pramanas and the language

7/28/2019 pramanas and the language

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to be published in:JIPh 2004

Pramas and language.A Dispute between Dinga, Dharmakrti and Akalaka*

Piotr Balcerowicz

1

In Three Simple Chapters (Laghyas-traya, LT), a concise thoughseminal work on epistemology written by a Digambara Akalaka Bhaa(c. 720780), we come across a verse that contributed to some controversyand to a variety of interpretations. It reads (LT 10cd11ab):

jnam dyam mati saj cint cbhinibodhikam /pr nma-yojanc chea ruta abdnuyojant//

Its contents is rather lucid and straightforward, it would seem. At firstattempt, we could render it as follows:

Int. 1 The first [kind of] cognition [comprises] sensuouscognition (here: memory), recognitive cognition, andinductive thinking [and] determined cognition, [andoccurs] before the association with name (speech). Theremaining [kind of cognition] is testimonial (mediated)cognition on account of the application of speech.

The interpretation of the verse should not be very problematic. In itAkalaka continues his exposition of his epistemological ideas. Here heiterates the idea that there are only two cognitive criteria (prama)1,divided into perception (pratyaka) and indirect cognition (paroka).The first variety comprises four subtypes: (1) sensuous cognition (mati-

jna), which embraces all cognitive processes that are directly basedon the activity of sense organs and that culminate in the act of retention(dhra), or saving the directly perceived image of an object to theresidue memory; (2) recognitive cognition, the idea of which is thedetermination and identification of things through comparing them withtheir image preserved in memory; (3) inductive thinking, or association,that consists in generalisation on the basis of a series of single similarevents; in the course of it, general ideas, images, principles and rulesare derived that may later serve as a background for universal

* The present paper is a part of my research subsidised by the Alexander vonHumboldt-Stiftung.1 For the reasons why I consistently renderprama as cognitive criterion see:BALCEROWICZ (2001a: 140145, n. 4).


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generalisations, indispensable to any inference; and finally

(4) determined cognition which completes sense-related cognitiveprocesses with a definite conclusion; for that reason the final stage isalso called inference (anumna)2. The second variety includes allremaining kinds of cognitive process, which in the above verse aregiven a joint name of testimonial (mediated) cognition (ruta), thecommon feature of which is that they are all mediated cognitions, asopposed to the first variety of cognitions that are acquired directly bythe cogniser. The very possibility of cognition to be mediated, i.e. to beconveyed to other people, is due to language, which is the vehicle ofinformation and the means of expressing the contents of ones ownknowledge. For this reason, Akalaka seems to relate the first variety of

cognition, viz. perception, with non-verbal sphere, and the secondvariety, viz. indirect cognition, with the use of language and applicationof verbal symbols.

The continuator of Akalakas ideas, a commentator of a number ofworks and an author of independent treatises, VidynandaPtrakesarisvmin (first half of 9th century) quotes the above verse of

Laghyas-traya and offers his own paraphrase of its contents, whichentirely agrees withInterpretation 1:

Int. 2 The first [kind of] cognition [comprises] memory,recognitive cognition, inductive thinking and determinedcognition; it arises before the association with name

(speech). The remaining [kind of cognition] is testimonial(mediated) cognition [that arises] on account of theapplication of speech.As for this idea, Akalaka said the following:The first [kind of] cognition [comprises] sensuouscognition (here: memory), recognitive cognition, andinductive thinking [and] determined cognition, [andoccurs] before the association with name (speech). Theremaining [kind of cognition] is testimonial (mediated)cognition on account of the application of speech.3

2 Clearly, the Sanskrit term anumna has a much wider connotation than inference. Ina number of contexts it refers to all kinds of reasoning which is based on symbols(including speech elements) of any system of coding; it proceeds from one symbol(word or idea), that has already been comprehended, to another, new one, of which weknow it is related to the former one. In this way the term anumna is applicable totypical cases of inference, but also to the use of language in which words as symbolsconnote ideas (universals), which are further related with each other or with theirreferents. This aspect ofanumna is clearly visible, for instance, in Dingas system.This also explains why Akalaka takes abhinibodha and anumna as synonyms.3TVA, p. 239:


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jnam dya smti saj cint cbhinibodhikam /prg-nma-savta ea ruta abdnuyojant//

atrkalaka-dev prhu

jnam dya smti saj cint cbhinibodhikam /pr nma-yojanc chea ruta abdnuyojant//

These two verses are followed by Vidynandas comment, which is additionallyinteresting in term of the qualitative usage of the particle eva (TVA, p. 239240):tatrda vicaryatemati-jnd dyd bhinibodhika-paryntc chea ruta

abdnuyojand evty avadhraam, rutam eva abdnuyojand iti v? yadi rutam

eva abdnuyojand iti prva-niyama tad na kacid virodha, abda-sasa-

jnasya aruta-jnatva-vyavacchedt. atha abdnuyojand eva rutam iti niyama,tad rotra-mati-prvakam eva ruta na cakur-di-mati-prvakam iti siddhnta-virodha syt. svyavahrika bda jna rutam ity apekay tath-niyame tuna-bdhsti cakur-di-mati-prvakasypi rutasya paramrthato bhyupagamtsva-samaya-pratipatte.As regards the idea, it is [now] examined. The remaining[kind of cognition different] from sensuous cognition, which is the first [kind ofcognition], [with its varieties] up to determined cognition, is testimonial cognition. Isthe restriction of the following kind: [1] Testimonial cognition [arises] exclusively onaccount of the application of [articulated] speech or [2] Exclusively testimonialcognition [arises] on account of the application of [articulated] speech? [Ad 2] If it isthe foregoing restriction: Exclusively testimonial cognition [arises] on account of theapplication of [articulated] speech, then there is no contradiction, because [in thisway] it is excluded that cognition connected with [articulated] speech is non-testimonial cognition. [Ad 1] If the restriction is: Testimonial cognition [arises]exclusively on account of the application of [articulated] speech, then testimonial

cognition is exclusively [such a cognition] that is preceded by sensuous cognitionderived from the organ of hearing, it is not [a cognition] preceded by sensuouscognition derived from the organ of seeing and other [senses]; [and] that would yield acontradiction with the doctrine. But if [we assume] such a restriction in dependence onthe rule that testimonial cognition is conventional verbal cognition, then there is noaccepted (sc. legitimate) subversion, because testimonial cognition is [then] ultimatelyacceptedin accordance with the contention of [our] own doctrineas also [acognition] preceded by sensuous cognition [derived from all sense-organs such as] theeye etc. For Vidynandas further comments that follow this passage see n. 85.To explicate Akalakas idea, Vidynanda Ptrakesarisvmin adds in the same spirit inTVA, p. 243:

abdnuyojant tv e rutam astv aka-vittivat/

sabhavbhva-savittir arthpattis tathnum //

nmsasa-rp hi matir e prakrtit /

nta kacid virodho sti syd-vdmta-bhoginm // But if this [sensuous cognition were to arise] on account of theapplication of speech, then let it be testimonial cognition (sc. indirectcognition), like cognition derived from sense organs, and [othercognitive criteria such as] equivalence, apprehension of absence [asnegative proof] as well as inference [which arise on account of theapplication of speech]. However, this sensuous cognition has declaredto have the form which is disconnected from name (speech). Therefore,


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The only difference between Vidynanda and Akalaka is the use of

the term mati (sensuous cognition), which is replaced by Vidynandawith an unequivocal term smti (memory). This should not surprise us

because Akalaka himself uses these two terms interchangeably severaltimes (cf. LT 25, LTV 61). This apparent synonymity of suchseemingly divergent concepts as sensuous cognition (whichapproximates the idea of perception) and memory is in itself a biteccentric, and will necessitate further explanation.

In his commentary on Siddhasena Divkaras Samati-tarka-prakaraa, another Jaina thinker Abhayadeva-sri (11 th century)extensively commented on the issue of the division of cognitive

processes and their relation to language, raised by Akalaka in the

above verse:Such a cognition [which occurs] before the associationwith speech is sensuous cognition; it [becomes] theremaining [kind of cognition], viz. testimonial(mediated) cognition, which is of various subdivisions,which is produced owing to the application of speechand which is unclear cognition.4

Here, the division is as follows: such cognition [whichoccurs] before the association with speech, which isdivided into memory etc. and which operates as beingcapable of activating infallible practical action is

sensuous cognition; however, [such a cognition] whichis manifested as a result of the association with speechis in its entirety testimonial (mediated) cognition.5

Abhayadeva confirms the initial analysis of the contents ofAkalakas verse. Interestingly, we find a new element inAbhayadevas exposition, which was absent in Akalakas: thereference to the practical side of cognition which is capable ofactivating infallible practical action (avisavdi-vyavahra-nirvartana-kama)a clear influence of the well-know idea ofDharmakrti, viz. the efficacy to execute causally efficient action(artha-kriy-smarthya).

there is no contradiction for those who take delight in the nectar of thedoctrine of modal description.

4 TBV, p. 553.1314:prk abda-yojant mati-jnam etat eam aneka-prabhedaabda-yojand upajyamnam aviada jna rutam.5 TBV, p. 553.2021: atra ca yat abda-sayojant prk smty-dikam avisavdi-vyavahra-nirvartana-kama pravartate tan mati, abda-sayojant prdur-bhtatu sarva rutam iti vibhga.


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If we suppose that what Vidynanda and Abhayadeva say, which is

unanimous withInterpretation 1, accurately depicts what Akalaka hadin mind, we still face a serious difficulty: how is it possible to

reconcile such processes as memory, recognition, recollection,inductive thinking (association) or inference with the idea of directcognition, or perception? And that is precisely what all theseinterpretations imply. In addition, Akalaka understandably relatesinference (anumna) to indirect cognition (paroka) at another place(LT 4). Did he not notice the contradiction to which his statement of LT10cd11ab leads to, namely that inference, said to be synonymous withdetermined cognition (bhinibodhika = mati-jna), merges incharacter with direct cognition, or perception? Was not this difficulty

noticed by his commentators?The premonition that the initialInterpretation 1 may not portrayAkalakas intentions adequately finds its confirmation withPrabhcandra-sri (11th century), the author of theNyya-kumuda-candra (NKC), the main commentary on AkalakasLaghyas-traya.His gloss on the verse accentuates entirely different aspects and theoverall interpretation conveys ideas that radically opposes

Interpretation 1:

Int. 3 The first [kind of] cognition is sensuous cognition.Memory, recognitive cognition, as well as inductivethinking and determined cognition are the remaining

[kinds of cognition, different from sensuous cognition,]viz. [they make up] testimonial (mediated) cognition[which occurs] before the association with name(speech) and on account of the application of speech.6

6 The above translation follows Prabhcandras commentary, the complete text ofwhich runs as follows (NKC, p. 404.4405.9):yat prathama-kriky eamaviada jnam ity uktam tat kim?rutam avispaa-tarkaam rutam avispaa-tarkaama ity-abhidhnt. ki yat nma-yojanj jyate viada jna tad evarutam, utnyad api? ity hapr nma-yojant. namna abhidhnasya yojant

prvam upajyate yad aspaa jna tac chruta nma-yojanjanitrthspaab-

jna-sdharmyd ity-abhiprya. cint ca ity atra ca-abdoc

bhinna-prakramaabdnuyojantity asynantara draavya. tena na kevala nma-yojant prva

yad aspaa jnam upajyate tad eva ruta ki tu abdnuyojanc ca yadupajyate tad api rutam ity saghta bhavati. ki tad? ity hasajity di.cint ca ity aya ca-abda punar bhinna-prakrama mati ity asynantara smti-

samuccayrtho draavya. tena smty-dy aviada jnad rutam ity uktabhavati. indriya-prabhava matie-jna tu deato vaiadya-sambhavtsvyavahrika pratyakam ity uktam. tasya rutasya ki kraam? ity hajanam dyam kraam. ki-nma? ity hamati iti. na cgama-virodhamati-


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To understand Prabhcandras commentary it is crucial to notice the

following equivocation: he applies the same term mati twice in twodifferent meanings. First, the term is taken in the sense of sensuouscognition in the phrase The first [kind of] cognition is sensuouscognition (jnam dyam mati = NKC:janam dyam kraam.ki-nma? ity hamati iti). Secondly, Prabhcandra uses it again inthe sense memory; (mati =smti) in the phrase: Memory, recognitivecognition, as well as inductive thinking and determined cognition arethe remaining [kinds of cognition] viz. testimonial cognition (mati

saj cint cbhinibodhikam ea ruta). He tries to justify hisinterpretational manoeuvre by way of explaining various positions ofthe copula ca, that is said to be placed wrongly, and suggesting that

the actual sequence of words in the verse is slightly different. However,Prabhcandra is justified in taking the term mati to mean memory(smti), apart from its usual meaning, by the Jaina tradition itself, e.g.

by Umsvmins remark that sensuous cognition, memory, recognitive

prva rutamfity-abhidhnt.What is this remaining [cognition] of which itwas said in the first verse (sc. LT 3) that it is unclear cognition? [It is] testimonialcognition, which is indistinct suppositional reasoning, [thus] on account of the explicitstatement: Testimonial cognition is indistinct suppositional reasoning. Is testimonialcognition only that which arises through the association with name (speech), or alsosomething else? To answer this, [Akalaka] says: before the association with name(speech). That non-lucid cognition which arises prior to the association with name, i.e.verbal statement, is testimonial cognition, because it is similar to the non-lucidcognition of an object which is not produced by the association with namesuch is[Akalakas] intention. In the following [phrase]: and inductive thinking, the speechelement and occurs in the irregular position (sc. is displaced) and should beinterpreted immediately after the phrase: on account of application of speech.Therefore, not only is testimonial cognition that [cognition] which arises prior to theassociation with name (speech), but also is testimonial cognition that [cognition] whicharises on account of the application of speechthus has [the idea] been recapitulated.What is this [testimonial cognition]? To answer this, [Akalaka] says: recognitivecognition etc. This speech element and [in the phrase] and inductive thinking,occurs again in the irregular position (displaced) and should be interpreted immediatelyafter the phrase: sensuous cognition, as having the meaning of conjunction withmemory. Thus, what this amounts to is the following: memory etc. are unclearcognition, i.e. testimonial cognition. However, sensuous cognition, which has its origin insenses, has been described as conventional perception [in LTV 4], in so far as it can occuras partially [having] clarity. What is the cause of this testimonial cognition? To answerthis, [Akalaka] says: the first [kind of] cognition is the cause [of this testimonialcognition]. What is its name? To answer this, [Akalaka] says: sensuous cognition. Thereis no contradiction with the scriptural testimony [of TS 1.13], because of the explicitstatement: Testimonial cognition is preceded by sensuous cognition [TS 1.20].a Cf. TVA, p. 237:rutam aspaam tarkaam. b r:yojanj janitrthspaa.c , r: atra abdo. d , r: aviada-jna. e B: prabhava-mati.c TS 1.20.


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cognition, inductive thinking [and] determined cognition are

synonymous expressions (TS 1.13: mati smti sajcintbhinibodha ity anarthntaram), a statement that also Akalakarefers to at another occasion (SViV 2.17, p. 115.1518).

The implication of Prabhcandras interpretation is that suchcognitive processes as memory, recognitive cognition, inductivethinking or determined cognition are separated from sensuous cognition(mati-jna). Such an opinion of Prabhcandra, in turn, contradicts thegist of Umsvmins aphorism of TS 1.13, quoted above. GrantedPrabhcandras exposition be correct, Akalaka would have torenounce another vital tenet of Jaina tradition, which he did accept onother occasions explicitly, and thereby he would inevitably run into

contradiction again. The problematic nature of such an interpretationwas evident to Prabhcandra, who was quick to add in the concludingsection of the gloss (NKC, p. 405.79) that: There is no contradictionwith the scriptural testimony [of TS 1.13], because of the explicitstatement: Testimonial cognition is preceded by sensuous cognition[TS 1.20]. This artifice of interpreting the sequence of cognitive actssuch as memory etc. in terms of their causes does not explain thedifficulty away: these cognitive acts (sc. memory etc.) may be caused

by perception but it does not mean that they all share with it the samenature.

2

To understand the contents of Akalakas enigmatic verse and its far-reaching consequences, one should take a closer look at the historicalcontext in which Akalaka formulated it and a range of ideas which areat its intellectual background, namely the centuries-old discussionamong Indian philosophers what cognitive criterion (prama) is andwhat its true nature consists in. It is also important to take into accountsome important shifts in its understanding among the Jainasthemselves.

The very notion of cognitive criterion (prama) was a foreignbody in the system of the early evolving Jaina theory of cognition. It

was adopted gradually under the influence of the methodological-analytical stream of nvkik and the Nyya school. The influence isundeniably attested by the choice of terminology and the typology ofcognitive criteria which we find in Jainagamas, which follows that ofnvkik and Nyya. The appropriation of the idea of cognitivecriterion by Jaina thinkers must have taken place probably after 1st or2nd century CE, i.e. when the term and its divisions had already becomewell-established in the nvkik and Nyya traditions. Initially, in


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Jaina sources, the termprama referred exclusively to classifications

known from these two traditions, and comprised: perception(pratyaka), inference (anumna), analogy-based reasoning (aupamya)and scriptural testimony (gama)7. Interestingly, the notion ofcognitive criteria was introduced into Jainism as an idea (along withits classification), not as a separate term. Before the Jainas started usingthe term prama, the current term was hetu (Prakrit he), orsource of cognition or cognitive tool8. That was also in perfectharmony with the usage we find in the Caraka-sahit9.

Further, the earliest fragments of Jaina texts of epistemologicalrelevance (probably after about 3rd or 2nd century BCE) testify thatJainas applied two schemes of classification of cognition that may have

coexisted as complementaries.The first scheme distinguished two basic kinds of cognition:immediate, direct cognition (pratyaka) and mediated, indirectcognition (paroka). In the initial phase of the development of Jainaepistemology the borderline between them was regulated by theinterpretation of what aka, or perceiving organ, is. Until 6th7th

centuries, for the Jainas the eye and other sense organs were merelyphysical or physiological mediators in acquiring cognition. Theexclusive perceiving organ was the cognitive subject (tman) himself,or living element (jva), the soul. All cognition which occurs in thecognitive subject (the soul) without the assistance of any additionalfactors, such as sense-organs or the mind, was taken to be immediateand direct (pratyaka), whereas any cognitive act which could not

possibly take place without the support of senses etc. was consideredindirect (paroka).

Such an approach conspicuously differed from the mainstream ofIndian epistemology and general usage with which basically mostIndian thinkers complied: direct cognition, or perception, originates insenses, whereas any cognition that follows the activities of the mind isan indirect variety of cognition, and these varieties were named andclassified differently. No wonder that Jaina terminological usage musthave seemed awkward to many and may have led to unnecessarymisunderstanding and complications.

The second typology comprised five kinds of cognition: sensuouscognition (mati-jna), testimonial cognition (ruta-jna),

7 Viy 5.4.26[3] (vol. 1, p. 201.12):pame cauvvihe paatte, ta jahpaccakkhe,aume, ovamme, game.8 h 336 (p. 149): ahav he cauvvihe pannatte, ta jahpaccakkhe aumeovamme game.9 E.g. CarS 3.8.33/ atha hetuhetur nmpalabdhi-kraa. tat pratyakamanumnam aitihyam aupamyam iti.


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clairvoyance (avadhi-jna), mind-reading (mana-paryya-jna10)

and absolute knowledge (kevala-jna).11 These two models werequickly combined into one consistent scheme which became thestandard for centuries to come. It also comprised subdivisions, orstages, of sensuous cognition: sensation (avagraha), cogitation (h),

perceptual judgement (avya12) and retention (dhra). The schemefound its classical formulation with Umsvmin in the Tattvrtha-stra(TS)13:

direct cognition (pratyaka)

clairvoyance (avadhi-jna)

mind-reading (mana-paryya-jna)

absolute knowledge (kevala-jna)

indirect cognition (paroka)

sensuous cognition (mati-jna)

scriptural cognition (ruta-jna)

cognitive criteria (prama)

sensation (avagraha)

cogitation (h)

perceptual judgement (apya)

retention (dhra)

Model 1

Model 1 underwent various modifications. One of them was tointroduce the division into cognitions that are distinct, having definite

10 The Digambaras, including Akalaka (RVr), preferred the variant: mana-paryaya-jna.11 Viy 8.2.2223 (p. 336): ...pacavihe ne paatte, ta jahbhinibohiya-nesuya-ne ohi-ne maapajjava-ne kevala-ne. ... bhinibohiya-ne catuvvihepaatte, ta jahuggaho h avo dhra. NaS 6[2829] i 8 (pp. 6, 9): ...a-dasaa-guam...a pacaviha paatta. ta jahabhiibohiya-asuya-a ohi-a maapajjava-a levala-a.12 The vetmbaras prefer the term apya.13 TS 1.912, 15. Umsvmins actual classification, based on classifications foundalso in thegamas, was far more complex and contained the blanket idea of cognitiveapplication (upayoga): (I)jna: (1) bhinibodhika-jna with four stages: (a)avagraha, (b) h, (c) apya, (d) dhra, (2)ruta-jna, (3) avadhi-jna, (4)mana-paryya-jna, (5) kevala-jna, (II) darana: (1) cakur-darana, (2) acakur-darana, (4) avadhi-darana, (5) kevala-darana. Comp. Viy 2.10.9[2] (p. 115): ...jvea aata bhiibohiya-na-pajjava eva suta-na-pajjava ohi-na-pajjava maapajjava-na-pajjava kevala-na-pajjava mati-aa-pajjava suta-aa-pajjava vibhaga-a-pajjava cakkhu-dasaa-pajjava acakkhu-dasaa-pajjavaohi-dasaa-pajjava kevala-dasaa-pajjava uvaoga gacchati, upayoga-lakkae a jve See alsoSTP 2.3, 5, 6, 8, 16, 23, 27.


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contents (skra = jna), and indistinct, not having any definite

contents (ankra = darana, vision)14.All these historical remarks are necessary to understand Akalakas

intention underlying the problematic verse. It will also be vital to bearin mind that Akalaka penned theRoyal commentary (RVr) onUmsvmins Tattvrtha-stra, which represented the above Model 1.As the author to the most fundamental Jaina text, which has beenconsidered the paramount exposition of Jaina doctrine until today,Akalaka not only knew the above scheme but also accepted it, at leastdeclaratively. What it practically meant was that he had to avoid anyopen contradictions with the tradition he glossed.

3

Around the 7th and 8th centuries some radical changes wereintroduced into Jaina systematics, which were subsequently endorsed

by Akalaka. The culprits were Ptrasvmin, the author of the lost Tri-lakaa-kadarthana, Siddhasena Mahmati, the author of the

Nyyvatra (NA),15 and the fundamental shift was directly compelledby certain Buddhist ideas and new epistemological concepts introducedby Dinga and Dharmakrti.

14 Cf. the following Canonical model (AD):prama: (I)jna: (1)pratyaka: (a)indriya-pratyaka (rotra, cakur,ghra,jihv,spara), (b) no-indriya-pratyaka:(avadhi, mana-paryya, kevala), (2) anumna: (a)prvavat, (b)eavat, (c)sdharmya, (3) aupamya [...], (4) gama [...], (II) darana: (1) cakur-darana, (2)acakur-darana, avadhi-darana, kevala-darana; see AD 435-471 (p. 173-179):[435]se ki ta jva-gua-ppame? ... tam jaha-gua-ppame dasaa-gua-ppame caritta-gua-ppame. [436]se ki ta a-gua-ppame? ... tajahpaccakkhe aume ovamme game. [437]se ki ta paccakkhe? ... ta jahidiya-paccakkhe, oidiya-paccakkhe ya. [438]se ki ta idiya-paccakkhe? ...ta jahsoidiya-paccakkhe cakkhur-idiya-paccakkhe ghidiya-paccakkhejibbhidiya-paccakkhe phsidiya-paccakkhe. se tam idiya-paccakkhe. [439]se kita noidiya-paccakkhe? ... ta jahohi-a-paccakkhe maapajjava-a-paccakkhe kevala-a-paccakkhe. se ta oidiya-paccakkhe. se ta pacchakke.

[440]se ki ta aume? ... ta jahpuvva sesava iha-shammava...[471]se ki ta dasaa-gua-ppame? ... tam jahcakkhu-dasaa-gua-ppame acakkhu-dasaa-gua-ppame ohi-dasaa-gua-ppame kevala-dasaa-gua-ppame ceva. cakkhu-dasae cakkhu-dasaissa ghaa-paa-kaa-raghdievsu davvesu, acakkhu-dasae acakkhu-dasaissa ya-bhve, ohi-dasaa -dasaissa davva-davvehi savva-pajjavehi ya. se ta dasaa-gua-ppame.15 Since the author of theNyyvatra is different from Siddhasena Divkara, the authorof the Samati-tarka-prakaraa, it is advisable to refer to the former as SiddhasenaMahmati, see: BALCEROWICZ (2001b).


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One of the two sources of new Jaina classification, which found its

earliest and fullest expression in theNyyvatra, was Dingas well-known statement of PS and PSV 1.2:

The two cognitive criteria are perception andinference, [because] the cognoscible object has twocharacteristicsFor there is no cognoscible other than the individuallymarked (unique particular) and the generally marked(universal thing), because we shall further demonstratethat perception has as its datum the individually marked(unique particular), whereas inference has as its datumthe generally marked (universal thing).16

The passage introduced a new ground for distinguishing twocognitive criteria: two divergent aspects of reality, which can be knowneither in terms of absolutely unique sensation, or a sense impressionwhich points to itself only, or in terms of concepts that actually conveya synthetised image, embedded in a set of relations that allow thecogniser to group items, construct hierarchies of objects, drawinferences etc., and, finally, to make use of speech, as the medium of allconcepts. It is precisely its application that draws the line of distinction

between the two spheres:

Perception is free from conceptual construction,

[which, in its turn,] is connected with name, class,etc.17

Perceptual data that constitute the contents of perception, such as aparticular patch of colour, a unique touch sensed in a particular moment

16 PS, PSV 1.2:

pratyakam anumna ca prame lakaa-dvaya /

prameyamna hi sva-smnya-lakabhym aparam prameyam asti. sva-lakaa-viaya hipratyakam, smnya-lakaa-viayam anumnam iti pratipdayiyma. Quoted inPrajkaragupta, PVA, p. 169.3, 213.6 and by Siha-sri in DNCV, p. 88.389.1; On

this quotation see HATTORI (1968: 7679, notes 1.11, 1.13, 1.14) and E. Steinkellnersnotes 44 (p. 28) and 51 (p. 2930) PVin II2. Cf. also NM, p. 50: As regards onesunderstanding there are only two pramas, I mean: inference and direct perception(pratyaka and anumna) since [the other pramas admitted by different schools] suchas tradition (abda), analogy (upamna) etc. are include in these two. Thus there areonly pramas, by which can apprehend the thing in itself (svalakaa) and itsgenerality (smnyalakaa). There is no other knowable besides these two, which canbe apprehended by aprama different from those [already referred to].17 PS1 1.3cd:pratyaka kalpanpoha nma-jty-di-yojan. Cf. HATTORI (1968:83, 85).


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etc., carry the information which does not extend over their actuality:

the unique particular communicates nothing but its self, or its presence.The contents of inference, which actually stands for any kind of validspeech- and concept-related piece of cognition, is artificiallyconstructed, generated on the basis of a range of perceptual data,memory and conceptual framework imposed on the perceptual data bythe language; such conceptualisation conveys a generalised object, be itan arrangement of various perceptual data that have been independentlyapprehended by different sense organs and subsequently correlated witheach other into one whole, or a set-up of abstracted features, theessential nature of which are its relations with other conceptualentities.18 It is precisely what facilitates acquisition, or expansion of

knowledge of a conceptual object B, of which we have no directknowledge, on the basis of an object A, which has already become thecontents of our cognition and of which we know that it is related to theobject B by a certain relationR. Dinga maintains, that the rulesgoverning acquisition of knowledge and co-ordination of its contentsare the same wherever any system of symbols is involved19. Allcognitive processes based on symbols, including verbalcommunication, can be therefore classified as inference, and for thisreason

Verbal cognition is not an additional cognitivecriterion, different from inference, because it names its

object through [the procedure known as] exclusion ofthe other in the same way as [the inference: x isimpermanent, because it is produced, determines itsobject to have the quality of impermanence on the

basis of the already known quality of] beingproduced etc.20

For Dinga all our knowledge can be organised in two disconnectedcompartments, the latter of which is defined by two coextensive andinseparable ideas: conceptualisations and speech. Whether we reach theconclusion that there is fire on a mountain by relying on fires specific

18 Cf. HERZBERGER(1986: 106144), HAYES (1988: 133144). As regard the historicalbackground which influenced the development of the idea of the unique particular (sva-lakaa) as the object of perception see: SINGH (1984: 117135).19 Cf. e.g. HAYES (1988: 173219).20 PS 5.1:

na pramntara bdam anumnt tath hi tat/

ktakatvdivat svrtham anypohena bhate //The original acc. to TSaP 15131514. Cf. the translation in: H AYES (1988: 300) andHERZBERGER(1986: 145146).


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mark, or symbol, viz. smoke which we directly perceive, or by relying

on the term fire, which is verbally communicated to us, both theseprocedures are essentially not distinct from each other: a symboltriggers the knowledge of its bearer to which it is attached. Bothreliable statements referring to things invisible to us and phenomena

perceived by us, of which we know are attributes of other objects, servethe same purpose in precisely the same manner: Since there issimilarity in terms of infallibility [as regards] the utterance of anauthoritative person, it has the status of inference21. What weeventually learn via these two procedures is likewise not different fromeach other: the cognitive contents is always a general, verballyexpressible concept, not a particular individual. In this sense we acquire

a vague idea of the inferred or verbally communicated thing, i.e. of itsgeneral features only that would not, however, allow us to identify anparticular individual on its basis, or to distinguish between similarindividuals covered by the same concept.

What Dinga actually does in his analysis is to search for one clearcriterion that help us reduce all sound cognitive phenomena to aminimum number of subtypes of cognitions.

As it is well known, this general conceptual framework was takenover by Dharmakrti who introduced some crucial innovations (PV12.13):

[1] Cognitive criteria are two, depending on two kinds

of data [which, in their turn, are also two] because oftheir potential (in the case of perception) or lack ofpotential (in the case of inference) to execute causallyefficient action. [For instance], a hair-net is not [a reallyexisting] object, because it does not [warrant] thefulfilment of [a causally efficient action that concludeswith the appropriation of] the object.[2] [We recognise that there are only two cognitivecriteria] also because of similarity (in the case ofinference) and lack of similarity (in the case of

perception), and also because of the [capability of thedata to become] the contents (in the case of inference)or not [to become] the contents (in the case of

perception) of speech, and also because [the objects]image is either present or absent when other causalfactors are present.

21 PS 2.5: pta-vdvisavda-smnyd anumnat / As quoted in PVSV4 (p. 108.1)and incorporated into PV4 3.216 / PVSV4 (p. 109.511) = PV3 3.216, PVSV3 (p. 72.2126).


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[3] What is capable of causally efficient action is

[called] here the ultimately existent; what is different iscalled the conventionally real. These two are[respectively] the individually marked (unique

particular) and the generally marked (universalthing).22

In these three verses Dharmakrti takes over Dingas twofoldclassification ofpramas in accordance with two kinds of cognoscibleobjects. In addition, however, the datum for perception fulfils anadditional condition: it is endowed with the capability, or potential, toexecute causally efficient action (artha-kriy-smarthya). In otherwords, what is ultimately existent is also causally efficient and triggers

perception; when it is subsequently manifested in the cognition as animage (pratibhsa), or verbally expressible concept, and no longerstands for what it is really is but for a whole class or bundle of features,it is neither causally efficient nor ultimately real.23

Inference, on the other hand, is inseparable from conceptualisationand mentally abstracted ideas which are based on similarities whichand that is also Dharmakrtis innovation, that goes back toBharthari24do not exist in real individuals but are superimposed on

22 PV 2.13:

mna dvividha viaya-dvaividhyc chakty-aaktita /artha-kriyy kedir nrtho narthdhimokata //

sadsadatvc ca viayviayatvata /

abdasynya-nimittn bhve dh-sad-asattvata //artha-kriy-samartha yat tad atra paramrtha-sat/anyat savti-sat prokta te sva-smnya-lakae //

Cf. also NB 1.1217: [12] tasya viaya sva-lakaam. [13]yasyrthasyasanidhnsanidhnbhy jna-pratibhsa-bhedas tat sva-lakaam. [14] tad evaparamrtha-sat. [15] artha-kriy-smarthya-lakaatvd vastuna. [16] anyatsmnya-lakaam. [17]so numnasya viaya.The datum for this [perception] isthe individually marked (unique particular). An object in the case of which [weexperience] the change in [its] representation in cognition depending on [its] proximity

or distance is what is individually marked. Nothing else but this [unique particular] isthe ultimately existent, because any real thing is characterised by the efficacy toexecute causally efficient action. What is different [from it] is the generally marked(universal thing). It is the datum for inference.23 Cf. PV 2.53d54:

meya tv eka sva-lakaam //

tasmd artha-kriy-siddhe sad-asatt-vicrat/tasya sva-para-rpabhy gater meya-dvaya matam //24 Cf. HERZBERGER(1986: 8183, 102103).


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the phenomenal world. The existence of common features in really

existing things is a product of the mind, and it is the fundament forconcepts and symbols, including linguistic symbols. Similarity, orgeneric features, cannot be observed directly in perception: it is themind that correlated all the perceived data in classes in accordance withthe framework imposed by language, and the correlatum of theframework is conventional reality (savti-satya). Accordingly, thecontents of inference, viz. the objects indicated by words, symbols andideas, are conventions dictated by the language. Ultimately real things,absolutely unique, void of any likeness to other objects and notamenable to verbal means of expression, never enter conceptualthinking or mental images (dh). Dharmakrti avails himself of the

nomenclature coined by Dinga (sva-lakaa andsmnya-lakaa),who took recourse to Vasubandhus statements25, but gives it a newtinge. Further, inPrama-vrttika26 andNyya-bindu27, he augmentsDingas definition of perception with an explicit idea of non-erroneousness: Perception is free from conceptual construction andnon-erroneous, a position tacitly accepted by Dinga 28. In25 AKBh2 4.14cd (p. 349.1113): kya sva-smnya-lakabhy parkate,vedan citta dharm ca. svabhva ev sva-lakaam. smnya-lakaa tv

anityat sasktn dukhat ssrav nyatntmate sarva-dharmm.The body is [now being] examined, as well as sensation, consciousness andelementary constituents of reality, by way of [their] particular and general

characteristic. The particular characteristic is their essential nature alone. The generalcharacteristic, on the other hand, is the impermanence in case of [elementaryconstituents] that are contingent, the condition of suffering in case of [elementaryconstituents] that are [suffused] with the [four] defilements and both emptiness andinsubstantiality in case of all elementary constituents.26 PV 2.123125:

pratyaka kalpanpoha pratyakeva sidhyati /

praty-tma-vedya sarve vikalpo nma-saraya //

sahtya sarvata cint stimitenntartman /

sthito pi caku rpam kate skaj mati //

punar vikalpayan kicid sn me kalpand/

iti vetti na prvktvasthym indriyd gatau //27

NB 1.4: tatra pratyaka kalpan

poham abhrntam.28 Cf. PSV 1.17 = HATTORI (1968: 3637, esp.: Section 3,1Bb). The idea is also implicitin PS1 1.7cd8ab, where various kinds of cognition are dismissed as perception proper:

bhrnti-savti-saj-jnam anumnnumnikam //

smrtbhilika cti pratyakbha sataimiram / (1) The cognition in the form of illusion, (2) [the cognition of] the conventionallyreal, (3) inference, (4) inferential cognition [as a result of inference], (5) recollection,(6) mental condition tainted by desire along with (7) cognition affected byophthalmological disorderthese are [varieties of] fallacious perception (sc. are notperception proper). This idea is further explicated in PSV 1.8ab: tatra bhrnti-jna


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contradistinction to perception, which pertains to ultimately existent

entities that are effectively causal, inference cannot but be erroneous(bhrnta), inasmuch as its actual referents are fictitious.

Another distinction, also introduced by Dinga, that willsubsequently prove crucial in the context of Jaina epistemologicaltheories, is that of inference for oneself (svrthnumna), as an internal

process of association and drawing general conclusions, and inferencefor others (parrthnumna), as a formalised procedure of

persuasion29. These two concepts were taken over not only by thesubsequent Buddhist tradition30 and other Indian philosophical schools,

but also by Jaina thinkers, with certain interesting modifications.

4

In an approach much the same as Dingas, who drew one clear linedividing all valid cognitive procedures into two main compartments,

mga-tikdiu toydi-kalpan-pravttatvt pratyakbhsam, etc. (Among these[varieties of fallacious perception] the cognition in the form of illusion, in cases of amirage etc., is a fallacious perception because it is activated by a conceptuallyconstructed idea of water etc., What is unclear in the verse is, firstly how we construe sataimiram. An alternative

interpretation of the verse, if we took it as a qualifier ofpratyak

bha, would be:(1) The cognition in the form of illusion, (2) [the cognition of] the empirical reality(the conventionally real), (3) inference, (4) inferential cognition [as a result ofinference], (5) recollection or (6) mental condition tainted by desirethese are[varieties of] fallacious perception, which is accompanied by confusion. The latterinterpretation is that which is preferred by HATTORI (1968: 28), whereas we find theformer (adopted by me) in BIJLERT (1989).Another question is which of these cognitions, above enumerated, are genuine cases offallacious perception. HATTORI (1968) concludes that Dinga distinguished three kindsofpratyakbha (nos. 1, 2, 3), which is contended by WAYMAN (1978), according to

whom Dinga distinguished four kids ofpratyakbha (nos. 1, 2, 3, 7); a compromisesolution is offered FRANCO (1986), who relies on direct suggestions of LambertSchmithausen (FRANCO (1986: 85)).29 See PS2 2.1ab (anumna dvividh svrtha tri-rpl ligato rtha-dk/

Inference is twofold. [The first one, inference] for oneself is the discernment of anobject by means of the triple-formed inferential sign.) and PS2 3.1ab(parrthnumna tu sva-drtha-prakanam / Whereas inference for others isthe proclamation (sc. demonstration) [to others] of the object one has experiencedoneself.), and PSV.2, K 109a.23 = V 27a.5 (svrthnumna): tshul gsum pai rtagslas rjes su dpag pai don (V: rjes su dpag par bya bai don) mtho ba ga yin pa de nira gi don gyi rjes su dpag pao . See: RANDLE (1926: 289), HATTORI (1968: 78,n. I.11) and PVin II2, n 1, p. 21.30 Cf. e.g. NB 2.12: /1/ anumna dvividh. /2/svrtha parrtha ca.


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rather than distinguishing a range ofpramas in conformity with a set

of insignificant individual features, the Jainas attempted to redefineearlier models, maximally simplify general typology of cognitions andspecify new criteria for it in a manner that would be commensurablewith general Indian standard. Conspicuously, their previousclassification of cognitive criteria and the understanding of whichcognition is direct or indirect, was strikingly at odds with what mostIndians understood underpratyaka andparoka, and must have led tofrequent undesired misinterpretations and unnecessary controversieswith other schools. Furthermore, engaging in a philosophical discoursenecessitated compliance with generally accepted terminology, ratherthan applying what would appear to others an arbitrary vernacular.

Siddhasena Mahmati was probably not only the first Jainaphilosopher to define whatprama is,31 but also to advance an entirely

31 Or, at least one of the first Jaina philosophers. Indeed, Samantabhadra, in pta-mms 101a, characterises cognitive criterion as the cognition of truth / reality(M 101a: tattva-jna prama), or perhaps better: as the cognition of reals /doctrinal categories, for what is actually meant are such categories as living elements,lifeless elements etc. mentioned e.g. Tattvrtha-stra (TS 1.4:jvjvsrava-bandha-savara-nirjar-moks tattvam). Later Jaina tradition, e.g. Vdirja-sri in his Nyya-vinicaya-vivaraa (NViV 1.3, p. 57.22), contends that Samantabhadras statement is afull-fledged definition of cognitive criterion. Some moderns scholars tend to bedeceived by that seemingly obvious definitional character of the statement.The full verse of M 101 reads as follows:

tattva-jna prama. ta yugapat sarva-bhsanam /krama-bhvi ca taj-jna syd-vda-naya-sasktam //

Cognitive criterion is the cognition of reals (doctrinal categories). It[either] is a simultaneous representation of all [entities (which is thecase with the absolute knowledge (kevala))] or occurs consecutively (ofthis kind are remaining varieties of cognitive criteria). The cognition ofthese [reals] is composed of the method of seven-fold modal descriptionand of [conditionally valid] viewpoints.

[ Here, I follow an emended text (see: BALCEROWICZ (1999: n. 45), for M seemsfaulty:

tattva-jna prama te yugapat sarva-bhsanam /krama-bhvi ca yaj-jna syd-vada-naya-sasktam // ]

However, what Samantabhadra really expresses is actually the contents, significantlyelaborated, of Umsvmins statement in TS 1.6:prama-nayair adhigama.thecomprehension of these [categories representing reality, mentioned in TS.1.4,] is[accomplished] through cognitive criteria and [conditionally valid] viewpoints. In thecontext ofTattvrtha-stra, it is clear that adhigama refers to the categories that havebeen discussed twostras earlier (TS 1.4:jva-ajva-srava-bandha-savara-nirjar-moks tattvam). Thereupon Umsvmin speaks of their descriptive standpoints fromfour various perspectives (TS 1.5: nma-sthpan-dravya-bhvatas tan-nysa), andclearly the expression tan-nysa is to be understood as tattva-nysa. Analogously,adhigama in TS 1.6 means tattvdhigama, which is confirmed by theBhya: e

ca jvdn tattvn yathkddin nmdibhir nyastn prama-nayair


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new classification of cognitive criteria, albeit resting on former

phraseology. In the opening verse of theNyyvatra he asserts:The cognitive criterion is the cognition revealing itself

and something else [different from it, and it is] free fromsubversion; [it is] two-fold: perception as well as indirectcognition, corresponding to [the way of] determination ofthe cognoscible.32

He maintains the traditional principle that perception is a directcognition that grasps an object not-indirectly (aparokatay)33.Subsequent verses imply, however, that he distinguishes two kinds of

perception: conventional, sense-dependent perception and absolute,

sense-independent perception (kevala; NA 27), probably contingent onvistardhigamo bhavati.And also a detailed comprehension of these reals such asliving elements etc., as they have been enunciated [in TS 1.4], which are describedfrom various standpoints such as appellation etc. (TS 1.5), is [accomplished] throughcognitive criteria and [conditionally valid] viewpoints. It is only much later, whenadhigama in TS 1.6 was connected not only with the reals mentioned in TS 1.4, andthereby with ontological issues, but also with the very first statement ofTattvrtha-stra (TS 1.1:samyag-darana-jna-critri moka-mrga.Correct knowledge,[correct] conation and [correct] conduct [constitute] the path to liberation.). It wasdone by Akalaka, much after Samantabhadra, in his commentary Rja-vrttika (RVr1.6:prame ca nay ca prama-nay, tair adhigamo bhavati samyag-

darandnm jvdnm.There are two cognitive criteria and [many] [conditionallyvalid] viewpoints, hence [in thestra]: cognitive criteria and [conditionally valid]viewpoints. Through these is [accomplished] the comprehension of [the threeconstituents of the path to liberation, mentioned in TS 1.1: correct] conation etc., and of[the reals, mentioned in TS 1.4]: living elements etc.Samantabhadras statement tattva-jna is, therefore, the repetition of theUmsvmins idea oftattvdhigama, and the remainder of the verse M 101,especiallysyd-vda-naya-sasktam, paraphrases Umsvminsprama-nayairofTS 1.6. For the above reasons, it is highly implausible to interpret M 101a ( tattva-jna prama) as a genuine definition of cognitive criterion.Another problem related to the issue of either Siddhasena Mahmatis andSamantabhadras priority in the context of the very first Jaina definition ofprama istheir real temporal dependence: there is no doubt that Samantabhadra lived afterDinga, by whom he was influenced, but it is still not clear whether Samantabhadra

was prior or posterior to Dharmakrti, who without any doubt flourished beforeSiddhasena Mahmati (see: BALCEROWICZ (2001b)). Certain passages of M seem tobetray Dharmakrtis stamp, but that requires further research.32 NA 1:

prama sva-parbhsi jna, bdha-vivarjitam /pratyaka ca paroka ca dvidh, meya-vinicayt//

33 NA 4:aparokatayrthasya grhaka jnam dam /pratyakam, itaraj jeya paroka grahakay //


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what we take to be the perceiving organ (aka)34. For Siddhasena the

category of indirect cognition comprises all remaining kinds ofcognitionespecially verbal cognition (bda, NA 8,9) and inference(NA 10), with its two subtypes for oneself and for others (svrtha-

pratyaka andparrtha-pratyaka, NA 11)that can all be groupedtogether as a separate kind of cognition based on verbal symbols, in amanner very much similar to what Dinga did. This new classificationof cognitive criteria can be represented by the following diagram:

direct cognition (pratyaka)

conventional perception

(svyavahrika-pratyaka)

absolute perception

(kevala-pratyaka)

indirect cognition (paroka)

verbal cognition (bda)

inference (anumna)

other

cognitive criteria (prama)

perception for oneself

(svrtha-pratyaka)

perception for others(parrtha-pratyaka)

inference for oneself

(svrthnumna)inference for others

(parrthnumna)

Model 2

34 Compare Siddhari-gains explanations in NAV 1.7:pratyaka cty-di; tatra

siddhnta-prasiddha-pramrthika-pratyakpekayka-abdo jva-paryyatayprasiddha. iha tu vyvahrika-pratyaka-prastvd aka-dhvanir indriya-vacanoghyate. tata cka pratigata pratyaka. yad indriyam rityjjihte rtha-skt-

kri jna tat pratyakam ity artha.As regards the term perception (pratyaka),[it can be etymologically explain as directed towards (prati) the perceiving organ(aka)]. Concerning that, the linguistic unit perceiving organwith regard toultimately real perception, well-known from the Canonis well-known as a synonymof the living element. Here [in this verse], however, the linguistic unit perceivingorgan is usedsince [we] are dealing [here] with conventional perceptionas anutterance [denoting] the senses. And, therefore, that which has gone towards (sc.pertains) the perceiving organ is perception. The meaning is as follows: such acognition perceiving directly an object which commences resorting to the senses isperception.


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What is especially important, Siddhasena Mahmati plainly indicates

that the source of the two-fold of cognitive criteria is actually notasDinga wanted itthe existence of two different aspects of reality theway we can cognise it, but two different modes of apprehending reality,or two different epistemic procedures35. Significantly, the generaldivisionary binary scheme, traditionally accepted, has been preserved

by Siddhasena in NA, albeit nominally for he has invested it with a newcontents that was more consistent with current terminology of the day,andpratyaka began to mean perception the way it was mostlyunderstood.

5 Akalaka adopted the overall model proposed by Siddhasena

Mahmati and presented it at the outset of theLaghyas-traya:

Perception is clearcognition, [divided] into primary andconventional, [whereas] indirect cognition [comprises all]remaining [types of] cognition. Thus, by way of summary,there are two cognitive criteria.36

He expressed the same idea also on other occasions, for instance intheNyya-vinicaya:

Perception is correctly [taken to be] lucid[cognition]; theother [type of cognitive criterion] is testimonial cognition(= indirect cognition) which is free of misapprehension,divided into [such varieties as] recognition etc. By way ofsummary, there are two cognitive criteria,37

35 NA 1cd:pratyaka ca paroka ca dvidh, meya-vinicayt// [Cognitivecriterion is] two-fold: perception as well as indirect cognition, corresponding to [theway of] determination of the cognoscible.It should be noted that Siddhasena speaks of two kinds of [ways of] determination ofthe cognoscible (meya-vinicayt), or two procedures of cognising, and not merely oftwo kinds of the cognoscible (*meyt= corresponding to the cognoscible). That is a

different approach from Dingas who as a justification for the number of cognitivecriteria mentions two cognisable aspects of reality, not two different ways of cognisingthese two aspects, see PSV2 1.2: dve eva yasmd lakaa-dvayaprameyamthereare only two [cognitive criteria], because the cognoscible object has twocharacteristics.36 LT 3:

pratyaka viada jna mukhya-savyavahrata /paroka ea-vijna prame iti sagraha //

37 NVi1 469 = NVi2 3.83 (p. 359):pratyakam ajas spaam anyac chrutam aviplavam /


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but also in thePrama-sagraha:

Perception is clearcognition, [and it is] divided in three,[whereas] testimonial cognition is free ofmisapprehension, [and it is] indirect cognition [whichincludes] recognition etc. Thus, by way of summary, thereare two cognitive criteria.38

Akalaka was seriously concerned, however, with effective criteriathat would enable us to differentiate between direct (pratyaka) andindirect (paroka) cognitions, but at the same their cognitively validnature would be preserved. The proper criterion of differentiation

involved two issues: non-erroneousness of all perceptions as validpramas and mediacy or lack of mediacy as a defining factor.Firstly, he had to face the issue of impeded cognitions, e.g. affected

by ophthalmological disorder (taimira), and the question why these arenot reckoned among valid perceptions. In the commentary on the versePV1 2.288, in which Dharmakrti elaborates on Dingas typology offallacious cases of perception, Prajkaragupta refers to a certainirksome objection in hisPrama-vrttiklakra, quoting Dingasverse:

What is the purpose to mention cognition affected byophthalmological disorder? Some say that also cognition

affected by ophthalmological disorder is conceptual.[Therefore,] in order to exclude such [a view], cognitionaffected by ophthalmological disorder is mentioned. If[cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder] is non-conceptual [cognition], then it would be perception[proper]. [But] not all [cognition that is] free fromconceptual construction is perception [proper]; on thecontrary, [it is perception] when it is [also] non-erroneous.[Only such a cognition which is both] non-erroneous andfree from conceptual construction is perception, not anykind [of cognition].39

prakra pratyabhijdau prame iti sagraha //

38 PSa 1.2 (p. 97.34):pratyaka viada-jna tridh rutam aviplavam /paroka pratyabhijdi prame iti sagraha //

39 PVA, p. 334.2327:sataimirika-grahaa kim-artham. taimiram api savikalpakamiti kacit. tad-vyvartanrtha tad-vacanam. yady [taimiram] avikalpaka


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To place the above objection and Prajkaraguptas reply, we should

first recall that Dharmakrti in PV1 2.28840 distinguished four kinds offallacious perception (either following or improving on Dingasvarieties, see n. 28) and grouped them according to their character. Firstthree kinds of fallacious perception are conceptual (since theycontaminate the perceived data with memory images or imposeconceptualised relations on it), and therefore cannot be classified asgenuine perception, which is by nature non-conceptual. However, onevariety, namely cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder(taimira), turns out to non-conceptual: it is fallacious because it iserroneous, inasmuch as it originates through the impediment in[sensory] substratum (sense-organ). To say, however, that cognition

affected by ophthalmological disorder (taimira) is, nevertheless,perception proper would seem to be in agreement with Dingasdefinition of perception, which only mentions its non-conceptual natureas the proper criterion. In other words, the definition ofPrama-

samuccaya would allow the following concomitance: every cognitionfree from conceptual construction is perception proper. That wouldyield the valid conclusion: cognition affected by ophthalmologicaldisorder (taimira) is also free from conceptual construction, hence it is

perception proper.That seemed improper not only do Dharmakrti, who improved on the

definition by explicitly adding the qualifier non-erroneous (abhrnta,NB 1.4), but also to Jaina thinkers, including Akalaka. The firstdefiniens non-conceptual (both in Dinga and Dharmakrti) wasinadmissible to the Jainas, for it would exclude a number of perceptual

processes (vide infra). Also the second definiens non-erroneous inDharmakrtis definition appeared to the Jainas completely inconsistentwith the notion of validity which the definition ofallcognitive criteria

presupposes. The way Dharmakrti defined it, non-erroneousness(abhrntatva) was limited topratyaka only, and did not extend toanumna. The first to criticise Dharmakrtis seeming amelioration wasSiddhasena Mahmati who contended: This [inference] is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception.41 Forthe Jainas, non-erroneousness could safely be adapted to qualify

pratyaka, however, it could not be taken as its definiens which shouldkalpanpohatvt pratyaka prptam. na sarva kalpanpoha pratyakam, api tv

abhrntatve sati. abhrnta kalpanpoha pratyaka na sarvam.40 PV1 2.288:

trividha kalpan-jnam raypaplavdbhavam /

avikalpam eka ca pratyakbha caturvidham //41 NA 5cd: tad(= anumna) abhrnta pramatvt samakavat.


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distinguish it from indirect cognitions, for non-erroneousness was a

defining mark of allpramas. Thus, abhrnta could not be employedin the definition of perception.42

That is why Akalaka searched for another criterionapart from theidea of direct/indirect modes of cognising, proposed by SiddhasenaMahmatithat would consistently distinguish direct cognition(pratyaka) from indirect cognition (paroka). As a matter of fact,Akalakas intention was to replace Siddhasenas criterion of [the wayof] determination of the cognoscible (meya-vinicaya), which both

42 Interestingly enough, there seems to be some influence of Dharmakrtis claim thatinference is erroneous on the way Akalaka understood the relationship betweenabsolute non-erroneousness and cognitive validity (prmya). Akalaka occasionallyadmits that no valid cognition is absolutely correct, and even false cognition possesslimited validity. See for instance A3 (ad M 101, p. 88.48), especially the commenton inference in the final sentence: buddher anekntt yena krea tattva-paricchedatad-apekay prmyam. tena pratyaka-tad-bhsayor api pryaa sakra-prmytara-sthiti unnetavy, prasiddhnupahatndriya-der api candrrkdiu

dea-pratysatty-dy-abhtkrvabhsant, tath upahatkder api sakhydi-

visavde pi candrdi-svabhva-tattvpalambht. tat-prakarpekay vyapadea-

vyavasth gandha-dravydivat. tath anumnder api kathacit mithy-pratibhse pi

tattva-pratipattyva prmyam.Since cognitive awareness is multiplex, cognitivevalidity concerns [only] that [aspect of cognition] by means of which determination offactuality (or: categories) [is accomplished]. Accordingly, it should be admitted as

established that, as a rule, cognitive validity and its opposite of both perception and itsfallacy respectively, are commingled, [i.e. in valid acts of cognition there is an elementof illusion, and in fallacious acts of cognition there is some valid component]. [It is so],(1) because even the act of seeingwith a sense organ of which [we] well know it isnot disabledof the moon, the sun etc. manifests [their] unreal forms such as [their]proximity in space etc., [and also] (2) because, similarly, also in case the eye which isdisabled [and we see a double moon etc.], even though there is fallibility (unreliability)as regards the number [of the moons] etc., there is [correct] apprehension of thefactuality of the essential nature of the moon etc. The distinction in designating [themas cognitive criterion and its fallacy] depends on the degree, like [in the case of]fragrant substance [which is both a substance and a fragrant quality]. Similarly, alsoinference etc.even though in a particular respect [it generates] false representation[of the cognoscible object]has cognitive validity, inasmuch as it does indeed [lead tothe correct] comprehension of factuality. This idea was expressed by Akalaka on

other occasions as well, e.g. LTV 22 and SVi 1.15 (and SViV ad loc., p. 73):tma-savedana bhrnter abhrnta bhti bhedivat/pratyaka taimira cndra ki nneknta-vidvim //

npi tat sarvath abhrntam eva svayam advayasypi dvaya-nirbhsa-pratte His reasons for the claim, in short, were dictated by his strictly realist stand: no piece ofour cognition is absolutely false, because all the contents of our cognition is arepresentation of the external world, and thus it must correspond to something real.Ultimate components of cognition (presentations of individual events) are true, only therelations between them that are imposed by conceptual activity of the mind can befalse.


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tended to be a bit vague and yielded some more difficulties that

surfaced the moment Siddhasena Mahmati restructured the overallmodel of valid cognitive procedures.

The second problematic issue turned out to be mediacy or lack ofmediacy as the feature that could help distinguish between direct andindirect cognitions, respectively. To maintain, in harmony with olderJaina tradition, thatpratyaka andparoka are differentiated on the

basis of their either immediate or mediated mode of acquisition, whileadopting Siddhasenas new scheme, would ultimately lead to theconclusion that such divergent cognitive acts as sensation or inferenceare merely two different aspects or varieties of one and the same kind

of cognition, insofar as both of them are mediated: either by senseorgans in the case of sensation, or by the mind, logical reasons,concepts or words in the case of inference. In practical enterprise, in allempirical spheres of life, every individual has to rely on some agencythat mediates cognitive processes, be it perception or inference: onsense organs, the mind, verbal expressions, symbols etc. Preserving thecriterion of mediacy, the borders between direct and indirect cognitionswould be blurred and the whole edifice would collapse.

The outcome of fitting the new contents, especially the newunderstanding of what perception is (in consonance with current Indianviews), into the old Jaina model was that the only ultimately directcognitions would be: absolute knowledge (kevala), tantamount to

omniscience (sarva-jna), or two less perfect forms of suchsupernatural cognitive powers: clairvoyance (avadhi-jna) and mind-reading (mana-paryya-jna). All of these three played an importantrole in soteriology, serving as vital elements in a range of proofs for theexistence of soul (jva) and final liberation (moka)43, beingcontemplated as paramount ideal, rending legitimacy to the authority ofthe scriptures and being believed in. Yet, these were inaccessible to anycontemporaneous mortal, with the exception of ancient personagesoccurring in myths and hagiographies. Consequently, one would haveto acknowledge that an average person has at his or her disposal nodirect means of knowing. That would, with certainly, provoke justified

and hardly refutable criticism from all other philosophical schools inIndia, namely, that the Jainas have to entirely rely on unsubstantiatedfaith in their doctrines, without any prospect to verify them, at least insome part, empirically. Moreover, the immediate conclusion would be

43 A number of them are formulated e.g. by Kundakunda in the Pravacana-sra andSamaya-sra, a most of them summarised by Hemacandra-sri in the Prama-mms.


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that all knowledge of the world a person may have is obtained in an

indirect, mediated manner, hence must be by nature liable to doubt andcensure. To admit that all judgements we have are derived fromsecond-hand knowledge would, at best, not only lead to scepticism andundermine the rational and realistic outlook Jaina thinkers intended tocultivate, but also subvert doctrinal framework of Jainism. Notestimonial statement of Jaina Canonical scriptures and oral traditioncould be amenable to any kind of direct verification, not even simpledescriptions of worldly matters contained in scriptures that were usedthrough the reasoning based on analogy and empirical exemplification(dnta)as a basis for supplementary corroboration of extra-mundane and metaphysical tenets (following the principle: if the

Canon accurately describes mundane affairs, its description of spiritualmatters must also be accurate). If any judgement, including all theassertions of thegamas, were beyond any first-hand validation, andcould only be proved indirectly, which would necessitate further,indirect as it were, proof, infinite regress (anavasth) would result.Accordingly, one would have to concede that doctrinal andepistemological principles of Jainism are faulty, inasmuch as they leadto logical inconsistencies and defects such as infinite regress andceaseless search for new warrants to sanction previous conclusions.

In the worst case, retaining a single criterion of mediacy thatdistinguishes between direct and indirect cognitions and concludingthat in all empirical dealings we rely solely on indirect cognitionswould result in rejecting the reality of the world we perceive, and inassuming its ultimately illusory character.

Besides, it is a tautology to say that a direct cognition grasps anobject not-indirectly (aparokatay), and therefore is bereft of anysubstantial contents.

All these considerations may have borne on Akalakas followingreflection expressed in theNyya-vinicaya:

Two first two [kinds of cognition, viz. sensuous cognition(mati) and testimonial cognition (ruta),] were rightlytermed [by Umsvmin in TS 1.11] indirect cognition,whereas the remaining [kinds, viz. clairvoyance (avadhi),mind-reading (mana-paryya) and absolute knowledge,were termed] direct cognition. However, it is only in orderto be in agreement with peoples opinion, that sensuouscognition is incorporated into the definition of[perception].44

44 NVi1 474cd475ab = NVi2 3.88 (p. 363):


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Clearly, these were also pragmatic considerations that made Akalaka

comply with general usage of the term perception, even though hehimself occasionally endorsed the idea that the ultimate perceivingorgan is the soul (tman): [Ultimate] perception, [which is acquired]independently of sense organs and the mind [and which is] free ofdeviation, is the seeing of definite contents. [In its case, there takes

place] the elimination of dependence on other [factors] in the sense:[perception] is confined to the perceiving organ (sc. the soul).45 Andit is the soul without which no cognition could be possible: If therewere no soul, production etc. of [any] cognition would be impossible,

because there would be no agent.46

There was no controversy that there is an essential difference between

perceptual, first- experience or immediate grasp of sensual data that arecurrently present, on the one hand, and indirect processes of inferenceor employment of verbal symbols, on the other, which are operativeindependently of whether the things we infer or speak about are presentor not. All philosophical systems tried to accentuate and explain thisdifference this way or another, by using such terms as perception,direct cognition, sensuous cognition, or inference, indirectcognition, analogy, presumption etc. in a sense that differed fromtraditional Jaina usage.

What made this essential difference for Dinga and Dharmakrti wasthe idea of conceptualisation, which characterised all non-perceptualkinds of cognition, and which connoted two main aspects: (1) the use ofa system of verbally expressible symbols (either a natural language or alogical system or relations) and (2) the application of such symbolsonly to general properties (universals), not to unique qualities(individuals).

A detailed analysis of complex cognitive processes which Akalakaintroduced in the contentious verse LT 10cd11ab will reveal that forhim such a contention was not only a simplification, but also aninaccurate exposition. In order to improve on Dingas andDharmakrtis definitions as well as on Siddhasena Mahmatis model,Akalaka introduces a new notion of clarity (vaiadya), or lucidity

dye parokam apara pratyaka prhur jasam /kevala loka-buddhyva mater lakaa-sagraha //

Akalakas approach became widespread in Jainism, compare for instance identicalarguments of Abhayadeva in his commentary (TBV) on STP 2.1, p. 595.2425, wherehe states that mati-jna is ultimatelyparoka (as it was described in TS), butaccording to practical convention it is pratyaka.45 RVr 1.12 (p. 53.4,11): indriynidriynapekam atta-vyabhicra skra-

grahaa pratyaka. aka prati niyatam iti parpeknivtti.46 RVr 1.12 (p. 45.8): tmbhve jnasya karaditvnupapatti kartur abhvt.


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(spaatva), for instance in the verses of NVi2 3.83 and PSa 1.2 quoted

above (p. 20, nn. 37, 38).For Akalaka, clarity consists in the way reality is presented in

cognition:

In contrast to inference etc., the clarity of [thisperception], in the case of discernment (becoming awareof the object), is recognised to be the representing of the

particular. What is different from this is non-clarity [in thecase of discernment].47

As a matter of fact, in the above manner Akalaka modifies anddisambiguates Siddhasena Mahmatis obscure and tautological

definiens: [the way of] determination of the cognoscible (meya-vinicaya) of NA 1 (p. 18, n. 32). Each act of perceptioneither(1) conventional and sensory, (2) internal and mental, or (3) absoluteand extra-sensorygrasps the particular thing, or individual aspect, andthis unmediated access to the individual is clarity, or lucidity. In otherwords, perception leads the cogniser to clearly discernible and uniquelyidentifiable entities that are amenable, at least in theory, to thecognisers actions. Inference, verbal cognition etc., on the other hand,do not bring the cognitive agent to clearly distinguishable individualfeatures of a thing. What is represented in such inferential or verbalcognitive acts are ideas or concepts that emerge as the contents ofindirect cognition. Ideas themselves, classes that correspond to the

ideas or words expressing the ideas cannot be acted upon individually.For this very reason such a cognition based on ideas and words isbereft of clarity (aviada, aspaa), inasmuch as it delivers merely avague and imprecise notion of what actual individuals, amenable in

practical actions, are denoted by words or are implies by inferences.Such an unclear (aviada) cognition merely extends over the wholerange of individuals and refers to each of them in precisely the samemanner, by pointing to their general common feature, and making themall indistinguishable from each other in our cognition. Thus, indirectcognition reveals no particular thing that is the designatum of a term oran actual source of the idea presented in the cognition. On the contrary,

on its basis it is not at all possible to make any practically relevantdistinction among singular items aggregated into a conceptual bundle.And this precisely what is involved in the notion of lack of clarity(avaiadya) or absence of lucidity (aspaatva).

47 LT 4:

anumndy-atirekea viea-pratibhsanam /tad-vaiadya mata buddher avaiadyam ata param //


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As a justification for the need to introduce another criterion for

genuine perception, other than its conceptual character, Akalaka citesthe case of fallacious perception which may be by nature non-conceptual, and thus fulfils Dingas criterion, but it remainnonetheless erroneous, inasmuch as it is unclear:

Therefore, fallacious perception, which is non-conceptual(indeterminate), is necessarily unclear.48

This is Akalakas answer to the problem referred to above byPrajkaragupta: how is it possible that an erroneous act of sensation,even though it is non-conceptual, is not genuine perception?

As one might expect, the concept of clarity (vaiadya) as the defining

feature of perception subsequently underwent changes andreinterpretations, and was also taken up by the vetmbaras. Of specialnote is the definition offered by Hemacandra-sri in thePrama-mms: Clarity is either independence of other cognitive criteria orthe distinct representation of the form: this.49 The first feature,independence of other cognitive criteria, invokes the idea that the

perceptual cognition is undeniable and obvious in its self-explanatorycharacter, i.e. it requires no additional justification for the accuracy ofits contents to be accepted. The second feature, viz. the distinctrepresentation of the form: this, which is mentioned as an alternativedefiniens, is a direct extension of Akalakas idea that clarity of

perception consists in the representing of the particular (viea-

pratibhsanam, LT 4).Vdideva-sri (11th/12th c.) is another example of a vetmbara

thinker who borrowed Akalakas definition verbatim: Lucidity is themanifesting of particular [features] in a greater degree that inferenceetc.50

6

A closer examination would now be required to see what is actuallyclear in a clear cognition? Is clarity simply the way an object is

cognised, viz. certainty implied by clear cognition, or is clarity a featureof the object that is presented in the cognition? Unfortunately, on mostoccasions Akalaka is not very clear on this point. When he says in his

48 LTV 23: tasmd aviadam eva avikalpaka pratyakbham.49 PM 1.14:pramntarnapekdantay pratibhso v vaiadyam.50 PNTA 2.3: anumndy-dhikyena viea-prakana spaatvam. = LT 4:

anumndy-atirekea viea-pratibhsanam / tad-vaiadya.


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auto-commentary to theLaghyas-traya (LTV 3):jnasyva viada-

nirbhsina pratyakatvam, itarasya parokat, the statement canequally imply both possibilities: Only such a cognition which reveals[its object] clearly (or: as clear) is perception; the other one is indirectcognition. The same ambiguity holds true in following passage ofPSaV 1.2 (p. 97.56):pratyaka viada-jna tattva-jnaviadam, indriya-pratyaka anindriya-pratyakam atndriya-

pratyaka tridh.Perception is a clear cognition (or: cognition ofsomething clear), [for] the cognition of reals (doctrinal categories) [as acognitive criterion51] is clear. It is divided in three: sensory perception,non-sensory (mental) perception and extra-sensory perception. Otherformulation wherespaa as a synonym ofviada occurs are likewise

inconclusive: LTV1 61 (p. 21.67): indriy

rtha-jna spaahithita-prpti-parihra-samartha prdeika pratyakam.Perception which is a cognition of an object [amenable] to sense organis lucid, capable of [triggering an action of] either appropriation of whatis wholesome or avoidance of what is unwholesome, [and it is] spatiallylimited; NVi1 157 (p. 50.2223) = NVi2 160 (vol. 1, p. 524.2122):aka-jnnujam spaa tad-anantara-gocaram /pratyakamnasa chaMental perception is brought about as aconsequence of a cognition [derived] from sense organs, it is lucid, itsdomain (contents) immediately [follows] this [cognition derived fromsense organ].

However, in a longer section of theNyya-vinicaya in which hediscusses the possibility of omniscience as the culmination of a seriesof supernatural perceptions, Akalaka mentions the following idea:

A lucid discernment with respect to a distant52 [objectthat] correctly [takes place] does not stand in

51 I take it as a reference to Samantabhadras characterisation of the nature ofpramain M 101a: tattva-jna prama (see n. 31). In this way, Akalaka expresses theidea that perception (pratyaka) is such a cognitive criterion (tattva-jna stands forprama) that is clear (viada).52 A distant object may connote not only distance in space, but also in time or nature(in the sense of: not perceptible with ordinary sense organs). See for instance: NS,

p. 170:yogi-pratyakam tu dea-kla-svabhva-viprakrtha-grhakam(Supernatural perception is the grasping of object distant in place, time and ownnature), and NBh, p. 170: dea-vipraksatya-lokdayo tidrasth vyavahit ca

nga-bhuvandaya, kla-vipraks tv attngat, svabhva-viprak

paramv-kdaya iti (Distant in place [means] places far away like existent worldsetc., concealed (from sight) [means] hellish abodes etc., distant in time [means] pastetc., distant in terms of ones own nature [means] atoms, ether etc.). These three kindsof distance correspond to abarasvmins four separate kinds of objects, viz. (1) pastand future (bhta, bhaviyant), (2) sublte (skma), (3) concealed from sight


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contradiction, because it depends on the loosening of

karmic veils obstructing cognition in a dream, or[cognition] of a fortune-teller etc.53

In the verse we can easily distinguish two separate elements: clarity(spaa), which belongs to cognition (vijna), and an object ofcognition which is spoken of as being distant (vipraka), not as

being clear. That would imply that clarity or lucidity primarilyqualifies the cognition as such, i.e. the cognitive procedures. We comeacross a similar indication inPrama-sagraha:

Cognition [derived] from sense organs is multiplex,inasmuch as another form (sc. one-sided form) is not

established, [and it is] lucid, because the object isproximate.54

Also here lucidity qualifies cognition separately from its object, ofwhich Akalaka merely says that it is proximate and its proximitywarrants clear and lucid perception. Therefore, on the basis of two latterquotations, it seems that Akalaka considered clarity (vaiadya) to

belong to the way of cognising (to qualify the cognitive process), notnecessarily to the object presented in the cognition. Vdideva-sri in

Prama-naya-tattvloklakra seems to support the interpretationthat clarity of perception refers to clear mode or presenting the object,

(vyavahita) and (4) distant (vipraka), with kind 3 and 4 subsumed under one headingofdea-vipraka, see Bh 1.2.2 (p. 4.79): codan hi bhta bhavantabhaviyanta skma vyavahita viprakam ity eva-jtyakam artha aknotyavagamayitum, nnyat kicanndriyam (The injunction enables [people] to knowanything of the following sort: past, present, future, subtle, concealed (from sight) anddistant). Frequently, however, the term vipraka does not indicate the temporal span,but is restricted to distance in time, as for instance in: VSV adVS 1.16 (viyukta-pratyaka):skma-vyavahita-viprakeu artheu te catuaya-sannikard apipratyakam jyate; PBh 22.12.2.a: [242] viyuktnm puna catuaya-sannikardyogaja-dharmnugraha-smarthyt skma-vyavahita-viprakeu pratyakamutpadyate; NMa 2 (I, p. 157.7): daranasya ca paro tiaya skma-vyavahita-vipraka-bhta-bhaviyad-di-viayatvam; YS 3.25:pravtty-loka-nyst skma-vyavahita-vipraka-jnam. It seems, however, that Akalaka uses the term also inthe sense of distant in time, since as the example he names a female fortune-teller(kaik), glossed by Vdirja-sri (NViV) asgrma-ki, i.e. someone whoforetells the fate. Vdirja-sri further implies that such cognitions when ones mind isabsorbed in meditative trance (samhita-citta) are also meant.53 NVi1 407 (P. 84.1314) = NVi2 21 (vol. 2, p. 291.12):

vijnam ajas spaa viprake viruddhyate /na svapnkaikder v jnvtti-vivekata //

54 PSa 4ac (p. 97.1617):aka-jnam anekntam asiddher aparkte /

spaa sannikitrthatvt


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rather than the clear object itself, for he says: Lucidity [of

perception] means the presentation of the particular [in consciousness]in greater degree than in the case of inference etc.55

On the other hand, it is the object as it enters the cognitive act thatdetermines whether it is immediate and direct or whether it is mediated,

based on conceptualisation and symbols. It would, however, bemistaken to suppose that the dependency between the object andcognition parallels Dingas model, viz. that perception graspsuniquely individual feature whereas inference and other forms ofindirect cognition comprehend a common property.

Prabhcandra appears to support another view, namely that claritybelongs both to the object as it is presented in cognition and to the

cognition itself, for he says in his commentary to LT 3: It is [such acognition] which reveals [its object] clearly, i.e. it is lucidrepresentation of the intrinsic nature of itself and the other (sc. externalobject), in so far as it is not oriented towards anything else [thanitself]it is perception, i.e. it is perceptional cognitive criterion. Theother one, i.e. that which reveals [its object] not-clearly (or: whichreveals an unclear object), is indirect cognition, i.e. indirect cognitivecriterion.56 Interestingly, Prabhcandras interpretation finds support inanother statement of Akalaka:

Furthermore, there is no absolute difference in the datumof these two [kinds of] conceptual (determinate)

cognitions: clear (perceptual) and its opposite (inferential),because acts of perception of proximate objects andopposite (sc. distant) objects can easily be demonstrated tohave as their datum one and the same object.57

The external object for direct and indirect cognitions remains thesame entity. However, its representation, or its cognitive image, inrespective cognitions is different. Therefore, it might seem that theapparent ambiguity in a range of above-quoted passaged (LTV 3,PSaV 1.2, LTV 61, NVi1 157 = NVi2 160) was deliberate and alsoAkalaka may have understood clarity both ways: as belonging to the

process and to the presented object.

55 PNTA 2.3: anumndy-dhikyena viea-prakana spaatvam.56 NKC, p. 67.1214: viada-nirbhsinapara-mukhprekitay sva-para-svarpayospaa-pratibhsasyapratyakatvam pratyaka-pramat. itarasya aviada-nirbhsinaparokatparoka-pramat. Bolded typeface reproduces the pratkas ofLT.57 LTV 23: na ca viadtara-vikalpayo viaya-bhedknta pratysanntarrtha-

pratyakm ekrtha-viayattpatte.


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The supposition that Akalaka understood clarity or lucidity of

perception in a two-fold manner, as belonging both to the cognitiveprocess and to the cognitive contents (the object), may find, at firstglance, some more reinforcement in a passage of theNyya-vinicaya1.3:

It has been correctly stated that the defining characteristicof perception is [that it is] clear and [that it has] definitecontents, [and that it is] the percipience of the essence ofan object [consisting altogether in] substance, modes, theuniversal character and the particular character.58

Accordingly, the object of perception is constituted by an aggregate

of a number of features, such as substantial (persistent in time), modal(momentarily changing), general and individual aspects, that all belongto one and the same substratum, and the contents of perceptionthat isthe representation of the extrinsic object (extrinsic in the sense that it isindependent of the given cognitive act, be it an external physical thingor an internal cognition that is being reflected upon)is definite andnot indistinct (lit. with the form). In the above passage the clarity ofthe representation of the object in cognition may at first appear to beimplied by the qualifierskra, which could hardly apply to the clarityof the cognitive process. What would, however, be problematic withsuch an interpretation is that the property of having definite contents(skratva) is introduced by Akalaka as one of two defining features

of perception, next to lucidity (spaatva). If the idea of definitecontents of cognition, viz. the clarity that belongs to the object incognition, were already implied by the termspaa, it would beredundant to mention it separately in the verse.

Furthermore, on another occasion Akalaka suggests that it ispossible to conceive of perception (direct cognition) of an object whichitself is unclear, or not clearly manifest:

When it comes to the union of the perceiving organ andthe object, [first] the seeing of [mere] existence [takes

place, and then] a comprehension of the notion (conceptualimpression) in the form of the object[these constitute]

sensation59

58 NVi 1.3 (p. 57):

pratyaka-lakaa prhu spaa skram ajas /dravya-paryya-smnya-vierthtma-vedanam //

59 LT 5ac: akrtha-yoge sattloko rthkra-vikalpa-dh / avagraho


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The passage describes the first phase of perception, viz. sensation

(avagraha). Following earlier Jaina tradition which distinguished twokinds of sensation: sensation of momentary manifestation(vyajanvagraha), which is non-conceptual, and sensation of theobject (arthvagraha), which is conceptual,60 Akalaka speaks of thefirst moment of sensation in which one merely becomes aware of thefact that something is there (sattloka), and thereupon there emerges aconceptual image the contents of which consists in a definite form of anobject (arthkra-vikalpa-dh). Both these stages of sensation are anintegral part of perception, hence both must be clear (viada), or lucid(spaa). It would be difficult to conceive of an object of the firstsensation of the vyajanvagraha kind which is both clear and non-

manifest, of which one only knows that it is present, insofar as it hasstimulated a sense organ. This would imply that clarity of perceptionqualifies rather the process, not the contents or the object that enterscognition.

In another work Akalaka refers to an idea of an illusory image of afirebrand circle which, despite being false, inasmuch it consists of aseries of momentary perceptions, is nevertheless perceived as a clearobject:

60 See TS 1.1718: arthasya. vyajanasyvagraha. The sensation of the object

(arthvagraha) is possible with all sense organs, whereas the sensation of momentarymanifestation (vyajanvagraha) concerns all sensory data with the exclusion of

vision, see RVr 1.18: vyajanam avyaktam abddi-jta tasyvagraho bhavati.Momentary manifestation [means] not manifest [data] generated by sound etc.; thesensation of such [momentary manifestation] occurs. Akalaka subscribes to thisdivision ofvyajanvagraha and arthvagraha, inasmuch as respective parts of

Pjyapda Devanandins Sarvrtha-siddhi that clearly state this idea are incorporated

into Akalakas Tattvrtha-vrttika: SSi 1.17 (p. 115.4): cakur-di-viayo rtha

(= p. 65.28) and SSi 1.18: vyajanam avyaktam abddi-jta tasyvagraho bhavati(= RVr, p. 66.2728).The nature of this stage is also described by Akalaka in his Aa-at, a commentary onSamantabhadraspta-mms 101, i.e. A3 101 (A3, p. 88.2223 = A3, p. 12)):

dhvaner akhaaa ravad adhigamo pi prthama-kalpika tattva-nirtir eva.Even the very fist comprehension [which takes place] a on hearing a sound as a whole(sc. as such) is nothing but a [cognitively valid] ascertainment of the factuality [of thesound]. The fact that he speaks of acoustic sensation, instead of ocular perception(which is the most usual reference when he speaks of perception), is significant, for it isacoustic perception in the case of which we can have sensation of momentarymanifestation (vyajanvagraha), not possible in the case of ocular sensation.a There can be no doubt tha

pramanas and the language

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