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Problems of Political Development in a Ministate: The French Territory of the Afars and theIssasAuthor(s): Nancy A. ShillingSource: The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Jul., 1973), pp. 613-634Published by: College of Business, Tennessee State UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4190061.

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2/23

The Journal

of

Developing

Areas 7 (July 1973):

613-634

Problems

of Political

Development

in a

Ministate:

The

French

Territory

of

the Afars and

the Issas

NANCY

A. SHILLING

The

proliferation

of

ministates

in

the postwar

world

is

a

phenomenon

directly related

to the end

of

the

colonial

era

and

the

acceptance

of the

legitimacy of self-determination by peoples, no matter how few in number

or how

limited their

economic,

social,

and

political resources.

Societies

of

extremely

limited

size,

whose

political

leadership

in

earlier eras would

never seriously have

contemplated

political independence,

now

clamor

for

international recognition as

sovereign

states and for

admission

to

multinational

bodies.'

Historically, there

have

existed

a number

of small

states

(Luxembourg,

Iceland, Monaco,

Licbtenstein,

San

Marino)

whose

right to

statehood

and

whose

ability to fulfill

international

commitments have

never been seri-

ously

questioned. Because such

states were

few

in

number and often

enjoyed

a

protected

status

vis-h-vis a

stronger

neighbor, size

per se as a

prerequisite for statehood or international participation occasioned little

study or

concern.

Ministates

Generally

Academic interest

in the

political, economic, and social

consequences

of

smallness is

relatively new, occasioned in

part by the problems pre-

sented to international

organizations by the

proliferation of

what we now

Assistant

Professor

of

Political

Science at

Hunter

College,

City

University

of

New

York;

formerly

Research

Associate,

Georgetown

Research

Project,

Atlantic

Research

Corporation,

Washington,

D.C.;

recipient

of a

New

York

State

Fellowship in

Com-

parative

Politics

(1969) and

a Ford

Fellowship

(1956-58);

research in

Middle

Eastern

as

well as

African

politics.

1

Ministates

admitted

to

the

United

Nations

include

Lesotho, Mauritius,

Equatorial

Guinea,

Fiji, and the

Gilbert

and

Ellice

Islands.

See

United

Nations

Institute

for

Training and

Research

(UNITAR),

Status

and

Problems

of

Very

Small

States

and

Territories,Series no. 3 (New York, 1969), pp. 9-17.

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3/23

614

Nancy A.

Shilling

term

ministates or

miniterritories. Questions have been

raised as

to

whether such

minuscule territories can long

enjoy genuine

independence

and whether they can fulfill the obligations of international sovereignty

sufficiently to

merit full, voting

membership in

international bodies.

Although the quantitative

limits of ministatehood remain to

be defined,

it is generally recognized that

some minimum levels of

territory, popula-

tion, and

resources are probably essential

for permanent, successful

political

independence and

for fulfillment of international

obligations.3

Establishing

these critical

lower limits is the problem.

Many

pertinent variables have been

suggested for measurement: size,

class structure

(particularly

its elite element),

bureaucratic efficiency,

economic

sufficiency, and iinstitutional

stability and strength.

These

and

related variables have been studied by the World Data Analysis Program

of

Yale University to

determine suitable criteria for defining

a ministate;

their

conclusion

was that all derived

definitions

were

relatively arbitrary

and subject to

serious qualifications. Smallness in

territory

or population

may be more

than balanced

by rich economic resources

(Kuwait), an

efficient

bureaucracy (Luxembourg,

Iceland), or well-institutionalized

political

processes (Monaco, Lichtenstein).

Countries may thus be small

in

one or more variables but

large in others relevant to

national viability.

Establishing lower limits for

these variables

and determining their rank-

ing and

interaction has thus far proven

impossible.4

Qualifications abound even

with regard to essential

definitional com-

ponents. Is all the territory, for example, contiguous (Luxembourg, 2,586

sq. km.)

or is it scattered (Pacific

Islands, 1,779 sq. km. composed of

2,100 islands,

only

96

of

which are

inhabited, spread

over

7,700,000 sq.

km.

of water)?

Is

the location of

the

territory, contiguous

or

scattered,

such

that

the

population

is

involved

in

the

world's

political, economic,

and intellectual

mainstream?

In addition to the

number

of

people,

their

density

and life

style (nomadic, agricultural,

urban) may

be

extremely

pertinent.5

Some

states,

small in

territory

and

population,

seem to

exhibit

more

potential

in

terms

of

resources, capital investment,

development

prospects,

and

land

for

population

growth

than do

larger

states

dependent

2

UNITAR,

Status

and Problems, pp.

26-50. Of

96

countries

currently

considered

small or

mini,

with

populations

of one million

or

less,

24 are

independent;

of

these

17

are

U.N. members. Twenty-nine

are

nonself-governing territories administered

under

chapter

11 of the U.N. Charter and

2 are U.N. trust

territories. The remaining

48 are

either

colonies or

fall

into

other

categories.

3

For

discussion of

possible

criteria for determiiininig iniinistatehood,

see

UNITAR,

Status and Problems, Burton Benedict, ed.,

Problems of Smaller Territories (London:

Athlone

Press for

the University

of London, 1967),

Paitricia

Blair,

The Ministate

Dilemma, Occasional Paper no. 6 (New

York: Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, October 1967); Jacques Rapoport,

E.

Nluteba,

anid

J.

Therattil,

Small States

and Territories:

Status and Problems

(New

York:

Ar-no, 1971). See

also

Jacques

Rapo-

port, The Participation

of

Mini

States in

International Affairs, Proceedings of the

American Society for

International Law (April 1968), pp.

155-88;

William L.

Harris,

Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose, Columbia Journal of Trans-

national Law 9 (Spring 1970): 23-53; Francis Plimpton, The United Nations Needs

Family Planning, New

York

Times Magazine, 18 September 1966, pp. 13-14, 97-100.

4

For further discussion of definitional criteria and limits, see Benedict, Problems, pp.

2-10, 45-55; Nadim A. Khalaf, Economic

Implications of the Size of Nations (Leiden:

Brill, 1972); and UNITAR, Status and Problems, pp. 23, 206-28.

5 Benedict, Problems, p. 29.



4/23

Problems

of Political Development

in a

Ministate

615

upon

single primary

crops (Senegal)

or

with

significant population

pres-

sures

(Egypt).6

Although a precise definition of a ministate must await further research,

in general

terms which

ignore the

examples

of qualification

mentioned

above, it

seems obvious

that small states and territories

share many

of

the

development problems

of large

states.

These common

problems

are also

usually more

serious

in their

impact

on

the small states.

For

example,

the

paucity

of human and

physical

resources

may reach levels beyond

which

the

most elemental needs

of a

population

cannot

be

met

at

reasonable

costs. A country with

10 million people

may

have 1 doctor per 100,000

inhabitants

yet

still provide a

minimal public

health service of 100

doctors,

including some

specialists.

A territory with

a

population

of 100,000

and

the same ratio, however, would have only 1 doctor for the entire country.

The achievement and maintenance

of economic

and

political

stability

is

also

apt to

be more difficult

for a small

state than

for

a

large

one. Its

income base

will

generally

be

too small to finance

the

increasingly

expen-

sive technological

and educational apparatus

required

for a

standard

of

living comparable

to that enjoyed

in

more complex and

wealthier societies.

The citizenry

of a ministate,

however,

will

expect

these levels of

living

and the related

government

services,

having

been made aware of

them

through

mass

communications

media. Because

of the

greater

government

visibility

and accountability

in ministates,

the potential

internal instability

is high when

the people

are disappointed

in their

expectations. Though

the opportunity for government control and manipulation of population

exists in a

ministate,

the chances

for intense

public reaction to

government

failures

seem the more

likely.

Serious external political

problems

coexist

with the

internal political

problems.

The government

of a ministate can

often expect

to remain

inde-

pendent

only upon

the sufferance

of stronger

states-whether

neighbors

or

major

world powers. The

prospects

for

regular

manipulation

or control

by stronger

states therefore

becomes

probable, with

a consequent

restric-

tion of

policy

options

available to

political

decision makers

within the

state.

If external

political

pressures

make it

difficult for larger,

wealthier,

and

politically

more

developed states,

such as

Nigeria,

India, and

Indo-

nesia, to establish and maintain political stability and independence, they

are

likely

to

overwhelm ministates

whose political,

economic, and

social

resources are

so

much more severely

limited.

Because

of their inherent

susceptibility to

foreign

pressures, the

pro-

liferation

of ministates, with little

or no actual

or potential

power, has

raised

serious questions

relating to

the transformation

of

international

relations

thereby

effected. The United

Nations,

for

example,

is seriously

considering

the creation of

an

associate membership

category

for

mini-

states.7

This status

would permit

full participation

with voting rights in

all committees and subsidiary bodies

of the U.N.

and full participation

with no vote in the General Assembly. The impact of ministate dependence

on

stronger

powers

as

a factor

in

determining

major

U.N.

decisions

would

thus

be reduced.

The

limitation of

voting

rights would

be offset by reliev-

6

Luxembourg, Kuwait,

Malta,

and

Barbados,

for example.

7

UNITAR,

Status and Problems, pp. 130-42;

see

also

U.N.,

General Assembly Reso-

lution

742

(8) of

27 November

1953,

and

Harris,

Microstates, pp.

40-50.



5/23

616

Nancy

A. Shilling

ing ministates of

the burden

of

proportional

inancial

participation

n

the

U.N.,

a

cost which

most could

carry only through

subsidies

from

wealthier

states.

Introduction to a

Specific Potential

Ministate

It is with the questions

of

possible independence

for a

potential

mini-

state and its

potentialities

for

national integration

and continuation

as

a

viable,

independent political entity that

this

study

is concerned.8 The

specific area

selected is the French Territory

of

the Afars and

the

Issas.9

As one of the few remaining vestiges of

European colonial control

in

Africa, apart from the Portuguese and South

African areas

to

the south,

the

logic

of

twentieth century political

change

on the continent would

suggest the impossibility of the area remaining a colonial enclave much

longer.

In

recent years, moreover, a significant

nationalist movement has

arisen within the

territory, and

on

two occasions the people's attitude

toward

continued

colonial

status

has

been

officially sought.

Yet the

terri-

tory's history and

geographic location as well as its limited land area,

population, and

resources render the

attainment and maintenance of

political independence a dubious proposition

at best.

The analysis will be presented in two

sections. The first will deal with

the

problems

of

nation building within the

territory, i.e., the economy,

cultural

pluralism, elite formation, political consensus

building,

and insti-

tution formation,

as manifested in the referendums of 1958 and 1967 and

their aftermaths. The second section will consider the external variables

which impinge on the territory's

nation-btuilding potential-tlhe

interests

of

adjacent

states

and great powers which

may facilitate or impede the

territory's

capacities to attain nationhood and viable, independent state-

hood.

The territory

is

in

an unenviable position

with respect both to its present

sitluation and future prospects. Built on a

volcanic wasteland, virtually

devoid of known

or suspected natural resources, it possesses a small,

heterogeneous

population whose existing

ethnic, cultural, and political

differences have

been

exacerbated by French policy and the policies of

its

immediate

neighbors, Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, both of whom

for vastly different reasons have territorial designs on the French depen-

dency.

The

possibility

of

internal

development sufficient to permit a viable

independence, already slight because of

domestic conditions, is further

diminished

by

these

conflicting

interests of

France, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

Just

as

the

territory

came into

existence as a

separate colonial entity

through

the

working

of forces

beyond

the

control of

the

indigenous

population,

so

its

ultimate

political

future

is

likely

to

be

determined,

neither by

rational

considerations

of

its

potential viability

nor

by

the will

of

its

inhabitants,

but

by

the

impact

of external

forces

largely beyond

its

control

and unconcerned

with

the

present

or future

well-being

of

its

people.

8

This research was undertaken

as an extension of that done for the Atlantic Research

Corporation in

1966

on

conflict

potential

in

the

Horn of

Africa.

9

Formerly

French

Somaliland,

it

was

officially

renamed

Territoire Francais des

Afars

et des

Issas

by

the

French

government

on

3

July

1967.

For

the sake

of readability,

it

will be referred

to

interchangeably

as the

territory,

French

Somaliland, and Somaliland.



6/23

Problems of Political

Development

in

a Ministate 617

The Economy

French Somaliland has movcd into the modern world with serious

handicaps in terms of its potential for national integration and political

independence among these are the limitations of its economy. Since the

closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, Somaliland has little hope of surviving

as an independent state without extensive and regular infusions of

foreign

aid. Half of the Somali population is concentrated in the only significant

town, the port of Djibouti, which derives its income almost exclusively

from direct or indirect participation in international commerce. Since 1967

a large proportion of its population is chronically unemployed. The re-

mainder of the people are pastoral or nomadic and do not participate

in

the modern money economy. Date culture and market gardening constitute

the only significant agricultural activities in the territory, and these are

not important as exports. For the rural population generally, animals con-

stitute

the sole source of wealth and food. The herds of the nomads are

seldom eaten or sold, as they represent the status and prestige of their

owners. These herds are too numerous for the available water and grass,

but there is little immediate prospect of substantially reducing their size

or of

making them economically profitable.

The economic

picture

is

depressing elsewhere, too. There

is little

industry except

for limited

service and processing activities

in

Djibouti,

including meat-packing plants which use cattle imported from Ethiopia

and Somalia for

export

to Aden

and other former British dependencies on

the Red Sea. A 1961 geological survey indicates that the territory does not

possess oil or

minerals

in sufficient quantities to warrant extraction.10 Salt

was

the only important export until 1957 when it lost its Ethiopian market.

France,

with a domestic

salt monopoly, refuses to import foreign salt,

so

the French-financed

and French-run salt industry has been closed.

Since

then, only limited quantities of rawhides and shells have been exported to

Red

Sea countries.

Prior to 1967 there

was still some

hope

for the

economy.

Somaliland's

geographic

location on the

Gulf of

Tadjoura

and the Red

Sea

permitted

it

to

serve

as a transfer center for

Ethiopian exports

and

imports,

and after

1960 as a service and supply port for ships traveling via the Suez Canal

and Red Sea to the

Indian

Ocean.

In

1948

Djibouti

handled

407,000

tons

of merchandise

in

transit,

but after

1952,

when

Ethiopia

and Eritrea

federated,

the

percentage

of

Ethiopian

trade

through Djibouti steadily

decreased.

At the same

time,

the

territory's exports virtually ceased,

and

reexport

of

imports

to countries other than

Ethiopia

also

declined.

Dji-

bouti's

importance

as a

fueling

and

provisioning center, however, rapidly

increased

as

its

utility

in

transshipping Ethiopian goods

declined.

How-

10Virginia Thompson

and

Richard

Adloff, Djibouti

and the Horn

of Africa

(Stan-

ford, Calif.: Stanford

University

Press, 1968), pp.

176-80.

11Between 1955 and 1965 the number of ships calling at Djibouti increased 81

percent.

In 1965 the

port

handled

2,254,000

tons of

merchandise connected with

its

fueling and

provisioning functions,

as

compared

with

801,000

tons

of

exports and

imports,

largely

for

Ethiopia,

handled in 1950.

See

La

Coite

Francaise des

Somalis,

Marche

Tropicaux

et Mediterraneens21

(25

December

1965): 3294-96;

H. P.

Douteau,

Le Port de

Commerce de

Djibouti 1965,

Revue

Francaise

de

l'Elite

Europeenne, no.



7/23

618 Nancy A. Shilling

ever, the closing of the Suez Canal as a

result of the June War

has

reduced

the port's operations

to 25 percent of capacity. Somaliland's

potential

for

economic survival as an independent state is thus minimal.

Cultural Pluralism

The Issa Somali constitute 46 percent

of the territory's population, and

the

Afar, a subdivision of the Ethiopian

Danakil tribe, constitute 38

per-

cent.'2

Both are of Hamitic stock, Muslim,

and fundamentally nomadic in

cuilture. They speak

different languages, inhabit separate

areas of the

country, and possess a

growing

consciousness of themselves as

culturally

distinct from one

another. While the Afar have retained their

nomadic

life

style, the Issa have increasingly settled in

the towns and are now largely

concentrated in the capital, Djibouti, which has a population approxi-

mately 75 percent Somali.

A

Somali cultural

consciousness has

been awakened in the Issa Somali

as

a result of their

exposure to two primary influences over

the past 25

years. The ideas of

nationalism and

self-determination began to permeate

the isolated tribal

societies of the territory

during and after World War

II

and

were strongly encouraged by the

growth of

pan-Somalism

in

former

British and Italian

Somaliland. The Issa thus came to embrace

two nation-

alisms-the first limited to the community

of Issa Somali, the

second, and

now

more prevalent,

to a territorial state including all

Somali. Pan-

Somalism in the territory has thus sought

the right of self-determination

from France, initially for political independence but subsequently for the

creation

of an

all-inclusive Somali state.

While

Issa political

consciousness seems largely to have

been a natural

result of their adaptation to urban life and

their response to

the influences

of

modernization, the

politicization of the more traditional

and nomadic

Afar

was mainly due to deliberate

French policy. To counteract Issa

demands for

independence in the late

1950s, the French government urged

a

policy

of

continued association upon the Afar.

Playing upon,

and

to

some

extent inducing, Afar fears of

subjugation and loss of cultural

iden-

tity

in

a larger Somali

state, the French convinced the Afar

that the best

guarantee of their autonomy would come from continuation of the colonial

status quo.

Emphasizing the ethnic, linguistic, and

economic differences

between the Afar and the Issa, the

French undertook in 1958 the pro-

tection of the Afar

against the Issa.

This

policy was at variance

with previous French

policy

with

respect

to

the

indigenous

inhabitants of the

territory.13

From the consolidation

of

French control

in 1885

until after World

War

II,

France was able

to

govern

Somaliland

with little

regard

for internal

political

demands.'4

The

182 (November

1965), pp. 35-42;

and

Cote Francaise

des Somalis,

Europe-France

Outre Mer,

no. 423 (April

1965), pp.

13-24.

12

The remaining

16 percent of

the population,

largely urban immigrants,

is com-

posed

of

Arabs,

Indians,

and

Europeans.

13

C6te

Francaise des

Somalis,

Tropiques, no. 373 (May

1955),

pp. 10-12, 73-77.

14

For a summary

of the

French acquisition of

Djibouti, see John

Drysdale,

The

Problems of French

Somaliland,

Africa Report

11 (November

1966): 11-12.



8/23

Problems of Political Development in a Ministate 619

barren,

backward

enclave

provided

little

opportunity

or incentive for

the

growth of

political

consciousness,

and

France

took

care

to

isolate

equally

all inhabitants from external contact. Increased contact with foreign

nationals

due to

Djibouti's strategic

importance

during World

War

II,

and

the

economic and

urban

development which

were

by-products

of

this,

politicized

the

more urban Issa

and thereby

established the

basis

for

political

challenge and

change

within

the

territory.

To

forestall a

possible indigenous

demand

for

representative

govern-

ment, the

French

created

a

Representative

Council

in

1946,

the

first

step

toward

constitutional

government for

the

territory.Fifty

percent

of

the

Council

members

were

representativesof the

resident

French

community;

the

other

half was

composed of

representativesof

the

indigenouspopula-

tion. Two Somali, two Afar, and two Arabswere to be elected by their

respective

communities,

and

the remaining

four

representativeswere to

be

appointed

by the French

government

from delegates of

chambers of

commerce,

professionalgroups,

and

trade unions.

This system

gave

disproportionate

representationto the

French and

Arabs;

more importantly

n terms of

the

currentpolitical

conflict based on

ethnic

origins and the

long-range

prospects

for national

integration, the

communalvoting

system

encouraged Issa

and Afar

to view

themselves,

not

only

as

culturally

and economically

distinct, but

as

politicallyseparate

entities with

fundamentally

different if not

irreconcilable

nterests.15

The

French

loi cadre

of 1956

correctedthe

imbalance n

Somali

representation,

thus slowing the growth of pan-Somalismwithin the territory.The pros-

pect

of

internal

political

autonomy also

tended to

deemphasize

intertribal

differences.

The

majority

of seats in

the first

election in 1957

was won

by

the

Union

Republicaine,a

nationalistcoalition

party of

Issa, Afar, and

Arab.,,

The

impending

independence

of the

Somali Republic

and its

potential

as a homeland

for all

Somalis

stimulated

Somali

nationalismamong the

Issa,

however, and

political

cooperationbetween

Afar and Issa

waned.

Moreover,

the

Issa

again

demonstrated

mpatience

with the

gradual pace

of

constitutional

progress

toward

autonomyand

renewed

their pressures

on the

French

for

further

reforms. A

movement within

the

territory for

its inclusion in the new Somalistate gained momentum,given

impetus by

pressuresfrom

Somalia

and encouraged

on grounds

of Islamic

brotherhood

by

Radio Cairo

broadcasts.

By

1958

when

the

referendum

on

the

proposed

constitution

of the

Fifth

Republic took

place, pan-Somalism

had

become an

open

and

important

issue in

Somaliland's nternal

politics,

and

it

claimed

widespreadsupport

among

the

territory's

ssa.

Due

to

Issa

inexperience

in

political

organiza-

15This

electoral system is

reminiscent of

that

introduced

by the

French

into Leb-

anon

in 1922,

which

has also

perpetuated and

reinforced

distinctions-not

only between

Christian and

Muslim, but also

among

Greek

Orthodox,

Protestant,

Maronite,

Sunni,

and Shia-and has made the task of national integration more difficult. For further

discussion see

Kamal S.

Salibi,

The

Modern

History of

Lebanon

(London:

Weiden-

field and

Nicolson,

1965),

and S. H.

Longrigg, Syria

and

Lebanon

under

French Man-

date

(London: Oxford

University

Press,

1958), esp.

p.

127.

16Ioan

M. Lewis,

Modem

Political

Movements in

Somaliland,

Africa 28

(October

1958): 345.



9/23


tion

and confrontation

tactics, their

earlier ineffectiveness

had allowed

France

officially to ignore the

movement. By 1958,

however, it was neces-

sary for France, while continuing to deny the reality of the movement,

to issue official regulations

to combat

and contain

it.17 For example,

the

French

administration gerrymandered

the electoral districts prior

to the

referendum

to give the Afar

the edge.

Until

1956 the

French had treated

the Afar and the

Issa impartially.

Both were denied

any significant political

role,

either within the adminis-

tration or through their political

organizations.

Between

1956 and 1958

France generally

supported the progressive

Issa

against the backward

Afar.

But in the

1958

referendum

campaign, the Issa

organized

Nvidespread,

effective political

opposition

in

an attempt to

attain a no

vote

on

con-

tinued association with

France. When the

Afar provided

an almost

unanimous yes vote for continued

association,

the French

shifted their

support

to

Afar political interests and ambitions

within

the territory

and

extended them protection

against the Issa.'8

France has since

consistently

adhered

to this position as Issa

Somali nationalism

has grown stronger

and

more adamantly

anticolonial.19

The 1958 Referendum

and

its Aftermath

The

1958 constitutional

referendum

was presented as

a

choice

between

continued

association

with France (a

yes vote) and

independence

with

the

object

of forming a

Greater Somalia ' (a

no

vote).

France

made

it

clear that independence would mean the immediate withdrawal of all

French personnel

and financial support.

The yes forces

won easily

with

75

percent

of

the

votes.

An

analysis

of

the methods

for determining

voter eligibility

and of

the

ethnic components

of

the

vote is illuminating

in

view

of recent troubles

and

the

1967

referendum

results.

Only

French

citizens over

21

years

of

age

whose

papers

were

in

order

were eligible to

vote.

Before

1958

there

were two categories of voters:

those with civil

status ( citizens )

who

held citizenship

in

metropolitan

France and those

with personal status,

including Africans and Asians,

who

were bom in the territory.20

Since

records

were

often

not

kept

within the territory

and where

kept were

highly inaccurate, administrative regulation permitted proof of birthplace

to

be

provided by

witnesses. In administering

this

regulation,

a

presump-

tion

of

birth

in

the territory was made

more frequently for

potential

Afar

voters than for

Issa Somali;

the latter

were often required

to provide the

unavailable

documentary proof,

even when they were

known

to

have

qualified

in

the

1956

elections. Wealthy Arab

and Indian immigrants

could often buy

the required proof,

while the poorer Somali

immigrants

and

many local Somali

could not.

Not

only

were

more

Afar

than Issa enfranchised,

on election day

more

than 27 percent

of

the registered

voters

did not vote. A

high proportion

17

See Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, pp. 66-75.

18

For

discussion of Afar interests, see Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, pp.

72-73.

'Ioan MI.Lewis, Prospects in the Hom, Africa Report

(April 1967), p.

37.

20

Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, pp. 39-41.



10/23

Problems of Political Development

in a Ministate

621

of the

nonvoters

were

Somali

who

boycotted

the

polls

to

protest

what

they

viewed

as deliberate

French

manipulation

of

the electoral

rolls. A

majority

of the Somali voted no, while the Afar and Europeans almost unani-

mously voted yes.

1

Of 15,914 eligible

voters,

11,733

went to the polls;

8,882 yes votes were

cast

and

2,851

no.

Immediately

following

the

referendum, the French

suspended Somali Premier

Muhammad

Harbi

from office, apparently

because he had campaigned against

continued

association with France.

They also dissolved

the

Assembly

and

called

for

new

elections.

Election contests after 1958 followed communal

lines, partly as a result

of

French policy

discouraging intertribal political alliances, and

partly

as

a

result of the distrust

sown between the

two communities by the events

surrounding the 1958 referendum. Though nationalist parties had pre-

viously rejected ethnic

and communal exclusivity, this became

increasingly

the

rule after the 1958

election with its arousal of ethnic

feelings. For

some time communal

rivalry was focused

prinarily

on

internal issues.

Local and clan rivalries

within the Somali

community superseded Somali

nationalism as broad

ideological and constitutional issues

were subordi-

nated to traditional

divisions within each community.22

The

Issa Somali, who constitute the

vast majority of the territory's

Somali population, are a

good example of such separatist

inclinations.

Divided between French

Somaliland,

Ethiopia, and Somalia, the Issa

before 1958

were

more concerned with

unification in an Issa-governed

polity than with integration into the Somali Republic.23 Their prosperity

as a trading

community within a trading nation could only

be diluted

by political union with a

large, impoverished nomadic state

needing tax

revenue from trade for development

purposes-thus the Issa reluctance to

cooperate with the pan-Somali movement

before 1958.

Issa separatism from

non-Somali groups within the territory,

however,

was

essentially an expression

of

dissatisfaction with the

lack

of

opportunity

for

their own education and

economic

development-defects

for

which

the

French administration

was

blamed.

This growing

dissatisfaction

with

internal

problems

and

the

lack of viable

alternatives for

resolving

them

have

encouraged

Issa

political leadership

to

move

away

from

separatism

toward support

of

Somali

political unity.

Moreover

the

importance

of

Islam

in

pan-Somalism

(i.e.,

Muslim

dislike of infidel

rule)

cannot

be

overlooked

as

a

force

for

Somali

unity beyond

the

territory's

borders.

The

most

vigorous supporters

of

Somali

unity

are the

younger

genera-

tion

of

Issa

who

have

grown up

in

a

relatively prosperous

urban

environ-

ment and

have

acquired

some education.

Many

of

them, along

with

the

younger

Arab

generation

in

Djibouti,

formed

the Parti du

Mouvement

Populaire

in

1962;

its

purpose

was to

press

for internal

political autonomy

'A report of Ethiopian troops

massed

on the frontiers

in case

of a

no

vote,

circulated in

Afar areas

during

the referendum

campaign,

undoubtedly

influenced

many

Afar to vote yes. See Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, p. 71, and Philippe Marchat,

Nuages

sur

Djibouti,

Revue Militaire

Generale

(December 1966), pp. 585-610.

22

See

Saadia

Touval,

Sonmli

Nationalism

(Cambridge,

Mass.:

Harvard

University

Press, 1963), pp. 128-29,

and

Thompson

and

Adloff, Djibouti, pp. 61-101.

23I

oan

M.

Lewis,

A

Modern

History of

Somaliland

(New

York:

Praeger, 1965),

p.

19.



11/23

622

Nancy

A.

ShilUlng

and eventual

independence

for the territory.

The formation of this

party

marked the entry of

Somali youth

into organized

politics

and

was seen as

an expression of dissatisfaction with the older politicians who had per-

mitted

personal and

clan

rivalries to

distract them

from

anticolonial

pursuits.

De

Gaulle's

Visit

to

Somaliland

and the 1967

Referendum

The growing

Somali

frustration

with the

French regime

and their

increasing

determination

after

1958 to

secure freedom

from

colonial

rule

and political

unity

with Somalia

led to demonstrations

during

General

de Gaulle's August

1966 visit to

Djibouti. It

was his

first stop

on a world

tour planned

to criticize

U.S.

Vietnam policy

and to

enhance France's

prestige as a leader in foreign policy and decolonization. On arriving in

Djibouti,

de Gaulle

was faced with

demonstrations

by Somali

nationalists.

Originally intended

to protest

the

political favoritism

shown

by the

terri-

tory's leadership

(with

strong

French

backing)

toward older

political

aspirants,

as

well as the

French

manipulation

of previous

elections,

the

demonstration

was

turned into a

demand

for immediate

independence

by

the many young,

unemployed

Somali workers

of

Djibouti

among the

demonstrators.24

After

clashes

between

nationalists

and the French

police, de

Gaulle

cancelled his

scheduled

public

speech and

addressed

the

territorial Assem-

bly.

In

the course of his speech,

he

obliquely

hinted that

independence

was now possible for the colony. Shortly after his visit, the French gover-

nor was

replaced and

a referendum

for

March 1967

on the

status

of the

territory was

announced.

Again the

French

government

made it clear

that

if

independence

was

chosen,

all French

financial support

would stop

and

all

French

officials

and troops

would be

withdrawn-presumably

as

in

Guinea.5

President

de Gaulle

believed

that such

a referendum

would

again

undermine the

political strength

of the pan-Somalism

within

the

territory

and

vindicate France's

role as

a decolonizer.

The latest official

estimate

of 1966 listed

58,000 Somali,

48,000

Afar,

and

19,050

Europeans,

Arabs,

and

Indians in the

territory.

Of the total

of

125,050, 37,850 were classified as aliens, of which 11,500 were Somali.26

Of

the

87,200

classified

as

French

citizens,

29,800

were Somali and

48,000

were

Afar.

Of

all the citizens,

only

39,024

were declared

eligible

to

vote

in the

1967

referendum,

for the

eligibility

regulations

were altered

to

en-

franchise

just

those who met the

age requirement

and had lived

in the

territory

for

more than

3

years.

This

change

was accompanied by

massive

24

Thompson

and

Adloff,

Djibouti,

pp. 61,

84-86.

25 For

de Gaulle's

explicit

threats on

a no vote

and

his

ambiguous

rewards

for a

yes

vote,

see

Monde,

29 October

1966;

New York

Times,

26 and

27

August

1966;

and

Economist,

5

November

1966, pp. 570-71.

On the

aftermath

of

Guinea's

no

vote

in 1958, see Gwendolyn M. Carter,

Independence

for Africa (New

York:

Praeger,

1960),

pp.

119-26.

26

It

is

interesting

to note that

until

September

1966,

when

France

decided

to hold

the referendum,

official

French

estimates

of

the population

were 82,000

to

86,000.

In

September

the

administration

revised

its estimate

upward

to 104,000

to

108,000;

finally

the

official

government

newspaper,

Reveil de

Djibouti,

on 11 March

1967

put

the figure

at 125,050.



12/23

Problems of

Political Development

in a Ministate

623

deportations of suspected aliens. Possibly 8,000 Somali, many

with

citizen-

ship papers, were deported, thus eliminating a sizable segment of the

population favoring independence.27 For the remaining Somali, a presump-

tion of noncitizenship was again apparently widely made. Of the

39,024

registered under the new regulations, 14,689 were Somali (25 percent of

all

Somali

in the territory), 22,004 were Afar (46 percent of

all

Afar),

1,408

were

Arab, and 923 European.

The large number of eligible Afar is surprising since nomadic Afar could

be expected to have greater difficulty demonstrating residence than the

more urban Somali. It is also suggestive that with the difficulties involved

in registering a nomadic, rural population, so many more Afar than Somali

were enrolled. Finally, although Djibouti contains over half of the terri-

tory's population (and a heavy concentration of Somali), it was accorded

only 25 percent of the registered electorate.28 The final list of voters thus

produced, as in 1958, an electoral base skewed toward the result which

France desired.

With more

Afar than Issa voting, a victory for French policy

was

assured

because of the consistency of ethnic voting patterns on the issue. Of

the

37,292 votes cast,

22,523

(60 percent) favored continuation of the existing

relationship with France, while 14,734 opted for immediate indepen-

dence.29

But

this result

can

hardly

be

taken as

a

genuine expression

of

territorial

sentiment.

As

observers

for

European newspapers

there at the

time

pointed out, though any rigging of the actual election

on

voting day

via threats, disallowance of ballots, etc., was possibly minimal (as the

French claimed),

in

any case it was superfluous due to preelection activi-

ties.30 The

electoral

rolls had already been sufficiently manipulated by

qualifying all Afar (including women) and declaring large numbers of

Somali (including

all

women) ineligible

to

make

the

result

almost

certain.3'

The rioting following

the

referendum and

the

refusal of Moussa

Ahmad

Idriss,

the

only

Somali

deputy

to the

previous

French National

Assembly,

to

stand

for reelection indicated that the referendum

had,

if

anything,

exacerbated

French

Somaliland's internal

political problems.

It

further

polarized

the

political relations

of

the

Afar

and

the

Issa

and

so

broadened

27

loan

M.

Lewis, The

Referendum

in

French Somaliland:

Aftermath

and

Prospects

in

the Somali

Dispute, World Today

23

(July 1967): 310,

and

Lewvis,

Prospects

in

the

Horn, p. 37;

Paul

Mousset,

Referendurn 'a

Djibouti,

Revue des

Deux

Mondes,

no. 4

(15

April 1967), p.

488;

and

Thompson

and

Adloff,

Djibouti,

pp.

94-95. The

Somali National

News

Agency

claimed

that

4,300

were

deported between

September

1966 and March

1967.

28

Lewis,

Referendum, p.

310.

`

The

U.N.

report

gave

the

figures as

22,555 for, 14,666

against,

but both New

York

Times,

21

March

1967, and

Thompson

and Adloff,

Djibouti, p.

96,

agree on the

slightly different figures

cited. French

Somaliland was

included in the 1965

report of

the Committee

of

Twenty-Four

as a

territory

to

which

General

Assembly Resolution

No.

1514

(15)

on

decolonization

applied.

For

discussion

of

the

pressures

exerted by

the French at

the time of the

referendum,

see L'Affaire

de Djibouti,

Revue

des

Deux

Mondes, no. 4 (1

February 1967), pp.

321-39; P. Chaleur,

Referendum

'a Djibouti,

Etudes

(December 1966), pp.

669-76;

Economist,

25

March

1967, p.

1128; and Somali

News,

17

February

1967.

3'

Africa Report

(May 1967), p.

24,

and Somali

News, 20

March 1967.



13/23

624

Nancy A. Shilling

the

mistrust between

Somali in

the

territory

and France that the

Somali

refused

thereafter

to participate in

any

foirmal

politics.:32

The

polarization

between Afar and Issa temporarily increased the cohesion among Somali

political

forces

in the

territory,

and

in June

1967 several

small

liberation

movements

merged

into the

Somali

Coast Freedom

Party.33

A few

weeks

later,

the French

government

without

explanation

dissolved

the Parti

du

Mouvement Poptulaire

(PMP),

the

official

Somali

political

organization.

Under

the

statute of

autonomy

granted

by

France following

the

refer-

endum,

and purportedly

designed

to gradtially

increase political

participa-

tion, the

first

territorial

elections

were

held

in November

1967

to choose

32 representatives

for

5-year terms

in the

Chamber

of

Deputies.34

Accord-

ing to the

stattute,

16

Afar,

1

1

Issa, 4 Europeans,

and

1 Arab

were to

be

elected.35 The disparity between Afar and Issa representation, given the

division of population

in the

territory,

caused

many

Issa to

refuse

to stand

for

election,

to run

token campaigns,

or to

discourage

their

supporters

from voting.

Partly

becatuse

of this,

23 of the

32

seats were

won

by

candi-

dates

of the

governing

Afar Parti pour

le

Progres

et la

Defense

des

Interets

du

Territoire

Francais

des Afars

at des

Issas,

led by Ali

Aref

Bourhan.

It

was the successor

to

the Rassemblement

Democratique

Afar which

had

led the

interim

government

between

the

referendum

and the

election.

The opposition

party,

the

Union

Populaire

Africaine (UPA),

led

by

Hassan

Gouled Aptidon,

won

six seats

in

Djibouti;

another

Issa

party,

the

Union des Issa,

won three.

Bourhan

was elected

president

of the

Conseil

du Gouvernement by a vote of 2.5-6. Because the Issa parties reftused to

name

candidates

for

his cabinet,

the eight

selected

were

from

the

Afar

party.36

The Afar

candidate

for the

French

National

Assembly,

Abdoul

Rader

Moussa

Ali, easily wvon

the

seat left

uncontested

by Idriss

because

the new Somali

candidate

campaigned

minimally

and the

election

was

again

boycotted

widely

by

Somali

voters.37

Since

1967, there

has therefore

been no effective

Somali

participation

in administration

or

legislation

in

the

territory

or

in

France.

To

strengthen

its

Afar political

support,

France announced

a

post-

referendum

increase

in aid to Afar

areas;

the new

total

was

US$3

million

a year. Shortly after Issa criticism of such discrimination, and possibly

to ensure political

tranquility

in

the

November election,

France

announced

a

$4.4

million

grant

to

expand

the

port

facilities at Djibouti.38

While

Africa

Report (May

1967),

p. 24, and

New

York

Times,

21 and

26 March

1967

and

6 April

1967.

33

Reported

by

Radio

'Mogadiscio,

8 June

1967.

`

On

12 September

1967 the

Somali

Republic

protested

to

the

U.N.

Committee

of

TIvent

y-Four

concerning

the French

statute

under which

the

election

was

to be

con-

ducted.

It claimed

that, aside

from

the uneven representation

of Issa and

Afar

voters,

the

stattute made

the

territory a

veritable

nineteenth-century

viceroy. Africa

Report

(November

1967), p.

37.

35

Africa Report

(February

1969),

p. 28.

36

Reveil

de

Djibouti,

18

and 22

November

1967.

37

New York

Times, 24

April

1967.

38

New York

Times,

23 March

1967,

and Agence

France-Presse,

22

April

1967.



14/23

Problems

of

Political

Development

in a Ministate

625

economically

advantageous

to

France

at

the

time

(before

the

closing of

the Suez

Canal),

this move

indirectly

benefited the Somali

who are

coni-

centrated in Djibouti, many of whom were employed directly or indirectly

in

port

operations. In

further

courting

of Afar

support,

France

took

advan-

tage of

Somali refusal to

cooperate

politically

and

gave

the

territorial

government broader

powers

than

were

politically

feasible

with

a

Somali-

dominated

regime.

France

has

also insisted

that the leader

of

any future

government

be

an

Afar, since

Afar voters

outnumber

Sonmali

oters.

By

early

1968 the

Issa appeared

willing

to

abandon

their

unsuccessful

attempts

to

force

concessions

from

France.

In

an

apparent

gesture to

reduce

political

tensions,

Aptidon,

the

leader

of the

outlawed

PMIP,

held

a

press

conference

in

January 1968

and

set

forth

his

party's

conditions

for

normnalizing he

political

situation :

(1)

rename

the territory

with

a title

more

representative of

ethnic

realities ;

(2)

amend the 1967

statute

of

autonomy

to create

a

vice-presidency

whose

incumbent

must be

of

an

ethnic

origin

different

from that

of

the

president ; (3)

adopt

an

electoral

law

providing

proportional

representation. He

indicated that while

his

party

considered

these

demands

negotiable,

Somali

participation

in

the November

1968

local

elections

would

depend on a

generally

favorable

French response

to

these issues.

Aptidon also

suggested

that the Somali

Republic's

participa-

tion

in

Issa

activism

would

increase

if

no

satisfactory

political formula was

reached. There

was no

official

French

response to

these

demands,

but

shortly

afterwards

Aptidon

was exiled

from

the

territory.39

France thus made clear its unwillinaness to give the Somali a propor-

tionate share

with the

Afar in

governing

the

territory; the

result

was

several

incidents of

political

violence

attributed to

or

acknowledged by

local

Somali

liberation

groups.

These

included

two

assassination

attempts in

mid-1968, one

against

Prime

Minister

Bourhan

and

another

against

the

minister of

information.

In the

second

attack the

vice-president of

the

Afar

party

was

accidentally

killed.

The Prime

Minister

attributed

the

attack

on

him

to

foreign

powers

trying to

destroy unity

between Afar

and Issa.

40

With

its

pro-Afar

policy

becoming

counterproductive

by

increasing Issa

eohesion and

militancy within

the

territory and by

reinforcing

Somalia's

determination to

press

its

claims

to

the

territory, in October 1968 the

French National

Assembly

increased

the

number

of

territorial

Assenmbly

deputies from

Issa-dominated

constituencies by one

and

correspondingly

reduced the

number

from Afar

constituencies.

Moreover, the

territorial

government

increased Issa

representation in the

council

froim

two to

three

nembers

out

of

nine.41

These

gestures toward

reconciliation

with the

Issa have

been

insufficient

to

reduce

the

extreme

polarization

effected

after the

1967

referendum, yet

39

He

continued his efforts from

Paris

where

he

called for

independence for

the

terri-

tory as

the

only

way

of

attaining

Somali

political

rights-but

with

continued

association

with

France.

Monde,

31

May

1968.

40

Reveil

de

Djibouti,

8

May 1968.

41 Africa

Report

(February

1969),

p.

28.

In

an

earlier

conciliatory

gesture,

the

High

Court of Somaliland

had

dismissed

charges

of

complicity

in the

1966

riots

against

seven

leaders of

the

outlawed Issa Parti

du

Mouvement

Populaire.

Africa

Report

(Janu-

ary

1968), p.

26.



15/23


the Issa Somali, with few exceptions, have apparently displayed such a low

profile of political activism as to have gone virtually

unreported in the

world press. The territorial press is heavily controlled by the French and

simply ignores unacceptable political events, but even

the official organ of

neighboring Somalia, Stella d'Ottobre, has found little to report on political

activities within the territory.42European, Arab, and

U.S. newspapers also

reported no political activity within the territory after

the 1968

assassiina-

tion attempts-with two exceptions.

In January 1970 a terrorist grenade attack on a restaurant in Djibouti

injured 16 Europeans. It was the

first

Issa political violence

directed against

Europeans. Leaflets of the Somali Coast Liberation Front

were later found

nearby.43 A few months later the men convicted in the

May 1968 assassina-

tion attempts escaped from jail in Djibouti. They kidnapped several French

hostages, including the French commissioner in the territory

and demanded

a

plane and safe conduct to the Somali Republic. These

demands were

granted by the French territorial governor, and they made good their

escape. Such isolated instances of Issa violence against French favoritism

and repression may continue. The Issa are in no position,

however, to wage

a

regular activist campaign for eitlher greater political

rights or indepen-

dence. The activists are few in number, most in exile

in Aden and else-

where, with little financial support. French military

control makes it ex-

tremely difficult for them to move into and out of the territory. Also, since

the military coup

in

Somalia, its military-busy with internal problems

and efforts to decrease regional conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya-has

not been eager to encourage militant activities by clandestine territorial

protest organizations.

The

Issa now seem to realize that

they can never

win a military victory over the French; with territorial elections scheduled

for

1973, they may decide to wait and try for power through

the ballot box.

While

this

course of

action seems

logical,

the Issa

are

extremely dejected

by what they

view as continued

French

maniptulation

of the

political

machinery

in

order to prevent genuine

self-determination and

to

deprive

the

Issa

of

their

rightful

share of

political power.

If

Somali

estimates

of

their

own

support are correct, a referendum in which all adult resi(lents

of the territory could participate would result in independence. Given the

continuing

resentment

over France's failure to

provide

such an

opportunity

for self-determination and

over

French

favoritism

to

the

Afar

under current

local autonomy,

the

renewal

of violence

by

Issa

against

Afar and the

French

remains

an

unlikely

but

possible option.

The

Political

Prospects

The

political

future

of French Somaliland will be determined

by

the

course

of

its

internal

politics

and

by

the interests of several

nations, i.e.,

France, Ethiopia,

and

Sonalia

directly,

and the U.S.

indirectly

because

of

its

unique treaty

relations with

Ethiopia.

If the Somaliland

question

42

In reviewing

some

700 issues of

the

daily

Stella

d'Ottobre

published

in

Mogadiscio

between September

1968

and

April 1972,

in other

words,

both before and

after

the

Somali Republic's coup

d'etat

of 21 October

1969,

no reference

to

any

political activity

within the territory was found,

despite

extensive

political coverage

of

African and

Arab countries.

O

New York

Timws,

26

January

1970.



16/23

Problems

of Political

Development

in a Ministate

627

is made a

cause celebre

at

some

point,

mnoreremote interests

might also

embroil the

U.A.R.,

the

U.S.S.R.,

and

conceivably

China

and

others.44

Five alternatives with respect to the tcrritory's political future seem to

emerge from these

varied domestic and

foreign

attitudes:

(1)

continuation

as a

French

colony, (2)

independence, (3)

total annexation

by either

Ethiopia or

Somalia, (4)

partition and

then

annexation

by Ethiopia and

Somalia, or (5)

independence wvith

international

(possibly U.N.) guaran-

tees. Each of

these alternatives will

now be

examined

in

terms

of

its

feasibility and its

political

implications for the

people

of

French

Somaliland

and

for the

Horn of

Africa as a

whole.

Continuation

as

a

French Colony.

France is

reluctant to

withdraw

from

the

area so long as

any suggestion

exists

that the

growth of internal

political

opposition is forcing her to do so. This reluctance was demonstrated in

1966

by de

Gaulle's

reaction to the

open

opposition to

France voiced by

Somali

nationalists

during his

visit and by

French conduct of

the

subsequent

referendum.

This

reluctance to

permit

self-determination by

open

plebescite is sur-

prising

given the

fragility of

her rationale

for

continued

colonial rule.

Although the

territory

once served as

a vital fueling

stop

on the route to

Indochina,

the

contraction of

the French

colonial empire

has rendered

this

strategic

consideration negligible.

Moreover, the

financial

cost of main-

taining her

position in

Somaliland far

outweighs any present

or

conceivable

future

return she

might derive

from it.45

Somaliland's economic drain on France is indeed appreciable. The ter-

ritory has

almost no

exports. Nearly

half of

its imports

come from the

sterling

bloc

and

almost 90

percent of its

exports go to that

bloc,

primarily

to

Aden. Its

budget is

derived

mainly from

French

subsidies which are

continually

increasing. Of

US$11.5

million budgeted in

1947-48, $8.5 million

were

derived from

French military

and civilian

expenditures, $2 million

from transit

trade, and

$1 million from

Djibouti port

services. In addition

to

annual

subsidies, between

1947 and 1959

France spent

FF7,029

million

(French

francs) on

economic

development.

Combined

forms of

French financial

aid to the

territory

in

1958 amounted

to SF26 million (Somali francs), and in 1965 to SF160 million. The direct

contribution

by France to

the

1967 budget

was

SF113.9 million;

this ex-

cludes

investment, equipment

supply,

development

funds for

the port, and

direct

military/civilian

expenditures.

The

closing of the

Suez Canal in

spring

1967 further

reduced

the

territory's

income

and

increased the

amount

of French

subsidy required.

From

June

to

November of

1967 the

deficit

in

the

port

of

Djibouti

ran

to

SF120 million

(US$560,000)

which

France had

to

largely

absorb.

If the

financial

outlay

required to maintain

political

control

by

force

is

added,

the

value

to

France of

maintaining its

colonial

rule

appears

further

diminished.46

Because

France's

sense of a mission

civilatrice

is

still a

significant

factor

44For a

discussion of U.A.R.

interests

in the

territory

and

its

motives

for possible

active

involvement,

see A.

A.

Castagno,

Conflicts in

the Horn

of

Africa, Orbis 4

(Summer 1960):

204-15.

i

See La Documentation

Francaise,

La

Cote

Francaise

des

Somalis, Notes

et Etudes

Documentaires,

no.

1321

(28 April 1950).

6

Thompson

and

Adloff, Djibouti, pp.

186, 188,

and New

York

Times, 19

March 1967.



17/23


in her colonial planning, it is conceivable

that

she may

be

contemplating

a

strengthening

of her

position

in the

Horri,

now that the British have

withdrawn from Aden.

Interestingly, in August 1966 President

de

Gaulle

offered assistance

to Ethiopia

in

building a

rail link with the

present

Djibouti line to enisure

increasing use of the line and possibly

to conmnmit

Ethiopia

to the

developnment

of Djibouti. Stuch development

might be

expected to enhance

French

poNver

and prestige around the

Red Sea and

the Gulf of Adcn. Djibouti at that time

had begun

to

win refueling

business

from

Aden, aind

France may therefore have seen

a

good

economic

and

political future

in retaining French Somaliland.

Althou

gh

the closing

of the Suez

Canal in 1967 drastically

curtailed

these prospects,

so far, political (and possibly

strategic) considerations seem

to have outhveigled the finanicial in France's attitude toward Somaliland.47

The 1967

referendum was intended therefore

to prove to

the

territory's

people and to the world that

nationalist sentiment

wvas

ephemeral,

if not

totally illusory.

Had it achieved that aim,

it might have laid the groundwork

for indefinite colonial status.

As

it turned

out,

the strengtlh

of

the

opposition reaction undermined

the

French position, made

a

sham of

her

stated

willingness to

abide by the

political

wishes

of

the populace, and encouraged the

Somali to

further

illegal and clandestine

efforts.48 Realistically, it does not secm

likely that

France will continue

to be willing to bear the increasing costs

of main-

taining

her

presence

in

French Somaliland in the face of cointiinued

nternal

unrest.

Her interests in

Somaliland aside, however,

a precipitate French with-

drawal could invite invasion by Ethiopia

and/or the

Soinali

Republic.49

Since either of these

alternatives would

be

uinacceptable

to approximately

one-half

of

the resident

population and since they are aware of

the likeli-

hood

if

France withdraws,

botlh Afar and Somali leaders may be

willing in

the

short

run to suffer

French rule. This

prospect seems to be France's

best hope of restrainiina the political restiveness

of the Somali

mallking

her

colonial

rule economically and politically

feasible for the time

being.50

Independence. Given its limited ecoiiomic

development, severe lack of

resources, and limited potential for signiificantly changinig its economic

dependency

on

others, permanent independence

for French Sonialiland

seems

unlikely.

Heavy subsidies would be required and, since

it is now

For discussion

of

France's

remainring

strategic

interests, see

Cote

Francaise

des

Somalis, pp.

77-79; Castagno,

Conflicts

in the Horn,

pp.

207-8;

and L'Affaire

de

Djibouti,

pp. 321-39.

48

Ioan

M. Lewis, Recent

Developments

in

the

Somali Dispute,

African

Affairs

66

(April

1967):

104-12,

and Djibouti-l'ind6pendance

dans cinq

ans, Jeune

Afrique,

no.

319

(19

February

1967),

p.

25.

49As

Chaleur suggests

in Referendum

a

Djibouti,

p. 676;

see also L'Affaire

Dji-

bouti,

p. 339,

and

Mousset,

Referendum, p.

486.

A resort

to violence in

this problem

which both Ethiopia and Somalia consider nonnegotiable is a distinct possibility. Since

1960,

when the

Somali Republic

became independent,

a consistent pattern

of

conflict

and coexistence

by

both states can

be traced,

undertaken

as tactical

moves

in

ptirsulit

of unchanging

objectives.

See, for example,

E.

A.

Bayne,

Brinkmanship

in the

Horn


18/23

Problems of

Political Development in a Ministate 629

economically

dependent on French

capital

and

technical

skill,

it seems

likely that an

independent

Somaliland

would

have to continue to look

for

external help. Thus indirect economic domination would be substituted for

direct political

control. This

would not solve, and

might

exacerbate,

Somali-

land's

internal

problems.

Offers of

subsidy from

the

Somali

Republic, the

United Arab

Republic,

or

Ethiopia might

be

forthcoming, but

these sources

would prove

un-

acceptable to

the

major ethnic

groups vithin

the

country, since each

would

imply a

political

orientation

which the

other

would find

abhorrent. The

Somali

would

reject

stronger ties with

Ethiopia.

The Afar,

too, would

reject

these ties

unless

the alternative

seemed to

be

absorption by

the Somali

Republic. The Afar

would also reject

U.A.R.

subsidy

of an

independent

Somaliland as an indirect means of strengthening pro-Somali political forces

within

the

country, since

the Somali

Republic and

the

U.A.R. are

politically

and

economically allied.

The most

significant

barrier to

independence as a

solution of

Somaliland's

status

is

problems of political development in a ministate: the french territory of the afars and...

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