Presumptions about populism in the press

An analysis of the framing of the economic policies of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders

Author: Melinda Nilsson

Supervisor: Benjamin Moffitt

Word count: 12,745

Number of pages: 46

Spring Semester 2018

Bachelor’s Thesis, 15 credits

Political Science, Advanced Course C

Department of Government

Uppsala University

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the framing of the economic policies of American populists Donald Trump

and Bernie Sanders in American quality newspapers during the 2016 primary elections. This is

done with the intent of investigating if the common assumption that the economic policies of pop-

ulists are irresponsible could be observed in the news media. By analyzing two newspapers oppo-

site each other on the political spectrum – The New York Times to the left and The Wall Street

Journal to the right – and their coverage of the policies of two candidates opposite each other on

the political spectrum, a complex comparative study is achieved. An inductive frame analysis

yielded six different frames used when discussing the economic policies of the candidates: dam-

aging, ignorant, unpredictable, unorthodox, status quo and positive change. While none of the

frames fit into a binary “irresponsible” or “not irresponsible” category, the frequent use of the

damaging and ignorant frames suggests that the assumption of populist irresponsibility is alive and

well.

Keywords: populism, media, economic policy, newspapers, inductive frame analysis

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Table of contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 1

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 3

1.1 Aim and research question .................................................................................................... 4

1.2 Delimitations ......................................................................................................................... 5

1.3 Thesis outline ........................................................................................................................ 5

2. Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................. 6

2.1 Populism ................................................................................................................................ 6

2.2 Previous research................................................................................................................... 9

2.4 Framing theory .................................................................................................................... 11

2.5 Defining economic policy proposals ................................................................................... 12

3. Research design ....................................................................................................................... 14

3.1 Methods ............................................................................................................................... 14

3.2 Case selection ...................................................................................................................... 16

3.3 Material ............................................................................................................................... 18

3.4 Operationalization ............................................................................................................... 20

3.5 Procedure of analysis .......................................................................................................... 21

4. Results and analysis ................................................................................................................ 23

4.1 Frames ................................................................................................................................. 24

4.2 The Wall Street Journal ....................................................................................................... 25

4.3 The New York Times .......................................................................................................... 29

4.4 Comparison ......................................................................................................................... 32

5. Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................... 35

6. References ................................................................................................................................ 37

Scholarly books and articles ...................................................................................................... 37

Newspaper and magazine articles ............................................................................................. 40

Other sources ............................................................................................................................. 41

Appendix 1: Analyzed material ................................................................................................. 43

Appendix 2: Coding scheme ....................................................................................................... 46

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”A full understanding of the populist phenomenon cannot be achieved without studying mass

communication perspectives and media-related dynamics, especially not without using a

comparative approach” (Mazzoleni et al., 2003:2).

1. Introduction

Since the early 1990s, populism has gained ground in Western democracies (Mudde, 2004). From

Geert Wilders to Hugo Chávez, populists can be found all across different cultures, contexts and

on either end of the ideological spectrum. The rise of populism has become a fact of political life,

and Cas Mudde (2004:542) even argues that we find ourselves in a populist Zeitgeist. Such a Zeit-

geist becomes especially apparent when we consider the fact that two of the most prominent can-

didates in the 2016 U.S. election, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, can be considered populists

(Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

Though many agree with Mudde’s sentiment, there is much debate regarding what it actually

means to be a populist. Among multiple different definitions, one feature that several argue is

inherent to populists is their irresponsible economic policy, a notion that is widespread in the world

of politics (Müller, 2017:592). To quote the former prime minister of the U.K., Tony Blair:

“[…] the problem is some of the populism on both the far left and the far right, it can make

a Tweet but not make a policy. And, you know, when you are dealing with issues that are as

important and serious as this, I understand why people search for simple solutions. But the

fact is, there aren't any.” (Morning Edition, 2016)

This sentiment is echoed in the populist literature where some authors have defined populism

solely based on economic policy (Rovira Kaltwasser, et al., 2017:51). For example, a recent paper

by Carlo Prato and Stephane Wolton (2017) rests on the assumption that populist reforms are more

likely to be botched, and the pair define populism as “[…] incompetent candidates proposing re-

forms despite knowing very well that they will be unable to carry them out successfully” (Prato &

Wolton, 2018). According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017:4), understandings of populism

as irresponsible economics are widespread in the popular discussion. But how do such assumptions

play out in the media coverage of populists and their policy?

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1.1 Aim and research question

By analyzing American quality1 newspapers this thesis aims to determine how the economic poli-

cies of populists – specifically those of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump – are framed. As media

can shape public opinion through framing (de Vreese, 2005:51), media frames are important fea-

tures to study when we want to learn more about the perceptions of political policies.

Furthermore, according to Aalberg & de Vreese (2017:3, 7), there is not a lot of research into the

effects of media on populism, including the framing of populist actors. This is surprising given

that the relationship between populism and media is seen as a significant contributor to the populist

Zeitgeist mentioned by Mudde (2004). In hoping to gain a better understanding of these scarcely

studied frames, and see if an assumption of irresponsibility is present in these frames, the research

question that this thesis aims to answer is thus:

How did American quality newspapers frame the economic policy proposals of Bernie Sand-

ers and Donald Trump?

Trump and Sanders were both candidates within the timeframe of this analysis – from the an-

nouncement of Trump’s campaign until Sanders’s loss in the Democrats’ primaries – and thus did

not implement any concrete economic policy during this period. Therefore, the focus of the anal-

ysis will be on their policy proposals. The research question will be answered through a frame

analysis of 32 articles from The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, written during the

2016 primary elections. These newspapers were chosen as they are top influential newspapers

(Talese, 2007; Rosenberg, 1982), among the most circulated in the U.S. (Barthel, 2017), and while

each has an ideological leaning, The New York Times is to the left and The Wall Street Journal is

to the right (Allsides, n.d.). This adds another comparative dimension to our comparison of the

policies of candidates on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, making the thesis comparative

across two lines. As the candidates’ economic policy proposals were vastly different, if the candi-

dates’ policies are both framed as irresponsible, this may indicate that policy content is irrelevant

1 The Oxford Living Dictionaries define a “quality newspaper” as: “A newspaper, typically a broadsheet, that is con-

sidered to deal seriously with issues and to have high editorial standards” (Quality paper, n.d.). Sometimes also re-ferred to as “broadsheets”. These newspapers are often considered to be a part of the “elite media”, which is con-

trasted to the “tabloid media” or “popular press” (Rooduijn, 2004:726; Akkerman, 2011:931).

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for the assumption of an irresponsible populist to be present. Comparing across different papers

will allow us to see if their different ideological leanings affect the framing of policy.

1.2 Delimitations

This thesis is based on articles from the printed and online versions of The New York Times and

The Wall Street Journal. While thousands of articles were published within the timeframe of the

2016 primary elections, I have limited my analysis to 32 articles. The reasoning behind the choice

of papers and the number of articles can be found in the section on research design.

The thesis is limited to quality newspapers as they are known to deal with serious issues – such as

policy – which is what this thesis focuses on. Tabloids, on the other hand, tend to deal with more

sensational and lurid content (Tabloid, n.d.). Additionally, including tabloids and thus adding yet

another comparison would be too ambitious given the scope and timeframe of a bachelor’s thesis.

The comparison is limited to the U.S. as it is a rare context in which populist left and right actors

operate simultaneously. Although other candidates in the primary elections could be considered

populist, none of them received as much media attention as Trump and Sanders. The research

question is limited to economic policy and does not cover other areas of policy because the goal is

to test the specific assumptions about the economic policy of populists.

1.3 Thesis outline

The structure of this thesis is straightforward – first, the theoretical framework is presented. An

overview of the many definitions of populism as well as the chosen definition for this thesis is

provided, followed by a brief recap of previous research, framing theory and definitions used in

the thesis. This is followed by the research design, where the methods, case selection, material,

operationalizations and procedure of analysis will be discussed. The results are then presented,

first by describing the frames and after that a section for each newspaper and an additional com-

parison. Finally, a concluding discussion will be presented, where I reflect on the findings and

their contribution to current scientific knowledge.

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2. Theoretical framework

This section will deal with the components that are central to this study: populism, its relationship

to media and economic policy, as well the theory of framing in a news media context. It begins

with a brief discussion on the many ways in which populism is defined, followed by the chosen

definition for this thesis. This is then followed by a short review of previous research on populism

and media, and populism and economic policy. Lastly, framing theory is described to provide

insight into the chosen method of research, and a central definition is discussed.

2.1 Populism

With recent events bringing it to the forefront of global discussion, populism has become a very

popular term as of late (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017:1). Although it has risen to prominence, the

concept itself is contested and a myriad of different definitions of the word can be found in the

literature on populism. In Populism: A Very Short Introduction (2017:2-5), Mudde and Rovira

Kaltwasser outline some of the most prominent definitions in the literature. They list the following

approaches:

• The ideational approach, a catch-all category that has defined populism as a discourse, an

ideology and a worldview at different times. Although there is no consensus on what pre-

cise definition is right, ideational definitions are popular. Common denominators include

an appeal to “the people”, an opposition to “the elite”, critique of the establishment and

devotion to the common people (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Mudde and Rovira

Kaltwasser themselves choose to define populism more precisely as a thin-centered ideol-

ogy.

• The popular agency approach, which defines populism as a lifestyle constructed though

popular engagement in politics. This approach sees populism as a positive force for mobi-

lization of the people and development of a democracy where community is central (Good-

wyn, 1976).

• The Laclauan approach, commonly used in political theory, considers populism as “the

essence of politics” and an emancipating power. In this understanding of populism, liberal

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democracy is a problem and radical democracy, executed through populism, is the solution

(Laclau, 2005; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).

• The socio-economic approach, discussed further in the section on previous research, un-

derstands populism as a type of irresponsible economic policy that involves massive spend-

ing and huge foreign debt. This view of populism was dominant in studies of Latin Amer-

ican populism in the 1980s and 90s (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Sachs, 1989).

• The political strategy approach, which sees populism as a strategy employed by a certain

type of leader who aims to govern based on the direct and unmediated support of their

followers. This approach is particularly popular outside of Western contexts (Weyland,

2001, 2017)

• The political style approach, which describes populism as a style of politics used by parties

and leaders to mobilize and appeal to supporters (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013; Moffitt, 2016).

This is the approach used in this thesis.

Though other definitions exist, and each has their strengths and weaknesses, I will argue for the

use of the political style definition in the following subsection.

Populism as a political style

Defining populism as a political style, a definition which has recently been further developed by

Moffitt, features three main aspects; an appeal to “the people” vs. “the elite”; bad manners and the

performance of crisis, breakdown or threat (Moffitt, 2016:45).

The populist’s appeal to “the people” works in two ways; while “the people” are their audience,

they are also the “true holders of sovereignty”. “The people” are then pit against “the elite”, and

sometimes specific Others presented as intertwined with “the elite” and posing a threat against

“the people”. These are then linked to a crisis or breakdown in society, leaving “the people” worse

off (Moffitt, 2016:44). In the case of Bernie Sanders, “the people” are mainly young people and

the working class – “the 99 percent”; conversely, “the elite” are the financial elite – big banks,

corporations and “the one percent” (Judis, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017:27). For Don-

ald Trump “the people” are white working- and middle-class Americans, and the political estab-

lishment in Washington D.C. is “the elite”, which he links to an Other: immigrants (Judis, 2016;

Rodrik, 2018).

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“Bad manners” encompasses the ways in which populists present themselves, an important factor

in their appeal to “the people”. What “bad manners” means differs depending on cultural context,

but it can be summarized as having a disregard for conventional behavior in the political realm.

Trump is well-known for his coarse language and vulgar statements, perhaps most notably his

statements about women and his “grab ‘em by the pussy” remark (The New York Times, 2018).

Sanders may not be as abrasive in his speech, but he is known for his confrontational and aggra-

vated demeanor and is often described as surly and unkempt in relation to other politicians (Wal-

lace-Wells, 2017).

The last feature, the performance of crisis, breakdown or threat, aims to induce such a situation

through acting or exaggerating, making “the people” demand change. The populist then presents

simple solutions and vows to act swiftly if in power. A famous Trump example would be his

proposal to build the wall to allegedly protect the U.S. from dangerous immigration (Trump, 2015).

Meanwhile, Sanders has provided a simple solution to the student debt crisis: simply making col-

lege free for all (“College for All Act Introduced,” 2017).

There are several advantages of using the definition developed by Moffitt. The first is the fact that

this definition of populism as a political style works across different contexts; it is applicable no

matter the ideological leanings or modes of organization found in a context (Moffitt, 2016:45). As

Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are on different ends of the ideological spectrum, and their

campaigns were not typical “establishment campaigns”, this makes the use of the political style

definition helpful.

Secondly, seeing populism as a political style allows us to view populism as gradational instead

of binary, letting us organize actors along the lines of “more populist” or “less populist”. The other

end of this spectrum is a technocratic political style, which features are the inverse of the three

populist features (an appeal to expertise, “good manners” and the performance of stability and

progress) (Moffitt, 2016:46). As Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump are rather different in both

rhetoric and demeanor, it makes sense that they place differently on a populist-technocratic polit-

ical style spectrum. A definition that is gradational thus allows us to see them both as populist

actors without them necessarily being the same “level” of populist.

Lastly, the use of a style-oriented definition of populism is already popular in the political com-

munications literature (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017:5) as well as in the media (Mudde & Rovira

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Kaltwasser, 2017:4), and as this thesis falls in between the political science and political commu-

nication literature, defining populism as a political style is fitting.

2.2 Previous research

Populists and economic policy

A popular approach to populism in the 1980s and 90s was one based in economics; in the eyes of

certain economists, overspending and economic irresponsibility was spurred by aims of political

popularity (Weyland, 2017:51). When defining populism, Dornbusch and Edwards (1991:9) iden-

tified certain economic policies specific to populism, even going so far as saying that “[…] populist

policies do ultimately fail; and when they fail it is always at a frightening cost to the very groups

that were supposed to be favored”.

Though definitions rooted in economic policy sparked interest at first, they were later criticized

for being too broad, and not particularly useful. Many politicians can be considered “economically

irresponsible” and using this to define populism produced a very diverse set of populist actors,

leaving the definition itself not particularly useful. Economic definitions faced additional setbacks

when populist leaders seemed to turn to more fiscally responsible policy, which was the case of

for example Evo Morales and Rafael Correa’s terms in office (Weyland, 2017:51).

However, in the shadow of events such as Brexit and Donald Trump’s presidency, it seems as if

the notion of populists being economically irresponsible has returned. Recent publications such as

that of Prato and Wolton (2017) present populists’ reforms as more likely be botched and refer to

populist candidates as incompetent, and Acemoglu et al. (2013) define populism as “[…] the im-

plementation of policies receiving support from a significant fraction of the population, but ulti-

mately hurting the economic interests of this majority”.

Researchers of Latin American populism also note certain economic tendencies of populists; Chá-

vez is an oft-touted example of a populist actor with little fiscal responsibility (Rodrik, 2018; Wey-

land, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Other examples of such behavior are Juan Perón,

Alan García and Salvador Allende (Weyland, 2017:51). Sachs (1989) even hypothesized a “pop-

ulist policy cycle” based on the economic and social policies of Latin America, characterized as

overly expansive macroeconomic policies that have devastating effects. In fact, in the Latin

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American context populism has been and can be synonymous with economic mismanagement

(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017:2).

Whether researchers define populism on solely economic grounds or not – and although such def-

initions can be problematic (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017:14) – an assumption of bad economic

credentials, poor policy proposals and fiscal irresponsibility certainly exists in the literature, and

according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017:4) remains current among economists and jour-

nalists, especially in the U.S., despite a lack of empirical research to reaffirm such assumptions.

Populism and the media

A common conception is that populism and the media have a beneficial relationship. However,

this is an assumption with little backing in research, as there is a severe lack of research in both

the theoretical and the empirical aspects of the relationship. At the same time, populists are more

and more prominent in our daily news and on our television screens, making media an important

populist platform (Moffitt, 2016:70). As the rise of populism is upon us, and this rise is seemingly

intertwined with the media, this relationship is worthy of more scholarly attention.

Based on the research that has been conducted so far, it is clear that the media can play an important

role in politics, particularly in determining the success of an actor or party. Research has shown

that when populist issues are focused on in the media, people are influenced to support the populist

party in question (Rooduijn, 2014). However, there is significant debate among existing studies on

whether the media acts as a friend of foe to populists. Some find that it can act as both (Mudde

2007:249). This has been seen to be the case in for example the U.S., where early populist actors

like Senator Joseph McCarthy were given the chance to shine on television, only to later be brought

back down to size by the same outlet that fueled his rise (Kazin, 1995:188-189).

Whether the media acts as a friend or foe to populists can be dependent on many factors, one being

the type of media outlet one looks at. A longstanding assumption in the literature is that while

commercial TV and tabloids are supposedly friendly toward populists, “elite media”, such as qual-

ity newspapers, typically favors the status quo (Manucci, 2017:470). This is based on two main

observations. First, quality newspapers have a tendency to be aligned with established parties,

while tabloids usually lack such connections – leading them to more readily criticize said parties.

Second, tabloids have more commercial interests than quality papers, making them more inclined

to appeal to the masses. This leads to an appeal to “the common people” – much like that of

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populists (Rooduijn, 2014:730). Although it can be argued that populists appeal to the commercial

interests of mass media with their propensity for scandal and messages appealing to “the people”,

studies such as those by Rooduijn (2014) and Akkerman (2011) have not found any evidence sug-

gesting that tabloids favor populist actors or produce more populist messages than quality papers

do.

These studies highlight the problems with empirical studies pertaining to the relationship between

populism and media. Existing studies are often lacking and contradict theoretical assumptions.

There are also many aspects that have not been empirically tested, due to several reasons. First,

the many different and conflicting definitions of populism, noted earlier, are in opposition to the

common understanding that consistent theories require. Second, even if authors use the same def-

inition, the way that they measure populism can still differ. Finally, studies across time and cultural

contexts are hard to come by as they are resource-draining. In addition to these problems, the

political science literature has largely overlooked knowledge from communication studies, forget-

ting that media does more than simply decide on how much exposure different political actors get

and what is reported or not – media can also both create and diffuse populist messages (Manucci,

2017:471, 473).

2.4 Framing theory

Media is an important part of daily life in a democracy, and the way media frames issues has the

potential to influence public opinion. Frames are part and parcel of political life; in the words of

de Vreese (2005:53): “They are alternative ways of defining issues, endogenous to the political

and social world.” Though framing theory has its roots in sociology and the work of Erving

Goffman, it has become commonplace in political science and communication studies (D’Angelo

& Kuypers, 2010).

Framing theory rests on the rather simple assumption that each issue can be viewed from several

different perspectives and can be presented as having a number of different implications (Chong

& Druckman:104). In other words, framing involves a communication source presenting and de-

fining an issue (de Vreese, 2005:51).

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According to de Vreese (2005:51-52), media framing is to be seen as a process which includes

frame-building and frame-setting. Frame-building consists of that which influences the construc-

tion on frames: internal factors like editorial policies, and external factors which might be the result

of elite-media interactions. The results of frame-building are the frames found in the text. Frame-

setting is when media frames meet the individuals’ prior attitudes and knowledge, and is the most

researched part of the framing process. The consequences of frames are framing effects, and may

be seen on both a micro and macro-level as changed understandings or collective action.

Framing has been defined in many different ways (Gitlin, 1980:7; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989)

but the way this thesis chooses to define frames follows the reasoning of Entman (1993): framing

selects some aspects of a perceived reality in order to make them more salient while neglecting

others in order to downplay them.

This thesis aims to investigate what frames exist in the reporting of a certain issue, which places it

in-between frame-building and frame-setting in the framing process (de Vreese, 2005:52). Con-

secutive research could build upon the work done in this thesis by studying the effects of the frames

encountered or by investigating how these frames come about.

2.5 Defining economic policy proposals

As stated in the research question, this thesis aims to investigate how economic policy proposals

of populists are framed. However, it is unclear what is meant by economic policy. It is a widely

used concept in economic debate and although it is a popular term, operational definitions differ

as readers are often assumed to already be familiar with the concept. While previous scholarly

definitions refer to the way governments influence the national economy in order to achieve their

goals (Bakoup, 2014:2-3), the definition of the term in this thesis will diverge from prior defini-

tions as the investigated parties in this thesis were candidates in the chosen timeframe of analysis,

and thus unable to implement any actual changes on the national economy.

Instead, economic policy proposal will in this thesis be a term that refers to the candidates’ pro-

posed economic endeavors. This will include any and all policy proposals that require some kind

of financing presented by the candidates within the timeframe of the study. This is a rather broad

definition, intended to catch policy proposals such as Trump’s border wall and Sanders’s abolition

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of tuition – policy proposals that might not be considered as “economic” at first glance but that

imply financial costs and/or benefits. In other words, what is central to this thesis is the context in

which these policy proposals are talked about: if the proposals are mentioned in an economic con-

text, they are seen as “economic policy proposals”. If economic costs and effects are not men-

tioned, for example if the morality of a proposal is discussed, a policy proposal is not considered

economic. In the text, the words “policy” or “policy proposal” will sometimes be used synony-

mously with economic policy proposal, in order to increase fluidity in the text.

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3. Research design

3.1 Methods

This thesis will use frame analysis, a method that can be used either quantitatively or qualitatively.

This method “examines the selection and salience of certain aspects of an issue by exploring im-

ages, stereotypes, metaphors, actors, and messages” (Matthes, 2009). Although there are many

ways of approaching frame analysis within the quantitative-qualitative spectrum, this thesis will

be using a qualitative approach that is mainly inductive.

Qualitative method

Research using a qualitative method aims to provide a deeper understanding and interpretation of

an issue, by asking questions such as how, why and what, rather than the quantitative “how many”.

This lets researchers use data that is more complex and rich than the data commonly used in quan-

titative studies. It also allows for the ways in which data is generated and interpreted to be flexible

– permitting adaptability to certain cases, or the emergence of new issues. The use of qualitative

method brings about a complexity in the analysis that takes the particularities of each case into

account and provides the retention of nuance (Ormston et al., 2014:3-4). This aspect is especially

important in this thesis, as an inductive method is used in order to find nuances and a deeper

understanding of the portrayal of the populist candidates.

Another important aspect of qualitative research is its reflective nature, which considers the effects

that the researcher and their personal experiences have on the output of the research (Ormston et

al., 2014:4). Reflexivity is important in frame analysis, as the frames that are identified can vary

depending on the researcher coding for them (Matthes & Kohring, 2008:259). A general aim in

qualitative research is “empathic neutrality” – avoiding bias and striving for neutrality in the gath-

ering, analysis and presentation of data. However, researchers acknowledge that avoiding bias al-

together is impossible, and so reflecting on one’s own role in the results of research is pertinent

when using qualitative methods (Ormston et al., 2014:22-23).

The feature of qualitative research that is perhaps most contested is its ability to provide general-

izable conclusions. Ormston et al. (2013) believe that the phenomena observed in qualitative re-

search can be generalized in terms of nature and diversity, but not in occurrence. However, the

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aim of this study is not to generalize any of the results, but rather to understand the frames present

in the specific context, and to potentially provide a starting ground for further research.

Frame analysis

When it comes to identifying frames in the news, there is little consensus regarding how one should

go about. Although variations can be based on different understandings of what a frame actually

is, even studies with the same theoretical definition can diverge in their operational definitions.

Two approaches to identifying frames are either doing so inductively, or deductively. An inductive

approach involves analyzing the given material without defining frames beforehand, instead letting

frames emerge during the analysis. Conversely, the deductive approach investigates frames that

have been defined and operationalized before the material is studied (de Vreese, 2005:53).

As mentioned in the previous section, the analyst must be reflective when conducting an inductive

frame analysis and consider that their own prejudice and biases might complicate the identification

of frames. To avoid such biases affecting results, Van Gorp and Vercruysse (2012) suggest em-

ploying a systematic approach in which several parallel phases of analysis are used in scanning

and comparing the given material. This thesis aims to achieve this by first constructing and initial

codebook following an inductive analysis of a sample, to then use this codebook deductively on

the material in its entirety.

Such a combination of inductive frame extraction and deductive coding is not free from criticism.

The criteria for extracting frames is often vague and unsystematic (Touri & Koteyko, 2013:3), and

inductive studies have been criticized for having reliability problems – the identified frames can

differ significantly depending on who is coding the material. The reliability of the results in this

thesis would be higher if there was intercoder reliability present, that is, if other coders also coded

for the frames in the frame analysis and found largely the same results (Esaiasson et al., 2017:65).

However, due to the time allotted and the challenge of finding additional coders, this was not a

priority. Additionally, the sampled material is often small, and studies are hard to reproduce (Mat-

thes & Kohring, 2008:259; de Vreese, 2005:53). Part of this problem can be negated by providing

a coding scheme for the deductive phase, such as the one included in the appendix of this thesis,

allowing at least that portion of the research to be replicated. Be that as it may, purely deductive

studies are not without their own problems. They are often accompanied by unanswered questions

16

on how the a priori frames were constructed, and on the level of observation and measurement of

these frames (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010).

The reasoning behind using an inductive approach lies in letting the findings in the research emerge

organically as opposed to being restrained by methodological practices. Inductive framing analysis

allows for an array of relevant frames to appear, regardless of whether they were conceived be-

forehand or not, while the researcher’s a priori notions of the data in a deductive approach can lead

to frames being overlooked or misconstrued. More depth to the research is obtained when unex-

pected frames are allowed to emerge (Thomas, 2006:237-238). This was exactly the goal in this

thesis – while a deductive approach, based on the assumptions about the economic policies of

populists found in the literature, would have yielded two frames – irresponsible vs. not irresponsi-

ble – an inductive approach allows nuances in the material to be captured as frames, should they

be significant. This allows us to get a better sense of how the populist actors are portrayed in a

more gradational way than the irresponsible/not irresponsible frames, which adheres to the general

theme of the thesis and the gradational notion of populism. If deductive analysis was used, results

would likely be unsurprising – reinforcing biases against populists and feeding into binary think-

ing. Such results would likely only reflect or fuel prejudices in the public debate, rather than con-

tribute to scientific knowledge. Hence, the more unfavorable aspects of an inductive approach are

in this thesis considered to be outweighed by the useful aspects of the approach.

3.2 Case selection

In his book The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and Euro-

pean Politics (2016), John B. Judis writes that populism is an American creation that has spread

around the world. American populism dates back to the 1890s and the People’s Party, but populist

mobilization has been a recurring factor in American politics, from Governor Huey Long, to Sen-

ator Joseph McCarthy, and more recently to the Tea Party and Occupy movements, existing all

across the political spectrum (Judis, 2017).

These recent movements have reinvigorated populism in the U.S. While the Tea Party and Occupy

were placed on different ends of the ideological spectrum, the movements shared many aspects,

such as their aversion to the government bailouts of banks, and their defense of “Main Street” as

17

opposed to Wall Street. However, the movements differed in their understandings of “the people”

and “the elite”. While Occupy’s definition of “the people” was broad and inclusive (e.g. “we are

the 99 percent”), the Tea Party’s definition of “the people” was implicitly racially exclusive and

their definition of “the elite” was commonly reserved for bankers, Democrats, and Hollywood.

While the Occupy movement lost momentum and relevance with time, some of their populist rhet-

oric has survived in that of Bernie Sanders (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017:26-27). Con-

versely, Donald Trump embodies much of the rhetoric and sentiment – and momentum – of the

Tea Party movement (Sanburn, 2017).

Exploring this research question within the American context is interesting, as it allows a compar-

ative study of populists on different ends of the political spectrum within the same cultural context.

While many countries have experienced the rise of either right-wing or leftist populism, not all

countries have had populist actors from both ends, within the same period of time. Focusing on

the period of the election when Trump and Sanders both were candidates in the primary is ideal as

the amount of media coverage they received was similar (whereas Trump is obviously now a

prominent and recurring figure in the media – Sanders not so much).

Furthermore, by looking at articles published in newspapers with different ideological leanings,

we may see if certain frames are more commonly used by those outlets of a certain political affil-

iation. The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal were chosen as they are among the quality

newspapers with the highest rate of circulation in the U.S., and thus can be assumed to be read

more than other quality papers (Barthel, 2017). More important than circulation, perhaps, is the

fact that both papers are considered to be immensely important and influential in American public

debate and political life (Talese, 2007; Rosenberg, 1982). Additionally, the two papers fall on

different ends of the political spectrum, with The New York Times leaning left in both their news

coverage and editorial pieces, and The Wall Street Journal leaning to the right in their editorial

content while being somewhat more centrist in their news coverage (“Media Bias Ratings,” n.d.).

This makes them more interesting from a comparative perspective than a more centrist paper, such

as USA Today. By reviewing the coverage of both candidates in both newspapers, we will be able

to see if the same framing of their economic policies exists across ideologies – whether we look at

those of the candidates, or the newspapers. Finally, both papers have been used in many other

frame analyses, both individually, but also in comparison to one another. One illustrative example

18

is Golan and Lukito’s article on the framing of China’s global leadership, where they compared

the two papers and the frames they used (2015).

In summary, the media’s role in the 2016 primary elections was huge, and thus a perfect case in

which to examine the relationship between media and populists – particularly in a time where the

relationship between the two is seen is increasingly salient.

3.3 Material

The 2016 election received an enormous amount of press coverage in the U.S., meaning clear

limitations in the scope of articles to use as units of analysis were needed. The first of these limi-

tations was in the timeframe of which the articles were sampled. The chosen timeframe was from

the time both candidates had officially announced their campaigns, to the last day in which they

both were in the race for the presidency. More specifically, this is from June 16th, 2015, when

Donald Trump announced he was running (Neate, 2015), until June 7th, 2016, when Hillary Clinton

officially secured a majority of pledged delegates, in effect making her the presidential nominee

of the Democratic party (McCaskill, 2016).

In this period, hundreds of thousands of articles were published. In order to quickly retrieve rele-

vant articles from a number of different newspapers, the research tool Factiva was used. The sam-

ple pool was further narrowed by limiting the search to articles from The New York Times and The

Wall Street Journal.

In order to find articles where the main focus were the candidates and their economic proposals,

articles were limited to those including the name of the candidate in addition to certain keywords:

“economic*”, “economy” or “fiscal*”, as well as “proposal”, “plan” or “policy”. The inclusion of

the third term was motivated by searches including only the first two terms resulting in a large

number of articles not touching upon the candidate and their relationship to the economy or policy,

but rather the two as separate issues within the same article. Articles were then sorted in order of

relevance to the specified keywords.

From the thousands of articles in the search results for each paper, the search was narrowed down

to include only the material available in both print and online versions of the papers. This was

done in the hopes of limiting the material to the articles that had been received by the largest

19

audience. Among the top articles many transcripts of various debates and TV appearances were

included – these were excluded from the sample as it is important that the units of analysis in this

thesis are what is written about the candidate and their policy, rather than what they themselves

are saying about it. Therefore, articles featuring the word “transcript” were excluded from the

search. Both editorials and news stories were included in the material in order to see if the ideo-

logical leanings of the papers had any effect on the frames present – while The New York Times’s

ideology shows more clearly in their news coverage than The Wall Street Journal’s, including

editorials and news was deemed to be the best way to observe the different frames at play (“Media

Bias Ratings,” n.d.).

Despite these limitations, hundreds of articles remained in the sampling pool; The New York Times

had 463 articles on Sanders and 690 on Trump, and The Wall Street Journal had 303 and 441

articles respectively2. Ten articles from each paper on each candidate were then chosen, which

resulted in a total of 40 articles in the initial text corpus. The reasoning behind choosing only ten

articles per candidate per newspaper from a pool of hundreds came down to the restrictions a

bachelors thesis faces in time and assistance. As all of the material was coded by only one coder,

the number of articles one can process in the allotted time is restricted, and thus only the top ten

articles of each search were selected to be in the corpus. Among these 40 articles, those where the

focus was not on the candidate themselves (for example if they were only mentioned in passing in

an article about another candidate) or those that did not include mention of their policies were

discarded. The resulting corpus included 8 articles from The New York Times and 9 from The Wall

Street Journal on Bernie Sanders, and 8 and 9 respectively on Donald Trump. However, two of

the articles from The Wall Street Journal intersected, as they touched upon both candidates. This

brought the total number of texts in the corpus, and thus units of analysis, to 32. The articles were

limited to text only, as Factiva does not include images in their results. Thus, the articles analyzed

consisted of the title and the body text. A list of all articles included in the material can be found

in the appendix.

2 As of April 24th, 2018.

20

3.4 Operationalization

While I choose not to operationalize any of the specific frames ahead of time due to the inductive

nature of the frame analysis, the term “frame” itself requires operationalization. While I previously

noted the adoption of Robert Entman’s definition of framing (selecting some aspects of a perceived

reality and making them more salient in a text), the way in which frames are identified needs

explanation.

As with the definition of the word frame, this thesis follows Entman in his identification of frames.

Entman (1993:52) suggested that frames be identified as “the presence or absence of certain key-

words, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide the-

matically reinforcing clusters of facts of judgements”. However, the identification of frames is

somewhat more limited in this thesis, as images are not analyzed. This is in part due to time, in

part to the material (described in the previous section) not containing images. By using both the

definition and operationalization for frames provided by Entman the aim is to ensure a high degree

of validity, which means that we measure what we intend to and nothing else (Esaiasson et al.,

2017:57).

Furthermore, four criteria developed by Cappella & Jamieson for identifying frames are kept in

mind. They are the following:

1. Identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics

2. Commonly observed in journalistic practice

3. Clearly distinguishable from other frames

4. Must be able to be identified by others (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997)

Another important factor in identifying frames is distinguishing between “core elements” and

“frame-carrying elements”. Scholars agree that the specific visual and textual elements within a

frame are essentially different from the “core news facts” in a story. In most studies of framing

effects, the distinction between the two parts has been applied in the operationalization of news

frames. For instance, news articles can be divided in sections containing frames, and sections con-

taining facts (de Vreese, 2005:54). This thesis will follow this line of reasoning and differentiate

between these core- and frame-carrying elements.

21

3.5 Procedure of analysis

When inductively analyzing these frames, three phases of analysis were carried out in parallel.

This procedure of analysis largely follows the ones used by Van Gorp and Vercruysse (2012), as

well as D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010). In the first phase, an open coding is applied to a sample of

the text corpus. Here, different sections of the text are given codes – recurring arguments, meta-

phors, descriptions and key terms. Each element is a particular framing device.

In the second phase these codes are listed and reduced to include the most significant and recurring

codes, arranging them around a certain theme. The material is then analyzed again with the help

of this more restricted list of codes.

The third phase is where frames finally are constructed; consisting of a combination of coherent

elements. Here, we keep in mind the criteria mentioned in the operationalization: these frames

must be distinguishable from each other and identifiable, both by the current researcher coding

and subsequent coders. The sample used in these three phases consisted of 17 articles: slightly

more than half of the text corpus. Based on the frames identified inductively, a coding scheme is

devised for the following phase.

After the 17 articles were coded for, a deductive phase begins where the remaining material is

fitted to the different frame packages identified in the third phase, based on a coding scheme found

in the appendix. Many of the articles in the material included several frames, which meant that if

a text was fitted to a single framing package it would mean a lot of nuance would be lost. To avoid

such a loss, paragraphs are fitted to frame packages rather than entire texts. In this phase, no new

frames were encountered. Though there of course may be other frames in the articles not included

in the sample, the fact that no new frames were found after the sample’s inductive phase suggests

that theoretical saturation had been achieved (Esaiasson et al., 2017:270).

There are some things that are important to keep in mind in this procedure. The number of framing

devices required to identify a certain frame is debated, and while some researchers argue that

frames can be implicit or apparent in only labels or metaphors, researchers such as Gruessing and

Boomgarden (2017) – who also use an inductive-deductive approach – propose that a frame is

apparent if at least two framing devices indicative of a certain frame appear in the same article.

Another important aspect is that several frames can be found in one article, which is taken into

22

consideration by fitting paragraphs as presenting one frame or another, rather than the entire arti-

cle. This was the case in nearly every article, as different frames were frequently presented in the

same text. A final caveat is that the absence of images in the frame analysis might influence the

frames identified. On the other hand, Van Gorp and Vercruysse (2012:1276) note in their research

that images can be highly ambiguous and were interpreted differently by different researchers.

Therefore, while the exclusion of them may have resulted in a certain framing device being over-

looked, the absence of them could be beneficial for intersubjectivity, should other researchers at-

tempt to analyze the same material.

23

4. Results and analysis

The analysis of the material resulted in the identification of a total of six frames. First, the frames

will be presented in Table 1. The table will then be followed by a description of each frame, and

their use in relation to each candidate and newspaper will be presented. Illustrative examples of

how frames were identified will be provided, mainly in the form of quotes from the articles. Fi-

nally, a brief discussion of the most interesting differences in the papers’ coverage and their rela-

tionship to the assumption of irresponsibility is presented.

Table 1: Frames used in relation to the economic policy of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.

Frame How is the policy described Implications policy is said to have

Damaging frame Disruptive; radical; overly costly; startling to

economists; worrying to consumers and in-

vestors; fiscally reckless; irresponsible

Would reduce revenues; start trade wars; disrupt

world trade; harm the working/middle class

Ignorant frame Less driven by evidence and more by ideol-

ogy; at odds with existing economics; re-

jected by economists; in opposition to facts;

devised on the fly; wishful thinking

Reforms that are not thought through; unfulfilla-

ble promises; would not get through Congress;

misallocations of capital

Unpredictable frame Inadequate; confounding to economists; not

fleshed out; unpredictable; confusing; inco-

herent; not serious

People do not understand the effect of the poli-

cies; predictions cannot be made

Unorthodox frame Unconventional; away from the mainstream;

set apart from other Republicans/Democrats

Redefines the boundaries of the politically palata-

ble; redefining the party; upending the system

Status quo frame Shares a common thread with moderate can-

didates’ policies; amplification of previous

agendas; policies do not merit their own ide-

ological label

Policies are continuations of the status quo; ef-

fects would be much like those of other candi-

dates’ policies

Positive change frame Optimistic; inspiring; supported by econo-

mists; for the people; simplifying

The dismantling of a “rigged” or “corrupt” eco-

nomic system; would help the economy

24

4.1 Frames

The frames found in the text corpus were damaging, ignorant, unpredictable, unorthodox, status

quo and positive change.

The damaging frame

The damaging frame is that which most clearly captures the assumption of irresponsibility in eco-

nomic policy – policy proposals are considered reckless, with dire consequences and massive

costs. The policy is implied to hurt either markets, consumer, taxpayers or all three. When costs

and debts are mentioned they are accompanied with words like “massively”, “enormous” or “im-

mensely”.

The ignorant frame

The ignorant frame encompasses allusions to policy proposals being conceived in opposition to

facts. These facts can be those presented by experts, or common knowledge. Policy proposals are

presented as wishful thinking and as unrealistic, and effects are presented as inefficiency and pol-

icy that will not be enacted. This frame portrays policies as ill-conceived and thoughtless, although

not outright damaging or hurtful.

The unpredictable frame

The unpredictable frame emerged from articles repeatedly mentioning the unpredictability, con-

fusing elements and the lack of specificity in a candidate’s policies. While this frame, like the

unorthodox frame, is relatively neutral in use, it is often used in a way which alludes to policies

not being fully formed or being confusing in a negative way. Policy proposals can be presented as

lacking in substance and confounding. This confounding quality applies not only to the public but

also to experts – presenting the policy proposals as exceptionally confusing. Effects are that pre-

dictions are hard to make, as well as a confused public.

The unorthodox frame

The unorthodox frame captures policy descriptions such as different, unconventional and away

from the mainstream. The use of this frame is fairly neutral to the policy at hand – it does not judge

the content of the proposal, but rather its position in comparison to other proposals. While this

frame presents the economic policy as unorthodox, it does not construe them as negative or

25

positive. It includes relatively neutral words like “unorthodox”, while synonyms such as “radical”

are not seen as indicators of this frame because of their more negative connotation. Effects of

policy are depicted as “redefining the party” or changing day-to-day operations in Washington

D.C.

The status quo frame

The status quo frame presents the candidates’ policy proposals as continuations of the status quo

– they are like those of their more moderate party members. Policy proposals are open for negoti-

ations and compromise and any changes implemented would be incremental or like those of their

party establishment.

The positive change frame

The positive change frame is the only frame in which the candidates’ policies are presented in a

mostly positive light. Policy effects are described as upending a corrupt system or helping the

economy and the taxpayers. Policy proposals are talked about as being good ideas, and as “ideal-

istic” – which while it insinuates that the policy is hard to enact, does not convey the same unreal-

istic aspect that is present in the ignorant frame.

4.2 The Wall Street Journal

Table 2: Frame frequency in The Wall Street Journal.

Frame

Frame frequency (percentage within parentheses)

Bernie Sanders’s

economic policy proposals

Donald Trump’s

economic policy proposals

Damaging frame 12 (31.6%) 17 (27%)

Ignorant frame 11 (28.9%) 14 (22.2%)

Unpredictable frame 4 (10.5%) 12 (19%)

Unorthodox frame 8 (21.1%) 8 (12.7%)

26

Status quo frame 1 (2.6%) 6 (9.5%)

Positive change frame 2 (5.3%) 6 (9.5%)

Total number of frames identified

38

63

Due to rounding, percentages do not always add up to 100%.

Bernie Sanders

The coverage of Bernie Sanders’s policy proposals in the sample of The Wall Street Journal arti-

cles uses all of the different frames identified, however some frames are far more frequently used

than others. The most commonly used frame when describing his proposals was the damaging

frame. This is exemplified in quotes such as the following:

“The Sanders campaign isn’t about idealism. It’s about the misallocation of capital” (Hen-

ninger, 2016a).

The same editorial even went so far as to say that “Bernie Sanders caused the Panama Papers”,

attributing the massive scandal to socialist policies and big government (Henninger, 2016a). More

common uses of the frame, however, were seen in policy being described as “radical” or “worrying

markets”. A particular aspect in The Wall Street Journal’s coverage of Sanders’s policies is the

focus on the candidate’s anti-Wall Street sentiment. Not only is he presented as being in opposition

to Wall Street, but the effects of his policy are described as “’beat[ing] the tar out of’ banks” (Ip,

2016) or “crushing Wall Street” (Seib, 2016).

Other editorials framed Sanders’s policy as ignorant (the second most common frame used) re-

peatedly highlighting their opposition to common economic knowledge and theories, exemplified

in this quote, where both Sanders and Trump are mentioned:

“Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders might seem unlikely economic soul mates, but they

share a mistaken reliance on zero-sum thinking and long-discredited economic policies”

(Paul Rubin, 2016).

Contrary to the editorials, the news articles used more neutral frames when discussing Sanders’s

proposals. Portraying them as unorthodox or redefining the system was quite common, as was

framing them as unpredictable. One article featured a quote capturing both frames:

27

“Indeed, part of the appeal of Messrs. Trump and Sanders to voters is that they have rejected

the orthodox economic approach that Washington has typically taken toward economics.

Many voters are aiming to disrupt this status quo. In turn, economists don’t know what to

make of proposals to curtail trade, sharply restrict immigration or dramatically overhaul the

tax code” (Zumbrun, 2016).

The phrases “rejected the orthodox economic approach” and “economists don’t know what to

make of proposals” are fairly neutral, but they convey an image of the proposals as unorthodox

and unpredictable.

Furthermore, Sanders’s proposals are often compared to Clinton’s, with articles often portraying

Clinton’s as more “modest”, although some articles dismiss their policies as copies of one another.

This is done not by using the status quo frame, however, but by portraying both candidates as

radical. The one time the status quo frame is used, Sanders’s policy is presented as being similar

to Clinton’s, only slightly further to the left. The few instances in which the positive change frame

is used are usually followed by rebuttals of the policy proposals. While one editorial starts off with

“Mr. Sanders’s policies would make the poor better off” (Paul Rubin, 2016), it later goes on to say

that Sanders’s policies would be more harmful than helpful.

Donald Trump

The Wall Street Journal’s coverage of Trump’s policies is not kind, despite the paper’s right-wing

affiliation. Like in the case of Sanders’s policy coverage, all frames are present in the reporting.

The frames most frequently used are damaging and ignorant, just as in the portrayal of Sanders’s

policy. However, a more even distribution of the frames used can be observed in the case of Trump,

positioning his policies in a kinder light more often than Sanders’s – while there were more overall

frames identified in the articles on Trump, a relative difference can also be observed.

Although not the most common frames, Trump’s policies were framed by the positive change

frame and the status quo frame more often than Sanders’s. Trump has been described as “[…]

standing shoulder to shoulder with other Republican candidates” (Galston, 2016), open to com-

promise and as edging closer to the Republican establishment – all uses of the status quo frame.

The articles and editorials focus more on the intent of Trump’s policy proposals than they did on

Sanders’s intent – resulting in a more frequent use of the positive change frame, exemplified in

28

this quote: “Mr. Trump also said he supported holding down the value of the dollar in order to help

American manufacturing and the economy” (Richard Rubin, 2016).

Nonetheless, editorials did not hold back when admonishing his policy – several of them blatantly

stated that Trump would be the cause of a trade war. One editorial, titled Trumpism, the Economic

Wrecking Ball, showcases The Wall Street Journal’s use of the damaging frame perfectly:

”Let’s tote up the score. Mr. Trump’s tax plan is doable, if Congress is sufficiently pliant.

But it would exacerbate income inequality and explode the federal deficit. Mr. Trumps im-

migration plans are heartless, hugely expensive and incredibly disruptive to the U.S. econ-

omy. His positions on international trade display abysmal ignorance, are economically harm-

ful and threaten America’s standing in the world” (Binder, 2016).

One editorial detailing the candidate’s fiscal policy argued that “At best, Mr. Trump is guilty of

disregarding prudence, decency and facts” (Galston, 2016), later dismissing it as a fiscal disaster

and a show of fiscal recklessness. The ignorant frame was also common, further depicted in quotes

such as:

“Mr. Trump has been floating in an inch-deep pool of policy and shows no inclination to

expand his pre-existing knowledge of anything” (Henninger, 2016b).

Like Sanders’s, Trump’s policies are also often depicted as unorthodox ideas, inconsistent and

lacking in detail. One articles describes Trump as “[A] reality-TV personality who devises policy

on the fly […]” (Ip, 2016), displaying the policies’ more unpredictable tendencies. In several arti-

cles, both Trump and Sanders are depicted as men who reject economic orthodoxy. However, in

comparison, Trump is more often framed as unpredictable, and Sanders more often as unorthodox.

29

4.3 The New York Times

Table 3: Frame frequency in The New York Times.

Frame

Frame frequency (percentage within parentheses)

Bernie Sanders’s

economic policy proposals

Donald Trump’s

economic policy proposals

Damaging frame 2 (3.9%) 10 (18.2%)

Ignorant frame 21 (41.2%) 17 (30.9%)

Unpredictable frame 5 (9.8%) 8 (14.5%)

Unorthodox frame 5 (9.8%) 8 (14.5%)

Status quo frame 8 (15.7%) 7 (12.7%)

Positive change frame 10 (19.6%) 5 (9.1%)

Total number of frame uses identified

51

55

Due to rounding, percentages do not always add up to 100%.

Bernie Sanders

The New York Times’s coverage of Sanders’s policy is mainly centered around the ignorant frame,

and although approximately half as common, the positive change frame is the second-to-most used

frame. The depiction of policy is fairly evenly distributed between frames with more negative

connotations (damaging, ignorant and unpredictable) and those with less (unorthodox, status quo

and positive change).

Policy was mostly presented as being at odds with economists, with numbers not adding up and

presenting Sanders as having overly optimistic economic assumptions. The New York Times arti-

cles featured many quotes from well-respected economists and reported on their opinions, which

were highly skeptical toward Sanders. Several articles mentioned an economist who came out in

30

support of Sanders but presented said economist as highly criticized and as someone holding fringe

views.

While Sanders’s ideas were portrayed as unorthodox, they were also often construed as idealistic,

with the end goal of helping people:

“Sanders’s idealism has sent a clear message to traditional economists on the left: They are

taking too long to develop answers to the problems of inequality and the corrosive effects of

concentrated wealth” (Davidson, 2016a).

Articles mentioned Sanders’s fight against a “’rigged’ economy”, and just as The Wall Street Jour-

nal gave mention to the intent of Trump’s policies, The New York Times did the same with Sand-

ers’s. Policies have admirable goals and Sanders is a goodhearted idealist for advocating them,

some articles seem to say.

Sanders’s policy is also framed as a continuation of the status quo far more often than in The Wall

Street Journal. Sanders is juxtaposed to Clinton in The New York Times just as he was in The Wall

Street Journal, however the two are not presented as having radical policy. In some articles, Sand-

ers’s policies were not construed as controversial at all.

“After all, Mr. Sanders does not want to nationalize the steel mills or the auto companies or

even the banks. Like Mrs. Clinton, he believes in a mixed economy, where capitalist insi-

tutions are mediated through taxes and regulation. He just wants more taxes and more regu-

lation than Mrs. Clinton does. He certainly seems like a regular Democrat, only more so”

(Barro, 2015).

In a surprising contrast to the number of times the damaging frame was used in The Wall Street

Journal, The New York Times only used the frame a mere two times, or 3.9% of the time that

frames were present (as opposed to 31% of the identified frame uses being damaging in The Wall

Street Journal). One of the few examples is when Sanders’s lumped together with Republicans,

whom the paper seems to consider just as damaging in their framing.

“The economists, who are all respected as luminaries in their field, said that Mr. Sanders’s

economic projections are as irresponsible as those promoted by Republicans who claim that

deep tax cuts will jump start the economy” (Rappeport, 2016).

31

In posing Sanders in opposition to economists, and presenting him as irresponsible, a duality of

frames can be seen that is quite common – pairing the ignorant and damaging frames is frequent

in all of the material, not only in The New York Times’s coverage of Sanders’s policy.

Donald Trump

The most commonly used frame in The New York Times’s coverage of Donald Trump is the igno-

rant frame – in line with the results from the Sanders articles. The frame is used in a myriad of

different contexts, for example when suggesting that Trump “dismiss[ed] any concerns over costs”

of his policy (Calmes, 2016a) and implying that the candidate does not know his own policy in

passages such as the following:

“In usual Donald Trump style, his statements about the flat tax have meandered into self-

contradictory territory” (Barro, 2015)

The candidate’s promises are often presented as wishful thinking or unfulfillable, repeatedly al-

luding to a lack of knowledge, insight or experience.

“For all the appeal his message might have for residents there (Mr. Trump captured almost

90 percent of the vote in Mingo county), much of what he is promising to do – on his own,

and through congressional legislation – couldn’t be accomplished in the first 1,000 days of

a Trump presidency, much less the first 100” (Schwartz, 2016).

While not the most common frame, in comparison to Sanders’s policy coverage the damaging

frame is used quite a bit more. Articles focus quite a bit on the negative effects of policy, disre-

garding their intent. They would lead to “a sharp drop in revenue” and “pushing up the national

debt” (Eavis, 2016), one article says. Another suggests that his proposal to impose tariffs “[…]

could have serious economic consequences at home […]” (Schwartz, 2016).

The unpredictable frame can be found in statements in which the writers appear to be confounded

by Trump’s policy: “I have spent much of the past few months trying to make sense of Trump’s

policy proposals” (Davidson, 2016b) or in articles clearly stating that his policy is erratic and con-

fusing.

Just as Sanders’s policy is compared to that of other Democrats, Trump’s is juxtaposed to that of

other Republicans. He and his policy are considered to be “[…] aligned with a flotilla of staunch

32

conservatives” (Rattner, 2015) by some articles – a perfect example of the use of the status quo

frame. However, the unorthodox frame is just as common – if not slightly more so – and presented

best in quotes such as the following:

“It was no secret that many Republicans viewed Trump as an explosive device poised to

obliterate in a single blast the party’s economic orthodoxy and its ability to project an image

of tolerance” (Draper, 2016).

The least common frame in The New York Times’s coverage of Trump is the positive change frame.

Although Trump may “blow up the party’s ‘rigged system’” (Draper, 2016) according to one arti-

cle, and some reporting on his intent exists, the negative consequences of his policy are presented

far more than any positive effects.

4.4 Comparison

Table 4: Total frequency of frames in both papers.

Frame

Frame frequency (percentage within parentheses)

The New York Times

The Wall Street Journal

Damaging frame 13 (12.1%) 29 (28.7%)

Ignorant frame 38 (35.5%) 25 (24.8%)

Unpredictable frame 13 (12.1%) 16 (15.8%)

Unorthodox frame 13 (12.1%) 16 (15.8%)

Status quo frame 15 (14%) 7 (6.9%)

Positive change frame 15 (14%) 8 (7.9%)

Total number of frame uses identified

107

101

Due to rounding, percentages do not always add up to 100%.

33

There are similarities in the coverage of the candidates’ policies in the two papers. The most com-

mon frame for Sanders’s policy in The New York Times was ignorant, while in The Wall Street

Journal it was damaging. The same is true for Trump’s policy. However, it is the frequency of the

frames in comparison to other frames that set the papers apart from one another.

While The Wall Street Journal’s coverage of both candidates’ policies presents said policies as

mostly damaging or ignorant, The New York Times’s coverage depends more on its ideological

leaning than its right-wing counterpart. In The New York Times, the left-wing candidate Bernie

Sanders and his policies are far more associated with the positive change frame than with the

damaging frame, while right-wing candidate Donald Trump’s most frequent frames in the paper

were ignorant and damaging. Despite The New York Times presenting Sanders’s policies as igno-

rant to a greater extent than those of Donald Trump, they also present his policies as having better

effects and intent than those of Donald Trump. While some articles in The Wall Street Journal

echo the same sentiment regarding Trump’s policy, this is done in a much lesser extent than in The

New York Times’s reporting. In fact, when comparing the frames used for both candidates, The

New York Times used the positive change and status quo frames almost twice as much as The Wall

Street Journal.

Another interesting aspect is that in each paper, no matter what candidate’s policies they were

covering, the most common frames were never the more neutral unorthodox and unpredictable

frames. Not to say that they were not used – they were fairly common. The interesting part is that

this means that the less neutral frames were used to a greater extent. This might be expected, how-

ever, considering the material was a combination of both editorials – filled to the brim with judge-

ments – and news articles.

The findings in this thesis suggest that while the presumption of populists and their irresponsible

policy exists, the papers’ presentations of policy are not divided neatly into two binary categories.

Due to the identification of as many as six frames, an intricate but also more complete understand-

ing of how the economic policies of populists are presented is gained. The point of using inductive

frame analysis was to find nuances in the material that could not be captured by a simple irrespon-

sible-responsible deductive framing based on the assumptions present in the literature. However,

when comparing the frames to each other, it became apparent that some frames presented policy

as being more irresponsible, and some frames highlight this aspect less or not at all – policy is

34

wasteful, or uninformed, or good for the economy. And while no frame can be fitted strictly into

the binary categories of “irresponsible” or “not irresponsible”, they may possibly be placed on a

spectrum between the two, with some frames portraying policy as more irresponsible than others.

One way to visualize this is presented in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Frame spectrum.

Irresponsible Not irresponsible

Ignorant Unpredictable

Unorthodox Status quo Positive change Damaging

35

5. Concluding remarks

This thesis started out with the aim to discover what frames were used by quality newspapers in

covering the economic policies of populists. While the irresponsible frame is one to be expected,

according to the literature, insight into multiple different frames was gained through a complex

inductive analysis. This analysis yielded six different frames, falling on a spectrum ranging from

irresponsible to not irresponsible.

While the results of this thesis make no claim at being generalizable, the findings from this snap-

shot of American elite media suggests that what Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser wrote is true: the

economic presumptions of populist irresponsibility remain current today, particularly among jour-

nalists in the U.S. (2017:4). While variations in framing existed between the two papers, perhaps

due to their different ideological leanings, both candidates were still framed as ignorant to a high

extent, and the framing of their policy in The Wall Street Journal was damaging and ignorant on

both sides. This confirms the previously discussed assumptions in the literature on quality papers

being hard on populists and favoring the status quo (Manucci, 2017:470).

Most importantly, this thesis has provided a nuanced account of the portrayal of the economic

policies of populists, which stands in contrast to the binary definitions in present in the literature.

Be they the newer studies by for example Prato and Wolton (2017), or the older studies by for

example Sachs (1989), the thinking around the economic policies of populists has revolved around

a dichotomy that might not be a dichotomy at all, but a spectrum. The frames identified in this

thesis showcase a nuanced framing of the policy in question, and while it does suggest that pre-

sumptions of irresponsibility are enduring, it also shows that other understandings of policy can

be concurrent. Populists are not portrayed as only having damaging and ignorant policies; they can

also be presented as providing the economy with much needed changes or simply as continuing

day-to-day operations, though such portrayals were less common.

Overall, in showing how American quality newspapers frame the economic policy proposals of

Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, this thesis has aimed to fill some of the lacunae in the literature

on populism and media. Future research could expand upon the frames identified in this thesis.

Studies on a larger scale could test whether or not frame saturation has been achieved in this thesis,

and quantitative studies on different material could more accurately determine frequency and use

36

of the frames (Esaiasson et al., 2017:198). A study focusing solely on news coverage or solely on

editorials would be interesting to better determine the differences in frame use in different types

of articles, as would studies focusing on a single newspaper or candidate. Examining other cultural

contexts in relation to these frames would also be of interest. Other possible research courses could

be analyzing the frame-setting or framing effects associated with these frames, in other words, the

other parts of the framing process detailed by de Vreese (2005:51-52) and mentioned earlier.

Empirical research on the relationship between populism and media has been lackluster, but it is

my belief that this thesis is just a drop in an ocean of the literature to come. After all, in a society

where the populist Zeitgeist is felt in every headline and notification, this increasingly salient and

multifaceted relationship will not be able to escape the scrutiny of diligent political scientists.

37

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43

Appendix 1: Analyzed material

Arbess, D.J., (2016). The Young and Economically Clueless. The Wall Street Journal. February

20th.

Barro, J., (2015a). Eight Thing to Watch For in Trump’s Tax Plan. The New York Times. Septem-

ber 3rd.

Barro, J., (2015b). What Does Sanders Mean by ‘Democratic Socialist’?. The New York Times.

October 20th.

Barro, J., (2016). A Tax Plan That Tests and Economic Hypothesis. The New York Times. February

9th.

Blinder, A.S., (2016). Trumpism, the Economic Wrecking Ball. The Wall Street Journal. March

22nd.

Calmes, J., (2016a). Analysts Question Viability of Deep Tax Cuts Proposed by Republicans. The

New York Times. February 23rd.

Calmes, J., (2016b). Left-Leaning Economists Question Cost of Bernie Sanders’s Plans. The New

York Times. February 16th.

Chozick, A., Calmes, J., Peters, J.W. & Gabriel, T., (2016). Clinton Offers Economic Plan Focused

on Jobs. The New York Times. March 5th.

Davidson, A., (2016a). Bernienomics Might Not Be Feasible – But It’s Useful. The New York

Times. April 17th.

Davidson, A., (2016b). What Donald Trump Doesn’t Understand About ‘the Deal’. The New York

Times. March 20th.

Draper, R., (2016). ‘This Is Fun, Right?’. The New York Times. May 22nd.

Eavis, P., (2016a). Trumps Backs Off Hint of Raising Taxes on the Rich. The New York Times.

May 12th.

Eavis, P., (2016b). When Elections Aren’t About the Economy. The New York Times. May 24th.

44

Galston, W., (2016). Politics & Ideas: Trump Dotes on Despots and Fiscal Fiasco. The Wall Street

Journal. January 13th.

Healy, P., (2016). Democratic Race Will Test Where the Left Stands. The New York Times. January

25th.

Henninger, D., (2015). Bernie Loves Hillary. The Wall Street Journal. October 15th.

Henninger, D., (2016a). Panama Bernie. The Wall Street Journal. April 7th.

Henninger, D., (2016b). Trump Among the Canaries. The Wall Street Journal. February 11th.

Ip, G., (2016). U.S. News – Capital Account: Economics and Populists Don’t Mix. The Wall Street

Journal. February 18th.

Meckler., L, (2015a). Clinton, Sanders Set To Tangle In First Debate. The Wall Street Journal.

October 15th.

Meckler, L., (2015b). Price Tag of Sanders Proposals: $18 Trillion. The Wall Street Journal. Sep-

tember 15th.

Peterson, K. & Hook, J., (2016). Trump, Ryan Edge Closer. The Wall Street Journal. May 13th.

Rappeport, A., (2016). Working The Numbers; Liberal Economists Raise Red Flags Over Sand-

ers’s Spending Proposals. The New York Times. February 18th.

Rattner, S., (2015). Trumps Economic Muddle. The New York Times. August 14th.

Rubin, P.H., (2016). The Zero-Sum Worlds of Trump and Sanders. The Wall Street Journal. March

21st.

Rubin, R. & Meckler, L., (2016). Election 2016: Policy on Entitlement Wavers. The Wall Street

Journal. May 12th.

Rubin, R., (2016). Trump Amplifies Stance on Tax, Debt. The Wall Street Journal. May 10th.

Schwartz, N.D., (2016). Putting Trump to the Test. The New York Times. May 22nd.

Seelye, K.Q., (2015). As a Mayor, Sanders Favored Pragmatism Over His Idealism. The New York

Times. November 26th.

45

Seib, G.F., (2016). Election 2016 – CAPITAL JOURNAL: Gloomy Campaign Rhetoric Shakes

Markets. The Wall Street Journal. February 16th.

The Wall Street Journal (2015). A Trumpian Tax Reform. The Wall Street Journal. October 1st.

Zumbrun, J., (2016). Election 2016: Campaign Blurs Growth View for Economists. The Wall

Street Journal. March 11th.

46

Appendix 2: Coding scheme

Damaging

1. Are the costs of policies emphasized in a neg-ative way?

2. Are policies presented as having devastating effects for an industry, a market, a relationship

or other entity? 3. Are policies described with words synony-

mous to hurtful or damaging?

Ignorant

1. Are policies presented as not thought through? 2. Are the policymakers described as not know-

ing or opposing the facts related to policy? 3. Are policies and their makers described with

words synonymous to ignorant or stupid?

Unpredictable

1. Are policies presented as being unclear and

hard to understand? 2. Are forecasts and predictions framed as non-

existent or not trustworthy? 3. Are policies described with words synony-

mous to incoherent, unpredictable or inade-quate?

Unorthodox

1. Are policies presented as being in contrast to

existing policies or the status quo? 2. Are policies presented as changing the sys-

tem? 3. Are policies described with words synony-

mous to unorthodox or upending?

Status quo

1. Are polices and policymakers presented as congruent with current policies and policy-

makers? 2. Are policies framed as not doing much or a

continuation of current affairs? 3. Are policies described with words synony-

mous to establishment or unchanged?

Positive change

1. Are the intents and effects of policies empha-sized in a positive way?

2. Are policies presented as popular or touching what people want and need?

3. Are policies described with words synony-mous to good, helpful or effective?