professional ethics mechanisms (en)

8/9/2019 Professional Ethics Mechanisms (en)

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Workingdocumentonpotentialmechanismsthatcanfurnishadvicetocounselonprofessionalethics

1. Inparagraph33oftheReasonsfortheDecisionontheApplicationofMr.JensDieckmannof28October2008forjudicialreviewofhisappointmentbytheRegistrarasdefencecounsel,in

accordancewith

the

decision

of

Pre

Trial

Chamber

II

of

21

October

2008,

dated

10

March

2009

(ICC02/0401/05378), the Presidency requested the Registrar to explore institutional

mechanismswherebycounselmayseekadviceonquestionsofprofessionalethicsandupdate

thePresidencythereon.

2. The present document is offered in the framework of this request, and proposes a nonexhaustive list of mechanisms identified by the Registry for the purposes of further

examinationandanalysisinanopendiscussionwiththelegalprofession.

I. Needforaflexibleformula3. The following possibilities have been devised taking into consideration a number of

parameterstosufficientlymeettheneedsofcounseltoobtainadviceonquestionspertainingto

professionalethicsthatmayariseinthecourseoftheirinterventionandexecutionofmandate

inproceedingsbeforetheCourt.

4. All possibilities foreseen in this document share the principle of flexibility in theirimplementation. Itwas equally considereduseful that contactdetailsofadvisors eventually

appointedwouldbeavailable toallpersonsadmitted to theListofCounselso that theycan

contact

the

former

at

any

given

time

in

order

to

seek

advice

on

professional

ethical

issues.

5. It issuggested that,atthepresentjuncture in theevolutionof theCourt, it isunnecessary toestablishalargerosterofadvisors,giventhelimitednumberofcounselcurrentlyactingbefore

theICC.Furthermore,itisproposedtoadoptaflexibleapproachallowingeachcounselinneed

of advice todirectly address an advisor, inparticularwherebothbelong to the same legal

system,whereitisappropriatetodoso.


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6. Consultationswould takeplacedirectlybetween counsel inneedofadviceand theadvisorthroughanymeans(telephone,writtencommunication,email,etc.)deemedappropriateand

mutuallyagreedwithoutanyinterventionwhatsoeverofathirdperson(ororgan).

II. Numberofadvisorsandappointmentprocedure7. Itisproposedthatfivepersonsbeappointedasadvisorsinafashionthatwillensurealllegal

systems and regions of the world are represented. These persons would be available to

provide, at any givenmoment, the appropriate reply to requests for advice received from

counselonthelist.

8. Advisorsmaybeappointedby thePresidencyof theCourt, theRegistrar,or electedby thecommunity

of

lawyers

admitted

to

the

List

of

Counsel.

This

last

formula

would

have

the

advantageofamoredirectinterventionofcounselinidentifyingsuitableadvisors.Conversely,

such an approachmay present the risk of failing to ensure adequate representation of the

different legalsystemsandregionsoftheworld intheselectionofadvisors.Inaddition,this

latterapproachwouldnotnecessarilyguaranteethatalladvisorshavethenecessaryexpertise

on professional ethics issues.Hence, nominations should in such a casebe subject to each

candidatemeetingcertainqualifications(yettobedefined).Allpersonswhodonotmeetthe

setconditionswouldbeexcludedfrombeingconsideredforthepositionofadvisor.

III.Procedurefortheappointmentofadvisers9. Fourmechanismstoidentifyandappointsuitableadvisorsareexploredbelow.

a.EnlargingthemandateoftheCommissionerresponsibleforinvestigatingcomplaintsofmisconduct10. ThecommissionersappointedinaccordancewithArticle33.1oftheCodeofProfessionalConduct

forcounselcouldbeselectedasadvisorsonquestionsofprofessionalethics.11. Thisformulahastheadvantageofmakingitpossibleforcounseltoaddressanyprofessional

ethicsquerytopersonswho,inadditiontotheirexpertiseonsuchmattersatthenationallevel,

alsopossess

relevant

experience

in

the

law

applied

in

proceedings

before

the

Court.

The

disadvantageofthisproposalcouldbetogenerateconflictofinterestissues;forinstancewhere

thepersonseekingadvicemaysubsequentlybecomethetargetofaninvestigationforalleged

misconductbythesameCommissionerthatfurnishedhimadvicepreviously. Thisdifficulty

could, however,be resolvedby designating an alternative Commissioner to undertake the

investigation in the same case.Yet thisoption couldpresent somedifficultiesas there isno

legalbasis for thisdesignationand the interventionofanalternativeCommissioner for this


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purposerenderingthelattersfindingssusceptibletobeingchallenged.Further,thepostofan

alternativeCommissionerisnotforeseenbytheCode.Notwithstandingtheabove,itoughtto

bementionedthatthePresidencyoftheCourtrelyingonitsinherentauthorityhasappointed

alternative Commissioners in the past, but in doing so, it has clearly classified them as

informalposts.

12. The recourse to the formulaproposedabovewould likelymake itnecessary to introduceanamendmenttotheCodeofProfessionalConductforcounseltoprovidefortheadvisoryroletobeaddedtotheexistingfunctionsoftheCommissionerandtoformallycreateandcodifythepost

ofanalternativeCommissioner.

b. Appointmentofoneorseveralformerelectedmembersofthedisciplinaryorgansorcommissioners13. Themandateof the first electedmembersof thedisciplinaryboardsat theCourt expires in

December2010.Afterthisexpirydate,itcouldbeenvisagedtodesignateoneormoreoutgoing

membersof theseboards as advisors for thepurposesof furnishing advice to counselwho

intervene in proceedings before the Court on questions of professional ethics. The same

approachcouldbeadoptedforoutgoingCommissioners.

14. Thisoptionwouldmakeitpossibleforcounseltoseektheadviceandopinionsofpersonswellversed in professional ethics and who possess notable knowledge of specific professional

ethicalquestionswithintheframeworkoftheCourtslawandpractice.

15. As themandate of themembers of the disciplinaryboards are not renewable, conflicts ofinterest issuesareunlikelytoariseexceptwheretheadvisorpresentshisorhercandidacy in

subsequentelections forconsiderationforaseat inthedisciplinaryboards.Appointmentsas

advisorsshouldbeacceptedbytheformermemberofthedisciplinaryboardsonlyafterhaving

fullyconsideredthepotentialimplicationsthatmayarisefromsuchappointments.

C.AppointmentofadvisorssolelyfromthoseadmittedtotheListofCounsel16. TheRegistrar could requestall counseladmitted to theCourtsListofCounselwhomaybe

interestedtoactasadvisorstopresenttheircandidacy,accompaniedbyadetailedcurriculumvitaespecifyingtheirexperienceinthefieldofprofessionalethics.

17. On thebasisofcandidatespresented,theRegistrarcouldproceedtotheappointmentpropriomotuorcommunicatethecandidatesfilestothePresidency(inaccordancewithproceduresto

bedevisedandapproved)forthelattertoappointthepersonsconsideredmostappropriatefor

advisingcounselonquestionsofprofessionalethics.


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18. Thisoptionhastheadvantageofprovidingaframeworkofconsultationbetweenpeers.Ontheotherhand,thisoptiondeprivescounselfromthepossibilityofbenefitingfromtheexpertiseof

advisorswhohaveanonarms lengthrelationshipwith themandwhoarenoton theListof

Counsel.Thisoptionalsopresentstheriskofcreatinganenvironmentwherecounselmaybe

hesitant topose sensitivequestionsofprofessional ethics to theirpeers,who couldbecome

theircolleaguesincasesbeforetheCourt.

D. Appointment of advisors from amongst individuals proposed by Counsel on the List and byassociationsoflawyers

19. Inthisproposedformula,anypersonwithexperienceinthefieldofprofessionalethicscouldbeproposedasacandidatebythoseadmittedtotheListofCounselandlawyersassociations.

Again,on thebasisofcandidatespresented, theRegistrarcouldproceed to theappointment

proprio motu or communicate the candidates files to the Presidency (in accordance withprocedurestobedevisedandapproved)forthelattertoappointthepersonsconsideredmost

appropriateforadvisingcounselonquestionsofprofessionalethics.

20. In thisproposed approach, thenominationof candidatesor theappointmentof theadvisoritselfwouldnotonlybelimitedtothoseontheListofCounsel.Onthecontrary,thissuggested

framework isbroader and open in scope enabling other suitable candidates who are not

registeredintheListofCounseltoalsobeidentifiedandconsidered.Thisopeninghencehas

theadvantage

of

injecting

into

the

system

the

possibility

of

having

other

professionals,

equippedwith exceptional competencesonprofessionalethicsappointedasadvisorsamong

thecandidatesproposedbytheListofCounselandlawyersassociations.

IV.Remunerationofservicesprovidedbyadvisers21. The system of couldbebased on the voluntary assistance of advisers (pro bono),with the

possibility of theCourt covering the costs of expenses incurreddirectly linked to activities

necessaryforthefulfillmentoftheadvisorsmandate(forinstance,participationinmeetingsor

consultationsrequiredtotakeplaceattheseatoftheCourt;givingpresentationsattheCourtsseminar

of

counsel

on

invitation,

interalia).

V.NeedforamendmentstothelegaltextsoftheCourt22. ExceptinthecaseoftheCommissionerdetailedabove,itdoesnotappearnecessarytoamend

the Code of Professional Conduct for counsel to include in the document the possibility ofobtainingadviceonquestionsofprofessionalethics.


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23. In the event amendments are deemed necessary, changes couldbe introduced to pertinentprovisions of the Regulations of the Court and Regulations of the Registry where the

modalities and procedures for the appointment of counsel and other related matters are

defined.

24. Eventually,itcouldbeenvisagedthattheCodeofProfessionalConductforcounselwouldrequireamendmentstoincludeandspelloutthemechanismofconsultationwiththeadvisoroncethis

project is approved and settled.This amendment couldbe considered once themechanism

agreed upon is put into practice and sufficient experience hasbeen acquired through the

implementationofthemechanism.

professional ethics mechanisms (en)

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