon Summit: Opportunity, Challenge Or Threat

E

The President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai; NATO Secretary General Anders

Fogh Rasmussen and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon during the joint

press point at the Lisbon Summit November 19-20. NATO Photo.

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 7

can lead to unclear lines of communication, fragmented expertise and advice, and possibly duplication of effort. Therefore, the SCs may wish to consider ‘partnerships’ being brought under a single coordinated ‘partnerships’ umbrella with a clearly defi ned but fl exible mandate and lines of communication with others providing ‘partnership’ services. While limited centralisation of military cooperation in 2008 resulted in signifi cant improvements, this needs further investigation in light of the Lisbon Summit. Proposals should be made to establish which functions should be brought under a centralised ‘partnerships’ umbrella. Additionally, the nature of the relationships and methods of working for all functions that impact partners need to be redefi ned and formalised to support the SCs’ goals for partnerships.

ilitary Cooperation is bound both by unclear terms (for example Contact Countries is a vague term with no clear defi nition) and restrictive defi nitions and missions, which in military cooperation

terms quickly become outdated. The Lisbon Summit provides a broad and comprehensive description of ‘partnerships’, which in turn gives the SCs an opportunity to review and redefi ne its own functions, relationships and methods of working. Built in fl exibility is required in order to better and more quickly address changing environment and requirements. Current military cooperation representation is limited to non-NATO nations. The Lisbon Summit provides an opportunity to expand this beyond non-NATO nations to other actors such as EU/UN, AU etc. Consideration may need to be given to expanding ‘partnerships’ representation at the SCs’ level and encompassing these within a ‘partnerships’ umbrella. However, there are two practical issues that have already been touched upon. Firstly, resources to support partnerships are fi nite and subject to the same practical limitations as other areas and disciplines. Therefore, resource limitations will affect partnerships at the SC level. Secondly, while the partnerships toolbox has become increasingly sophisticated and seemingly comprehensive, that is not synonymous with usable. Therefore, there is a case for a simplifi ed partnerships toolbox that brings the current plethora of tools together. The MCD has already made great progress in developing a overarching mechanism leading to streamlined and more focused operation.

Conclusion. The North Atlantic Council has redefi ned ‘partnerships’. It has acknowledged that our relationships with non-NATO Nations, organisations and entities is important to our work in supporting transformation and its part in regional and global security. The current climate provides an opportunity to break out of the mold of military cooperation and to consider ‘partnerships’ comprehensively. This should include a redefi nition of partnership responsibilities and functions, while providing built in fl exibility to expand to support new ‘partners’. Partnerships command control and relationships will need to be redefi ned to support these new requirements and the defi nition and development of the necessary tools and mechanisms should …be part of this overall approach. ■

By M. Laurie Daykin, NATO Civilian, MCD

September 2008, is the primary organisation for management and coordina-tion of military cooperation at the SC level. It has a footprint in HQ SACT whilst being mainly located in Mons, Belgium. It is a Bi-SC division and works equally for both Strategic Commands. The MCD supports over 40 non-NATO Nations, many of which have representation in Mons, some are also represented in HQ SACT. Currently, it does not have the mission, nor does it support non-NATO actors. It is possible therefore that the term ‘military cooperation’ may no longer be appropriate. ‘Partnerships’ in the context of the Lisbon Summit is a far broader and perhaps a more appropriate term covering military cooperation, relationships with other non-state and international and industrial organisations. Whilst the post Lisbon landscape is clear, the SCs’ role within it needs further development. It is questionable whether the structures and mechanisms that have served the SCs well for the past few years are now fi t for purpose. One thing is clear, it is certainly not ‘more of the same’. Even so, any changes to better support the SCs’ redefi ned partnerships role must be made within the context of reduced resources, increasing sophistication of partnerships and the tools and mechanism and the ongoing new NATO Command Structure.

So what basic principles might govern the SC’s new partnerships structure? The Military Cooperation Division is the main organisation for dealing with Military Cooperation at the SC level. However, it is not the only bodyresponsible for the delivery of all ‘partnership’ services. Other SCs divisions and entities also have some responsibilities for military cooperation. This

M

The emergence of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as

a wide scale tactical weapon employed for operational

and strategic purposes has presented NATO with a new

dynamic to its assumptions about operations, training,

and sourcing. Countering IEDs requires anticipating and

adapting innovative solutions for the deployed opera-

tional force as well as the need for creative thinking and

agile capability development across the Alliance. Allied

Command Transformation (ACT) has embarked on an

eff ort to reframe long held assumptions as it responds to

both current and future manifestations of the IED threat.

The proliferation of IEDs as a tactical weapon of

choice by NATO adversaries refl ects a fundamental

change in NATO operational assumptions. Once confi ned

primarily to the realm of political terrorism, the IED threat

now encompasses much broader Alliance concerns.

It changes the way NATO approaches application of its

collective and National military capabilities to perform

strategic missions in operating environments dominated

by non-state and transnational threats.

riginally considered a weapon for politically

motivated but essentially criminal activists,

IEDs have become the tactical weapon of

choice by many NATO adversaries lacking

either the means or nation-state construct

for fi elding more conventional military

capabilities. The strategic success of IEDs also makes

them increasingly attractive to more capable adversaries

who seek to exploit NATO limitations or restrictions. The

distraction created by the relatively slow Western military

adaptation to a threat that did not readily conform to

long-standing conventional military assumptions,

has given IEDs a strategic impact far beyond their

tactical eff ectiveness.

On a military level, NATO is transforming its

fundamental assumptions about what doctrinal,

organisational, technological, procedural, and training

capabilities are required by the Alliance to address the

range of hybrid threats. IEDs are but the most visible, and

arguably the most pressing threat manifestation. NATO

eff orts at Countering IEDs began with eff orts to fi rst

understand, and then to protect against the threat.

Now, more than eight years after IEDs expanded from

a primarily terrorist tool to a viable and widespread

tactical tool, NATO is focused on developing the

capabilities required to attack adversary networks

that enable employment of IEDs.

Corporal McGuff og of the Royal Engineers demonstrates the use of a British metal detector to students from the Afghan National Police

on the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Course at the Helmand Police Training Centre. MOD Crown copyright.

The Transformation of NATO C-IED“The more effective a measure is initially, the faster its effectiveness tends to decay,

because the more effective the measure is, the greater is the pressure on the enemy to adapt.” – Lt Col David Kilcullen, Australian Army

O

8 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

Figure 1 illustrates how this transformation dynamic has

aff ected NATO eff orts to address capability gaps through

training since 2005 when SACT created the NATO C-IED

Integrated Product Team (IPT). Initially focused on

informing or sharing information regarding techniques,

tactics, and training ACT produced an operational

concept and initiated educational off erings on the

concept to commanders, staff s, and Nations.

s NATO Nations have gained greater under-

standing and practical experience with C-IED,

the ACT C-IED eff ort shifts to more specifi c

leader education and training required to

develop a C-IED capability rather than theater

specifi c soldier awareness or acquisition of

defensive technologies. The red box in the illustration

highlights the importance of the ACT role in preventing

member Nations remaining stuck for too long in the

reactive and isolated defensive aspects of C-IED

evolution. This construct is key as the Alliance must

continuously seek comprehensive adaptation rather than

“just attempting to keep pace” as cautioned in the NATO

Bi-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept for the

Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats.

C-IED is an area in which ACT is truly leading

operational transformation and providing Nations the

strategies required to overcome institutional inertia.

AJP 3.15 and STANAG 2294 were fast-track ratifi ed

and formed the basis for national and specialist

capability development. These documents refl ected

NATOs collective understanding and emphasis at the

time, but now less than two years later, they are already

under revision. The revised AJP 3.15 will be promulgated

to Nations in March, and the revised training standard

will be completed by summer. These revisions will not

replace fundamental concepts; instead it builds upon

them as NATO collective understanding of the threat

and requirements for multi-national development of

operationally integrated C-IED capabilities continues.

ACT is helping the Alliance collectively and organisation-

ally move forward enabled by mission experience,

while not retarded by it.

To date, NATO’s International Security Force

Afghanistan (ISAF) mission has provided both the

strong urgency and basic operational construct to

drive fundamental transformation. Afghanistan is

the place where soldiers from individual Nations are

gaining understanding and experience dealing with

the IED threat, and it is the mission in which NATO’s

new operational doctrines are being incrementally

tested and adapted.

ISAF experience is hard won, but not defi nitive.

While the success of C-IED eff orts in ISAF is critical to

the Alliance, Afghanistan is not the only NATO mission

where countering the threat of IEDs is critical to mission

success. IEDs are a threat tactic, the method by which

the enemy makes contact to achieve a specifi c result,

regardless of the way we choose to categorise a

particular NATO operational mission or environment.

Thus NATO C-IED capability concepts transcend the

type of operation and must transcend the details

of national resources in a specifi c theatre.

C-IED principles are valid whether the working

construct is Conventional Warfare, Counter-insurgency

(COIN), or Counter-terrorism (CT) - only the assignment

of operational responsibility and allocation of military

resources varies. NATO must avoid the

temptation to isolate C-IED as a separate

technical activity or overemphasise tactical

issues in Afghanistan when addressing NATO

operational requirements for developing

broader capabilities for countering the use

of IEDs to attack the political will of member

Nations. There are many with tactical level

experience in Afghanistan, but that experience

alone rarely provides the experience required

to address NATO C-IED challenges at the

operational and strategic levels. ACT leadership

is critical to NATO’s full evolution of its C-IED

eff orts beyond simply reacting to techniques

observed in a singular theater.

hile some Nations have developed

stand alone organisations to

coordinate C-IED operations, such

as Task Force Troy and Task Force

Paladin in the United States, NATO,

through ACT, is working to institu-

tionalise C-IED in basic soldier and staff skills,

from tactical through strategic levels. Similar

to how Nations institutionalised NBC Defense

during the Cold War, C-IED principals need to

be institutionalised as well. Military personnel

need to be trained at all levels in C-IED

awareness and force protection principals no

diff erent than we train basic trainees how to do personal

decontamination and staff offi cers that are taught to

plan operations in a contaminated environment. ACT

fully recognizes that the IED threat is not limited to ISAF,

but will be a condition during future operations and the

Alliance needs to be able to conduct operations where

IEDs are a condition of the operating environment.

As ACT has shifted NATO C-IED focus “left of the

boom” toward attacking the networks, it has designed

and is off ering a new course to give primarily the

intelligence and operational staff offi cer an understanding

of their responsibility in this area. The Attack the

Networks Tactical Awareness Course (ATAC) is off ered

to Nations by ACT at Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in

Poland. Focused on how to use intelligence, information,

and combat enablers to understand the networks

operating in a given area of operation, it also provides

the skills to plan operations to infl uence, disrupt or

destroy the critical nodes in those networks, using

kinetic and non-kinetic means.

NATO adversaries continue to evolve their IED tactics

and techniques in order to better achieve their strategic

objectives. Regardless of the specifi c countermeasures

or techniques employed by friendly forces, the enemy

continues to observe and adapt. The pressures of

casualties, media coverage, and national politics require

the operational command to rapidly address current

theatre conditions and threats. However, as David

Kilcullen cautions, the more eff ective we are at any

(continued page 10)

A

W

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 9

Figure 1

Figure 2

10 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

NATO C-IED (continued from page 9)

one aspect, the faster the enemy evolves to something

else. C-IED at the NATO ACT level demands a depth of

understanding that enables anticipation and innovation.

Innovation within ACT and agility within Allied

Command Operations (ACO) requires constant

observation and analysis of a very diverse and constantly

changing global threat environment resulting in relevant

recognition of capability gaps and bold, coherent shifts

in operational methods. ACT must also integrate

a wide variety of disparate national priorities and

tactical capabilities to create a unifi ed vision that aligns

supporting and supported NATO operational activities,

all in order to solve complex

strategic challenges.

In an ever evolving

threat environment, the

capability to innovate

and adapt is more critical

than the desire for

predetermined

uniformity and stan-

dardisation. Individual

Nations have political,

economic, and defence

considerations that

infl uence their capability

priorities to meet specifi c

NATO operational mission

expectations that must

be understood. In an

ill-defi ned future threat

environment, the diversity

of national tactical capabilities may provide NATO with

greater fl exibility than the tradition of defi ning common

standards. Operational unity of eff ort is important, but

agility requires a diff erent measure of eff ectiveness

than traditional NATO standardisation directives

once required.

The solution of a single Nation cannot be

universalised as the de facto solution for NATO or indeed

for all Nations within NATO. Over-reliance upon specifi c

individual experiences tends to perpetuate outdated

assumptions for pre-deployment training as well as

capability development solutions. It is only by

multi-national cooperation that the Alliance is able to

meet collective obligations. It is necessary to approach

C-IED from the perspective of a comprehensive approach

to continuous evolution since the challenge cannot

be met without considering the various considerations

and experiences of NATO Nations and its Partners.

The concept of countering IEDs is action oriented.

In descriptive language C-IED is a verb, not a noun.

The NATO concepts for C-IED, whether focused upon

knowledge development, command and control,

attacking threat networks, or force protection, are

founded upon principles that are fundamental to

any Nation or command’s ability to evolve and

adapt based on the mission itself.

Capability intentions must translate into actual

organisational concepts and

programs that are equally

adaptive and evolutionary.

Any NATO-wide program

attempting to universally

codify specifi c theatre

“best practices” as the

NATO-wide requirement is

obsolete by the time it is

fully developed by a staff

and integrated within

member Nations. Thus,

as exemplifi ed in Annex C

of STANAG 2294, capability

requirements must be

developed with an eye

toward action and

fl exibility not reactive

qualifi cations.

The challenge of

training individuals and small units for specifi c mission

tasks is diff erent from the challenge of developing a

multinational force capable of performing the wide

range of NATO military missions. While it is a National

responsibility to provide trained and equipped forces and

individuals to NATO operations, unique or new NATO

mission requirements often confl ict with Troop

Contributing Nation defence priorities and capabilities.

Thus it is an accepted development that NATO has a moral

obligation to provide some common funding for training

which is required to achieve an acceptable readiness ca-

pability in short time, or where the Nations agree it most

cost eff ective to let NATO conduct collective training.

Addressing these ever changing requirements and

conditions not only demands a fl exible concept, it also

requires a mechanism for NATO senior leaders to make

informed decisions about the prioritisation and allocation

of common funding to achieve the desired C-IED

outcomes. For ACT, such decisions are focused on

anticipating capability requirements rather than

responding to current events.

The ACT staff requires an agile information collection

and analysis capability, manned by individuals with

deep expertise and broad operational experience.

Deep expertise is required to avoid the myopia of over-

specialisation based upon a specifi c technique or singular

assignment. Broad experience is required to see developing

paths of threat and counter-threat evolution outside

the limits of conventional boundaries and assumptions.

Defeating a non-state or transnational adversary

ability to “network” and employ IEDs eff ectively against

NATO forces starts with uncovering how they are

operating in order to reveal who, why, when, and

where to focus next. The ever evolving nature of non-

conventional threats means there will rarely be a clear,

or universal, answer to this requirement.

ACT has produced a C-IED Action Plan that is a living

document refl ecting the true nature of the threat, as well

as NATO’s political, economic and military challenges

to meeting ever evolving mission threats. It is aimed at

reducing the immediate impact of IEDs in Afghanistan,

while also guiding the strategic development of national

capabilities within coherent doctrine. Key initiatives in

the Action Plan include: an Intel/Info Fusion study

to identify NATO organisational and operational

requirements, development of a NATO C-IED Portal,

NATO C-IED lessons learned process and numerous

other initiatives to enhance NATO’s capability to conduct

operations where threat networks use IEDs.

Implementation of these concepts cannot be done

by an ACT staff working group alone, nor can it be done

by a single Nation alone. New requirements will emerge

and obsolete practices must be critically reviewed.

Contributing Nations expect from ACT a command that is

focused and fl exible, able to analyse and identify issues,

formulate relevant and feasible solutions and develop

principle based solutions to near,- medium,- and

long-term C-IED capability requirements. ■

U.S. Army Lt. Col. (P) John GreavesKevin McEnery. LTC, US Army, Retired.

Consultant with The Wexford Group International.

“We must be careful not to allow the gap to grow into a credibility gap. That means we must ensure cohesion across the Alliance in our defence decisions.”

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen – 21 June 2010

Members of the Afghan National Army search for improvised

explosive devices during Operation Omid Panj. (British Army

photo by Sgt. Rupert Frere)

In the analyse of the new threats, we can observe that

the Alliance is no longer confronted with opponents who

use a single form of action as they did in the past, but

with people able to engage in high-intensity combat

as well as criminal enterprise or terrorist actions,

sometimes simultaneously.

Nowadays, this is a signifi cant issue, which we

know under the broad name of ‘hybrid threats’ (HT). To

give a common perception to all NATO Nations about how

to counter hybrid threats, ACT is developing a concept.

In order to go deeper into the analyse and development

of solutions, one of the major supporting activities will be

the HT experiment based upon a seminar/game structure

that will be held in Tallinn, Estonia in May 2011.

The goal of this experiment is to investigate the

utility and the feasibility of the Countering Hybrid Threats

(CHT) Concept and to develop with both military and

civilian actors a mutual understanding of potential NATO

approaches and responses. One of the objectives is to

identify appropriate military contributions within a

wider comprehensive approach to CHT.

This experiment concurred with the principles

of broad and diverse engagement of actors (Civilian,

military, NATO and non-NATO) to ensure a comprehensive

exploration of the issues identifi ed.

For the fi rst time, Industry and Academia will

be invited to participate. As the recently developed CHT

concept itself recognises the importance of making

greater use of partnerships and building better

cooperation beyond the NATO borders, it makes perfect

sense to involve industrial and academic partners in

the testing of this very ambitious concept.

For ACT, it will be the occasion to operate within

a Comprehensive Approach setting, leveraging expertise

lying outside of the Alliance and the national entities. For

Industry and Academia, it will be a unique opportunity

to participate in a NATO game and make their voice heard

as to how they can and should cooperate with NATO to

deal with hybrid threats. The National Defence University

especially, will provide substantial support to this

experiment both during the preparation of the game

and during its conduct.

This collaboration will mark a new step forward

in the development of the ACT initiative called FFCI.

Although strong signs of interest from Industry and

Academia had been perceived before, it was still

uncertain in September 2009 when ACT initiative called

“Framework For Collaborative Interaction” (FFCI) was

launched how much mutual interest there would be for

ACT, Industry and Academia to eff ectively work together.

Since this initiative, which give ACT the right

and ability to jointly engage Industry and Academia in

collaborative work at the non-procurement phase was

launched, more than fi fteen companies have engaged

beyond initial discussions in sustained exchanges

with ACT on a large variety of topics in areas such as

Knowledge Management, Cloud Computing, Situation

Awareness and Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC).

For each of these topics, needs and objectives are

diff erent and the FFCI approach allows tailoring of the

interaction with industry and academia to specifi cally

meet those needs.

At the very fi rst level of interaction, the ACT Health

subject matter experts used ACT Industry Day 2010 to

identify appropriate industry partners in their area and

to create a community of interest for future projects.

The conference was therefore a good opportunity for

them to communicate on NATO’s priorities and ACT’s

program of work, generating awareness and interest.

Another example of the exploratory work that can be

conducted under the FFCI umbrella is the eff ort done in

the domain of Cloud Computing where ACT is working

with several companies, using their expertise and

experience to identify prospects and risks associated

with investing in cloud computing solutions, in order to

develop sound advice to NATO and National authorities.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the

ACT NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC) subject

matter experts focus their eff ort toward educating

industry on NNEC and encouraging them to use the

NNEC roadmap as a tool for guiding products

development for NNEC. ACT will also benefi t from

feedback received from industry partners on the

latest NNEC documents as well as on the feasibility

and availability of required services and products.

Throughout the past year and a half, a series of

lessons were learned and identifi ed. Among them, ACT

has tremendously benefi ted from exposure to cutting-

edge vision from Industry and Academia to steer its

on-going internal projects and consider the initiation

of a few new ones. But more importantly, ACT did

not suspect how much its subject matter expertise;

operational insight and its ability to formulate the

future NATO needs would be of so much value

and well received by Industry in particular.

This is for ACT a true mark of success of the FFCI

initiative. In the year 2011, ACT will continue to increase

the number of opportunities for collaboration on

additional new subjects and will welcome off ers from

Academia and Industry to jointly work on challenging

topics of common interest. In that respect, one of the

key milestones will of course be the ACT Industry Day

2011 conference which will be held in London on

September 12 and 13, with the support of the UK

Ministry of Defence. Record-level attendance is

expected as this year’s edition will run back to back

with DSEi (Defence & Security Equipment International),

the world’s largest fully integrated defence and

security exhibition. ■

Future Solution Modelling and Simulation Branch

Relationship With Industry

And Academia: Increasing

Opportunities For Collaboration

One of the objectives is to identify appropriate military contributions

within a wider comprehensive approach to CHT.

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 11

General Vlastimil Picek (left), Chief of the General Staff

of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic;

General Stephane Abrial (centre), (SACT) and Dr. Alexander

Vondra (far right), Minister of Defence for the Czech Republic,

at ACT Industry Day 2010. Photo by Martin Koller,

Press, Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic.

12 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

2011 SACT Strategic Engagement Overview

NATO

AC

January February March April May June Ju

26/27 Jan

DefencePlanning

SymposiumOberammergau 18 Feb

SACTSeminarBrussels

9/11 May

AlliedReachPoland

(ACO Lead)

10/11 Mar

InformalMeeting

Of NATO’s Defence MinistersBrussels

26/27 Jan

MilitaryCommitteein Chiefs of

Staff SessionBrussels

4/5 May

MilitaryCommitteein Chiefs of

Staff SessionBrussels

14/15 Apr

InformalMeeting

Of Foreign Ministers

Berlin

9/10 June

FormalMeeting

Of Defence MinistersBrussels

13/15 Jun

StrategicMilitary Partner

ConferencePlanning

SymposiumBelgrade,

Serbia

7/11 Mar

NATO-wideExecutive

DevelopmentProgramme

ACT

5/8 Mar

NATONetworkEnabled

CapabilityConference

Finland

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 13

MC/CS Event Key Political Event SACT Key Engagements

uly August September October November December January

27 Oct

MCVisit To

ACTJALLC

Nov

CD&EDevelopment

AndExperiment-

ationConference

TBC

4/5 Oct

InformalMeeting

Of NATO’s Defence MinistersBrussels

1/2 Dec

FormalMeeting

Of Foreign MinistersBrussels

11/12 Sep

IndustryDay

London

Sep

MilitaryCommitteeIn Chiefs OfStaff SessionConference

Sevilla

06:00 “Severe Weather Alert,” the Weather Channel announces on the radio, “Issued by The National Weather Service, Tallahassee, FL, 2:27 am, Mon., Jan. 10, 2011 ... HIGH SURF ADVISORY IN EFFECT UNTIL NOON TODAY... HIGH RIP CURRENT RISK IN EFFECT UNTIL NOON TODAY...” Crazy weather, how can the weathermen predict the future?”

09:00 The Doctor takes a last glance at my X-Ray, “Uh-uh, you need surgery on this knee.” I look at him with some dismay, he is probably in his early 30s. “Have you done this before Doc?,” “A thousand times,” “you’re kidding me, are you not?,” “Well, actually 100 times for real and the other 900 times in an immersive surgical simulator.” It doesn’t alleviate the pain but it feels reassuring.

Modelling and Simulation seems to be everywhere nowadays: from entertainment to weather forecast; from health care to disaster and emergency response; from improvement of transportation to the protection of the environment; from space exploration to readiness of military forces. Some Nations have already formally recognized the importance of modelling and simulation. Among other provisions, they declared that they

“recognise modelling and simulation as a National Critical Technology.” They also stated that modelling and simulation have and will continue to “provide vital strategic support functions to our [U.S] Military.” NATO established the extreme relevance of modelling and simulation when the Secretary General stated the NATO vision on the Modelling and Simulation Master Plan (1998); “Modelling and simulation will provide a readily available, fl exible and cost-effective means to enhance NATO operations dramatically in the application areas of defence planning, training, exercises, support to operations, research, technology development and armaments acquisition.” He also established the strategy to achieve this vision “by a NATO-wide co-operative effort that promotes interoperability, reuse and affordability.”The NATO modelling and simulation community

coordinates within the NATO Modelling and Simulation Group where Nations and NATO bodies work together to synergise efforts and share best practices and experiences on using modelling and simulation to support military missions. The main focus is on standards and interoperability. ACT plays a main role in this community. Some visionary leaders have shown the way. Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Italian Navy Admiral Luciano Zappata affi rmed in Vol. 5 Issue 3 of The Transformer, “Modelling and simulation is high on the agenda of decision-makers because of the benefi ts it provides to improve interoperability, reduce cost, mitigate risk, improve the quality of products, making them closer to the needs of the users, and help reduce the time to fi eld capabilities.”

10:00 “... to summarise the results...” It seems we are getting to the end of this JFCOM brief. It was not bad. “Exercise Noble Resolve 2007 was conducted virtually - required fi ve months, 140 personnel and $2 million for development. Compare that to a 2002 Millennium Challenge exercise that was conducted live and required fi ve years, 14,000 personnel and $250 million or development.” Wow, that’s savings!

12:00 I meet a pilot for lunch, a good friend of mine who will shortly be deployed to Afghanistan.“Flying there will be completely new for you,” I said to her. She stares at me and says, “I’ve already been there.” I know she hasn’t. “How did you do it,” I ask. “I’ve fl own over this terrain and practised my mission almost daily for the last two months in a U.S. Army simulator.” Oh. “That gives you an advantage before you get there. I’m relieved to know you will be better prepared and safer, my friend.”

Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Force Trainer, Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck is leading the transformation in the NATO training arena. He stated in the Showdaily magazine of I/ITSEC 2010 “when we look into the world of distributed learning, distributed exercises, virtual worlds, and immersive environments, [we see] key items to get

Modelling And Simulation, Enabling NATO StrategyMost importantly,

the Snow Leopard Programme has aroused

the awareness of the collective training and

exercise community on the possibilities of distributed modelling

and simulation and has opened the debate on

the transformation of the way NATO forces should

be trained, setting the foundations for a future

capability to fulfi l the ACT vision.

14 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

A screenshot of Allied Command

Transformation’s game, ‘Boarders Ahoy!’,

a 3D multiplayer game for security and search

teams that looks at the boarding of suspect

merchant vessels. The game recently won

the ‘Serious Games Showcase and Challenge

People’s Choice of Best Serious Game’

at I/ITSEC 2010 in Orlando.

Future Solution Modelling

and Simulation Branch

better training,” he continued asserting that “next year [2011] is the year of modelling and simulation immersive environments for distributed exercises and training”. During the last decade, under the umbrella of the NATO Modelling and Simulation Group, NATO has demonstrated the technical feasibility of the concept of distributed synthetic training with a whole battery of incremental technical demonstrations and development of agreed solutions to improve interoperability. In 2007, ACT leadership decided to create a program called Snow Leopard with the aim to operationalise the technical concept and streamline the efforts of the model-ling and simulation community to better serve the needs of the training and exercise clients in NATO and nations. Under this programme, with the support of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the NATO Command, Control and Consultation Agency (NC3A), ACT has supplied its two training centres, Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, and Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, with the necessary tools to achieve their missions. Most importantly, the Snow Leopard programme has aroused the awareness of the collective training and exercise community on the possibilities of distributed modelling and simulation and has opened the debate on the transformation of the way NATO forces should be trained, setting the foundations for a future capability to fulfi l the ACT vision. ACT is also working on the important area of scenario development. In the short term, it aims to provide a NATO Exercise Scenario Portal that will be a one stop shopping for the training and exercise communities to access and reuse resources for scenario development. On the other hand, ACT is working with nations, industry and NC3A to construct a framework that allows the test and evaluation community to share and be aware of available assets, such as battle laboratories or particular test and evaluation services. One of the most important objectives that ACT aims to reach is to support the deployment of systems, typically national, on the area of operations by providing visibility of NATO reference test facilities, ensuring that systems are ready and interoperable for operation in theatre in advance.

17:00 “Hi girls.” No response. “Anybody here willing to give a big hug to a tired dad?” Silence. Lucia is furiously driving a BMW FWD on the dusty roads of the Dakar rally. Better not to bother her, it can be dangerous ... for me. “And where is my little princess?” She is jumping and moving her arms in front of her Wii, trying to catch some virtual ‘something.’ Sigh. No welcome kisses for Dad today...

These computer games really transport my kids to a virtual 4th dimension. ACT examines new technologies that can be utilized in the benefi t of the warfi ghter. In particular, for the past two years, ACT has been investigating virtual worlds as a possible technology to be used for improving NATO capabilities. Three worlds were built. The fi rst two were a generic deployed operational HQ similar to ISAF and the SACT headquarters in Norfolk. Both had conference rooms built to very similar conditions to the real ones and were meant to encourage distributed meeting and pre-deployment familiarization. The fi nal is a ship-boarding world with the potential of facilitating the training of maritime interdiction operations. The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) evaluated a prototype based in this last world in October 2010. CAPT Önder Celebi, TUR(N), the Deputy Commander of the NMIOTC stated that “It is obvious training facilities can exploit such technologies in providing better quality products. We believe that this type of capability will certainly add value.” …Celebi also spoke about mobile training teams and how “we can use this to train and simulate where we cannot take our mock-up ship.”

18:30 Deep in my sofa, lazily watching TV. “Now, from Lisbon ...,” CNN shooting the news, “... the 28 Chiefs of State of NATO signed a common declaration after the summit ... they have decided, among other things, to enhance the NATO contribution to the Comprehensive Approach, to further boost NATO partnerships with countries and organisations, to develop a missile defence capability, to improve NATO cyber defence capabilities and to agree on the Lisbon package of the Alliance’s most pressing needs.”

I’d better rest now; it seems to me I will have a lot of work to do during the next few years.

Because of its versatility and capacity to recreate the reality allowing harmless manipulation of the environment to assess alternatives or present challenges to the user, modelling and simulation is a key enabler of strategy and capability development. Modelling and Simulation is also a vehicle to build partnership because of its ability to provide neutral scenarios in which future partners learn to gain confi dence to work together, to fi nd common objectives and to practise procedures to fulfi l them. NATO is also undertaking a severe structural reform. In spite of future cuts, the role of ACT will be reinforced, as ACT Chief of Staff, Royal Navy Vice Admiral Robert Cooling, soundly declared in his December message. “ACT has a clear role in ensuring that the overall

coherence of Alliance capabilitiesis preserved or even enhanced despite the cuts in national defence expenditure.” Modelling and simulation will, for sure, play an important role in making sure that his vision is achieved. To do so, ACT will continue leveraging national capabilities, initiatives and best practices. We have the opportunity, as well, to take advantage of the imminent establishment of the Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence in Italy that will serve as a factor multiplier for the transformational power of modelling and simulation in NATO. We are also consolidating our links with industry and academia with the purpose of exploiting their solutions and infl uencing their lines of research. Finally, a word of caution, even if considered a key enabler for NATO strategy, modelling and simulation is not the panacea. It should be used when needed to support the NATO endeavours in defence of the freedom and secu-rity of the allied nations. Thinking needs to be done to ensure we better use this terrifi c technology for our benefi t. I leave you with a quote from Italian Army Brigadier General Giovanni Fungo, Assistant Chief of Staff Capability Engineering, when he meditated about the quintes-sence of modelling and simulation nowadays on a recent article on the Defence Management Journal. “…M&S is more than just a fl ight simulator or a fi rst person game, it is about capturing the essence of future situations, to include operating with non-military actors (governmental, civilian, local population etc.), requiring quick and sound decisions.”

20:00 Uh, too deep of a thought for a relaxing time after dinner. Maybe I should check out this nice Avatar movie again. And that is how a day of modelling and simulation goes. ■

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 15

A general overview of the new NATO

Defence Planning arrangements, with

a particular emphasis on the fi eld of

planning for non-military capabilities.

During their meeting in June

2009, the Alliance’s Defence Ministers

welcomed the development of a more

coherent, traceable, transparent NATO

Defence Planning Process (NDPP) able

to identify, develop and deliver the

necessary range of forces and associated

capabilities, to undertake the Alliance’s

full spectrum of missions. The lessons

learned from

current NATO

operations make

it clear that a

comprehensive

political, civilian

and military

approach is

necessary for

eff ective crisis

management.

The new NDPP

will address the

whole range of

capabilities which

will in turn capture,

in an integrated and balanced manner,

the single set of the Minimum Capability

Requirements (MCR) in a continuum

from the near to long term to meet

the Alliance’s Level of Ambition.

Thereafter, Nations, groups of

Nations, or NATO collectively will be

encouraged to achieve these apportioned

targets and to provide solutions from

either military or non-military capabilities,

the latter identifi ed by the NATO Strategic

Concept endorsed at Lisbon.

How is the new NDPP addressing this additional challenge?

Of the Strategic Commands, ACT has

the lead of the Defence Planning Staff

Team (DPST) for the conduct of the NDPP

Step 2 (Determine Requirements) and

the initial part of the Step 3 (apportion

requirements/set

targets), together

known as Step 2+.

The engine driving

this work is

an analytical

process called

the Capability

Requirements

Review (CRR),

which will identify

the MCR to meet

the quantitative

and qualitative

ambitions set out

in NATO’s new

Strategic Concept and forthcoming

political guidance.

During this transitional cycle, CRR

2012, the MCR will be expanded to

encompass requirements beyond

those of a purely military nature, as in

previous Requirements Review cycles.

The MCR, due in November 2011 will,

inter alia, identify a range of non-military

capabilities. These will be derived from

the analysis of NATO mission types

and representative scenarios in light of

‘operationalising’ the Comprehensive

Approach and an increased emphasis

on stabilisation and reconstruction

operations and phases within operations.

This new work will be in addition to the

planned analysis and lessons learned

from recent Disaster Relief (DR) and

Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

operations. The MCR’s focus is on

identifying required capabilities. It is

accepted that many requirements could

be met by either the use of military

capabilities, or if available and coordinated,

by civilian entities. In this way a range of

requirements will be developed, many

of which will more naturally be fulfi lled

by non-military capabilities, rather than

those of the military, when security is

assured. The current NDPP cycle will

examine tasks, such as the following,

that are vital to operational success in

humanitarian or stabilisation operations:

• delivery of essential needs to local

populations/support to restoration

of the basic services - access to water,

food, utilities, shelter, and

basic medical care

• restoration of good governance

• restoration of public security -

basic justice system and rule of law

• support to restoration of political

institutions and civil and economic

infrastructures

• military capacity building -

mentoring, advice, operational

support and training

• support to security sector reform

including disarmament,

demobilisation and reintegration

• military, police, judiciary,

prison reform

• reconstruction of the basic

infrastructure (e.g. roads, airfi elds,

electrical power)

ACT has had considerable and

fruitful engagement with the Civil

Emergency Planning (CEP) domain over

the past year to exploit CEP’s experience

and existing planning mechanisms.

However, stabilisation operations will

prove an added challenge to NATO

lanning Domains and deriving

requirements and setting targets will

require a coordinated approach. The

NDPP provides the structures, and the

experts will engage together in the CRR

to identify the military and non-military

capabilities required in support of

operations.

How will you integrate military and non-military solutions in the same capability planning mechanism”?

Rather than apply the terminologies,

military or non-military, the CRR will

consider only NATO requirements that are

fulfi lled through a set of solutions which

could be military or non-military. Within

the CRR, the methodology for deriving

capability requirements consists of four

main components:

• Mission Analysis. A Mission-to-Task

Decomposition (MTD) is conducted

in order to identify the full panoply

of tasks and sub-tasks that must be

accomplished to ensure success

during the conduct of each specifi c

mission type (Collective Defence,

Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping,

Humanitarian Assistance, etc.). Our

analysis accounts for, and is informed

by, NATO current operations. We

will explore the implications of

NATO conducting inter alia, counter

Planning For Non-MilitaryCapabilities

A VIEW FROM

Allied Command Transformation

Brigadier General Peter Bartram

Assistant Chief of Staff Capability Requirements

16 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

insurgency, stabilisation and

reconstruction operations and

stabilisation and reconstruction phases

within operations. The tasks identifi ed

in this analysis might be performed

through the employment of existing

or new capabilities – similarly, these

might be provided by military or

civilian capabilities.

• Situation Analysis. The Situation

Analysis comprises the development

of suitable scenarios within which

tasks and requirements are analysed

and derived. A set of Generic Planning

Situations (GPS) are examined. They

represent the context where the

Alliance might conduct an operation

under a broad range of political,

military, social, economical,

informational, infrastructure and

physical environmental parameters.

Subsequently, dedicated cases

studies will be developed to better

describe and characterise tasks

within a specifi c GPS. For example, in

order to examine the complete set of

requirements needed to successfully

conduct a Disaster Relief/Response

(DR) operation a case study, based

on the 2005 Pakistan earthquake

experience, will be developed. A

second case study will represent

a Support to Humanitarian Assistance

(SHA) operation based on the 2010

Haiti mission. The latter will also

include aspects which clearly lead to

the development of Stabilisation and

Reconstruction (S&R) requirements.

• Capability Analysis. The third

component is a Capability Analysis

which aims to defi ne the type, quality

and quantity of forces and capabilities

NATO requires to execute a given task

in a given situation. Each capability, or

group of capabilities, is uniquely coded

and described in qualitative terms

emphasising the expected eff ects

and the enabling factors. To assess

the required quantity of capabilities,

suitable algorithms will be formulated

and employed using Capability

Assignment Logic (CAL). These

CAL formulations can be simple

mathematical expressions or advanced

analytical models used to run complex

modelling and simulation test cases.

This process is developed by

combining military and operational

Subject Matter Expert judgement

and NC3A technical and analytical

expertise.

• The last step, the synthesis, ties

together all three phases: mission,

situation and capability analyses.

This synthesis allows the identifi cation

of a package of forces and capabilities

required to achieve the mission

objectives.

How do you translate requirements into Targets apportioned to nations, groups of nations or NATO collectively?

Having determined the MCR for the

mandated mission types, the NDPP will

identify the relevant shortfalls. First, an

assessment of what is already available

in NATO will be conducted on the

information provided by Nations through

the Defence Planning Capability Survey.

Secondly, this is compared with the

newly identifi ed full list of

requirements, in the understanding that

some capabilities must be maintained.

The outcome of the process is an indication

of a ‘shortfall’ or a ‘surplus’. To meet

the identifi ed shortfalls, targets will be

drafted and apportioned to nations,

groups of nations or to NATO collectively.

In accordance with the existing policies,

these targets could be issued to provide

specialized capabilities to deliver a desired

eff ect during an operation in the fi eld

of Stabilisation and Reconstruction

(S&R), Humanitarian Assistance or

Disaster Relief. Nations will be

encouraged to develop, in addition to

their military forces, additional capabili-

ties to respond to these types of targets.

Some Nations will have well developed

internal cross departmental cooperation

mechanisms and the wherewithal to

integrate military and civilian planning

functions. However, for some allies, this

may necessitate a signifi cant revision of

internal defence planning processes and

mechanisms. It may mean developing

an inter-ministerial structure, able to

provide an integrated mixture of military

and non-military capabilities to respond

to the needs of the Alliance. It is hoped

that all Allies will be able to support this

approach. To facilitate this evolution,

our draft targets need to be Specifi c,

Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and

Timely (SMART). Within the initial part

of the NDPP Step 3 the draft targets will

be discussed with the Nations prior to

being formally issued - the aim being to

fi nd existing national resources to the

maximum extent possible.

Conclusion

Today, it is hard to envisage a crisis

or confl ict being resolved solely by

military means. Security depends upon

stability and both security and stability

are infl uenced by factors beyond the

purely physical. Human perceptions

are the key to crisis resolution and

management. Consequently, the Alliance

must be better prepared to positively

infl uence peoples’ perceptions across

a wider spectrum and not just in the

traditional military (physical security)

sphere. In many cases NATO will not be

the provider of non-military capabilities,

but will need to act in coordinated

partnership and cooperation. This in

itself highlights the need to implement

the Comprehensive Approach at the

Strategic Level (as well as Operational

and Tactical), where the Alliance must

work closer with the UN, EU, World

Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF)

amongst other global partners, agencies

and NGOs. To do that successfully, the

Alliance needs to determine the military

and non-military capabilities it requires

to achieve its strategic and operational

objectives in humanitarian, disaster relief

and stabilisation and reconstruction

operations ‘on the ground’. The NDPP

is the tool chosen by the Alliance to

address this issue. The process is new,

but the NDPP has already demonstrated

that it has the potential to provide

credible, transparent and traceable

outputs to meet the Alliance’s security

challenges of the 21st Century. ■

Mid-term Requirements Branch

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 17

The primary mission of the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC) is to support ACT in capability development within the maritime domain. Historically, NURC has accomplished this through the development of purpose-built hardware and software in anticipation of future requirements of NATO navies. Although purpose-built systems can offer great technological advancements, they can be expensive, diffi cult to integrate into existing systems, and diffi cult to share among NATO Nations. To make collaboration easier, to streamline costs, and to allow for easier integration into existing systems, scientists and developers at NURC have recently started using open-source software for several of the Centre’s programmes. The MOOS-IvP platform is a suite of open-source programmes that lets teams of developers and scientists programme robots, in this case autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). Started at MIT’s Department of Ocean Engineering

and since maintained by the Oxford Mobile Robotics Group, the Naval

Undersea Warfare Center and MIT, MOOS stands for “Mission Oriented Operating Suite.” MOOS was originally developed as software for AUVs, but it can be used in any environment where multiple applications and operating systems need to work together. The interoperability that this allows is of great advantage to NATO militaries trying to integrate and coordinate various hardware platforms. Simply described, developers use MOOS-IvP to programme a set of behaviours that can be used to control autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV). Behaviours can be simple, such as maintain a course, or they can be highly complex, such as keep a certain distance and bearing away from a moving object. IvP stands for Interval Programming, a mathematical programming model for multi-objective optimisation. It determines the vehicle’s next best action combining all behaviours and using the data the vehicle has

acquired about the environment, outputs the desired settings for speed, heading, and/or depth. MOOS-IvP is being used at the Centre in a number of different project areas:

• For port and harbour protection, using AUVs, autonomous surface vehicles (ASVs), and a variety of sensors and warning devices to identify and deter small boats and swimmers from entering a restricted area.

• For mine countermeasures, using AUVs and ASVs to fi nd, identify, and dispose of mines.

• For antisubmarine warfare, using AUVs to gather underwater data and behave in ways that are specifi c to the current environment and more importantly the anticipated environment.

A specifi c example of how MOOS-IvP can be used for antisubmarine warfare was shown last summer during the Generic Littoral Interoperable Network Technology 2010 (GLINT10) experiment. The goal of the 20-day experiment was to test a small fl eet of AUVs for their ability to operate autonomously and cooperatively in shallow waters near shore where using sonar poses the greatest technical challenges. The tests, which included three 21-inch AUVs running MOOS software, showed that AUVs can be programmed with behaviours that allow them to track a target autonomously and that AUVs can work together to minimize the errors associated with localizing, or fi nding, a target. More complex behaviours will be tested as part of GLINT11, which is currently scheduled to take place September 6-25 in the Gulf of Taranto. Scientists and developers at NURC like using MOOS because it offers a modular approach to complex projects

and it allows multiple people to work simultaneously yet independently. Because the Centre works with so many organisations, software such as MOOS-IvP that facilitates collaboration is extremely valuable. Programming is done in C++, suitable for small computers, and MOOS-IvP has a relatively quick learning curve. This latter feature is particularly important at NURC because rapid prototyping is common and there is a high rotation of staff, so scientists and developers need to ramp up quickly and integrate their work into existing projects. The NATO military is a collaborative and rapidly changing institution. It is also an institution where legacy systems and new systems must be integrated. Using open-source software, such as MOOS-IvP, is a cost-effective means for rapid, collaborative development that allows for interoperability of existing and new systems. ■

NURC Public Aff airs Offi ce

of Ocean Engineering

and since maintained by the Oxford Mobile Robotics Group, the Naval

U d W f C d MIT MOOS d f

(GLwaautshochaAUprotarmina tofS

andindorg

ll

Fostering CollaborationThrough Open-Source Software

MOOS software runs on a variety of hardware

platforms at NURC, including (from top):

a fi xed sonar diver-detection system, a long-

range acoustic device, the Ocean Explorer

AUV and the Mandarina ASV.

18 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

NATO Undersea Research Centre

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 19

Current commercial developments in ‘cloud computing’, includingservice oriented architectures and virtualisation, are being widely promoted as a means of making more effi cient use of computing resources. Cloud computing allows users to pull information from a series of networks operating together and sharing credentials. The main gains are cost savings and increasedinteroperability: ‘cloud computing’ offers opportunities to reduce operating costs for information systems, together with increased effi ciency and fl exibility in the way information is stored, managed and used. This is achieved through shared network-delivered services, both public and private, in which each user sees only the service, as the implementation or infrastructure is managed elsewhere. HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) staff involved in planning and developing future information systems can benefi t from greater awareness of the prospects and risks associated with investing in ‘cloud computing’ solutions, in order to develop sound advice to NATO and national authorities. To this end, HQ SACT personnel from Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Division, with the ACT Offi ce of Security and Capability Engineering Division, have recently initiated several related projects that will greatlyimprove the staff’s depth of current knowledge about the prospects for benefi tting from ‘cloud computing’ techniques in the NATO environment. The projects involve information exchange with industry and experimentation that will identify pros and cons of ‘cloud computing’ in the NATO environment. The results should also be benefi cial to NATO as a whole. The NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) has begun a high level advisory study for HQ SACT on “Implications of ‘cloud computing’ developments for NATO operational structures. More than 20 companies involved in the development and implementation of ‘cloud’ technologies are participating in this multinational study. The results will represent the combined views of industry across many of the NATO nations. Through ACT’s Framework For Collaborative Interaction (FFCI), several non-procurement collaborative projects have been launched with companies to obtain a range of industry perspectives on ‘cloud computing’ and learn from industry knowledge and experience in applying ‘cloud’ solutions.

ACT Begins Cloud Computing Initiatives

IBM held a series of information exchange workshops with HQ SACT staff during 2010 and has additional projects planned in 2011 that will focus on “on-premise” ‘cloud computing’ challenges. Microsoft Corporation has agreed to conduct technical workshops on ‘cloud computing’ in early 2011 and has also been exploring some specifi c applications for ‘cloud’ solutions to solve capability shortfalls. The current focus for Microsoft collaboration on ‘cloud computing’ is “off-premise” scenarios. Several other companies, including Hewlett Packard, Dell, Orange Business Service and others, are initiating similarcollaborative projects to help HQ SACT address ‘cloud computing’ issues through the FFCI initiative. In addition to the collaborative projects, there are also some related projects within the C4ISR Division, funded as a part of the ACT Programme of Work, that are contributing to the overall ‘cloud computing’ investigations. Experimentation and development projects are addressing a number of identifi ed challenges related to ‘cloud computing.’ ACT is experimenting with practical ‘cloud’ solutions for the consolidation of the former ACT C4I San Diego data centre and the Norfolk-based reference facility located in the C4ISR Technology & Human Factors Branch. The combined data centre will be used to support several activities, including: the Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXercise, eXamination, eXperimentation and eXploration event (CWIX); Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA); Joint Intelligence, Surveil-lance and Reconnaissance (JISR) and architecture experimentation. Industry was also invited to participate in the most recent “Tidesprint” meeting in November 2010. Among several workshops run during the event, the one on ‘cloud computing’ was particularly well supported, and results of the discussions have been published on a collaborative website that is accessible to the participants. ■

Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division (C4ISR)

he Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), NATO’s focal point for tactical level combined and joint training and transformation, focuses on training aimed at achieving tactical interoperability. Therefore, the Centre hosts activities or deploys providing support and expertise in the training of all Alliance and Partner Forces. The JFTC conducts International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Command training and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) training. Besides, it hosts Counter Improvised Explosive Device Courses, Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercises and offers a platform for testing and experimentation. Since NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002, transformation has been one of the Alliance’s priorities. The transformation enabled NATO’s enlargement and a setup of a new command structure. Offi cially established in 2004 in Bydgoszcz, Poland, the JFTC soon started to play its role under the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) training network and evolved constantly. NATO’s transformational ambitions include the creation of further integrated, network-enabled, combined joint forces. Forming them requires investment in both training and transformation, down to the tactical level. This is the “raison d’être” for the

JFTC. Initially, the JFTC was mainly designed to support the NATO Response Force (NRF) Training at the Component Command level, but since 2008, following a decision of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, the JFTC has focused on pre-deployment training of Allied Forces for current operations. NRF training support became a matter of secondary importance. The authorised strength of the JFTC has risen from 84 to 105. This increase in personnel highlights the importance of training conducted by the JFTC in order to meet the demand for high quality tactical level training for the Alliance forces. The NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010 pointed out the importance of counter insurgency operations and stabilisation and reconstruction missions as well as providing the necessary training and exercises for assuring our defence against a full range of security challenges. The JFTC plays a distinct and unique role within NATO by focusing on joint and combined training at the tactical level. Additionally, it co-operates with other Alliance member Nation training centres, including Partnership for Peace training centres, and “Centres of Excellence” in order to ensure application of NATO standards and doctrine in the combined and joint areas at tactical level. In this role, the Joint Force Training Centre is a critical element in assisting the transformation of Alliance and Partner forces. Currently the Joint Force Training Centre has focused on ISAF pre-deployment training. It supports ISAF commanders at the tactical level ensuring that ISAF Regional Command (RC) Head-quarters achieve a high level of interoperability and fl exibility and that soldiers are fully prepared to execute assigned missions upon their deployment in Afghanistan. Training events for deploying Regional Command staffs include media, counter improvised explosive device, counter insurgency, cultural, functional area systems, electronic working procedures and staff function specifi c training. The capstone

event for regional events is a computer assisted exercise in which theory is turned into practice. Plans for 2011 include two RC North training events and the support of one for RC South. The fi rst RC North training will be connected to the US Unifi ed Endeavour training event for US-led Regional Commands. Training events for OMLTs focus on preparing team members to teach, coach and mentor their Afghan National Security Forces counterparts. Training includes counter-improvised explosive device, counter insurgency, cultural, and mentoring tactics, techniques and procedure training. Like Regional Command staff training events, Operational Mentor and Liaison Team training events also utilise simulations to better prepare the team members to execute their missions once in theatre. While the Kandak (battalion) level OMLT training is a combination of theory and practice and therefore conducted at the US Joint Multinational Readiness Centre in Hohenfels, Germany, the Above Kandak level OMLT training combines academics and Computer Assisted Exercises based on extended case studies.

JFTC staff deploys into operations very frequently in order to make training relevant and to offer the best available training support. Both Regional Command staff and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team training events utilize subject matter experts from Allied Nations, Non-Governmental Organisations, International Organisations and marry up actual Afghan

J O I N T F O R C E T R A I N I N G C E N T R E

At The Heart Of NATO’s Preoccupations

T

20 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

National Security Forces Offi cers with the training audience. The result being that the deploying personnel receive the most current training available and are able to engage in conversa-tions with those who have the fi rst hand knowledge of the actual situation in theatre. Additionally, since 2010 the JFTC has hosted Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Courses (C-IED). The Staff Offi cer Awareness Course (SOAC) and the Battle Staff Course (BSC) are designed to prepare Staff Offi cers for the Improvised Explosive Device threat. The SOAC’s aim is to give Staff Offi cers, assigned to Brigade Headquarters level and above, an overview of the threat from IEDs with the emphasis on staff interaction, responsibilities and approaches to defeating the IED system in accordance with NATO C-IED Doctrine. The Battle Staff Course is designed for Staff Offi cers and Senior Non-Commissioned Offi cers assigned to Brigade Headquarters level and below. Its purpose is to provide offi cers with knowledge on principles and processes to attack and degrade the insurgent network and IED system. In 2011, the JFTC will host six Attack the Network C-IED courses and, for the fi rst time, the NATO C-IED conference.

Also for the fi rst time, the JFTC will host the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX). Later this year 500 software developers and system experts from 15 Nations will arrive for the largest JFTC event yet, testing and improving

the interoperability of more than 100 functional area systems used for battlefi eld management and overwatch. This ACT-led exercise is intended to improve the interoperability of NATO as well as National Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and it will rely on Combined Federated Battle Lab Network (CFBLNet) for distributed system trials. The JFTC established its connection to the CFBLNet last fall. It allows the JFTC to take part in distributed training events and in the future it will signifi cantly strengthen its role in the establishment of the Afghan Mission Network Training Federa-tion. For the fi rst time the JFTC used its CFBLNet connection during last year’s NATO Education and Training Network (NETN) Modeling and Simulation Group 068 (MSG 068) Experiment that took place simultaneously in six headquarters. The main goal of the experiment was to prepare recommendations

for persistent infrastructure architecture, shared scenarios and resources sharing within NATO, NATO Nations, PfP and Contact Countries. As JFTC takes ownership of the NATO Live Virtual Constructive (NLVC) suite of training tools and becomes the hub for NLVC-based training, JFTC is also becoming an important partner with ACT’s Distributed Training and Exercises (DTE) project. The JFTC’s motto, “Transformation Through Training”, refl ects its mission. The JFTC plays a key role in the NATO transformation process by delivering NATO centralized pre-deployment training at the tactical level and thus supports current operations, by organising conferences and courses and by offering a platform for experimentation. The training facility is designed to be fl exible and can be easily confi gured to meet different demands. Conducting experimentation or supporting current operations, the JFTC is at the very heart of the Alliance’s preoccupations. The importance of training and of experimentation will grow and the JFTC intends to fulfi ll its missions in the best possible way to help NATO to master tomorrow’s challenges. ■

(Left) The plenary sessions are held in the Auditorium seating 300

people. (Bottom left) As often as possible, the training audience

interacts with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from Afghanistan,

NATO, NGOs and IOs. (Above) An air view showing the JFTC as

combination of renovated and newly constructed buildings.

In case studies, supported by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), the offi cers discuss possible solutions.

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 21

Exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10 took place from December 3-16 and trained expeditionary forces of the NATO Response Force (NRF) on Crisis Response Planning procedures and served as a fi nal step in the training and evaluation process of the NRF 16 Rotation. The exercise was conducted simultaneously

at six locations in Italy, Belgium, Norway and Turkey. Sponsored by NATO’s Allied Command Operations, SFJO 10 was conducted by U.S. Navy Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III, Commander Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples), and directed by German Army Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). The exercise trained, evaluated and certifi ed JFC Naples together with its respective Component Commands of the NRF rotation this year. The main aim was to train and exercise JFC Naples as Joint HQ Main (JFC Naples currently leads NRF 16) as well as NATO’s Allied Land Component Command Madrid (LCC Madrid) for the Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE). Based on a sophisticated contingency scenario related to an asymmetric environment, NATO’s three level (strategic, operational and tactical) STEADFAST Series of

Exercises are designed to continuously develop the expeditionary capabilities and functionality of the NRF. Also, the exercises help maintain a level of readiness for NATO forces all over Europe. Creating the exercise scenario for that training falls under the responsibility of the Joint Warfare Centre’s Joint Exercise Division. It takes more than a year to fully plan a STEADFAST SERIES. U.S. Air Force Colonel Jeffrey “Pep” DeVore, Chief of the JWC’s Joint Exercise Division explained, “It is a daunting task to take a STEADFAST series exercise from cradle to grave, especially when you consider we are working three STEADFAST series exercises in parallel with two ISAF exercises at one time. On the surface, the task seems quite simple, but when you realize all the detail our scenario and planning teams put into an exercise, even the 13 to 14 month cycle isn’t long enough to cover all the areas we would like to.” DeVore went on to explain, “The dynamic security environment NATO faces today is extremely complex. Although JWC strives to cover as much as we can for NRF training, there are always some parts and aspects we will not be able to cover due to time constraints or resourcing. But, our job is to prepare the NRF for possible rotation and we take that responsibility very seriously.” The scenario for SFJO 10, CERASIA II, was fi ctitious,

Joint Warfare Centre Certifi es NRF 16 Leadership At Ulsnes

22 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

German Army Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre (right) speaks to an attendee at Exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10.

About The JOINT WARFARE CENTRE

The Training Establishment of the

NATO Alliance: The Joint Warfare Centre

provides the best training support

possible for the collective training and

certifi cation of NATO’s joint operational

and component level Headquarters.

Joint Warfare Centre Mission: As

directed by Supreme Allied Commander

Transformation (SACT), Joint Warfare

Centre promotes and conducts NATO’s

joint and combined experimentation,

analysis and doctrine development

to maximize transformational synergy

and to improve NATO’s capabilities

and interoperability.

Provides operational level training

in support for ongoing operations;

Conducts training of joint and combined

staff s (NATO Command Structure/NATO

Force Structure); Supports concept

and doctrine development; Assists the

developmental and experimental work

of ACT on new concepts, technologies,

modelling and simulation; Performs joint

analysis, collects Lessons Learned, and

feeds them back into the transforma-

tional network through the JALLC;

Provides a biannual Iraqi Key Leader

Training course to senior representatives

of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Offi ce,

Ministry of Defence and Ministry

of the Interior. ■

CORE TASKS: More Effective, More Efficient NATO Response Force

Each STEADFAST Series of Exercises is

tailored to meet the specifi c Exercise

Objectives. The Exercise Objectives for

SFJO 10 focussed on practicing

the Comprehensive Approach,

Communication and Information

Systems planning, eff ective channels of

communication and interaction between

the Main HQ, Forward Element and the

Component Commands, operational

campaign assessment, operational

logistic planning, joint targeting, CBRN

Defence Capability and Strategic Com-

munication (StratCom) and Intelligence.

One peculiarity of the exercise was

the fi rst-time participation of SHAPE

StratCom into the exercise construction.

Thus, the eff ective involvement of Strat-

Com and their meticulous assessment of

all 68 incidents ensured that the Strat-

Com desired eff ects were considered and

acted upon throughout the exercise. “A

StratCom presence was required during

the Main Planning Conference, Incident

Development, and Scripting Workshops

to ensure StratCom considerations were

woven into the exercise narrative in a

manner requiring decision makers at

with various fi ctional countries involved, and based on a United Nations mandated NATO-led Crisis Response Operation to restore peace and security in a war torn region as well as to support reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, while simulating extensive challenges for the Training Audience, such as piracy, genocide, internally displaced persons, natural disasters, lack of water and food supplies and security and environmental threats. During the exercise, 961 injects were generated over the 68 incidents in the three main events entitled: Stakeholders, Threats and Sustainment. “While the scenario creates the operational environment within which the Training Audience will deploy, the Main Events List/Main Incidents List (MEL/MIL) determines which aspects of that environment will be leveraged to provide opportunities for the participants to achieve the exercise and training objectives,” said Canadian Army Lieutenant Colonel John Cullen, an analyst working at JWC’s Joint Training Divi-sion and the Chief MEL/MIL for SFJO 10. “In the case of SFJO 10, working from the exercise and training objectives, from the desired and expected outcomes of specifi c NRF processes and activities and by maximising role players relevant to the scenario, the MEL/MIL introduced challenges to the participants with a view to causing the Joint HQ to execute the Joint Coordination Process and to synchronise the components activities using campaign assessment to set their priorities. The MEL/MIL created situations where tension was introduced between the stability and security lines of operation; where solutions required joint planning and coordination on all time horizons and cooperation across all of the stakeholders in the comprehensive environment. The HQs participating in SFJO 10 exploited the training opportunities presented by the scenario and the MEL/MIL, effectively applying a Comprehensive Approach in a complex operating environment.” Exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10 involved approximately 2,000 military and civilian personnel from various commands including the Rapid Deployment Corps in Italy, the Air Component Command in Izmir, Turkey, the Special Operations Component in Ankara, Turkey, the Maritime Component Command in United Kingdom, the Nuclear- Radio-logical- Biological- Chemical Defence Battalion in Hungary, the Command Post in Slovenia, the Combined Air Operations Centre in Turkey and the Multinational Civil-Military Cooperation Group in Italy. On 14 December 2010, the Joint Warfare Centre hosted a Distin-guished Visitor’s Day and welcomed 42 visitors to observe the exercise, including General Walter Natynczyk, Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant General Alfredo Cardona Torres, Commander Allied Force Command Madrid; Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, Commander Allied Joint Force Command Lisbon; Lieutenant General Vincent Tesniere, Deputy Commander Allied Air Command Izmir and Major General Thomas Beckett, Deputy Commander NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy. ■

Article and photos by Inci Kucukaksoy

Public Aff airs Offi ce, Joint Warfare Centre

the military strategic, operational and

mission headquarters to ensure StratCom

eff ects were part of their decision-

making deliberations,” said Lt Col Rita M.

LePage, Canadian Forces Public Aff airs

Offi cer currently working in the SHAPE

Strategic Communications offi ce. ■

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 23

How to take the LL capability forward

IntroductionThe Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)

hosted the 2010 NATO Lessons Learned (LL) Conference

in Lisbon, Portugal from October 26-28. The aim of the

conference was to provide NATO’s forum for exchange

of information within the NATO LL community and, in

so doing, to stimulate discussion on best practices for

joint analysis, the LL Process, Remedial Action Processes,

and supporting tools. One of the two specifi c goals of

this year’s conference was to determine what

constitutes a LL Capability.1

The term “LL Capability” has been adopted within

ACT over the last year and a half and several articles

published in The Transformer and JWC’s Three Swords by

HQ SACT LL staff in that time have attempted to describe

what such a capability might be. They have focused on

describing the value of this capability and the LL elements

available within NATO to support it. Where these articles

(and other documents such as recent drafts for a revised

Bi-SC LL Directive) have missed the point however is in

not defi ning the term “LL Capability”, not explaining the

way in which the existing

elements are expected to

contribute to developing

this Capability, and in not

indentifying the critical

factors for success of this

capability. Perhaps most

signifi cantly, prior to this

year’s LL Conference, no

one had addressed the

question of who exactly

should benefi t from this

capability; that is, who is

it that needs to learn individual lessons. Thus this year’s

conference presented a valuable opportunity to agree

a defi nition for such a Capability and discuss these

other aspects.

On the fi rst day of the conference, COL Nick

Lipscombe, GBR A and JALLC LL Analysis Branch Chief,

presented a draft defi nition of a LL Capability and some

background discussion as food for thought. Over the next

two days this background and draft defi nition served as

the basis for much of the panel discussion and, by the

time the conference closed, attendees were able to agree

a (somewhat modifi ed) defi nition for a LL Capability,

develop some insight into the supporting pillars that

the capability should consist of, and apply fi ndings from

recent JALLC analyses to determining the critical success

factors for the capability. The remainder of this article

will discuss these three aspects, which have since been

presented in greater depth to HQ SACT leadership in

a point paper called Lessons Learned Capability –

An Examination & Proposal. 2

LL Capability – A Defi nitionThe defi nition of a LL Capability as

agreed at the 2010 NATO LL Conference is:

“A lessons learned capability provides a

commander with the structure, process

and tools necessary to capture, analyse

and take remedial action on any issue

and to communicate and share results to

achieve improvement. A desire to improve

and the right mindset are essential to

ensure that the capability works

in harmony.”

The most signifi cant change made to that

defi nition proposed at the beginning of the conference

was to substitute the word “commander” for “an

organisation or head-

quarters,” as “commander”

emphasizes the critical

role of leadership and

command responsibility

in the overall LL capability,

one of the critical success

factors that will be

discussed below.

A LL Capability needs

to consist of supporting

pillars, which at the

conference were proposed

and, after some discussion, generally agreed to be:

Processes, Structures, and Tools, all resting on a base of

a common Mindset for collecting, implementing, and

sharing lessons. The right Mindset requires a desire to

improve and, as we belong to an alliance of nations, a

desire to share that improvement for the greater benefi t

of the organisation as a whole. The right mindset is,

therefore, what underpins the LL Capability–without

it the pillars will not stand up.

Also presented at the conference were fi ndings from

a recent JALLC Analysis of LL Sharing in NATO and the

Nations which determined that there are three critical

factors for the success of a LL Capability. These are

Leadership, Stakeholder Engagement, and Information

Assurance. Panel discussions led to the idea that, of

these factors, Leadership is so important that it too

merits being considered a base for the supporting pillars.

Consensus at the conference was strongest on the

need for Sharing to be the fundamental tie binding the

pillars of the LL Capability together. Without Sharing,

which should take place at all phases in a LL Process,

lessons that are identifi ed or learned and which are not

shared results in their potential value being severely

limited–particularly in an organisation like NATO.

Figure 1 is a graphical representation of a LL

Capability’s supporting pillars and bases, a fi gure

which JALLC refers to as the LL Capability Temple.

The Supporting PillarsProcesses

There are two processes, internal and external.

The former provides the nation, headquarters, or

organisation with the requisite mechanisms to facilitate

the gathering of observations, to staff and analyse those

observations, to endorse and take remedial action (as

applicable), and fi nally to assist subordinate commands

with their lessons. The latter provides the ability to

access, view and share lessons from/to external sources.

Clearly, the processes go hand-in-glove with the

structures and tools.

Structures

There are two parts to the structures: the policy and the

people. First, structures require a clear delineation of LL

procedures and responsibilities and so policy, directives

and operating procedures are needed to ensure full

Virtual Development of NATO’s Lessons Learned Capability: Outcome of the 2010 Lessons Learned Conference

Discussion Forum on the NATO LL PortalIn order to provide an opportunity to readers

for discussing further development of the

LL Capability in NATO, JALLC has opened a forum

in the NATO LL Portal. To participate,

please visit the LL Portal at http://nllp.jallc.nato.int

on either the NS WAN or the Internet.

24 T h e T r a n s f o r m e r

Figure 1 – The LL Capability Temple

ConclusionJALLC believes that a LL Capability as described in this

article can provide the framework for increased lesson

learning in NATO, but the capability cannot succeed

without leaders and stakeholders. JALLC’s goal for the

2011 LL conference is to include more of the stakeholders–

operators, planners, logisticians–while reducing the

number of pure LL practitioners, especially participants

from national LL organisations that are not directly

involved in the development of NATO’s LL Capability. We

also intend to include the NATO standardization working

groups, who we consider to be the principle stakeholders

in a great number of the lessons that arise from JALLC

analyses, and a broader cross section of NATO Force

Structure HQs. Including these vital elements of the LL

Capability can only help in furthering its development.

However, the mere existence of a LL Capability and

its constituent elements does not guarantee that NATO

can become a successful learning organisation. As

Danish Air Force, Brigadier General Peter Sonneby,

JALLC Commander

stated in his closing

remarks at the

conference, LL

Practitioners are not the

Stakeholders in LL. They

do not benefi t from learning

specifi c, individual lessons.

They are merely the

facilitators to help leaders

and stakeholders learn

lessons and implement

change. No LL Practitioner

has the authority to make major changes within an

organisation; that is, to require other branches or

individuals to learn a given lesson or change the way

they do business. Even JALLC, a key element making

up NATO’s LL Capability, can do no more than make

recommendations to NATO’s leaders based on our analysis

work. JALLC cannot make them act upon those recommen-

dations. They are free to disregard them – at NATO’s peril. ■

By Mr. Chuck Ridgway NATO CIV and COL Nick Lipscombe GBR A

1 The other was How to turn Lessons Identifi ed into Lessons Learned,

which, as it turns out, is closely related to the existence of a LL Capability and, in particular, the presence of the three critical factors

success of for that capability that will be discussed in this article.2 The subject point paper is available on request from JALLC via the

NS WAN. A complete report on the proceedings of the 2010 NATO LL Conference, including those portions not related to the subject of this article, can be found on JALLC’s NS and unclassifi ed Internet sites. [www.jallc.nato.int].

3 That is to say, an attitude that merely entering a lesson into a LLDb is tantamount to all stakeholders achieving instantly the required level of awareness of the issue and the remedial action being implemented. JALLC has seen many examples of this assumption, most recently in a proposal by one headquarters to establish an automatic data dump of all lessons in their internal LL archive into the NATO LLDb maintained by JALLC without any staffi ng or intellectual review by a sentient human being, as if such data transfer were equivalent to all NATO

learning these, as yet unstaff ed or unendorsed, lessons from theatre.

understanding, compliance and common and

reciprocated functionality of the processes and tools.

Second, LL staff offi cers (LLSO) need to be trained on

these processes and be provided in the right numbers

at the right locations within the NCS and NFS (or other

nation, HQ or organization) so that the LLSO has a

thorough understanding of the fi eld within which

he/she is operating. LLSOs should have access to

commanders and the key leaders who are empowered

to prioritize, endorse and task; in short, to ensure that

the remedial action process functions smoothly.

It is interesting to note that there is no standard

location of the LL staff within HQ structures. Some are

located in the Knowledge Management Directorate

(KMDs), others in operations directorates (mainly under

training branches) and some in resources/logistical

directorates. The one area that would seem to be the

most suitable to ensuring the requisite profi le and

support is in the command group, yet not one HQ

appears to have considered this.

Tools

There was broad agreement that the tools required to

execute a LL capability are, fi rstly, technological tools to

facilitate staffi ng and sharing of lessons and, secondly,

training and education. With the former, the most

obvious is some form of LL database, preferably one that

is compatible and accessible across all parts of NATO and

contributing nations, including Partner Nations. There

is no doubt that the more user friendly the technological

tools and the smoother the process, the greater the

probability of LL Practitioners and Stakeholders using

them and the higher the likelihood of sharing among

users. On the other hand, there appears to be a danger

that the availability of technological sharing and staffi ng

tools can engender an assumption, among the staff that

use them, that the tools will allow automatic learning

of lessons without any active eff ort on the part of those

who need to learn them.3 No technological tool is a

substitute for thought and eff ort applied by trained

and engaged LLSOs, Stakeholders, and Leaders.

The other tool is Education and Training, which is

crucial to ensuring a common understanding of the

process and a commonality of execution across the

capability spectrum. In NATO there are (currently) two

courses; the LL SOs’ course and the LL Analysts’ course.

Nations and individual HQs also off er various forms

of LLSO Training.

Critical Success FactorsAs mentioned above, the JALLC report on The Lessons

Learned Process and Lesson Sharing in NATO and Nations

identifi ed three critical factors for success of any LL

process. These are: Leadership Engagement, Stakeholder

Responsibility, and Information Assurance. Each needs

to be included in the development of NATO’s LL Capability,

for, in their absence, few are the lessons being learned in

NATO by those who need to learn them and too seldom

are they shared.

Leadership

JALLC has found that successful LL Processes are often

personality driven, from the top down, while less suc-

cessful ones often can be found in organisations where

leaders, despite paying lip service to the importance of LL,

often are not engaged in driving the process or are not

accessible to their LL practitioners. For a LL Capability to

work, leaders must be engaged and they must be

provided with high quality (see the success factor

Information Assurance), actionable written products

and they must give direction based on those products

to the appropriate stakeholders and action bodies. And

they must hold assigned stakeholders and action bodies

accountable for executing actions assigned.

Stakeholder

Responsibility

LL Practitioners, the LLSOs

and data collectors, are

not the benefi ciaries of a

lesson or, by extension,

the existence of a LL

Capability – Stakeholders

are. Stakeholders are the

persons or organisations

that are aff ected by a

problem and/or its

resolution. For this reason, stakeholder involvement is

crucial to organisational learning. Stakeholders must be

made aware of lessons that aff ect them, be convinced

of the value they present, and be tasked and held

accountable by leaders for taking action based on those

lessons. Stakeholders must bring to light those problems

that they believe can be rectifi ed through the LL Process.

Information Assurance

Proper staffi ng of lessons is essential in order to be

able to ensure their validity and applicability for the

stakeholders aff ected. For lessons originating within

an organisation, decisions based on faulty information

or inadequate assessments may lead to more problems

rather than correction of existing ones. When implementing

external lessons, the originator’s analysis must be

trustworthy. A system must be in place to verify and

validate raw observations, to ensure the correct root

causes and remedial actions are identifi ed, and to

separate low-value/quality lessons from good ones.

JALLC’s New Newsletter - The Explorer

In 2010, JALLC inaugurated a newsletter to keep

the LL Community apprised of JALLC activities and

LL developments. The Explorer is published

in electronic format and is available

on both our NS WAN and our Internet sites.

[www.jallc.nato.int]

T h e T r a n s f o r m e r 25