private sector: vital role in times of war
TRANSCRIPT
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Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation
Economic Studies & Forcasting Sector
Issue (35) July, 2018
With their ancient cultural heritage, Yemenis have man-aged to establish prosperous civilizations that played an important role in the East-West trade. They have distin-guished themselves throughout history with their entrepre-neurial spirit which endowed them with long experiences that enabled them to accumulate capital and build effective partnerships with the regional and international private sec-tor.
The private sector played a major role in leading the economic activity prior to the war by contributing over 50% of GDP and providing employment for 69.4% of total employed population(1). It was also a major contributor to the public budget deficit through treasury bills and Islamic Sukuk. During the ongoing war, the private sector has be-come more important and provided an excellent example in supporting humanitarian relief efforts and responding to market demands for goods and services. While the public sector reached a state of collapse, the already weak private sector continued to perform its development role, includ-ing the provision of education, health, water and electricity, and importation of fuel and other commodities even at high prices, thereby emphasizing that it has greater flexibility and better ability to cope with war conditions.
The private sector has been struggling to survive despite the deep wounds and violent shocks it sustains day by day, most notably the negative repercussions of the public fi-nance crisis, liquidity crisis, physical damages, economic losses in enterprises and restriction of internal and external transactions. To mitigate the challenges and risks facing the private sector, it is important to reach an economic settle-ment to distance the private sector from war and conflict in order to ensure the continuity of the economic activity and improve the livelihoods of people.
IntroductIon
Private Sector: Vital Role in Times of WarFirst: Economic, Social and Humanitar-ian Role of the Private Sector.Second: Main Difficulties and Risks Fac-ing the Private Sector.Third: Priority Interventions.
Facts and IndIcators
The parallel exchange rate in mid-September 2018.
33% of retirees in the GAIP with-out pensions since March 2017.
YER 600 / USD Over 41,000 Retirees **
people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2018 *.
people displaced (IDPs & re-turnees) as of September 2017.
22.2 million 3 million *
people are food insecure in December 2017.
Cumulative decline in real GDP during 2015-2017.
6 in 10 * 47.1%
90% of the population lack access to public electricity.
Sources: * UN Agencies.** General Authority for Insurance and Pensions (GAIP), 2017.*** WB, June 2016.
24.3 million ***
In thIs edItIon:
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The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) refers to the value of final goods and services produced by the society over a given period of time. By distributing the real GDP into public and private sectors, it’s noticed that the contraction rate in the pub-lic sector (-31%) was higher than the private sector (-18%) during the years of 2015-2016(2). Thus, the private sector’s contribution to the real GDP increased from 62.3% in 2014 to 70% in 2016 (Figure 1). This reflects the private sector’s stronger immunity and better ability to cope with war condi-tions compared to the public sector, which reached a stage of almost total collapse, especially after the division of state economic institutions since late 2016. Therefore, the already feeble private sector became the main player in the Yemeni economy, along with the international and national organiza-tions that endeavor to fill part of the vacuum left by the public sector in delivery of basic social services. This requires sup-porting the private sector and strengthening its role in turn-ing the wheel of economic growth and generating work and income opportunities now and in the future.
First: Economic, Social and Humani-tarian Role of the Private Sector:• Role of the Private Sector in Economic Activity:
70.0%
66.9%
62.3%
62.6%64.3%64.6%
63.0%
201220112010 2013 2014 2015 2016Pre-war During war
GDP – Public sector (YEM billion)GDP – Private sector (YEM billion)
GDP of private sector to GDP (%)
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
0
200
400
600
800
Figure (1): Size of private sector and its share in the real GDP ($billion & %)
Source:CSO, National Accounts Bulletin 2016.
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 2 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
At the level of the main economic sectors, the private sector used to dominate the real GDP of the Agriculture sector by 100%. This highlights the vital role of the private sector in Yemen’s national economy, especially since the Agriculture Sector provides about 20-25% of the total food commodities available in the country, and spreads geographically in rural areas where pockets of poverty are concentrated in Yemen. Table (1) indicates the growing contribution of the private sector to man-ufacturing, construc-tion and services sec-tors during the war, despite the numerous damages and chal-lenges facing it(A). This means that the private sector is more resilient and has greater ability to absorb shocks and adapt to the repercus-sions of the ongoing war, compared to the public sector.
The private sector plays a vital role in the social and humanitarian fields, where it used to provide em-ployment for 20% of the total employed population, according to the Labor Force Survey 2013-2014. If all laborers in the non-public sector are considered as private sector employees, the private sector’s contribu-tion to the employment of workers will increase to 69.4% (Figure 2 ).
Findings of the quick survey on the crisis’ impact on employment and labor market— conducted by the Central Statistical Organization and the International Labor Organization (ILO) in three governorates (Am-anat Al-Asemah, Hodeida and Aden) in November 2015 indicated that total number of jobs in the three governorates decreased by about 132,000 (12.8%) between 2014-2015.
Although not representative, if this were replicated nationally that would equate to 600,000 total job losses. The agriculture and services sectors were at the forefront of the most affected sectors by job losses. The loss of jobs was partly compensated by an increase in the construction workers by 8% due to the start of reconstruction activities in Aden and the resort of some residents to maintain the purchasing power of their money in the form of real estates (Table 2).
Despite the negative repercussions of the ongoing war on enterprises, a survey conducted in 2017 re-vealed that all employers reported that they retained majority of their workforce through negative adapta-tion strategies such as the reduction of salaries and working hours(5). This is in contrast to state employees, who haven’t received monthly salaries in most of the Yemeni governorates since late 2016. Private activi-ties have become a haven for the state employees and a source of income for many of them.
• Social and Humanitarian Role of the Private Sector:
* Include wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, hotels, transportation, storage, communications, finance, insur-ance, real estate, personal services, community services and government services.
Source:Central Statistical Organization, National Accounts, 2016.
Description/ Year2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Pre-war During war
AgriculturePublic sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Private sector 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ManufacturingPublic sector 37.1 39.4 41.2 39.5 61.2 60.8 47.8
Private sector 62.9 60.6 58.8 60.5 38.8 39.2 52.2
ConstructionPublic sector 61.2 58.7 56.1 61.6 55.6 53.6 53.2
Private sector 38.8 41.3 43.9 38.4 44.4 46.4 46.8
Services*Public sector 25.7 31.5 32.6 34.0 35.7 37.7 33.3
Private sector 74.3 68.5 67.4 66.0 64.3 62.3 66.7
Table (1) Private Sector contribution in the Main Economic Sectors at constant Prices (%)
(A)The increase in the private sector contribution to GDP is not attributed to the raise in the absolute value of the private sector’s GDP, but to the fact that the public sector is declining more than the private sector.
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 3 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
In education and health, the private sector had 899 basic and secondary education schools out of 16,730 school in 2016. In addition to 101 universities and colleges in high education accommodating 83,177 stu-dents out of 310,340 student in 2014(3). The private sector owned over 60% of the country’s health facilities in 2014(4). Since late 2016, the collapse of the public education and health system has been accelerated by the ongoing war repercussions, including the salary crisis for state employees, suspension of operating costs of public facilities in most of the governorates, while the private sector continued to provide education and health services to people. However, these services remain inaccessible by many low-income people due to their high costs. Private companies facilitate the flow of medical supplies to pharmacies and health facili-ties nationwide. Most international and national humanitarian organizations operating in Yemen relied on Yemeni companies to get medical supplies for the cholera response during April-September 2017 because of the ability of the private sector to import the needed supplies urgently.
Item/Year 2014 total
2015 total
Absolute change
Percentage change
2014 share
2015 share
(thousands) (Percent)
Agriculture 146.8 73.9 -72.9 -49.7 14.2 8.2
Industry 74.2 71.2 -2.9 -4.0 7.2 7.9
Construction 57.7 62.3 4.6 8.0 5.6 6.9
Trade 324.3 277.0 -47.2 -14.6 31.4 30.8
Treansport 151.1 123.1 -28.0 -18.5 14.6 13.7
Other Private Services 86.1 100.1 14.0 16.3 8.3 11.1
Private Services 561.4 500.2 -61.2 -10.9 54.4 55.6
Public Services 191.5 191.9 0.4 0.2 18.6 21.3
Services 752.9 692.1 -60.8 -8.1 73.0 76.9
Total 1,031.5 899.5 -132.1 -12.8 100.0 100.0
Employer7%
20%11%
Private Sector Employees
31%
Puplic Sector Employees
31%
Own-account worker
Contributing family workers
Table (2) Composition of and impact on employment by sector in Sana’a City, Al-Hodeida, and Aden
Figure (2): Employed Population by Status in Employment, Labor Force Survey 2013-2014
Source:ILO, 2016, Yemen Damage and Needs Assessment, Crisis Impact on Employment and Labor Market..
Yemen imports most of its food needs from abroad. According to the UN Logistics Cluster, commercial imports accounted for 96.5% of food commodities that entered the country during January-March 2017, while INGOs have imported 3.5%(5). Humanitarian organizations rely on the private sector to provide sup-ply chain services such as transportation, storage, customs clearance and re-shipping services. Private enterprise owners provide Humanitarian organiza-tions with various goods and services, including au-tomobiles, generators, food baskets and cash transfer services.
For sure the reliance of INGOs on local companies to carry out more of their activities and continuity to purchase from inside Ye-men increases the employ-ment and income opportu-nities and allows foreign exchange to flow into local markets, thereby supporting the national currency.
Source: Logistic Cluster and WFP, Snapshot on shipping, Food and fuel imports, March 2017.
Source : UNDP and Connecting Business Initiative, Private Sector Organizations/Companies Engagement in Emergency Pre-paredness, Response and Recovery, Preliminary Survey Results, August 2017.
43,7681,262,616
-525,689
FOOD (mt)
FUEL (liters)
Commercial Humanitarian
0 5 10 15 20
Shelter Support
Support for Women
Electricity
Education
Awareness
Feeding Programme
IDPs Livelihoods
Non-Food Items
Health Services
Food
Financial
Figure (3) Commercial vs humanitarian imports (Jan 2017 - Mar 2017)
Figure (4) Type of Assistance Provided to Conflict Affected Persons in August 2017
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 4 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
In May 2017, the World Bank estimated the funding requirements for reconstruction and recovery in Ye-men at about $88 billion, including the reconstruction cost of physical assets of $25 billion(7)(B). Despite the lack of updated and comprehensive data on war damages to the private sector enterprises, findings of a rapid survey conducted by the Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Service (SMEPS), in cooperation with UNDP in six governorates (Abyan, Taiz, Hajjah, Aden, Sa’ada and Sana’a) during August-September 2015, indicated that 26% of enterprises were forced to shut their doors, 95% of the closed enterprises sus-tained partial and complete damages(8).
Second: Main Difficulties and Risks Facing the Private Sector:
1. Physical Damages of the Ongoing War:
(B)These estimates do not necessarily reflect the total magnitude of current war damage and losses because the damages are increasing day by day and the survey methodology is deficient in terms of the geographical and sectoral coverage. Additionally, damages weren’t examined on the ground, but the assessment methodology was mainly based on remote data collection.
Out of its social responsibility towards the society, the private sector implements charity projects and provides hand of assistance to charities and the poor. For example, the private sector established the Yemeni Food Bank in 2017 as an independent humanitarian civil society organization to combat hunger in Yemen. At the inauguration ceremony, businessmen donated about YR300 million.
According to a questionnaire conducted by UNDP on 53 private organizations in Yemen in August 2017, 81% of these organizations were providing assistance to conflict affected persons(6). These organizations reported that the most important types of assistance they provide include financial services, food and health services (Figure 4).
At the governorate level, enterprises operating in Taiz and Aden were most affected by 95% and 90% respectively (Figure 6). By governorate and the degree of damage (complete/partial), it’s noticed that the highest incidences of complete damages have been recorded in enterprises operating in Sa’ada governorate by 43% of the total affected businesses surveyed in Sa’ada (Figure 5).
In May-July 2017, the International Labor Organization (ILO) conducted an assessment of the damages to small and medium-sized enterprises in Sana’a city and its outskirts, which included 460 businesses (73% small enterprises and 27% medium enterprises). The assessment shows that the majority of these projects were affected by the war in 2015(9). However, enterprises that remained closed were less than 10%, while 41% of businesses resumed their operations partially. Findings of the survey revealed that 5% of the busi-nesses were completely destroyed; 22% sustained significant damages to human, material and economic as-sets and 58% sustained limited damages. While some of the enterprises sustained physical damages, most of them (97%) sustained economic losses such as disruption of work, loss of expected revenues and a decline in the number of workers and customers(9).
Abyan Taiz Hajjah Aden Sa’dah Sana’a
41%
95%
85%90%
58%
69%Sana’a
Sa’dah
Hajjah
Taiz
20%-80%43%- 57%
14%-86%
25%-75% Aden 23%-77%
Abyan10%-90%
Complete damage per governorate.Partial damage per governorate.
Figure (6) Percent of businrsses report physical damage because of war
Figure (5) Incidence of physical damage be-tween partial and total across governorates (%)
Source:SMEPS & UNDP, Impact of the Yemen Crisis on Private Sector Activity, Aug.-Sep., 2015
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 5 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
The average financial com-pensation required for a medi-um-sized enterprise to resume its operations was estimated at $40,541, while small entrepre-neurs need $18,108 on average. Most of the required funding covers materials and assets(9). In order to recover, small entrepre-neurs reported that they needed to borrow money while medium-sized entrepreneurs were more interested in getting equipment and operational capital to resume their operations.
The ongoing war has severely affected the basic infrastructure in large parts of the country, including roads, bridges, land, sea and airports and imposed severe restrictions on movements of people and inter-nal and external trade, thus raising the costs of the private sector. For example, armed confrontations in Haradh-Al-Tawal area resulted in the closure of the Al-Tawal Port since May 2015, the most important land port, thereby forcing people and goods to pass through Al Wadeeah land port, which is more than twice the distance far from the highly-populated areas in Yemen(10). It takes more time, effort and money and poses higher risks compared to using usual roads.
2. Restrictions on Internal and External Transactions:
Most of the commercial shipments were referred to Aden Port and then had to pass through several checkpoints along the roads before reaching traders’ warehouses in Sana’a and other cities. This delays the shipments add high financial costs, including customs duplication. Not to mention the increase in internal transportation costs on such shipments that may be higher than the cost of shipping due to the monopoly of the Syndicate of Heavy Transport Trucks Drivers for the internal transportation from Aden Port(10). Table(3) indicates the approximate transporting costs for 20 ft. and 40 ft. containers (or their equivalent) from Aden/Hodeidah to Sana’a in 2017, compared to the pre-war period. These fees have undoubtedly increased cur-rently.
Shipping of goods to Yemen is very expensive and shipments that used to take a month prior to the war need three to four months now due to the delays in entry and clearance of ships in Yemeni ports and the imposition of additional insurance premiums due to war risks at $500 per shipment equivalent to 20 feet and $1,000 per shipment equivalent to 40 feet. The insurance costs are even added to shipments going to Aden despite the city being declared as a safe area, i.e., not a subject of the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM)(10).
Pre-conflict During the conflict Price increase
20 ft. 40 ft. 20 ft. 40 ft. 20 ft. 40 ft.
Hodeidah – Sana’a 150,000 230,000 250,000 340,000 66.67% 47.83%
Aden – Sana’a 230,000 310,000 315,000 430,000 36.96% 38.71%
Table (3) Transport Costs for 20 ft. and 40 ft. Containers Before and During Conflict
* Since the war broke out payments are required at various checkpoints along transport routes; however, these are not included in the above pricesSource:Ala Qasem and Brett Scott, Deeproot Consulting, Navigating Yemen’s Wartime Food Pipeline, November 2017.
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 6 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
Figure (7) Average delays in entering ports in July 2018
Port delays refer to the time span between arrival at anchorage area and berthing; it does not include the time
elapsed while awaiting clearances.
IMPORTANT
Sources: Logistics Cluster, WFP, WSS reports
The operational status of ports as shown on the map is based on information provided by Wilhelmsen Ship Services AS.
ASH SHIHR* No berths in Jul
MUKALLA
BALHAF
ADENOPEN
CLOSED
MOKA
AL HUDAYDAH
RAS ISA (SBM)
RAS ISA (SHORE TANKS)
SALEEF
Source:Logistics Cluster and WFP, Yemen Humanitarian Imports Overview, July 2018.
In addition, air freight costs have increased because insurance companies impose 200% as insurance fees on Yemen Airways(10). Airports in Sana’a, Aden, Hodeida, Mukalla, Seiyun and Taiz sustained damages. Air flights were resumed only at Aden and Seiyun airports, with international flights limited to Cairo and Amman, while other airports in Hodeida, Taiz and Mukalla remain closed. In Sana’a, only UN humanitar-ian flights are allowed to land at the airport. This hinders shipping the goods of the private sector and the transfer accumulated foreign currency balances of the private sector and banks to and from Yemen.
In addition, strict limitations have been placed on cash transfers between areas under the control of the parties to the conflict. The majority of correspondent banks suspended dealing with Yemeni banks in US dollar remittances and opening documentary credits due to the classification of Yemen as a high-risk area. This greatly affects the provision of banking services such as international remittances and commercial fi-nancing, which are vital to the good performance of the economy and to enable the private sector to import goods and services. Foreign banks that agree to open documentary credits require cash insurances by 100% of Yemeni bank balances for these credits, thereby raising the prices of imported goods.
The private sector has a close interrelationship with the public finance. on the one hand, it is a major con-tributor to the public budget through the payment of taxes and fees, purchase of treasury bills and Islamic Sukuk and provision of hydrocarbon revenues produced by foreign companies. On the other hand, the public expenditure is a key driver of the private sector’s activities and demand for its products and services, thereby improving employment and income levels in the economy as a whole.
3. Public Finance Crisis:
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 7 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
Figure (8) Implications of the Public Finance Crisis on the Private Sector
Suspension of salaries in most gov-ernorates, as well as the social welfare assistance and pensions. This affects in-come levels and leads to a contraction in the demand for private sector products.
Suspension of fuel subsidies and disruption of the op-erating expenses for public facilities in large parts of the country, including water and electricity through the public grid. This raises the production, transportation and storage costs; contributes to the low productivity and revenues of the private sector and reduces its capacity to expand and generate employment and income opportunities.
Freezing the projects of the Public Investment Program, which has greatly affected the contracting sector and its activities.
Non-payment of hundreds of billions arrears owed to the contracting sector and suppliers.
Non-payment of domestic public debt interests and instal-ments, thus depriving investors in treasury bills from the returns of their financial investments and leaving the banking sector vulnerable to a severe liquidity crisis, which has adversely af-fected entrepreneurs.
Placing further tax and customs burdens on the private sector and undermining the confidence between the public and private sectors.
However, the collapse of public finance system as a result of the ongoing war have had a heavy impact on the private sector. The ratio of public revenues to GDP declined from 31.4% in 2014 to 16.1% in 2016 due to the disruption of hydrocarbon exports, suspension of donor support to the public budget and contraction of tax revenues. Under pressure from the declining revenues, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP de-clined from 36.1% in 2014 to 30.1% in 2016(11). The situation worsened further with the division of public finance and collapse of the public budget following the relocation of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) to Aden in September 2016. This had disastrous consequences on the public and private activities. Figure (8) clarifies the transmission channels of the public finance crisis to the private sector in more details.
The liquidity crisis has contributed to the nonpayment/reduction of wages and salaries and the layoff of some workers from enterprises, thereby reducing their purchasing power for food and non-food staples and deepening the contraction in demand for the private sector’s products. As a result, the economic activity has deteriorated and unemployment and poverty rates have increased.
Additionally, the foreign exchange liquidity crisis has led to growing obstacles and higher costs on the private sector and restricted its ability to import goods and services such as wheat, rice, sugar, medicine and fuel. The direct purchase of U.S dollar by goods’ importers from the parallel exchange market puts strong pressure on the exchange rate, thereby increasing the cost of imported goods. For example, the retail prices of food commodities reached to 39%-104% in May 2018 compared to what it was in pre-crisis period af-fected among other factors by the foreign exchange scarcity(12). This poses a threat on food security in the country and requires securing trade finance facility for basic commodities and fuel at a fixed exchange rate.
The banking sector is currently facing a severe liquidity crisis, where about 65% of bank’s total assets are out of control and unavailable for use in the form of government securities, balances (deposits and required reserves) at the CBY and loans offered to the private sector in danger of default(13). Therefore, banks are unable to meet the demands of their clients (business owners) in a timely fashion. This has affected the activities of those clients, weakened their confidence in the banking sector and made them prefer to keep liquidity outside banks. Not to mention the emerging challenges of the liquidity crisis, such as the large difference between the payment in cash and check or refusal to accept checks, low exchange rate of the earlier series of U.S. banknotes (before 2006) compared to the new series, in addition to the increase in the percentage of non-performing loans which reached 52.5% of the total loans and facilities of banks to the private sector in December 2017(13). Therefore, banks demand large guarantees on credit, which hinders the private investments.
4. Aggravation of the Liquidity Crisis:
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 8 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
Yemen is ranked 186 among 190 countries worldwide in the World Bank’s Doing Business Indica-tor-2018 (Figure 9). This places Yemen among the top five worst countries on the map of the world’s Do-ing Business. The countries that are worse than Yemen are South Sudan, Venezuela, Eritrea and Somalia. Yemen’s rank has significantly dropped from 101 in 2012 to 186 in 2018, making it difficult for Yemen not only to attract foreign investments, but also to regain the national migrant capital and foreign companies that left Yemen due to the conflict.
5. Deterioration in Doing Business:
Figure (9) Trend of Yemen Rank in Doing Business Indicator at World Level During (2010-2018)
2014 2015 2016 20172010 2011 2012 2013 2018
190190189189189185183183183
186179170
137133129
101105104
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Yemen Rank Total No. of countries (Worst World Performance)
186Yemen, Rep.
187South Sudan
188Venezuela, RB
189Eritrea
190Somalia
By comparing Yemen’s rank with the countries of Middle East and North Africa Region in the main indicators of the Doing Business, it’s noted that Yemen scored the worst performance in indicators of trad-ing Across Borders, getting electricity and credit. In addition to the deterioration of Yemen’s rank in other indicators such as ease of doing business and dealing with construction permits. This reflects the suffering of the private sector inside Yemen.
Indicator Yemen RankWorst regional performance Best regional Performance
Rank Economy Rank Economy
Ease of Doing Business Rank 186 185 Libya 21 UAE
Starting a Business 163 167 Libya 31 Oman
Dealing with Construction Permits 186 186 Yemen, Syria, Libya 2 UAE
Getting Electricity 187 187 Yemen 1 UAE
Registering Property 82 187 Libya 10 UAE
Getting Credit 186 186 Yemen, Iraq, Libya 90 UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran
Protecting Minority Investors 132 186 Djibouti 10 UAE, Saudi Arabia
Paying Taxes 80 167 Egypt 1 UAE, Qatar
Trading Across Borders 189 189 Yemen 53 Jordan
Enforcing Contracts 140 175 Djibouti 12 UAE
Resolving Insolvency 156 168 Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya 63 Tunisia
Table (4) The Republic of Yemen and the MENA Region: Doing Business Indicators, 2018
Source: World Bank Group, Doing Business Report, 2018. http://www.doingbusiness.org
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 9 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
Traditional policies and interventions are no longer useful to encounter the challenges and risks that plague the Yemeni private sector in light of the ongoing war and conflict in the country. In this context, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry expressed its views for the solution by presenting the private sector’s initiative for economic settlement between the parties to the conflict to ensure the continuation of economic activity and enhancement of livelihoods in Yemen. This edition highlights the terms of this initiative as fol-lows:1- Ensuring the independence and impartiality of the CBY and unifying its administration under one inde-
pendent and neutral leadership, or at least ensure full and direct coordination between the CBY struc-tures in Sana’a and Aden if it is not currently possible to unify the administration.
2- Ensuring full freedom of land, sea and air transport, focusing on:
3- Neutralizing all sovereign state revenues, by focusing on:
Third: Priority Interventions:
● Facilitating the foreign trade movement by opening all land, sea and air ports without exception to al-low the flow of the private sector’s goods and the movement of businessmen and travelers.
● Facilitating the movement of travelers, businessmen and goods between different areas of Yemen, as well as neutralizing all seaports, airports, roads and bridges from military operations.
● Restoring the full operational capacity of Yemeni ports, including Hodeida Port, by repairing the dam-ages and expediting ships unloading and entry to the ports, and abolishing the monopoly of the Syndi-cate of Heavy Transport Trucks Drivers for the internal transportation from Aden Port.
● Directing all oil and non-oil sovereign resources, including foreign aid, to one party such as the CBY or an agreed upon special fund under a neutral Yemeni leadership and the supervision of the international community (EU and / or IMF and WB).
● Agreeing on aspects to spend these revenues, most importantly paying the monthly salaries and wages of all state employees throughout Yemen according to the 2014 payrolls and providing the inevitable operating expenses for the health and education sector at all stages.
4- Neutralizing electricity from war and conflict by focusing on:
5- Resuming hydrocarbon production and exports by focusing on:
6- Mobilizing donor support for agricultural, fisheries and livestock activities and improving livelihoods of citizens.
7- Neutralizing the private telecommunication companies from war and conflict, focusing on:
● Neutralizing electricity plants and networks from war and conflict, and imposing international sanc-tions on saboteurs.
● Re-operating the public and local power plants.● Providing periodic maintenance for the power plants and repairing and maintaining the electricity
transmission networks.● Ensure the safety of engineers and technicians and their freedom of movement between different areas
throughout Yemen by the parties to the conflict.
● Rehabilitating and operating the oil and gas facilities to ensure the resumption of hydrocarbon produc-tion and exports.
● Rehabilitating and operating the Aden and Marib refineries, thus supplying the local market with nearly half of its fuel needs.
● Paying all financial obligations and taxes of the telecommunication companies to the CBY or the spe-cial fund as agreed.
● Enabling employees and engineers of the telecommunications companies to move freely between all Yemeni areas for the maintenance of transmission stations and equipment.
● Coordinating between the concerned authorities on how to control these companies and releasing their equipment held in some ports.
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Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 10 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
Annex: Map of access roads in Yemen:
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!c
!c
!c
!c
!c!c
!c
!c
!c
!c
!c
LT: 7
-10 d
ays
505 n
m
LT: 3
0 h
ours
249 n
m
LT: 3-4 days
703 nm
LT: 3 days
1922 nm
Ex. P
ort S
udan
Ex. Dubai
Ex. Salalah
LT: 7
-10 d
ays
733 n
m
LT: 12 hours
176 nm
'
'
'
'
Mokha
Aden
IBB
ABYAN
AL BAYDA
AL JAWF
AL DHALE'E
AL MAHWIT
AL MAHARAH
TAIZZ
HAJJAH
HADRAMAUT
DHAMAR
RAYMAH
SHABWAH
SA'ADA
SANA'A
AMRAN
LAHJ
MARIB
D j i b o u t iD j i b o u t i
E r i t r e aE r i t r e a
E t h i o p i aE t h i o p i a
S a u d i A r a b i aS a u d i A r a b i a
S o m a l i aS o m a l i a
Ash Shi�r
Shabwah
Makshela
Bayt
Shurayfah
Qurayr
Fardet Nahem
Hamle
Huth
Wadi Mure
Sa'ada
Osaifera
Attar
Rasyan
River
Tanah River
Al Daragah
Mankkah
Shiras
Al Rakwah
Al FaishAl Zeham
Al Madraj I
Makhsan
Al Madraj II
Obal
Alkasabah
Alaman Wadi
Khifa
Albdah
Hawari
Al Saifi
Khaiwan
Barakan
Karah
Zeham
Ar Rawnah
Al Mabraz
Z'arwan
Ash Shaykh
Salim
Ar Ramadah
Quta‘ah
Madinat
ash
Shirq
Jirdan
Imran
Al 'awban
Dhubab
Dar Salim
Salak
Dar
Bayt ‘Ukaysh
Ayn al
Juwayri
‘Awwayn
At Tannan
As Sali
‘Arasi
Al Qurayyah
Al Qanawis
Am Khudayrah
Al Khaymah
Al Jarba’
Am ‘Ayn
Al ‘Aws
Al ‘Aram
Ad Dimnah
Dhalie
Al Kharshah
Bi’r
Bashah
Maqrabah
Az Zilah
Sanaban
As Sawm
Ma'all al
Ghathamah
Ash
Shahili
Al Qasabah
Al Baradah
Najd Qusaym
Al Muqdar
Al Khalil
Ash Shamsarah
Al 'anakah
Al Asluf
As Sabal
Mu‘ayin
al Ghaythi
As Sudd
Masliqah
Za‘linAd Dalil
Al Badiyah
Bayt Ma‘tan
Ar Rizwah
At Tayn
Al Lati
Ibn Tawwah
Madaran
Al Masawi‘ah
Ma'all Bissin
Laffat al
Mujir
Al ‘Anaqah
Dhi Yurwak
As Sadah
Al Maswa
As Suwaydi
Al Jabal
Sanawi
Al Sawab
Mandabah
Bayt Shabanah
Ash Shi`bah
Al Harajah
Thabrah
Ghuraf
Al Buq' Thamud
Sayhut
Rada`
Quflat `Udhr
Ni`aydah
Mukayras
Mayyun
Kamaran
Jidr
Huth
Al `Abr
Hawra
Harrah
Barat
Balhaf
As Salif
Ar Rawdah
Al Mansurah
Al Mafraq
Loheiya
Al Khabr
Ghuraf
Al `Anad
Falaise
As Saymar
Al Hammadi
Kharaz
MOKHA
RAS ISSA
BALHAF
Taizz
Hodeidah
ADEN
LOHEIYA
MUKALLA
SALEEF PORT
BERBERA
BOSASO
DJIBOUTI
HODEIDAH
Sana'a
Ibb
DhamarAl Mukalla
Ash Shihr
Ad Dis
Zinjibar
Zabid
Yarim
Tarim
Abs
Shibam
Shafar
Seiyun
Sa'ada
Rida'
Raydah
Al Qutay'
Ma'rib
Ma`bar
Lawdar
Lahj
Khamir
Jiblah
Ja`ar
Hays
Haradh
Hajjah
Al Habilayn
Ghayl Ba
Wazir
Damt
Bayt al Faqih
Bayhan
Bajil
Az Zaydiyah
At Turbah
Al Tuhayta'
Ataq
Ar Rahidah
Amran
Al Qa`idah
Al Misrakh
Al Marawi`ah
Al Mansuriyah
Al Mahwit
Al Mahabishah
Al Khawkhah
Al Jarrahi
Al Huzum
Al Hazm
Al Qatn
Al Bayda
Al Dhale'e
Al Jabin
Al Marhinah
Maqbanah
Dahyan
Ad Dahi
Qa`tabah
Sihar
Ahwar
50°3'E47°53'E45°45'E43°36'E
17°30'N
15°21'N
13°11'N
11°3'N
±
YE
ME
NA
cces
s C
onst
rain
ts a
s of
22
Ma
y 2
018
hf 0 80 16040
Kilometers
G u l f o f A d e n
Re
d S
ea
Ex. B
erb
era
Date Created: 22 May 2018
Contact: [email protected]
Website: www.logcluster.org
Prepared by: YEM CO GIS Unit
Map Reference:
YEM_OP_LC_AccessConstraints_2018_A3LThe boundaries and names and the designations used on this mapdo not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the UnitedNations.
Data Sources: UNGIWG, GeoNames, GAUL, WFP, LC
© OpenStreetMap Contributors and OCHAS o m a l i aS o m a l i a
*Detour might not be accessible during rainy season.
!\ National Capital
!! Major Town
!Intermediate
Town
! Small Town
! Village
International
Boundary
Governorate
Boundary
Coast Line
Road Closed
Road Difficult to
access
Road Open
Primary Road
Secondary Road
Al Faish Al Madraj IAl Madraj IIAl SaifiAl Zeham Alaman Wadi KhifaAlbdah Alkasabah BarakanFardet NahemHawariKarahKhaiwanLahemanMakhsan Obal OsaiferaSa'ada Shiras ZehamAl RakwahAl-HadidBayt ShurayfahMakshelaMankkahQurayrTanah River
Restricted-LightRestricted-LightRestricted-LightRestricted-LightRestricted-LightRestricted-LightRestricted-Light
Al DaragahAttar HamleHuthMawkaahRasyan RiverWadi Mure
ClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosedClosed
Name StatusBRIDGE
RestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestrictedRestricted
THIS MAP NEEDS YOUR HELP
IF YOU HAVE UPDATED ACCESS INFORMATION
CONCERNING ACCESS, PLEASE CONTACT THE LOGISTICS
CLUSTER INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OFFICER
DISCLAIMER
THE INFORMATION DISPLAYED ON THIS MAP CAN CHANGE
AT ANY TIME DUE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN YEMEN.
THE LOGISTICS CLUSTER CANNOT GUARANTEE THE
ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF THE INFORMATION
DISPLAYED AND ACCEPTS NO LIABILITY FOR RELIANCE ON
THE DATA. PLEASE TAKE CARE TO VERIFY THE
INFORMATION BEFORE USE.
PLEASE ALSO NOTE THAT THE MAP REFLECTS ONLY
CONFIRMED INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE CLUSTER,
AND DOES NOT COVER ALL ACCESS ISSUES IN YEMEN. THE
MAP DOES NOT REFLECT THE POLITICAL SITUATION OR
ADDRESS SECURITY ISSUES.
Restricted: alternative
access aside the
bridge*
Restricted-Light: alternative
access aside the bridge
(Soft Vehicles only)*
Closed
Sea Route Open
Sea Route Closed
!c Port Closed
!c Port Functional
Airport Closed'Airport Functional'
From To StatusROAD
Al Hudaydah (Al Jarrahi) Al Hudaydah to Al Mukha via HaysAl Hudaydah (Hays) Al Hudaydah (Al Khawkhah)Sana'a (Khwlan) Marib (Sirwah/Marib City)Sana'a (Nihm) All routes in Nihm districtAbyan All routes in Zingibar districtAl Bayda All routes in Al BaydaAl Hudaydah (Al Mansuriyah) Al Hudaydah via Zabid/Al Jarrahi/Rida' (Ibb)Al Jawf All routes in Al JawfAmran All routes in AmranDhamar Al Bayda (Rada and Damt - Al Dhale'e)Hajjah All routes in HajjahHajjah (Abs/Hajjah) Sana'a via Amran/ShibamMarib (As Sawm/Dhi Yurwak) Al Bayda (Madaran)
TaizzAl Baradah/Ash Shamsarah/Al Muqdar/Al Misrakh/Taizz City
Taizz Taizz City/Al Asluf - Ar RawnahAl Qa'idahTaizz (Dhubab) Taizz (As Suwaydi)
ClosedClosedClosedClosed
Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted
Restricted
RestrictedRestricted
Source: https://logcluster.org/map/yemen-access-constraints-map-22-may-2018
GGDP $$$ YYEMENYEMEN SOCIO-EECONOMICSOCIO-EECONOMIC
UPDAATE
GDP $$ YEMENYEMENSOCCIO-ECONOMMICSOCIO-ECONOMIC
UPDATE
UUUPDATEGDP $$ YEMENYEMEN
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
Issue (35) July, 2018 Page 11 Yemen Socio-Economic Update
Key Sources:1. Central Statistical Organization, Labor Force Survey 2013-2014.2. Central Statistical Organization, National Accounts, 2016.3. Central Statistical Organization, Statistical Yearbook, 2014. 4. Ministry of Public Health and Population, Annual Statistical health report, 2014.5. Ali Al-Azaki, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, International Aid Organizations and the Yemeni Pri-
vate Sector: The Need to Improve Coordination in Humanitarian Crisis Response, March 2018.6. UNDP & Connecting Business Initiative, Private Sector Organizations/Companies Engagement in
Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery, Preliminary Survey Results, August 2017.7. World Bank, toward blueprint for the recovery and reconstruction of Yemen, May 2017.8. SMEPS & UNDP, Impact of the Yemen Crisis on Private Sector Activity, Aug.-Sep., 2015.9. ILO and Afcar for Consultancy, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Damage Assessment in Sana’a
City and its Suburbs, July 2017.10. World Bank Group, Yemen policy note 3: Private sector readiness to contribute to reconstruction and
recovery in Yemen, May 2017.11. Ministry of Finance, Government Finance Statistics, 2016.12. WFP, YEMEN Market Watch Report, Issue No. 24, May 2018. 13. Central Bank of Yemen, Monetary and Banking Developments Data, 2018.14. Ala Qasem and Brett Scott, Deeproot Consulting, Navigating Yemen’s Wartime Food Pipeline, Novem-
ber 2017.
Contact PersonFor more detailed information about items in this update please contact:
Mr. Abdulmageed Albatuly Email: [email protected] Tel.:+967 771 555 730 www.mpic-yemen.org
“This monthly update is supported by UNICEF YCO”