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2005 49: 432Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual MeetingThomas E. Nygren and Rebecca J. White

Failurelating Decision Making Styles to Predicting Selfefficacy and a Generalized Expectation of Succes

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RELATING DECISION MAKING STYLES TO PREDICTING SELF-

EFFICACY AND A GENERALIZED EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS

AND FAILURE

Thomas E. Nygren and Rebecca J. White

The Ohio State UniversityColumbus, OH

The theoretical and applied distinction between a propensity toward a more intuitive decision style versus a

more analytical style has gained prominence in recent years. A self-report measure, the Decision Making

Styles Inventory, is presented and is shown to differentiate among those who endorse an analytical, an

intuitive, or an avoidant, regret-based decision style. Results from one study, a horse race betting task,

indicated that those who endorsed a decision style, particularly those endorsing a flexible analytical and

intuitive style, performed better on the task than those who did not. A second study clearly showed that

decision style was related to self reports of self-efficacy, optimism, and self-regard. These results suggest

that having either an analytical, intuitive or combined decision style is beneficial to the decision maker.

Individual differences in decision making styles havebecome increasingly important components of theories

of decision making. In particular, the distinction

between a propensity toward a more intuitive decision

style versus a more analytical style has gained

prominence (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson,

1993). In recent years a number of books have been

written to address the specific role that intuition might

play in peoples decision making strategies. Two of the

current authors (Myers, 2002; Hogarth, 2001) make it

clear that an investigation of intuitive and analytical

decision styles is critical to understanding human

decision making behavior. Nygren and White have

shown in a number of recent papers (c.f., Nygren &White, 2001, 2002; White & Nygren, 2002) that a

reliable and valid self-report measure of decision

making styles could be constructed that differentiates

between propensities to be a more analytical decision

maker, a more intuitive decision maker, or a more

regret-induced procrastinator or decision avoider. In

addition, they found that a persons propensity toward

one decision making style (e.g., analytical) did not

necessarily preclude use of the other (intuitive), and that

some individuals actually endorse both styles. That is,

the two styles are not, as had been informally assumed,

opposite extremes on one unidimensional continuum,

where endorsement of one precludes endorsement of theother. This suggests that we ought to find some

individuals who might, in the vein of Payne, Bettman,

and Johnsons (1993) idea of the adaptive decision

maker, endorse both an analytical and an intuitive

decision style and use either style as a task might

warrant. Clearly, some tasks exist where a more

deliberate analytical style is most likely to enhance

performance, and other tasks suggest that quick,

intuitive responses are more beneficial. Thus, the

literature suggests that being a kind of flexible decision

maker who could use either style as necessary ought to

enhance performance and improve quality of decisions.

We also suggest that a predisposition toward avoidingdecisions or use of a regret-based style can undermine

positive aspects of using either an analytical or intuitive

style.

The Decision Making Styles Inventory

Our measure, the Decision Making Styles Inventory,

assesses all three styles. It currently consists of a set of

45 scale items, 15 items on each of three scales (6-point

Likert-type response format.). Based on two separate

factor analyses of about n=800 each, three scales

consistently emerged from the analyses that clearly

separated items associated with endorsing use of anAnalytical decision making style (ANA), an

Intuitive decision making style (INT), and an

Avoidance, Regret-based Emotional decision making

style (AVOID). Examples of items from each scale are:

Analytical: My best decisions are those for which I

have weighed all of the relevant information.

Intuitive: When making decisions, my first instinct

usually turns out to be the best.

Avoidance: When I find out that Ive made a bad

decision, I feel a lot of regret.

In both of the factor analysis and currentsamples, the analytical and intuitive scales were nearly

orthogonal (r = .094, n = 830; r = .071, n = 801, and r =

-.047, n = 1154, all ps > .05). Correlations among the

other pairs of factors are typically small, but are

significant (ANA vs AVOID, r = .280, p


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The DMI scales have been correlated with a number

of individual differences measures; Table 1 presents

some of these. The construct validity of the Analytical

decision making style scale is supported in that those

who endorse an analytical decision style are, as

expected, less likely to be risk-seeking (r = -.214, n =

1130) or impulsive (r = -.394, n = 182), and are more

likely to be rational thinkers (r = .333 with EpsteinsRational Thinking scale, n = 1154), are low in cognitive

disorganization (r = -.165, n = 332), and have a higher

need for cognition (r = .281, n = 793). The Intuitive

scale correlates very highly with the Epsteins REI

Experiential Scale (r =.640, n=1154), risk taking

tendency (r = .245, n=1130), impulsivity (r = .320, n =

182), Rosenbergs self-esteem scale (r = .250, n=509),

and belief in luck (r = .274, n = 1117). Those endorsing

an avoidant regret-based decision making style are less

likely to be REI experiential thinkers (r=-.261, n =

1154), less likely to be risk-takers (r = -.303, n = 1130),

are high in self-doubt (r = .463, n = 451), and more

likely to be low in self-esteem (r = -.387, n = 509).

Win-Place-Show (WPS) Gambling Task

Although people clearly can be expected to make

idiosyncratic decisions from time to time, we were

interested in determining whether a majority of

individuals would endorse at least one of these decision

styles and whether endorsement and use of a particular

style would enhance performance in a gambling task.

Participants. In a study of simulated horse race

gambling, 313 participants evaluated and placed bets on

30 different hypothetical horse races. All participants

started with 500 dollars and were, unknown to them,programmed to win on exactly eight of the 30 races

(i.e., on the same trials for all participants) and lose on

the other twenty-two. Each individual saw the

particular horse races in a unique random order,

however, and each could bet either to win, place, or

show, with amounts of 0 (no bet), 30, 60 or 90

dollars. Although the gains and losses, betting

behavior, and the actual races differed from trial to trial

across individuals, all subjects ultimately experienced

the same races and the same number and sequences of

one, two, three, or even four losses in a row. On

average, then, all subjects should have performed about

the same.Results. Results showed surprising differences in

performance. Figure 1 shows the results of three

separate analyses for subjects who were grouped as

either (a) high (upper 1/3, n=112) or low (lower 1/3,

n=111) endorsers of an analytical decision style, (b)

high (n=96) or low (n=102) endorsers of an intuitive

decision style, and (c) high (n=90) or low (n=117)

endorsers of both an analytical and intuitive decision

style. Regardless of particular decision style, those who

did endorse a style did significantly better than those

who did not, even though there was no statistical basis

for them to do so. Further, as the bottom graph in

Figure 1 shows, those who endorsed both styles did

even better.

We suggest from these results that endorsement of

either or both decision styles may be associated with

greater confidence and self-efficacy and less influence

of poor heuristics or biases and avoidance or regret-

based decision making.

Correlational Studies

In several large scale correlational studies we

wanted to specifically examine this idea that we could

find people who endorsed either or both an analytical

and intuitive style, and that these individuals would, in

fact, show greater self-efficacy and confidence in their

decision making abilities as long as they did not endorse

an avoidance or regret-based style as well. Specifically,

we examined how well the three DMI scales could

predict four measures of self-esteem / self-efficacy and

the Big Five personality factors of Extraversion,

Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability,and Intellect as measured by the IPIP (Goldberg, L. R.,

1999). The Generalized Self-efficacy Scale is designed

to reflect a generalized expectation of success rather

than failure in new situations; the Unconditional Self-

Regard Scale measures global self-esteem; and the

Instrumentality Scale measures the ability to take action

on ones behalf and to feel a sense of control in ones

life.

We predicted that those individuals who highly

endorsed either an analytic or intuitive decision style

would score higher on all of the self-efficacy measures,

but that those individuals who endorsed an avoidant

regret-based style would score lower on all measures.Secondly, we predicted that there would be an

interactive effect; namely, that those individuals who

endorsed both an intuitive and analytical decision style

would score even higher on the self-efficacy measures

and in the positive domain of the Big Five measures of

agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional

stability. Those who endorsed an analytical and

avoidant or an intuitive and avoidant combined style

would score lower in self-efficacy. Finally, we

hypothesized that in a statistical sense all three DMI

scales and at least the INT x ANA interaction would

each be statistically significant components of a formal

stepwise multiple linear regression model that couldreliably and validly predicting self-esteem, self-efficacy,

instrumentality, and some components of the Big Five.

Participants. Six hundred and six introductory

psychology students participated in the self-efficacy

study and 395 in the IPIP Big Five study.

Results.Table 2 provides the results of the four

stepwise regression analyses for the self-efficacy scales

and for the five personality factor scales. Each row

contains the multiple correlation of the three DMI scales

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with the respective dependent measure and the simple

correlations between the dependent measure and each

DMI scale or pairwise interactions of DMI scales.

Finally, bullets () indicate which main effect or

interaction term significantly entered into the stepwise

regression equations.

Several points are striking with respect to these

analyses. First the DMI scales can, when independently

combined, explain an impressive amount of variance inindividuals self-reports of their ability to take action

(instrumentality), their perceived self-esteem, their

optimism, and their general self-efficacy. For example,

in Table 2 with respect to Generalized Self-Efficacy, all

three DMI scales serve as important predictors and the

multiple R is impressively high across this very large

sample (R=.680). Higher self-efficacy is associated

with eitheran analytical or intuitive decision style.

Moreover, as hypothesized, there is an even stronger

relationship if the individual endorses both analytical

andintuitive decision styles. In fact, for each of the

Self-Efficacy, Self-Regard, and Instrumentality scales,

the interaction between analytical and intuitive is asignificant overall predictor in the stepwise regression

equation. This positive interactive effect between

analytical and intuitive decision styles suggests, as

hypothesized, that those individuals who endorse both

an analytical and an intuitive decision style are more

likely to report higher self-efficacy and self-esteem and

greater assurance of their ability to perform well and be

in control of events.

What is equally impressive from the additional IPIP

analysis in Table 2 is that a positive decision style is

clearly associated with positive personality

characteristics including agreeableness,

conscientiousness, and emotional stability. Again, ineach case the interaction of analytical and intuitive

styles makes a significant enhanced contribution; those

who endorse both styles are more likely to score higher

on the agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional

stability scales.

DISCUSSION

The results of these studies suggest that in many

decision tasks we may find that those who are more

likely to endorse either a consistent analytical or

intuitive decision style will report greater self-efficacy,

confidence, and show better performance in decisionmaking tasks. Further, the analyses in Table 2 suggest,

interestingly, that neither style is necessarily more likely

to enhance self-regard, confidence, or self-efficacy.

There is evidence to suggest, however, that the best

decision makers from a self-efficacy perspective, and

maybe from a performance perspective as well, may

very well be those who show additional flexibility in

their decision style those who are willing to endorse

both an analytical approach or an intuitive approach,

and use each depending on the demands of the situation.

These results suggest that we may find that a

valuable component from a human factors perspective

for training individuals who must make decisions that

lead to high performance and consistency over time

would be to teach them to be flexible decision makers

and comfortable with analytical and intuitive style.

As a final caution, it is important to note that this

correlational study is just that; there is no attempt here

to suggest that a causal relationship exists between self-efficacy and decision style. Nevertheless, the DMI has

shown, as a self-report individual differences

instrument, that individual differences are important,

reliable components of the decision making process and

warrant further study. Our findings suggest that human

performance may benefit if we can discover via the

DMI or similar instruments when a more intuitive or

when a more analytical decision making style may be

best for the adaptive decision maker.

REFERENCES

Epstein, S., Pacini, R. Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996).Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and

analytical-rational thinking style. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 71,390-405.

Goldberg, L. R. (1999). A broad-bandwidth, public domain,

personality inventory measuring the lower-level facets of

several five-factor models. In I. Mervielde, I. Deary, F. De

Fruyt, & F. Ostendorf (Eds.), Personality Psychology in

Europe, Vol. 7 (pp. 7-28). Tilburg, The Netherlands:

Tilburg University Press.

Hammond, K. R., Hamm, R. M., Grassia, J., & Pearson, T.

(1993). Direct comparison of the efficiency of intuitive

and analytical cognition in expert judgment. In W. M.

Goldstein & R. M. Hogarth (Eds.),Research on Judgment

and Decision Making. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press. Pp. 144-180.

Hogarth, R. M. (2001). Educating Intuition. Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press.

Myers, D. G. (2002). Intuition. New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press.

Nygren, T. E. & White, R. J. (2001). Decision making styles

and choice behavior in gambling tasks. Paper presented

at the 73rdAnnual Meeting of the Midwestern

Psychological Association, Chicago, IL, May 2001.

Nygren, T. E. & White, R. J. (2002). Assessing Individual

Differences in Decision Making Styles: Analytical vs.

Intuitive. Proceedings of the Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society, 953-957. Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society: Santa Monica, CA.

Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J> (1993). The

adaptive decision maker: Effort and accuracy in choice.

In W. M. Goldstein & R. M. Hogarth (Eds.),Research on

Judgment and Decision Making. Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge University Press. Pp. 181-204.




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White, R. J. & Nygren, T. E. (2002). Influence of

Analytically and Intuitively Framed Instructions upon

Multi-Attribute Decision Task Approach. Proceedings

of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 497-500.

Human Factors and Ergonomics Society: Santa Monica,

CA.

Table 1. Simple Correlations Among DMI Analytical, Intuitive, and Avoidance Scales and

Decision Making Related Measures

Scale DMI

Analytical

DMI

Intuitive

DMI Avoid

/ Regret

N

DMI Intuitive Style -.047 1154

DMI Avoidance / Regret Style .280 -.180 1154

Rational Experiential Inv. Rational (S. Epstein, 1996) .333 .111 -.241 1154

Rational Experiential Inv. Experiential (S. Epstein, 1996) -.124 .640 -.261 1154

Jackson Personality Inventory Risk Taking (D. Jackson) -.214 .245 -.303 1130

Personality Research Form Impulsivity (D. Jackson) -.394 .320 .148 182Self Doubt (K. Oleson, 2002) -.045 -.179 .463 451

Decisional Self Doubt (H. Mirels & P. Greblo, 1994) -.001 -.099 .658 180

Rosenberg Self Esteem (S. Rosenberg, 1965) .148 .250 -.387 509

Belief in Luck(P. Darke & J. Freedman, 1997) -.084 .274 -.128 1117

Need for Cognition (J. Cacioppo & R. Petty, 1993) .281 -.018 -.142 793

Cognitive Dysorganization (Mirels, unpublished) -.165 -.174 .161 332

Gender .002 .047 .225 1154

Table 2. Stepwise Multiple Regression Results for DMI Scales as Predictors with Generalized Self-Efficacy

Measures, Big 5 Personality Measures, Goal Orientation Measures, Betting Task (WPS) Measures,

and Multi-task Performance (MAT) Measures

Dependent Measure Multiple

R

R2 N Ana Int Avoid An x

Int

An xAv Int x

Av

Generalized Self Efficacy .636 .404 606 .368 .420 -.397 .482 -.072 -.104

Generalized Self Regard .544 .296 606 .205 .342 -.434 .327 -.194 -.183

Instrumentality .680 .463 606 .323 .509 -.443 .497 -.129 -.091

Optimism .518 .268 606 .228 .372 -.357 .363 -.124 -.089

IPIP - Extraversion .286 .082 395 .262 -.153 .207

IPIP - Agreeableness .280 .078 395 .203 .235 .280 .166 .215

IPIP - Conscientiousness .484 .235 395 .460 .170 .427 .209

IPIP - Emotional

Stability

.595 .354 395 .205 -.568 .159 -.389 -.379

IPIP - Intellect .196 .038 395 .166 .148 .196

All correlations are significant at p < .01. Bullets () indicate predictors from stepwise regression equation.


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Figure 1. Running Point Totals for High and Low Analytical Decision Style Subjects, High and Low Intuitive

Style Subjects, and High and Low on Both Scales

Running Total for Points: High vs. Low Analytical Decision Makers

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