proceedings - inside special ops

7/25/2019 Proceedings - Inside Special Ops

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22 Juy 2009 www.usni.g

By Captain John J. Burnham, U.S. Navy

NSWs traditional operations now include even moreand

fasterirregular warfare. This is not going to change anytime soon.


On Easter Sunday, SEALs rescuedMaersk Alabama

Captain Richard Phillips off the coast of Somalia

and quickly dispatched three pirates. This brought

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) into the spotlight

for a few news cycles. Footage of Basic Underwater De-

molition/SEAL (BUD/S) training ran on cable news, statis-

tics on operational deployments and recruiting got air time.The coverage highlighted one of NSWs core missions:

maritime special operations. But this incident of strategic

application was only one in a long stretch of NSW opera-

tions since 11 September 2001.

Like the other units inside the U.S. Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM), SEALs and the NSW commu-

nity have continuously adapted during Operations Endur-

ing Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As the current fight ap-proaches the eight-year marklonger than NSWs direct

Cpyig 2009, Proceedings, U.S. Naa Insiue, Annapis, Mayand (410) 268-6110 www.usni.g


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www.usni.g PROCEEDINGS 23

to SEAL teams. The Naval Special Warfare Command

(NAVSPECWARCOM), a one-star headquarters, was

established as the stateside command. In 1987 the U.S.

Special Operations Command was created, carving NSW

away from the Fleet and into a dedicated SOF chain of

commandwhich continued to report through the Navy

administratively. As a minority in a command dominated

by the Army and Air Force, NSW played limited but criti-

cal roles.One of the biggest issues was that NSW continued

to deploy in much the same way it had for 30 years: in

platoon-size elements, attached directly to ships or The-

ater Special Operations Commanders. By the late 1990s,

it was apparent that the community needed to update its

organization. The force was expanding, operational re-

quirements overseas were shifting, and training needed

to be streamlined.

NSW 21 Sets the Stage

NSW 21, as NAVSPECWARCOMs overarching plan

for these changes was known, was the most comprehen-sive community reorganization since UDTs had shifted

to SEAL Teams. The goal was to increase relevance and

effectiveness to reflect the maturity of theater SOF op-

erations while maintaining operational support and focus

to the Fleet commanders. As one of many structural and

operational changes, SEAL teams would now deploy

with operations, intelligence, and logistics enablers into

theaters as NSW squadrons, not piecemeal to individual

commanders.

The transition was not always smooth, but in the end the

new NSW 21 organization provided the Fleet and theater

commanders with more responsive capability. It set the

stage for NSW to effectively deploy after 9/11 to meet

the new mission requirements.

Into the Present

In recent testimony before the House Armed Services

Committee, USSOCOM commander Admiral Eric Olson

noted that special operations forces (SOF) are employing

many of their core capabilitiesunconventional warfare,

counterterrorism, civil affairs, information operations, and

partnering with host nation forces.5

The benefits of using NSW in many cases revolvearound their small footprint, the precision of their opera-

tions, and their ability to blend and adapt to environment

and mission requirements. This year (and since just after

9/11) about 85 percent of overseas SOF units are deployed

to the Central Command theater of operations, and that

percentage is about the same for NSW.6Tactically, the

mission scope covers all operations: urban, desert, and

riverine combat in Iraq; long-range small-unit operations

in Afghanistan; maritime special operations in the Philip-

pines; and a number of continuing training relationships

with the maritime special operations forces of numerous

countries in all theaters. Staffs and specialty augmentshave been involved as wellintelligence, communica-


involvement in either World War II or Vietnamwe must

assess our performance as well as how the nature of this

enemy is changing the organization, capabilities, and stra-

tegic employment scheme of naval special warfare.

While balancing the very different demands of maritime

special operations and the missions in Iraq and Afghani-

stan, we need to explore how to maintain meaningful ties

to the Navy as well as to USSOCOM. And we need to

study the question of where to put resources for the nextfight.

Movement: NSW Legacy

As a small force in a big service, NSW has always

used combat necessity and evolving conflicts, along with

their important after-effects, to shape the community and

its capabilities. This has involved defining the capability

required, devising the training and outlining resource re-

quirements, convincing sometimes reluctant theater com-

manders of the mission feasibility and value of the force,

and finding the right operators for the job.

World War II saw the beginning of the long struggle bythe navys frogmen to define their mission and understand

who they are.1From the early days there was a broad

scope of missions: Scouts and Raiders in China behind

enemy lines as advisers, Naval Combat Demolition Units

blowing obstacles in support of the Normandy landings,

underwater demolition teams in the Pacific supporting am-

phibious landings after the disaster at Tarawa.

The early focus was on direct action, not so much

counterinsurgency or nation-building.2That shifted when

President John F. Kennedy encouraged all the services to

expand special operations. In a 1962 speech at West Point,

Kennedy described his vision: This is another type of

war, new in intensity, ancient in originswars by guer-

rillas, subversion, insurgents, assassins; wars by ambush

instead of by conventional combat. . . . It requires a whole

new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force,

and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military

training.3

The Navys Unconventional Activities Committee rec-

ommended the formation of a unit on each coast to be

the focal point for Navy involvement in guerrilla and

counter-guerrilla operations: Sea Air Land (SEAL) teams.4

This marked the first step away from direct Fleet support.Drawn from the existing UDTs, SEALs hit the radar in

Vietnam, where their advisers were from 1962 to 1973,

and their platoons operated from 1965 to 1971.

Underwater-demolition and SEAL teams reconnected

with Fleet commanders after Vietnam through direct sup-

port deployments with battle groups and expanded part-

ner training with other countries maritime special op-

erations forces. In 1983, all remaining UDTs converted

AP Photo (AAroN FAvIlA)

CRITICAL ONGOING EFFORTSIn 2002, U.S. special forces and SEALstrained with local counterparts in the southern Philippines jungle. The

militant extremist group they aimed to take out, Abu Sayyaf, has beenlinked with al Qaeda and continues to operate.


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tions, logistics, administrative supportand the entire

community has been expeditionary.

Broadly speaking, NSW has changed since 9/11 in three

primary ways: the fusion of operations and intelligence

(ops/intel), interagency teamwork, and a refocusing on

irregular warfare.

The Ops/Intel CycleMuch has been written about the SOF find-fix-finish-

exploit-analyze cycle that describes how operations and

intelligence come together before target execution at the

tactical and operational levels, with the rapid exploita-

tion and follow-on analysis that leads back into the ops

cycle. This is a vastly improved dynamic from pre-9/11

processes.7

SEALs in Vietnam were known for their ability to gather

timely, quality tactical intelligence and act on it quickly.

In todays ops/intel machine, that same thread connects

strategic intelligence straight to the tactical level, opera-tions that are then augmented by manned and unmanned

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms.

These provide a real-time picture of the enemy network

and individual targets.

The exploitation cycle has likewise expanded. Intelli-

gence gained from operations is fed directly to the larger

intel community, complementing the national collection

and starting the cycle again. Operating at the speed of

war now extends up, down, and across the spectrum.8

Joint and Interagency Teamwork

Joint special ops increased during the 1990s, but the in-

teragency effort had nowhere near the same level of effort

or emphasis. That has now changed. The Combined Joint

Special Operations Task Force structure has come a long

way since Operation Desert Storm. Today, SEALs work

not only with conventional U.S., Coalition, and partner na-

tion forces; they also interact directly with representatives

from every agency in our government. Operations En-

during Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have served as livinglaboratories for NSW in joint/interagency operations.

LEGACY OF COVERTNESS SEALs in Vietnam (here in 1969, watching the detonation of a satchel charge they set to destroy a Vietcong bunker)were known for timely information-gathering and quick action. Today, those same skills are applied to real-time pictures of enemy networks andindividual targets.

AP

Pho

to


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Whether it is working with Provincial Reconstruction

Team representatives from the Departments of State,

Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, or the U.S. Agency

for International Development;or having almost all the

three letter agencies live and work with them in their

spaces, NSW members are now experiencing levels of

interaction leagues beyond pre-9/11 days. Tactical les-

sons learned can be shared or improved upon, and chal-

lenges or obstructions at higher staff levels can be moreeasily surmounted when people deal face to face and

communicate with others who have had similar deployed

experiences.

The system is not perfect. Some information stovepipes

remain, and the occasional organizational turf battle still

occurs. But overall it is a vast improvement, and its a

two-way street. As NSW gains from its contact and work

with other agencies and departments, those representatives

are exposed to NSWits people, the tactics, the opera-

tions, and the results.

Another factor that will have

positive long-term effects is thehuge number of Navy augmentees

in the ground fight. When an O-5

submariner or aviator has spent

a year commanding a Provincial

Reconstruction Team and has

worked daily with the SEAL and SF units in his province,

its a powerful lesson in understanding NSW. Similarly,

Navy intel specialists in an interagency task force work

side by side with CIA, NSA, DIA, NGA and other per-

sonnel from all the intelligence disciplines, directly sup-

porting operations and interacting with the operators. And

Seabees,communicators, and supply personnel live at the

forward operating base with the assault forces, building

the camp and interacting with locals for contracted ser-

vices. They are immersed in the overall battle rhythm.

The legion of Sailors and officers who have lived and

worked with NSW in Operations Enduring Freedom and

Iraqi Freedom will be like the bulge in the economic fore-

cast charts: Years from now, when they are O-6s and E-9s,

they will have a fundamentally different outlook based on

their time working in those environments. This is good for

NSW and for the Fleet as a whole.

Irregular WarfareNSW has a long operational history in the areas that

now make up what is termed irregular warfare. In todays

counterinsurgency environment, unilateral combat opera-

tions must fit into a larger framework of security, develop-

ment, and governance. The success of this effort will have

the long-term effects of denying sanctuary to the enemy

and stabilizing the region.

NSW forces have continued to improve the combination

of advising and operations as they work with Iraqi and

Afghan army and police, Philippine maritime comman-

dos, and other nations forces during training exchanges.Bringing irregular warfare to a full capability has been a

SOCOM priority, and NSWs inherent access to countries

with maritime special operations forces has been a key

part of this effort. The concept of conducting operations

by, with, and through partner nation forces is a rule, but

so is maintaining the ability to conduct unilateral opera-

tions when required.

NSW has benefited from the Navys increased focus

on irregular warfare. This past spring the Office of Naval

Intelligence created four subordinate commands, one ofwhich is the John F. Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center.

Thus, a five-year ONI project was given formal structure.9

Initiatives like this will increase the connection with what

NSW is already doing around the world.

Funding for NSW has also improved, as have ways in

which money can be used. In the 1990s, training and work-

ing with foreign SOF was done under the Joint/Combined

Exchange Training program. This system maintained rela-

tionships but could not be operationalized. In 2003, Con-

gress appropriated $25 million for

geographic combatant command-

ers to bolster partner nation forcesand gain access, through employ-

ing indigenous units, to hostile

areas where U.S. forces cannot

openly operate. Known as 1208

funding for the relevant section

in the legislation, it has been renewed and expanded since

its inception, and proven to be a valuable force multiplier

for NSW.10

As in any dynamic environment, we must exploit oppor-

tunities, address issues, and improve processes. Enduring

situations like post-9/11 operations have long-term effects,

of course, and discussing them goes beyond tactical les-

sons learned.

Combat Leadership

An NSW operator who enlisted or was commissioned

in 2000 and finished BUD/S or Special Warfare Combat-

ant Crewman training in 2001 has known only combat

deployment cycles for the first half of his career. Reserve

NSW groups are staffed with combat veterans who re-

turn to support the forward-deployed task forces on their

augmentation cycles. This unprecedented level of diverse

experience is having a significant impact on the commu-nity. The full scope of benefits will be clear as junior

operators and technicians assume leadership positions,

mentored by combat veterans and with current relevant

experience themselves.

This kind of a game-changing factor could be a boon

to NSW. The potential downside is that a community with

too much of the same type of perspective in its ranks may

get stuck in the rut of fighting the last war, or, as Admiral

Olson expressed it, concern over short-term gains in com-

bat experience at the cost of reduced capability in specific

skill areas not utilized in OEF and OIF.11

For this reason it is crucial that we gain perspective onthe thematic and organizational changes. We must lift the

We need to think aboutwhat the world will be

like in ten years.


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principles out of tactical white noise and guide the com-

munity on the best path forward. For example, instruction

in language and cultural knowledge must be prioritized

and considered a long-term training investment. There are

only so many frogmen and too many countries in which

operations are possible. We need vision to determine

where the next focus areas should be.

Finding the New OperatorsAt the other end of the leadership chain, recruiting

continues to be strong. There was a concern that the op-

erational tempo and demands would push people away.

However, the new operators understand the deployment

cycles and requirements of the careerand they accept

them. What would have been categorized as a crushing op

tempo in the 1990s is now considered normal.12

Motivated operators and high morale are critical fac-

tors for a long fight. But high as the warriors enthusiasm

may be, that of their families may not last. We must con-

tinue with our attention and concern for the well-being

of spouses, children, and other family members, whilecontinuing to ensure operators get the proper amount of

time between deployments to stay on top of the wave.

Maintaining the Fleet Connection

In a number of categoriespersonnel augmentation

for deployments, increased budgeting, and high recruit-

ing prioritiesthe Navys support to NSW has improved

dramatically in the past ten years. And despite the opera-

tional demands of the current fight, we remain connected

to the Fleet in training and other professional exchanges,

along with officer and senior enlisted placement on key

naval and joint staffs.

This close relationship results in service support for cur-

rent and emerging joint NSW requirements, support that

pays real dividends. What still remains, though, is for the

rapport to be strengthened between non-Fleet expedition-

ary ops elements of the Navy. This means NSW, the Naval

Expeditionary Combat Command (formed January 2006),

and the Marine Special Operations Command (directed by

the Secretary of Defense in fall 2005). Given the relatively

recent creation of each, its about the right time to engage

at deeper levels and shore up linkages.

NSW Expanding Leadership Roles

The past ten years have seen a significant increase in

SEAL leadership in the Navy and joint arenas. In 1999

NAVSPECWARCOM was a one-star headquarters, and the

highest leadership outside NSW lifelines was at the O-6

and E-9 levels in the Theater Special Operations Com-

mands.

Ten years later, NAVSPECWARCOM is a two-star com-

mand with a Force Master Chief. SEAL flag officers work

at SOCOM HQ, at the National Counterterrorism Center,

and on the National Security Council staff. SEALs have

been commanders of Special Operations Command

Centraland Special Operations CommandEurope, a SEAL two-

star is the Fourth Fleet commander, a SEAL three-star

commands the Joint Special Operations Command, and a

SEAL four-star commands USSOCOM.

Todays senior flag officers and senior enlisted entered

NSW in the mid-1970s, when the Navy was considering

shifting the two SEAL teams to the reserves; their career

arcs have seen a considerable shift in the communitys

relationship with the Navy.

Looking Ahead

We need to look beyond todays fight and think about

what the world will be like ten years from now. NSW will

be in the war zones for some time to come, but when the

ACCELERATED OP TEMPOUSSOCOM commander Admiral Eric T. Olson (right) recently testified before the House Armed Services Committee that hisforces were using core unconventional-warfare capabilities while partnering with host nation forcesat an operational pace he termed the new nor-mal. Appearing with him are Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michle A. Flournoy (center) and Commander, U.S. Central Command General DavidH. Petraeus (left).

DoD

(BrADleyA.lAIl)


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joint task forces wind down and the bureaucratic amberresin again hardens around the various organizations, it

will be essential for our tactical relationships to have

matured. Its easy when everyone is deployed together,

but when the temporary overseas structures dissipate, as

military and civilian counterparts climb their respective

organizational ladders, a permanent, institutionalized solu-

tion must already be in place.

As he goes through his small-unit drills, every young

frogman learns that the goal of a SEAL element when

faced with an enemy force is to create a momentary im-

pression of overwhelming fire superiority. You need to

make the unknown enemy think your element is a lot

larger while you figure out exactly

what to do next.

Organizationally, NSW has been

doing that for most of its existence.

Since 9/11, its contributions have been

increasingly recognized, resourced,

and supported. But with greater gifts

come greater responsibilities.

The upcoming decade will requirethe community to ruthlessly scru-

tinize and assess its core missions.

For example, significant acquisition

decisions about maritime platforms

are coming in the next few years.

SEALs and other NSW team mem-

bers, even as they continue to perform

numerous critical operations in sup-

port of the global fight, must always

remember that only one force inside

SOCOMNSWis charged with

and capable of the unique maritimespecial operations missions. And, as

Maersk Alabama Captain Phillips

knows, keeping that edge sharp is a

no-fail requirement.

1. Orr Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters (Novato, Calif.:

Presidio Press, 1992), 101. Two of the best references

on the origins and history of NSW are this and The

Naked Warriors, the 1956 classic by legendary frog-

man Francis Fane (available as a Naval Institute Press

reprint).

2. Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuild-

ing U.S. Special Operations Forces(Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institute Press, 1997), 65.

3. Speech given at West Point, Public Papers of the

Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1962), 453.

4. Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters, 76.

5. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, USSOCOM Com-

mander, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Budget

Request for USSOCOM, 4 June 2009. U.S. House Com-

mittee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terror-

ism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. Available

through Federal News Service, www.fnsg.com.

6. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, 4 June 2009.

7. Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, Thomas Cantrell,

Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices, Joint Forces Quarterly, 3rd quarter 2008.8. Ibid.

9. Robert K. Ackerman, Naval Intelligence Ramps Up Activities, Signal, February

2009.

10. P.L. 108-375, Section 1208, 28 October 2004. Available at ww.dod.mil/dodgc/

olc/docs/PL108-375.pdf.

11. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Advance Policy Questions for Vice

Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Special Operations Com-

mand, 12 June 2007. Available at www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/

June/Olson%2006-12-07.pdf.

12. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, 4 June 2009.

Captain Burnham, a SEAL with combat experience in Bosnia, Afghani-stan, and Iraq, is Deputy Commander, Naval Special Warfare Develop-ment Group in Dam Neck, Virginia.

ADVISING AND FIGHTINGU.S. special forces work in Iraq and Afghanistan to help secure thepopulation and disrupt enemy networks. Here, a female Army soldier in the Iraqi Special Opera-tions Forces Brigade prepares for a joint operation in an Najaf province.

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