postone - review - jean cohen on marxian critical theory

8/2/2019 Postone - Review - Jean Cohen on Marxian Critical Theory

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Review: Jean Cohen on Marxian Critical Theory

Reviewed Work(s):

Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory by Jean L. Cohen

Moishe Postone

Theory and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Mar., 1985), pp. 233-246.

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Review Essay

J E A N C O H E N O N M A R X I A N C R I T IC A L T H E O R Y

A discussion of Jean L. Cohen, Class and Civil Society: The Limits ofMarxian Critical Theory, (Amherst: University of Mass. Press, 1982).MOISHE POSTONE

Jean Cohen 's exposi t ion and cr i t ique of Marx is a ser ious a t tempt tocontribute to the creation of a crit ical social theory th at would be ade qua te tocon tem pora ry societies. Her app roac h is very m uch informed by the expe-riences, perceptions, an d con cerns of the Left in the past tw o decades. It ismarked by an insistence upon political freedom, civil liberties, and humanrights as en ds in themselves, an un com prom isingly crit ical stance tow ardsso-called real existing socialist societies, emph asis o n new social mo vem ents,an d a skeptical at t i tud e towa rds the notion of the proletariat as the revolu-tionary subject.A new adequate cri t ical theory should, in Cohen's opinion, retain what isvalid in M arx's analysis but m ust get beyond its weaknesses. A cen tral them eof Coh en's boo k is her insistence o n the imp ortanc e to an y social critique of atheory of political institution s, one tha t c once rns itself with the institutionali-zation of legality, plurality, an d publicity, tha t is, with wh at C oh en term s thekey fea ture s of civil society (p . 225). It is precisely in this are a, acco rdin g toCo hen , that Marx's theory was m ost deficient. S he claims, moreover, thatthis deficiency was no t merely conting ent, bu t necessarily was roo ted in thena ture of M arx's analysis, in particula r, in his class theo ry.Cohen argues this posit ion by means of a consideration of Marx's socialtheo ry, which she precedes and follows with a discussion of some m ode rnsocial theorists. She begins her exposition with a critique of what sheconsiders to be variations of Marx's class theory: the theories of Marcuse,

Ce nter for Psjc~hosocial tudies , Chicago.


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Mallet , Gorz, Poulantzas, E. 0 . Wr igh t, Gou ldner , and Konrad andSzelenyi. Co he n arg ues tha t these theories, despite their differences, follow asimilar pattern, on e which is bou nd to the fundam ental presuppositions ofthe M arxia n synthesis an d, hence, is not able to dea l adequately with newerhistorical developm ents such as the new social movements an d the chan gedrelation of s tate to society (p. 21). Sh e closes her work with an e xam ination ofH abe rm as, Offe, Toura ine, and Castoriades, trying to bring together aspectsof the ir approa ches in orde r to suggest a possible direction fo r a newer criticaltheory (w hich Coh en un fortun ately te rm s a "critical stratification theory").At th e center of this bo ok is an analysis of the develo pm ent of M arx's classtheory. Cohen begins her examination of the theory from its inception inM arx's early Co ntribu tion to the Critique of Hegel's Ph ilo so ph j~f Right.She then traces it through the first critique of political economy (the 1844M anuscripts) , the transhistorical version of the theory, which Co hen term s"historical m aterialism" (T he G erman Ideology, Theses on Feuerbach , TheCommunist Manifesto), and the historical works. She concludes with adiscussion of Marx's mature critique of political economy, in which thehistorical specificity of the categories informs the nature of the critique(Grundrisse, Capital).Althoug h it is difficult to sum marize adequately an argu men t a s dense asCohe n's in the space of a review, the m ain thru st of her crit ique of M arx canbe outlined as follows. Marx's analysis of capitalism was successful as a"critique of an antag onistic social system th at generates illegitimate inequali-ties thr ou gh its exclusionary m echanisms" (p. 228). H owever, except in hisearl ies t cr i tique, M arx comm it ted the funda me ntal er ror of assuming that"the in stitutions of m od ern civil society an d th e class relation s of the cap ital-ist mode of production are . . the same" (p. xiii). This implied that thedestruction of the capitalist system would entail the destruction of civilsociety (p . 49). Because M ar x failed t o concep tualize an d realize the signifi-cance of a public space between state an d eco nom y in his critique of capital-ism and representation of socialism, he was not a ble socially to groun d thedemocratic norms and ideals he personally valued (p. 109). Instead he fellprey to the dangerous anti-political myth that a future society would beconflict-free an d hom ogeneous (p. 209).At the core of this theoretical app roac h, according to C ohe n, is the M arxia nconcept of class; the notio n of the proletariat provides bo th the sta nd po int ofMarx's critique of civil society and his model of a future rational andhomogeneous society (pp. 50, 106). Because Marx sought to ground hiscritique of civil society in relations of class do m ina tion , he saw in the w orking


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class the em bod ime nt of the universal tha t was no t truly realized in capitalistcivil society (p. 100). Co nseq uently , tha t class becam e the model for socialism(p. 106). The notion of a homogeneous universal class as a model for thefuture, however, implies a homogeneous future ord er entai l ing the aboli tionof politics, a futu re that w ould be a n extension of the present or der (p p. 101,107). Th e productivism of cap italism , there fore, becam e viewed affirmative-ly; this, in turn, implied a statist, authoritarian, vision of socialism (pp.183-193).Cohen's bo ok is a powerful state me nt again st a statist conc eptio n of social-ism an d fo r a serious consideration of the public sph ere of non-state politics.It is, at the sa me time, an indictment of M arxi sm for having failed to considersufficiently the im po rta nc e of this sphere. Cohe n m akes a convincing case forthe severe limitations of any critical social theory that rests on a notion ofclass as the sta nd po int of its critique an d th at, explicitly or implicitly, positsthe self-realization of the working class as the conditi on of em anc ipatio n.M uch of Cohen's arg um ent is applicable to imp orta nt tendencies within theMarxist tradition. However, her thesis that a necessary connection existsbetween M arx's critique of capitalism a nd a non -dem ocra tic vision of social-ism is based upon a questionable, if widespread, interpretation of thatcritique. At issue, as Co hen herself indicates, is the na ture of a n ade qua tefoundation for contemporary critical social theory. In my opinion, thequestionable aspects of her interpretation of M ar x reappear as problems an dweakness es in the so rt of new synthesis she prop oses in the last ch ap ter of herbook .At the very center of Cohen's inte rpre tation is a traditiona l reading of M ar xwhereby the so cial relations of capitalism a re interpre ted essentially as classrelations. W ithin such a reading, relations of dom inati on are treated in termsof class dom inati on. They a re considered t o be a function of private ow ner-ship of the m eans of prod uctio n with its atte nda nt inequalities and exclu-sions. Social dom inat ion interpreted as class-domination is extrinsic to theprocess of production itself; the use and ownership of production is con-sidered to be capital is t , but i ts material form is not . Hence the Marxiancon trad ictio n between the forces an d the relations of production is generallyinterpreted as being one between industrial production, on the one han d, andprivate p roperty an d the market, o n the other. Such an interpretation positsa n affirm ation of industrial prod uctio n th at, freed from th e "fetters" of thecapitalist relations of production, supposedly constitutes the foundation ofsocialism. By the same token, the class that is intrinsically bound to theindu strial proce ss of prod uctio n, t he p roleta riat, is seen as realizing itself in


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socialism. T he crit ique, acco rding to this traditional reading, is one of theparticular (the bourgeoisie) from the standpoint of the general (labor, theproletariat).Cohen's criticism of Marx is based upon such a class-centered reading,which, however, is not adequ ate, particularly with respect to M arx's m atu retheo ry. In Marx's later work s the social relations of capitalism a re expressedby the categorial form s such as the comm odity, value, capital . These catego-ries can neither be adequately understood in narrowly econ om ic terms n orcan they be sufficiently grasped by consid eration s of class. Th ey represent a nattempt to analyze the very nature of the fundamental social relations thatconsti tute m ode rn civilization, not only the unequa l distr ibution of wealthand power within that civilization. The differences between the categorialan d the class-centered inte rpr etat ion s of social relations entail very differentanalyses of do m ina tio n in capitalism an d wh at its overcom ing would imply.The two interpretations also view differently the implications of locatinghistorically the in stitutions of m od er n civil society with reference to capitalistsocial relations.Curiously, in her general introduction to Marx's late works (p. 134ff), Coh enincludes some elements of an interpretation that is not class-centered, ele-ments th at p oint to very different conclusions tha n thos e of her critique. Yet,those elements, while presented, have l i t t le ult imate impact on her owninterpretat ion. She presents the thesis that in the Grundrisse and CapitalMarx analyzed the historical specificity of capitalism and recognized thehistorical determ inaten ess of his categories, no longer consid ering notion ssuch as class struggle and the dialectic to possess transhistorical validity(p. 134). According to this interpretation, the value categories of Marx'sm atu re critique g rasp the social relations of dom ina tion specific to capitalismas well as its historically specific fo rm of wealth. F urth erm ore , in his m atu recritique, M ar x analyzed the m aterial form of the lab or process, its technicaldimension, as being itself social and structured by capital (p. 135). Socialdomination in capitalism is abstract. Cohen quotes Marx's characterizationof th e specificity of capitalism in term s of a system of "persona l ind epen dencefoun ded on objective (sachlicher) dependence . . . in which a system of ge neralsocial m etabo lism , of universal relations, of all-roun ded n eeds and universalcapacities is formed for the first time" (Grundrisse, p. 158).It should be noted t ha t even these few determ ination s suggest M arx's critiquewas very different fro m the tradition al class-centered the ory. M arx's analysisof the industrial process of production as intrinsically capitalist, becausemolded by capitalist relations, calls into question the in terpreta tion of those


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relations in class terms alone, the affirmative stance towards industrialpro du ctio n an d , hence, the noti on th at the pro letariat is to realize itself insocialism. Similarly, Marx's concept of objective dependence, grounded inthe value forms, cal ls into quest ion the notion that domination of thewo rking class by the bourgeoisie is the m ost fu nd am en tal gro un d of socialdom ination in capitalism an d th at th e cr it ique is one of the part icular fro mthe standpoint of the universal. Finally, the passage cited indicates thatMarx's critique of capitalism was not merely a condemnation of classdo m in ati on b ut entailed a theory of a two-sided process of historical consti-tut ion. This cr i t ique, in other words, was n ot based o n those posit ions that ,according to Cohen, imply a non-democrat ic vision of a future society.Co hen seems to take cognizance of this when she writes:

the model of communism presented in the f i rs t text to break with evolut ionism, theGr~mdrisse ,s nei ther product ivis t no r s ta t is t. F ar f ro m general iz ing the s ta tus of the workerto all of society, or extending the productivist logic of capitalism to the future, theGrundrisse model of co mm uni sm envisages the abol i t ion of the direct labor of the workeran d the emanc ipat ion of socie ty f rom the tyranny of labor t ime" (p . 151).

She maintains, however, that Marx's "model" of communism in theGrundrissewas directly contra dicte d by his later analysis in Capital,which is"aggressively technocratic, productivist, and, implicitly . . . statist" (p. 152).But, as I shall indicate, Cohen's reading of Capital overlooks the nature ofMarx's categorial critique and instead returns to the assumptions of thetraditional class-centered interpretation. C oh en doe s not address the ques-tion of the relationship between the categories of the critique of capitalisman d the determ inations of such a "model" of com mun ism: Yet Marx's no tionof com m un ism a s the determ inate nega tion of capitalism implies an intrinsicrelat ionship between the negation an d what i t negates, i.e . the fundam entalbasis of the capitalist formation. That basis, in Marx's mature works, issuppo sedly grasped by the historically specific categories of the critique.Th e elements of a fu ture society outlined in the Grundrisse entail the over-com ing of a system of "objective dep endenc e," the ab olitio n of direct labor ina process of produ ction tha t is intrinsically capitalist , an d the ema ncipationof society fro m the tyran ny of la bo r time. Hen ce if the categories of thecritique are t o po int t o the possibility of suc h a future society, they mu stexpress a system of objective dependenc e, the necessity of direct lab or in theprocess of pro du ctio n, the intrinsically capitalist character of that p roduc -tion, an d th e tyranny of labor time. The unfolding of the categories, more-over, must indicate the emerg ent possibility of their determ inate nega tion.Ma rx's categories in Capital such as the co mm odity, value, abstract labo r,capital, and valorization process fulfill precisely these determinations. By


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m eans of these categories, Ma rx ana lyzed the ch aracter of the social fabric ofcapital ism. W hat renders th at fabric so peculiar, according to M arx , is that i tis consti tuted by labo r. The category of ab stract la bor refers to a historicallyspecific function of labor in capital ism. Labor is not only a productiveactivity, as in all social form atio ns, but serves as a m edium of social relations.Those relations are constituted as impersonal, quasi-objective, compellingstructu res of "objective d ependence" (value, capital). So cial do m ina tion incapital ism is not simply do min ation by a social grouping but is the abstractdomination exercised by the historically-specific structures of the labor-mediated, a nd hence alienated, social relations. These abstra ct structures d ono t veil th e "real social relations" of capitalism, they are those relations an dare themselves veiled. A n interpre tation of M arx's ma ture theor y of capital-ist relations in terms of concrete relations alone (e.g., classes), misses thisessential aspe ct of his critical theo ry. It is becau se of its historically specific,socially cons tituting role that l ab or is central to M arx's analysis of capital-ism. It is th e object, not th e sta nd po int, of the critique. This theory h as littlein common with conventional theories of the primacy of production.Cohen, however , appea rs to misunders tand the character of the M arxiancritique. S he fails to recognize that M ar x intended his basic categories togra sp the deep struc ture of a historically determ inate reality an d, instead, shemistakenly assu mes that the categories are intended as a "representation of aheterogeneo us reality, a fetish of the capitalist mo de of produ ction" (p. 157).C oh en , therefore, takes M arx's the ory of fetish to be one of a social illusion, atheory of form s tha t disguise w hat presumably is truly social: class struggle(p p. 163-164, 169). Coh en's no tion of M arx's critique is th at it unveils thistru th, th at it "seeks to defetishize the cap ital fetish by po inting t o relations ofclass struggle at the heart of the value categories" (p. 164).By conflatin g class an d value, C oh en equa tes categories of the distrib ution ofconcrete social power in capitalism with M arx's analysis of the very characte rof its social fab ric. M arx's analys is of the pe culiar na ture of social relations incapital ism as expressed by the categories is thus swept aside by Co hen as aveil covering the tr uth of class struggle. Su ch a n interpretat ion breaks theintrinsic links between th e categories of Mar x's critique an d a notion of thefutu re as their determinate negation. I t also con sti tutes class as the necessarysta nd po int of the critique. F ollowing this interpretive logic, Co hen r eturns tothe tradit ional interpretat ion, maintaining that in Capital the proletariatdoe s represent the principle to be realized in the fu tur e society (pp . 155-156).Sh e identifies M arx's notio n of the forces of produ ction with wage-labor an dthe relations of production with capital (p. 134), which would imply thatindu strial produ ction is not intrinsically capitalist an d tha t the statu s of the


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wo rker will be generalized to all of society in socialism. Co he n thu s attributesto M ar x a n otion of socialism in terms of the continu ation of the logic of[capitalist] industrial production, once liberated from the limits of themarket and private property (pp. 182-183). These class-centered positionsare all imputed to M arx r athe r tha n based on a categorial analysis. M ore-over, Cohen's reading of the notion of fetish excludes the epistemologicalaspect of M arx's categories, his social-historical theory of know ledge, an d itsrelat ion to this theory of social constitut ion. T his allows her to co nclude thatMarx's theory of social action overlooked the importance of beliefs andworld views and was based solely o n a utilitarian n otion of interest (pp . 112,113, 196ff).Cohen 's interpre tation of the M arx ian categories as what veil social reality,rather than as determinations of that reali ty, leads her to at tr ibute thecharacteristics of tho se categorial forms t o the class tha t they supposedly veil.Th e result, as I shall outl ine, is a trans form ation of w hat M arx cri ticized in toits imputed affirmation.This transposition emerges very clearly in Cohen's discussion of Marx'sanalysis of capitalist industrial production in Capital, his unfolding of thelabor process as a capital-determined process of creating surplus value(p. 158). Th is proce ss of valorization entails a series of inve rsions, wherebythe wo rker becom es the object rather tha n the subject of produ ction ( p. 163).With industrialization, the inversions of valorization become materialized.The worker becomes an appendage of capital ist machinery as productionbegins to depend more on the direct application of science and technologyand less on di rect hu m an labor (pp . 166-167). Coh en points ou t that Marx 'sanalysis of production implies the proletariat becomes integrated into thelogic of capita lism (p p. 168-169). Because, however, she m aintains th at inCapital the w orkin g class represents the socialized p rodu ctive forces an d themod el of ano the r futur e, Co hen concludes that Marx's analysis expresses afuture-directed teleology in which the task of the proletariat in socialismwould be to further the productivist project of capital (pp. 163, 174, 183).This conclusion de pends o n Cohen's presuppo sit ions regarding the proleta-riat in M arx's critical theo ry. It is precisely his categ orial analysis of pro duc-tion in Capital, however, which calls those presuppositions into question.The production process in capitalism is analyzed as capital-determined.Hence b oth t ha t process and the class engaged in it are to be overcome, n otrealized, in socialism. Th e analysis sought t o show that the developm ent ofcapital ist p rod uctio n no t only increasingly fragmen ts proletarian labor, bu talso points to the possibility of its abolition. It did so by means of an


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examination of the contradictory necessities and anachronisms of value-based production. With industrialization, capital begins to appropriatedirectly science and technology. Capital, as a structure of alienated socialrelations not reducible to capitalist private ownership, thereby becomesgreater tha n th e su m of its parts; i ts power can no t be directly related back t oits constituting workers. Far from representing the socialized productiveforces, the pro letariat becomes a n increasingly insignificant source of thos eforces that , as capital , are consti tuted in alienated form . The w orker becomesan app end age of the productive ap para tus; the class becomes anachronistic.Nevertheless, ac cord ing to M arx , the only source of value, i.e., of the fo rm ofsocial wealth in capitalism, is the expe nditu re of direct labo r time. Hence theworkers rem ain necessary to ca pital as the source of value, al though much oftheir labor has become superfluous in terms of the use-value dimension.They have literally become the objects of valorization. The inversions ofvalorization are no mere i l lusions, but are real . They do not disguise thepowe r of the proletariat , but express the growing fragmentation an d empti-ness of its lab or. V alorization, acco rding to M arx , necessitates ever-increas-ing rates of productivity in addition to the retention of direct labor inproduction. Ra ther tha n affirming productivism, M arx analyzed capitalismas a form of production characterized by runaway productivity, in whichproleta rian la bo r rem ains necessary only as a result of the exigencies of value,while becoming increasingly fragmented, reduced, and anachronistic.Marx's analysis of capitalist production in Capital thus implies a notion ofsocialism similar to that expressed in the Grundrisse. Th e compulsion toever-inc reasing rates of produ ctivity a n d the co ntin ue d necessity of proletar-ian labor were not treated affirmatively, but were grounded in historicallyspecific categorial form s tha t point to the possibility of their ow n nega tion.These com pulsio ns were not ultimately rooted in class dom ination , but in the"objective" do m ina tio n of the abstract structure s of value an d capital that arecon stituted by lab or acting in a peculiar, historically specific fashio n as asocial me diation . Th e overcoming of capitalism entails the abolition of tha tconsti tuting i ts value found ation : proletarian lab or. The democ ratic form ofsuch abolition would be one of self-abolition. Marx's conception of theself-abolition of the proletariat may be problematic, but it has nothing inco m m on w ith an affirmation of the work ing class as the model of the future.It does , more over , raise the que stion of the historical constitution of general-ized needs fo r meaningful activity, which arise bo th within a nd witho ut theworking class. Cohen, however, fails to grasp Marx's analysis of capital interms of a n alienated process of the developmen t an d socialization of theproductive powers of humanity that become greater than the aggregatedirect labor con stituting them . According t o his analysis, the development of


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capital ism eventually renders proletarian lab or anach ronist ic while m ain-taining its continued necessity. Instead Cohen takes Marx's analysis of theattr ibu tes of capital to be a n analysis of the at tr ibutes of the w orkers' labo r inmystified fo rm (p . 167). Th e reversal is based o n Cohen's assum ptions th at,for Marx, class struggle is the essential social reality that is veiled by thecategorial forms, an d that the process of class consti tut ion fundam entallychallenges the logic of capital (pp. 163-164). Hence she raises the prob lem ofhow a class, whose labo r was analyzed by M arx as increasingly fragmen tedan d em pty, could have been considered by him a s a radical alternative to thelogic of capitalism (pp. 155-156). But she does not consider that perhapsMarx's analysis itself con traven es the assu mp tion th at the pro letariat was hismodel fo r the future . This la t ter assum ption is central to Cohen 's argu men tregarding the necessary relation between Marx's critique of capitalism andan apolitical statist vision of socialism. However common that assumptionmay be, it is alien to Marx.Even in his early wo rks, M ar x viewed class negatively and , as Cohe n herselfpoints out , s pok e cri tically of the su bsu m ption of individuals un der the class(p. 106). She claims, however, that Marx developed a notion of theproletariat as the universal, rat ional , hom ogeneo us m odel of the future in theGerm an Ide ologj? p. 108). Th ere, however, M ar x continued his crit ique ofclass and stated that the proletarians can only liberate themselves asindividuals by abolish ing what creates classes, i .e., lab or (G erm an Ideology,pp. 77-79). Th is is hardly a n affirma tion of class as the mo del of the future.Co hen also at tem pts t o gr oun d her thesis of the necessary apoli t ical o r stat istconsequences of Marx's cri t ique of capital ism with an argument based onBaudrillard's reductionist interp retation of the category of use-value. M arx ,she claims, considered use-values an d needs to be pure calculable econ om icentities and, therefore, envisioned an apolitical future society in which thesatisfaction of needs would ei ther be autom atic o r would be regulated by thestate (pp. 187-189). It seems clear, however, that with categories such asvalue and abstract labor Marx sought to specify the historically uniquecharacter of capitalism precisely in terms of a system of quasi-objectiveregulation and domination. Marx thereby implied the negation of suchregulation a nd of the objective calculability of needs an d goo ds in a futu resociety. Questions of the sorts of goods produc ed, their distr ibution, an d thesorts of needs to be met, would be decided up on co nsciously. If one does notimpute to M arx's notion of socialism the at tr ibutes that he analyzed ascharacterizing capita l, there is nothing in the theory tha t necessarily points tothe n otion t ha t such consciou s decisions could only be ma de in a central izedstate structure. Indeed w here Coh en argues that M arx called for the dissolu-


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tio n of politics itself, it is with reference t o a passag e in which he qu ite clearlywas speak ing of the dissolution of state-power (p. 107). In oth er wo rds, theMarxian critique of capitalism can certainly be read to imply a sort ofnon-statist political institutionalization of socialist society thro ug h which theconstan tly required socio-political decisions could be m ade dem ocratically.My discussion of Cohen's criticisms of Capital has revealed a f und ame ntaltheoret ical transfo rma tion of cr it ique in to imputed aff irmation. All of theproperties tha t C ohen attributes to M arx's not ion of the proletariat and ofsocialism - abstract homogeneous universality, "objective" calculability,abstract rationality, the affirmation of industrial p roduc tion for production'ssake are properties of capital in M arx 's mature critique. This reversal,rooted in a class-centered reading , underlies conven tional M arxist affirma-t ions of the proletar iat . I t would be importan t to ex am ine the ground s in theworkers' movement an d in comm unist parties for this reversal, whereby th evision of the futu re could indeed be described as one of the dom ina tion ofcapital, freed fro m private property an d the ma rke t. But this would en tail asocial-epistemological history of M arx ist theo ry. C oh en , how ever, proceed sin the opposite direction. By reading traditional Marxism into Marx, sheimplicitly prese nts a history of subseq uen t social an d political developm entsin terms of Marx's theory, an app roach that is adeq uate neither to thosedevelopments no r to the theory. I t is because C ohe n reads M ar x ul timatelyth ro ug h th e spectacles of "real existing socialism" t ha t she posits a necessarycorrelation between the critique of political economy and authoritarian,statist politics (pp. 183ff.).Ma rx's critique of civil society ap pe ar s in a different light when his analysis ofthe fu nd am en tal social relations of capitalism is not limited to con siderationsof class do mi nat ion . Cohen poin ts out tha t in his late works, M ar x relatedthe characteristics of civil society to the universalization of exchange rela-tions. S he notes th at his m atu re critique did not entail reducing civil societyto ec onom ic processes, b ut w as directed against the conce almen t of a newfor m of domin ation (p. 145). Th at form of dom ination , however, is not , asCo hen goes o n to arg ue, merely a class relation (p. 146). M ar x did n ot simplycriticize civil society because its universalistic form s con ceal th e p articularis-tic interests of the bourgeoisie. R ath er, the critique was of the dom ina tion ofcapital, of a specific form of universalism itself that had been constitutedhistorically with th e sprea d an d generalization of the com modity-determinedform s of social relations.M ar x so ught t o analyze the institutions, values, and world-views of mod erncapitalist civilization in terms of those basic forms of relations. Such an


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ap pr oa ch does not necessitate treating those insti tutions and values as meresham s. It doe s, however, avoid the sort of position th at, lacking epistemolog-ical self-reflection, contextualizes the values and institutions of all othercultures, but treats those of bourgeois capitalism as transcendent concepts,hovering above the surface of history, that have not been fully realized incapitalism, but should be so in socialism.M arx's critical theory of social cons titution was two-sided, as is indicated bythe passage q uote d a bov e in which he characterized capitalism a s a system ofpersonal independ ence and objective dep endence . Within that theo ry, theunive rsal, with all of its positive dim en sion s, is indeed historically co nst itut-ed. It is, however, constituted by labor-mediated social relations in analienated, homogene ous fo rm that e xerts a sort of objective dom inatio n overthe individuals. The dual character of the universal finds expression in thedu al ch aracter of the values a nd institution s of bou rgeois civil society. It isthe recognition of the duality of the alienated universal rather th an th e mereopposition of universal and particular that informs Marx's mature critique.The institutions of modern civil society are not simply collapsed in to classrelations, but are grounded with reference to the abstract categorial forms.Th e critique should be unde rstood as a critical theory of social con stitution,rather than one that only reveals the sordid t ruth behind the faqade ofbourgeois ideology. It points neither to th e future realization of the abstracthomogeneous universal of the existent formation, nor to the aboli t ion ofuniversality. On this level, there is a conceptual similarity to the matureMarxian analysis of industrial production as intrinsically capitalist. Over-com ing capitalism would not entail the aboli tion of the productive potentialdeveloped in the cou rse of the p ast centuries. Th e for m as well as the goal ofproduction in socialism, however, would be different. In both cases theanalysis avoids hypostatizing the existent fo rm a nd positing i t as the sine q uanon of a future free society while also avoiding the notion that what wasconstituted in capitalism will be completely abolished in socialism.Th e abstract universal analyzed by M ar x gro und s an objective form of socialdominat ion that i s not s imply one of a social grouping and that i s notsufficiently grasp ed in terms of the "self-regulating" m ar ke t. It is expre ssed inthe compulsions of capital accumulation with all of i ts at tendant socialconsequences o n a world-wide scale - namely, the massive and constantrestructuring of patterns of living, of production, of transportation, ofrelative pow er am on g states, etc. Th e ove rcom ing of "objective dependen ce,"of the runaway locomotive of capital-determined history, was for Marx anecessary condition for personal a nd social freedom.


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If domination in capitalism were class domination alone, it would be ex-pressed only in the un equa l distribution of social power as well as of wealth,which could presu ma bly be rectified politically. If, however, the dom ina tionof capital also entails the sorts of qu asi-auto ma tic developments analyzed byMarx, then the question of overcoming that domination must be poseddifferently. Th e limitation s impose d o n freed om of political decisions by thenecessities of cap ital can no t be ignored. N either sh ou ld they simply be reifiedas quasi-natural requirements of "the economy" (as French and Germansocial dem ocrats have do ne in the recent past).Co hen's criticisms of affirmative produ ctivist social theory a re well tak en, yether identification of such a theory w ith Marx's critique creates antinom ies inher reading and w eakens her notion of a conte mp orar y cri tical theory. Hertransformation of the object of Marx's critique into its affirmative stand-point leads her to the un fortunate conclusion that the attempts to locate thepossibilities of the fu ture in the structu re of the present mu st necessarily leadto th e con tin ua tion of the logic of the present in to the future (p p. 189-190).Th is position implies a theo ry who se stan dp oin t is essentially n orm ative, atthe expense of an analysis of cont em po rar y society, especially of its dyna mictendencies. In her concluding chapter, Cohen suggests aspects of a newcritical social theo ry. It is not accidental tha t, given her class-bound inter-pretation of Marx and her positive reception of his analysis of capitalismonly in term s of the critique of social antag onism an d inequality (p. 228), sheover look s bo th his critique of accu mu lation a nd his theory of social constitu-tion.Marx's critique approached the relation of system and action in terms of acomplex theory of social constitution. The underlying social structures ofcapitalism expressed by the categories of commodity and capital are con-stituted by labor as a historically specific social mediation. They are thus"objective" in charac ter. M oreo ver because their constituting principle - incon trast to overt social relations - is abstract an d hom ogeneou s, they consti-tute a "system." Th e notion of "system" is not o ntologized, but is sh ow n to behistorically specific and constituted by social action . Social action , accordin gto M arx , is in turn conditioned by those deep structures, as mediated by theirforms of appearance. Marx's theory of the fetish was not one of mereil lusions, but was a n attem pt to g roun d a theory of the consti tution of bothsocial objectivity an d social subjectivity by relating form s of th ou gh t, worldviews, an d beliefs to t he ways in which social relations p resent them selves toimm ediate experience. Capitalwas an attem pt to indicate the consti tution ofhistorically specific deep social structures by social action that is, in turn,guided by beliefs and mo tivation s groun ded in the veiling form s of app ear -


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anc e of such deep structure s. T he w hole, however, is not statically circularan d doxic. I ts dynamic an d contradictory character entails both the genera-t ion of needs and perceptions th at tend t o perpetuate the system an d of thosetha t call aspects of the system into que stion.Cohen's reading overlooks this immanent dimension of the Marxian cri-t ique. In her last chap ter, she turn s to the q uestion of the relation of systemand action, without the benefit of a theory of the social constitution ofsocially consti tuting action. O n the one h and , she ado pts the reified notion ofsystem, as it has been tak en over by H abe rma s an d Offe, but crit icizes theirinability to deal with the creative dimension of social movements(pp. 193-209). O n the other hand, she turns to To uraine and Castor iades forthe notion that social action is consti tuting. But the question of socialcon stitution is not only imm ediate, referring to that which is directly co nsti-tuted by act ion . It is also m ediate, a question of the historical constitutio n ofsocial knowledge, n orm s, and needs tha t mold social action. F or this lat terdim ensio n Cohe n seems to accept Haberm as's ev olutions theory of history asa learning process implying the developm ent of cognit ive and mo ral compet-encies (p. 220). Th is, however, ultimately und erm ines a ny dialectic of systeman d ac tion inasm uch as i t blocks the que stion of the consti tution by socialaction of what consti tutes the social actors. Instead frozen and com partm en-talized dim ens ion s of social life ("system," "socially creative action") beco meextrinsically bou nd throu gh a theory of evolution. The elements of such anap pr oa ch w ere already called into q uestion by C ohe n herself in the course ofher discussion of Marx, in her critique of reified concepts, transhistoricalprojections, a nd Enlightenment notions of progress and e volution (p. 87).Fina lly, in Cohen's e xpo sition, there is n o discussion of accu mu lation in itsmanifold social dimension s. Run aw ay g rowth, fo r exam ple, is not m erely a"cultural m odel" of con tem po rary western society (p . xi). It is rooted incapital as a social form. Overlooking the question of abstract dominationimpoverishes the theory of an analysis of the dyna mic developm ent of thesocial for m atio n, of a social critique of large-scale on goin g social changesan d global developm ents in terms that break out of the antin om y of objectiv-ism an d voli t ionism. It is certainly im por tant to emphasize, as Co hen does,tha t co ntinu ing at tem pts to d em ocratize all aspects of social an d political lifeca nn ot an d sho uld no t wait for other "conditions" to be realized first . O n theother hand, the issue of democratization, of popular self-determination,cannot and should not be confined to spheres of concrete domination andovert inequality. A theory of dem ocratization m ust also address the questionof the abs tract do min ation of capital , which imposes very determinate l imits


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o n the freed om of political decisions so long as value remains the hidden coreof the social whole.

Theor) and Society 14 (1985) 233-246 03404 -2421 851 $03 .30 @ 1985 Elsevier Scien ce Publishers B.V

postone - review - jean cohen on marxian critical theory

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