powerpoint presentation · title: powerpoint presentation author: tim kelsall created date:...
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Collective action problems
and pathways of change
Tim Kelsall
The Framework: Getting to Step 4
• Refresher: what do we mean by a plausible pathway of change?
• A broad sequence of events that is easily imaginable given what we know about
the existing distribution of power and incentives, or relatively small changes
thereto.
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How do we identify them?
1. Identify the problem in which you are interested;
2. Run through steps 1-3, ie: map foundational factors, actors, rules of the
game;
3. Analyze what type of a problem it is;
4. Map the actors’ relationship to the problem, and whether they have an
interest in solving it.
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Now, think about the nature of the problem, and whether
small changes might resolve it, eg.
1. If this is a simple capacity problem, then increased resources and knowledge might solve it;
2. If a simple coordination problem, then increased communication among stakeholders might lead
to a joint commitment to change;
3. If a simple principal-agent problem, then increased information might lead to better performance;
4. If a vested interest/free rider problem, then increased consciousness about the importance of joint
action might lead to more effective mobilization;
5. If a nested or complex problem, the solution might be more difficult to foresee.
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Step Four: Use this to think about implausible and
plausible pathways of change
1. Eg. If we have a clientelistic political settlement and strong vested interests around reform in a
specific sectoral problem area (eg inappropriate textbooks in schools), then it is hard to imagine
the public (or parents) making effective demands for reform via the electoral route or the
affected Ministry (eg Education) self-reforming (eg by making changes to procurement);
2. If, however, there are at least some potentially powerful actors (eg a Principal Secretary, quality
textbook suppliers, sections of business, Principals of Teacher Training Colleges) with an interest
in reform, we can imagine that reduced barriers to collective action among them might help tip
the balance of power against blockers in the Ministry.
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Step Five: Implications for policy
1. Probably ‘No’ to public information campaigns or TA to the Ministry (at least
when undertaken in isolation);
2. Probably ‘Yes’ to convening, brokering and enabling stakeholders with an
interest in reform.
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An (optional) case study
follows:
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Example: Informal payments in the health sector in Guinea Bissau
• https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12949.pdf
Example: Informal payments in the health sector in Guinea Bissau
National factors:
1. Foundational: GB is small, poor, sparsely populated;
2. Actors: rival, party-based political elites, criminal networks, civil
servants, the military; DPs, though it is not a ‘donor darling’;
3. Institutional: an unstable (narco) state, with an elitist political settlement;
elections, though ostensibly democratic, are clientelistic; health spending
is low
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Key actors in the health sector:
1. National level politicians
2. Health service managers
3. Frontline health workers
4. Wealthier patients
5. Poorer patients
6. DPs and NGOs
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Key rules of the game
1. To subsist, health workers must elicit informal payments;
2. They can do this with little fear of punishment;
3. Staff know better than patients what services should be free and what should be
charged, and the relevant prices;
4. At least some types of informal payment are seen as culturally legitimate;
5. Some health professionals are nevertheless dismayed by the situation
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What type of problem is it?
This is a complex or ‘wicked problem’:
1. Lack of monitoring + ignorance of proper fees = principal-agent/information;
2. Health workers and wealthier patients benefit from informal payments = vested
interest;
3. Poor patients can’t change the system = collective action;
4. Cultural issues = coordination problem with misaligned preferences?
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Who wants to change the practice of informal payments?
High influence
Low influence
For the
changeAgainst
the change
Standard
stakeholder
mapping
Most politicians
Most frontline staff
Health managers
DPs and NGOs
Most poorer patients
Most wealthier patients
Scenarios and pathways of change
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Scenario Pathway Probability
No change If all the main actors carry on doing what they’re doing and there are no unexpected exogenous shocks.
High
Positive change
If salaries could be raised, health worker
resistance might weaken; if information about
charges increased, patients might be less
inclined to pay; if cultural norms changed,
popular mobilization around the issue might
increase.
Low probability that all can be attained simultaneously or even consecutively
Negative change
If monitoring of and sanctions for informal payments increased, absent an increase in salaries, it could prompt staff exodus from the public health system.
Low, given unlikelihood of monitoring increasing
Step 5: implications for development agencies:
• We have a wicked problem with numerous potential entry points but a
low overall probability of success;
• However, if the potential gains from success are high, it is appropriate to
ask:
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Step 5: implications for development agencies:
• Who are the actors with an interest in change? Can they be facilitated?
• Are there examples of positive deviance that can be built on? Are there
savvy ideas or ‘second best solutions’ for context-sensitive reform?
• Is it worth making a ‘small bet’ on a locally led solution and seeing
where it goes?
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Summing up:
• Combining our framework with some concepts from collective action
theory, we can identify more and less plausible pathways of change;
• Sometimes, we have to accept that change may not be feasible.
• But don’t rule out the possibility of politically smart, change against the
odds
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