precedent and politics: dutch-american relations at the

PrecedentandPolitics:Dutch-AmericanRelationsattheInternationalMilitaryTribunal

fortheFarEast

[email protected]

Studentnumber:11598875Master’sThesis:UniversiteitvanAmsterdam

History:HolocaustandGenocideStudiesSupervisor:Prof.dr.JohannesHouwinkTenCate

SecondReader:Dr.ThijsBouwknegt November2018

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TableofContents...................................................................................1

Abstract.....................................................................................................................................................................2

Introduction............................................................................................................................................................3

Chapter2:Historiography.............................................................................................................................11

Chapter3:PrecedentsforModernInternationalLaw,JapaneseWarCrimesinthe

NetherlandsEastIndies……………………………………………………………………………………………..29

Chapter4:DenialofResponsibilityandtheDeathPenalty:Atrocitiesin

Nanking……………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………44

Chapter5:CrimesinManchuria.………………………………………………………………………………….55

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………...……66

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...74

2

Abstract:

ThisthesisexaminedadifferenttypeofdiplomacyattheInternational

MilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast(IMTFE):thatamonglegalprofessionalspresentat

theIMTFE,ratherthanamongheadsofstateandcareerdiplomats.Thisthesis

addressedthefollowing:WhatwasthestatusofDutch-Americanrelationsatthe

InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast(IMTFE)?Andhowdidthese

relationsaffectthetrialsandtheiroutcomes?Thisworkinvestigatedthisthrough

casestudiesoftrialsconductedinthreeIMTFElocations:Nanking,Manchuria,and

Batavia(modern-dayJakarta).Dutch-Americanrelationsoftenoccurredintheform

ofcooperation,primarilyinformationsharing.Theirdirectimpactsonthe

proceedingswerelimitedinquantity;howevertheywerenoteworthy,suchas

JusticeB.V.A.Röling’sdissentingopinionintheHIROTAcase.Additionally,there

wereindirect,yetsignificantlong-termeffectsoninternationallaw.Thisincluded

theeventualcreationoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,adaptationstoDutchlaw

thatincreasedprosecutionsattrialsinBatavia,andtheprecedentsetbythe

WASHIOcase.

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Introduction:

InaSeptember1947transcriptfromtheTokyoTrials,page22discussedthe

transferofevidencefromtheDutchrepresentativestotheAmericans.Thisissue

wassocontroversialthatitrequireddiscussion,includingtheDutchjustice,Bernard

VictorAloysius(B.V.A.)RölingandDutchassociateprosecutorMaj.W.G.Frederick

Borgerhoff-Mulder.1TheAmericansperceivedthattheDutchwerewithholding

“writteninterrogatories”2fromtheAmericans,wheninfacttherewasadifference

inlegalprocedurecausingadelay.Thisresultedinamisunderstandingbetweenthe

twogroups;however,itwasquicklyexplainedandresolved,whenthepresidentof

theTribunal,AustralianJusticeWebbstatedhe“willinsistupontheDutchmethods

beingadoptedoneveryoccasionsofarasthetakingofevidenceintheNetherlands

EastIndiesisconcerned.”3

ThisquoteimpactedthetrialsintheNetherlandsEastIndies(NEI),aswellas

thosetakingplaceinTokyo.Thisincidentclearlydisplayedhowcloselythenational

representativesattheITMFEworkedtogether,aswellashowtheirrelationshipand

broaderdiplomacymayhavehadanimpactontheproceedingsandtheiroutcomes.

Thiswasasmallmisunderstandingthatshowedoneofthemanydifficultiesofthe

TokyoIMT—Nuremberg’sPacificTheatercounterpart—accountingforsignificant

cultural,language,andlegaldifferencesamongthenationspresent.Thisoccurrence

1“Maj-Gen.W.G.FrederickBorgerhoff-Mulder,”People,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,2“CourtProceeding,”20,Box5,Folder5,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/5/5/court-proceeding.3Ibid.22.

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raisedconcernoverinterculturalcommunicationanddiplomacyandhowtheymay

haveaffectedtheIMTFEproceedingsandoutcomes.

TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast(IMTFE)4wasamassive

operation.ItwascenteredatTokyo,withthetrialsof27defendants,5tobereferred

tointhisthesisastheTokyoInternationalMilitaryTribunal(IMT).TheTokyoIMT

wasthePacifictheatercounterparttoNuremberg,albeitwithafewdifferences.In

Nuremberg,therewerefour,broadcounts;whileinTokyo,therewere55.In

Nuremberg,theproceedingsweresignificantlyshorterandmorecentralized,as

opposedtotheIMTFE,whichbroadlyincludedtrialsinTokyo,andindividualtrials

atmanylocationsthroughoutAsia.

Thisthesisasks:WhatwasthestateofDutch-Americanrelationsatthe

IMTFEandwhateffect(s)didthesehaveontheproceedingsandoutcome?This

paperwillseektoanswerthisquestionthroughanumberofcasestudies.The

chapterswillcorrespondtothelocationinwhichthedefendants’crimeswere

committed.Thereissomeoverlap,howeveritwillfocusonthedefendants’crimes

inthelocationsmentionedinthechapter.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatfor

Japaneseactors,last(family)nameswillbewrittenfirst,inallcapitalizedletters,so

asnottobeconfusedwithotherswrittenintheWesternstyle,withpersonalname,

thenfamilyname.

4TheIMTFEisalsocommonlyreferredtoastheTokyoTrials,nottobeconfusedwiththeTokyoInternationalMilitaryTribunal(IMT),whichservedasafocalpointforthebroaderIMTFE(orTokyoTrials).5“People,”InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,UniversityofVirginiaLawSchool,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/people.

5

Thethesiscontainsthreechaptersnamedforlocationsofcrimes:Manchuria,

Nanking,andtheNetherlandsEastIndies.Eachchapterdiscusses3-5casestudies

namedforthedefendant,andtheDutch-Americanrelationsthatoccurredwithin

theirrespectivecontextsasawayofexaminingDutch-Americanrelationsatthe

IMTFE,whilestillfocusingonimportantdetailsofeachcasestudy.Thesourcebase

isratherbroad,utilizingmultiplecollectionsfromtheInternationalMilitary

TribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollectionfromtheUniversityofVirginiaSchoolof

Law,the402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersfromthe

InternationalProsecutionSection,NetherlandsDivision,andjudgeB.V.A.Röling

collectionfromtheNetherlandsInstituteforWar,Holocaust,andGenocideStudies

(NIOD),andtheICCLegalToolsDatabase.Forthechapterdiscussingcrimes

committedintheNEI,FredL.Borch’s2017monograph,MilitaryTrialsofWar

CriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949,provideddetailed,English-

languagecaseinformationfromtheproceedingsintheNEI.

Therewereanumberofsignificanthistoricaleventsanddocumentsthatled

totheideaandimplementationoftheIMTFE,whichwillbebrieflydiscussedhere.

ThePotsdamdeclarationwascreatedatthePotsdamconference,whereSoviet

leaderJosephStalin,BritishPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchill,andAmerican

PresidentHarryTrumanmet17July-2August1945,to“continue”discussionsofthe

post-warworldfromtheYaltaconferenceearlierthatyear.6ThisledtothePotsdam

Declaration,knownforitsdiscussionofpostwarGermanyaswellasits

“ProclamationDefiningtermsforJapaneseSurrender,”whichcalledfor6“ThePotsdamConference,1945,”U.S.DepartmentofState,OfficeoftheHistorian,https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/potsdam-conf.

6

“unconditionalsurrender…thealternativeforJapanispromptandutter

destruction.”7ThePotsdamdeclarationalsocalledforadherencetothe1943Cairo

declaration,whichresolvedtoendthewar,bycallingonunconditionalJapanese

surrenderandforfeitureoftheterritorygainedduringthewar.8TheTreatyofSan

Francisco,signedon8September1951,officiallysetJapanasa“sovereign”9equalto

theUntiedStates,andservedasaTreatyofPeacebetweenthetwonations.10These

documentssetthestagefortheIMTFE,andtheTreatyofSanFranciscoofficially

endedthisperiod,andresumedrelativelynormaldiplomaticrelationsbetweenthe

U.S.andJapan.

ComparedtoitscounterpartattheNurembergIMT,theindictmentforthe

TokyoIMTissignificantlymoredetailed—itlisted55counts.Thesecountswere

splitintothreegroups.Thefirstgroup,CrimesAgainstPeace,includedcounts1-36;

thesecondgroupwasMurder,counts37-52.ThethirdgroupincludedConventional

WarCrimesandCrimesAgainstHumanityincounts53-55.11

7“ADecadeofAmericanForeignPolicy1941-1949PotsdamConference,”TheBerlin(Potsdam)Conference,July17-August21945(a)ProtocoloftheProceedings,August1,1945,TheAvalonProject,LillianGoldmanLawLibrary,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp.8“CairoConference1943,”TheAvalonProject,LillianGoldmanLawLibrary,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/cairo.asp.9“No.1832.TreatyofPeacewithJapan.SignedatSanFrancisco,on8September1951,”UnitedNations-TreatySeries,47,https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20136/volume-136-i-1832-english.pdf.10Ibid.49.11“FullIndictment,”7,Box1,Folder3,G.CarringtonWilliamsPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,1-15,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/carrington-williams/1/3/full-indictment.

7

Generally,thetermIMTFEisusedtorefertoallwarcrimesthattookplacein

thePacifictheaterofJapanesewarcriminalsaftertheendoftheSecondWorldWar,

andincludedthetrialsinTokyo.ThebasicbreakdownofthedefendantsistheClass

A,majorcriminals,whoweretriedattheTokyoIMT.TheclassBandCwar

criminalsweretriedinvariouslocationsthroughoutAsiaineachrespectivenation’s

trialsofJapanesewarcriminals.Thesetrialsinclude,butarenotlimitedtotrials

heldin:Batavia(moderndayJakarta),andmultiplelocationsinChina,including

Manchuria.ThemainandcentraltrialstookplaceinTokyo.TheTokyoIMTwas

primarilyanAmerican-runoperation,withsignificantinputandparticipationfrom

otherAlliednations.

Therewere11justicesattheTokyoIMT,onefromeachoftheAlliednations,

plusthosefromnationsthatwerevictimsofJapanesewarcrimes,includingChina

andthePhilippines.TheAlliedJusticeswereWilliamFloodWebb(Australia,

PresidentoftheTribunal),B.V.A.Röling(Netherlands),HenriBernard(France),

HarlanF.Stone(USA),MyronCadyCramer(USA),JohnPatrickHiggins(USA,but

wasreplacedbyCramerinJuly1946),EdwardStuartMcDougall(Canada),Erima

HarveyNorthcroft(NewZealand),WilliamDonaldPatrick(UnitedKingdomand

NorthernIreland),IvanMicheyvichZaryanov(SovietUnion),andRadhabinodPal

(BritishIndia).12ThosefromstatesvictimizedincludedDelfinJaranilla(Philippines)

andJu-aoMei(China).13TheTokyoIMTjudgmentwasreleasedon4November

12“People,”InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,UniversityofVirginiaLawSchool,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/people13Ibid.

8

1948.14Therewassignificantrifeamongthejusticesregardingguiltoftheaccused

andlegitimacyofthetrial.Asaresult,JusticesBernard,PalandRölingsubmitted

theirown,dissentingjudgmentsinadditiontotheofficialjudgment.15Thefocusof

thisthesisisonDutch-AmericanrelationsattheIMTFEandtheTokyoIMT.

Generally,thisthesishasbeenlimitedinscopebyafewparameters.Thefirst

islanguage:thisstudyhasreliedexclusivelyonEnglish-languagesources,andmay

beimpactedasaresult,however,thismayalsobeaccountedforbythefactthat

muchofthecommunicationbetweenDutchandAmericanrepresentativesinTokyo

wasconductedinEnglish.DuetothevolumeofrecordsoftheIMTFE,the

parameterswerelimitedto1946-1950,andwillexamineonlyasmallselectionof

casestudies.ThetrialsofJapanesewarcriminalsbeganinTokyo;however,this

thesiswillexaminedefendantswhosecrimeswerecommittedinNanking,

Manchuria,andtheNEI,eachlocationcorrespondingtoeachmajorchapter.

ThroughmyexaminationofDutch-Americanrelations,thisthesisaimstounveila

uniquediplomaticandlegalhistoryonanunderstudiedandsignificantcontributor

tomoderninternationallaw.

TheSecondWorldWarbroughtanendtoAmericanisolationismandDutch

neutrality.16E.H.vanderBeugelarguedinhisarticlethatitwaswithintheUnited

14“IndictmentfortheIMTFE,”http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/tokio.pdf.15“SeparateOpinionsoftheJustices,”JusticeErimaHarveyNorthcroftTokyoWarCrimesTrialCollection,UniversityofCanterbury,https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/library/search-our-collections/archives-collection/war-crimes/opinions/.16AlfredvanStaden,“American-DutchPoliticalRelationsSince1945:WhatHaschangedandWhy?”BMGN:LowCountriesHistoricalReview97,no.3,(1January1982):471.

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States’bestinteresttohelpWesternEurope;however,theMarshallplanwasalso

motivatedbygenerosity.17TheNetherlandswasthefifthlargestrecipientof

Marshallplanfunding,andthelargestpercapita,at1.1billiondollars(in1947).18

AlfredvanStadenarguedfromthestandpointofDutchviewsoftheUnitedStates,

thatAmerican-Dutchrelationswerestrongintheimmediateaftermathofthe

SecondWorldWar—theNetherlandswasconsideredaloyalally;thishoweverlater

devolvedintoareluctantoneintheaftermathofdisagreementsoncolonialismof

IndonesiaandUSinvolvementinVietnam,butstillanalliancenonetheless.19Van

Stadenalsostated“beyonddoubt”thatthe1950sand1960stheDutchattitude

towardtheUnitedStateswasoneofoutright“loyaltyandfaithfulness,ifnot

docility.”20Thisloyalty,accordingtovanStaden,wascharacterizedbyrespectfor

thecountrywhoseaidtheNetherlandsweredependentuponfortheir“continued

existence.”21Post-warAmerican-Dutchrelationsprovidedimportantcontextfor

IMTFEandtheroleofDutch-Americanrelationsandtheirimpactoftheirrelations.

CurrentliteratureontheIMTFEhasattemptedtoaddressitsentirety—an

immensetask.Thereishowever,someliteraturethatfocusesonIMTFEproceedings

specificallyinTokyo,theNetherlandsEastIndies,orChina.Thisthesisuseda

samplingofcasestudiestodiscussrelationsamongrepresentativesfromtwoAllied

nationsattheIMTFEinordertoexaminewhat,ifany,effectstherewereonthe17E.H.vanderBeugel,“AnActWithoutPeer:TheMarshallPlaninAmerican-DutchRelations,”BMGN:LowCountriesHistoricalReview97,no.3(1January1982):460.18Ibid.464.19AlfredvanStaden,“American-DutchPoliticalRelationsSince1945:WhatHaschangedandWhy?”BMGN:LowCountriesHistoricalReview97,no.3,(1January1982):470-471,473,476-477.20Ibid.476-477.21Ibid.478.

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outcomeoftheproceedings.AlfredvanStaden,ArthurComyns-Carr,andFrances

GoudaalldiscussedDutch-AmericanrelationsaftertheSecondWorldWar;however,

thisworkexaminessuchrelationsattheleveloflegalprofessionalsworkingtoward

obtainingjusticeforwarcrimes.Thereisnopriorliteraturewhichdiscusses

internationalrelationsamonglegalprofessionalsattheIMTFE,andwhatthistypeof

diplomacymeansforinternationallawandfuturediplomaticrelationsbetweenthe

UnitedStatesandtheNetherlands.Thispapersurveyedthespecificdetailsofeach

casestudytodeterminewhattherelationsbetweentheUSandtheNetherlands

were,andifandhowtheyaffectedtheproceedingsandtheiroutcome.

Specifically,thisthesisasks:WhatwasthestateofDutch-Americanrelations

attheIMTFE?Andwhat,ifany,impactdidtheyhaveontheproceedingsandtheir

outcomes?AmongthecasesexaminedDutch-Americaninteractionislimitedin

quantity,butwhenpresentwassignificant.Exceptforthosetrialsthattookplacein

Batavia,itwasprimarilyJusticeRöling’sinputthatconsistedthemajorityofDutch-

AmericaninteractionthatimpactedtheproceedingsandresultsoftheIMTFE.For

mostofthetrials,therewassignificantinputfromtheAmericans,withthe

considerationofrepresentativesfromthe10othernationstheJusticesrepresented.

Thisthesiswillnowexploretheseconceptsmorein-depth,beginningwitha

historiographicalreviewofthecurrentandpastimportantliteratureontheIMTFE

andexaminationofthecasestudiesinthreelocations:Tokyo,Manchuria,and

Nanking.

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Chapter2:Historiography

TheTokyotrialsareabroadexampleofpost-warjustice.Thisthesisseeksto

examinetheroleofDutch-AmericanrelationsattheIMTFEinthecontextofthe

trialsinChina,Tokyo,andIndonesia.Inabriefglanceovercurrentscholarship,

thereisasignificantamountofliteratureontheNurembergTrials,aswellasthe

TokyotrialsinrelationtotheirEuropeancounterpartsinNuremberg.

ThereislimitedscholarshipontheTokyotrials,andthisthesisseeksto

uncoveradiplomaticandlegalhistoryoftwoAlliednationsinthewakeofJapanese

warcrimesandhowthismayhaveimpactedthejusticeachievedduringtheIMTFE.

Accordingtoa1947articletitledNewTrendsinDutchForeignPolicy,Dutchforeign

relationsbothwithinandoutsideoftheNetherlandsCommonwealthhaschanged.

Therewasacontemporaryshiftawayfrompriorneutrality,discussionofannexing

portionsofGermany,andlooseningofcolonialauthorityontheDutchEastIndies.22

Inkeepingwitha“strongtraditionoftolerance,”23theyhavedeclinedthe

opportunitytoannexportionsofGermany,andengagedindiscussionofgranting

theDutchEastIndies“equalstatus”intheNetherlandsCommonwealth.24

H.ArthurStiener’sarticle,Post-WarGovernmentoftheNetherlandsEast

Indies,examinedthegovernmentoftheNEIattheendandimmediatelyafterthe

endoftheSecondWorldWar,andthecontributingrolesoftheUnitedStatesandthe

22 J.Barents,“NewTrendsinDutchForeignPolicy,“ForeignAffairs25,no.2(January1947):328-333.23Ibid.329.24J.Barents,“NewTrendsinDutchForeignPolicy,“ForeignAffairs25,no.2(January1947):328-333.

12

KingdomoftheNetherlands.25Italsoportrayedthecomplexnatureofthegrowing

independenceoftheNEIfromDutchruleanditseventualfullindependence.This

articlespoketothecontemporarypoliticalconditionsintheaftermathofWWII—

chaoticandinconsistent,amidagrowingnationalistmovement.

BritishAssociateProsecutor26A.S.Comyns-Carrpublishedacontemporary

articleinMay1949,inwhichhegaveabriefhistoryofeventsinthePacifictheater

includingtheMukdenIncidentandtheattackonPearlHarbor,reflectedonthe

unprecedentednatureoftheTokyoIMT,basicfactsofthetrial,andhowitdiffered

fromitscounterpartinNuremberg.Inthispiece,hearguedthattheTokyoIMT

made“legalhistory.”27Thissourceisuniquebecauseitprovideshistoricalcontext

totheTokyoIMTlessthanoneyearafterthereadingofthejudgmentinNovember

1948.IthasservedasasourceofcomparisonbetweentheIMTsatNurembergand

Tokyo,andasacontemporarysourcetointroducethetopicanditsunprecedented

natureinthisthesisstudy.

RichardMinear’sVictor’sJusticewasoneoftheearliestandmostwellknown

scholarlyworksonthistopic.Itwashighlycriticalofthetrials,aimingto“challenge

thisprevailingimageofthetrial,todemolishthecredibilityoftheTokyoTrialand

itsverdict.”28Minearnotedthathiswasaworkof“politicalscholarship,”29thathis

25H.ArthurSteiner,“Post-WarGovernmentoftheNetherlandsEastIndies,”TheJournalofPolitics9,no.4,(Nov.1947):627.26“SirArthurStrettelComynsCarr,”TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors/arthur-strettell-comyns-carr.27A.S.Comyns-Carr,TheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,FarEasternSurveyvol.18,no.10,(May18,1949):109.28RichardMinear,Victor’sJustice:TheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,(NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1972):ix.

13

bookwaswrittenforanAmericanaudience,whilerecognizingthatJapanese

scholarsbelieveinthevalidityofthetrials.30Minear’sbookservesasafocalpoint

forthehistoriography,asitrepresentsacentraldebateregardingthefunctionofthe

IMTFE:itsroleasjusticeforthevictimsorforthevictors.

DonaldM.McKale’s1977article,TheNaziPartyintheFarEast,1931-1945,

arguedthatNazipenetrationofEastAsiawasanunderstudiedtopic,andthattwo

importantaspectsofHitler’spolicytowardtheFarEastwerehisracialideologyand

theNaziparty’suseofGermancommunitiesinChina,Japan,India,Australia,andthe

DutchEastIndiesaspawnsofGermanpolicy.”31Thisarticlebroughtaunique

perspectivetothescholarshipusedinthisthesisbecauseitconnectedthetwo

theatersoftheSecondWorldWaroutsideofthecomparisonbetweenpost-war

trialsatNurembergandtheIMTFE.

Twoyearslater,PhilipR.Piccigallo’sTheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWar

CrimesOperationsintheEast,1945-1951.Piccigallo’sworkwascertainlyambitious,

providingacomprehensiveoverviewandaccountoftheIMTFE.Hestatedinthe

introductionthathisbookwasintendedtoshowthattheJapanesecommittedwar

crimesandthattheAlliednationsheldthemresponsible.32

PiccigallomentionedthedifficultyofwritingabouttheIMTFE,thevast

amountofdocumentation,translationdifficultiesfromJapanesetoEnglish,andthe

29Ibid.xiii.30Ibid.ix.31DonaldM.McKale,“TheNaziPartyintheFastEast,1931-45,”JournalofContemporaryHistory12,no.2(1977):291.32PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979):xii.

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factitwasan“uncomfortable”and“political”topic.33Piccigalloarguedthata

comprehensiveanalysiswill“giveclearerandmoreaccurateunderstandingofhow

andwhypostwarinternationalrelationsintheEastdevelopedordegeneratedas

theydidinthesucceedingyearswillemerge.”34

DutchscholarAlfredvanStaden’sfindingsonchangesinpost-SecondWorld

WarDutch-AmericanrelationsarguethatAmerican-Dutchestrangementhas

grownsincethe1960s,“isbeingmutedanddisguisedbythepolishedlanguageof

officialdiplomacy,”andpredicteda“dangerous”futurefortheNetherlandsandthe

UnitedStates.35

ArnoldC.Brackman’s1987book,TheOtherNurembergexaminedtheTokyo

trialsinrelationtothoseinNuremberg.36ItwaswrittenfromanAmerican

perspective,theauthorisAmericanandwasacorrespondentattheTokyoTrials.

Theprosewasfocusedonchronology,withafewanecdotesfromtheauthor’stime

inTokyoandwasmorechronologicalratherthanargumentative.37Brackmanstated

thatheintendedforhisbooktoserveasanexpose,to“settherecordstraight,”for

whathappenedattheTokyoTrials.38Forthepurposesofthisthesis,itprovided

factualinformationrelatedtothetrialsinTokyo,andareferencetoearlierworkson

33RichardMinear,Victor’sJustice:TheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,(NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1972):xiv.34PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979):xiii.35AlfredvanStaden,“American-DutchPoliticalRelationsSince1945:WhatHaschangedandWhy?”BMGN:LowCountriesHistoricalReview97,no.3,(1January1982):470.36ArnoldC.Brackman,TheOtherNuremberg:TheUntoldStoryoftheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,(NewYork:Morrow,1987).37Ibid.38Ibid.27.

15

thetopic.Mostnotably,thebookwaspublishedin1987,beforetherewasa

significantamountofpublicationsonthistopic.

AnotheruniquepieceofliteratureregardingtheIMTFEwasTheTokyoTrial

andBeyond:ReflectionsofaPeacemongerbyB.V.A.RölingandAntonioCassese.It

detailedCassese’sextendedinterviewofRölinginthe1970sbutwasnotpublished

until1993,eightyearsafterRöling’sdeath.39Thisisaninterestingsourcebecauseit

hasservedasbothprimaryandsecondarysourcesforthisthesis.Itwouldbea

primarysourcebecauseitisaninterviewwithJusticeRöling,butalsosecondary

becausetheinterviewwasconducteddecadesafterthetrialended.Itcangivea

(more)candidviewofaDutchofficialinTokyo.Thismadeaninteresting

contributiontotheliteraturepresentedinthisbecauseitconnectedthefacts,

narrativesandRöling’sexperiencesinTokyowiththeeffectsoftherelations

betweenDutchrepresentativesandthatofotherAlliedNations.Cassese’s

interviewswithRölingsuggestthatRölinghadsignificantdissentionfromtheother

justicesinTokyo,andareuniquebecausetheyprovideaveryreflectiveviewof

Röling’sexperiencesattheIMTFE.

Inanarticleafewmonthsbeforethe50thanniversaryoftheTokyoIMT

judgment,theWashingtonPostdiscussedHiroshiOSHIMAasan“unwittingspy”for

theUnitedStates.40OSHIMAwasa“confidante”ofGermanleadersandpassed

39B.V.A.Röling,Ed.ByAntonioCassese,TheTokyoTrialandBeyond:ReflectionsofaPeacemonger,(Cambridge,PolityPress,1993).40CharlesFenyvesi,“Japan’sUnwittingD-DaySpy,”TheWashingtonPost,26May1998,https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/05/26/japans-unwitting-d-day-spy/9309f2b9-dd69-4ee3-8eaf-b9b4754631d8/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.35836461d94f.

16

informationontoAmericanauthoritiesinthemonthsleadinguptotheinvasionof

NormandyviatheForeignOfficeinTokyo.41Thissourcedidnotdirectlypertainto

hiscriminalcaseattheIMTFE;itdoesprovideaslightlydifferentnarrativeofhis

wartimerole,aswellasoutlinethestateofmemoryoftheIMTFEinmodernJapan.

OneofthemostimportantsourcestobeexaminedinthischapterisThe

TokyoMajorWarCrimesTrial:TheRecordsoftheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfor

theFarEastwithanAuthoritativeCommentaryandComprehensiveGuide,withan

IntroductionbyR.JohnPritchard.Thisbookisaguidetolookingatthetranscripts,

withsomeincludedbackgroundinformationitsintroduction.InPritchard’s

introduction,heaimedtomaketheresourcesoftheIMTFEknownandaccessibleto

alltypesofresearchers,includingstudents,governmentofficialsandlawyers.42

Pritchardstatedthathefoundit“regrettable”thatpreviousworksonwarcrimes

didnotaddresstheirrespectivehistoricalcontexts.43Healsomadetheimportant

distinctionbetweenhistoriansandlawyers,anoften-missingyetfundamentalpoint

inaddressinglegal-historicalevents.“Thehistorian,inasomewhatdifferent

mannerthanapurelawyer,mustdistinguishbetweentwoaspectsofthe

proceedings:firstly,theintegrityofthetrialprocess…secondly,thesubstantive

issuesandtheevidencewhichrevolvearoundthatprocess.”44Pritchard’sbook

41Ibid.42R.JohnPritchard,TheTokyoMajorwarCrimesTrial;TheRecordsoftheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastwithanAuthoritativeCommentaryandComprehensiveGuide,WithanIntroductionbyR.JohnPritchard,(Lewiston,N.Y:PublishedfortheRobertM.W.KempnerCollegiumbyE.MellenPress,1998):xviii.43Ibid.xxii.44Ibid.xxii-xxiii.

17

servedasareferencetextfortheTokyoTribunaltranscripts,inanattempttomake

itmoreaccessibleandthusincreasescholarship.

AccordingtoJudgmentatTokyo,Americanhistoryprofessor45TimothyMaga

arguedthattheTokyotrialsweremorecomplexthantheusual“victor’sjustice”or

“doingtherightthing”soundbites.46Magaalsoarguedtherewere“goodintentions”

behindthetrials,andthat“thecommitmenttojusticewasfirm,althoughthetrial

effortitselfwasbesetwithproblemsandcontroversies.”47Magastatedinthebook

thathisaimwastofamiliarizethereaderwiththebasicfactsandresultsofthetrials,

the“dramaoftheperiod,”andexaminethecontroversiesandlegaciesthatliveon

today.”48Thisbookwaswrittenin2001,andbalancedtheVictor’sJusticemotive

withthemoderntrendinscholarshiptowardreevaluatingthetruesignificanceof

theproceedingsatTokyo.Maga’sJudgmentatTokyoisuniquebecausehe

acknowledgesthecomplexnatureoftheeventsandsubsequentscholarship

surroundingthetrialsleadingupuntilthebook’spublicationin2001.49

TimothyBrook’sarticle,“TheTokyoJudgmentandtheRapeofNanking,”

tookamoreneutralstanceontheIMTFE’sroleinshapingthenarrativesofNanking.

ItargueditiscontroversialinshapingtheidentitiesofbothChinaandJapan,50and

thatthe“Tokyojudgmentmightmovebothsidesawayfromrestingtheirarguments

45“TimothyP.Maga,”OhioUniversityPress,https://www.ohioswallow.com/author/Timothy+P+Maga.46TimothyMaga,JudgmentatTokyo:TheJapaneseWarCrimesTrials(Lexington:TheUniversityPressofKentucky,2001),ix.47Ibid.ix.48Ibid.xii.49Ibid.x-xi.50TimothyBrook,“TheTokyoJudgmentandtheRapeofNanking,”JournalofAsianStudies60,no.3(Aug.2001):673.

18

ontheIMTFEandtowardexploringothermeansofcomingtotermswiththeir

differences.”51BrookarguedthattheRapeofNankingisacontroversialidentity

markerforjapanandChina,aswellasJapan’sstatusasacolonialpower.52Brook’s

articlefocusedononeevent—theRapeofNanking,andhowproceedingsrelatedto

itattheIMTFEimpactedpost-wardiplomacy.

FrancesGoudawroteamorenarrowlyfocusedbookpublishedin2002,

whichrevisitedDutch-AmericanrelationsaftertheendoftheSecondWorldWar.In

AmericanVisionsoftheNetherlandsEastIndies/Indonesia:USForeignPolicyand

IndonesianNationalism,1920-1949,thisDutch-Americandiplomatichistory

providedabasicbackgroundhistoryonDutch-Americandiplomacyfromtheinter–

waruntilthepostwarperiod,andprovidedcontextforpost-wardiplomacy.It

arguedthattherewasashiftofAmericanpositionfromstrongsupportoftheNEIas

aDutchcolonytosupportingitsIndependence.53

YumaTotani’s2008book,titledTheTokyoWarCrimesTrialswillalsoserve

asanothercentralpieceofliteraturerelatedtothisthesis.Totanistated“the

JapanesepeopletodayregardtheTokyotrialasfocalpointofWorldWarII.”54The

bookexploredthetrialsthematically,asopposedtoearlier,chronologicalworks.55

NeilBoisterandRobertCryer’s2008book,TheTokyoInternationalMilitary

Tribunal:AReappraisal,wasappraisedasa“nuancedanalysisofthelegalissues”of51Ibid.674.52Ibid.673.53FrancesGoudaandThijsBrocadesZaalberg,AmericanVisionsoftheNetherlandsEastIndies/Indonesia:USForeignPolicyandIndonesianNationalism,1920-1949,(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2002),17.54YumaTotani,TheTokyoWarCrimesTrial:ThePursuitofJusticeintheWakeofWorldWarII,Cambridge,Massachusetts,HarvardUniversityPress,2008),1.55Ibid.6.

19

theIMTFE.56Intheirbook,BoisterandCryerprovidedthein-depthlegalanalysis,

butalsoarguedthatMinear’sVictors’Justiceargumenttooka“jadedview”ofthe

proceedings,57thuscharacteristicofthenewerscholarshipontheIMTFE.

JamesBurnhamSedgwick’sarticle,“MemoryonTrial:Constructingand

Contestingthe‘RapeofNanking’attheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFar

East,1946-1948,”outlinedthecontestednatureoftheIMTFEonthecrimes

committedduringtheRapeofNanking.58Sedgwickarguedthat“usingcourtsasa

panaceaforpostwarrestorationandasvalidatorsoftraumaticnarrativesisboth

short-sightedandineffective.”59TheauthorpositedthattheIMTFEisaprime

exampleofthis“inadequacy.”60

SedgwickalsoexplainedthattheRapeofNanking“literatureistypifiedbya

divergenceratherthanconsensusanddefinedmorebyvitriolandideologythan

historicalinquiry.”61Thisarticledelvedintowhetherornotlaw(trials)canbea

sourceforrecordinghistory,thusseparatingtherolesoflawyersandhistorians.

ThiscontrastswiththecontributionsofComyns-Carr’sarticle,whichblendedthese

twotogether,viaalawyerwritingajournalarticleinwhichhediscussedthe

historicalprecedentsetbytheTokyoIMT.Thoughthisarticlewillcontributetothe

56KirstenSellars,“ImperfectJusticeatNurembergandTokyo,“TheEuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw21,no.4,(2011):1102.57NeilBoisterandRobertCryer,TheTokyoInternationalMilitaryTribunal:AReappraisal,(NewYork:Oxford,2008):1.58JamesBurnhamSedgewick,“MemoryonTrial:ConstructingandContestingthe‘RapeofNanking’attheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast,1946-1948,”ModernAsianStudies43,no.5(September2009):1229.59Ibid.1229.60Ibid.61Ibid.1232.

20

chapteronNanking,itisuniquebecauseitisthemostrecentliteraturefoundthat

alignsitselfwithMinear’sVictor’sJusticeargument.

In2011,KristenSellarspublishedanarticle,ImperfectJusticeatNuremberg

andTokyo,whichprovidedabookreviewofthreeimportantworksrelatedtothe

studyoftheNurembergandTokyoInternationalMilitaryTribunals.Init,sheargued

thateachbookmakesanimportantcontributiontoscholarship,providinginsight

into:“conceptualizationofcharges,conductofthetrials,thefindingstheymadeand,

finally,therespectivelegaciesofNurembergandTokyo.”62Sellars’work

highlightedhowviewsofthetrialschangedwitheachgenerationofauthors

influencedbytheirrespectivepoliticalandhistoricalcontexts,63andhowthe

problemsintheoriginalchargesremainunsolved“despitetheappearanceofsimilar

chargeswithintheremitof“themodernICC.64Thisarticleshedlightonafewofthe

majorworksofbothmajorIMTs.

BeyondVictor’sJustice:TheTokyoWarCrimesTrialRevisited,Ed.ByYuki

Tanaka,TimMcCormack,andGerrySimpson,isacollectionofarticlesandchapters

attemptingtoreaddressanunderresearchedtopicandreconsiderMinear’sVictor’s

Justicenarrative.Thiscollectionofpapersbeganwitha“contextualization”ofthe

TokyoTrials,includinghistoricalsignificance,historiography,andJapanesesocietal

62KirstenSellars,“ImperfectJusticeatNurembergandTokyo,“TheEuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw21,no.4,(2011):1087.63Ibid.1088.64Ibid.1085.

21

attitudes.65Furthermore,theauthors“attemptheretolocatetheTrialinbroader

contextsandtointroduceissuesthatariseagainforsubsequentanalyses.”66

AccordingtolegalacademicZacharyD.Kaufman,67theUnitedStates

governmentplayedacentralroleintheTokyoIMTforthreereasons.Thefirst

reasonwasAmericansensitivitytothesufferingofAmericansoldiers“atthehands

of”theJapanesemilitary;68thesecondwasthedesirefortheU.S.toestablisha

strongerpresenceinAsia,inanattempttostopthespreadofcommunismand

increaseAmericanstatureininternationalaffairs.69Thethirdreason,which

Kaufmanarguedwassubconscious,wasdiscrimination.70Thissourceshedlighton

theextentofAmericaninvolvementatTokyo,andtheirstatusasaglobalactorat

thetime.

TheHiddenHistoriesofWarCrimesTrialsisacompilationoflesser-known

historiesbycontributingauthors,withfouraims:consolation,recovery,pedigree,

andpedagogy.71Thisbookisacollectionofarticlesandchaptersattemptingto

readdressanunderresearchedtopicandreconsiderMinear’sVictors’Justice

65Ed.ByYukiTanaka,TimMcCormack,andGerrySimpson,BeyondVictor’sJustice?TheTokyoWarCrimesTrialsRevisited,InternationalHumanitarianLawSeries30,Brill,2011:xxviii.66Ibid.67“ZacharyD.Kaufman,”Directory,StanfordSchoolofLaw,https://law.stanford.edu/directory/zachary-kaufman/.68 ZacharyD.Kaufman,“TransitionalJusticeforTojo’sJapan:TheUnitedStates’RoleintheEstablishmentoftheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastandOtherTransitionalJusticeMechanismsforJapanAfterWWII,”EmoryInternationalLawReview27,no.2(2013):786-787.http://law.emory.edu/eilr/_documents/volumes/27/2/symposium/kaufman.pdf.69Ibid.787.70Ibid.787.71 Ed.ByKevinHellerandGerrySimpson,TheHistoriesofWarCrimesTrials(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),2-6.

22

narrative.Itpositedthatthecontributingpiecesofliteratureinthebookachieve

thesefouraims,andthattheworldwasalteredaftertheendofWorldWarII.72This

booktookauniqueapproach,byputtinghistoricalstudyintothecontextofwar

crimestrials.Italsoservedasanecessaryadditiontothehistoriographicalchapter

becauseofthediversenatureoftheworksincluded.Thisworkpoignantlystated,

“Internationalcriminallawwasbornoutofthegreatcontradictionsthatexistedin

theaftermathofWWII.”73Italsohasthepotentialtopowerfullyshape“narratives—

highlightingsomerelationsand‘spiritingaway’others;concealingwhatmust

remainhidden—wassoonrealized.”74Thisquoteintroducedanotherinteresting

debate:theroleoflawinthenarrationandrecordofhistory.InTheHiddenHistories

ofWarCrimesTrials,theeditorsarguedthatTribunalsdoplayaroleinshaping

narratives.

In,FromTokyototheUnitedNations:B.V.A.Röling,InternationalCriminal

Jurisdiction,andtheDebateonEstablishinganInternationalCriminalCourt,1949-

1957,LisetteSchoutenoutlinedJusticeRöling’sworkattheIMTFEandlatertheUN

andhiseffortstounifyinternationalcriminallawintoasinglecourt.Shearguedthat

RölingwasimpactedbyhisworkattheIMTFE,andthatRölingviewedthatasan

“internationalcriminalcourtwouldbenecessarytotrythesenewcrimes,sincethey

couldnotbeprosecutedundernationallaw.”75SchoutenarguedthatRöling’sviews

72Ibid.191.73Ibid.191.74Ibid.75 LisetteSchouten,“FromTokyototheUnitedNations:B.V.A.Röling,InternationalCriminalJurisdictionandtheDebateonEstablishinganInternationalCriminalCourt1949-1957,”inHistoricalOriginsofInternationalCriminalLaw:Volume2,byMorten

23

on“globallegalstandards”andhisattempttocreateaninternationalcriminalcourt

were“aheadofhistime.”76ThischapterprovidedauniqueinsightintohowRöling’s

careerwasshapedaftertheIMTFEandthesubsequenteventsthatledtoarisethen

fallinpopularityofaninternationalcriminallegalsystemandtheeventualcreation

ofthemodernICC.ThisshowsthecontinuedimpactoftheIMTFEonmodernlaw.

AccordingtoYumaTotani’sJusticeinAsiaadthePacificRegion,1945-1952:

AlliedWarCrimesProsecutions,TotanianalyzedthetrialrecordstobringoutAllied

courts’findingsoncriminalliabilityofthoseaccusedofwarcrimes.77Thebook

arguedthatvariousfactorsinfluencedthefairnessofindividualtrials:“1.Timingof

thetrials,2.competenceofothercourtstaff,especiallycourtinterpreters,3.

Competenceoftheprosecution,thedefense,andthejudges,4.Typesofevidence

introducedduringthecourtproceedings,5.Politicsthatdefinedthecontextof

individualtrials.”78Totani’sbookprovidedaninterestinganalysisofthetrials,

however,ithadanAnglo-Americanfocus.Thissourceprovidedimportant

informationregardingsomeoftheindividualtrials.

Moreover,KirstenSellars’articlealsobrieflyconsideredthelegacyofJustice

Pal,andhiscomplicityinJapaneseconservativeaimsofjustifyingJapan’spolicies

duringthewar.79A2016DeutscheWellearticlealsoconsideredthispositioninits

examinationoflegacyofJusticePalinJapan.ThearticlearguedthatbecauseJusticeBergsmo,Ed.CHEAHWuiLing,andYIPing(Brussels:TorkelOpsahlAcademicEPublisher(2014),210, https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/387173242.pdf.76Ibid.212.77YumaTotani,JusticeinAsiaandthePacificRegion,1945-1952:AlliedWarCrimesProsecutions(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress(2015),5.78Ibid.20.79Ibid.1099-1100.

24

PalrejectedthelegitimacyoftheIMTFE,currentJapanesecitizens,includingPrime

MinisterShinzoAbe,veneratePaltoday.80Thisshowedacontinuedrelevanceofthe

trialsinJapantodayandtheircontestedlegacy.

ThemajorityofliteraturehasabroadfocusontheTokyotrialsandthe

IMTFE,withtheexceptionofFredL.Borch’sworkMilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsin

theNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949.Thisbookhasbecomeacentralpieceof

scholarshipinboththehistoriographicalchapterandthroughoutthethesis.This

bookisthefirstinclusiveEnglish-languagebookaboutDutchwarcrimes

prosecutionsintheDutchEastIndies(NEI).81BorchpostulatedthattheIMTFEwas

apartoftheAlliedefforttoimplementorderandseekjusticeforJapanesewar

crimesinthe“newworldordercreatedbytheUnitedNations,warcrimeswouldno

longergounpunished.”82

Borch’sbookwasthefirstofitskind.Itincludedoverviewsofmajorcasesof

theIMTFEintheNEI,andthusservesasanexcellentstartingpointfor

understandingtheDutchroleintheIMTFEandthechangingworldorderinthe

aftermathoftheSecondWorldWar.Thisthesisusedthisbookasaplatformfor

furtherresearch,expandingthistobothDutchandAmericanindividualsintheNEI,

aswellasthoseinChinaandJapan.

80MartinFritz,“TheeternalburdenoftheTokyoWarCrimesTribunal,”DW,18January2016,https://www.dw.com/en/the-eternal-burden-of-the-tokyo-war-crimes-tribunal/a-18986976.81FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),v.82Ibid.vi.

25

Oneofthemostrecenttitles,JapaneseWarCriminals:ThePoliticsofJustice

AftertheSecondWorldWar,alsoattemptedtheoverwhelmingtaskofanalyzingthe

entireTribunal,bytracing“theprocessesbywhichJapanesewarcrimeswere

identified,investigated,prosecuted,andpunished.”83Thebookarguedthattheaim

wastoachieve“substantivejustice,”whichdiffersfrom“proceduraljusticethrough

itsfocusonoutcomeanditspragmaticapproach…thatlawandlegalproceedings

aretoolsforachievingjusticenotendsinthemselves.”84Amajorflaw,however,is

thatthereisnoconsensusonwhatthesubstantivejusticemeans.85Thisbook

maintainedthattheIMTFEtrialswereentirelylegitimate,86constitutingacertain

departurefromMinear’sVictor’sJusticeview.

ThehistoriographybeganduringtheIMTFEwithComyns-Carrandother

analyses.However,theseconsistedmostlyofapoliticalscience-relatedanalysisof

theevents.TheliteraturecametoaheadwithMinear’sVictor’sJusticein1972:he

consideredhisownworktobepoliticalinnature.Minear’sbookwasthefirstmajor

analysisoftheIMTFEandremainsanimportant,dominatingworkofliteraturein

thisfield.Therewassomescholarshipinthe1970sand1980s,whichsoughtto

broadlyunderstandtheIMTFEandpost-warDutch-Americanrelations.

Cassese’sinterviewswithJusticeRölingwerepublishedin1993,addinga

primarysourcetotheliterature,andanewspaperarticlenearlyoverlappingwith

the50thanniversaryoftheTokyoIMTdiscussingtheroleofmemoryinmodern83SandraWilson,RobertCribb,BeatriceTrefalt,DeanAszkielowicz,JapaneseWarCriminals:ThePoliticsofJusticeAftertheSecondWorldWar,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2017),4.84Ibid.85Ibid.86Ibid.270.

26

Japan.Thisworkisclassifiedasaprimarysourceaswellasahistoricalaccountof

theseevents.In1998,R.JohnPritchard’sintroductionmayspeaktothe

transformationinthedisciplineoftheliterature:ultimatelyalegal-historical

analysisoftheIMTFE.

Theearly2000ssawaslightincreaseinscholarship;however,thismayhave

coincidedwithageneralincreaseinscholarshiprelatedtotheSecondWorldWar.In

2008,BoisterandCryer’sbookwasstrictlyalegalanalysisoftheTokyoIMT,

becausetheauthorsarelawyersratherthanhistorians.87Sedgewick’s2009article

alsoservedtobridgeagapbetweenlegalandhistoricalanalyses.Inthemostrecent

decade,from2010,therehasbeenaresurgenceofscholarshiprelatedtotheIMTFE,

whichhassoughttoreexaminetheVictor’sJusticenarrative.

Thisthesisintendstounderstandthetrialsinagreementwiththis

historiographicaltrendawayfromRichardMinear’sargument,necessitatingan

extensivestudyofthedocumentsrelatedtothetrialtoconductthisreevaluation.

Thispaper,unliketheambitiousnatureoftheearlyscholarlyliterature,isnarrowed

downtoAmerican-DutchrelationsfocusedononlythreelocationsoftheIMTFE,

insteadofattemptingtocovertheentireTribunal.

Theliteraturealsoexaminedtheroleofnarratives.Thereisnoconsensuson

whetherlaw—orinthiscasetheIMTFE,canorshouldhavetheabilitytorecord

historicalnarratives.SomesourcesalsoquestionedwhethertheTribunalshould

playaroleindeterminingnationalnarrativeofastate’swarintheSecondWorld

War.Mostsignificantly,theliteraturetodatehasexperiencedadisciplinary87NeilBoisterandRobertCryer,TheTokyoInternationalMilitaryTribunal:AReappraisal,(NewYork:Oxford,2008):1-2.

27

evolution.Theliteraturesurveyedinthishistoriographybeganwithapolitical,

contemporaryanalysisoftheIMTFE,andhasevolvedtoahistoricalanalysisand

mostrecently,alegalanalysisoftheevents.

Thesourcespresentedinthischapterservedasafoundationfortheresearch

discussedinthecomingchaptersregardingthepotentialinfluenceofDutch-

AmericanrelationsattheIMTFE.FredL.Borch’sbookwastheonlybookinEnglish

thatexaminedwarcrimestrialsintheNEI.Currentdebateandscholarship

surroundsMinear’sinitialargumentthattheIMTFEwassimplyVictor’sJustice,

however,newscholarshipencouragesareexaminationofthatclaim.Current

scholarshiprelatedtotheIMTFEwasexaminedonthespectrumofagreementwith

Minear’sVictors’Justiceargument.Thisthesisseekstounderstandwhatthestateof

Dutch-AmericanrelationswereattheIMTFEandwhat,ifany,impacttheymade

havehadontheproceedingsandtheiroutcomes.

ThisworkaimstounderstandtherelationshipbetweenDutch-American

relationsattheproceedingsandtheoutcomeoftheIMTFE.Thisthesisreliedon

officialdocumentationoftheproceedings,includingtheindictment,defensiveand

prosecutorialarguments,theTokyoIMTJudgmentof12November1948,Justice

Röling’sdissentingjudgment,aswellasbackgroundinformationregardingthe

individualcasesoutlinedinthecasestudies.Thisdocumentationcamefromthe

NetherlandsInstituteonWarHolocaustandGenocideStudiesinAmsterdam,the

ICC’sLegalToolsDatabase,andtheUniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw’s

InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection.Additionally,this

thesisutilizednewsarticlessurroundingeventsrelevanttotheproceedings

28

includingthoseinvolvingDr.OKAWAassaultingTOJOHidekiincourt,88and

cooperationintheformofinformationsharingbetweenDutchandAmericans

workinginbothTokyoandBatavia.Somesecondarysourceliteraturewasusedfor

thecasestudies,mostnotablyFredL.Borch’sMilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsinthe

NetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949,andPhilipR.Piccigallo’sTheJapaneseonTrial:

AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast,1945-1951.Despitethemassivescaleof

theIMTFE,thereislittlescholarshiptodiscusstheeventsandtheirpotentialimpact

onmoderninternationallawanddiplomacy.

88“NewsClippingJapWhoSlappedTojoCured-WillFaceTrialAgain,”TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/3/7/news-clipping-jap-who-slapped-tojo-cured-will-face-trial-again.

29

Chapter3:PrecedentsforModernInternationalLaw,JapaneseWar

CrimesTrialsintheNetherlandsEastIndies

TheNetherlandsEastIndies(NEI),knowntodayastheRepublicofIndonesia,

heldtrialsofclassBandCJapanesewarcriminals.Forthecasesoutlinedinthis

chapter,thesetrialswereheldinDutchtemporarycourts-martialinBatavia

(modern-dayJakarta),andMakassar.DutchmilitarycourtsintheNEItried448

cases.89Thetwocasestudiestobediscussedinthischapter,caseno.76Prosecutorv.

AwochiWashio,90andcaseno.79,Prosecutorv.ShigekiMotomuraand15Tokkeitai

Members,91wereconductedinBataviaandMakassar,respectively.Bataviaand

MakassarwerethesitesofthelargestDutchwarcrimestrials.92Primarily,the

JapanesewarcrimestrialsintheNEIwereaDutch-runshow,unliketheirTokyo

counterpart,whichwasrunbytheAmericanswithDutchrepresentationand

input.93

InJune1940,JapansentdemandstotheDutchgovernmentinexiletosupply

oilandminerals,whichtheDutchrefused.Japanmadethesamedemandsvia

delegationtoBataviainSeptember1940.Lt.GovernorGeneralHubertusJ.Van

89PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),174.90FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),134.91Ibid.157.92Ibid.37.93PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),chapter10.

30

MookrejectedthesedemandsinJune1941,andthenJapanattackedHawaiiandthe

PhilippinesinDecember1941.94

Bytheendofthewar,theJapaneseinternedonehundredthousandcivilians,

“allEuropeanandsomeEurasians.”95InMilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsinthe

NetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949,UnitedStatesArmyAttorneyFredL.Borch

arguedthatJapaneseoccupationoftheNEIandsubsequentproceedingswere

uniquebecauseofthesheernumberofindividualspersecutedbytheJapanese.96

DutchtrialsintheNEIendedon24December1949,with1,038defendantstriedin

proceedings.97

AccordingtoAmericanprofessorH.ArthurSteiner,theDutchhad“political

andeconomicresponsibilities”98intheNEIsince1595.IntheNEI,politicalauthority

wasdividedgeographically99betweentheRepublicofIndonesiathatdeclared

independenceon17August1945,100andtheNetherlandsIndiesCivil

Administration(NICA),whichbecametheDutchgovernmentoftheNEI.101The

NICAestablishedcivilgovernmentsin“alloftheislandsofIndiesaccessibletothe

forcesoftheSoutheastAsiaCommand”(SEAC),withwhomtheyenteredtheNEIin

94FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),12.95Ibid.15.96Ibid.15.97Ibid.36.98Post-WarGovernmentoftheNetherlandsEastIndies,H.ArthurSteiner,TheJournalofPolitics,Vol.9,No.4,(Nov,1947),625.99PoliticalauthorityintheNEIwasdividedgeographicallyatthetime,thearticlewaswrittenin1947.100Post-WarGovernmentoftheNetherlandsEastIndies,H.ArthurSteiner,TheJournalofPolitics,Vol.9,No.4,(Nov,1947),627.101Ibid.

31

1944-45.102ThisexcludedJava,Sumatra,andMadura“(exceptforcoastalareasin

thevicinityofBataviaSoerabaya,Java,andaroundPadangandMedanin

Sumatra).”103Intheaforementionedexcludedareas,theRepublicofIndonesiahad

alreadyestablisheditsauthoritypriortothearrivaloftheAlliesinlate1945.104

SteineralsoexplainedtheprovisionsandsignificanceoftheLinggadjatiagreement,

ratifiedbyboththeDutchandRepublicofIndonesiangovernmentson25March

1947.105ItsprovisionscallforDutchrecognitionoftheRepublicofIndonesia’sde

factoautonomyoverJava,Madura,andSumatra,tobeincorporatedintothe

Republicon1January1949.106TheU.S.alsogavedefactorecognitiontothe

RepublicofIndonesia,“subjecttothesovereigntyoftheNetherlandsinmatters

relatingtoforeignandeconomicaffairs.”107Steineralsoarguedthatthe1945

provisionalConstitutionoftheRepublicofIndonesiacitedprinciplesfromthe

AmericanconstitutionandDeclarationofIndependence.108Moreover,thisshows

thecomplexnatureofDutch-Americandiplomaticrelationsatthetime.

Forthepurposesofthischapter,thediscussionwillbelimitedtothe

territoriesunderDutchauthority,primarilyBataviaandMakassarandwillexamine

Dutch-AmericanrelationswithinthecontextoftheIMTFEandfocusonthetwo

casestudiesexaminedinthischapter.Therewassignificantevidenceofcooperation

betweentheDutchandAmericansworkingintheNEIandTokyo,forthepurposeof

102Ibid.627-628.103Ibid.627-628.104Ibid.627-628.105Ibid.635.106Ibid.635.107Ibid.108Ibid.640.

32

prosecutingwarcriminals,mainlyintheformofsharingevidenceand

communicationregardingwitnesstestimony.Moreover,Americanlawandthe

TokyoIMT(trialsofclassAwarcriminals)influencedchangestoDutchlaw

allowingforincreasedprosecutions.Thischapterarguesthattherewasatop-down

impactofDutch-AmericanrelationsonthetemporaryCourts-Martialandthecases.

Dutch-Americanrelationsandcooperationprimarilyimpactedthechangesinlaw,

whichinturnaffectedthecasestudiesexaminedinthischapter.

IntheNEI,DutchwarcrimesfollowedthesameapproachasBritain,

Australia,andCanada.109AccordingtoauthorPhilipPiccigallo,theNetherlands

created“twosetsofregulationsgoverningwarcrimestrialsintheEastandin

Europe.”110ThisstandsincontrasttothewarcrimestrialsintheNEI,where

primaryreliancewasoninternationallawbecauseDutchregulationsexcluded

specificreferenceto‘crimesagainstpeace,’and‘crimesagainsthumanity.’111

PiccigalloexplainedthatcourtsinHollandreliedonDutchpenallaw,that

warcrimesweretreatedas“offensesagainstthemunicipallaw,notasviolationsof

thelawsandcustomsofwar.”112IntheNEI,however,authorities“approachedwar

crimestrialsindependentlyofmunicipallaw.”113Piccigalloexplained,“primary

reliancewasoninternationallaw.”114

109Ibid.110Ibid.111Ibid.175.112PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),174-5.113PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),174-5.114Ibid.175.

33

InAugust1945,Dr.H.J.VanMook,theNetherlandsEastIndiesLieutenant

General,warnedJapanesecommandersintheNetherlandsEastIndiesthatthose

whomistreatedciviliansorPOWs“wouldbetreatedlikewarcriminals.”115Justice

B.V.A.RölingandAssistantProsecutorW.G.FrederickBorgerhoff-Mulderalso

servedinBataviaaftertheirpostsinTokyo.116ThewarcrimestrialsintheNEIwere

conductedbyCourts-Martial,amilitarycourt.InBatavia,aTemporaryCourts-

MartialtriedtheWASHIOAwochicase;thejurisdictionofwhichwasdeterminedby

StatuteBookDecreeNo.46in1946concerning“LegalCompetenceinRegardsto

WarCrimes.”117

AttheDutchtrialsintheNEI,therewere39offenses“prosecutableaswar

crimes,”33ofwhichwerealreadyconsidered‘violatingthelawsandcustomsof

war,’whilesixwere“warcrimesprosecutablebydomesticlaw.”118Later,fivemore

offenseswereaddedto‘violationsoflawsandcustomsofwar’tobeprosecutableas

warcrimes.119Theseadditionaloffenseswere:“ill-treatmentofinternedciviliansor

prisoners,carryingoutoforcausingexecutiontobecarriedoutinaninhumanway,

refusalofaidorpreventionofaidbeinggiventoshipwreckedpersons,intentional

withholdingofmedicalsuppliesfromcivilians,andcommission,contrarytothe

115Ibid.174.116Ibid.174.117LawReportsofTrialsofWarCriminals,SelectedandPreparedbytheUnitedNationsWarCrimesCommission,Vol.XIIILibraryofCongress,(London,1949),123,https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-13.pdf.118FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),37.119Ibid.40-41.

34

conditionsofatruce,ofhostileactsortheincitementthereto,andthefurnishingof

otherswithinformation,theopportunity,orthemeansforthatpurpose.”120

Additionally,authoritiesintheNEIdecidedtoremoveprohibitionofexpost

factolawfromtheTemporaryCourts-Martial.121Additionally,thesuspensionof

Article1intheNetherlands,definedastheremovalexpostfactolaw,fromthe

NetherlandsPenalCodeandintheNEIalsoallowedforincreasedprosecutions.

Borchstatedinafootnotethatthesuspensionofexpostfactolawisalsofoundin

Article1oftheUSconstitution,Articles22-23oftheTreatyofRome,andArticle7of

theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.122

Inadditiontothe38offenses(33generallyacceptedandtheadded5)listed

inDecreeNo.44,Lt.Governor-GeneralvanMooksignedDecreeNo.45,addinga39th

offense,characterizedasa“radicaldeparturefromDutchpenallaw.”Thiswasthe

recognitionandadditionof“Conspiracy”asaprosecutableoffense.123Inthe

NurembergIMT,conspiracywastheoneoffourchargesincludedintheindictment

fortheNurembergIMT.124Theinclusionofconspiracyasacrimewasamajor

influenceofAmericanlaw.

Priortothetemporarycourts-martialintheNEI,thereisevidenceof

cooperationandcommunicationbetweenDutchauthoritiesinNEI,Dutch

representativesatTokyoIMT,andAmericanauthoritiesinTokyo.AletterfromA.T.120Ibid.121Ibid.41-43.122FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),41-3.123Ibid.42-43.124“InternationalMilitaryTribunalatNuremberg,”HolocaustEncyclopedia,UnitedStatesHolocaustMemorialMuseum,accessed19July2018,https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007069.

35

Lavergetothe“ActingChiefofCounsel”provedcommunicationbetweenDutch

AuthoritiesintheNEIandAmericanAuthoritiesinTokyo,aswellasameeting

betweentheNEILt.Governor-GeneralDr.H.J.VanMookandAmericanCaptain

Parsonson11February1947.125Intheattachedmemorandumregardingthe

meeting,itstatedthattherewasevidencesharedbetweenDutchandAmerican

representativesfortrialsbothintheNEIandinTokyo.126Thememorandumdidnot

haveanydirectimpactontheoutcomeoftheproceedingsintheNEI;however,itdid

showacommunicationandcooperationbetweentheUSandtheNetherlandsin

prosecutingwarcriminals.The“NetherlandsMilitaryMission”alsoshared

witnesseswithIMTFE.127ThisparticulardefensewitnesswasLt.General

NAKASHIMATetsuzo,whoatthetimewasdetainedinSumatra,NEI,andrequested

temporaryreleasetotraveltoTokyo.128ThedocumentalsostatedthatNAKASHIMA

wasinformedthathewasunderinvestigation,thathewasalsoinpoorhealthand

A.T.LavergerequestedthattheAmericansobtainonlyan“interrogatory”rather

thanhavingNAKASHIMAtraveltoTokyototestify.129

125“NetherlandsauthoritiesandAmericanConsulGeneral,”1,Box4,Folder2,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast,DigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/4/2/netherlands-authorities-and-american-consul-general.126Ibid.2.127“Witness,NAKASHIMATETSUZO,”Box4,Folder2,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaLawSchool,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast,DigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/4/2/witness-nakashima-tetsuzo.128Ibid.129Ibid.

36

Additionally,“Dutchrepresentativesalsoassistedintheinvestigationand

trialofJapanesesuspectedofwarcrimesagainstAmericans.”130Thisreferredto

Americanairmenwhoweretakenprisonerand/orexecuted.131

Moreover,theUSandtheNEIauthoritiescooperatedintakingthe

defendants’statements.132Thisdocumentalsoexplainedamisunderstanding

betweentheUSandNEIauthoritiesregardingadelayintakingstatements,which

wasamicablyresolveduponreceiptofanapologyfromtheNetherlandsliaison

officertoA.T.Laverge.133InTokyo,Dutch-Americanrelationswerecharacterizedas

overt(inpublicview),andlimited,albeitsignificant.InthetrialslocatedintheNEI

however,thestateofDutch-Americanrelationsislessvisible,andoccursprimarily

viacorrespondenceandsharingofevidenceanddocuments.Thecooperation

betweenDutchandAmericanrepresentativesattheDutchwarcrimestrialsinthe

NEIischaracterizedbycontinuouscommunication.

ThefirstcasestudyinthischapterisProsecutorv.WashioAwochi.WASHIO

wasaccusedofcommittingthewarcrimeofenforcedprostitution.WASHIOAwochi

wasbornin1886inNagasaki,Japan,butworkedinBataviafrom1920untilhis

returntoJapanon30November1941,thenreturnedtoBataviaby“order”ofthe

130PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),178.131Ibid.132“DefenseAffidavitsbyJapaneseHeldinNEI,”1,Box5,Folder4,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaLawSchool,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast,DigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/5/4/defense-affidavits-japanese-held-nei.133Ibid.

37

Japanesegovernment,inJune1942.134WASHIOAwochiwasaJapanesecivilian

hotelkeeperandowneroftheSakuraClub,“underdirectorindirectthreatof

interventionbytheJapaneseMilitaryPolice(‘Kempeitai’),womenwereforcedto

serveJapanesecivilianmenasprostitutes.”135Hewasaccusedofrunningthe

brothelintheSakuraclubSeptember1943-September1945;andthe“atleast11of

thewomenworkingasprostituteshadbeenDutchinternedinthecampat

Cideng.”136AccordingtotheUNWCC,LiesBeerhorstassistedWASHIO,withwhom

helivedsince1943,andclaimedthatBeerhorstfoundwomentoworkintheSakura

Clubaswaitresses,whowerethenforcedintoprostitution.137Thewomenandgirls

wererequiredtoearn450guilderspereveningandhaveatleast2visitorseach

night.138

Thedocumentalsostatedthatuponhiring,thewomenwereunawareofthe

brothel’sexistence.139Moreover,veryfewofthewomenwillinglyagreedtoengage

inprostitutionandWASHIOandBeerhorstoftenusedthreatsofpolicemeasures

134FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),134-5.135NinaH.B.JorgensenandDannyFriedmann,EnforcedProstitutioninInternationalLawThroughthePrismoftheDutchTemporaryCourtMartialatBatavia,Chapter31,https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=672090112009084083108116093019087076109025046003043075006119075007098120064108114095098106127035013015098003064070118098024110051055086041049118122065025082008083113036087084029010121096113105001096068123118117117031020070021031095104095125112028001117&EXT=pdf.136FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),135.137“CaseNo.76,TrialofWashioAwochi,”UNWCC,ICC,LegalToolsDatabase,122-3,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/34df8e/pdf/.138Ibid.123.139Ibid.

38

andforcetocompelthewomenandgirlstobecomewaitresses.140TheUnitedStates

LibraryofCongresspublishedselectionsin1949fromwarcrimestrials,which

elaboratedthatinfewcaseswhereprospectiveemployeesknewaboutthebrothel,

“madespecificarrangementsthattheywouldhavenothingtodowithit.”141Forhis

defense,WASHIOadmittedtohavingthebrothel,howeveritwasunderthe“orders”

ofJapaneseauthoritiesandthatLiesBeerhorstrantheentirebusiness.142On25

October1946,hewasfoundguiltyofthewarcrimeofEnforcedProstitution,and

sentencedto10yearsinprison.143HewassenttoStruiswijkprisoninBataviato

servehissentence,anddiedtherein1949.144

Prosecutorv.WashioAwochiwastriedbythetemporarycourts-martialat

Batavia,andcontinuestoberegardedasacasesettingaprecedentfortransitional

justiceandinternationallaw.Accordingtolegalscholars,theseproceedingsare

uniqueamongpost-WorldWarIItrialsfor“invokingthewarcrimesofabducting

girlsandwomenforthepurposesofenforcedprostitution.”145Moreover,itwasthe

140Ibid.141LawReportsofTrialsofWarCriminals,SelectedandPreparedbytheUnitedNationsWarCrimesCommission,Vol.XIIILibraryofCongress,(London,1949),122,https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-13.pdf.142“CaseNo.76WashioAwochi,”UNWCC,LegalToolsDatabase,123,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/34df8e/pdf/.143“TrialofWashioAwochibyaNetherlandsTemporaryCourts-MartialatBataviaSentence,”25October1946,LegalToolsDatabase,ICC,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7742fc/pdf/.144FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),138.145NinaH.B.JorgensenandDannyFriedmann,EnforcedProstitutioninInternationalLawThroughthePrismoftheDutchTemporaryCourtMartialatBatavia,Chapter31,https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=67209011200908408310811609301908707610902504600304307500611907500709812006410811409509810612703501301509800306407011809802411005105508604104911812206502508200

39

onlyforcedprostitutiontrialtranslatedtoEnglishandpublishedintheUNWar

CrimesReports.146

Inthesecondcasestudy,Prosecutorv.ShigekiMotomuraand15Tokkeitai

Members,MOTOMURAShigekiand15otherTokkeitai(Japanesenavalpolice)

memberswereaccusedofcommittingwarcrimesincluding,“massarrests,

systematicterrorismagainstcriminalsuspects,and‘repeated,regular,andlengthy

torture,’”147beginninginMarch1942untilAugust1945.148Thefourmostculpable

defendantswereSub-Lt.MOTOMURAShigeki,whowasthehighest-rankingaccused

andsecond-in-commandoftheTokkeitaiinSouthCelebes,SeniorPettyOfficer

SAKAI,MOTOMURA’sdeputy,andWarrantOfficersMINAMIandONO.149Theywere

chargedbecausethey“ordered,encouraged,orallowed”thoseundertheir

commandtocommitwarcrimes.150MOTOMURAwasalsoaccusedof“severely”

mistreatingthreeAmericanAirmenwhowerecapturedandturnedovertohimin

January1945.151Duringtheproceedings,MOTOMURAonlypartiallyadmittedtohis

crimes,includingthoseofhissubordinates(butonlythoseunderhisdirectcontrol),

8083113036087084029010121096113105001096068123118117117031020070021031095104095125112028001117&EXT=pdf.146FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),134.147Ibid.157.148LawReportsofTrialsofWarCriminals,SelectedandPreparedbytheUnitedNationsWarCrimesCommission,Vol.XIIILibraryofCongress,(London,1949),138,https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-13.pdf.149FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),158.150Ibid.151Ibid.159.

40

anddeniedmistreatmentofthoseheinterrogatedinMakassar.152All16defendants

werechargedandtriedasagroup.153MOTOMURA’sdeputy,SAKAI,admittedto

orderingmassarrests,butonlyunderdirectordersfromhissuperiors,andonly

admittedto“occasionally”striking“withtheflatof”hishand.154Inthiscase,allbut

oneofthe16defendantswerefoundguilty,and14weresentenced.155MOTOMURA

andSAKAIweresentencedtodeath,andtheremainderofthedefendantssentenced

accordingtovaryingdegreesofresponsibility.156

Prosecutorv.ShigekiMotomuraand15TokkeitaiMembersisalsoan

unprecedentedcase.Thedefendantswerechargedasagroup.157Accordingto

Article10oftheNEIStatuteofBookDecreeNo.45of1946regulated“penal

responsibilityofgroupsofpersons.”158Article10stated:

“1.Ifawarcrimeiscommittedwithintheframeworkoftheactivities

ofagroupofpersonsinsuchawaythatthecrimecanbeascribedtothat

groupasawholethecrimeshallbeconsideredtohavebeencommittedby

thatgroupandcriminalproceedingstakenagainstandsentencepassedon

152FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),159.153Ibid.138.154Ibid.159.155Ibid.160.Borchstatedinthebookthatonewasacquitted,andonediedduringtheproceedings.156Ibid.160.157Ibid.140.158LawReportsofTrialsofWarCriminals,SelectedandPreparedbytheUnitedNationsWarCrimesCommission,Vol.XIIILibraryofCongress,(London,1949),141,https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-13.pdf.

41

allmembersofthatgroup.2.Nopenaltyshallbeimposedonhimofwhomit

isprovedthathehadtakennopartinthewarcrime.”159

Article10ofDecree45madeparticipationintheKempeitaiorTokkeitaiwar

crimesbecausecommissionoftheseoffensesispartofdailyoperationsofthese

organizations.160Article10statedthatwarcrimes“committedwithinthe

frameworkoftheactivitiesofagroupofpersonsinsuchawaythatthecrimescan

beascribedtothatgroupasawhole,thecrimesshallbeconsideredtohavebeen

committedbythatgroup,andsentencepassedonallmembersofthegroup.”161It

alsostated“nopenaltyshallbeimposedonthememberforwhomitisprovedthat

hehadtakennopartinthecommissionofthecrime.”162One-thirdofJapanesewar

criminalsprosecutedbytemporarycourts-martialform1946until1949were

membersoftheKempeitaiandTokkeitai.163

Thisissimilartothearticles9and10oftheNurembergIMTcharter.Article

9statedthatmemberofacriminalorganization“maydeclare”theirmembershipin

suchanorganization.164Article10oftheCharterstated:“Incaseswhereagroupor

organizationisdeclaredcriminalbytheTribunal,thecompetentnationalauthority

ofanySignatoryshallhavetherighttobringindividualtotrialformembership

159Ibid.160FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),43-44.161Ibid.43.162Ibid.163Ibid.44.164“NurembergTrialProceedingsVol.1CharteroftheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,”AvalonProject,YaleLawSchool,LillianGoldmanLawLibrary,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.

42

thereinbeforenational,military,oroccupationcourts.Inanysuchcasethecriminal

natureofthegroupororganization”hasbeenproved.165

Article11stated“anypersonconvictedbytheTribunalmaybecharged

beforeanational,military,oroccupationcourt,referredtoinArticle10ofthis

charter,withacrimeotherthanofmembershipinacriminalgroupororganization

andsuchcourtmay,afterconvincinghim,imposeuponhimpunishment

independentofandadditionaltothepunishmentimposedbytheTribunalfor

participationinthecriminalactivitiesofsuchgroupororganization.”166Moreover,

article9ofDecree45madewarcrimesprosecutableandallowedsuperiorstobe

heldresponsibleforthewarcrimesoftheirsubordinates.167

Amongtheunprecedentednatureofthesecases,thewarcrimestrials(or

temporarycourts-martial)intheNEIhadanumberofuniquefirsts.Thetemporary

Courts-martialintheNEIweretheonlytribunaltoprosecute:thewarcrimeof

‘systematicterrorism,’168enemysoldiersforviolationofanarmistice,andwar

crimestrialsofentiregroups.169Moreover,theywerealsotheonlywarcrimescourt

withamandatorysentencingframework,andthefirsttoprosecute‘enforced

prostitution’asawarcrime.170

165Ibid.166Ibid.167FredL.Borch,MilitaryTrialsofWarCriminalsintheNetherlandsEastIndies1946-1949(London:OxfordUniversityPress,2017),51-2.PriortoWWII,warcrimeswerenotprosecutable.168Ibid.232.ThisprecedentissetintheProsecutorv.ShigekiMotomuraand15TokkeitaiMemberscase,inwhichthedefendantsperpetratedmassarrests,and“tortured”thosetheyarrested(Ibid.157).169Ibid.232.170Ibid.

43

Additionally,theproceedingsintheNEIwereuniquebecausetribunalswere

requiredtostatetheirrationalesintheirjudgments,unliketheirAmericanand

Britishcounterparts.171BasedonchangestoDutchpenallaw,anddrawingonthe

NurembergandTokyoTribunals,theDutchadaptedlawstoincreaseprosecutionof

warcrimescommittedbytheJapaneseagainstDutchnationalsintheNEI.Inthe

MOTOMURAcase,thechapterarguesthatAmericaninfluencewastop-down.There

wasnohardevidenceofDutch-Americanrelationimpactingthiscase,however,

adaptationsfromtheNurembergIMTinfluencedDutchprosecutionofthiscase.

ThereisasimilarfindingregardingtheWASHIOcase.LiketheMOTOMURAcase,

therewasnoevidentiarysupportofDutch–Americanrelationsimpactingthe

outcomeofthecase,however,herethiscasehastheoppositeeffect.TheWASHIO

caseinfluencedmoderninternationallaw,andinthatwayimpactedDutch-

Americanrelations.TheimpactoftheprecedentsetbytheWASHIOcasereachesfar

beyondthecontextofthecaseanditsoutcomeandisusedinmodernwarcrimes

trials.172

171Ibid.52.172ValerieOosterveld,“SexualSlaveryandtheInternationalCriminalCourt:AdvancingInternationalLaw,”MichiganJournalofInternationalLaw25,no.3(2004):167,https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1264&context=mjil.

44

Chapter4:DenialofResponsibilityandtheDeathPenalty:

AtrocitiesinNanking

TherearefoursignificantcasespertainingtoJapaneseWarCrimestrialsfor

atrocitiescommittedinNanking,thoseinvolvingdefendants:BaronKokiHIROTA,

GeneralMATSUIIwane,OSHIMAHiroshi,andGeneralMUTOAkira.Thischapterwill

examinetheHIROTA,MUTO,andMATSUIcasesin-depth,andinordertobetter

addressthecentralquestionofDutch-Americanrelations,willalsoexaminethe

OSHIMAcase.Allfourdefendantsweretriedfortheirconnectiontothe‘Rapeof

Nanking,’andatrocitiesinChinafromtheinvasionofNankingcontinuinguntil1945.

NankingfelltoJapaneseforceson13December1937,thiswaslaterdescribedatthe

IMTFEas“crimesagainsthumanityineveryprovinceinChinaoccupiedbyJapanese

troops.”173TheprosecutionlistedatrocitiesthatoccurredinNankingincluding“(1)

massacreandmurder,(2)torture,(3)rape,(4)Robbery,looting,andwanton

destructionofproperty.”174TheoccurrenceandsubsequenteffectsofDutch-

AmericanrelationsattheIMTFEwithinthecontextofthesecasestudiesandthe

broadercontextofClassAcriminalsfortheRapeofNankingwasnoteworthy,

howeverlimited.Theevidencesuggestsanumberofoverlaps,includingJustice

Röling’sdissentionontheHIROTAcase,includingaconnectiontoNazileadersand

JapaneseactivityduringthistimeintheNEI.Fundamentally,thecrimesrequired

173AllMilitaryAggression-SummaryofEvidenceandNoteofArgument,30,Box25,Folder3,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/25/3/all-military-aggression-summary-evidence-and-note-argument174Ibid.

45

someconnectiontotheNEIoraninputfromJusticeRölingfortonecessitate

significantinputfromDutchrepresentativesattheIMTFE.

Inthefirstcasestudy,BaronHIROTAKokiwasbornon14February1878;

heservedastheJapanesePrimeMinisterfromMarch1935untilFebruary1937,

ForeignMinister1933-36,andAmbassadortotheSovietUnion1928-31.Hewasthe

onlycivilianexecutedbyIMTFEruling,atSugamoprisononDecember23,1948.175

BaronHIROTA’sconvictionswereonCounts1(Conspiracy),27(WarofAggression),

and55(ViolationofLawsandCustomsofWar).176IncludedinCount55wasthe

ViolationoftheLawsandCustomsofWaragainstmultipleAlliedNations,including

boththeUnitedStatesandtheKingdomoftheNetherlands.177Notably,almostallof

thedefensecounselsattheIMTFEwereAmerican—includinginHIROTA’scase.Mr.

DavidM.SmithandMr.GeorgeYamaokaservedasAmericanAssociatelegalCounsel

forHIROTAKoki.178Mr.GeorgeYamaokaalsoservedasAmericanAssociateDefense

CounselforKokiHIROTA.Notably,YamaokawasalsothefirstJapanese-Americanto

beappointedtotheNewYorkStateBar.179JusticeB.V.A.Rölingdissentedfromthe

175UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,People,BaronKokiHirota,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-347.176CountsonCrimesAgainstPeace.Box3,Folder4,RoyL.MorganPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/morgan/3/4/counts-crimes-against-peace.177Ibid.3178UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,People,Mr.DavidF.Smith.http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors/david-f-smith.179UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,People,Mr.GeorgeYamaoka,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-21

46

majorityopinioninthiscase,inwhichhearguedforHIROTA’sacquittalbasedon

evidentiarysupportofhisinterventiontosupportforeignersinNankingproviding

assistancetorefugees,andtheseparationbetweencivilandmilitaryleadershipthat

RölingarguedwasnotwithinHIROTA’sjurisdictiontointerveneinmilitary

matters.180

Inthiscase,therewasasomewhatadversarialrolebetweentheUnited

StatesandtheNetherlands,throughthisAmericanserviceonthedefensecounsel—

Americanswereworkingonbothsidesofthebench.Withinthecontextofthiscase,

thedirectinvolvementoftheNetherlandsandrelationsbetweentheUnitedStates

andtheNetherlandswaslimited.Itisclearthattherewasamarkeddifferenceof

opinionbetweentheDutchandAmericanrepresentationattheIMTFE,andthe

somewhatadversarialroleofAmericansservingonboththedefenseand

prosecution,andthepresenceoftheDutchJusticeB.V.A.Röling.

Inthenextcasestudy,GeneralMATSUIIwanewasthecommanderof

JapaneseforcesinNanking.Matsuiwasbornon27July1878,andwasthe

commanderoftheShanghaiExpeditionaryForceduringtheRapeofNanking.181The

prosecutionstatedwithevidentiarysupportthatthecrimescommittedinNanking

were“typical,”and“numerous.”182GeneralMATSUIwasconvictedonlyoncount

180IMTFE,12November1948,OpinionofMr.JusticeRoling,MemberfortheNetherlands,191-210.https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fb16ff/pdf/.181UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,People,GeneralIwaneMatsui,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-351.182TrialTranscriptAugust15,1946,3887,Box8,Folder1,RoyL.MorganPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,

47

55.183HewasthenhangedatSugamoPrisonon23December1948.184Inadditionto

thecrimeshecommittedinChina,MATSUIwasalsochargedwithcrimesagainstthe

SovietUnionincluding“undeclaredaggressivewar,”and“subversiveactivities.”185

TrialtranscriptsalsooutlinedcollusionbetweenRibbentropandOSHIMAagainst

“communist”policiesinChina.186Asaresult,JusticeRölingpublishedinhis

judgmentthatheagreedwiththedeathpenaltyforthiscase.187

AlettermentionedawitnessfordefendantMutonamedNAKAYAMAYasuto;

thisletterindicatedcooperationbetweenauthoritiesintheNetherlandsEastIndies

andAmericanauthoritiesinTokyoforprosecutionofJapanesewarcriminalsforthe

RapeofNanking.188Theletteralsoinquiredastowhetherthiswitnesswouldbe

http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/morgan/8/1/trial-transcript-august-15-1946.183Count55istheviolationoftheLawsandCustomsofWarregardingPrisonersofWarandciviliansintheRepublicofChina.JudgmentInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast,Indictment(Excerpts),5,http://www.history.ubc.ca/sites/default/files/courses/documents/%5Brealname%5D/imtfe_indictment_excerpts_0.pdf.184Ibid.185MATSUIIwane-Analysis-RussianDivision,Box9,Folder7,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/9/7/matsui-iwane-analysis-russian-division.186TrialTranscriptAugust9,1946,3618-3622,Box8,Folder1,RoyL.MorganPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheinternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/morgan/8/1/trial-transcript-august-9-1946. 187IMTFE,12November1948,OpinionofMr.JusticeRoling,MemberfortheNetherlands,178.https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fb16ff/pdf/.188UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,Witness,Nakayama,Yasuto,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/4/3/witness-nakayama-yasuto.

48

abletotestifyonJapanese-Netherlandsrelations.189Thisdocumentshowsahighly

interconnectednetworkofcrimesagainstAlliednationsandtheirformerrelations.

Intheletter,AssistantProsecutorA.T.LavergeaccusedNAKAYAMAofengagingin

“espionage,”andpreparationsfortheJapaneseinvasionofJava.190Thisisespecially

notablebecauseithighlightsapotentialconnectionbetweenJapanandcrimes

againsttheNetherlands.NAKAYAMAYasutowasrequestedtotestifyforthedefense

inMUTO’scase,todenyMUTO’sinvolvementwiththeatrocitiescommittedby

JapaneseforcedinChina.191Laterinthissameletter,Lavergeelaboratedthat

NAKAYAMAwaspartoftheJapaneseEconomicDelegationtotheNetherlandsin

1940-1941,andagainin1942astheHeadoftheGeneralAffairsDepartmentinthe

JavaMilitaryAdministration.192NAKAYAMAwaslistedasaknowledgeablesource

ofinformationregardingDutch-JapaneserelationspriortoandduringtheSecond

WorldWar.JusticeRölingwroteinhisdissentingopinioninhischargeof

ConventionalWarCrimesthatHIROTA,“withoutanydoubt”shouldbeacquitted,193

andfurthermore,not“heldresponsiblefortheatrocities”asoutlinedinconnection

totheRapeofNanking.194

GeneralMUTOAkirawasbornon15December1892,andfunctionedasthe

ViceChiefofStaffoftheChinaExpeditionaryForcein1937.195GeneralMUTOwas

189Ibid.190Ibid.191Ibid.192Ibid.193IMTFE,12November1948,OpinionofMr.JusticeRöling,MemberfortheNetherlands,191,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fb16ff/pdf/.194Ibid.207.195UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,People,Gen.AkiraMuto,

49

foundguiltybytheIMTFEonCounts1,27,29,31,32,54,and55.Hewassentenced

todeathandhangedon23December1948.196MUTOtestifiedforthedefense,

claimingthatMATSUIissuedspecificinstructions.197Theseinstructionsincluded

“refrain”from“makinganyillegalacts,”“maintenanceofmilitarymorale,”

prohibitiontobemetwith“severepunishment”of“plunder”or“carelessness.”198

ThisfunctionedasadefenseforMATSUI’sroleinTheRapeofNanking,anattempt

toshowthatMATSUIactuallytriedtopreventtheseatrocitiesfromoccurring.

InhisIMTFEstatement,MUTOoutlinedthethreedivisionsoftheJapanese

OperationalPlan.OperationalPlanAwastargetedagainstAmericabutonlyplanned

operationsagainstthePhilippines.OperationPlanBwasagainsttheSovietUnion,

andaccordingtoMUTOwasexecuted“thoroughly.”199MUTOfinallydescribedPlan

C,whichwasdirectedatChina.Hethendeniedthattherewasnoexistingplanof

attackagainstBritainorHolland.200Thisisespeciallyinterestingbecauseit

contradictedAssistantProsecutorA.T.Laverge’sunderstandingofJapanese

involvementofwithwarcrimesagainstDutchsubjects.ThisalsodistancedMUTO

fromcrimesagainsttheNetherlandsandwasevasivewhendescribingcrimes

againsttheAlliednations,byexplainingPlanA’sindirectattackontheUnitedStateshttp://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-291.196Ibid.197InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast,TranscriptofProceedings,12May1947,21,895,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ac2917/pdf/.198Ibid.21,895-21,897.199StatementofGeneralMuto,Box2,Folder1,G.CarringtonWilliamsPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/carrington-williams/2/1/statement-general-muto.200Ibid.

50

byattackingthePhilippines.Thisisalsosignificantbecauseitblatantlydeniesany

plannedattackagainstHolland.

FormergeneralMUTOwasalsochargedfor“aggressiveacts”againstthe

SovietUnionduringalaterpostofastheDirectoroftheMilitaryAffairsBureau.201

Mutowasfoundguiltyoncounts1,27,29(aggressivewaragainstUS),31

(aggressivewaragainstBritishCommonwealth),32(aggressivewaragainst

Netherlands),54,and55.202MUTOwasfoundnotresponsibleforwarcrimes

committedinNanking,butwasconvictedforwarcrimesinthePhilippines,because

hispositioninthePhilippinesgavehimtheauthority—andtheresponsibility—to

“influencepolicy.”203MUTOwassubsequentlyhangedon23December1948.204For

thiscase,JusticeRölingstatedinhisseparatejudgmentthatheagreedwiththe

deathpenalty.205

InthefinalcasestudyregardingNanking,OSHIMAHiroshiservedasthe

JapaneseambassadortoGermanyfrom1938-39and1941-45.206OSHIMAwasakey

201MUTOAkira-Analysis-RussianDivision,Box9,Folder7,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/9/7/muto-akira-analysis-russian-division.202“AkiraMuto,”TrialInternational,lastmodified7June2016,https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/akira-muto/.203TokyoJudgmentContents,PartBChapterVIIIConventionalWarCrimes.(Atrocities),1185-1186,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/454c01/pdf/.204Ibid.205IMTFE,12November1948,OpinionofMr.JusticeRöling,MemberfortheNetherlands,178,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fb16ff/pdf/.206UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,People,“Gen.HiroshiOshima,”http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-156.

51

linkbetweentheFarEastandEuropewithregardtobothAxispowersandwar

crimes.HefrequentlyworkedwithNaziGermany’sForeignMinisterJoachimvon

RibbentropinperpetratingcrimesagainstChinaandtheSovietUnion.

FormerIMTFEreporterArnoldC.BrackmancitedOSHIMA’sassociationwith

NazibigwigsincludingHitlerandHimmler,referredtohimas“moreNazithanthe

Nazis”attheIMTFE.Uponhearinghissentence,BrackmanrecalledthatOSHIMA

“stooddefiantlyatattention,”unlikeotherdefendantsandformercolleagues,who

bowedorsimplywalkedoutofthecourtroomafterhearingtheirfate.207Brackman

statedOSHIMA’sloveofGermanyandGermanculture,andnotedthatheworked

closelywithNaziforeignministerJoachimvonRibbentrop,whosecrimesagainst

theNetherlandsremaintheonlylooseconnectionbetweentheNetherlandsand

defendantOSHIMA.On27October1940,OSHIMAwroteintheYo-Murinewspaper

ofapossibilityoffurtheringrelations“ofmutualharmonyandprosperity”inthe

NetherlandsEastIndies,FrenchIndo-China,India,andtheSouthSeaIslands.208

OSHIMAarguedthatthispolicy“settledtherelationshipofthisareawiththeNew

OrderinEurope…pointsonwhichconsultationwithGermanyandItalyis

necessary.”209Thisquoteissignificantbecauseitoutlinedaconnectionbetween

GermanandJapanesewarcriminalsandtheirconnectiontocrimesagainstthe

Netherlands.ThisalsopointstoadirectconnectionbetweenIMTFErulingsand207ArnoldC.Brackman,TheOtherNuremberg,TheUntoldStoryoftheTokyoWarCrimesTrials,(NewYork:WilliamMorrowandCompany,Inc.,1987),383.208 “Doc.587-ArticlesbyOshimain27October1940EditionofYo-MuriNewspaper,”UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,4,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/10/2/doc-587-articles-oshima-27-october-1940-edition-yo-miuri-newspaper.209Ibid.

52

crimescommittedagainsttheNetherlands,justiceforwhichinvolvedbothDutch

andAmericanrepresentatives.OSHIMAwaschargedwithcounts20,37,38,53,and

55.210AttheIMTFE,OSHIMApleadedthatheremainedundertheprotectionof

diplomaticimmunity;however,theTribunalfoundthatthisimmunitydoesnot

applytocrimesagainstinternationallawoverwhichaninternationaltribunalhas

jurisdiction.211OSHIMAwasultimatelyfoundguiltyundercount1.212Hewas

sentencedtolifeinprison,butwasparoledin1955andgrantedclemencyin

1958.213

JoachimvonRibbentropwasknownforhisroleastheMinisterofForeign

AffairsofNaziGermanyfrom1938-1945.Hewasindictedandfoundguiltyonall

fourCounts214attheInternationalMilitaryTribunalinNuremberg;hewasaccused

ofhavingknowledgeofandofparticipatinginimplementinggenocidalpolicy

throughoutEurope.On18May1940,RibbentropsignedadecreethatplacedDr.

ArthurSeyss-InquartinchargeoftheNetherlandsunderGermanAuthorityduring

210IndictmentforIMTFEhttp://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/tokyo.anklageschrift.pdf.211“HiroshiOshima,”TrialInternational,https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/hiroshi-oshima/.212LegalToolsDatabase,IMTFE,TokyoJudgmentContents,PartB.,ChapterVIII,ConventionalWarCrimes,1189,https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/454c01/pdf/.213“HiroshiOshima,”TrialInternational,https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/hiroshi-oshima/.214ThechargesoftheNurembergInternationalMilitaryTribunal:1.Conspiracytocommitthefollowingcharges;2.Crimesagainstpeace;3.Warcrimes;and4.Crimesagainsthumanity.“TheNurembergTrials,”USHMM,accessed27June2018,https://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007722.

53

thewar.215IntheNurembergInternationalMilitaryTribunalJudgment,Ribbentrop

wassaidtohavehadadvanceknowledgeofattacksonDenmark,Norway,andthe

LowCountries,andpreparedtheofficial[German]ForeignOfficedocumentation

justifyingtheseactions.216Ribbentrop’scrimesagainsttheNetherlands,andhis

extensiveconnectionswithOSHIMAHiroshiandotherJapaneseofficialsservesasa

noteworthylinkbetweentheEuropeanandPacifictheatersofthewaranda

evidenceofcooperationbetweenGermanyandJapan.ThoughRibbentropdidnot

commitcrimesagainsttheNEIortheNetherlands,hemaintainedcloseassociations

withthosewhodid,includingSeyss-InquartandOSHIMA.

Overall,itwastheAmericanrepresentativesattheIMTFE,withlimitedalbeit

remarkableinputfromtheirDutchcounterpartswhoaddressedprosecutionofthe

crimesandatrocitiescommittedinNanking.Themostsignificant,tangibleimpactof

Dutch-Americanrelations—specificallytheircooperation—asrelatedtocrimesin

NankingwasJusticeRöling’sparticipationintheproceedingsandhissubsequent

dissentioninBaronHIROTA’scase.

Thereisalsoabroadconnectiondrawnbetweenthesecasesandthe

Netherlands,evidentthroughtheconnectiontoRibbentropwhowasconvictedfor

crimesagainsttheNetherlandsandasmallamountofDutchinvolvementinthese

casesintheIMTFE.AmericanhistorianDonaldM.McKale217examinedNazi

215InternationalMilitaryTribunal,VolumeV,“OfficialTextintheEnglishLanguage,Proceedings9January1946-21January1946,”LibraryofCongress,16,https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-V.pdf.216“Judgment:Ribbentrop,”TheAvalonProject,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judribb.asp.217“McKale,DonaldM.,”Faculty,ClemsonHistory,

54

penetrationofEastAsia,thatthefirstFarEasternNaziPartychapterwas

establishedinHankow,Chinain1931.218ProfessorMcKalearguedthatNaziracial

ideologyandGermancommunitiesinEastAsiaincludingChina,Japan,India,andthe

NetherlandsEastIndieswereconsidered“pawnsofGermanpolicy.”219McKalealso

statedthatGermanychosetosupportJapansteadofChinaafterthestartofthe

Sino-Japanesewarin1937.220

Dutch-AmericanrelationspertinenttothetrialsofJapanesecriminalsin

Nanking(asrelatedtothecasesexaminedinthischapter)havesomelinktothe

NetherlandsEastIndies.Inthesecases,aconnectiontotheNetherlandsEastIndies

wasestablishedinorderfortheretobeasignificantamountofDutch-American

cooperationtotakeplace.ThereisanoveralllimitedevidenceofDutch-American

cooperationandrelationsinthesecases.EvidenceofDutch-Americanrelations

relatedtocrimesinNankingconnectionislimitedtoRöling’sdissentioninthe

HIROTAcase,acases’connectiontotheNetherlandsEastIndies,anddiplomacy

betweenOSHIMAandRibbentrop.

http://www.clemson.edu/caah/departments/history/people/facultyBio.html?id=395.218DonaldM.McKale,TheNaziPartyintheFastEast,1931-45,JournalofContemporaryHistory12(1977),292.219Ibid.291.220Ibid.301.

55

Chapter5:CrimesinManchuria

JapanesewarcrimesinChinaextendedbeyondNanking.Japanesetroops

invadedManchuriaandsetupapuppetstate,Manchuko.AccordingtoCount18of

theIndictment,membersoftheJapanesemilitarycommittedcrimesinManchuria

including“awarofaggressionandawarinviolationofinternationallaw,treaties,

agreementsandassurances,againsttheRepublicofChina.”221Thedetailsofthese

crimesincludedmilitaryandeconomicaggression,production,anddistributionof

narcotics.222

Arguably,thewarbeganforChinain1931duringtheMukdenincident.223In

theMukdenincidenton18September1931,anexplosiondestroyedaportionof

railwaytracksnearMukden.224Theowners—whowereJapanese—blamedChinese

nationalists,andtheJapaneseinvadedManchuriainretaliation.225American

interventionoccurredviatheLyttonCommissionandReport,whichwascomprised

ofagroupfromtheLeagueofNations,thisincludedone“unofficialdelegate”from

theUnitedStates,toinvestigatetheMukdenincident.226TheLyttonReportfound

thatitwouldnotrecognizeManchukobecauseitwasinviolationofthe“territorial

221“FullIndictment,”7,Box1,Folder3,G.CarringtonWilliamsPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/carrington-williams/1/3/full-indictment.222Ibid.16-18.223IshiiShinpei,TheCanarythatForgotitsSong:AReturntoWartimeManchuria,Manoa,vol.13no.1,Summer2001,37.224“TheMukdenIncidentof1931andtheStimsonDoctrine,”OfficeoftheHistorian,U.S.DepartmentofState,https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/mukden-incident.225Ibid.226Ibid.

56

integrityofChina.”227AfteritsratificationbytheLeagueofNationsin1933,Japan

lefttheLeague.228

WhiletherewerewarcrimestrialsforClassBandCcriminalsinManchuria,

thischapterwillexaminethecasesfordefendantstriedatTokyo,TOJOHidekiand

ITAGAKISeishiro—bothofwhomwereclassAcriminals—forthecrimesthey

committedinManchuria. AJapanesedoctor,OKAWAShumei,becamefamousfor

slappingTOJO“attheopeningofthetrials…onthehead.”229Hewassubsequently

removedfromthecourtroomandadmittedtotheMatsuzawahospital’swestwing

forpsychiatrictreatment.230Areportfrom7December1946regardingDr.

OKAWA’sconditionnotedthathe“hasimprovedgreatly,”“nolongerbabbles

Germanlikeaninsaneperson,”andwasin“goodspirits.”231AnAssociatedPress

newsarticlestatedfrom10December1946statedthatOKAWAhadalmost

recoveredandwillstandtrialagain,232showingtheimportanceandhighstakesof

TOJO’strial.ThischapterwillarguethatAmericaninvolvementwasmoreintensive

thanthatoftheNetherlands,althoughDutchjusticeRölingdidmentionboth

defendants,TOJOHidekiandITAGAKISeishiroinhisseparatejudgment.According

227Ibid.228Ibid.229“Dr.OKAWAinInsaneAsylum,”Box3,Folder7,TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/3/7/dr-okawa-insane-asylum.230Ibid.231Ibid.232“NewsClippingJapWhoSlappedTojoCured-WillFaceTrialAgain,”TavennerPapersandIMTFEOfficialRecords,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/3/7/news-clipping-jap-who-slapped-tojo-cured-will-face-trial-again.

57

toPhilipR.Piccigallo,“nonationsustainedmorevictimsofJapanesewarcrimes

thanChina.”233Thedefendantinthefirstcasestudy,TOJOHideki,wasborninTokyo

on30December1884.234JapansurrenderedtotheAllieson2September1945,and

the“initialorder,listingPrimeMinisterTOJOtobearrested,wentoutSeptember10

[1945].”235TOJOwasconsideredJosephB.Keenan’sprincipaldefendant,themajor

warcriminalAmericanprosecutorJosephB.Keenansoughttoconvict.236TOJO

becameprimeministerinOctober1941,andlegalnon-governmentalorganization

TrialInternationalarguedthathewas“personallyresponsibleforwagingwarinthe

Pacificand…orderedtheattackonPearlHarboron7December1941.”237From

February1944hewasCommanderinChiefoftheGeneralStaff,andresignedJulyof

thesameyearafterthelossofSaipan.238TOJOwasfoundguiltyoncounts1,27,29,

31,32,33,and54.Hewassentencedtodeathon12November1948,andhangedon

23December1948.239

TOJOwasincommandof“armyoverseasoperations”whentheMukden

incidentoccurred,andduringthesubsequentseizureofManchuriaandthenorth

Chinaprovinces;thesettingupoftheRegency,andthefirstuseofforcebyJapanto

233PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),158.234 “HidekiTojo,”TrialInternational,lastmodified07/06/2016,https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/hideki-tojo/. 235Ibid.45.236TimothyMaga,JudgmentatTokyo:TheJapaneseWarCrimesTrials,(Lexington:TheUniversityPressofKentucky,2001),44.237“HidekiTojo,”TrialInternational,lastmodified07/06/2016,https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/hideki-tojo/.238Ibid.239Ibid.

58

gainitsoverseasexpansion,hemustbechargedwithwhattookplace.”240This

documentalsostatedthatTOJOheldmany“important”positionsthataccelerated

Japan’spreparationforwar.241Theprosecutionalsoarguedthatregardingthe

aerialbombardmentofChina,TOJO’slackofinterventionandfailuretocondemn

theseactionsmeantthathesupporteditandwastobeheldresponsible.242

Moreover,hewasheldresponsiblefordemandsmadeunderthreatofforceagainst

theNetherlandsEastIndies(NEI),aswellas“infiltrationintoenterprisesand

investments”byJapaneselivingintheNEI.243

InTOJO’scase,therewereAmericansbothintheprosecutionandthe

defense.HisleadingdefensecounselswereI.KiyoseofJapan,andAmericanGeorge

FrancisBlewett,whosummarizedTOJO’sdefenseinsevenpoints.244Thefirstpoint

ofdefensewas“Japanhadneitherplannednorpreparedbeforehandforthewar

againsttheUnitedStates,Britain,andtheNetherlands.”245Thesecondpointwas

“hostilitiesagainsttheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,andtheNetherlandswere

provokedbytheAlliednations,andwereunavoidablyinstitutedbyJapaninself-

defenseandforself-existence.”246Theactionsdescribedinpointnumbertwowere

theresultoftheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,andtheNetherlands’issuanceoforders240402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast;papersfromtheinternationalprosecutionsection,Netherlands,andJudgeB.V.A.Röling;249XXTOJOHideki,3. 241Ibid.8.242Ibid.11.243Ibid.22.244402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersfromtheinternationalprosecutionsection,NetherlandsandjudgeB.V.A.Röling;283:OpeningStatement:TOJOHideki:IndividualDefense,bycounsel:I.KiyoseandG.F.Blewett,1.245Ibid.2.246Ibid.4-5.

59

tofreezeJapaneseassetson26July1941.247Thesefirsttwopointsarealso

interestingbecausetheystatetheirentranceintothewarasadefenseratherthan

anoffense,andstatedtheAlliesprovokedtheJapanese.

Thethirdsummarizingpointis“theJapanesegovernmentscrupulously

preparedtodeliveredthelawfulnegotiationsofwartotheUnitedStatesof

Americanpriortothecommencementofhostilities.”248Numberfourstatedthe

“truepurportandsignificanceoftheGreaterEastAsiaPolicy.”249Forpointfour,the

defensearguedthepurposeofthispolicywasoften“distorted”byAlliednationsand

thatitwas,infact,for“securingpoliticalfreedom…theemancipationofEastAsia

thenthemutualcooperationfortheestablishmentofEastAsia.”250

Numberfivecalledfor“thenon-existenceoftheso-called‘Militaristic

Clique.’”251Thesixthpointadvocated“theIndependenceoftheSupremeCommand

andthefunctionsoftheLiaisonandtheImperialConference.”252Thefinal

summarizingpointofthedefensiveargumentwas“thedominantcharacteristicsof

theMilitaryAdministrationexercisedbyTOJOconsistedinajustcontroland

disciplineofthemilitarysystem,andheneitherordersfor,tolerated,norconnived

atanyinhumanacts.”253

TOJOonlymadeapartialadmissionofhisguilt.Heassumedresponsibility

for:1.TreatmentofPOWsatdetentioncampsunderMinistryofWarandofcivilian

247Ibid.5.248Ibid.6.249Ibid.7.250Ibid.8.251Ibid.9.252Ibid.11.253Ibid.12.

60

interneesinternedinwarzones,exceptforChina;2.“administrativeresponsibility

incumbentontheSupremeCommandasChiefofthegeneralstaff,”February-July

1944;and3.administrativeresponsibilityasMinisterofForeignAffairs“in

connectionwithprotestsinforeigncountries,orthroughtheInternationalRed

Cross,”1-17September1942.254

Additionally,TOJOwasconsideredtohaveknownandfailedtointervenein

theHolocaust.255TheprosecutionclaimedtohavedocumentsfromSHINPEIIshii

thatprovedTOJO’sknowledgeofHitler’sinvasionofHollandandpersecutionofthe

Jews.256Thoughtheprosecutiondidnotspecifywhatthesedocumentswere,they

werelistedasexhibitsfortheprosecution,andtheysoughttodrawaconnectionto

crimescommittedbyTOJO’sEuropeanallies.Despitethis,therewaslittle

documentationtosupportsignificantDutchinterventionanduproarregarding

TOJO’scase.

TAKAYANAGIKenzo,counselfordefendantSUZUKITeiichi,wrotearesponse

withG.F.BlewetttotheprosecutionforTOJO’scase.Init,hestatedthattheIMTFE

wasnotaproperMilitarycourtoperatingina“peaceful”settingandthatthe

defendantswerestatesmennotfelons.257TAKAYANAGIalsoargued“theTribunalis

254402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersfromtheinternationalprosecutionsection,NetherlandsandjudgeB.V.A.Röling;249XXTOJOHideki:56.255402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersfromtheinternationalprosecutionsection,NetherlandsandjudgeB.V.A.Röling;249XXTOJOHideki;29.256Ibid.257402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersfromtheinternationalprosecutionsection,NetherlandsandjudgeB.V.A.Roling;286:SectionB,ArgumentonLaw:answerofthedefensetotheProsecution’sargumenton

61

wellawarethathistoryisrepletewithinstanceswherethedeathpenaltyimposed

onapoliticalorreligiousleadernotonlypurgesallhisoffences,butmagicallylends

glorytoanotherwiseprosaiclife.”258Withthisquote,TAKAYANAGIattackedthe

Tribunal’sdecisiontoindictandtryleaders,bystatingthatitwillnotbe

constructive,butwillinfactmakethemmartyrs.Hestatedthattheeffectofsuch

actionsis“settingacruelexampleto,andchillingtheenthusiasmof,theJapanese

people”withregardtotheirnewconstitution,and“theruleagainstexpostfacto

penalizationforminganintegralpartthereof.”259TAKAYANAGIarguedthatthevery

essenceofwhatwasoccurringwassettingapoorprecedentforpost-warJapan.He

continuedbystatingthatthiswould“createanenduringimpression…thatthere

couldbeonelawforthevictorsandanotherforthevanquished”260Thisdocument

appearedtobeanattempttoquestionthestandardsandeventhelegitimacyofthe

IMTFE.Moreover,TAKAYANAGIappearedtohintattheVictors’Justiceargument

thatcomprisedthedichotomyofopinioninscholarshipregardingtheseevents.At

theendofthedocument,TAKAYANAGIcalledontheTribunalto“abidestrictly”by

thelaw.261AccordingtoPiccigallo,“theU.S…spearheadedtheinvestigation.”262In

Internationallaw,byK.Takayanagi,counselforSuzuki,andG.F.Blewett,counselforTOJO,152.258Ibid.157.259Ibid.157.260Ibid.157.261Ibid.157.262PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),34.

62

thiscase,therewaslittletonoDutchintervention.TheAmericansprimarilyran

TOJO’strial,andJusticeRölingagreedwithhissentencetodeath.263

Thesecondcasestudyofthischapter,thatofdefendantITAGAKISeishiro,

whowasbornintotheSamuraiclasson23January1885.264ITAGAKIwastheChief

ofStaffoftheKwantungArmy1936-1937,MinisterofWar1938-1939,andheldthe

rankofGeneral.265ITAGAKIwaschiefoftheintelligencesectionoftheKwantung

army,“responsibleforplanningJapaneseaggressionintoChinathatledtothe1931

Mukdenincident.”266

AttheIMTFE,AmericanFloydJ.Mattice,andhisJapaneseheadofcounsel

YAMADAHanzo,andfourJapanesecounselrepresentedhim.267ITAGAKIwasfound

guiltyoncounts1,27,29,31,32,35,36,and54.268Hewassentencedtodeathand

hangedon23December1948.269Accordingtotheprosecution,hewasfoundtobe

instrumentalincreatingthepuppetstateManchukoandinstallingDOIHARAasthe

263OpinionofMr.JusticeRoling,12November1948,LegalToolsDatabase,ICC,IMTFE,178.https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/462134/pdf/.264402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersoftheInternationalProsecutionSection,NetherlandsandJudgeBVARoling;1075:ITAGAKI,Seishiro:pp.1.265“Gen.SeishiroItagaki,”People,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,”http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-334. 266“Gen.SeishiroItagaki,”People,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,”http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-334. 267Ibid.268Ibid.269Ibid.

63

mayorofMukden.270TheyalsoarguedthatITAGAKIwasinvolvedinsettingupthe

OpiumMonopolyBureau,underwhichopiumwasgrownandsold.271Thedocument

alsoarguedthathewashighlyinvolvedinthe“conspiracy.”272Attheendofthe

documents,theprosecutionarguedinbothhismilitaryandgovernmentalroles,

ITAGAKI“consistentlyinitiatedaggressionandcommittedcrimesagainstpeaceand

crimesagainsthumanity.”273Thedefense’sopeningstatement,however,arguedthe

ITAGAKIplayedno“culpable”roleincausingwaragainsttheUnitedStates,

Thailand,thePhilippines,GreatBritain,andtheNetherlands.274

Aninterestingpointofcontentionregardingbothdefendantsistheuseofthe

wordandchargeofconspiracy.Conspiracywaslistedundercount1intheIMTFE

Indictment.275ItwasusedinCount1attheNurembergInternationalMilitary

Tribunal.276TAKAYANAGIKenzocallsthecrimeofconspiracy“remarkableforits

comprehensivenessandvagueness.”277IntheArgumentonBehalfoftheAccused,

270402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersoftheInternationalProsecutionSection,NetherlandsandJudgeBVARoling;233:HH:ITAGAKAISeishiro;pp.6-7.271Ibid.11.272Ibid.29.273Ibid.30.274402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast;papersoftheInternationalProsecutionSection,NetherlandsandJudgeB.V.A.Roling;272:OpeningStatement:IndividualDefenseofItagakiSeishiro,1.275“FullIndictment,”3,Box1,Folder3,G.CarringtonWilliamsPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,TheInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/carrington-williams/1/3/full-indictment.276“InternationalMilitaryTribunalatNuremberg,”HolocaustEncyclopedia,UnitedStatesHolocaustMemorialMuseum,https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007069.277“ConspiracyArticlebyKenzoTakayanagi,”2,Box2,folder3,C.CarringtonWilliamsPapers,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,

64

writtenbyITAGAKI’sdefense,alsochallengedUSlaw,bystating,“courtsinthe

UnitedStateshaverepeatedlyheldanindictmentwhichchargesonethingand

another,usingtheconjunctive“or,”doesnotchargeanything,butisindefiniteand

uncertain.”278ThisisinterestingbecauseitnotedachallengeofUSingeneralbythe

defense.Moreover,thisisnotsurprisingbecausetheAmericanswerechiefly

involvedinrunningtheTokyoIMT,andthedefensecalledthischargeacatchallto

increaseprosecutions.

AccordingtotheUniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw’sIMTFEonlinearchive,

duringITAGAKI’stenureasministerofwar,“headvisedtheFiveMinisters

ConferenceonpoliciesregardingJewswithinthebordersofJapan,Manchuria,and

China.279IntheArgumentonBehalfoftheAccused,ITAGAKI’slegalteamcitedthe

OttTelegramof6September1939,whichrevealed,“ITAGAKIworkedhardto

strengthentherelationsbetweenJapanandGermany,butitdefinitelyrecognized

thathefailedtodoinconsequenceofthechangeinEuropeansituation.”280Inthis

caseJusticeRölingalsoagreedwithITAGAKI’ssentencetodeath.281

http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/carrington-williams/2/3/conspiracy-article-kenzo-takayanagi.278Ibid.258.279“Gen.SeishiroItagaki,”People,UniversityofVirginiaSchoolofLaw,InternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEastDigitalCollection,”http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-334.280402_ENGInternationalMilitaryTribunalfortheFarEast:papersoftheInternationalProsecutionSection,NetherlandsandJudgeBVARöling;272:OpeningStatement:IndividualDefenseofItagakiSeishiro;pp.164-165.281OpinionofMr.JusticeRoling,12November1948,LegalToolsDatabase,ICC,IMTFE,178.https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/462134/pdf/.

65

Dutch-Americanrelationsregardingthiscasewerelimited.JusticeRöling

agreedwiththesentencesregardingbothTOJOandITAGAKI.Bothdefendantswere

chargedwithcrimesagainsttheNetherlands,butbothcaseshadsubstantial

involvementfromtheAmericans,whichwastypicalofClassAdefendantswhowere

triedinTokyo.RegardingTOJO’sknowledgeofpersecutionofJewsandofHitler’s

invasionofHolland,andcrimesagainsttheNEI,therewasclearlyanimpactofthis

caseontheDutchattheIMTFE—theywereaffectedbythecrimesofdefendant

TOJO,however,theywerelessvocalduringtheirtrialandpunishment.

66

Conclusion

This thesis examined a selection of cases tried at the Tokyo IMT and in

Batavia, NEI (modern-day Jakarta, Indonesia), for Japanese war crimes. This

research sought to address the following:Whatwas the state of Dutch–American

relationsat the IMTFE(within thecontextof thesecases)andwhatbearingdid it

have on the IMTFE? Generally, US-Dutch relations at the IMTFE consisted of

cooperation in prosecutions and information sharing, with some influence on

individualverdictsandalong-lastingimpactoninternationalcriminallaw.

InthechaptercoveringcrimescommittedinNanking,thisthesisarguedthat

itwastheAmericanswhoplayedacrucialroleintheproceedings.However,there

were few but significant instances of Dutch involvement in the proceedings,

including justice Röling’s dissention in the HIROTA case. Moreover, there were

Americans working on both the defense and prosecutorial teams, placing former

alliesinasomewhatadversarialenvironmentattheTokyoIMT.

For the chapter regarding Japanesewar crimes trials in theNEI, theDutch

authorities ran the trialswith limited input from the Americans. This is in sharp

contrast to the trials of the Tokyo IMT, which were led by the Americans with

limitedDutch assistance. Additionally, therewere victims of Japanesewar crimes

whowereDutchcitizenslivingintheNEI,likelyincreasingtheNetherlands’interest

inseekingprosecutionofJapanesewarcriminals.Itisalsoworthnotingtheadded

layer of complexity of the emerging Indonesian independence movement and

attemptsoftheNetherlandstoholdontoitscolony.Overall,therewasatop-down

impact of Dutch-American relations on the temporary Courts- Martial at Batavia.

67

This was evident through the impact of American law and the Tokyo IMT

influencing changes in Dutch law, thus allowing for increased prosecutions. The

chapter covering crimes committed inManchuria and tried at Tokyo argued that

AmericaninvolvementwaswhollymoreintensivethanthatoftheNetherlands,and

thattherewaslimitedimpactontheproceedingsandtheiroutcomes.Inthischapter,

Dutch-American relations had little impact on the outcome of the cases studies.

There were also a number of cases throughout the entire thesis in which Röling

agreedwith the general judgment:MUTO (Nanking),MATSUI (Nanking), ITAGAKI

(Manchuria),andTOJO(Manchuria).

Withinthecontextofthecasesexamined,Dutch-Americaninteractionsand

their impacton the IMTFEareencompassedbya fewkey themes.The firstwasa

small, but significant amount of involvement, present primarily in the Nanking

chapter. The second was top-down American involvement, which occurred

throughout the cases examined in this thesis, primarily related to the temporary

Courts-MartialatBatavia,NetherlandsEastIndies.

ThethirdthemewascharacterizedbyastrongDutchinvolvementmarkedby

highstakesfortheNetherlandsinthedefendantsandthecrimes,includingbutnot

limitedtoDutchvictims. This isnotableof thecases inNankingandtheNEI.The

fourth formof influence is the interplay of political ideology. Though not directly

relevant, it isnoteworthybecauseof thediplomaticnatureof the topic examined,

and the emerging independence movement in Indonesia at the time of the trials

bothintheNEIandinTokyo.

68

Moreover, therewasalsoaconnectiontowarcrimescommitted inEurope.

This included the presence of Nazism in Southeast Asia, and OSHIMA’s close

workingrelationshipwithJoachimvonRibbentrop.Additionally,intheNEIchapter

thereweremanycrimescommittedagainstEuropeanslivinginIndonesiaasevident

in theWASHIOcase.Thismaybe theresultof influenceof theNuremberg IMTas

wellasthealliancebetweenJapanandGermanyduringtheSecondWorldWar.

The history of Dutch-American relations among legal professionals at the

IMTFEoutlinedhowinternational,cooperativeeffortsimpactedtheimplementation

of criminal justice in the wake of war crimes as well as the context of opposing

political aims regarding the Dutch colonization of Indonesia and its emerging

movementforindependencefromtheNetherlands.

TheliteratureonpostSecondWorldWarDutch-Americanrelationsandthe

IMTFEhasconsistedofadisciplinaryevolutionfromlate-1940spoliticalanalysisto

the legal and historical analyses characteristic of the literature in the last two

decades.Moreover,RichardMinear’sVictors’Justicehasservedsinceitspublication

asoneoftheforemostbookscoveringtheIMTFE,andhasevencreatedaframework

on which later scholarship presented its arguments (in relation to the Victors’

Justice argument). However, recent scholarship trends have shifted away from

Minear’s narrative. This thesis follows the legal-historical disciplinary trend of

current literature, however, it does not address the motives of the IMTFE, by

specificallyaskingwhetheritwasjusticeforthevictorsorthevictims.Rather,this

thesis sought to consider how diplomacy between representatives at the

proceedingsaffectedtheproceedingsamidstanevolvingandunprecedentedchange

69

intheworldorder.Thispaperaddedauniquely(i.e.narrowly)focusedviewofthe

IMTFEthroughcasestudiesinordertounderstandthebroaderdiplomaticandlegal

historyoftheperiod.Minear’sbookwasasacatalystforhistoricalresearchofthe

IMTFE,butitscentralargumentisnolongerinvogue.

Thispaper agreeswithComyns-Carr’s analysis that the IMTFEmade “legal

history.”282It did not attempt a comprehensive outline of the entire IMTFE, but

focusedononly three locations, andexaminedDutch-American relations through

the context of case studies in those locations. Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades

Zaalberg’s book, American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: U.S.

Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949, covered diplomacy in the

traditionalsense—relationsamongheadsofstateandforeignministries,whilethis

papersoughttounderstandrelationsamongrepresentativesattheIMTFE,i.e.legal

professionals, who were also working together toward a common and tangible

goal—the prosecution of Japanese war criminals. Gouda and Zaalberg’s book

providedanoverviewofdiplomacyatthistime,howeveritwasnotthesamekindof

diplomacy as that covered in this thesis (among legal professionals); the type of

diplomacythathadlong-lastingimpactsoninternationalcriminallaw.

Muchoftheliterature,mostnotablyArnoldC.Brackman,PhilipR.Piccigallo,

TimothyMaga,YumaTotani,andFredL.Borchallprovidedfactualinformationon

which to conduct this analysis, suchas thebasic structureof the trials, individual

cases,majoractorsinvolved,andthevastscaleofitsoperations.Theydidnotdelve

intothecooperationamongAlliednationsattheIMTFE.Borch’sanalysisprovided282A.S.Comyns-Carr,TheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,FarEasternSurveyvol.18,no.10,(May18,1949):109.

70

theonlyEnglish-languageanalysisofthetrials intheNEI,astrongcontributionto

scholarshipon this topic;however, it lackedcontent inrelation to thewidespread

operationsof the IMTFE, and significant coverageof the cooperationbetween the

AmericansandtheNetherlandsinBatavia.

ArnoldBrackman’sTheOtherNuremberg:TheUntoldStoryoftheTokyoWar

CrimesTrialalsoattemptedtoaddresstheentireIMTFE.Inhis“attempttosetthe

recordstraight,”283hetoldhisownversionoftheeventsasanAmericanpresentat

the proceedings. This is advantageous because it included anecdotes from his

experience inTokyo. Brackman recalled he “lived at” the ForeignCorrespondents

Club,284 but never saw Keenan or his supposed “uproarious behavior,” which

indicatedthathehadsomeviewofhowAlliedrepresentativesbehavedoutsideof

the courtroom at the Tokyo IMT. However, he was a journalist not a legal

professional, thus limiting his exposure to the cooperation among legal

professionals.

YumaTotani’s2015monograph, JusticeinAsiaandthePacificRegion,1945-

1952: AlliedWar Crimes Prosecutions analyzed trial records to understand Allied

Courts’ findings on criminal liability of the accused.285While it provided valuable

case-specific information, it lacked information regarding the Kingdom of the

Netherlands and their diplomatic relations with the United States during the

proceedings. In the introduction,TotanicitedPhilipR.Piccigallo’sTheJapaneseon

283ArnoldC.Brackman,TheOtherNuremberg:TheUntoldStoryoftheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,(NewYork:Morrow,1987):27.284Ibid.55285YumaTotani,JusticeinAsiaandthePacificRegion,1945-1952:AlliedWarCrimesProsecutions,(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015):5.

71

Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945- 1951 as a “key reference

material” on the topic. 286 Piccigallo’s book was published relatively early in

scholarship on the IMTFE and was similar to Brackman in their comprehensive

overviews of the IMTFE. Piccigallo’s book, like this thesis, examined the IMTFE

throughthe lensofanargumentabouttheAlliednations.ForPiccigallo, theAllied

nations held Japanesewar criminals accountable;287in this thesis, it is thatDutch

andAmericanrepresentativescooperatedat theIMTFE,sometimeswith impactful

resultson theoutcome,and forever shaping international criminal law.Thisbook

hasmadeasignificantcontributiontoacademicscholarshipoftheseeventsandthis

projectbecauseitprovidedanexampleofuseoftheIMTFEtostudypost-warAllied

nations and international affairs. Piccigallo’sworkwas ahead of its timewhen it

eloquentlystated:

“Greater relevance, to wit, may be found in a comprehensive and

comparative examination of each Allied nation’s policies toward, and

treatmentof,Japanesewarcriminalsuspects,aswellastheirrelativepolicies

vis-à-visoneanother,Fromthis, it isbelieved,a clearerandmoreaccurate

understanding of how andwhy postwar international relations in the East

developedordegeneratedastheydidinsucceedingyearswillemerge.”288

This called for study of Allied nations at the IMTFE. Piccigallo argued that

such scholarship would allow for a comprehensive understanding of the286Ibid.5.287PhilipPiccigallo,TheJapaneseonTrial:AlliedWarCrimesOperationsintheEast1945-1951,(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1979),xii.288Ibid.xiii.

72

developmentofthepostwarworld.Thisquoteencompassedwhatthispaper,albeit

onasmallerscale,aimedtocontributetoscholarshipofAlliednationsattheIMTFE.

While Piccigallo’s monograph contained incredibly useful information and

poignantviewsoffuturescholarship,hadsomeissues.Intheintroduction,Piccigallo

stated that his book attempted not to judge the trials but aimed for “historical

objectivity,”animpossiblestandard,asauthorsarehumanandsometraceamount

ofsubjectivityisinevitableinallliterature.

LikePiccigallo,TimothyMagaarguedthatVictor’sJusticewaspresentatthe

IMTFE,albeitbutwithaltruisticmotivesbeneathitssurface,lyingbetweenMinear’s

Victor’s Justice argument and the trend of recent scholarship, one that discredits

thatargument.Specifically,Magaargued that theTokyo trialsweremorecomplex

than Victors’ justice, and the “commitment to justice was firm, although the trial

effortitselfwasbesetwithproblemsandcontroversies.”289

Thesemonographshardlydetailtherelationshipsamonglegalprofessionals

at the IMTFE. If present, they only do so in Tokyo, the small epicenter of the

geographicallyimmensewarcrimesproceedings.Thisprojectilluminatedboththe

relationsamonglegalprofessionalsattheIMTFEwhilediscussingthedetailsofthe

casestudiescoveredandhowthatformofdiplomacyimpactedthoseproceedings.

TheNurembergTrialsandtheIMTFEsetaprecedentformodernwarcrimes

trialsandinternationalcriminallaw.TheIMTFEwasacooperativeeffortledbythe

UnitedStates,andaseriesofJapanesewarcrimestrialsthroughoutAsia.TheIMTFE

is an understudied topic, despite its large scale and precedent for modern289TimothyMaga,JudgmentatTokyo:TheJapaneseWarCrimesTrials(Lexington:TheUniversityPressofKentucky,2001),ix.

73

international criminal law.Both theDutchandAmerican representativesplayeda

significantroleintheTokyoIMT,andinsomecases,impactedtheproceedingsand

individualverdicts.

74

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