prevention by regulatory control of radioactive sources as the best defence against international...

Prevention by Regulatory Control of Radioactive Sources as the Best Defence against International

Radiological Threats

J Sabol, L. Navrátil, B. Šesták

Prague, Czech Republic

6th Dresden International Symposium: HAZARDS – DETECTION AND MANAGEMENT

Prevention by Regulatory Control of Radioactive Sources as the Best Defence against International Radiological Threats

Classical characterization of the terrorism:

The terrorism achieves its goal not

through its acts but through the

response to its acts.


Threat and its prevention:

Today, after the Cold War, terrorists rather than nuclear-

armed nations or military blocks are more likely to

perpetrate their dreadful and lethal acts using nuclear or

radiological weapons.

This is a new global threat to international peace and

security which is based on some specific phenomena and

thus it has also to be challenged by specific measures

where prevention by regulatory control is one of the most

important tools of defence.


Threat and its prevention:

Millions of radioactive sources are used every day for

medical, industrial, research, and commercial purposes, all of

which need to be adequately secured.

Fortunately, however, only a small percentage of the sources

are considered suitable for making potent radiological

weapons.

The following relatively common seven reactor-produced

radioisotopes could pose particularly high security risks:

americium-241, californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60,

iridium-192, plutonium-238, and strontium-90.


Nuclear terrorism:

In the case of nuclear weapons, the terrorist groups could

seize and detonate an intact nuclear bomb originating from a

military arsenal or they could acquire a sufficient amount of

highly enriched uranium or plutonium to construct and

explode such a crude or improvised nuclear device.

Nuclear terrorism may also involve the sabotage of or attack

on nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants, research

reactors, spent nuclear fuel storage compounds or a transport

consignment containing nuclear material.


Nuclear vs radiological terrorism:Due to strict regulatory measures regarding the safety and security of nuclear weapons, material or installations, many of them adopted even before the 9/11 attack in 2001 or Chernobyl accident in 1986. Nuclear facilities were always relatively well protected and this protection has recently been further enhanced by means of the latest technology applied to minimize the threat of nuclear terrorism. This is why it is expected that at present, potential terrorists would concentrate their efforts towards acquiring high-activity radioactive sources and use them in a so-called “dirty bomb” rather than trying to attack nuclear facilities or attempting to seize nuclear material or nuclear weapons kept by the military.


Nuclear vs radiological terrorism:

Nuclear and radiological terrorism also

differ markedly in their consequences.

Although dirty bombs could cause dozens of

fatalities from the conventional blast, they

would typically kill few, if any, people in the

near term from exposure to ionising

radiation.



The most widely-known dissemination method isthrough explosives, commonly called a “dirty bomb”. Dirty bomb - radiological weapon or radiological dispersion device (RDD) - is any weapon that is designed to spread radioactive material with the intent to kill, and cause disruption upon a city or nation. The RDD is only one type of radiological weapon . Other kind of radiological weapons are different sorts of radiation emission devices (RED). Terrorists might try placing a RED in a crowded location in heavily populated areas such as a busy train station.



Nuclear and radiological terrorism also

differ markedly in their consequences.

Although dirty bombs could cause dozens of

fatalities from the conventional blast, they

would typically kill few, if any, people in the

near term from exposure to ionising

radiation.



Over a period of several years, however, many people might develop

cancer as a result of this exposure.

Experts have labelled dirty bombs, or radiation dispersal devices, as

weapons of mass disruption because the main effects would probably be

psychological and social disruption caused by fear of radiation and by

radioactive contamination that could shut down large areas of a city.

Similarly, a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant or

radioactive-waste storage site would release radiation, spark fear, and

cause widespread disruption.


Chain of actions terrorists have to go through:

• to identify financial sponsors and dedicated individuals and to organize a

terrorist group (it would require some communications , traveling and

meetings),

• to take decision to commit the violent act and to select a vulnerable or other

sensitive site for the attack,

• to decide which weapon to use and collect sufficient information how to

acquire necessary components to complete such a device (including illicit

trafficking, theft, purchase etc),

• to prepare/construct the weapon and to transport it to the site of the attack,

• to carry out the attack and leave the site


Prevention strategy:

to break any link in the chain of terrorist actions and apply a

defence-in-depth (multi-layer) approach,

the strategy should include:

• intelligence to identify nuclear terrorist organisations,

• law enforcement and military action to apprehend or destroy the terrorists,

• physical guarding of nuclear weapons, fissile material, radioactive material,

and nuclear/radiation facilities housing highly radioactive substances,

• radiation detection systems to help intercept nuclear explosive material and

potent radioactive sources at border crossings


Control of nuclear vs radioactive material:

Historically, the control of radioactive sources, including

those with high activities, has not usually been at a level

comparable to the control of nuclear materials or nuclear

installations.

In most countries these radioactive sources have not been

under the responsibility of central nuclear/radiation

regulatory authorities but under different government or

local agencies where traditionally the most important role has

been played by ministries of health, industry or environment.


National vs international dimension:

During the last decade or so, coordinated and internationally

harmonized procedures have been developed and

appropriate steps began to be implemented in order to

increase the control of high-risk radioactive sources. This

control relies on the regulatory infrastructures empowered

to adopt all necessary measures in ensuring adequate safety

and security of these sources at both national and

international levels.


Safety vs security aspects:

The previous regulatory mechanisms for controlling most

powerful radioactive sources were aimed primarily on

safety aspects, while security issues were not sufficiently

addressed.

By present standards, these mechanisms are considered to

be inadequate because they do not comply with the current

security requirements, where a performance-based

philosophy is replacing the older compliance-based

concept.


Safety vs security aspects:

The previous regulatory mechanisms for controlling most

powerful radioactive sources were aimed primarily on

safety aspects, while security issues were not sufficiently

addressed. By present standards, these mechanisms are

considered to be inadequate because they do not comply

with the current security requirements, where a

performance-based philosophy is replacing the older

compliance-based concept.


Main regulatory mechanisms :

Establishment of efficient national radiation protection

infrastructures, including the creation of a national independent

regulatory authority empowered to introduce a system of

notification, authorization, inspection and enforcement, and to

issuing appropriate regulations addressing the safety and security

of radioactive sources applying the concept of defence-in-depth,

including physical and organizational barriers; the adoption of

relevant legislation; and the implementation of other relevant

security measures based on international standards and

recommendations.


Main regulatory mechanisms :

Introduction and maintenance of the inventory of

radioactive sources based on the classification of the sources

in accordance with their dangerous effects, and on the

regular updating of these sources taking into account their

monitoring and ensuring the control of the sources following

the principle “from the cradle to the grave” which requires

an adequate radioactive waste management system to

properly store or dispose of sources at end-of-life.


Main regulatory mechanisms:Establishment of national capabilities regarding technical support

services, including mechanisms for detecting, localizing,

identifying, recovering and securing orphan, lost, stolen and other

unaccountable sources as well as intercepted illicit sources.

Establishment of a system for the adequate training of personnel,

including regular exercises, encouraging the cultivation of the

safety/security culture approach, and promoting awareness of the

population toward understanding the threat of radiological

terrorism and response in line with the international

recommendations.


Role of international organizations:

UNO



ICRP



ICRP

Existing ICRP recommendations



ICRP

The recommendations in the report are conceptually applicable to a

wide range of conceivable attacks, ranging from malevolent uses of

radioactive materials, such as employing the so-called ‘radiological

dispersion devices’, or RDD, sabotaging nuclear facilities to cause a

nuclear accident or, in extreme cases, detonating improvised nuclear

devices, or IND. However, since the two latter scenarios are

perceived to present a wider range of potential situations, to be less

accessible, and perhaps to be more unlikely than those involving

commonly used radioactive materials, the Commission has tailored

its recommendations to radiological attacks with RDDs in

particular.



ICRP

Planning for radiological protection in the aftermath of a

radiological attack requires the establishment of appropriate

programmes, at both the local and national level. These

programmes need to ensure that first responders and rescuers

are adequately trained and have the proper equipment to

identify the presence of radiation and radioactive

contamination, and that radiation protection specialists are

available to advise local and other relevant authorities.


The leading organization in this field is the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which

has been succeeding in mobilizing relevant

international expert bodies, organizations and

regional groupings towards the implementation of

efficient tools for controlling radioactive sources and

materials.


IAEA



IAEA

Adoption and implementation of the IAEA documents:

Basic Safety Standards on the Protection against Ionizing

Radiation and the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS),

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive

Sources ,

Guidelines on the Import and Export of Radioactive

Sources



IAEA

The IAEA is the world's nuclear watchdog organization. One Focus of the IAEA is maintaining and improving the radiation safety standards and guidelines that are used throughout the world, including security for both nuclear power plants and radioactive sources. The IAEA has been working for a number of years to increase security standards and measures.

IAEA headquarters in Vienna



IAEA



IAEA – Code of Conduct

The G-8 at its meeting in Evian in 2003 expressed its full political support for the IAEA actions and for the Code of Conduct and encouraged all States working to increase the safety and security of radioactive sources. At Sea Island in 2004, the G-8 gave its support to the “Guidance on the Import and Export of High-Risk Radioactive Sources,” which was developed under the auspices of the IAEA and was subsequently endorsed by the General Conference in September 2004. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, in its preamble, recognized that most States have taken effective preventive measures in accordance with the recommendations given in the Code of Conduct.



IAEA – Code of Conduct

The Group of Eight (G-8) nations—Canada, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia—

is a smaller, but powerful, forum in which countries have decided

to work together to address the threat of radiological terrorism.

The G-8 includes most of the major producers of commercial

radioactive sources. At its June 2003 summit, the G-8 announced

that its members would focus on high-priority provisions of the

IAEA Code of Conduct.



IAEA



IAEA

Material is circulating in unauthorized/ criminal circumstances (one has also to take into account that terrorists might be smart)

Illicit Trafficking Database Programme (ITDP)



IAEA: Safeguards (non-proliferation) + Safety + Security


IAEA: Detection techniques



EU (EURADOS)

Adoption and implementation of the IAEA documents:

Basic Safety Standards on the Protection against Ionizing

Radiation and the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS),

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive

Sources ,

Guidelines on the Import and Export of Radioactive

Sources


Conclusion:

Nuclear/radiation security is an investment.

The IAEA to assume a leadership role at the interna-

tional level, in close coordination with States and other

international organizations.

A holistic, synergistic and sustainable approach with

emphasis on synergies will be both efficient and effective

Operators must manage their facilities/locations with

focus on security.

There is no room for complacency in this serious matter.