poverty in venezuela - daldrup
TRANSCRIPT
FH Aachen campus Julich
Faculty 3: Chemistry and BiotechnologyEuropean Master in Nuclear Applications
Poverty in Venezuela
International Management I & II
Antonio Jose Figueroa C.29th April, 2017
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Historical Overview 3
3 Statistics 53.1 GDP Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53.2 Inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63.3 Misery Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.4 Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Causes 104.1 Economic Policies: Exchange Rate system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104.2 Price Fixation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Conclusion and Outcomes 13
References 14
1
List of Figures
1 Anual GDP growth rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Inflation Rate in Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Misery Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Petare neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Poverty in Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Ease of Doing Business in Venezuela Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Status of international companies in Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2
1 Introduction
The present work provides an overview of the poverty in Venezuela. Specially in
later years due to boom in oil prices (in particular after the 2008 worldwide crash)
it was expected that resource rich countries such as Venezuela would take hold of
the opportunities given and experience growth , however this was not the case.
This overview of poverty is presented through an exploration of Venezuela’s recent
history and an examination of the country’s statistical indicators. In a subsequent
section the focus is placed on the effect of two relevant economical governmental
policies on poverty levels. Finally conclusions and outcomes are presented along
with possible solutions.
2 Historical Overview
The 20th century marked the development of Venezuela from an agricultural econ-
omy to an Industrial fueled by the discovery and exploitation of oil which started
in 1914 in the oils fields of Mene Grande in the Maracaibo Basin. At first, the
economic model applied by the government to regulate the oil industry was that
of concessions and royalties, based in part due to its lack of technology and po-
litical alliances in tune with the Monroe doctrine. However, it was not until the
last years of Venezuela’s 20th century first dictator when the shift from the farms
to the cities became notorious. This change would have a considerable impact
on the economy of the country as well as on the living conditions of the population.
The royalty system, although modified later, provided the country a large amount
of wealth (even at the low oil prices characteristic of the early and mid 20th cen-
tury) which was to develop the country through investment and modest social
policies, unfortunately the investment focused on the mining and the oil sector
leaving the agriculture stagnating, as the wealth generated by the other economy
branches (mainly the oil industry) allowed to import food and goods. It was not
until the early 70’s when the government decided to nationalize the oil industry
increasing the amount of wealth managed by the government , this marked a
period of general welfare lasting until the early 80’s which also saw an increase
in corruption and inequality. Until the late 90’s this inequality as corruption
increased and went unaddressed resulting in the election of Hugo Chavez under
promises of a radical change from the past regimes, though the implementation
of his so called Socialism of the 20th century which as the classical socialism /
communism pursued the state ownership of most production mediums, hindering
3
and increasing the risk for investments.
During the first years of his mandate the country saw a reduction of inequal-
ity and poverty through the use of several social programs maintained by high
public spending fueled by high oil prices. Unfortunately the corruption contin-
ued to increase in his regime during which the country achieved exports of about
1 trillion US$ of which at least one third of it has vanished through obscure
mechanisms [1]. As the people grew accustomed to unsustainable subsides and
the oil price decreased, the situation quickly deteriorated, this is particularly no-
table at the start of mr. Chavez successor, Nicolas Maduro’s term, during whose
regime the country economy has collapsed reaching levels comparable to war torn
countries such as Syria and Libya [2].
4
3 Statistics
The study of a country’s statistical data allows for the analysis of its performance
and for the evaluation of the result of economical and social policies on each exer-
cise period. Unfortunately since 2013 the government stopped the publication of
data on poverty as well as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) in 2015, possibly due to the country’s poor performance and
a deterioration of democracy levels seen in the last years [3] (although there is
evidence for the deterioration of its democracy as early as the year 2002 [4]). For
this reason, the data presented on the following figures consists on official govern-
ment data and estimates from third party institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well as studies from Venezuelan
universities. In this section several economic indicators of Venezuela are explored.
3.1 GDP Balance
Through its modern history Venezuela a considerable fraction of its GDP has
been due to oil exports. During the regime of president Chavez the Oil industry
participation in the national GDP increased dramatically reaching levels of about
50% of the GDP and 95% of total exports.
Figure 1: Annual GDP growth rate [5]
5
It is notable from figure 1 that the 2008 global crisis had a somewhat delayed
impact on the country GDP, this probably due to the increase in oil prices which
reached a historical maximum of about 130 US$. However after 2013 when the oil
prices declined the GDP growth rate also followed, reinforcing the classification
of recessing economy given by the IMF in 2013. Considering data from 2016 the
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita amounts to 12793 US$ which classifies
Venezuela into High income countries group of the World Bank.
3.2 Inflation
Inflation is typically measured through the use of CPI. Due to the fall of oil prices
and the high dependence of the Venezuelan economy on imports, public spending
is financed through the conversion of foreign currency (US Dollars) into Bolivares.
As the export income decreases the government requires to bring more Bolivares
into the market to fund its spending. This would account to a devaluation of
the currency. However, with the aim to preserve prices on imported goods the
government increased the Bolivares liquidity while simultaneously keeping the
exchange rate fixed to an artificially low value. This policy has created a vicious
cycle in which more money has to be printed to maintaining the public spending
resulting in inflation. Figure 2 shows the inflation rate based on the CPI.
Figure 2: Inflation Rate in Venezuela [5]
According to data from the IMF, in 2016 Venezuela ranked 1st in the list of
countries by inflation rate. Estimates for the end of 2017 consider an inflation of
720% and 2068.5% for the year 2018, which suggest that Venezuela will keep its
top spot in the rank [6].
6
3.3 Misery Index
The world misery index is an economic indicator created by economist Arthur
Okun which aims to measure and compare the performance of a group of 108
countries based on a simple sum of economic indicators like inflation, unemploy-
ment and lending rate minus the percentage change on real per capita GDP. The
index is intended to reflect the level of misery caused by life conditions in a way
that can be easily understood. Figure 3 corresponds to the latest misery index
report on Venezuela and its position compared to other countries.
Figure 3: Misery Index as of 2016 [7]
7
In 2013 Venezuela reached the top position of the ranking and has continued
to do so until the year 2016. In addition, based on current estimates on inflation
from the IMF, it expected that the country will keep this infamous position on
the ranking for the following years. The reason for this being the high inflation
levels the country has been experiencing in the latest years. The Misery Index has
attracted criticism based on reports which indicate that the level of unhappiness
appears to be more influenced by unemployment than inflation, a factor which is
normally not taken into account in the classical calculation of the index (which
equally weights all its contributor factors).
3.4 Poverty
Poverty in Venezuela has generally been influenced by several milestones such
as the shift from an agricultural economy into an industrial one. This led to
an improvement on the conditions of living for people with a certain degree of
education, however, the rest of the population with poor education were left with
little to no jobs and forced to live in the outskirts of the cities forming what
is known as misery circles or “barrios” consisting of shacks precariously built
on mountains without proper residential planning and building materials quite
similar to the better known “favelas” in Brasil (See figure 4). A further reason
behind the emergence of these “barrios” is a deficiency in city planning as the
city population increased faster than the residential creation rate.
Figure 4 shows a contrasting picture of the eastern portion of Caracas, Venezuela’s
capital. With the highway serving as a “border” dividing regions of formal res-
idential buildings and areas formed by shanty towns indicating the borders of
the city. This sight of severe contrast in living conditions being remarkable in a
resource rich country.
Due to the high dependence of the GDP on oil exports and their participation
on the national budget (being also oil exports responsible for up to 95% of the
country’s foreign currency income), the poverty level became coupled to variations
on the oil prices. Figure 5 shows the evolution of poverty along the past 20 years.
8
Figure 4: Petare neighborhood. Striking contrast can be observed between atraditional urban development and the “favelas” like residences. [8]
Figure 5: Poverty in Venezuela. A letter E corresponds to estimates based oninformation for years 2014 to 2016 obtained through polls due to the lack ofofficial data. Source: National Poll on Living Conditions [9]
9
4 Causes
The topic of poverty in Venezuela is very complex as there is no single cause
behind it but a mixture of elements such as lack of education, investment and
social policies failure coupled with an economic dependence on oil exports. In this
section, the focus is placed on two governmental policies which have characterized
the Venezuelan regime for the last 17 years: the foreign currency exchange rate
system and the goods price fixation system.
4.1 Economic Policies: Exchange Rate system
Several exchange rate systems have existed in between the last 18 years of the
socialist government of Mr. Chavez and his successor Mr. Maduro. Initially
created with the purpose to prevent capital flight and loss of reserves in addition
as a method to keep the prices of goods in the country, mainly food, low as a
considerably portion of goods are imported. The system quickly devolved into
a mechanism for the extraction of wealth through corruption due to its inner
workings which favored clientelism and non transparent deals for the acquisition
of foreign currency by private parties fomenting corruption. The general scheme
of the current system is one in which the exchange of US$ to Bolivares (Bs) is kept
artificially low at 10 Bs per US$ that is destined (according to the government)
to the acquisition of food and primordial consumption goods accounting to 99%
of the total transactions of foreign currency. Simultaneously a second floating
exchange rate exists that according to the government corresponds to 1% of the
total transactions. The principal mechanism of corruption and wrong doing is one
in which the goverment allows a group of private companies or persons (typically
owned or related to government officials) to buy cheap dollars to make imports
which are not throughfully regulated and which in many cases do not happen.
Later by selling these dollars in the black market (at a rate of up to 5000 Bs per
US$) such groups make a very large profit. It is through this mechanism that up
to 300 Billion US$ have disappeared from the nation’s coffers in the last decade.
This distortion coupled with price fixation which is explored in the next section
drives away investment and limits the growth possibility of the country increasing
poverty among its citizens.
10
4.2 Price Fixation
The practice of price fixation and government aggressiveness towards private in-
vestment has resulted in diminished profitability and operating capabilities of
businesses which has lead to a decrease in investment and large companies go-
ing out of business and leaving the country. This in turn led to an increase in
unemployment of a large portion of the professional and educated part of the
population. The prospect of a small amount of jobs and decreasing quality of
life, has led to a brain drain as more professionals look outside the country for
opportunities of a job and a better life. The effect of price fixation and other
government policies affecting business such as nationalization and excessive regu-
lation of economic activity can be measured through the Ease of Doing Business
in Venezuela Index (Figure 6, created by the World Bank Organization and which
considers a group of 190 countries.
Figure 6: Ease of Doing Business in Venezuela Index [5]
Comparing fig. 6 with fig. 5 a direct correlation can be observed in which
as the difficulty on doing business in Venezuela increases so does the poverty
levels. As it can be observed from fig. 6 since 2010 Venezuela has increased its
position on the ranking slowly getting closer to the 190th position (a higher rank
indicates an economy with excessive regulation where business cannot be done
easily). This factor shows the unattractiveness of the country for both national
and international investments which hinders severely its potential for growth and
development. This is made evident through figure 7 which shows the status of
several high profile international companies and their dealings with Venezuela.
11
Figure 7: Status of international companies in Venezuela [10]
With the late increase in political instability and legal insecurity the prospects
for future investments becomes shrouded in uncertainty.
12
5 Conclusion and Outcomes
The problem of poverty in Venezuela is not an easy one to solve. Mainly due
to the country’s notorious dependence on oil exports as evidenced in the above
graphs. This situation puts the country in precarious and risky position, with an
increased sensibility to oil price variations.
A change in the energy consumption trends is expected in the developed countries
(taking for instance Germany and EU policies) as well as a shift into renewable
energies would certainly increase the troubles for the country and its already
weakened economy. For this reason, the dependence on oil puts limits on the
sustainability and middle to long term capabilities of the Venezuelan economical
model. In addition to this, there exists increasing pressure on foreign debt which
amounts to 90 billion US$ to be paid in the next decade [5].
Furthermore, the current political situation of high levels of civil unrest, along
with business threatening government policies such as expropriations and nation-
alizations, greatly increases the political risk of the country reducing the legal
security and attractiveness to foreign and internal investments dearly needed to
develop the country. Without investments and sustainable growth, reduction in
poverty cannot happen.
The best case scenario consists in one in which sustainable economical mea-
sures are taken and a change in governmental policies on businesses takes place,
along with a return to political stability and good social policies in education
which would make the country more desirable for investors and capital both na-
tional and international. However, even in this case the poverty is expected to
increase until the measures take effect on the economy and recovery effects can
be observed.
13
References
[1] Pons, Corina et Chinea, Eyanir. Venezuela ex-ministers seek probe into
$300 billion in lost oil revenue. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
venezuela-politics-idUSKCN0VB26F.
Accessed on April 23, 2017
[2] Rosati, Andrew. Venezuela´ s Awful Economy Got Even Worse in
2016. Bloomberg Markets. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
01-11/goodbye-recession-hello-depression-venezuela-gdp-takes-10-hit.
Accessed on April 23, 2017
[3] Venezuela: Deteriorating Democracy. The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/12/venezuela.
Accessed on April 23, 2017
[4] Coppedge, Michael. Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela
Through Nested Inference. Kellogg Institute, Hesburgh Center. University
of Notre Dame. Notre Dame, Indiana, USA.
[5] Venezuela Economic Indicators. Trading Economics.
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/inflation-cpi.
Accessed on April 23, 2017
[6] Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela and the IMF. International Monetary
Funds. http://www.imf.org/external/country/ven/.
Accessed on April 23, 2017
[7] Crook, Nathan. Venezuela’s Revolution . Bloomberg QuickTake.
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/venezuela-price-revolution.
Accessed on April 23, 2017
[8] Urdaneta, Isabella. DANIEL IN PETARE, LIVING IN A “NEIGHBOR-
HOOD” WITH HALF A MILLION PEOPLE. United Youth Journal-
ists. https://unitedyouthjournalists.com/2015/07/17/daniel-in-petare-living-
in-a-neighborhood-with-half-a-million-people-isabella-urdaneta-venezuela/
Accessed on April 23, 2017
[9] Espana, Luis Pedro. Pobreza . ENCOVI: Encuesta
Nacional de Condiciones de Vida en Venezuela.
http://www.fundacionbengoa.org/noticias/2017/encovi-2016.asp.
Accessed on April 23, 2017
14
[10] Companies Hang On to Venezuela Plants Despite Seizures. Bloomberg
Markets https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-25/companies-
cling-on-in-venezuela-even-as-maduro-seizes-plants.
Accessed on April 25, 2017
15