The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 52 | Number 3 | Dec 24, 2012

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Power of the Korean Film Producer: Park Chung Hee’sForgotten Film Cartel of the 1960s Golden Decade and itsLegacy

Brian Yecies, Ae-Gyung Shim

Key words : Korean c inema, f i lmproduction, film policy, Park Chung Hee,Shin Sang-ok

After censorship was eliminated in 1996, a newbreed of writer-directors created a canon ofinternationally provocative and visuallystunning genre-bending hit films, and new andestablished producers infused unprecedentedventure capital into the local industry. Today, abevy of key producers, including verticallyintegrated Korean conglomerates, maintaindominance over the film industry whileengaging in a variety of relatively near-transparent domestic and internationalexpansion strategies. Backing hits at home aswell as collaborating with filmmakers in Chinaand Hollywood have become priorities. In starkcontrast to the way in which the film businessis conducted today is Korean cinema’s GoldenAge of the 1960s – an important but little-known period of rapid industrialization, highproductivity and clandestine practices. Todevelop a fuller understanding of thedevelopment of Korean cinema, this articleinvestigates the complex interplay between filmpolicy and production during the 1960s underauthoritarian President Park Chung Hee, whosegovernment’s unfolding censorship regimeforced film producers to develop a range ofsurvival strategies. A small but powerful cartelof producers formed alliances with a largercohort of quasi-illegal independent producers,thus – against all the odds – enabling Koreancinema to achieve a golden age of productivity.

An analysis of the tactics adopted by theindustry reveals the ways in which producersnegotiated policy demands and contributed toan industry “boom” – the likes of which werenot seen again until the late 1990s.

Power of the Producer

Since the early 1990s, Korean film producershave been shaping the local film industry in avariety of ways that diverge from thosefollowed in the past. A slew of savvy producersand large production companies have aimed toproduce domestic hits as well as films for andwith Hollywood, China, and beyond, thusleading the industry to scale new heights.2 Theydiffer markedly from those producers andcompanies that, throughout the 1970s and1980s, were primarily focused on profitingfrom the importation, distribution andexhibition of Hollywood blockbusters and HongKong martial arts films in Korea. From the1990s, Korean cinema benefitted from acomparatively new level of transparency andefficiency that family-run conglomerates(chaebols in Korean) and other financialinstitutions brought to the local film industryafter they began to see the film business as agood investment – despite the impact of the1997-98 Asian economic crisis.

For instance, in 2001, representative producerTcha Seung-jai – founder of Sidus Pictures (nowSidusFNH) and former chairman of the KoreaFilm Producers’ Association – opened animportant pathway between the Korean andChinese film industries when he and writer-director Kim Sung-soo shot the historical epic

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Musa The Warrior (2001: see Figure 1) as a co-production in Northeast China. Musa was themost expensive Korean film budgeted at thetime, thus establishing Tcha’s reputation as oneof Korea’s most powerful and ambitiousproducers in Chungmuro – the centre ofKorea’s film industry.3 In 2006 and again in2007, Tcha was selected by his professionalcolleagues as the most influential person in theindustry, acknowledging his management ofgenre hits such as Girls' Night Out (1998), Savethe Green Planet (2003), Memories of Murder(2003), and A Dirty Carnival (2006), as well ashis mentoring of countless junior staff who arenow working at the center of the industry.4

Figure 1. Musa The Warrior (2001). Thislarge-scale historical epic was shot inChina and Mongolia over a nine-monthperiod with massive battle sequences anddialogue recorded in three languages.Image courtesy of Madman Entertainment.

However, a significant part of the producer mixtoday is the vertically integrated group ofinvestor-distributors CJ Entertainment andLotte Entertainment, that is, powerfulcorporate executive producers who nowmonopolize all aspects of the industry. Theyhave more or less cut traditional producers likeTcha out by forming their own relationshipswith bigger directors. As a result of their size,exhibition chains, and ties to the corporatemedia and financial institutions, together theseexecutive producers have successfully exertedmore influence than any single producer. Thegroup’s power and position was considerablyenhanced after they resuscitated the industryfollowing the recession it underwent in 2006thanks to illegal downloading and piracy, and asuccession of unsuccessful films. This was at atime when the power of individual producerssuch as Tcha, and others such as Lee Choon-yun (Cine2000), Jaime Shim (Myung Film), OhJung-wan (bom Film), and Shin Chul (ShinCine), had begun to wane, partly due to adecline in investor confidence caused by theloss of international pre-sales and the erosionof ancillary markets. Also, several of thesetraditional producers were hit hard by theirpoor decisions to list their companies on thestock market through backdoor means. CJEntertainment, which launched its Chinabranch in mid-2012, now leads the pack with itscorporate production, distribution and sales,and actor management services, as well as anincreasing number of multiplex cinemas inKorea and a smaller number in China (alloperating under the brand-name CGV).5

These corporate/executive producers haveushered in a new level of ruthless efficiency inthe film business by maintaining and fine-tuning proven pre-production and marketingplanning techniques – core elements of “high-concept” filmmaking. In turn, their efforts havegenereted increased venture capital and alsoensured accountability to their shareholdersand audiences rather than pandering to thewhims of auteur filmmakers. Their diverse

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business strategies and achievements havemediated the risks associated with previousfinancial strategies involving self or familyfunding, private loans, and pre-sales fromregional distributors/exhibitors, thusredirecting the impetus of the industry in newdirections. In sum, the so-called power of theproducer – as opposed to the power of writer-directors such as Im Sang-soo, Kim Jee-woon,Hur Jin-ho, Lee Chang-dong, Park Chan-wook,Bong Joon-ho, and Kim Ki-duk – has reachednew heights in Korea during the 2000s by theirwillingness to finance globally marketable filmsand encourage talented young directors tomake them.

The power behind the corporate producer hasbecome even more evident with the recentnews that producers JK Film (in conjunctionwith CJ Entertainment) had fired auteur LeeMyung-se – the acclaimed writer-director ofnotable films such as M (2007), Duelist (2005),Nowhere to Hide (1999), and Gagman (1989) –mid-stream from the 2012 production of thespy-comedy Mister K. According to industrysources, JK Film and Lee had divergent viewson artistic and legal issues.

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Lee was replacedwith rookie director Lee Seung-joon (who hada s s i s t e d o n t h e b l o c k b u s t e r f i l m sHaeundae/Tidal Wave (2009) and Quick(2011)), thus sending a clear message aboutthe limits of artistic freedom that corporateproducers are willing to extend to a director.

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With the increasing power of the producer inthe contemporary Korean cinema in mind, thisarticle focuses on a very different but pivotalperiod when a range of dynamic productionstrategies – including creative responses byfilmmakers to government policy – contributedto an industry “boom” in the 1960s. Given thesignificant impact of this period of rapidindustrialization on this past decade, it issurprising how little attention it has been givenin previous studies.

Earlier studies highlight the frenzy of

production during the 1960s, paying tribute tothe rise of auteur directors and the memorablefilms they made.8 This was a period when Koreaexperienced rapid progress in industrializationand policy development, as well as in theproduction of entertainment for the masses. Alarge number of productions that stemmedfrom a seemingly limitless source of creativeenergy focused the spotlight on a coterie ofpassionate filmmakers and their artisticachievements. Although these historiographicalstudies provide extensive details about theformation of the nation’s cinema in artisticterms, they are less successful in providing anadequate political-economic perspective on theindustry as a whole . They obfuscateinformation about the dodges and occasionalacts of resistance engaged in by producers andothers further down the industry food chain. Bycontrast, close attention to the often seamlessconnections between policy and industrial andartistic factors will prove to be the key tounderstanding how this cinematic golden agewas built and buttressed.

Perhaps even more surprising is the near-complete omission of cultural policy and thedevelopment of South Korea’s creative andcultural industries in more recent scholarshipon Park Chung Hee.9 Despite the enormousamount of information available, these studieslack a sustained discussion of the central rolesthat film and media played in the government’swell-documented national industrializationstrategy and policy.10 In some ways, the presentarticle is the missing chapter in the ParkChung-hee story.

Hypergrowth of the Propaganda Factory

On 16 May 1961, General Park Chung Hee leda military coup that successfully seized controlof South Korea. Within the first few months ofi ts abrupt r ise to power, his mil i tarygovernment had succeeded in systematizing itsnear-total administrative control over all filmproduction, distribution (importing and

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exporting), and exhibition. This process beganwith the creation of the Ministry of PublicInformation (MPI) on 20 May 1961, theNational Film Production Centre (NFPC) on 22June 1961, and the Motion Picture Law (MPL)on 20 January 1962. The MPI was tasked withthe role of administering the NFPC and theMPL, and coordinating all film, print and radiobroadcasting media campaigns.

Almost immediately, the film industry, whichwas experiencing a new-found creativity sincethe end of the Japanese colonial period(1910-1945) with accomplished artfilms such asYu Hyun-mok’s Obaltan/Aimless Bullet (1960;see Figure 2), was reduced – both literally andfiguratively – to the status of a propagandafactory in which all productions were classed aseither “hard” or “soft” propaganda. They wereto become key tools in what one criticdescribed as “campaigns of assault” and“campaigns of assistance” respectively.11 Theregime achieved these a ims f i rs t byconsolidating the number of feature filmproduction companies from 76 to 16 in 1961and then by launching two new initiatives.

Figure 2. Obaltan film advertisement fromDonga Daily 21 October 1963: 4. Obaltan isdirector Yu Hyun-mok’s most well-knownfilm. Yu used montage and sound effects asa medium to capture the run-down post-war Korean society. At the time of itsrelease, the film was considered to be awatershed in Korean cinema for its rareattempt to capture a realistic picture ofKorea (Chosun Daily 28 April 1961: 4) –that is, the theme, mise-en-scène, andvisual style of ‘aesthetics of devastation’,while other films, mostly melodramas, hadlittle reference to real life.

The first was the National Film ProductionCenter (NFPC), established in June 1961 toproduce newsreels and cultural films (munhwayeonghwa, documentary or narrative filmsdelivering specific political messages), and todistribute these materials through commercialcinemas. The NFPC grew out of the Film

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Department of the Bureau of Public Information(BPI) that had been established in 1948 underthe Syngman Rhee government (1948-1960).

The second initiative was the Motion PictureLaw (MPL), which guided the production ofpropaganda feature films with a heavy hand.The MPL conveniently adopted the oppressivecontents of the Chosun Film Law such asproduction control, the import quota system,scr ipt censorship, and the producerregistration scheme outlined in 1941 by theJapanese colonial government in Korea,applying them on a wide scale in order tocontrol Korea’s burgeoning film industry.12 Allthese developments and precedents workedhand-in-hand to control the film industry. Thegovernment’s ultimate intention was toconstruct a studio system that operated insimilar ways to Hollywood studios, but with anauthoritarian twist.

In January 1962, the military governmentpromulgated its first film policy through theMPL, imposing twenty-two wide-rangingmeasures relating to censorship fees, screeningpermits, producer registration, and importing,exporting and exhibiting films. These measuresapplied to the entire Korean film industry, withheavy f ines or imprisonment for non-compliance.13 The MPL consisted of three maincomponents: the Producer Registration System(hereafter PRS), import regulations andcensorship guidelines. Relentless enforcementof these three elements enabled the MPI toeffect ively control the f i lm industry(particularly producers) by means of a systemof “carrots on sticks”.14

Through the PRS, the government compelledall producers, including those remainingfollowing the forced consolidation in 1961 andothers interested in joining this elite group, toregister with the MPI. According to the MPL,each applicant for registration had to meetspecific criteria for equipment and personnel:ownership of a 35mm film camera and 50 KW

lighting kits, as well as securing contracts withat least one experienced engineer or technicalexpert and two actors with established careers.Following the introduction of the law, theserelatively liberal requirements enabled all 16 ofthe consolidated producers, plus an additionalfive that also met the criteria, to register underthe new system.

Figure 3. Park Chung Hee presentingdistinguished film director and producerShin Sang-ok with the Best Film award atthe 9 t h Asian Film Festival in Seoul(launched in Tokyo in 1954, and now calledthe Asia-Pacific Film Festival). This event,which closed pointedly on the one-yearanniversary of Park’s military coup d'état,was coordinated by Shin, a leadinge x p o n e n t o f t h e P a r k r e g i m e ’ sindustrialization agenda. As director of theKorean Motion Picture ProducersAssociation, Shin was the industry’sfigurehead at this time. Donga Daily 17May 1962: 3.

However, in 1963 amendments to the MPLintroduced stricter criteria, making it tougher

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for Korea’s 21 existing producers to maintaintheir registration status. Each registeredproducer was now obligated to operate apermanent studio (approximately 7,100 sq feetin size) equipped with three 35mm filmcameras, 200 KW lighting kits, and a soundrecorder. Contracts with three directors, threecinematographers, one recording engineer, andten actors per studio also became mandatory,requirements which in turn gave registeredproducers control over directors, actors, andother technicians. Additionally, each companywas required to maintain a rigorous productionschedule of 15 films per year and to engage inthe import and export of films.

This forced merger between its production anddistribution arms consolidated the industryeven further. Almost overnight, a “studiosystem” resembling a factory assembly line hadbeen born. Korea now had six major filmcompanies – a cartel – that suddenly foundthemselves in possession of exclusiveprivileges. The financial power and charismaticauthority of those in the inner circle increasedover time as they became the heart andfoundation of all industry activities.

There were three types of registered (i.e.authorized) producers operating during the1960s: producers in the traditional sense;producers with an importing background; andshort-term producers.15 Those in the firstgroup, such as Shin Film, Geukdong, Hapdong,Taechang, and Hanyang, followed the originalagenda of the PRS to the letter, treatingproduction as their primary business and filmimporting as a sideline.

The second group, represented by HangukYesul and Segi Sangsa, which had begun theirimport businesses as far back as 1953,prioritized importing over production. Underthe PRS, they had to transform themselves intoproducers to preserve their professional status.Due to their limited production expertise, thefirms in this group relied heavily on working

with independent producers by illegallysubcontracting and selling production rights tothem.

The third group consisted of smaller registeredproducers including Shinchang, Aseong andDaeyoung; although they managed to becomemembers of the Korean Motion PictureProducers Association, they failed to maintaintheir registered status as governmentrequirements became tougher. Their corebusiness was working with the independentproducers and administering the necessarypaperwork for making films. This type ofregistered producer was often described as “areal estate agency”.16

Rise of the Cartel and the Coalition of theWilling

The systematization of the PRS threw up acartel of producers, who operated from theindustry’s center. Within this elitist system,registered producers maintained direct lines ofcommunication with the MPI and otherindustry participants. Contributing covertly tothe industry’s productivity was a slew ofunauthorized independent producers andimporters who were more than willing to helpthe cartel manage their demanding workloads,in particular their ever-increasing registrationrequirements. A small army of exhibitors,operating across Korea’s 13 separateprovinces, enabled these various practitioners –both elite and “illegal” – to keep the industryafloat by investing in productions through pre-sales.

Film financing was largely sourced from savvyexhibitors who invested in a production inreturn for the exclusive rights to distribute andscreen the film across multiple provinces.Competition was fierce, as by law only sixprints of a given film were allowed to circulatenationwide.17 Ji Deok-yeong and Kim Dong-jun,owners of the Seoul-based Myeongbo Cinemaand Paramount Cinema respectively, andalternate presidents of the Korean Theatre

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Association throughout the 1960s, betweenthem represented the interests of exhibitors,who reached a nationwide total of 597 in1969.18

In this way, demand from regional exhibitorsstimulated producers to increase the size andfrequency of their output. Usually, exhibitorsadvanced about 60% of the production budgetto producers in exchange for exclusive rights –paying up to a further 30% on receiving thefilm print.19 Buffered by this economicallyreciprocal funding scheme, producers wereexposed to very little risk.20 In addition, in somecases producers were able to secure pre-salesfunding in excess of the total productionbudget, in which case the excess went straightinto their coffers.21

Exhibitor-investors also influenced theproduction environment in similar ways to theimpact of “New York Bankers” in Hollywood –at least as it was understood at the time.22

Ultimately, producers became overlydependent on pre-sales investments, and thusfailed to develop a range of other fundingsources. This exposed the industry to beingunduly influenced by exhibitors in makingdecisions about favored film genres andstyles.23 By the late 1960s, the film market wasoversupplied with product, mostly quotaquickies – “cheap second-rate domestic films”.24

Faced with this flush of lower quality films,exhibitors had difficulty earning high yields ontheir investments. This situation wasexacerbated by the fact that exhibitors beganpassing bad cheques to producers.25 As a result,the flow of funding for productions came to anabrupt halt, resulting in an unprecedenteddownturn for the industry.26 Today, producersrun the fi lm industry with far greatertransparency and accountability than was thecase in the 1960s.

There were two major industry organizationsoperating at this time: the KMPPA (KoreanMotion Pictures Producers Association), which

became a powerful trade association thatadvanced the business interests of its members– the cartel of registered producers; and theMPAK (Motion Picture Association of Korea),which represented the remaining members ofthe industry.27 Although there was no ceilingset for membership of the KMPPA, the MPIcontrolled the organization’s size by makingfrequent changes to the PRS which kept thenumber of registered producers at a small butoptimal level, resulting in constantly fluctuatingnumbers.

Most previous scholarship has viewed theintroduction of the PRS as part of the Parkgovernment’s larger industrialization agenda,and has seen the compulsory nature of thescheme as a harmful influence on theindustry.28 By contrast, other studies havelinked the development of the PRS to theHollywood studio system, showing how a smallnumber of registered producers such asHanguk Yesul and Donga Heungeop attemptedto mimic Hollywood’s practice of verticalintegration – despite their ultimate failure dueto lack of capital and a disorganizeddistribution system.29 Both views offer food forthought.

In the US in the 1940s, a group of elite studioowners ran their Hollywood studios as “asystem of corporations”,30 asserting their(business-oriented) “creative control andadministrative authority”31 over filmmaking.Similarly the PRS model concentrated poweramong a small cartel of producers, and theKMPPA operated as an oligopoly similar to theUS trade association, the Motion PictureAssociation of America (MPAA). However, inKorea, although producers had the right todistribute films, in effect exhibitors had muchmore say over the distribution process – that is,over the choice of films for public screeningand their exhibition venues. Producers had todeal with at least six exhibitors when makingdecisions about the distribution of a particularfilm. These practical constraints illustrate the

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vulnerability and political impotenceexperienced by the Korean film industry underthe authoritarian military regime of the 1960s.While the Hollywood studio system allowedmajor studios such as Fox Film Corporation,Paramount Pictures, Universal Pictures andColumbia Pictures (all controlling members ofthe MPAA) to control the bulk of the USmarket, the KMPPA (and PRS) remained amuch less stable and predictable entity thanthe MPAA.

Once more, the cartel or oligopoly thatemerged out of the PRS was a mixture of twomodels: the family-business-oriented chaeboland the Hollywood studio system. The chaebolconcept grew out of Japan’s prewar zaibatsusystem, which enabled a few large family-runvertically integrated business conglomerates –in the automobile, iron/steel, and heavychemicals industries, for instance – to exert asignificant influence on the nation’s economy.32

Resembling the chaebol, but on a much smallerscale, the PRS overemphasized the role ofproduction, which was a direct outcome ofdevelopmental state policy.33 Buttressing thefilm industry in this way reflected the ways inwhich Park “mixed the Japanese ethos of top-down mobilization and the US ideas oftechnocracy with Korean nationalism in mostun-Japanese and un-American ways to clear theway for economic growth”.34

Through the PRS, and comparable to initiativeslaunched by other countries such as Britain,Japan, India , and China, the Koreangovernment attempted to build a national filmstudio system based on current industrypractices in the US. As a spokesperson for theKMPPA, producer/director Shin Sang-oks t rong ly advocated the bene f i t s o findustrialization, seeking to influenceamendments to the MPL that would enable hisown production company, Shin Film, tofunction more like Columbia Pictures. WhileShin may have referred to Columbia Pictures asthe kind of studio he wished to create, he also

learned how Japanese film studios operatedwhile forming relationships with two of them,Daiei and Toho.35 In the process, it becameclear to Shin that the Japanese film industrywas built on the Hollywood studio system.

For its part, the Park regime may have had atleast one eye on the Japanese film industry,which had been thriving in both domestic andoverseas markets since the 1950s. Under hisgovernment’s direction, the studio system inKorea flourished – despite the weakening of thestudio system in Hollywood and Japan duringthe 1960s. This late adoption of the studiosystem facilitated the government’s controlover the industry because studios had to workwithin its directives in order to keep inbusiness. At the time, the efforts of Shin andthe Korean government were recognized in UStrade reports that considered the stage ofdevelopment reached by the Korean filmindustry as “comparable to early Hollywood,with players under contract to the variousstudios”.36

Despite some similarities between the structureof Korea’s PRS and the major studio system inHollywood (a “mature oligopoly – a group ofcompanies cooperating to control a certainmarket”,37) the effects of centralized policyintervention in Korea – and the resultantartificial shaping of the industry’s development– made the Korean system very different fromHollywood. In particular, given that the PRShad been designed as a production-centricindustry system, the neglect of exhibition anddistribution became a serious barrier to verticalintegration.

Taming Producers with “Carrots on aStick”

Throughout the 1960s, the PRS served as thekey mechanism for shaping and controlling thefilm industry. Registration status was keptcurrent by members meeting the new criteriaannounced with each policy modification.

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Producers seemed to be constantly catching upwith these ever-changing requirements, givingrise to the oft-used metaphor of a carrot on astick. Striving to strike a realistic balancebetween profit-taking and policy demands,registered producers engaged in three keystrategies: trading rights to produce a film(daemyeong jejak in Korean); trading rights toimport a film (under the Import LicenseReward System, discussed below); andgenerating film pre-sales.

By continually introducing new industryspecifications, the MPI was able to influence(and elevate) industry standards whileregulating the number of producers and theday-to-day conduct of their activities. However,as discussed below, the MPI’s influence in suchmatters was only partially effective, as asurprising number of unregistered (akaindependent) producers found ways tocircumvent the system. This was a relativelyeasy task given the industry’s small size andcollegiality; almost everyone knew everyoneelse.

Daemyeong jejak (hereafter daemyeong) was awidespread subcontracting system thatemerged at the end of 1961. It enabled aregistered producer to remain competitive bymeeting stringent registration requirementswhile simultaneously facilitating – theoreticallyil legal – fi lmmaking opportunities forindependent producers (deemed illegal afterthe PRS was launched in 1962). Subcontractingof this kind involved a four-step process.

First, in a move beneficial to both parties, aregistered producer gave (and later sold)independent producers the right to make filmsby letting them use his name (registered status)in order to file the necessary paperwork and toget approval for production. Second, theindependent producers – who included namessuch as Ho Hyeon-chan and Choi Hyeon-min,and directors Yu Hyun-mok and Jeong So-yeong

– made their films using their own or theregistered producer’s networks and equipment,opening the way to substantial box officeprofits without the large investment necessaryfor official registration. 38

Third, from 1963 the independent producerwould return the favor by paying a commissionto the registered producer, and the film’s boxoffice profits would go into the former’spockets.3 9 When a daemyeong film wasscreened, the opening credits identified twotypes of producers: the producer-in-charge(jejak damdang or chong jihwi, referring to theindependent producer) and the producer (jejak,referring to the registered producer). Thisacknowledgement suggested that the practice,albeit illegal, was widespread and recognizedby those involved in the industry. Finally, thefilm in question was submitted to the MPI’s filmawards process, an arrangement whichexclusively benefitted the registered producerif successful as the “prize” was a license toimport and distribute a foreign film – a sureformula for generating lucrative box officereturns.

Whilst this semi-covert activity – initiallyconducted without the exchange of money –was an unintended consequence of the PRS andtherefore fell outside the government’sblueprint for the industry, it became critical tothe sustainability of the producers’ cartel andthe industry as a whole. In 1963, the rate ofdaemyeong-funded productions increasedrapidly after amendments to the MPL requiredregistered producers to make a minimum offifteen films per year. Simply put, it was avaluable tool that enabled registered producersto meet the increasing demands of the PRS.Eventually, the daemyeong system became soentrenched that the MPI acquiesced in itsoperation, demonstrating how at least thosefilmmakers with the right networks perseveredby following multiple pathways for survival andsuccess under the Park regime.

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As part of this changing environment, in 1964the MPAK increased the level of its complaintsagainst registered producers exploiting theirindependent colleagues.40 Despite this, thedaemyeong system continued to grow. Tradereports estimate that, in 1965, 130 out of 189new films were daemyeong productions,meaning that two-thirds of all films produced inKorea at this time were completed by “dubious”means.41 In reality, these figures indicated thatfew if any registered producers had been ableto produce the statutory minimum of fifteenfilms per year that the MPL required.42 The MPIdid not hinder daemyeong because the practicewas clearly beneficial in enabling the industryto reach a desired level of productivity, risingrapidly from 86 films in 1961 to 189 in 1965.43

However, the end of the system was not faraway. In 1966, the same year that Korea’sscreen quota was launched, the MPI formallybanned daemyeong because it was no longerneeded as a mechanism for generatingproductivity. The government was satisfiedwith current levels of productivity, and set anannual production figure for the industry of 120films – a target easily achievable by theregistered producers alone. Nevertheless,daemyeong continued, but with escalatingcosts for independent producers as a result ofthe lower number of productions permitted.44

Few unregistered producers could afford tostay in the game, and a handful even took theirown lives out of a growing sense of despair.45

In response to ongoing organized protests overthe new production regime, the KMPPA agreedto eliminate the annual quota limit anddaemyeong was legalized by the MPI.46 Inresponses, production numbers soared from172 in 1967 to 229 in 1969.47

About 80% of the films produced in 1971 weredaemyeong films, mostly low quality “quotaquickies,” and all 21 registered producers wereinvolved in daemyeong productions, with amaximum of eight films each, reaffirming the

widespread utilization of the system.4 8

Ironically, the government’s acceptance of theindustry’s call for loosening of controlsundermined the production environment,eventually leading to a dark age (throughoutthe 1970s) for Korean cinema.

Cinema of Deterrence

To further regulate the industry, the MPIenacted two related measures in 1962 whichwere aimed at deterring the number of filmimports entering Korea and restricting theirexhibition: the Import Recommendation System(IRS) and the Import License Reward System(ILRS). These two schemes were usedalongside the Screen Quota System, which theMPI introduced in 1966, to curtail the powerfulinfluence that foreign films were commandingat the box office.49 Given that the majority offoreign feature films exhibited at this time wereAmerican, Hollywood distributors were effectedthe most by this policy.

The IRS required importers to submit a list offilms to the MPI for approval. During thisprocess, content regulation was carried out ontwo fronts: firstly, through the self-censorshipimposed by the importers themselves andsecondly, through the MPI’s screening processof potential films for import. The chief criterionused by the MPI was a moral and cultural one –whether a particular film would be harmful oroffensive to Korea’s customs and manners.

Linked to the IRS, which served as thegovernment’s primary import control tool, theILRS functioned as a financial subsidy for theregistered producers. The system was designedto administer licenses based on five criteria:quantity of f i lms produced; quality ofproduction; the existence of a successful exportcontract; formal co-production status; andsubmissions to international film festivals andawards received. Each time a producer met anyone of these criteria he was eligible to receive alicense to import one film.50

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In response, registered producers devised twocovert ways of obtaining import licenses and/orexploiting them for profit: firstly, by falsifyingor faking official documents such as domesticfilm export licenses and international co-production contracts; and secondly, by sellingan import license to another registeredproducer. From early on, producers freelyengaged in these two illegal and so-called blackmarket strategies. The idea of selling importrights was especially appealing to thoseregistered producers who were prolificfilmmakers and/or frequent recipients offoreign film festival nominations and awards,but who were unfamiliar with the import/exportside of the business.51

Spurred by the big profits to be made, illegalimport agencies became very active,purchasing import licenses from registeredproducers for 3 to 6 million won (betweenapproximately USD$23,000 and USD$46,000)each and then negotiating with American filmdistributors (based in Japan) on their behalf.52

Figure 4. Monkey Goes West (1966) filmadvertisement from Gyeonghyang Daily 8August 1966: 8. This Shaw Brothers’production made under the direction of HoMeng-hua was falsely presented toaudiences in Korea by Shin Film as a co-

production co-directed by Im Won-sik.Shin Sang-ok was subsequently chargedwith fraud and violating tariff regulations.Shin and Korean actor Park No-sik,promoted as a leading character in thefi lm, were summoned to the stateprosecutors’ off ice in Seoul , andinterrogated over the affair. To convincethe MPI (and viewers) of their bona fides,close-ups of Park No-sik’s face had beeninserted into the film at appropriatepoints; Park had spent three days in HongKong shooting the required scenes. For adetailed study about official and unofficialKorean-Hong Kong co-productions in the1960s, see Shim and Yecies (2012).

In most cases, export prices for a single filmvaried between about US$5,000 andUS$10,000, including royalty and printmakingfees.53 In other cases, however, films wereexported for as little as $100 in order togenerate the necessary paperwork that wouldenable a registered producer to receive animport license.54 While the falsification ofexport figures was on the rise throughout the1960s, the MPI took little action to curtail theprocess because it lacked the resources tomonitor activities that were happening on sucha large scale.

With the rising popularity of the martial artsgenre after the mid-1960s, there was strongcompetition among registered producers toimport Hong Kong f i lms . They weresignificantly cheaper than Hollywood films andperformed equally well at the box office. One ofthe easiest ways to import a Hong Kong filmwas by informing the MPI that the film inquestion was a Korean–Hong Kong co-production. Apparently, Hong Kong productionhouses such as the Shaw Brothers willinglyagreed to assist Korean producers by forgingco-production contracts, even though thesedeals involved the selling of their films toKorea.55 The practice of faking international co-

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production contracts lasted until the early1980s.56 Sometimes, a short scene with arandom Korean actor was inserted into a film,as in the Shaw Brothers’ Monkey Goes West(1966) and Valley of the Fangs (1970) – inorder to give some semblance of a co-production.

Figure 5. Valley of the Fangs (1970) filmadvertisement from Donga Daily 6 October1970: 6. This is another ‘ fake co-production’ that was introduced in Koreaby Shin film as a way of boosting domesticoutput in order to gain the advantagespromised under new f i lm po l i cyregulations.

In short, registered producers resorted to avariety of tricks and schemes to obtain importlicenses, especially as the ability to importHollywood films brought with it the opportunityfor lucrative box-office takings and increasedprofits for production-distribution companies.The producers, or importers working on theirbehalf, contacted Hollywood agencies based inJapan such as Warner Brothers and negotiatedthe films to be imported as well as prices; suchdeals usually included a two-year distributionperiod, royalties, and expenses for prints andfreight.57

In 1968, 18 Korean import agencies includingDonga Export Corporation, HwacheonCorporation and Samyeong handled around90% of foreign film imports (about 50 films outof 60).58 Although the number of domestic filmsexhibited in Korea outnumbered foreign filmsat this time, foreign productions consistentlydrew larger audiences.

By the mid-1960s, foreign films, which wereexhibited for two or three times as long asKorean films, were outperforming domesticfilms at the box office on a regular basis.59 Anew generation of young filmgoers born afterthe end of the Japanese colonial era in 1945believed that the narrative and aestheticqualities of foreign films were superior to thelocal product.60 Hong Kong martial arts films,“spaghetti” westerns and James Bond actionfilms were especially popular with this group,generating much larger profits than everbefore. For example, although the number offoreign and domestic films screened in 1968 in

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Seoul was 80 and 204 respectively, theaudiences for foreign films left local films in theshade: in that year the average audience forforeign and domestic films reached 107,269and 40,271 respectively.61

This two-headed import policy substantiallysubsidized the industry. At the same time, itencouraged registered producers to followgovernment guidelines as though they werechasing a carrot on a stick.

In less than five years, the MPI’s PRS,censorship guidelines, and import regulationsenabled the Park government to shape andcontrol the film industry as it had done for theautomobile and iron and steel industries.62 ThePark government wielded increasing powerover the film industry, seeing the potential ofc inema as an impor tant veh ic le fordisseminating national ideology as it did inthese other industries. Preventing theexhibition of noncompliant films was a keyaspect of film policy during Park’s tenure aspresident, thus completing the harnessing offilm production, distribution and exhibition tohis political agenda as a propaganda tool.

Despite the draconian structure created by theMPI’s three main policy components,throughout the Park period members of thefilm industry – in particular the Motion PictureAssociation of Korea, representing thoseoperatives not covered by the registeredproducers’ body, the Korean Motion PictureProducers Association – offered resistancewherever and whenever they could. On behalfof the great majority of the film community –including directors, cinematographers, actors,and independent (unregistered) producers – theMPAK consistently lobbied for the abolition ofthe MPL. In particular, it challenged the MPIover the PRS and daemyeong processes byappealing to the National Assembly as early asMarch 1964, on the grounds that daemyeongstrengthened the privileged cartel of registeredproducers. The anti-MPL campaign was a bold

sign of the industry’s readiness to stand up tobul ly ing from the MPI (and the Parkgovernment more generally), and resistancespearheaded by the MPAK continuedsporadically throughout the 1960s.

Conclusion

The golden age of cinema in Hollywood(1929-1945) has been defined as a periodmarked by exceptional films, and the time whensound film was perfected as an “influentialbusiness, cultural product and art form”.63

Similarly, the golden age of French cinema inthe 1930s has been characterized as the age ofproduction, auteurs, star actors, and the use ofliterary texts for filmmaking.64 According tothese critiques, the term “golden age” refers toa period when cinema reaches the point ofbeing appreciated as the combined product ofart, business and technology. The same notioncan readily be applied to Korea’s golden age ofcinema in the 1960s, a time when the filmindustry underwent rapid industrializationunder the Park Chung Hee dictatorship, raisedproduction values, and experienced the adventof new auteurs and their works. Yet, at the cruxof this development was a cartel of powerfulproducers, whose various business modelsshaped and sustained the film industry.

During the Golden Age of the 1960s, Koreancinema was largely defined by dynamic powerstruggles which brought the government andthe film industry together in often conflictualways as producers, both registered andindependent, sought to assert some measure ofindependence for themselves and the industryas a whole. Today, while some of the businessstrategies adopted by 1960s filmmakers mayseem absurd and retrogressive, we can see thatthey were responding to specific problems andthat their solutions were effective at the time.Their desire to achieve and retain their statusas producers provided a dynamic motivationthat gave a powerful impetus to the filmindustry as a whole. Money and the promise of

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prosperity drove productivity, allowing thelocal industry to enjoy its first true golden age.

By examining this early golden age of Koreancinema from a political-economic angle, theauthors have attempted to provide a morecomplex discussion of national cinema and itslinks to policy and the production side of theindustry than has previously been achieved.One of the central claims of this study is thatthe golden age of the 1960s was the outcome ofa combination of a protectionist film policy andstate control, and the new production systemthat resulted from these circumstances.

Under the direction of Park Chung Hee’smilitary regime, the MPI achieved near-totaladministrative control over production,exhibition, import and export activities with theaim of converting the film industry into apropaganda factory. The Ministry engaged intwo types of overt propaganda – a two-prongedweapon consisting of the direct propagandaproduced by the NFPC, composed of newsreelsand short message films, and the more obliquematerial produced by the private film industrysuch as anticommunist and ideologically driven(“enlightenment”) feature films, all directed bythe exigencies of the MPL. While a range ofcontemporary Korean filmmakers continues tomake films dealing with cultural patriotism andnational issues, the use of “propaganda” isinfinitely more subtle than in the past.

In the 1960s, some important differencesexisted between Korea’s PRS and theHollywood studio system. In Korea, the studiosystem was created by the state. Following theregime’s emphasis on productivity, the PRSwas designed to create a production-centricindustry system, neglecting exhibition anddistribution, and thus vertical integration inany real sense was obstructed – a significantdeficit in the industrial development modelproposed by an authoritarian military regime.

Hence, the policy framework and interventionsput in place by the Park regime were never

totally effective or successful. In response tothese government moves, the industrydeveloped various coping mechanisms andreactive strategies, such as sharing equipmentand staff when being inspected for compliancewith infrastructure criteria. While the industrygrew in size as a result of the PRS system, itsheavy focus on the production arm led to therelative neglect of other areas such asdistribution and exhibition, leading tounbalanced development. Producers devisedvarious less-than-transparent methods fordealing with the pressures they faced, creatinga daemyeong system and exploiting the ILRS.These back-door deals and black market tieshave been left far behind in 2000s, as theindustry has become increasingly transparentand efficient, especially in financial matters,and has suffered less intervention from thegovernment – especially since the Kim Dae-jung(1998-2003) administration’s adoption of theprinciple of “support without control”.

The rise of an elite producers cartel and thesystematization of their operating methods inthe 1960s was partly a by-product of the Parkregime’s policy of supporting chaebols – family-run business conglomerates. Both the PRS andchaebols were products of a developmentaliststate policy. In favoring chaebols, Park and hisfollowers selected and nurtured industrialelites based on factors such as personalconnections and proven records of businessperformance. In return, the chaebolsspearheaded the government’s export drive,which was also a critical part of the productionside of the industry. However, while the filmindustry shares many similarities with chaebolsin terms of its development pattern, there arealso differences between them: chaebols stillcontinue to operate in Korea, while the PRSdisappeared in the 1980s. The chaebols andtheir legacy have survived for three mainreasons: the government became overlydependent on them for economic reasons; thechaebols by contrast became progressively lessdependent on the government; and their

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leaders remained in their posts while politicalregimes changed around them.65

The PRS was eventually abolished in 1984,when anyone became free to open a productioncompany by reporting their intentions to theMinistry of Culture and Athletics (now calledthe Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism).Then in the late 1990s and early 2000s – withinthe country’s developed market economysystem – two major companies wereresponsible for the first sustained attempt atvertical integration within the Korean filmindustry: CJ Entertainment and LotteEntertainment. Without the threat ofgovernment intervention hanging over them,the influence of these three companiesincreased rapidly. As the center of privatefunding for the industry, and covering all threekey areas (production, distribution andexhibition), this major new conglomerate iscontinuing to stimulate the growth of astronger and more powerful “studio system” inKorea.

Ae-Gyung Shim has contributed to severalKorean and Australian film industry writingprojects, and has held research assistant andpart-time teaching positions at the University ofWollongong. Her Routledge book Korea’sO c c u p i e d C i n e m a s(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0415995388/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20), 1893–1948 (with BrianYecies) was published in 2011. Dr Shim is apast Korea Foundation Post-Doctoral fellowhosted by the Centre for Asia Pacific SocialTransformation Studies (CAPSTRANS) at theUniversity of Wollongong. Contact details:Institute for Social Transformation Research(ISTR), University of Wollongong, Wollongong,N S W 2 5 2 2 , A u s t r a l i a . E - m a i l :aegyung.shim@gmail.com

Brian Yecies is a Senior Lecturer in Media andCultural Studies at the University ofWollongong, and an associate member of theInstitute for Social Transformation Research

(ISTR). He teaches transnational film anddigital media subjects that emphasize culture,policy and convergence in Asia. Dr Yecies is apast Korea Foundation Research Fellow and arecipient of prestigious grants from theAcademy of Korean Studies, Asia ResearchFund and Australia-Korea Foundation. HisRoutledge book Korea’s Occupied Cinemas(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0415995388/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20), 1893–1948 (with Ae-GyungShim) was published in mid-2011. Contactdetails: Faculty of Arts, University ofWollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia.E -ma i l : b r i an_yec ies@uow.edu .au(https://apjjf.org/mailto:brian_yecies@uow.edu.au)

Recommended citation: Ae-Gyung Shim andBrian Yecies, 'Power of the Korean FilmProducer: Park Chung Hee’s Forgotten FilmCartel of the 1960s Golden Decade and itsLegacy,' The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue52, No. 3, December 24, 2012.

Articles on related subjects

• Sonia Ryang, North Koreans in South Korea:I n S e a r c h o f T h e i r H u m a n i t y(https://apjjf .org/-Sonia-Ryang/3771)

• Robert Y Eng, China-Korea Culture Wars andNational Myths: TV Dramas as Battleground(https://apjjf.org/-Robert_Y_-Eng/3503)

• Brian Yecies and Ae-Gyung Shim, DisarmingJapan’s Cannons with Hollywood’s Cameras:Cinema in Korea Under U.S. Occupation,1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 8(https://apjjf .org/-Ae_Gyung-Shim/3437)

• Ch’oe Yun and Mark Morris, South Korea’sKwangju Upris ing: F ict ion and Fi lm(https://apjjf .org/-Ch_oe-Yun/3297)

• Mark Morris, The New Korean Cinema,Kwangju and the Art of Political Violence(https://apjjf.org/-Mark-Morris/3298)

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• Stephen Epstein, The Axis of Vaudeville:Images of North Korea in South Korean PopC u l t u r e(https://apjjf.org/-Stephen-Epstein/3081)

• Mark Morris, The Political Economics ofPatriotism: Korean Cinema, Japan and the Caseo f ( h t t p s : / / a p j j f . o r g / - M a r k -M o r r i s / 2 9 3 5 ) H a n b a n d o(https://apjjf .org/-Mark-Morris/2935)

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Notes

1 The authors thank Mark Morris and thejournal’s referees for their valuable suggestionsas well as Korean film maestro Darcy Paquetfor his insights on producing in the newmillennium. The Korea Foundation andAcademy of Korean Studies have providedvaluable assistance for this work in progress.

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2 An increasing number of Korean producers,directors, actors, and post-productionspecialists are leaving their mark on films madein China. For example, Korean digital visualeffects (VFX) firms operating in Chinacontributed to Tsui Hark’s 2010 martial artsdrama Detective Dee and the Mystery of thePhantom Flame; and his 3D film Flying Swordsof Dragon Gate, produced in 2011. Korea’sDigital Idea shared the visual effects award forthe latter film at the 31st Hong Kong FilmAwards. Hur Jin-ho directed two films in Chinawith Beijing-based producer Zonbo Media: AGood Rain Knows (2009) and DangerousLiaisons (2012). CJ Powercast, Next VisualStudio and Lollol Media completed the VFX and2D/3D d ig i ta l in termed iary for theNingxia/Dinglongda/Huayi Brothers’ fantasy-action film directed by Wuershan – currentlythe highest grossing domestic film ever inChina. Also, An Byung-ki, producer of SpeedScandal (2008) and Sunny (2011), both boxoffice hits in China, directed the horror filmBunshinsaba (2012) in China. In Hollywood,Lee Byung Hun (G.I. Joe: The Rise of the Cobra(2009) and G.I. Joe: Retaliation (2013)) and BaeDoona (Cloud Atlas (2012)) have starred inblockbusters, while Park Chan-wook and KimJee-woon have directed Stoker (2013) and TheLast Stand (2013) respectively. These are just afew examples of the collaborative inroadsKoreans have been making in the film worlds inChina and the US.

3 Sadly, this high-concept blockbuster film,starring Zhang Ziyi of Crouching Tiger, HiddenDragon (2000) fame, failed at the box officepartly due to its release a few days before the11 September attacks on the World TradeCentre in New York.

4 The results of this annual Cine21 survey canbe found in Lee (4 May 2006) and Moon (3 May2007). After leaving Sidus FNH in 2009, Tcha’sformer company began concentrating ondistribution and exhibition rather thanproduction, for which Tcha had been well

known.

5 Since the mid-to-late 2000s, various arms ofthe Korean film industry have been besottedwith China. Shooting on location in China’s vastand inspiring landscapes, casting stars for wideor international audience appeal, and pursuinga range of official (joint and assisted) andunofficial collaborative co-productions are allfactors that have helped the Korean filmindustry gain access to China’s massive andfast-growing market. Without question, thepersonal networks (guanxi) that Koreanstudents at the Beijing Film Academy havedeveloped in China since enrolling in thisprestigious institution from the early 1990s –serving as local liaisons and consultants forboth industries – have been invaluable to thisprocess. Hence, Korean film companies andindividual practitioners have thus far madestronger inroads into China than Hollywood,once believed to be the sole center of cinematicfame and success. For more on the types ofcontributions that Korean film people arecurrently making in China, see Yecies, Shimand Goldsmith (2011).

6 Patrick Frater, 10 May 2012. “CJ reassuresover problem films.” Film Business Asia.

A v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://www.filmbiz.asia/news/cj-reassures-over-problem-films). Accessed 14 November 2012.

7 Readers may be reminded here of the powershift in producing that is occurring in otherparts of the world such as China, whereinternationally renowned Fifth GenerationChinese filmmaker Zhang Yimou unexpectedlysplit with his long-time producer of 15 years,Zhang Weiping, in October 2012, citingconflicts between the creative and businessdemands of filmmaking. Staff Reporter. 8October 2012. “Zhang Yimou splits with long-term collaborator.” WantChinaTimes.comA v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-

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cnt.aspx?id=20121008000005&cid=1504&MainCatID=15). Accessed 14 November 2012.

8 See Lee and Choe (1988); Ho (2000); Byon(2001); Lee (2004); Park (2005); McHugh and

Abelmann (2005); and Yi, Jung, and Park(2005).

9 Here we specifically refer to the massive“landmark volume” edited by Kim and Vogel(2011), and its smaller companion edited byKim and Sorensen (2011).

10 Other detailed accounts of Park Chung-hee’slegacy such as Kim (2004) and Lee (2006) alsosuffer from this oversight.

11 Rubin 1971: 81.

12 Park’s colonial experience is an importantfactor in this regard. Park was born in 1917,seven years after the Japanese colonized Korea.He was educated as a Japanese military officerin Manchukuo in 1940 under Japanese colonialauthority which continued in Korea until 1945.As a military dictator, like the Japanese colonialauthorities, he would have prioritized issues ofnational security and civil control above allelse. It is no secret that Park deeply admiredJapan’s Meiji imperial restoration responsiblefor Japan’s modernization, and also that he wasprofoundly influenced by Japanese colonial andmilitary traditions. He once stated that ‘thecase of the Meiji imperial restoration will be ofgreat help to the performance of our ownrevolution. My interest in this direction remainsstrong and constant’ (1963: 121). Fordiscussions of Park’s colonial experience andits long-term effects on his thinking, see Yi2002; Yi 2003; and Moon and Jun 2011.

13 These guidelines were supplemented in twofurther ministerial decrees: the MPLEnforcement Ordinance (promulgated in March1962) and the MPL Enforcement Rules (July1962), consisting of fifteen and seven articlesrespectively. During the 1960s, the government

released a series of film policy amendmentsthrough this hierarchical legislative framework.

14 For a discussion of the impact of censorshipon directing and genre choice – that is, as a

determinant of which types of films were madeand how stories were expressed within

particular narrative and aesthetic conventions –see Shim (2011).

15 Yeonghwa Japji (Film Magazine). December1967: 226-229.

16 Yeonghwa Japji (Film Magazine). January1970: 148.

17 This number was limited to six until 1988. In1989, the number of prints allowed to circulateat any one time was increased to twelve, andbetween 1990 and 1993 this figure increasedby one print per year. In 1994, this restrictionwas abolished, enabling films to be released ona nationwide basis, thus improving marketconditions for both domestic and internationalfilms during this pre-multiplex rollout era. SeeAhn (2005: 296-297).

18 Gukje Yeonghwasa (International Film Co.)1969: 201.

19 For a detailed historical overview of Korea’sfilm distribution system, see Kim et al. (2003).

20 Members of the US film industry would havebeen made aware of this practice througharticles published in Variety such as “No UnionSpells E-c-o-no-m-i-c-a-l; All 11 Producers asStudio Owners” (8 May 1968).

21 In a few cases – for example, as a result ofsecuring pre-sales funding from multipleexhibitors, each from a different province – aproducer was required to contribute not morethan 8% of the total budget (Kim et al. 2003:12-24).

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22 See Wade (1969: 10).

23 A similar phenomenon has occurred in thecontemporary film industry in Korea. Between2003 and 2005 Japanese distributors such asS h o c h i k u , C o m s t o c k , a n d G a g aCommunications rushed to purchased Koreanfilms even before they were completed,accounting for between 70% and 80% of allKorean film exports and leaving Koreanproducers over-reliant on the Japanese market.

24 Standish 1994: 73.

25 Geundae Yeonghwa (Modern Film) December1971: 23-31.

26 Other industries also ran into trouble aroundthis time. Between 1969 and 1971, over 300

firms either went bankrupt or were on theverge of bankruptcy, desperately seeking stateloans

to bail them out. See Cumings (1997: 362-363).

27 The KMPPA was established in 1957 torepresent the interests of producers. By 1963,it

had become an interest group of registeredproducers, excluding independent producersfrom

its membership.

28 See, for instance, Kim (1994) and Park(2005).

29 Byon 2001: 233.

30 Gomery 2005: 3.

31 Schatz 1996: 225.

32 See Yoo and Lee (1987: 96). Samsung andLG, which were formed in the 1950s, and otherfamily companies such as Hyundai, SK, andDaewoo , f ounded in the 1960s , a re

representative Korean chaebols. Over the pastfive decades, these Korean conglomerates havereceived enormous government subsidies andpreferential treatment in all facets of domesticbusiness.

3 3 See Kim (2004: 206) . Park and hisgovernment pre-selected chaebols andnurtured them as industrial elites loosely basedon a combination of personal connections andpast business performance. In return, thechaebols designed and executed business plansthat relentlessly backed the government’s driveto expand exports. This was one of thegovernment’s chief strategies for generatingforeign currency, a primary aim of developmentpolicy under the Park regime.

34 Moon and Jun 2011: 115.

35 It is likely that Shin saw the benefits of thestudio model through his working relationshipwith Daiei and Toho Studios in Japan, whichtaught him some important lessons. Forexample, in 1961 Shin exported his film SeongChunhyang (1961) through Daiei, and usedDaiei’s advanced technology to complete theunderwater scenes for Story of Shim Cheong(1962). Even after he was “kidnapped” andtaken to North Korea in 1978, Shin invitedToho’s technical staff to North Korea andworked with them to complete his science-fiction quasi-Godzilla monster film Pulgasari(1985), a political allegory glorifying theunquenchable spirit of North Korean society.

36 Variety 17 April 1968.

37 Schatz 1988: 9.

38 Veteran producer Kim In-gi, who worked for160 different film production companiesbetween the 1950s and 1980s, reportedpositive experiences with making daemyeongfilms in the 1960s. This subcontracting practiceenabled his unregistered production companiesto remain in business, thus advancing hiscareer.

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39 This commission was in effect an advance taxpayment on future box office revenues –

half was used to pay tax levied on box officegains and the other half went into theregistered

producer’s purse. When box office returns werebetter than expected, an additional fee was

charged to the independent producer to pay forthe increased tax bill.

40 Director Yun Bong-chun, president of theMPAK, wrote a column accusing registeredproducers of being greedy, taking advantage ofindependent producers twice over by sellingproduction rights and then taking up importlicenses (Silver Screen January 1965: 110).

41 Chosun Daily 3 February 1966: 5

42 Despite this, there was still room in theindustry for passionate younger independentproducers such as Ho Hyeon-chan and ChoiHyeon-min who specialized in art-house films,which were rarely attempted by registeredproducers.

43 This sudden increase in product overloadedthe exhibition system: over 50 completed filmsproduced in 1965 could not find outlets despitebeing scheduled for release in 1966. SeeKMPPC (1977: 46); and Yeonghwa Yesul (FilmArt) January 1966: 132.

44 See Silver Screen March 1966: 70; YeonghwaSegye (Film World) November 1966: 173; andShin Dong-a October 1968: 359. In August1966 revisions to the MPL banned daemyeongand declared that any registered producersinvolved in the practice would lose theirregistered status; following this directive,members of the KMPPA formally agreed to stopthe practice of selling production rights toindependent producers. However, somesecretly continued to exchange their privilegesto independent producers fo r h igh

commissions, ranging between 40,000 and50,000 won. Within two years, the commissionto buy the rights to produce a single film hadrisen to an astounding one million to 1.5 millionwon. According to Lee (2004: 329), averageproduction costs were 5-6 million won in 1961,a figure that rose to 10-12 million won in1968/69.

45 One such case involved the death of anestablished director, Noh Pil, in late 1966. Nohtried to shake off his massive debts by makinga profitable film but was unable to afford theproduction rights, and his attempt ended insuicide (Yeonghwa TV Yesul (Film TV Art)January 1967: 50; and Yeonghwa Japji (FilmMagazine) January 1967: 102). Film magazinesand newspapers made a martyr of Noh as away of raising awareness of the human cost ofthe daemyeong system. The MPI’s new annualquota system was blamed for the worseningsituation which had ultimately led to Noh’sdeath. (According to the Korean MovieDatabase (KMDB), Noh (1928-1966) debuted in1949 with Pilot An Chang-Nam and directed atotal of sixteen films. Most of Noh’s films weremelodramas.)

46 In 1968 the MPAK accused the registeredproducers of charging excessive daemyeongcommissions and monopolizing import licenses,and threatened a nationwide strike of itsmembers. More than 600 film industrymembers joined demands for an amendment tothe MPL and abolition of the production quotasystem. It was the first action of its kind todemonstrate the collective power of the MPAK.See Shin Dong-a October 1968: 359.

47 KMPPC 1977: 46.

48 Geundae Yeonghwa (Modern Cinema)December 1971: 23-31.

49 Although it was rarely policed, the ScreenQuota System required that a minimum of one-third of all films screened per year should be ofdomestic origin. For a detailed overview of

APJ | JF 10 | 52 | 3

23

screen quotas in Korea, see Yecies (2007).

50 See KMPPC (1977: 243). This reward systemoriginated in the 1958 Ministry of EducationNotice No. 53, detailing preferential treatmentto encourage domestic film production.According to this measure, specific importrights would be given to producers of high-quality domestic films, international award-winning films, exported films, and importers ofcultural or news films and high-quality foreignfilms.

51 See (KMPPC 1977: 77). Popular films such asMarines Who Never Returned (1962), The RedMuffler (1964), and Love Me Once Again(1968) were exported through official channelsto Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan. Korea’sbiggest export markets were Hong Kong andTaiwan, which accounted for 70-80% of totalexports, while smaller numbers of films wereexported to Japan and the US.

52 Importers operating independently ofregistered production companies wereoutlawed after the MPL was passed in 1963.From this date, import agencies mostly workedclandestinely and their activities were rarelydocumented. Film and Entertainment Yearbook(1969) published by Gukje Film Co. is one ofthe few sources that documents their activities.

53 KMPPC 1977: 77.

54 See Yeonghwa TV Yesul (Film TV Art) January1967: 52 and Yeonghwa TV Yesul (Film TV Art)September 1967: 16. The case involving theexport of a film for $100 was described bycrit ic Lee Young-i l as ‘shameful’ and‘laughable’. In another case, a bundle ofunclaimed (and unreleased) Korean film printswere found in a Taiwanese customs warehouse

– they had been dispatched to Taiwan to createthe appearance of an export contract.

55 Cho 2004: 20.

56 Director Lee Hyeong-pyo, who had directexperience of this kind of secret deal, said in aninterview (with the authors, 26 October 2004)that registered producers simply provided theirHong Kong partners with a list of Koreannames to include in the credits to make a givenfilm look like a co-production.

57 Documents detailing these transactions canbe found in the USC-Warner Bros. Archives.File: Japan # 16624B: Warner Brotherscorrespondence Re: South Korea 10 June1963.

58 Film and Entertainment Yearbook 1969: 133.

59 The popularity of Hollywood films in Koreawas first noticed in the 1920s and 1930s. Onthe basis of the huge influx of Hollywood filmsinto the Korean peninsula during the Japaneseoccupation period, Yecies has dubbed thedecade 1926-1936 ‘Hollywood’s First GoldenAge’ in Korea (2005: 59).

60 Comments regarding audience experiencescan be found in: Korean Cinema September1972: 99-103.

61 KMPPC 1977: 160.

62 Discussed respectively in Lee (2011) andRhyu and Lew (2011).

63 Jewell 2007.

64 Bergfelder, Harris, and Street 2007: 169.

65 Chung et al. 1997: 42-45.